CONSIDERATION.

HC Deb 06 July 1858 vol 151 cc1002-50

Order for Consideration of the Bill, as amended, read.

MR. GREGSON moved that the consideration of the Bill, as amended, be postponed until Thursday next. He had no wish to impede the progress of the measure, but as the reprint of the Bill with Amendments had only been delivered with the Votes that morning, he thought that Members had scarcely had time to give it the consideration which its importance demanded. If the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) would not consent to the Motion, he would then appeal to the House whether, under the circumstances, it was not a fair one to make.

LORD STANLEY

said, he was in the hands of the House in regard to this matter; but he apprehended that the general feeling of the House was rather in favour of proceeding with as little delay as possible. He would remind the hon. Gentleman that the reprint consisted really of nothing but the original Bill and those Amendments which had been in print for several days before.

SIR HENRY RAWLINSON

said, the paragraphs in the reprint were all numbered differently to what they were in the original Bill.

Motion negatived.

LORD STANLEY

then moved the omission of Clause 31, with a view to the insertion of new clauses. The first of those new clauses was as follows:— Sections 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42, of the Act of the 16th and 17th of Victoria, chap. 95, are hereby repealed, so far as the same apply to or provide for the admission or appointment of persons to the civil service of the East India Company.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM

said, he was very unwilling to obstruct the further progress of the measure, more especially since the noble Lord the President of the Board of Control had displayed so much candour and wisdom in dealing with this Bill; but he must certainly say that, in reference to Clause 31, the proposed Amendment was not an improvement. The noble Lord proposed to omit that clause and to insert another clause. With all convenient speed, after the passing of this Act, regulations shall be made by the Secretary of State, with the advice and assistance of the Commissioners for the time being acting in execution of Her Majesty's Order in Council of 21st May, 1855, 'for regulating the admission of persons to the civil service of the Crown,' for admitting all persons being natural-born subjects of Her Majesty (and of such an age and qualification as may be prescribed in this behalf) who may be desirous of becoming candidates for appointment to the civil service of India, to be examined as candidates accordingly, and for prescribing the branches of knowledge in which uch candidates shall be examined, and generally for regulating and conducting such examinations under the su- perintendence of the said last-mentioned Commissioners, or of the persons for the time being entrusted with the carrying out of such regulations as may be from time to time established by Her Majesty for examination, certificate, or other test of fitness in relation to appointments to junior situations in the civil service of the Crown, and the candidates who may be certified by the said Commissioners or other persons as aforesaid to be entitled under such regulations, shall be recommended for appointment according to the order of their proficiency as shown by such examinations, and such persons only as shall have been so certified as aforesaid shall be appointed or admitted to the civil service of India by the Secretary of State in Council; provided always that all regulations to be made by the said Secretary of State under this Act shall be laid before Parliament within fourteen days after the making thereof, if Parliament be sitting, and, if Parliament be not sitting, then within fourteen days after the next meeting thereof. He must own he did not think there ought to be an ouster of the advice of the Council, which this Amendment seemed to imply. He thought the advice of the Council on such a point the very best advice which could be given. He had the greatest respect for the two Civil Service Commissioners; but he thought the Council still more competent to give advice than Sir John Lefevre and Sir Edward Ryan. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry) had, on a former occasion, observed that he (Sir J. Graham) seemed to be the organ of the East India Company in that House. He knew not what he had done or said there to justify such an observation. He certainly had not hesitated to express his opinion that the Directors of the East India Company had served their country in an eminent degree, and deserved the confidence of the British public; they had mainly created and conquered a great empire for this country; and he believed it would not be found much more easy to maintain it than they had found to conquer it. For the rest he might tell the hon. and learned Gentleman that he (Sir J. Graham) never had been in receipt of wages from the East India Company, and was not at present a pensioner of that body.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

supposed it would be thought that the right hon. Baronet had made a very pointed and severe attack upon him when he alluded to a gentleman having received the wages of the East India Company and being a pensioner of that corporation. The right hon. Baronet had doubtless employed his leisure in framing the most sarcastic sentence he could devise as applicable to him; but he begged leave to observe that the right hon. Baronet was entirely wrong in his facts, for he had not been in the service of the East India Company and was not one of their pensioners.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM

never said, the hon. Member had been in the East India Company's service.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of his being in their pay and being their pensioner. He had, indeed, received the public money for his services, and so had the right hon. Baronet; and without placing himself in competition with the right hon. Gentleman he would say this, that he had served as faithfully and to the best of his ability as the right hon. Baronet had himself done. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to be nettled that he should have been described as the organ of the East India Company in that House. He would tell him again, what he had alluded to the other day, that by maintaining the position of the East India Company and endeavouring to assimilate the new Council to the Court of Directors, the right hon. Baronet had, in his humble opinion, done more injury to the measure before the House than any other man in it. It might easily be conceived that the right hon. Baronet, at his time of life, should be indisposed to make any change; and doubtless that feeling accounted for his votes on this question. However, the observation of the right hon. Baronet did not apply to him, for he could say that he had given every vote in reference to the East India Company as conscientiously and as free from bias as any Member of that House. With respect to the clause now under consideration it was in perfect unison with the 16th clause of the Bill, and the objection of the right hon. Baronet therefore fell to the ground. He hoped the noble Lord would adhere to the clauses he had drawn.

MR. VERNON SMITH

said, that in the course of the discussion in Committee the noble Lord had laid about forty different Amendments on the table, and though those Amendments had been adopted they had never been reprinted. The Bill had indeed been reprinted; but the noble Lord now sought to introduce fresh clauses and Amendments on the Report. It was desirable that the noble Lord should explain the object of the alteration which he now proposed.

LORD STANLEY

said, as Clause 31 originally stood it left the competitive principle optional in reference to the ad- mission into the civil service. The clause in effect placed the question upon the same footing as it stood in the Act of 1853. Under the clause of 1853 there was nothing to prevent any Government from sweeping away the whole system of unlimited competition, and of adopting, if it were so pleased, limited competition by examination tests. He had no doubt but that the framers of the Act of 1853 acted wisely at the time, leaving as large a discretion as possible in the hands of the authorities. But when the clause so taken from the Act of 1853 was brought to his notice, he felt that it was not the intention of Parliament or the Government to have the permissive principle contained in the present Bill. The Government were, therefore, willing to accept the clause of the hon. and learned Gentleman because it established beyond doubt the principle of competition, which was thus made binding and no longer permissive. The rule of unrestricted competition could not now be altered except by an appeal to Parliament. That, he thought, was an important gain.

MR. GLADSTONE

thanked the noble Lord for introducing into the Bill a positive enactment on the subject of competitive examinations. Furthermore, he thought the noble Lord would act wisely in providing that the superintendence of the examinations should be placed in the hands of the Civil Service Commissioners, because they had the experience and staff which rendered them the best qualified to conduct such examinations. But the clause went somewhat beyond that, because it was a complete ouster of the Council from many matters referring to the admission of candidates to the civil service upon which they would be the most competent to give an opinion.

MR. MANGLES

, in order to show that there was room for the consultation of the Council, said that if the President of the Board of Control had asked the advice of the Court of Directors as to the mode of carrying out the provision of the Act of 1853, he would have avoided the fatal mistake of fixing the limit as to the age of candidates too high.

LORD STANLEY

said, that the exclusion of the Council by this clause was not so absolute as it appeared, because by Clause 36 it was provided that "the power of making regulations in relation to appointments in the civil service may be exercised by the Secretary of State in Council." At the seine time, he had no objec- tion to insert in the next clause (31 A) the words "in Council" after "Secretary of State:"

Original Clause 31 struck out.

Clause 31, as amended, agreed to, and added to the Bill.

The clause above recited was then brought up, and read 1^o and 2^o.

The words "in Council," after "Secretary of State," were, on the Motion of Lord STANLEY, inserted in the clause.

Clause, as amended, added to the Bill.

