HC Deb 03 May 1858 vol 149 cc2177-204

Order for Committee read.

House in Committee.

Mr. FITZROY in the Chair.

Question again proposed,— That for this purpose it is expedient to provide, that Her Majesty, by one of Her Principal Secretaries of State, shall have and perform all the powers and duties relating to the Government and Revenues of India which are or may be now exercised and performed by the East India Company, or by the Court of Directors or Court of Proprietors of the said Company, either alone or with the approbation of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India.


moved to leave out in the Resolution after the first word "that," and insert— In order to ensure the administration of such government with due care, caution, and efficiency, all the powers and duties now vested in the East India Company, the Court of Directors or the Court of Proprietors of the said Company, either alone or with approbation of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, shall be exercised and performed by a Minister of the Crown in Council. He said that, before going into the main question he would make a few observations with reference to the latter part of the Amendment, by which he proposed to vest the powers and duties of the East India Company in a Minister of the Crown. The Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to vest this authority in a Secretary of State, whilst the Bill of the late Government proposed that it should be vested in the President of the Council. Now, he did not wish to embarrass the consideration of this question by any discussion upon names. He thought such a discussion would be somewhat unprofitable, for if there were any advantage in a name, it lay in the appropriateness of that name to the nature of the duties to be performed, and it would be rather difficult to give any name to this Minister of the Crown until it was decided what his duties were to be. They had, therefore, better at first deal with the abstract idea of the Minister of the Crown, leaving it to those who might afterwards have to frame the Bill in accordance with these Resolutions to determine a name which might be most suitable to the person on whom these duties devolved. Therefore, dealing with him as a Minister of the Crown, of the same rank as one of Her Majesty's Ministers are generally understood to hold, he should abstain from further dilating upon that question, and should confine himself to an explanation of the gist of the Amendment which he proposed. In each of the other Resolutions the object it had in view was set forth, and he accordingly proposed that this Resolution also should state that the object of the change was with a view of increasing care, caution, and efficiency in the Government of India. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not, he thought, in submitting to the notice of the House the Resolutions under its consideration, taken that comprehensive view of the subject which might have been anticipated. He had, upon the contrary, concentrated his attention upon the question of electing a Council, which he (Mr. Ayrton) could not help regarding as a narrow view of the subject, inasmuch as the independence or the efficiency of a Council depended much more on the position in which it was placed in relation to the Minister than upon the manner of its appointment. It was essential that this Council should be in an honourable and independent position, and that it should enjoy the confidence of the authorities in India. It mattered not what was the scheme of government adopted here, if it did not possess the confidence and have moral weight with the local Governments, and it was equally necessary that it should command the respect of the people in India. By the people, however, he did not refer to the Natives of India generally, as they received their impressions of the Government from the few Europeans and the Natives who resided at the Presidencies. If the Government in India did not respect the home Government a thousand devices would be resorted to in order to evade its wishes, and its despatches would be a dead letter. In order to arrive at a sound conclusion upon the point, it was desirable, in his opinion, that Parliament should consider what had been the nature of that administration in India which we were about to control. They did not arrive at the form of government now subsisting by inspiration. It was the result of very long and painful experience, and of many failures. It was not until after years of trial that the authorities in India and in this country had at last arrived at what was considered the best form of administration in India. It was not till the year 1784, when the Board of Control was established, that the system in India was introduced into that form which, with some changes, had remained until this day. It was settled that India being divided, as was generally known, into three Presidencies—Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta—there should be at each of the former two a chief authority, consisting of a Governor and three Councillors, and at the latter a Governor General of India and three Councillors, who was also the local Governor. Afterwards, in 1793, it was found necessary to regulate the relations between the Governor and his Council, and those relations were settled on this footing. The Governor was bound—and this system had continued to the present day —to transact his business with his Council, and in his Council to this extent. He was bound to consult them upon all affairs of government. If they differed from him, they were bound to communicate with each other and record their opinions in writing, It was not likely that he would depart from their view if he found the majority of the Council against him, unless upon very strong grounds. But the section in the original statute provided that if, after consideration, the majority and the Governor still differed in opinion, that then the Governor, on his own authority, might suspend or reject the measure in question. That section had been reenacted at the different periods at which the charter of the Company had been renewed. The Committee would therefore see how careful the Legislature had been to hem round the authority of the Governor, with precautionary arrangements in order that he might not act inconsiderately or indiscreetly; and, consequently, his (Mr. Ayrton's) object in proposing this Amendment was to impose the same amount of caution upon the Minister of State to whom they intended to give the authority contemplated in the proposed change of the Government of India. The administration of the affaire of India was divided into five departments—the political, the military, the financial, the judicial, and the general departments. The acts of those departments were submitted to the Governor General in Council, through a secretary appointed for each department. The Governor General and each Councillor made his minute, and, if they concurred the secretary to Government prepared a despatch accordingly. If they did not agree, the matter was discussed fully before decision. That course of proceeding had gone on for seventy years, and no practical objection had been raised. He might be told that there was a fatal argument against him—that, although it might be necessary to hedge in the authority of a Governor General in India, still there was no such necessity to regulate the conduct of a Minister of State in this country. He did not think there was the least force in that argument. A Minister of State for India in this country would be exempt from all practical supervision, according to the Resolutions now proposed. That officer would stand in a very different position from that of any Secretary of State of the great departments now existing in this country. If any wrong or objectionable act was done here by a Secretary of State, it speedily became known, the person to whose prejudice it was done appealed to the newspapers or to his representative for protection, and his complaint could he brought before Parliament if sitting, and the country, without a day's delay; but the Minister of State for India might send out any order to that country, which would be there acted upon, and would only come to the know- ledge of persons in England several, it might be many, months after. It was said that, being a Minister of State, he would be subject to the supervision of Parliament; but they knew what kind of feeling was evoked when the conduct of one Minister was criticised—his colleagues adopted his acts, and it became a question of confidence in the Government. He objected to that solidarity of Government, which had been carried too far, and had been the source of much evil; for it was impossible to canvass and judge the errors and misconduct of any one Minister without evoking those interests and feelings which were brought into play when any question involved the fate of a party or a Government. He submitted, however, that they should not confine their attention to the detection of errors, but they should adopt measures as far as possible to guard against their commission. The tenure of office by the members of the Council was a point of great importance; for it was the real guarantee for their independence. When our predecessors resolved themselves into a Committee to consider the guarantees they should provide for the liberty of our ancestors—they had to consider how they should best secure the independence of the Judges of the land, who they knew to be the guardians of their laws—they had then determined that this object was to be best attained by declaring that the salaries of the Judges should be fixed, and that their tenure of office should be no longer at the pleasure of the Crown, but be for good behavior. He thought it would be advisable to deal with the Council which it was proposed to create. Upon this principle, the members of that body would not feel themselves in a proper position, if they were not entitled to sit at the council table as the equals of the Minister, and be made aware of all measures connected with the administration of India. To be of any service they must be a Council in reality, and not a mere body of clerks; whereas he conceived that the manner in which it was proposed to constitute the Council was a mere blind to the people of this country, to screen from them the real object of Ministers, which was to vest an absolute and arbitrary power in a Minister of the Crown. The Bill of the noble Member for Tiverton, the Bill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Amendment of the Lord Protector of these Resolutions, expressly provided one who might be called the Councillors should be removable by the vote of Parliament; but how could Parliament discharge such a duty? How was it possible for them to determine whether they ought or not to remove Councillors, if they could not ascertain to what extent each had participated in any act affecting the people of India? He thought, therefore, it was necessary that every Councillor should be individually responsible, and he conceived that that wag the great object sought to be accomplished by the transfer of the government from the Court of Directors to the Crown. It was objected to the present system that the Directors acted as a corporate body, and that for their decisions no individual was responsible; and it was deemed desirable that, whatever number of persons might be engaged in conducting the government of India, each man should be responsible for his own acts alone, and not for those of any other person. He considered that, looking at the position which the Councillors would occupy, and that they were liable to removal by a vote of Parliament, they ought to be placed in such a relation to the Minister of the Crown as would enable them to discharge their duties conscientiously and independently. He was quite aware that such an arrangement might not be palatable to great men, but it would be acceptable to men of intelligence, knowledge, experience, and capacity, who, although not great men by birth or rank, wore in every way competent to participate in the government of India, and worthy of being treated as equals by those who might, by the advantage of birth or fortune, become Ministers of State. He hoped the Committee would concentrate their minds upon this practical consideration, instead of adhering to what the right hon. Gentleman had called the "barren simplicity," but which he would rather call the barren theory, that election was necessary in order to secure independence. Had the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to select from the present Court of Directors twelve of its members, to constitute the first Council, and had he provided that one of them should retire annually, another Councillor being appointed in his stead, they might have obtained the services of men who, if not the very best, had the practical experience of years, and would have possessed a guarantee for the duration of their offices which would have secured them independence, and would have rendered them more efficient than he thought they had hitherto been. It was his opinion that the solution of the question would be easy, if they turned their attention to the practical difficulties, and did not stop to discuss mere theories; and he concluded by expressing a hope that on this subject the leaders of party would give freedom of opinion to their followers, and that both sides of the House, sinking all minor differences, would unite to form, if possible, a really good and practical Bill for the future government of India.

