§ SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, that the purport of the Motion which stood in his name was—"That, under present circumstances, it is not necessary or expedient to carry into effect the recent Order for despatching 6,700 Men to India, from the Depots of Regiments serving in India." The late Government gave orders for the despatch of a considerable force of artillery to India six or eight months ago. The matter was brought before the House, and the Government judiciously altered their determination, and did not then send artillery to India. The circumstances of the present case were essentially the same—6,000 or 7,000 men were about to be sent out, and he hoped the Secretary for India would find on consideration that this was not either necessary or advisable to be done. It was said by the Secretary for India that this was the usual season for sending out recruits to India. That might be; but circumstances were not such as to justify such a force being sent out of the country. Both on financial and general grounds such a step would be unwise. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India a night or two ago, said that the finances of India were in an alarming state. This despatch of troops would cost £300,000 at least, and this 1062 burden would necessarily fall on the Indian Government. The transmission of each soldier to India cost £15, and you had to add to that the same amount for each man coming home. At the present moment it was stated that 4,000 men were coming home; so that these two forces would cross each other on the sea. In a more important point of view than the financial one he thought he made no undue assertion—it had indeed been repeatedly admitted in discussions in that House—when he said that the military force actually in this country was inadequate. The sending away of these 7,000 men would cause a serious diminution of that force, and this certainly was not a time to diminish it by so large a number. The Indian army was immense—far beyond the present requirements of that country. The recent despatches from India stated that everything was going on satisfactorily. Oude was tranquil, about a thousand forts had been captured from the talookdars and destroyed, a great quantity of cannon, and above a million of small arms taken away from the Natives, and yet you were sending out European troops, while at the same time the Government of India proposed to reduce the Native army by one-fourth. If all this was the case, surely it was not necessary to send reinforcements out of this country. He might be told that he exaggerated the requirements of this country for troops. He did not think so. It was true that intelligence had been received that the French army was to be reduced, and it was satisfactory to learn that such an order had been issued by the French Government; but it was a delusion to suppose that such a disarmament afforded any analogy to a disarmament of the English army and navy, for the disarmament of the French was only a furlough to the men, who were liable to return within a month when required, while the officers and non-commissioned officers remained on the establishment whether in peace or war. It was said that the French disarmament extended to sailors; but there was a curious circumstance, which deserved notice. Hitherto the furlough of sailors allowed them to return to their ships at a month's notice; but now they were required to do so at five days' notice. This looked as if the French Government wished to be prepared to replace their fleet in an effective state with more than usual promptness, if it should deem it expedient. This disarmament of France, therefore, was no such dirarmament as would justify 1063 us, if our force was inadequate, in reducing it still more. There were now 100,000 European soldiers in India, and this bore on the subject of the finances of the Indian Government. He had seen a statement in the Bengal journals that "it was not bayonets or artillery that were wanted, but a good system of government." He wished to impress on the House that it was objectionable to send these troops out of this country. It was said that the recent disturbance in the local force in India was an additional reason for sending out more troops from England. The authorities here and in India had mismanaged this matter of the local troops. Forty men of this force were to be brought to courts-martial, and 6,000 or 7,000 of this force were to be discharged. You had a large force in India, double the number that put down the mutiny, and when you found that the Indian Government was reducing their local force it showed that any additional troops were unnecessary.
§
Amendment proposed,—
To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'under present circumstances, it is not necessary or expedient to carry into effect the recent Order for despatching 6,700 Men to India, from the Depots of Regiments serving in India,'" instead thereof.