MR. GLADSTONE

, in rising to move a clause of which he had given notice, said that he cordially accepted that principle of our constitution which treated the waking peace and war as strictly a function of the Executive Government, and as such a part of the prerogative of the Crown; but it had always been part of the wisdom of Parliament to limit the exercise of that prerogative by a variety of safeguards, and the means which had been adopted for that purpose had generally been effectual. By one of the fundamental laws of the constitution it was a high breach of the rights and privileges of the people to maintain a standing army without the authority of Parliament; nor was that authority a mere matter of form, for in its annual proceedings the House gave practical effect to that principle by voting the precise number of men of which the army was to consist, as well as the exact amount of military expenditure; and that check ensured the earliest appeal to Parliament in all matters connected with the levying of war by the Crown. Moreover, it had been the practice of Governments not to confine their appeals to Parliament for support, when about to undertake military operations, to cases where an increase of the military establishment or an increase of expense was necessary. The force which Mr. Canning sent to Portugal in 1825 and 1826, with the view of defending that country against hostile machinations on the side of Spain, was a very small one; but, because it was in the nature of a military operation, it was thought advisable to obtain the assent of Parliament to the measures that were contemplated, and a message was brought down to Parliament on the subject. It was difficult to apply that principle to the case of an empire so distant as the East Indies; but it was by no means so difficult now as it was sixty years ago, when Parliament was first called upon to legislate for our East Indian territories, and when the average communica- tion between this country and India was not less than five or six months instead of as many weeks. Yet, at that time, two great constitutional authorities—Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox—who agreed on hardly anything else, were agreed on the necessity of limiting the powers of peace and war which were to be exercised in the East Indies, and both of them, by means not very different, gave effect to their intentions in their respective Bills. Under the BM of Mr. Fox it would have been unlawful, under any circumstances, to make any war in India, excepting upon a State that was certified to be about to attack and make war upon us or upon our allies; and the measure of Mr. Pitt, which became an Act, contained provisions nearly similar. It might, be said that these provisions had been ineffectual; but he alluded to them solely with reference to the principle which they enshrined—namely, that it was necessary in a case like that of the East Indies, where we could not have the securities which we possessed at home, to devise limitations of another kind upon the prerogative of the Crown in making peace and war. The question now arose, in what manner ought we to deal with this important subject, at the present time? He thought it was not difficult to show, in the first place, that it was practicable to make arrangements more likely to be efficacious than those which were adopted by Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, and, in the second place, that a great necessity now existed for such arrangements. The communications with the East Indies were now so greatly shortened, and the contrivances of modern science and the daring of British enterprise were likely to effect so much in shortening them still further, that the whole question had assumed quite a different character from that which it had fifty, forty, or even twenty years ago, with regard to the probable inconvenience of hampering, in case of necessity, the action of the Executive Government. What he proposed was:— That, except for repelling actual invasion, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, Her Majesty's Forces in the East Indies shall not be employed in any Military operation beyond the external frontier of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, without the consent of Parliament to the purposes thereof. At the time when Mr. Fox proposed his Bill, and Mr. Pitt passed his Act, the wars waged in India were local wars. That was not the case now. Such had been the growth of the British empire, that we had now reached a point at which it became a subject of speculation what Powers might be intriguing against us that stood in positive geographical connection with our frontiers, and whether the arms of Europe might not be carried into India. The consequence had already been, that wars had been waged in India that had been entirely divested of a local character, and that had had exclusive reference to European politics. Upon that ground alone it was necessary that we should contemplate seriously the imposition of restrictions such as those he now suggested, and which he hoped would not be thought too stringent. But, in order to prove his case, he must refer to particular instances, and he would take as his examples the Affghan and Persian wars. The Affghan war was the subject of long previous eensideration— not the offspring of any sudden or unforeseen necessity, but the fruit of deliberate policy and of mature preparation; and if it had been necessary to appeal to Parliament before it was commenced, there was no doubt that it could have been done without danger or inconvenience. It was, however, entered upon without any such reference, although a large section of the House of Commons disapproved of it; and so strong was that sentiment, that, even after the war had been commenced, his right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham), who was then acting in connection with a numerous and powerful party, actually gave notice of his intention to challenge the judgment of the House upon the propriety of the war. But as the war had been actually begun, it was considered, on grounds of State policy, practically impossible to appeal to the judgment of Parliament, and Parliament was excluded from pronouncing its opinion on the Affghan war, which involved the lives of as many subjects of the Queen as the Russian war, and which added to the debt of India some £12,000,000 or £15,000,000 sterling, forming a permanent burden on the population of that country. He was not now saying whether that war was right or wrong—that did not matter to his purpose; but what he maintained was, that it was a matter in which Parliament ought to have had something to say, and Parliament had nothing to say in it. At a later period an attempt was made by the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) to challenge the judgment of Parliament in a retrospective and condemnatory sentence on that war. The Motion entirely failed, as all such Motions did, and usually ought to do, even if Parliament differed on the original policy of the war, unless in the case of some flagrant breach of public principle and duty. He appealed, then, to that war to prove the necessity of a prior reference to the opinion of Parliament. The question to consider was, whether the Great Council of the Queen and nation should be practically excluded from consultation and influence on questions vitally affecting the interests of the empire. With respect to the Persian war the case was still more forcible, because it came home nearer by one degree to the rights of the British people and to the rights of the House of Commons. When the Government of that day gave orders for military operations in the case of the Persian war, they seemed to have felt that it would be unjust to impose on the people of India all the burdens of that war, as the war was to be made for objects really not Indian but British; and, perhaps, it would have been more just, as the people of India had no voice in the matter whether the war should be made or not, if India had not been called on to pay any charge in respect to it. Accordingly, the Government proposed an arrangement under which the cost of the war was to fall in the first instance upon the East India Company; but a portion of that cost was to be reimbursed to them from the Imperial Exchequer. He wished the House of Commons to look at its position in reference to the Persian war. In the autumn of 1856 an order was sent out for military operations in Persia. In February, 1857, Parliament met, and he did not recollect whether there was any communication in the Queen's Speech on the subject. There might have been; but, at all events, it was only one of that nature that called forth a formal and ceremonial answer, according to the usual practice of the Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne at the beginning of a Session. Time went on, and Government were asked whether it was their intention to take a vote for the Persian war. They answered that it was not; and the Parliament which existed when the war was made was dissolved without having had the opportunity of saying, whether it was or was not an assenting party to that war, though during the existence of that Parliament all the expenditure was incurred. He was not at the present moment uttering one word as to the policy of the war; assuming the public necessity for all the measures taken, his doctrine was, that those were measures to which Parliament ought to have been a party. He appealed to the Members of the late Government to say, whether it was not a most dangerous precedent that it should lie in the discretion of the Executive to make use of what might be called extraneous finance and an extraneous army for the purpose of making war, the expense of which was hereafter to be charged on the British people? The point did not bear argument, and it was plain that if such a precedent were to grow into a practice it would amount to a perfect nullification of the privileges of the House of Commons upon one of those points most vitally and immediately connected with the rights of the British people. He, therefore, strongly urged on the House the necessity of some restraint being placed by law on the action of the Government in this matter; and he did not believe that any public inconvenience would arise from so doing. It was quite plain that if they could suppose a case arising in which military operations would be necessary, and which was not governed by the exceptions he proposed, it would be the duty of the Executive, on its own discretion, to order those preparations, and come down to Parliament for a Bill of indemnity.

Clause brought up, and read 1^o.

LORD STANLEY

said, he did not rise to reply to the arguments of his right hon. Friend, nor did he propose to enter into the circumstances which he had used as illustrations of the argument itself. There was not one expression which fell from him on the subject to which he was not prepared to assent. The Government were prepared to assent to the clause which his right hon. Friend proposed. He would only add, that the sole reason which prevented its being in the original draft of the Bill was, that it seemed to the Government that, although a clause of this kind might be very valuable as a declaration of the intentions and opinions of Parliament, still, as a practical check upon the Minister, it had not much binding force. There was first in the clause the exception of cases of "sudden and urgent necessity." That exception when considered by a Governor General, under the influence of strong feelings in favour of war, might be very largely extended. Then, again, the troops were not to be employed without the consent of Parliament. That was a security for one-half of the year, but it was not a security during the months when Parliament was not usually sitting, and could not be conveniently called together. Still, he agreed that it was important to place on record the opinion and feeling of Parliament on a subject of this kind. He thought the clause would answer the effect of constituting such a declaration of opinion; and, in that sense, and accepting it in such a manner, he should be glad to see the clause introduced into the Bill.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