Amendment proposed,— To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, "in order to ensure the administration of such Government with duo care, caution, and efficiency, all the powers and duties now vested in the East India Company, the Court of Directors or the Court of Proprietors of the said Company, cither alone or with the approbation of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, shall be exercised and performed by a Minister of the Grown in Council," instead thereof.


I confess that when I heard the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman I felt some surprise on recollecting the votes which he gave—first, on the introduction of the Bill of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), and, secondly, on the proposition which was submitted to us on Friday last, for the whole of the hon. Gentleman's speech to-night was, in its practical effect, an argument in favour of the government of India as now carried on by the East India Company, and against the conduct of such government by a Minister of the Crown. He has spoken of the risk of leaving the government to a Minister; of the secrecy which would attend his administration; of his practical irresponsibility for actions done by him; and of the danger which would result from that secrecy and that irresponsibility. If I had so little faith as the hon. and learned Gentleman appears to have in the efficacy of the control to be exercised by this House over the future government of India, I confess I should have thought twice, and should have hesitated long, before I consented to vote for a transfer of the government of India to a Minister of the Crown. Now what is the object which the hon. and learned Gentleman proposes to attain? He wishes the duties of the Home Government of India to be performed by a Minister of the Crown in Council. It is true the hon. and learned Member drew a distinction between the acts of a Minister in Council and those of a Minister and a Council; but, although he drew such a distinction with great ingenuity at one moment, I think he forgot it the next. He contends that the obvious meaning of saying that power is to be exercised by a Minister in Council is, that it is to be exercised with the approval of the Council. If, however, you say that a Minister is only to exercise power with the approval of his Council, you mean there is to be a conjoint authority—a division of power—between such Minister and the Council; and, surely it is obvious, that if you do so divide powers between the Minister and the Council you are doing away with one of the main principles upon which we are endeavouring to legislate, namely, that of securing the undivided responsibility of a Minister. There seems to be—if I may venture to say so— some confusion in the minds of many persons as to what it is they really desire. I often hear persons arguing against the danger of giving authority to a Minister, and at the same time desiring that he should be made responsible. Now, I say you cannot separate the one from the other. If you intend to impose responsibility you must give power. Constitute a Council having conjoint power with the Minister, and if any act of that Minister is impugned in Parliament what will be his answer? He will say, "You have bound me to act with the approval of certain persons. That approval, therefore, I must necessarily obtain, and I could only obtain it by following the line of policy I have adopted in this instance; and you who have imposed upon me this restriction have no right to reproach me with its natural and inevitable consequence." It may be the object of the hon. and learned Member to establish such a state of things, but that result was not contemplated by the Government, nor is it, I apprehend, contemplated by the House. We want individual Ministerial responsibility. It will be asked, no doubt, if that is our object, why have a Council at all? I know that question has been put, and I refer to it for the purpose of showing that it admits of an answer. I think my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer described very truly the object and intentions of the Government in proposing a Council, when he stated that the Council is intended to exercise a moral control—that is to say, the Minister is to be surrounded by those who can bring long experience to bear on the questions submitted to their consideration, who can give the Minister the best advice, and supply him with the best materials on which to form his judgment; but having the benefit of that advice and experience, he is bound to act on his own single and personal responsibility. There is one other objection to the proposed Amendment. I think that, to some extent, it neutralizes the effect of the course we are now taking in proceeding by way of Resolution. The object of proceeding by way of Resolution is, that we should go on step by step, advancing one step at a time. Now, in the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman we are made to take two steps at once. The Amendment declares, first, that there shall be a Minister for Indian Affairs; and, secondly, that that Minister shall stand in a particular relation to his Council. These are separate propositions, both open to controversy and debate. Many persons, those especially who support the administration of India by the Company, object to conferring on a Minister such a power as is contemplated by the Resolutions. Other persons, willing to give him such a power, are unwilling that he should share it with a Council. These, then, are separate questions, to be discussed apart, and it seems like anticipating the judgment of the Committee on a future Resolution if on the present occasion we adopt the words proposed by the hon. and learned Gentleman. On these grounds, I hope the Committee will not agree to the Amendment.