§ COLONEL P. HERBERT, who had a Notice of Motion on the paper, "That in the opinion of the House the military force at present available for service within the United Kingdom is inadequate to existing requirements," said, that as, by the forms of the House he could not make his Motion, he would take advantage of that of his hon. and gallant Friend to make the statement he desired to address to the House on that subject. He would not enter into the question of the general defences of the country, or of the military forces of other nations, or even of what ought to be the number of troops for the defence of this country; he wished to confine himself to the fact of the number of troops which were actually possessed in the United Kingdom at the present moment. He had before him a document, the accuracy of which would not be disputed by the Secretary for War, and he had extracted from it the figures he wished to bring before the House. He would refer to the number of troops in the United Kingdom on the 1st of June in this year. The total number on that day, including militia, was 110,000. He wished to enter into an examination of the actual value of 1064 that number of men. Excluding the embodied militia the number was reduced to 86,000; of these 10,000 were officers, sergeants, and drummers; and that reduced the rank and file to 76,000. When a force was of inferior quality you required a larger number of men. Of the 76,000 men nearly one half were under one year's service, and the number under twenty years of age was 28,000. Of the whole number 11,000 were recruits—and you must take the sick at 5,000, absentees at 4,500; making a total of 20,500; leaving fit for duty 55,000. So that you had come down to one half of the original number. Of this force the cavalry were 7,600, the artillery 9,000, the engineers and the medical corps 3,000, making 19,600; so that the regular infantry were reduced to 34,500. Of this number 15,000 belonged to depots principally of the regiments in India. The depots were composed of 24,000 men altogether, and of these 10,000 were under twenty years of age, and 15,000 were under one year's service. This showed what would be the value of these depot troops, and except for the purpose of defending fortified places it would be extremely small. Of the seven battalions of the Guards and the twenty-four regiments of the line, excluding the sick and absentees, the grand total of rank and file was 21,000; to which were to be added officers, sergeants, and drummers, 3,000: making the entire number 24,000. The embodied militia amounted to 23,000, and if the deductions in the regular forces were great, it must also be large from this 23,000 men. Many of the militia regiments were extremely fine battalions, but many of them were not in the highest state of efficiency. If you allowed the defence of Portsmouth, Pembroke, and Plymouth to be committed to the militia and the depot battalions, and took the whole of the regiments of the line in Great Britain available for service in the field, the force of infantry would be 21,000 men, and if you added to these 12,000 or 14,000 militia, you would get a field force amounting to something like 35,000 men. He should no doubt be told that all armies were subject to the deductions which he had pointed out; but in this case they were out of all proportion to the nominal strength of our army. Another point which would probably be urged against him was, that if these statements were true, it was indiscreet to make them. But he differed on that point. These things were well known to everybody but our- 1065 selves. Any one who was in the habit of looking at the Daily States of an army might easily come to the same results as he had. Military officers of foreign nations were as able to make these calculations as he was. Every week the stations of our army were published in some of the journals, and for 1s. 6d. any one could get the Army Estimates; and by these means any soldier could make the calculation for himself. The remedy was in the hands of the Government, and if they could get over the financial difficulty—that of getting the money—the expense of putting the matter on a proper footing would be small. Our regimental establishment was large, and 30,000 men could be added to our infantry without the addition of a single officer. More militia regiments ought to be embodied. In any reply to his figures he should like the House to bear in mind that the repetition of the gross totals could not be considered as a refutation of his argument. His figures were correct, and if they showed that our infantry was only 21,000, and that you had only 14,000 out of the 23,000 militia to add to them for the purpose of meeting an enemy in the field, he hoped the House would feel that the military force at present available for service within the United Kingdom was inadequate to existing circumstances.
§ SIR ANDREW AGNEWsaid, that with reference to the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, he would say that we had now in India a force most adapted for the defence of this country, and instead of not sending out these 6,000 men to India it would be better to let them go, and bring home some of the fine seasoned men with all the experience of the Crimea and the late war in India upon them. It was a shame that such troops should be allowed to die away from the effects of climate in India. It was best to send out the newly raised men, and bring the seasoned troops home, who would be more available for our defence than militia or newly raised corps.