said, that reference had been made to former Acts, in which an attempt had been made to carry into effect the principle of the proposed clause; but these had all unfortunately proved ineffectual in restraining Governors General from entering into wars. Now, the exception in this clause would probably be found to leave the matter still at large, wherever there was a Governor General with a disposition to engage in wars. There were not now, it was true, the same motives for undertaking wars in India which existed in the time of Lord Wellesley, inasmuch as nearly the whole of India had been brought under British dominion; and the temptation now was to engage in such wars as had occurred in Affghanistan and in Persia. He thought that great difficulties might result from the practice which would be introduced by this clause with regard to Indian wars. It was the prerogative of the Crown to declare war, and it would undoubtedly be the prerogative of the Crown to declare war in any part of Asia. But the general prerogative of the Crown in declaring war was practically limited by the necessity of obtaining votes of Supply from Parliament for the purpose of carrying on war. Beyond that constitutional necessity the prerogative of the Crown with regard to a declaration of war, or concluding peace, was unlimited. Suppose, however, the Governor General desired to make war, not for the purpose of repelling actual invasion, or under other sudden and urgent necessity—he would have to communicate with the Home Government; and in what manner would the consent of Parliament be obtained? He presumed it would be necesary to obtain the consent of both Houses, and that it would be the duty of the executive Government to introduce a Bill formally giving their consent to the Governor General's making war. That might be difficult to procure. Then the question might arise whether, Parliament having consented to the commencement of a war, it was competent for the Governor General to terminate such war without the assent of Parliament? If they sanctioned such a principle it might be extended to other wars, and they might eventually adopt the doctrine that the British Parliament, like the American Senate, should give its consent to all wars in derogation of the existing prerogative of the Crown. If this clause was to have a practical effect these points would have to be considered.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, he would not enter into any argument as to the past wars to which his right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone) had referred; but be must observe that the right hon. Gentleman was mistaken, as to a matter of fact, in his statement with regard to the Persian war, which was formally announced to Parliament in Her Majesty's Speech at the opening of the Session, and after such announcement it was competent to any hon. Member to call the attention of Parliament to the subject. He entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend who last spoke, that the consent of Parliament was not necessary previous to a declaration of war, because it was a fundamental principle of the constitution, that the power of declaring war and concluding peace rested with the Crown, the Ministers of the Crown being responsible for the manner in which they advised the Crown to exercise that prerogative. To maintain that the previous consent of Parliament was necessary, either to the commencement of a war or to the conclusion of a peace, would be to introduce a principle destructive of the British constitution; and he was somewhat surprised that Her Majesty's Ministers, who were the guardians of the prerogatives of the Crown and of the constitution of the country, did not rise and protest against doctrines which, in his opinion, were most inconsistent with prerogative and the constitution. But apart from the constitutional question, there was, he thought, a technical verbal objection to the clause in its present form. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) proposed to enact that Her Majesty's forces in India should not go beyond the frontiers of Her Majesty's Indian dominions except to repel invasions; but invasion could only be repelled in the country which was invaded, and to state formally and deliberately in an Act of Parliament that troops should not go beyond the frontier of an invaded country to repel invasion was to perpetrate what in the sister country might be called a "bull." His right hon. Friend would probably adopt some other phraseology with the view of accomplishing his object. He apprehended, however, that the clause in its present form would go beyond the intentions either of his right hon. Friend or of the Government. What were "Her Majesty's forces ill the East Indies?" Did those words refer to the local army, or to the Queen's troops stationed in the East Indies? He presumed they were meant to apply only to the local army, because otherwise the clause would prevent any part of the Queen's troops in India from being removed from that country for the purpose of carrying on military operations in any other part of the world without the previous consent of Parliament. Suppose a war should break out with China, Turkey, or any other Power, and it should be deemed necessary to remove a portion of the regular troops from India for the purpose carrying on such war, were those troops to be placed upon a different footing from Her Majesty's forces at the Cape, at the Mauritius, or in any other part of the Queen's dominions abroad? He thought the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) would act somewhat hastily if he adopted the clause in its present form.

THE CHANCELLOR of THE EXCHEQUER

said, that the noble Lord had said that by the constitution of the country the Sovereign alone had the power of peace and of war, and that he looked to the Ministers of the Crown, who were the constitutional guardians of that prerogative, to oppose the clause which was now brought forward. [Viscount PALMERSTON: The principle which it involves.] The principle enshrined in the clause. Well, let it be so. No doubt by the constitution of the country the power of peace and war rested with the Sovereign; but what they were now considering was a state of affairs not under the constitution of the country. The power of declaring peace and war might be left to the Sovereign under the constitution of this country, and with a House of Commons that voted the supplies and had a legitimate and constitutional mode of expressing its opinion. But if the power of declaring war and peace was left entirely in the hands of the Sovereign in India, there were not the means of controlling its exercise that existed in this country, and a policy might be pursued extremely injurious to the national interests. The instances which the noble Lord gave to show the injurious consequences of adopting the clause did not apply. The noble Lord said that if this clause were adopted there would be no power of employing the Queen's troops that happened to be in India in a war which might arise with China, Persia, or other Powers. But if the Queen's troops in India were required by a war in China or in Turkey, that war would have been declared in consequence of an exercise of the prerogative of the Grown under the constitution, and in that case Parliament would have had an opportunity of declaring its opinion; and, therefore, the clause could not interpose any difficulty in the way of the troops being moved from India. Some provision of this kind, would, he thought, be salutary as regarded India. And although an alteration might perhaps be advantageously made in the language of the clause, he believed that it did not involve any invasion of the prerogative that the Crown exercised under the constitution of the country, but was a salutary and politic provision.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

agreed in the general policy of the clause on the grounds which had been stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for there were in India upwards of 200,000 soldiers to whose support a large amount of revenue was appropriated, which soldiers were not voted by the House of Commons, neither was the means of paying them. He did not agree in all his noble Frind's objections to the working of the clause—for instance, in regard to "repelling invasion;" that would obviously apply to troops crossing the frontier to attack the enemy after the invasion had taken place; but he was disposed, however, to concur in the objection raised by his noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) to the terms of the clause. "Her Majesty's forces in the East Indies," it was said, "shall not be employed in any military operation" beyond the frontier of India without the consent of Parliament. Now, supposing we had a war with some European power, and that, this war being supported by the House of Commons, it was considered desirable for the Indian army to attack the possessions of this enemy of the Crown, it appeared to him the clause would prevent the employment of those forces without the consent of Parliament. Thus if, prior to the attack on Java, when we were at war with the Dutch, the Governor General had been obliged to send to the home Government, and they had been obliged to apply to Parliament to obtain authority for this expedition, it might have failed altogether, be- cause, by making it known to the enemy through a debate in Parliament, you would entirely defeat your object. He doubted, also, whether the language of the clause would not have prevented the expedition to Egypt.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

thought the clause as it stood would meet both the cases mentioned by the noble Lord, which would come within the scope of the words "or under other sudden and urgent necessity." He would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) whether it would not be better to alter the wording of the clause by making it read—Her Majesty's forces "maintained out of the revenue of India" shall not be employed, &c.

MR. WILSON

believed there was no precedent whatever for the interference of the House of Commons in the disposal of Her Majesty's forces. He concurred with his right hon. Friend {Mr. Gladstone) that it was desirable Parliament should have a check upon Indian as well as upon European wars; but he suggested whether his object would not be gained in a more constitutional way if, instead of saying that "Her Majesty's forces in the East Indies shall not be employed," and so on, he provided "that the revenues of India shall not be applied for such purpose, except with the consent of Parliament." This would leave the prerogative of the Crown in respect to the employment of forces unimpaired. It would then be exactly analogous to the practice in this country, where a Vote of Supply formed the only check upon military operations.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, he had no objection to make the alteration suggested by the Solicitor General, which he thought would meet the case. He did not think the alteration suggested by his hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson) was a desirable one.

MR. VERNON SMITH

thought the alteration proposed by the Solicitor General a good one; but he wished to ask in what manner it was thought necessary, in point of law, that the approbation of Parliament should be signified.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, the most convenient and constitutional course of testing the consent of Parliament would be by an Address to Her Majesty from both Houses.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, the troops of the regular army While stationed in India were paid out of the Indian revenue, and the clause would thus restrain the action of the Queen's as well as of the local troops.

MR. GLADSTONE

thought the obvious answer to this was, that the moment the troops of the regular army were removed from India into another country for the purpose of military operations, they would cease to be maintained out of the Indian revenue, but would become a charge upon this country.

MR. MANGLES

said the Affghanistan and Persian wars constituted charges upon the Indian revenue.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

thought that the clause was most objectionable, and, although he did not think that it would be possible to strike it out by a division, he should when the Question was put from the Chair that the clause be added to the Bill, say no to that proposal. Clause read 2^o; and amended, by leaving out the word "in," in line 2, and inserting the words "maintained out of the Revenues of," instead thereof.

Question put, "That the clause, as amended, be added to the Bill."

The House divided:—Ayes 152; Noes 46: Majority 106.