said, that for the first time he had the happiness of entirely concurring with the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton). He was sure that that hon. and learned Gentleman would not be suspected of the crime of being too partial to the Court of Directors. He was sorry to hear from the noble Lord, for he thought it was not worthy of him, that argumentum ad invidiam which was involved in the charge against the hon. and learned Gentleman, that he had in fact reverted to the re-establishment of the Court of Directors. Now, before proceeding further, he wished to observe that he should speak as if the Court of Directors had been entirely disposed of the passing of the first Resolution, and all his efforts would be directed to render the Council most efficient and serviceable. The noble Lord appeared to have misunderstood the proposal of the hon. and learned Gentleman, when he stated that proposal to be that the Minister of the Crown, whatever he might be called, should exercise his power only with the approval of his Council. All that the hon. and learned Gentleman required was that the Minister of the Crown should be obliged to sit in Council, and consider before he acted what his Council recommended. That, in his opinion, was the only effectual manner in which the experience of the Council could be brought to bear on the Minister of the Crown. He entirely concurred with the noble Lord in a desire for the responsibility of the Minister, and he fully agreed that in order to secure responsibility in the Minister he must have power. Let him have absolute power by all means. The Amendment did not propose to deprive him of that power by associating a Council with him. He would let him have absolute power. The noble Lord forgot that this was no new proposition, for precisely the same system had been in operation in India for the best part of the century. No one there complained that the Governor General had not sufficient power; in fact, he had absolute power, for although he was compelled to listen to his Council, and to carry on all his functions in its presence, yet be had the power entirely to set aside their opinion, and to act on his own responsibility. That was all the Amendment intended, and what further power would the noble Lord wish to give to a Minister in this country? Unless the Minister of the Grown were compelled at least to listen to the opinions of his Council, the Council would be a mere sham and a delusion. If the Minister were to have the power of acting on his own responsibility without previously consulting his Council, what protection would there be against rash and inconsiderate proceedings on his part? The noble Lord spoke strongly of Parliamentary control, but how could that control be exercised under the system advocated by the noble Lord? An order might be sent out to India and do a vast deal of mischief there, and it would only be after the lapse of many months that the order would be known to Parliament; whereas, if the Minister were obliged to sit in Council and listen to the opinions of the Council, that House would know a priori what occurred, instead of a posteriori, when all the mischief was done. He entreated the House not to look on a matter of this kind as a party question at all. It was not a question of Whigs or Tories, but a matter of the most vital importance to the government of India that a real substantial power should be given to the Council, not of overriding the Minister, but of stating their opinions and offering advice to the Minister.


I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to what I think should be their course at the present moment. I think we are in danger of being allured from the straight path before us, and of getting into controversies which will not facilitate the progress of public business. My noble Friend has put a construction upon the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman, which, if it were the correct one, would be fatal to it. I confess I think that the true version of the Amendment. Of course, I may be wrong, and I accept the disclaimer of the hon. and learned Gentleman if he makes it [Mr. AYRTON: "Hear!"], which I do with all sincerity, that it is not his purpose to confer a conjoint authority upon the Council and the Minister. But I must remind the Committee that these Resolutions were drawn with the intention of advancing step by step towards a general settlement of this question. By the first Resolution we asked the Committee to vote that the government of India shall be transferred from the East India Company to the Crown. By the next we propose to it to lay down the principle that the Government shall be exercised by a responsible Minister. I think it is unnecessary and unwise at this stage to introduce the further question of whether there shall be a Council or not. If you decide upon a Council it will still be open to controversy what shall be its functions and the extent of its powers. I think, therefore, the Committee will agree with me that this is not the occasion when we should entertain the question whether there shall be a Council or not. Let us solve the proposition before us, whether there shall be a responsible Minister under the name of a Secretary of State; and having arrived at a conclusion on that head, let us proceed to the next, whether there is to be a Council, and if so, how it is to be composed, and what are the functions it is to exercise. At this moment there are many hon. Gentlemen who are of opinion that there ought to be a Minister responsible for the government of India, who are not in favour of a Council. On the other hand, there are hon. Gentlemen against a Minister with undivided authority, and who are for his sharing it with a Council. The hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Ayrton) does not appear to be in either of these categories. Let us, then, first decide this preliminary point, whether it is expedient that there should be a minister under the name of a Secretary of State, who shall perform the functions appertaining to the government of India. I hope the Committee will not sanction the Amendment, even if they approve of it. It may be just and proper in the right place, and at the right season, but this is not the proper opportunity to offer it to the Committee.


said, he thought all that had occurred proved the inconvenience of proceeding by way of Resolutions. He fully agreed, however, with the noble Lord opposite in the view he took of that Amendment, because the words of the Amendment certainly did imply that the Minister should in no case act without his Council. He thought, therefore, that all who were in favour of concentrating responsibility in the Minister should vote against the Amendment. In the case of the Governor General it was true he might overrule his Council, but still he had no individual and separate action unless he happened to be up the country, when it was allowed him to act without them. He thought also there was much force in what the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that these Resolutions were intended to proceed step by step. As he quite agreed in that opinion, he rose merely to guard the House against the supposition that by agreeing to the Resolution he therefore preferred a Secretary of State to a President. The Secretary of State was, according to the theory of the constitution, supposed to be a direct emanation from the Crown; he took his commands directly from the Crown only on matters relating to his own department. There would be an inconsistency if he were to be fettered by a Council. That inconsistency did not apply to the functions of a President. But he would reserve his arguments on this point till the Bill was before them.


said, the Committee were about to take away from the present Indian governing body in this country all the functions and powers that be-longed to them, and to confer them on a Minister of the Crown. He would remind them that every authority who had written on this subject, including Lord Macaulay, had contended that it was essential for the maintenance of the British dominion in India that there should be an independent, intermediate power between the Crown and the Government of India, Were we, in order to preserve the con- sistency of some political party and the honour and dignity of that House, to sacrifice the welfare of the people of India? He would urgently press on the Committee that they would render the tenure of the country extremely doubtful if they did not appoint some independent authority, free from political bias, who would govern it for the welfare of the people of India and of this country.