COLONEL NORTHhoped the Government would send out this force. He could understand that if these men formed one corps, there might be an objection to losing their services; but these men were all driblets from various depôts to fill up some regiments, and enable others to be relieved. Many regiments in India would be rendered inefficient if the usual reliefs were not sent to them, and it would be like a sentence of perpetual banishment if regiments were 1066 not brought home. He was afraid that the services of more than 6,700 men would be required in India, according to the reports which had just reached this country. He believed the Secretary of State for India had a Motion, the object of which was to increase the local European force in India; but if what we had heard was true, and one regiment of this force had set the example of intrenching itself in its barracks and electing its own officers, he thought the sooner our own regular soldiers went out there the better. A man who got a European regiment to mutiny must he very clever indeed; but, from inquiries he had made, he believed that the ranks of Indian regiments were filled with broken-down lawyers and men of that description. He meant no disrespect to the learned profession, but troublesome soldiers were always called the "lawyers" of the regiment. There was not a single case of mutiny in a Queen's regiment. Even the outbreak in question could hardly be called a mutiny. It was one of very gross insubordination. The men had shown respect for their officers; but they had a grievance which they insisted on being redressed; but, if proper steps had been taken and they had been told that the case had been settled against them, not by the Attorney or Solicitor General, but by the Adjutant General, they would have manifested a different feeling. It had been admitted by the present Prime Minister that they were entitled to their discharge or some consideration. Every one knew how particular soldiers were in these matters. A man who had enlisted into the 6th regiment knew he could not be obliged to serve in the 5th or any other regiment. In a Queen's regiment things would be explained to the men on their private parades; or if the men fancied they had a grievance an old soldier would go to his captain, and on returning, when asked the result, would probably tell the men, "I don't know what he said, but it's all right," and they would be satisfied. If this had been done here, there would have been no rumpus whatever. With regard to this Indian European Force he could not say much for its internal discipline when such a widespread movement should have taken place, and that not a single Non-Commissioned Officer from the Serjeant-Major to the Lance-Corporal had made his officers acquainted with it, and its being found out was owing to the soldierlike feeling of two private soldiers who had been transferred to the Indian Army from 1067 the 9th Lancers, and who gave information of it the moment it came to their knowledge. He understood that the only regiment of that force who stood by their colours, and their officers was the 1st Bengal Fusiliers which had distinguished itself so much at Delhi. With regard to the available force in this country, he thought that his gallant Friend (Colonel P. Herbert) took too gloomy a view. An infantry soldier of a year's standing, so far as fighting was concerned, was an efficient soldier; Waterloo was won by men who had not been more than two or three months in the service. As to the calculations which had been made, he did not see why the sergeants, who were armed like the rest of the men, should be deducted from the available force; and the Military Train Corps, though non-combitant, formed an integral part of our force, and ought to be reckoned with it. Then, again, 5 per cent was the usual allowance made for the sick; and altogether he thought the deductions made were far too many. With regard to the Militia, he was at Aldershot last Saturday, and, as far as the movements of the men went, he defied any one to distinguish Militia from Line regiments. It was impossible to see finer troops, and he hoped the Government would continue to maintain the regiments which were now out. It was not drill or numbers which made a regiment, but the soldierlike feeling and discipline which animated the men. Five hundred men well disciplined were more valuable than 1,000 others. He was glad, therefore, to hear the notice of the Secretary for War that evening for the formation of a reserve corps from men who had been ten years in the service. They would prove a great additional security to the country if they could be got to join this corps. He agreed that no sufficient inducement was proposed; but, as a soldier who entered the army at eighteen would leave it in the prime of life, 20,000 such men would be of the highest value in protecting our shores.
§ SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKEsaid, he shared in the opinion of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) that looking to the state of India, and the large European force there, he could not see why such a large number of additional men should be sent out. But he rose to point out to the House that the force which the hon. and gallant Member wished to retain in this country did not belong to the British Government, but to the Government of India. It was natural that 1068 the hon. and gallant Gentleman should wish to have as many troops as might be necessary for the defence of the country; but he hoped he would do justice and allow that if this force were made available for the defence of this country its expense should be charged on the revenue of this country instead of that of India. The whole question of the relative expense of troops borne by this country and India deserved considerate revision by the Government. He (Sir Edward Colebrooke) had given notice of his intention to bring in a Bill to extend the power of the Indian Government to increase the local force.
§ SIR CHARLES WOODthought it unnecessary for the House, on a simple question of sending draughts to India, to wander into a debate upon Indian finance, upon the organization of the Indian army, or upon the national defences. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member opposite, the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) that if this were a question of sending regular organized regiments out of this country to India, it would be objectionable. Nothing of the kind was, however, proposed. Whether the force in India was to be reduced or to be kept up at its present amount, it was indispensably necessary to send out these draughts in order to keep up the efficiency of the regiments which were to remain in India; and this was really all it was now proposed to do. Although it might appear that it was a large number of men to send out at one time, it should be observed that they were sent out at this particular time in order that they might arrive in India at a season of the year when they were least likely to be affected by the change of climate, instead of being sent out in driblets all through the year. With regard to the reduction of the force in India, it had been intended to send home ten regiments in the course of this year; but circumstances had occurred which interfered with that measure, and the excitement which had arisen amongst the European troops, though it had been a good deal exaggerated, made it advisable, in the opinion of the Government of India, to retain two or three of the regiments which had been ordered home. One regiment of cavalry, however, and seven regiments of infantry, with a battalion of the military train, had already left India, or were on the point of embarking.