Clause udded to the Bill.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

then rose to move the following clause:— That so much of this Act as relates to the nomination, election, numbers, duration of service, salaries, and retired allowances of the Councillors, shall not continue in force longer than for five years from the 1st day of August, 1858. His object was to limit the duration of the Council, and so to place Parliament under the necessity of reconsidering these arrangements after the lapse of a certain time. The arrangements which the Government had been led to make in regard to the constitution of the Council would, he thought, be found in practice inconvenient. In the first place, the proposed Council would be to a certain extent, a continuation of the double government. It was a maxim with a political writer of Italy that if, being compelled to make a charge, you wished to maintain things as nearly as possible as they were, you should change their names. That was precisely what the Government proposed to do in the present instance:—that was to say, they changed the name of the "Court of Directors" to the "Council of India"—but they left, under the new name, very much the same state of things and the same obstructive machinery (as everybody admitted the Court of Directors to be) as existed under the old. Consider what was proposed to be done. There were now eighteen Directors of the East India Company. It was proposed to substitute fifteen Councillors, the greater portion of whom would, of course, be chosen from the present Court of Directors; and no doubt, so far as that choice went, it would fall upon men conversant with Indian affairs and men of capacity. To that, therefore, he could not object. But the House must look not to individuals but to things. Those gentlemen, who had hitherto received £500 a year for doing certain duties, were henceforward to be paid £1,200 a year for doing, at all events, nothing more, and probably less, than they did now. Hitherto they had as Directors held their offices for six years, but were eligible for re-election; now they were to hold office for life; and more than that, these gentlemen, who, if compelled to retire by ill-health or by not being re-elected when the period for re-election arrived, retired without pension, were in future to be entitled to pensions of £500 a year each. What was the object of this great change? What was the reason why the duties the Council had to perform required that the Councillors should be placed in so much better a position than had been occupied by the very individuals who composed it up to the present time? He did not see any reason for it. The duties of the Council would in a few years greatly diminish, for the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) admitted that when the Government of India was transferred to the Crown a great deal of the details of business which were now sent to India would not be sent, and that a great deal of the work would progressively decrease. Their functions would be of a less important character, for, as he understood the Bill, the Council would not have to decide anything; the Cabinet, on the system of Ministerial responsibility which the House had been endeavouring to establish, must have the deciding voice on matters relating to India as well as in other parts of Her Majesty's dominions. The Councillors would have no responsibility, whereas the Directors of the East India Company were responsible to their constituents. Here were fifteen gentlemen without any responsibility about to be placed in a much better position as regarded tenure and as regarded salary than before, for no reason whatever that he could see. He thought it advisable that Parliament should have an opportunity of reconsidering the ar- rangement now made without giving to the Councillors a freehold interest in their places, such as the Bill now proposed to give them. Otherwise, if in three or four years the Government of the day came down and said that they were of opinion that there should be fewer Councillors, that their tenure of office should be shorter, and that retiring pensions ought not to be given, unless there was something in the Bill to enable Parliament to re-consider its enactments, the Act would be pleaded in bar to the action of Parliament as affecting vested interests, unless the Bill itself contained a provision binding them to reconsider the matter within a certain period. As far as it was advantageous to the interests of India, he still thought the number of fifteen Councillors too large. When the late Government was considering the question, they thought six a sufficient number, but in deference to opinions which were expressed on the subject, they extended the number to eight. He was sure that eight would be amply sufficient, and that even six would be found sufficient. If that opinion was correct, it would be found that fifteen would be cumbrous, and that in the transaction of business of moment, so far from accelerating, they would rather tend to retard it. He would put it to hon. Gentlemen who were accustomed to serve on Committees in that House whether, when they consisted of fifteen Members, in deciding on the details of administration—for the Chancellor of the Exchequer emphatically denied that this was an executive, but that it was only an administrative Council—he put it to Gentlemen whether, on Committees consisting of fifteen members, in considering matters analogous to those which would come before this Council, a great deal of time was not consumed in discussing matters which one or two of the Committee, or even the Chairman, could have satisfactorily decided. So far as the details of the Indian Government at home were concerned, he was strongly of opinion that fifteen would be an inconvenient number for the Council, and that the consequence would be either that one-half of the Council would degenerate into sinecurists, or that their exertions would prove an impediment and clog on public business. Indeed, he thought that the noble Lord's (Lord Stanley's) tendency was towards the same opinion. As regarded the convenience of administration, there should be some provision in this Act which would bind Parliament, within a limited period, to reconsider the matter. When that time came, if the Secretary for India stated that he found it to be necessary and convenient that there should be so many Councillors, and that fifteen were required, Parliament, deferring to his experience, would have no difficulty in continuing that number. If the Minister of the day said that he was satisfied from experience that those officers should hold their offices for life instead of for a limited time, of course Parliament would give greater weight to an opinion founded on experience than on those founded on conjecture, on which alone the Government had now acted. The proposition he now made did not interfere with any decision to which the House had come. All he asked was, if this Act passed in its present shape, that any future Government or Parliament should be able to deal with the question of this Council without being met by the question of vested interests and Parliamentary titles to the office of Councillor. He submitted that by the clause he now proposed, future Parliaments and Governments would be free to propose either to alter or to continue the arrangements which were now made, but that if they wished to alter them, that they should not be met by that plea in bar which the Bill, as it now stood, would afford.

Clause brought up. and read 1^o.

LORD STANLEY

said, the noble Lord, at the commencement of his speech, had used two expressions as equivalent the one to the other, which, nevertheless, appeared to convey an entirely opposite meaning. He said, first, that he wished to give Parliament an opportunity of reconsidering this question within a limited time; and then, correcting himself, he said he wished to put Parliament under the necessity of reconsidering it within a limited time. These were two very different propositions, and he objected both to the one and the other, though for different reasons. He objected to the plan by which the noble Lord proposed to give Parliament an opportunity of reconsidering this subject, because Parliament had such an opportunity, not merely at the end of five years, but at the very earliest moment when any measure which it had passed was found inconvenient in its practical working. The noble Lord had talked of keeping the door open for reconsideration. Why, the door was open. And, as to placing the Legislature under the necessity of reconsidering the subject, there was a strong objection to fixing a definite period at which a great question like that of the Indian Government must be dealt with by that House. Such an enactment might have been a proper provision when what was called the renewal of the charter of the East India Company had to take place at certain prescribed intervals; but even with regard to that, frequent and just complaints had been made of the inconvenience of their being compelled to legislate at one particular moment, no matter what might be the other subjects pressing on the attention of Parliament, and no matter how desirable it might be to obtain a longer period for discussion. The House generally had shared in that opinion; because, when the measure of 1853 was brought forward by a Government of which the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was himself a Member, to which Members on both sides objected quite as strongly as the noble Lord did to the present Bill, the question was raised whether, instead of that measure continuing in force until Parliament should otherwise determine, a certain period of time should be fixed for its reconsideration. The sense of the House was against that proposition, partly from many hon. Members thinking it would be imprudent to tie up the whole question for ten years, and partly from the reason he had stated, that no one could foretell what events might occur in that time, or whether, at the end of ten years, there might not be some great political agitation, or a war imminent or pending, which would compel them either to legislate without due attention, or to resort to the clumsy expedient of a Continuance Bill. The noble Lord said he was afraid, unless some such provision were introduced, of vested interests being created, and that Parliament would have to grant heavy compensations in case it should be proposed to reduce the number of members of Council or to diminish their salaries. But if the noble Lord had referred to the last paragraph of the 14th clause, he would have found that that contingency was already guarded against. In the 14th clause it was provided that no Councillor should have any claim for compensation for loss of office under ten years' service, in the event of Parliament deciding at any future time to reduce their number. As the Bill now stood any member of Council, having served ten years, would at the end of that time be allowed a retiring salary, which in case of any reduction in the number of the Council would stand as compensation for his removal. So that, as far as vested interests were concerned, the House need not trouble itself to guard against a peril which was already provided for in the Bill. The noble Lord had also found fault with the provisions of the Bill generally, and had spoken of it as continuing the double Government and the existing machinery of the Indian Government. He (Lord Stanley) remembered hearing a speech of the noble Lord at the commencement of the Session, in which he dwelt upon the inconveniences, delays, and the complexity of the transaction of Indian business which arose from the existence of two offices, and the sending backwards and forwards of despatches, and the noble Lord described what he called "the travels of a despatch," to the amusement of the House. Now, the Bill, whatever else it might have spared, had certainly swept away the two offices, and despatches would not have to travel until they commenced their journey to India. Then, again, the Court of Proprietors having been abolished, the administration of Indian affairs having been placed directly under the Crown, great facilities had been provided for placing the army in India upon a different footing, if it should be deemed necessary, and the first step had been taken, without which any measures of reform hereafter would have been more difficult. He denied that, although the Bill was less extensive in its character, and gave less power to the Minister than the measure of the noble Lord, it was therefore to be considered as a mere continuance of the existing system. Into the question of the number of the Council he would not follow the noble Lord, but would only observe in reference to his remark that fifteen was an awkward number, that after long experience that House continued to adopt that very number for its Committees. In fact, a great part of the work of the Council would be done in the Committees which it was proposed to create, and not by the whole collective body. The noble Lord seemed to think that the Government looked forward to the time when the number of the Council might be reduced. He (Lord Stanley) repeated what he had said on former occasions. They were told that by a different mode of carrying on business in India it might be possible greatly to diminish the work of the Government at home. Upon that point he expressed no opinion. If it should turn out that the amount of work transacted in this country was diminished, no doubt it would be proper to consider whether the number of Councillors also might not be reduced. But he did not regard the Councillors merely as so many clerks; their assistance would be required for the experience they would bring, the advice they would give, and the administrative ability they would possess. He did not deny that hereafter a reduction might be possible, and if so, remembering that they were all now acting in a great measure upon conjecture and as an experiment, he would not be ashamed, and no Minister need be ashamed, to come down to that House and ask Parliament to alter the arrangement which it had sanctioned, but which a change of circumstances had rendered unfit to be continued. If the noble Lord thought so badly of the Bill as he appeared to do, it was not a question of enduring for five years only, but whether it should pass at all. If that was his opinion, there would soon be an opportunity of trying the question upon the third reading, when he could ascertain whether the House still adhered to the opinions it had already expressed upon this subject.