The Committee have been told that they ought to go by steps, but I have heard enough during the debate to convince me that some of these steps are in a backward direction. The hon. Baronet, for instance, who has just spoken has addressed himself wholly to a Resolution which the Committee on Friday determined by a large majority — namely, that the Company should no longer govern India. The question now before the Committee is how the Crown should govern India. The first proposition is that there shall be a Secretary of State responsible for the government of India; and we are told that in discussing that we are not to discuss the question of the Council. I differ thereupon from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because when I decide that one man alone should govern, I decide that there should be no Council. Great confusion had prevailed on this subject. We have not kept distinct the government of India in England and the government of India in India. We are now discussing the government of India in England. We are now endeavouring to form a constitution, by which the feeling—if I may so express my myself—of the people of England shall be brought to bear on the government of India. We are endeavouring to form some sort of government which shall exercise a power in England over the government in India. This is our object; this was the object which was attempted by Parliament in 1783. Then, Mr. Pitt, meeting Mr. Fox on this point, found feelings rife in England which enabled him to defeat Mr. Fox. From the beginning of the reign of George III. there had been in that monarch's mind a determination to put down the power of the great aristocratic families of England, and he objected to any power placed in the House of Commons which could control him. All these things have been changed now. The House of Commons is no longer at the more beck of the great aristocracy, and there is no longer any attempt on the part of the Crown to govern this country independently of the House of Commons. The real government of England is in this House. This House is daily becoming more and more the representative of the people of England. Therefore every power to be given to this House is a power given to the people of England. Now comes the practical conclusion to which I want to draw the House. I want them to have a Secretary of State to govern India, and I want him to govern on his own responsibility. Therein, in words, I agree with the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies; but what I mean is something more than he, for I mean responsibility without an aid, sharing the power and sharing the responsibility, as a Council must necessarily do. I want a Minister of State responsible to this House for every act which he does with regard to India. Now, then, I come to the question of the Council, and I am obliged to do so when I am requiring that there shall be a Secretary of State who should be responsible. The two questions cannot be dissevered. I say, then, that any attempt to put a Council by his side is against the Resolution which is now before the House. What is the meaning of a Council? A Council, says one hon. Member, means moral influence. What is the moaning of this moral responsibility? The hon. Member, the Chairman of the East India Company, says:—" I want a Minister of State in Council; I ask that He shall not act without hearing the reasons of his Council; that he shall not act without putting his reasons in writing." And all because the Governor General in India has a Council. Now, just mark the difference between the Governor General in India and the Secretary of State about to be appointed in England. The untrammelled Minister will be on that bench —he will be responsible to this House— every act he does will be known. Oh, says some hon. Gentleman, known hereafter. I want to know, is not that the case with every act? Have I not seen a peace made after a most trying war? Have I not seen hon. Gentlemen come down to this House to know what was going on? How were they received? The Government told them, if you think we are not fit to govern this country, vote us out; if not, wait till we have done, and then you shall know what it is that we have done. Is not this the very consequence of a responsible Government? Can you have a Government which comes to this House and makes this House a Council? No; you say to the Crown—choose your Ministers; your Ministers shall govern this country upon their own responsibility; what they do we shall know when they have done it, and we will punish them for it, if we think they have done wrong. Well, then, what was done in the case of the war with Russia shall we not do with regard to India? Recollect that in the former case, day after day the public mind increased in anxiety about the peace which was being negotiated with Russia, but no hon. Member attempted to obtain information from the opposite benches about that peace until it was made. And the same must be the case with India and a Secretary for the government of India. Now I come to that phantom, an "Old Indian Council." This sort of Council assumes to itself great knowledge of India, which I deny. The "old Indians" can know only what they have seen. The present to their eyes overpowers their understanding, and they judge of India by that small part of it to which their experience has been confined. Suppose then that this Minister of the Crown has a standing Council of "old Indians" to assist him, what then? Why these old Indians will impose upon the people by virtue of their being "old Indians," and the Minister will not dare to exercise his own judgment and responsibility, and will come down to this House and say that such and such things were done with the universal consent of my Council. But it may be a great folly. We can conceive even a Council of "old Indians" committing a great folly— indeed, I believe that of all Councils that of "old Indians" will be the worst. It appears to me that what we want is undivided responsibility. Any man who is placed in the situation of Governor of India, in the capacity of Secretary of State for India, being seated on that bench, is responsible to us for what he does. If you surround him with a Council that will be irresponsible, he who should be responsible will shelter himself under an irresponsible power. So that in fact you will be placing a Council irresponsible to the people in the position of this House, which is responsible to the people. I believe that is an unwise proceeding. Our object should be to obtain a single individual — to place him there (pointing to the Treasury bench)—to make him responsible for the government of India, and to punish him if he does wrong. For let us remember this, that if we cannot punish him, we can punish no one.