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSasked how many men were coming home?
§ SIR CHARLES WOODcould not say 1069 exactly the number of men, because they were allowed to volunteer into other regiments remaining in India up to the moment of the departure of their regiments. The regiments coming home were the 9th Lancers, the 10th Foot, the 29th Foot, the 32nd Foot, the 78th Foot, the 84th Foot, the 86th Foot, and the 2nd battalion of the Military Train. The 61st Regiment also, he believed, had actually left, or was on the point of leaving India for the Mauritius.
§ COLONEL SYKESsaid, that there were at present 110,000 European troops in India; their cost was enormous, and it would be financially prudent to diminish their numbers as soon as possible. But the main question to be considered now was, whether a certain amount of European troops were more required in India than in this country. If their services were more needed in England than in India, then it would be of the greatest possible advantage for the purpose of the defence of the former, as well with a view to relieving the finances of the latter, that those European regiments which could be spared should be sent home as fast as possible. But he must add that the proposition of the hon. Member to send out to India raw recruits and send acclimatized soldiers back to England, seemed to him somewhat extraordinary. The new-comers in India died off by scores in the first two or three years, and the expense of transport to replace them was very great. But if it be necessary to increase the army in England, it were better to retain the proposed reinforcements of recruits than to order home acclimatized soldiers. With regard to the so-called European mutiny, he could not refrain from remarking that the discontent which had recently arisen among the Company's European troops had, in his opinion, been strengthened by mismanagement, and the display of a great want of tact on the part of the authorities. If they said to the men, "We do not think you are entitled to demand that which you claim; but you have fought gallantly at Delhi, and Cawnpore, and Lucknow, and elsewhere, and we are disposed to deal liberally with you out of admiration for your valour," they would, he thought, have adopted a much wiser course than they had pursued in having recourse to that narrow economy which had led to such unhappy results, and which had been productive of fourfold the expense which a generous policy would have involved.
§ MR. HORSMANsaid, he did not think the question raised by his hon. and gallant 1070 Friend the Member for Westminster (Sir De L. Evans) was so unimportant as the Secretary of State for India seemed to think. He thought that the attention of the House could not be called too frequently or in terms too strong to the state of insecurity in which this country was now placed, owing to the fact that she possessed no adequate military force at home for her protection. His hon. and gallant Friend had shown that the troops which were now in India were not required there; that they were a great burden to its finances, and that on Imperial grounds the services of an additional number of soldiers were required in Great Britain. The question, in short, which his hon. and gallant Friend's Motion raised, was not whether a certain number of recruits should or should not be sent out to India, but whether a number of seasoned regiments should not be brought home from that country to England. We had at present an army consisting of 110,000 European troops in India; but it must be borne in mind that 30,000 European soldiers had put down the mutiny there when it was at its height, and that therefore we were keeping up in India a larger force than the circumstances of the case demanded, while at home we had a smaller force than the safety of the country justified us in maintaining. This must not be treated as merely a departmental question. In dealing with the subject, there were two questions to be considered—the first being what was the probability of our military force being required for any home exigency; the next whether, if so required, it would be sufficient to meet the exigencies of the nation. In order to furnish an answer to the first of those questions, it would simply be necessary for him to refer to the sentiments of all the Statesmen of the Continent who were most versed in European politics, who were most intimately acquainted with the secret springs of action in the case of cabinets, rulers, and armies, and who, almost without a dissentient voice, stated it to be their belief that the time might not be far distant when England would need the aid of a large army to fight for English liberty upon English soil. The great majority of such men held the occurrence of such a crisis in our history to be not only not improbable, but as being in accordance with present appearances inevitable. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen might cry "Oh, oh!" but nobody who looked closely into the aspect of European politics could fail 1071 to be of opinion that the peace of Europe could not for many years to come be maintained unbroken ["Oh, oh!]; or who did not think, if another European war were to take place, it was by no means unlikely that England would find herself compelled to engage in the struggle. And those of our own public men who from their character and the nature of their pursuits were the most disposed to be reserved—diplomatists who were versed in the affairs of the Continent—spoke in terms of warning upon the subject, and, if that warning were not attended to, we might have cause ere long to rue our indifference. But, suppose such an hour of danger were to come, what, he should like to know, would be the position in which we should stand? He was afraid that the hon. and gallant Member for Ludlow (Colonel P. Herbert), who had made so clear a statement, spoke from better information than the hon. and gallant Member for Oxford-shire (Colonel North). But it was not a question of a few more or less troops, or of figures, or returns, but it was the fact that the strongest representations and remonstrances had been addressed to the Government by the highest and most competent authorities on the subject; and they had had as great an amount of concurrent testimony laid officially before them as was ever got together. They were told the other night by the Secretary of State for War that a Military Committee was appointed last year to report confidentially to the Government. It was composed of the highest military authorities. They had given a confidential Report to the Government. The House had never seen that Report, and they were not likely to see it, because every one knew that the Report was of such a character that the Government would hardly feel justified in laying it upon the table. But if that were the case, the Government ought not to hold language at variance with their secret convictions and the official information which they possessed. They ought not to hold language to lull the country into false security, and in reality inconsistent with the evidence in their own possession. The other night, when he made a Motion on the national defences, he was answered in a very frank and manly speech by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War. If the subject had been left where that speech left the should have been satisfied, and taken a course more agreeable to the House, by abstaining from a division. But, unfortu- 1072 nately, he heard with regret the right hon. Gentleman followed in that discussion by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, who made a speech of a different character. The noble Lord began by sneering at "the rifle fever," for having encouraged which his colleague had just taken credit to the Government, and the noble Lord went so far as to tell the House that if there should be a war and a disaster at sea, and the actual landing of a hostile army, the population of the country would be sufficient to annihilate the invaders. He was very sorry to hear that statement from so high an authority, because he was sure that no military man in the country would say that it was founded upon reason, and he was sure that, on further consideration, the noble Lord himself would not be disposed to repeat it. He thought the statement was to be extremely regretted. The forms of the House did not enable him to reply to it; but he gave the only reply which he could give—he entered his protest by dividing on that Motion, and riveting public attention to the speech, as he hoped it would be riveted on every act and word of the Minister on this important and growing question. He felt that if only a partial disaster should occur, if even the smallest injury should be inflicted, a heavy responsibility would rest on those charged with the protection of the country. If that day should come, every word that had been spoken, every act which had been done, every confidential Report which had been submitted to the Government, would rise in judgment against them. It was said by the great Napoleon that an invaded country never wanted men, but it did want soldiers, and that was a complete answer to the statement of those who fancied that an unarmed population was in any degree to be relied upon in a case of urgent necessity. The hon. and gallant Member for Ludlow spoke from official returns, and showed how delusive the statements already submitted to the House were, and that the regular force was not only inadequate, but, in comparison with any force brought against it, almost no force at all. It was impossible to contemplate such a state of things without great disquietude. No one knew how soon an emergency might come. If in July, 1858, any one had told the Emperor of Austria that before July, 1859, a war with France would be begun and ended, he would have been taken for a lunatic. In these days danger came with suddenness 1073 and rapidity. Events came quicker and passed away quicker, and it being now a matter of notoriety that the most competent and responsible of our military authorities had laid, before Her Majesty's Government in the strongest manner, repeatedly and urgently, their views of the state of insecurity in which we were, he thought it behoved his hon. and gallant Friend to take this opportunity of impressing upon the Government the duty of strengthening the home force. It was not sufficient that they were sending 7,000 to India, and bringing home 5,000. What he said was that they wanted the 7,000, and they wanted 20,000 or 30,000 more if they could get them from India, and even then they would not have the strength which every man of authority to whom the Government referred for information or advice told them that strength ought to be. Under these circumstances he really felt that these regiments were not required in India. They were required at home, and he hoped the House would take every opportunity of impressing upon the Government the duty of bringing home every single soldier who was not absolutely required in India.