MR. BRIGHT

observed that, when the clause of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton first met his eye he was undecided as to the course that he should take, for he was afraid that fixing a period of five years for the time when this question should be reviewed might give to what he considered altogether a faulty measure, a length of life which it did not deserve. On the other hand, he had a fear that if no period for review was fixed probably such a measure, once passed, might go on for a good many years without alteration. When the present Government of India was enacted by Parliament, in 1853, the period that had formerly been fixed at twenty years was omitted, and he wished, at the time, that such provision had been made, but with a shorter period. It was argued in reply, that no period was fixed; that they could alter the law at any time; that Parliament could have it for a year if it chose. Now, that was very specious, and might take with some people; but he would venture to ask the House, if they had not had an earthquake in India, in this great revolt, whether these eighteen gentlemen would not have gone on for many years in the India House just as they had done up to this period; and he ventured to say that there was nothing really in what had taken place in this revolt that was conclusive against the gentlemen in Leadenhall Street with reference to their past career. He thought they had been most unjustly judged by being made to bear the odium of that revolt, especially by gentlemen who, during their political lives, had always defended the Directors of Leaden-hall Street as if they were the best possible government for India. The noble Lord at the head of the Board of Control had given a reason which to his (Mr. Bright's) mind was very much in favour of this clause. He said that what we were doing was very much based upon conjecture, and very much a matter of experiment. Everybody in the House knew that, and that this Bill was a Bill of the majority of a House which originally was not in favour of any Bill at all. The present Government and its followers were opposed to any legislation this Session, and not a small portion of the Bill he held to be as objectionable, and very much like that which they intended to destroy. Yet the Bill was carried by the hon. Gentlemen opposite, assisted by some fifty Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House, whose sympathies were with the East India Company. The Bill, besides being a measure of conjecture and experiment, was a measure that was opposed by a party in the House that really had never made up its mind, except upon compulsion, to legislate in the matter at all; and therefore it was not to be wondered at that the Bill should be like the one it pretended to destroy, and if there was any argument or reason for overthrowing the existing Government of India there might also be very strong reasons for doubting whether the Bill that supplied its place was likely to answer the purpose of Parliament in establishing good government in India for the future. The fifteen gentlemen with handsome salaries, fair retiring allowances, and whose work would be so small that no one was yet able to divine what they were about to do—these gentlemen would be the last persons to complain of the Act under which they were created, and they would find that their friends in that House and out of it, and in the press, would say that nothing was so admirable as the Act that was passed in 1858; and so the condition of India might be neglected and the complaints that had been frequently made in that House with regard to the neglect of that country might be equally justifiable five, ten, or fifteen years hence, and these fifteen gentlemen would still assert, with the most unblushing countenances, that nothing could be better than their administration of India. Under these circumstances, he thought it would be wise in Parliament to adopt the clause that had been proposed. Some approved, others disapproved of the Bill; but he hoped they were all agreed in this one conclusion—that in carrying out the government of India, its government for the future should be better than its government for the past. But if this Bill were based upon conjecture, if it were a measure of experiment on a question so momentous, if it involved details so intricate, and in many cases so much unknown to them, was it unreasonable that Parliament should put itself in a position to say, "We will do the best we can under this measure, but whatever may happen, or if nothing should happen at the end of five years, Parliament will be imperatively called upon, the Cabinet of the day will be necessitated to take this question into consideration, with the purpose of reviewing the action of this Bill, and to consider whether the time was come for improvements to be made in Indian administration." All past government of India had been under a Bill for twenty years; and it was not an unusual thing to appoint periodical revisions. This had been the case with regard to the income and property tax, which had been passed for three years on several occasions, advantageously to Parliament and the country. For these reasons he should give his vote for the clause of the noble Lord the hon. Member for Tiverton. The noble Lord at the head of the India Board said the subject would be open next year; but would that be less so when this clause should be passed? This clause of five years would not prevent the noble Lord at the head of the India Board proposing to diminish the Council next Session. It would not incapacitate him from a single thing he proposed to do, but it said to the House of Commons and its successors, and to the successors of the noble Lord and his colleagues—for no doubt the House and Cabinet would have successors many by that time—it said to them, all these great questions that you have settled with so much difficulty through the tumults of political strife, and while groping in mists and darkness, on this great question in 1858—in the year 1863, in justice to the people of England, and still more in justice to the people of India, will have to be reviewed and reconsidered.

MR. MACAULAY

said, that he was opposed to the clause. He thought that the observations of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, and the argument of the hon. Member for Birmingham would have been well adapted to the question whether the Councillors should be appointed for life?—whether their salaries should be £1,200 a year?—whether they should be at liberty to sit in Parliament? But he could not understand how the House, having enacted that the Councillors should be for life, that they should have salaries of £1,200 a year, and should not boat liberty to sit in Parliament, how it could be consistently urged that those provisions should be only for five years. It was like giving an estate for life, and, by a clause in the deed, saying that it should only be for five years. It was competent to the House to alter the Bill next year, or in two years to deal with the settlement of the Government of India as it had done this year with the settlement of 1853. That measure was an enactment in force until Parliament should otherwise provide; but it seemed to him, with great respect for the noble Viscount, something very like nonsense to mention that certain offices should be for life, and then to say that they were practically only to continue for five years.

MR. VERNON SMITH

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had misunderstood the clause. His noble Friend proposed that the Council and the other arrangements made by the Bill should be subject to revision in five years. The hon. and learned Gentleman said, that the Councillors were appointed for life; but it was not for their natural lives, but during good behaviour. The same objection as had been made would apply to any alteration in the Act. The proposal of his noble Friend was only that the Act should be subjected to revision in five years. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) said, that he objected to the expressions of his noble Friend, which stated either that the House should have an opportunity, or be compelled to take au opportunity, of revising this measure; and the noble Lord said that Parliament always had an opportunity of doing so. But would any one take the opportunity without some such provision as this? The noble Lord said, that great events, such as a war or a Reform Bill, might interfere with the dealing with such a question as was involved in this Bill, but the answer was that a Continuance Act could be passed. He agreed with the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) that this Bill, faulty as it was, ought to pass; for at least they had got rid of the inconvenience of separate establishments for conducting the home government of India. As regarded the Council, it seemed to him that there was some extravagance in enacting that the identical Gentlemen, performing identically the same duties, should have their salaries more than doubled, should have the advantage of a superannuation which had never existed before, besides a large amount of patronage. He was sure that if those expenses were to have been paid out of the revenues of England, instead of those of India, the proposal would have been hooted out of the House as a perfect job. The only ground for increasing the salaries was that there would be an increase in the active duties of the Councillors, which he thought it could be shown would not be the case. There ought to be an opportunity afforded for the revision of this measure, and the object of the clause of the noble Viscount was to invite attention to what was, after all, an experiment, and it was better to limit the time during which it was to exist.

MR. WHITESIDE

thought that the course taken by the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman opposite was not very complimentary to the sense of the House. Nor was the expression of the noble Lord that the appointment of the Council was a job, a very civil one. More labour, pains, and due consideration had, he believed, been bestowed upon this measure, than had ever before been given to any proposal by a deliberative assembly; and now, after the House had discussed and decided all the questions as to whether there should be a Council, of what number it should consist, and what should be the emoluments of its members, they now sought to revive and reopen the debate upon all those matters. The whole subject of the remuneration of the Councillors turned upon the question whether the men to be chosen would discharge the duties which would devolve upon them, if India was to be well governed, for a less sum than was by this Bill proposed to be paid to them. What, he would ask, was the nature of the proposition which the House was engaged in discussing? It was nothing more or less than that at the end of five years the functions of the new Council should cease; that the constitution of the Government of India should fall to the ground, and that the House of Commons should at the close of that period proceed to the work of reconstruction. Now that, in his opinion, was a proposition as extraordinary as could well be submitted to a body of intelligent men. The arguments which had been urged in its favour by the hon. Member for Birmingham were quite consistent with the views to which he had previously given expression, inasmuch as he objected to a Council, be it composed of eight, or fifteen, or any number of persons; and he was of opinion that one man, the Secretary of State, should be invested with absolute power. It had, however, been decided by the House that the Minister for India should be afforded the assistance of a body of men of ability, knowledge, and experience, and he should put it to hon. Members whether they were prepared to legislate upon the principle that affairs in India, as seemed to be anticipated by the hon. Member for Birmingham, would take a disastrous turn during the course of the next five years, instead of looking forward to the happiest results from the operation of a measure which would transfer the administration of Indian affairs to a responsible Minister, who would be aided in the discharge of his onerous duties by men competent to give him the advice of which he might stand in need. For his own part, in spite of these unpatriotic prognostications, he believed that such a measure was calculated to be productive of the greatest benefit to India, and he, therefore, trusted that the proposition of the noble Lord opposite would not receive the assent of the House.