said, that they had a most important question to decide—was it safe to transfer to a Secretary of State the power now enjoyed by the Board of Control and the Court of Directors? Was he to have unchecked control over the finances, the external relations, the military forces, and £30,000,000 of revenue of India? Was it in short intended to abolish all existing control, and substitute no other. He heard it said indeed, that that House was to supply the necessary check and control over the Minister. But as Lord Macaulay said, that House had neither the time nor the knowledge to do this; and he added, which he (Sir H. Willoughby) believed to be the fact, that a broken head in Coldbath fields would create more sensation in that House than three pitched battles in India. The noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies had entirely misunderstood the object of the Amendment. It was, that the Minister for India should be paramount in his Council, as in the analogous case of the Governor General; but it also provided that he should be furnished with a Council of responsible advisers, who on important occasions should give him that advice, assistance, and information which he must require in dealing with the interests of so many strange and sensitive peoples. It was utterly impossible, looking to the short tenure of office on the part of most Presidents of the Board of Control, and their want of all previous acquaintance with India, that they should be able to act without advice and assistance; and if that were so, it ought to be given by a responsible Council. But the Amendment did not contemplate giving the Council any power of controlling the Secretary of State. He would be supreme, just as the Governor General of India was in his Council. What would be obtained was a security for the full and well-informed consideration of all important subjects. Another thing which he believed would be thus obtained was a security against the perpetration of jobs. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) had sneered at "old Indians." Did the Committee suppose that India could be governed without knowledge or experience? The Minister for India must have somebody to advise him, and surely it was better that he should go to a responsible Council rather than to irresponsible clerks, He felt quite con- vinced that there was no man in the United Kingdom who was able to exercise uncontrolled such power as would be vested in the Secretary of State for India, without some such cheek as was suggested by the proposition before the House. He hoped, therefore, that the Amendment would be pressed to a division.


said, he thought the Committee were discussing two questions which, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite had stated, were rather the subject of two separate Resolutions, and that they had belter confine themselves for the present to the particular Resolution before them. He did not apprehend that, by assenting, as he was about to do, to this Resolution, that they either affirmed or denied the propriety of appointing a Council. The House was at perfect liberty to deal with the following Resolution, which established a Council just as it pleased after it had agreed to this. Those who had voted in favour of transferring the government of India from the Company to the Crown could not reasonably object to the present Resolution, because if the Government of India at home were transferred to the Crown, the Crown must act through a responsible Minister for that department; and he agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), that the object which Parliament and the country had in view was to make the Minister of the Crown answerable and responsible to this House for the home administration of the government of India, but they would entirely defeat that object if they erected around the Minister a Council who would be irresponsible—who would have the power of controlling the Minister, or a power superior to that of the Minister, or upon whose consent the action of the Minister would depend. To constitute such a council would be to re-establish a double Government under a more objectionable form even than that now in existence. What he wished to press upon the House was this, that it was premature to discuss whether there should be a council and what its function should be, for there was a subsequent Resolution which stated that the Minister should be assisted by a Council. The Committee would do better to postpone until that Resolution had been put, the question what should be the composition of the Council, whether it should be nominated, whether it should be elected, and in what degree it should be an advising Council, or more than an ad- vising Council. The present Resolution merely affirmed that there should be a Minister to act as the organ of the Crown, with regard to the administration of India. To that Minister the Resolution gave the title of Secretary of State; the Bill of the late Government gave him the title of President of the Council. That, however, was a matter which might be discussed upon the Bill; and he trusted that the House would not agree to the Amendment of Mr. Ayrton, which appeared to be inconsistent with the principle which had already been decided—namely, that it was expedient to transfer the government of India from the Company to the Crown.


said, the question raised by the present Resolution was not whether there should be a Council, but whether the Secretary of State or Minister for India, like the Governor General, should never act without consulting his Council. It was necessary the Committee should consider how the Council in India arose. At one time the Governor General waged wars and concluded treaties of peace which were believed in England to be inconsistent with justice and adverse to the policy which the country ought to pursue. In order to control the Governor General, acting as he did at a great distance, the plan was hit upon of sending out three or four persons to form his Council, and, without depriving him of the absolute power of carrying his own views into effect, Parliament resolved that if he differed from his Council the members should be at liberty to record in writing the reasons of their dissent. That contrivance, though perhaps the best that could be adopted, was not very successful, for it led during many years to dissensions in the Council, at one time Warren Hastings, and at another Mr. Francis having a majority. But, whether the contrivance was good or bad, the case of the Governor General bore no analogy to that now under consideration, for he presumed they did not want the Minister for India to be obliged on every occasion to go to his Council and obtain their opinions in writing. He was not to act at a distance; he was not to exercise any despotic powers, or to act in any other manner than the Secretary of State for the Colonies or Foreign Affairs did at present. Upon any matter of great importance he would have the advice of his colleagues in the Cabinet, but upon other occasions and probably in the majority of eases he would consult with his Council, if he had a Council, and hear what their opinion was. But whether he had Council, or whether, as proposed by some, he should simply he assisted by an Under Secretary, he would certainly not despise the opinion of "old Indians; on the contrary, he would doubtless deem it his duty to consult with men of knowledge and experience in India. At the present moment, however, the real question before the Committee was whether the Minister should be so controlled by his Council as to lose all responsibility. The Amendment of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets seemed to answer that question in the affirmative, and therefore the Committee ought to reject it.