§ MR. SIDNEY HERBERT—Before I address myself to what fell from the hon. and gallant Officer opposite, let me make some few remarks on the last sentences of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. He gives in his adhesion, after discussion of the Motion, to the wish to stop these draughts and reliefs being sent out to India, because of the danger from attack by foreign Powers at home. What would be the result of stopping these draughts? Do not let the House think that we are sending out trained men with a military organization. These are draughts of young recruits belonging to regiments in India. We want to get whole regiments and battalions sent back to this country. We have seven coming; they are afloat, and one has arrived. But we want many more battalions from India. We are now going upon a system which is wrong, but to which our necessities compel us. In time of profound peace we are bringing our reserves into line and using our embodied militia where we ought to have regular troops. We want to get rid of this state of things. We necessarily press upon the Indian Government to send back regiments as soon as circumstances will allow. They are unwilling to do so. Following the mutiny of the Sepoys there is the mutiny of the Euro- 1074 pean local troops, and no doubt great alarm in India, and great unwillingness to send back battalions. If you want to confirm the Indian Government in retaining these battalions you cannot take a surer method than by refusing to send the draughts and reliefs which belong to regiments there; because they naturally say, "We want so many thousand men; if you keep back the draughts and reduce the regiments to skeletons we shall be obliged to keep more battalions to have the same number of men." The result would be, you would have an army in India with a disproportionate number of officers and an insufficient number of men, and an army in England with a vast number of men without a sufficient number of officers. You would produce inefficiency both here and there, make a great disturbance, and defeat the very object which you have in view—namely, to get battalions home to England. With regard to the speech of the gallant Officer opposite, he says, and justly says, that in estimating the value of our forces we must take into consideration that a great many battalions are very young, that there are a vast number of men under twenty, and a vast number under twenty-five. In making that statement he confirms that which I have stated on a former occasion, because I stated the other night that an improved health of the army could not be entirely depended upon, as the army was disproportionately young. But that is a fault which will mend every day. We have newly raised young raw levies; but even young and raw levies as they are, when they arrived at Malta and were seen accidentally by a distinguished and competent judge, he said he could scarcely believe that they were such young battalions, so efficient did they seem to him. Then with the question of the amount of our military force comes the question how armies are to be counted. At one time they were counted by rank and file, and sergeants were not counted, because they did not carry any arms of offence, but only a halberd. But now they are armed; they have a better musket than the men carry, and I confess I do not understand why you throw them out of the account. You may or may not count sergeants. But, then, you must recollect that, comparing man for man and army for army, our own counts by rank and file, -while France, Austria, and I believe Russia, all count all ranks. I confess I think the whole calculation of the gallant Officer rests on very inaccurate conditions. I 1075 have stated that I think that hitherto we have been forced into a wrong system. When we get regiments home from India we shall get into a right system. But to say that what you mean by a peace establishment is an army ready at any moment to resist war of which no notice is given, and which may take place any day of the week, is an impossible state of things. Of course, if you take a peace establishment and compare it with a large war establishment, there must be a great disproportion. The gallant Officer says that the country under present circumstances ought to be placed in a state of defence. What are those circumstances? I do not think the circumstances now, compared with those of the past, are such as to justify us in making a violent effort greatly to increase our force. A short time ago there was war in Europe; that was said to be a reason for increasing the army; but now peace has been made, and we are told we ought to increase it because there is peace! I do not say our means of defence are not small; I think we ought to make an effort to improve them. But, again, we are told by a right hon. Gentleman opposite the time is come when we ought to reduce our army; these arguments, then, are matters of opinion, according to the political position hon. Gentlemen take. At any rate, it is not politic to be always challenging invasion, and at the same time to say, "If you do come you will find us totally unprepared." The best course is in time of peace to keep up such a force as can be easily strengthened in the case of an emergency. Let us go on improving our defensive force, for I do not say that our defences are what they ought to be, and I do say that we ought to go on improving them. But do not mislead the public by holding out the notion that this country will ever support a vast war army in time of peace. After all, what is our reserve? Supposing we were under the necessity of arming ourselves, we have a reserve, including the militia, of 65,000 men. This is not a force on paper, but consists of men actually embodied. It is a force strong enough, we are told by good military