MR. MELLOR

, looking at the great number of changes of opinion which had taken place with reference to the details of the measure, thought it not unreasonable to expect that still greater changes would take place in the course of five years, and enforce on Parliament the necessity of reconsidering the various schemes which had been proposed. The present Bill appeared to be framed chiefly for increasing the salaries of the Directors, and he trusted the House would not allow it to pass without providing for its revision within five years.

MR. KINNAIRD

observed, that question relating to India, had always been distasteful to the House, and it was desirable that these matters should come before them of necessity for reconsideration. He thought the clause was well and ably drawn up, and would be in all respects answerable for the end in view.

MR. AYRTON

said, he could not help thinking that of all the propositions which had emanated from the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton in reference to India that under discussion was the most mischievous. One would have supposed that the noble Viscount would be satisfied with the divisions which, at his instance, had already been taken, and with the success which he had met in his attempts to induce the House to adopt his views; but, not contented with the repeated evidence which had been afforded him that a House of Commons elected under his own auspices was entirely opposed to the various propositions which he had made in connection with the future government of India, the noble now asked them to destroy every thing which they had previously resolved to accomplish. The clause which the noble Lord had moved would, if assented to, pledge the House to a declaration that at the end of five years all the provisions of the Bill in regard to the Council should absolutely cease and determine; and the result would be that, when that time had expired, the government of India would become completely vested in the hands of the Secretary of State. Now, a fatal objection to the course which the noble Lord asked the House to adopt was, he thought, to be found in the circumstance that its tendency would be to make the Council dependent upon the good opinion of the Government of the day, and so to preclude the exercise upon its part of that freedom of thought and advice which it was the whole scope of the Bill to secure. The Bill was framed not merely to reform the Court of Directors, but also the Board of Control, which he and almost everybody else felt stood very much in need of reform, especially during the administration of the noble Viscount. It was, in his opinion, highly inexpedient that the government of India should be intrusted to one man, and the more so when that man was found to be wholly incapable of discharging his duties with efficiency; nor was he anxious to see the exhibitions of last Session repeated, when the only able and intelligible speech which had been made upon the subject of India in that House had been delivered, not by a member of the Govern- ment, but by a right hon. Gentleman, entirely unconnected with it, and to whom no sources of official information were open. Such an exhibition as that he hoped the House would never again see; and it was because he thought the clause would render it possible that he opposed its being introduced into the Bill.

MR. DUNLOP

said, he did not think the proposal of the noble Lord was open to the objection which had been made to it by hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House. The clause would not, at the expiration of five years, vest uncontrolled powers in the Secretary of State, for the Bill provided that the authority of that functionary should be exercised by him in Council. The only effect of their adopting the proviso would be that they must reconsider that question at the end of five years.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, the clause did not require that the constitution of the Council should come before Parliament at all; the effect of it would be simply this—that at the end of five years the Minister of the day might continue, if he chose, to govern India without any Council whatever. In August 1863 the state of things would be this—there would be no salaries, no Councillors, no superannuations, no retiring allowances; but there would be a Secretary of State; and thus the arrangement which the hon. Member for Birmingham had consistently advocated throughout would thus come to pass—India would be administered by a Secretary of State without the assistance of a Council. The hon. Member for Birmingham said that the attention of Parliament could never be directed to the affairs of India except under the pressure of some great necessity, such as the recent revolt. That argument was conclusive against the proposition before the House. When the five years elapsed Parliament might be found in that apathetic state Which had been so much deprecated, whereas it was now in a proper frame of mind for establishing a constitution for India. But, as he had said, there was nothing in the clause to compel Parliament to reconsider the question at the end of five years as had been the case in reference to the Company's charter; for the noble Viscount did not propose that the Act should expire at the end of five years, but that the Council should terminate at that period. In the Bill as it stood, however, there was a clause to the effect that if at any time dur- ing the next ten years Parliament should think it right to alter the constitution of the Council no Member should be entitled to demand compensation by way of indemnity for the loss of his office. That was a much better way of dealing with the question than the one proposed by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, whose opinions with regard to the Council had undergone some extraordinary changes since the commencement of the Session. The matter would thus be left perfectly open for reconsideration, but he thought the execution of the Council would be completely paralysed if they were told that they were doomed to last for only five years, and that after that period the Secretary of State was to reign supreme.

MR. WILSON

could not think that the Solicitor General was serious in the argument which he had urged upon the House. That argument was that if the clause were passed the question of the Council would not necessarily come before Parliament at the end of five years, but that the government of India would fall entirely into the hands of the Secretary of State. The hon. and learned Gentleman must know, however, that the Secretary of State had no power under this Bill separate from his Council. What the clause really proposed was that in the spring of 1863 it should be incumbent upon Parliament to reconsider the whole of this question. A similar provision had always been inserted in the Indian Bills of former times, and the fact that nobody knew what the results of the present measure would be afforded a strong reason for making the same arrangement now.

MR. G. VANSITTART

opposed the proposed clause; for if it were held out that the whole of this matter was to be again taken into consideration at the end of a few years, no one would consider that their policy was placed on a firm foundation.

MR. GRIFFITH

said, the whole of the subject was surrounded with considerable difficulty, and that the House must feel considerable doubt with respect to the working of any scheme which they might adopt. Under those circumstances he thought they ought to leave it open to Parliament to reconsider the measure within some definite period, and he should therefore support the clause.

MR. ADAMS

thought, the House would act very unwisely if it adopted the clause, and could not imagine that the noble Lord seriously intended it to form part of the Bill. Should such a clause pass it would in the first place be completely at variance with the other provision of the Bill by which the Councillors were to hold their offices "during good behaviour;" and in the next place there would be great difficulty in inducing the right men to accept the office of Councillor when they knew that they would be turned out at the end of five years; and the people of India would have but little confidence in them on account of their want of permanency. But, above all, the independence of the Council would be utterly destroyed if their existence was to depend upon the will of the Minister who might be in office at the end of five years. A great deal had been said with respect to the increase of salaries. It was true the present Directors had only £500 a year, but they were not bound to devote the whole of their time to their duties, whilst under this measure the whole of their time must be devoted to the service of India.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, it had already been remarked that if the House should agree to the proposition of the noble Lord, the consequence would be that the whole of the powers that could be exercised under the Act would be exercised by the act and will of the Secretary of State. That argument had been met by the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Wilson), by the assertion that it could only be exercised by the Secretary in Council; but that as the clause would determine the attributes of the Council, of course the Secretary of State would no longer be able to exercise the powers entrusted to him. Granted. But what was this Bill before them? It was a Bill to transfer the government of India from the East India Company to the Crown, and this was a proposition relating to that part of the Act which referred to the existence, the constitution, and the functions of the Council. Abrogate that constitution and those functions, and where were they placed? They had by their votes in that House transferred the powers and attributes of the Company to the Crown. If they agreed to this clause, they placed in the power of the Crown an unrestricted and irresponsible authority, which the Crown in its constitutional functions would immediately delegate for its exercise to a Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State would be without any restriction or control. The noble Lord, if he disapproved of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which the House had on so many occasions ratified, might legitimately, on the third reading, have asked the House whether it would or would not sanction a course of legislation which the noble Lord and those who supported him disapproved of. But the course which the noble Lord now took, asking the House at this stage of the Bill, when it had passed through Committee, and had not arrived at the third reading, was to ask the House not to disown the principles of the Bill, but to terminate all those regulations and all those arrangements by which the principle of the Bill could be regulated, modified, and contested in such a manner that a House of Commons could accept the proposition of the Government. It was really, practically speaking, to transfer an arbitrary authority to the Crown, if they agreed to the destruction of the arrangements which they had already sanctioned; it would be transferring the authority of the Company to the Crown, without the slightest control of Parliament. Surely the House would pause, after all its labours, before it assented to a proposition of this kind. He thought the original proposition of the noble Lord which he made some months ago was one which Parliament should look at with some suspicion. That was a proposal for the exercise of patronage on the part of the Crown which he thought the House would do well before it ratified; but after all the government of India was, to a certain degree, brought under the management and control of Parliament. But if they acceded to the present proposition of the noble Lord, they would have this Bill denuded of all the modifications and arrangements they had already sanctioned, leaving nothing but a caput mortuum in the shape of a bare transfer to the Crown of the power now exercised by the East India Company. This proposition was so monstrous that he could not believe the noble Lord could have contemplated its result. By this proposition, they would at one fell swoop abrogate all the decisions to which the House had arrived during its long and laborious dicussions on this Bill. Were they to surrender at discretion to the Crown the exercise of this great authority, and of this great patronage which they and those who had preceded them had always looked upon with so much jealousy, and guarded by legislative enactments? The question of the number of the Council —whether it should consist of eight, twelve, or fifteen members, and the duration of the term for which the office should be held—had been fully and amply debated on previous occasions, and they were really now discussing the principle of the Bill upon the Report.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, that as far as he could judge from the addition which had been made within the last half-hour to the Members on the benches opposite, the speeches which had been delivered against the clause, like the Resolutions of the noble Lord the President of the Board of Control, had answered the purpose for which they had been intended. There were two modes, both of them of a complimentary character, of meeting a proposition; and he was proud to say that two Amendments he had brought forward had been met in one or other of those forms. The first was to say nothing upon the question, and that was the course pursued by the Members on the Treasury bench in reference to a Motion he had submitted to the House some evenings ago. The other complimentary form of opposition was totally and fundamentally to misrepresent a proposition, and instead of answering it to answer something entirely different. That was the way in which the present proviso had been met. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had stated that the clause would, in the course of five years, hand over the government of India to the Secretary of State absolutely and without control, inasmuch as at the expiration of that period it would put an end to the existence of the Council. But there was not a word in the clause about the existence of the Council, and he had studiously abstained from proposing that at the end of five years the Council should cease to exist. If the clause were adopted every part of the Act which related to the constitution of the Council, and which compelled the Secretary of State to act in conjunction with such a body, would remain untouched. The clause would merely render it necessary for Parliament to reconsider the question of the salaries and of the number of the Councillors at the expiration of five years. There could be no doubt but that necessity would involve a reconsideration of the whole of that arrangement; but that was precisely the merit of the proposal. It would not only give an opportunity to Parliament, but would render it necessary for Parliament to take into consideration the re-arrangement of the Council, and although it would not put an end to the Council, as the right hon. Gentleman supposed it would, by declaring that till further legislation took place the number and regulations of the Council should no longer be continued under this Act, render it necessary for Parliament to consider the re-arrangement of the Council, and with that the other questions connected with it. He thought the proposal a good one, and trusted the House would agree to it.