said, he thought the Committee were likely to get into some confusion, not so much from the determination to proceed by way of Resolution, as from the uncertainty of the method in which Parliamentary Resolutions ought to be drawn. The opinion appeared to prevail that when the Committee proceeded to frame Resolutions those Resolutions should be in the nature of general statements, and should not express in specific terms the real intentions of the House. In that view he did not concur. The Resolutions were of course less developed than the clauses of a Bill, but the intention of the House must be to make the Resolutions as precise and exact as if they were engaged in the discussion of a Bill. It had been made a question whether the present Government possessed the confidence of the House, but for his part, he never saw a more striking proof of confidence than the passing of the first Resolution on Friday night, because it was not pretended that the language of that Resolution was accurate, and the first Resolution seemed about to become a precedent for the rest. He concurred in the objection of his right hon. Friend (Mr. Vernon Smith) to the appointment of a Secretary of State. The position of a Secretary of State was too important to be dealt with in so light a manner. It was no light matter to preserve the ancient lines and limits of those great offices. He was by no means certain that they bad acted wisely in making the Minister for War a great spending officer. If it were intended that the Treasury should maintain a pecuniary control over officers who spent the public money, it was very material whether they had to deal with the Secretary "at" War, or an officer of the rank of Secretary of State "for" War. One inconvenience that would attend the novel management proposed had already been pointed out—namely, that they proposed to take the Secretary of State, who was more immediately the representative of the Crown than any other officer—a sort of legate a latere from the Crown—and make him discharge functions which obviously belonged to the President of a Council. Although the present Government proposed to call the new Indian Minister a Secretary of State, there was really no variance between the plan of the present and the late Government, as in reality the new-Minister would be substantially a President of the Council. If it were to be so, it was desirable to call him so at the outset, and not to describe him as a Secretary of State in the Resolutions in order that in the Bill he should be metamorphosed into a President of the Council. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) said that the Committee were not called upon to describe the exact functions of the Council in this Resolution, but the Resolution put an absolute negative upon all separate powers whatever in the government of India. Was it meant that the House should vote that negative now, and then consider hereafter whether there should be such separate powers or not? The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield was hopelessly inaccessible in regard to one point. The Council would, in his opinion, exercise a very evil influence—above all, if its members possessed any knowledge or experience of India. The ancient poets declared that there was no animal so wretched as mortal man, and that would be true if the hon. and learned Member's view were correct, that as we were born ignorant into this world, so the more knowledge we acquired on a particular subject the less capable we were of giving an opinion upon it. It might be well not to admit the absolute authority and omniscience of those old Indians, but a man's experience and application to a particular subject ought to be worth something, and though it might excite the merriment of the House to hear the pedantry of old Indians derided, he dared say that a Parliament of old Indians might return the compliment by exposing the proceedings and showing the uselessness for Indian purposes of old Members of Parliament. The Resolution, however, undoubtedly contained the negation and destruction of all separate powers, and he was not prepared to vote for a Resolution couched in terms so broad. One separate power, at least, was so important that it ought not not to he extinguished without discussion—namely, the power of recalling the Governor General. He, for one, was not at present convinced that no such power should exist; hut it was a question which should have received discussion, in place of which, however, it had not been mentioned, but appeared to be taken altogether for granted. It appeared to him that upon this point neither the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston). nor the Government was consistent. It had been proved that there were certain most vital acts which the Minister for India ought not to do without the assistance of his Council. If so, how could the Government say that all these powers ought to reside in the Secretary of State? The noble Viscount intended to provide by his Bill that the President of the Council should not be able to stir without a majority in Council, and if the noble Viscount affirmed this Resolution his affirmation was worth nothing, because he meant to contradict himself next week, or the week after, when the House came to deal with his Bill, by introducing important exceptions to the rule which he was now laying down in terms that were perfectly absolute. Neither did it appear to him (Mr. Gladstone), after hearing the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), that the Government were consistent in regard to this Resolution. He did not stand upon the technical meaning of the words of the Amendment. He agreed that it was not their place to set a Minister of the Queen in this country in the same position as that of Governor General in India. He did not understand that the term Minister in Council bound them to any particular legal signification. It conveyed an idea of the method of doing business and he would submit to the House that the words of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Ayrton) were in exact accordance both with the speech of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) and the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he introduced the India Bill. That right hon. Gentleman stated that the whole business of India at home was to be transacted by the Minister in Council, and that this was the intention of the Government. But under the Resolution it might be intended that the Council should only be summoned when some questionable transaction was to be carried through, and when the Minister wanted some creditable names to gild his proceedings. He understood the language of the Amendment to be that the business of India should be, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer described it, transacted by the Minister in Council. But now it was not affirmed that the Minister was to have the concurrence of his Council. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) said that they wanted a Council which should give the best advice, while the Secretary of State should act upon his own authority. The words of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member gave precise expression to the words of the Government, while the words of the Resolution of the Government gave expression not to their intentions, hut to the intentions of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. He was not able to vote for the Resolution, since it was a Resolution not intended to be worked out in regular conformity with its terms, unless the House chose to adopt the views of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck), which it did not seem inclined to do at present. He understood the Amendment to mean that the Council should be cognizant of the whole business of India. He was prepared to vote for it, and to pledge himself to that extent, but no further. In supporting the Amendment he was only giving effect to the views that had been expressed by Members of the Government.


said, he would not have presumed to address the House on this subject only that having spent a great portion of his life in India, he wished to say a few words on this subject, and particularly as regarded the word "responsibility." He thought that in handing over to the care of a Minister the destinies of 180 millions of people they were taking a step of the gravest consequence. Responsibility as he read it meant "answerability," and yet supposing some great calamity to arise in India of a nature to fright this isle from its propriety, and any hon. Member came down to the House threatening impeachment against that Minister, he would receive about as much attention as if he were to speak of burning a woman for witchcraft. He, at all events, would enter his protest against giving such unlimited power to any one Minister.


said, that the present discussion exemplified the confusion the House was likely to get into by proceeding by Resolution. The whole intentions of the Government could not be expressed by Resolutions. If they transferred the government of India from the East India Company to the Queen they must express that the Queen acted by her responsible Minister. That was all that the Resolution expressed. Having held the responsible office of Minister for India, he could unhesitatingly say that no man would be able to act in that office without the assistance of a Council, and one composed of men who, having long acquaintance with India were able to afford him effectual assistance. All he meant to express by voting for the Resolution was, that the House was about to transfer to a responsible Minister of the Crown the powers of the East India Company. The extent of the authority he was to exercise and the nature and functions of the Council would, he thought, more properly come within the scope of subsequent Resolutions than of the one now before the Committee.


said he was anxious, before the Committee divided, to explain that which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had rendered somewhat obscure, doubtless owing to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman was not in the House when he (Mr. Ayrton) explained to the Committee the object of his Amendment. Now, his object in proposing that Amendment was to prevent the Government being vested in an ordinary Secretary of State, as expressed in the words of the Resolution, but in a Minister of the Crown, who was to act in concert with a Council, having nevertheless full and perfect responsibility. So far, indeed, from diminishing the responsibility of the Minister to Parliament his Amendment would increase it, because the presence of an intelligent Council would compel him to state and record the reasons which had induced him to adopt any particular course of conduct, and these reasons could at any time be produced. He had, in fact, proposed the Amendment under the impression that the Resolution before the Committee affirmed what it contained, and not as affirming something which it did not state.


said, that this question was of so much importance that he trusted the Committee would indulge him for a minute while he referred to two historical errors into which the noble Lord the Member for the City of London had fallen. The noble Lord had spoken of the Council of Warren Hastings as being a Council then for the first time appointed. Such was not the case, inasmuch as the Governors General of India had always had a Council under the old constitution. The noble Lord had also spoken, and justly, of the mischief which that Council did by interfering with and crippling the power of Warren Hastings; but at a later period Parliament wisely conferred on the Governor General the power, which Warren Hastings had not, of overruling the opinion of his Council, and acting upon his own responsibility. He trusted that the Minister of the Crown would have the same power.


said, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair whether any decision at which the Committee might now arrive would debar them from considering at a future period the question of a Council to aid the Secretary of State.


the Committee will not be debarred from considering any Amendment which may be put at a subsequent period.