authorities, to defend all our chief arsenals. It may be a small and young force, but it is certainly an improving one. We have besides 14,000 pensioners. Including seven regiments now on their way from India, we shall have thirty-nine battalions of infantry, seventeen regiments of cavalry, and about 2,800 artillery—in all 1076 about 61,000 men. I wish the force were larger; but the way to make it larger is certainly not to retain the draughts due to India. A force of 61,000 men may not be considered a large one, but it is not to be frittered away in the manner the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite has dealt with it. The right hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) has referred to the terms of the confidential report on our means of defence; he says he is not aware of its character, but thinks it must contain some severe truths, as I have not ventured to quote its language. I should have thought that a sufficient reason for not quoting a confidential report is simply because it is confidential; and what is intended to be confidential is not generally made known. The right hon. Gentleman says we hear of certain representations having been made to the Government, and since those representations there has been some augmentation of our military force. I must admit that we seem to be perpetually oscillating between parsimony and the opposite excess when we deal with our military establishment. At one time we give way to an excess of extravagance; when the temporary fit is over there is an inevitable reaction, and the retiring wave leaves us at a lower point than we stood at before we began the spasmodic exertion. This uncertainty, this continual up and down, is exceedingly injurious to the efficiency of the army. I should wish the House to look at this subject calmly and reasonably, and fix as nearly as possible what should he the number of our military establishment, and the Government are now using steady efforts to augment our forces, and hope to do greater service in this way than by these kinds of spasmodic exertions. If, having no offensive intentions against any country, we steadily maintained a force sufficient for our own security, it would be much better than these violent and spasmodic attempts to convert a small army into a large one, and, after a reaction of feeling, disbanding it and reducing it to 40,000 men; though it is a system very difficult to resist in a country governed by a popular assembly. I have no objection to discussion on this subject; the more the public know about it the less they will he affected by unfounded alarms.
COLONEL DUNNE, whilst thinking that we ought to avoid doing anything that was calculated to offend a neighbouring Power, was of opinion that it was our duty to place our defences upon an efficient footing. 1077 Now, he feared that we had not taken proper means for the defence of the country in the event of danger. It was all very well to say that we must keep as large an array as the resources of the country would admit of; but what we required was the means of expanding that force in the presence of danger, and that at present we did not possess. There were no less than four Bills having reference to the military force on the table that night; but all that would be of no avail unless we had a proper system for organizing our army. He thought the proposed reserve force men would be prevented from entering the militia. He also suggested that the expense incurred for recruiting might be reduced by consolidating the machinery employed for the purpose. The system of warfare had changed very much of late years, especially as to the use of arms of precision. This had been made especially clear in the late war in Italy. But it was nonsense to talk of arming the population, for a sufficiency of arms could not be found; yet the arms of the military force had been brought to such perfection that any force that was not similarly armed would inevitably be cut off and destroyed. Therefore, he thought no man could bring himself to say calmly that he was satisfied with the defences of the country. Every step ought to be taken for putting the population in a state for defending itself; but the Government ought to guard against the raising of small desultory corps, which required a large staff, and frittered away the resources of the country.
SIR FREDERIC SMITHsaid, the House had wandered from the question whether these 6,700 ought to be sent out to India. These men belonged to different corps, and if they were not sent out those corps would be deficient in that number of men. He thought the Secretary for War went too far when he said that sergeants ought to be fighting men, A sergeant's proper duty was to attend to the men who were fighting in the line. A great deal had been said about our defences, and the Secretary for War was about to appoint a Commission to inquire into the state of our fortifications. It was desirable that the House should be informed of the instructions that were to be given to that Commission. He hoped that if the Commission reported in the recess, and the Government approved of their report, immediate steps would be taken by the Government to act 1078 upon the report, without waiting for the reassembling of Parliament. If certain works ought, in the opinion of the Commission, to be suspended, he hoped that those works would be instantly suspended, and that on the other hand, if new works were proposed in lieu of works which had been voted for, the Government, if they thought those recommended by the Commission were works of urgency, would take upon themselves to construct them without delay. He very much approved of the proposition to maintain a reserve force of men who had served ten years. He thought such a force would be of a most valuable description.