Motion made, and Question put, "That the said Clause be now read a second time."

The House divided:—Ayes 115; Noes 149: Majority 34.

MR. DANBY SEYMOUR

then moved the addition of the following clause:— Whereas it is expedient to promote Civil Servants who have shown conspicuous ability, although by the length of their service they may not be entitled to such promotion, and likewise to throw open some offices hitherto exclusively filled by members of the Civil Service to other qualified persons, Be it Enacted, That the fifty-sixth and fifty-seventh Sections of the Act of the thirty-third George the Third, chapter fifty-two, are hereby repealed; and the Secretary of State for India in Council shall, within one year of the passing of this Act, publish a list of offices in India, declaring which shall be open to all qualified persons, and which shall be reserved only to the members of the Civil Service. His object in bringing forward this clause was, to give greater encouragement to the military service in India, by repealing the provision of the 56th clause of an old Act of Parliament, in so far as they gave precedence to civil servants of the Crown in the territories of the East India Company. The change he wished to carry into effect had been recommended by some of the highest authorities in India. The consequence of the exclusive character of the civil service under this Act of Parliament was, that persons were appointed to offices they were totally unfit for; for instance, the boy-judges, of whom great complaints were made, and yet persons well fitted were left unappointed because they were of the uncovenanted service. Again, young gentlemen of high acquirements were appointed to offices which required no such education; and yet the Governor General had no option. It was also a question worth consideration, whether the civil service and judicial offices ought not to be separated, and the latter filled by gentlemen educated for the law. Moreover, he thought it unwise that the educational department, so suspected by the Natives, should be headed by gentlemen of the civil service, thereby weakening the proper influence of that service in India. To show the injustice wrought by this exclusiveness, he instanced the case of Mr. Venables, in the north of Bengal, who, though not of the civil service, came forward at a time of great difficulty and did the most distinguished service; yet the highest reward which the Governor General could give him, or he could hope to rise to, was a place of £1,500 a year, such as any young gentleman two years out might have attained to. In fact, instead of tying up the matter in that way, the Governor General ought to be left a discretion and a power of laying down rules for the guidance of the authorities on such subjects. What he wished was, no injury to the civil service, but a thorough revision of it by the repeal of this clause.

Clause brought up, and read the first time.

MR. SPEAKER

said, that by the Orders of the House, notice must be given of clauses moved in consideration of the Report. Any material alteration in the form of the notice of course destroyed its value, and it appeared to him that the alterations introduced by the hon. Member were of such a nature as to bring them under the rule of the Standing Orders.

Clause withdrawn.

MR. DANBY SEYMOUR

said, he would now move the addition of the following clause. Whereas it is expedient that some offices hitherto exclusively filled by members of the Civil Service, should be thrown open to other qualified persons, the fifty-seventh section of the Act of the thirty-third year of George the Third, chapter fifty-two, is hereby repealed.

Clause brought up, and read the first time.

LORD STANLEY

said, that the hon. Gentleman had opened a very wide subject, and had treated it concisely, ably, and fairly; but he had proposed to get rid of certain well-established privileges in a most summary and sweeping manner. He did not wish to express any opinion as to what might be the effect of the change proposed. He had hardly yet had the opportunity of inquiring into the relations between the covenanted and uncovenanted civil services; but, whether the proposed change would be a benefit or not, it was evident that it would swamp all those privileges which for more than seventy years, the covenanted civil service in India had enjoyed. Now, that was a great change to make, and although some hon. Gentlemen might be sufficiently conversant with the question to enable them to give a judgment upon it, he did not think that was the case with the House in general. He considered that they owed it to themselves not to embarrass the future consideratioa of so large a question as that with which they were dealing by the expression of an opinion upon the immediate point before them, unless they could convince themselves, the public here, and the public in India that they were prepared to deal with it in a satisfactory manner. There was one other consideration he was bound to notice. The object of all, who, during this Session, had framed Bills for the government of India had been to limit their scope as far as possible to the home administration of India. If that branch of the subject was now to be departed from—if they went into the larger and more important question of the internal administration of India in the country itself—it would not be easy to see why they were not, in connection with this measure, to consider many other questions of internal reform which were equally deserving of their attention. No doubt the events that had taken place during the last twelve months had in a measure disorganized the whole framework of society in India, and had, consequently, rendered it necessary to effect extensive changes. Those events had broken up many old customs, and would probably open the eyes of all classes to the necessity of various administrative changes being made. It was not easy to see why one such change, and one only, should be embodied in the Bill now before the House. The proposition of the hon. Gentleman was twofold. First, be proposed to open to the uncovenanted services the privileges at present confined to the covenanted service; and next, he proposed that merit should stand in lieu of seniority; so that eminent service should give that claim to promotion which was now given by length of service. He thought that this subject must necessarily engage the attention of the Government on a future day. Further than that he was not prepared to express any decisive opinion upon it; and considering the difficulties of the subject, the House would probably agree with him in thinking it much better not to commit themselves by any expression of opinion upon it.

SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE

trusted the House would act with great caution in this matter. He had been a member of the civil service, but he was not blind to its defects, and he had taken every opportunity of bringing the subject under the consideration of the Committee of 1852, of which he was a member; but he did not think the present Motion was calculated to remedy the defects. He entreated the House to forbear, for the present at least, to commit themselves, as this clause would commit them, to altogether destroying those barriers which had hitherto existed against the abuses of patronage by the Ministers of the Crown.

MR. W. VANSITTART

said, the object of the Bill being to provide a better home Government for India, he apprehended this clause would not come within its general scope; and taking that view, he had refrained from giving notice of a clause, which he should otherwise have done, connected with the Legislative Council of Calcutta, the establishment of which was so pertinaciously insisted upon in 1853 by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax (Sir C. Wood). The duties and functions of the Members of this Council were identical with those of the Supreme Council. It cost India one lac of rupees, or £10,000, per annum; and as all the members were Government nominees, it was universally allowed that it had failed to produce any good or practical result. In point of fact, it was nothing more or less than a sham legislative assembly—a burlesque on the House of Commons, and resembling the Court of East India Proprietors, which this Bill had happily swept away. He desired, therefore, to see it either entirely abolished or thrown open and enlarged by the admission of indigo planters, merchants, agriculturists, and other gentlemen possessing every variety and every shade of Indian mercantile and other information. The clause they were now called upon to insert must necessarily give rise to considerable discussion, and he hoped, therefore, the hon. Member for Poole would not press it at present. In his opinion, it was a subject of far more importance which demanded our attention, and that was the future state of a Native army for the Bengal Presidency. It was now upwards of sixteen months since the utter breakdown of our old Bengal Native Sepoy army had been made patent to the whole world; and up to the present time not a single step had been taken towards its reorganization, not even a foreshadowing had yet appeared of the new army so essential to the existence of our great Eastern empire, and he hoped, therefore, the noble Lord the President of the Board of Control would turn his early attention to that important and pressing subject.

Clause by leave withdrawn.