Question put, That the words, 'for this purpose it is expedient to provide that her Majesty' stand part of the Question.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 351; Noes 100: Majority 251.

List of the AYES.
Adeane, H. J. Brand, hon. H.
Agnew, Sir A. Bridges, Sir B. W.
Akroyd, E. Brocklehurst, J.
Alexander, J. Browne, Lord J. T.
Annesley, hon. H. Bruce, H. A.
Archdall, Capt. M. Bruen, H.
Ashley, Lord Buller, Sir J. Y.
Atherton, W. Buller, J. W.
Bagwell, J. Bunbury, W. B. M'C.
Bailey, C. Burghley, Lord
Baillie, H. J. Burrell, Sir C. M.
Baines, rt. hon. M. T. Butt, I.
Baring, H. B. Buxton, Sir E. N.
Baring, T. G. Caird, J.
Barnard, T. Cairns, Sir H. M.
Bernard, T. T. Calcutt, F. M.
Bathurst, A. A. Campbell, R. J. R.
Beach, W. W. B. Cardwell, rt. hon. E.
Bective, Earl of Carnac, Sir J. R.
Beecroft, G. S. Cartwright, Col.
Bennet, P Cavendish, hon. W.
Bentinck, G. W. P. Cavendish, hon. G.
Berkeley, F. W. F. Cecil, Lord R.
Blake, J. Charlesworth, J. C. D.
Boldero, Col. Child, S.
Bouverie, Rt. Hn. E. P. Christy, S.
Bovill, W. Clark, J. J.
Bowyer, G. Clay, J.
Boyd, J. Clive, G.
Bramley-Moore, J. Clive, hon. R. W.
Bramston, T. W. Close, M. C.
Cobbold, J. C. Gilpin, Col.
Codrington, Gen. Glyn, G. G.
Cole, hon. H. A. Goderich, Visct.
Collier, R. P. Greaves, E.
Collins. T. Greenall, G.
Coningham, W. Greenwood, J.
Conolly, T. Greer, S. M'C.
Cowper, rt. hon. W. F. Gray, Captain
Corry, rt. hon. H. L. Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Cowan, C. Grey, R. W.
Cox, W. Griffith, C. D.
Craufurd, E. H. J. Grogan, E.
Cross, R. A. Grosvenor, Earl
Curzon, Visct. Gurdon, B.
Dalkeith, Earl of Hall, rt. hon. Sir B.
Davey, R. Hall, Gen.
Davison, R. Hamilton, G. A.
Deedes, W. Hamilton, Capt.
Denison, hon. W. H. F. Handley, J.
Dent, J. D. Hankey, T.
De Vere, S. E. Hardy, G.
Devereux, J. T. Harris, J. D.
Disraeli, rt. hon. B. Hassard, M.
Dobbs, W. C. Hatchell, J.
Du Cane, C. Hay, L. J.
Duff, M. E. G. Hayes, Sir E.
Duff, Major L. D. G. Headlam, T. E.
Duke, Sir J. Heathcote, hon. G. H.
Dunbar, Sir W. Henley, rt. hon. J. W.
Duncan, Visct. Holford, R. S.
Duncombe, hon. A. Hopwood, J. T.
Duncombe, hon. Col. Hornby, W. H.
Dundas, G. Horsfall, T. B.
Dunkellin, Lord Horsman, rt. hon. E.
Dunne, M. Howard, hon. C. W. G.
Du Pre, C. G. Howard, Lord E.
Dutton, hon. R. H. Hudson, G.
Edwards, H. Hume, W. W. F.
Egerton, Sir P. G. Hutt, W.
Egerton, W. T. Ingestre, Visct.
Egerton, E. C. Inglis, J.
Elton, Sir A. H. Jermyn, Earl
Emlyn, Visct. Jervoise, Sir J. C.
Ennis, J. Johnstone, hon. H. B.
Esmonde, J. Johnstone, J. J. H.
Estcourt, rt. hn. T. H. S. Jolliffe, H. H.
Evans, T. W. Kelly, Sir F.
Ewart, W. Kendall, N.
Ewart, J. C. Kerrison, Sir E. C.
Fagan, W. Kershaw, J.
Farnham, E. B. King, J. K.
Farquhar, Sir M. King, E. B.
Fellowes, E. Kinglake, A. W.
Fenwick, H. Kinglake, J. A.
Ferguson, Col. Kingscote, R. N. F.
Ferguson, Sir R. Kinnaird, hon. A. F.
Fitzgerald, W. R. S. Kirk, W.
FitzGerald, rt. hon. J. D. Knatchbull, W. F.
Fitzwilliam, hon. G. W. Knatchbull-Hugessen E.
Foley, J. H. Knight, F. W.
Foljambe, F, J. S. Knox, Col.
Forde, Col. Labouchere, rt. hon. H.
Forester, rt. hon. Col. Langton, W. G.
Forster, Sir G. Langton, H. G.
Foster, W. O. Laslett, W.
Fortescue, hon. F. D. Lennox, Lord H. G.
Franklyn, G. W. Leslie, C. P.
Fraser, Sir W. A. Levinge, Sir R.
Freestun, Col. Lewis, rt. hn. Sir G. C.
Gallwey, Sir W. P. Lindsay, W. S.
Gard, R. S. Lisburne, Earl of
Garnett, W. J. Locke, John
Gavin, Major Lopes, Sir M.
Lovaine, Lord Sandon, Visct.
Lowe, rt. hon. R. Sclater-Booth, G.
Lowther, hon. Col. Scott, Major
Lowther, Captain Scrope, G. P.
Luce, T. Seymer, H. K.
Lygon, hon. F. Shelley, Sir J. V.
Lytton, Sir G. E. L. B. Shirley, E. P.
Macartney, G. Slaney, R. A.
MacEvoy, E. Smith, rt. hon. R. V.
Mackie, J. Smith, Sir F.
Mackinnon, W. A. Smyth, Col.
M'Clintock, J. Smollett, A.
Maguire, J. F. Somerset, Col.
Malins, R. Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W.
Manners, Lord J. Spooner, R.
March, Earl of Stanhope, J. B.
Marshall, W. Stanley, Lord
Martin, C. W. Stapleton, J.
Massey, W. N. Stephenson, R.
Matheson, Sir J. Stirling, W.