§ VISCOUNT PALMERSTON—The hon. Gentleman who spoke last but one (Sir F. Smith) wished to know what were the functions of the Commission which my right hon. Friend has appointed, or is going to appoint. My right hon. Friend, I think, has already explained what are the functions of that Commission. Their duties will be to examine accurately all the plans of works which are yet to be made, to compare them with those works which are already made, and to see what will be the best mode of adapting that which is to be added to that which exists, in order to render as complete as possible with reference to the present system of attack those works which are essential to the defence of the dockyards and establishments of the country. They will not have so much to overhaul the works now in existence as to see in what way those works may be made most effective. I should hardly have risen, however, had it not been to correct a misconception on the part of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Horsman) as to what I said upon a former occasion. I think I understood him as imagining that I had stated the people of this country were themselves able to defend it in case of invasion. I never meant any such thing. I was approving of the riffle corps then in contemplation in the interior of the country, and I said that if we were engaged in war I did not doubt but that the people would exhibit the same spirit which was evinced by a much smaller population during the war which commenced in 1803, when 200,000 or 300,000 volunteers were raised, organized, armed, equipped, and officered, for the defence of the country. I have no doubt such a force, in addition, of course, to the regular army and the militia, would 1079 teach any invader a severe lesson. It was not in the least degree as a single means of defence that I adverted to the existence of that volunteer system, but as an addition to the other modes of defence. I may here just remark that the discussions which at different times we have had upon this subject seem to have been influenced by momentary considerations rather than by any permanent settled system. When the Indian mutiny broke out it was urged that we ought to take the guns out of our line-of-battle ships and send them to India as transports for the conveyance of troops. Lately, when discussing the means of defence at home, great stress was laid, and properly so, upon the importance of having a Channel fleet and adequate means of naval defence. There is not much consistency between these two arguments—one urging the Minister to send away all our line-of-battle ships and the other to keep them at home for home defence. I mention this that hon. Gentlemen, when turning their attention to the national defences, should divest their minds of all momentary influences and all considerations of temporary and accidental circumstances, and look calmly at the question as a permanent system. I confess I do not think, although I admit our defensive system is capable of and trust will receive improvement, yet it is not altogether so contemptible as the public seem to imagine. I hold that in the event of war we could put into the field something very little short of 200,000 fighting men. We have the regular force of, I hope, not less than 60,000 men. Then we have the militia, the establishment of which is 120,000, and if that militia he well recruited and supplied, as in the event of emergency I am sure would be the case, I reckon upon 100,000 there. Then we have 14,000 yeomanry, 12,000 or 14,000 pensioners, and then we have those men who have served their ten years, with whom my right hon. Friend the Secretary for War proposes to deal tonight. We have also always at home a certain force of marines, and we could if we chose reorganize our dockyard battalions for the defence of those establishments. Putting all these forces together, I say that an enemy contemplating an attack upon us must reckon upon not less than 200,000 men to resist him. I do not wish to prolong the discussion, but I think my right hon. Friend has shown that these 7,000 men now proposed to be sent out to India are merely recruits to fill up regiments 1080 there, and to enable other regiments to return home, and thus strengthen our means of defence at home.
COLONEL DICKSONobserved, that the House was told that the 7,000 men about to be sent to India would release seven regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of military train, which could then return home. It must be remembered that those regiments would come home mere skeletons.
§ MR. SIDNEY HERBERTThe depots here are in excess of the regimental strength.
COLONEL DICKSONsaid, that might he, but the fact was that the regiments themselves would come home skeletons of regiments with not more than 250 to 300 men in each. He agreed that people were apt to take too gloomy a view of our military means; but, on the other hand, the noble Lord appeared to take too flattering a view, and he (Colonel Dickson) could not see whence the troops enumerated were to be procured upon an emergency. As for the formation of a reserve corps he quite agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for Queen's County (Colonel Dunne), that it was a most ill-advised measure. It was intended to catch the ten years' service men after their periods of service had expired, but those were just the men who were wanted in the militia, and thus having set up an expensive staff to procure men for one service they were about to establish another expensive staff to form an inefficient force. He had been disappointed with the Report of the Militia Commissioners, which did not contain one useful suggestion, and he regretted to hear the Secretary for War express his intention in carrying out future reforms to act upon the suggestions in that Report.
§ Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.
§ Main Question put, and agreed to.
§ Resolutions read 2°, and agreed to.