Maxwell, hon. Col. Steuart, A.
Mellor, J. Stewart, Sir M. R. S.
Miles, W. Sturt, H. G.
Miller, T. J. Sturt, N.
Miller, S. B. Sullivan, M.
Mills, T. Thornhill, W. P.
Moffatt, G. Tite, W.
Monsell, rt. hon. W. Tollemache, hon. F. J.
Montgomery Sir G. Tollemache, J.
Morgan, O. Tottenham, C.
Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R. Trefusis, hon. C. H. R.
Naas, Lord Trelawny, Sir J. S.
Napier, Sir C. Trollope, rt. hon. Sir J.
Neeld, J. Trueman, C.
Newark, Visct. Turner, J. A.
Noel, hon. G. J. Vance, J.
North, Col. Vansittart, G. H.
North, F. Vansittart, W.
Ogilvy, Sir J. Verner, Sir W.
Ossulston, Lord Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Packe, C. W. Vivian, H. H.
Paget, C. Waddington, H. S.
Paget, Lord C. Walcott, Adm.
Pakenham, Col. Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.
Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J. Walsh, Sir J.
Palk, L. Warre, J. A.
Palmer, R. Warren, S.
Palmerston, Visct. Welby, W. E.
Paull, H. Western, S.
Pease, H. Westhead, J. P. B.
Peel, rt. hon. Gen. Whitbread, S.
Pennant, hon. Col. Whiteside, rt. hon. J.
Perry, Sir T. E. Wickham, H. W.
Pevensey, Visct. Williams, Col.
Pilkington, J. Williams, W.
Potter, Sir J. Williams, Sir W. F.
Powell, F. S. Willson, A.
Pritchard, J. Wilson, J.
Proby, hon. G. L. Wingfield, R. B.
Pugh, D. Winnington, Sir T. E.
Puller, C. W. Wise, J. A.
Ramsden, Sir J. W. Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.
Rebow, J. G. Woodd, B. T.
Repton, G. W. J. Woods, H.
Ricardo, O. Wortley, Major S.
Richardson, J. Wyndham, Gen.
Robartes, T. J. A. Wynne, rt. hon. J. A.
Robertson, P. F. Wynne, W. W. E.
Roebuck, J. A. York, hon. E. T.
Rushout, G. Young, A. W.
Russell, Lord J. TELLERS.
Russell, A. Jolliffe, Sir W.
Rust, J. Taylor, Col.
List of the NOES.
Adair, H. E. Langston, J. H.
Agar-Ellis, hn. L. G. F. Liddell, hon. H. G.
Bagshaw, R. J. Locke, Joseph
Baring, A. H. Lockhart, A. E.
Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T. Macarthy, A.
Baring, T. Mangles, R. D.
Bass, M. T. Mangles, C. E.
Baxter, W. E. Marjoribanks, D. C.
Bland, L. H. Melgund, Visct.
Bonham-Carter, J. Milns, R. M.
Bouverie, hon. P. P. Morris, D.
Briscoe, J. I. Newdegate, C. N.
Bruce, Major C. Nicoll, D.
Buchanan, W. Nisbet, R. P.
Buxton, C. O'Brien, P.
Byng, hon. G. O'Donaghoe, The
Calcraft, J. H. Paxton, Sir J.
Clinton, Lord R. Philips, R. N.
Cobbett, J. M. Pinney, Col.
Colebrooke, Sir T. E. Rawlinson, Sir H. C.
Crawford, R. W. Ridley, G.
Dalglish, R. Roupell, W.
Damer, L. D. Schneider, H. W.
Deasy, R. Scott, hon. F.
Dillwyn, L. L. Shafto, R. D.
Dunlop, A. M. Sheridan, H. B.
East, Sir J. B. Smith, J. A.
Ebrington, Viscount Smith, M. T.
Ellice, rt. hon. E. Smith, A.
Ellice, E. Steel, J.
Elliot, hon. J. E. Stuart, Col.
Elphinstone, Sir J. Sykes, Col. W. H.
Ewing, H. E. C. Talbot, C. R. M.
Fitzwilliam, hn. C. W. W. Tancred, H. W.
Fortescue, C. S. Taylor, S. W.
Fox, W. J. Tempest, Lord A. V.
Gifford, Earl of Thompson, Gen.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W. Vane, Lord H.
Greene, J. Verner, Sir H.
Gregory, W. H. Waldron, L.
Grenfell, C. W. Watkins, Col. L.
Greville, Col. F. Weguelin, T. M.
Gurney, J. H. Whatman, J.
Hanbury, R. White, J.
Hartington, Marq. White, H.
Heathcote, Sir W. Willyams, E. W. B.
Holland, E. Willoughby, J. P.
Hope, A. J. B. B. Wood, W.
Hotham, Lord
Ingham, R. TELLERS.
Johnstone, Sir J. Ayrton, J.
Knightley, R. Willoughby, Sir H.

MR. ELLICE, in moving that the Chairman report progress and ask leave to sit again, said, that when the House next went into Committee, he would propose to insert in the Resolution words to the effect that "a President in Council" be substituted for "a Secretary of State."


said, that as there was another Amendment on the paper which applied to this Resolution, he thought the Committee had better dispose of it before reporting progress. If, however, the Committee was disinclined to proceed any further that night, of course he could not resist its wish.


said, if it were the desire of the Committee, he would move his Amendment then.

House resumed.

Committee report progress; to sit again on Friday.