MR. GREGSON moved the following clause:— That the settlements of Penang, Singapore, Malacca, Labuan, and Sarawak, be placed under the President and Council of India.

MR. FITZROY

rose to order. He submitted that the Motion of the hon. Gentleman could not be considered in the nature of a clause in connection with the India Bill.

MR. SPEAKER

concurred that it was merely an expression of opinion, giving no enacting powers, and therefore that it could not stand as a clause in the Bill.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY moved, after the word "behaviour," to insert the words, And shall not, so long as he shall remain such Councillor, accept, hold, or carry on any other office or situation, or any profession or employment from which any gain or profit shall be derived. The hon. and learned Gentleman said the question had been discussed once or twice, and he had no doubt he should be met with the argument that it had been sufficiently discussed. He admitted that the Liberal side had not been able to carry a single Amendment; but it was their duty to advocate sound principles and record their votes in their favour, as upon a new election, which was probably not very distant, the constituencies would profit much by looking at the division lists. It would be found that the Liberal Members had not given a single factious veto throughout this Bill, and that the great body of them had voted with the Government whenever the Government had been right. Nothing distinguished English administration so much as purity, and nobody in Government employment in India could have anything to do with trade during the time he was in office. It had long been matter of reproach that the Court of Directors, having the government of a great empire, were themselves engaged in trade. When the matter was discussed before, the only answer was that it was most difficult to frame a clause to meet the objection which he had brought forward. He had, however, found a clause in the 8 & 9 Vict., the act for regulating the Commissioners in Lunacy, and he had adopted the words of that statute in framing his clause. The East India Company had obtained a great deal of influence from the enormous sums of money which they had expended in the city in shipping and other things, and he wished to sever this connection between government and trade.

LORD STANLEY

said, he did not believe that in the course of these debates there had been any considerable admixture of party feeling. For himself he had supported the Bill of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), although he thought many alterations were required in it, and many Members sitting opposite had supported the measure of the Government, not as such, but because they believed it would, in the main, carry out the object they had in view. There could be no misunderstanding of the views of the Government with regard to the duties of the Council. The principle be wished to lay down was this, that that portion of time which the public service required from the Members of Council, they must be prepared to give; but further than that the Government did not think it necessary to place any limit upon their private occupations. He still thought it would be difficult to frame a clause that would exclude all sorts of occupations; for instance, how were they to exclude a man that was a sleeping partner? He was content, therefore, with securing sufficient time for the performance of all public duties; with the disposition by the Council of the rest of their time he was not disposed to interfere.

MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE

thought it might at least be worth the while of the noble Lord to consider whether he would not continue the restriction which prevented the members of the present Court of Directors from trading with India. For instance, if a Member of Council was a director of an Indian railway his private interests might clash with his public duties.

Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and negatived.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

then rose to move that clause 27 and 28, which provide that orders now sent through the Secret Committee may be sent by the Secretary of State without communication with the Council be omitted from the Bill. The noble Lord said that it would not be necessary that he should occupy the time of the House long, but he would take leave to say that he introduced this Motion in no hostility to the Bill. In his opinion, al- though he differed from it in several respects, and although to some of the clauses he could offer many objections, it was upon the whole not only a Bill which he wished to see passed, but he hoped it would form a foundation for the good government of India. On this question there were some clauses of great importance, and none more so than those relating to the Secret Committee. The House would understand that the Secret Committee had been, heretofore, subject to the President of the Board of Control, and his power, covered by this secrecy, was of a very extensive nature, not only as regarded wars or the making of treaties, but with regard to the policy to be pursued with the Native Princes. The Governor General of India addressed the President of the Board of Control through the Secret Committee, and he was answered through the same Committee; and therefore all matters of revenue, police, or judicial establishments might be brought under the notice of that Committee. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) said he wished to see men of experience, men of ability, and men of administrative talent employed in the Council of India. He quite agreed with the noble Lord; but for that purpose he must consider both the men likely to be obtained and the measures with regard to which the secret power would have to be exercised. With regard to the men, it would be sufficiently obvious that the best men could only be secured by making them members of the Council and parties in all deliberations. It was of the utmost importance to this country and India that all questions of peace or war, and all questions of policy towards Native Princes, should be considered by men of ability and experience, like those who were to form the Council, and their opinion would be of the utmost support to a Minister; for Parliament would be much more ready to adopt a policy which had been pursued if they knew it had been more thoroughly sifted and agreed to by a Council of able men acquainted with India. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) said they might rely on the power given to the Minister with regard to the Secret Committee not being abused; but that was not the policy or maxim of the House of Commons. The maxim of the House of Commons was, that, when a dangerous power was given to a Minister, it was likely that power would be abused. It would depend on the temper of the Minister, and his confidence in his own powers and resources, whether he would consult the Secret Committee or the Council. He did not think there would be any well-founded objection to reserving this proposed power to the Minister, in the event of a European war, or the apprehension of such a war; but his objection was that this power might be exercised for the purpose of undue aggression. He thought that no war in India should be undertaken by the Minister until he had heard the opinions of the Members of the Council; and if ten or twelve gave an opinion decidedly averse to such a war, the Minister would hardly insist upon pursuing it; and in a case of that kind they would have the benefit of the war being stopped by the Council; or if it were not stopped they would know the opinions of a body at home on the subject. As these clauses were inconsistent with the general powers of the Bill, he hoped the House would agree to their omission.

On Motion that Clause 27 be omitted,

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, the whole question came to this, whether a combination of circumstances might not arise when it would be necessary for the Secretary of State to act on his own responsibility and without consulting his Council. He had not heard the noble Lord himself maintain that such a combination of circumstances would never arise; and therefore the question came to be, whether it were wise or prudent to deprive themselves beforehand of the possibility of acting with secrecy at a time when all men would be ready to admit the necessity; and if they admitted the principle, surely it would be unwise, or impracticable, to attempt to define the conditions under which secrecy should be observed. No general rule could possibly be laid down. The noble Lord said, they must not trust to the character of the Minister; but the answer to a position so vague was one that necessarily partook of the same vague character. They could not demonstrate the emergencies under which a Minister ought to act by himself, and they could not prove that he would never abuse his power; but it might be fairly argued that with the increased sense of responsibility which now existed in society, a Minister was not very likely to abuse that extraordinary power some portion of which, they were all agreed, ought to be entrusted to him. They were all anxious to establish the responsibility of the Minister, but if they laid down the maxim that he was never to act upon his own responsibility, but that, at any moment of emergency, when his responsibility was likely to be tried, he must go and consult his Council, they would, to a certain degree, be diminishing the Minister's responsibility, besides the risk of endangering the best interests of the State. They were all agreed that this was a question of degree. He had himself considered the question, as he dared to say many other gentlemen in the House had considered it, whether the powers of the Bill might not be more limited than the Bill proposed; whether, for instance, it should not be confined to matters external to India, and that they should lay it down as a rule that the Council must be consulted on all matters of internal administration; but then there was always this danger of laying down strict rules, that the emergency might arise in that very quarter from which they had excluded the Minister's responsibility. Bearing in mind that no one had laid it down as a principle that secrecy to some extent was not necessary, the point they had to decide was, whether it should be more limited than it was in the Bill now before them. He had considered whether language could be devised by which it could be more limited, and he believed the Bill might be so drawn as somewhat to limit the power of secret action. But, if they made up their minds to intrust the Minister with this power of secret action, they must ask whether it would be wise or beneficial to restrain him in the exercise of it. The Minister was always responsible to the House, and it was for the House to consider whether they would consent to take from the Minister the power of exercising to the best of his judgment the power which secrecy would give to him. The noble Lord who had moved the omission of the clause had stated that he was not actuated by any feeling of hostility to the Bill. Now, any such assurance was quite unnecessary. Any one who had watched the progress of the measure must have seen that the noble Lord had shown an example which he trusted would not be forgotten. He had shown how, on a great question of Imperial interest, party considerations could be thrown aside, and that the weight and influence of a person holding a high position in that House could, without regard to party motive, be directed towards the establishment of a state of things in India which might seem the best adapted for securing the future prosperity of that country. No one could have witnessed the course pursued by the noble Lord during the whole discussion on the India Bill without recognising that he was animated by a great sense of public duty. He did not, therefore, quarrel with the noble Lord for bringing forward the Motion before the House, but he would beg the House to pause before it agreed to a proposal which would in many respects tie the hands and fetter the action of the Indian Minister.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM

said, that he, no more than the noble Lord who made the Motion, was actuated by any feeling of hostility to the Bill; but at the same time he was not influenced by any parental feeling with regard to it which would induce him, in this particular case, to object to its symmetry being destroyed. He could not admit that secrecy would be violated if it was compulsory on the Minister to communicate with the Council on all questions. Experience had proved that the Court of Directors could keep a secret. He recollected that when, during the Government of Sir Robert Peel—at a time when the Court of Directors consisted of twenty-four members—a question of the greatest importance arose with respect to the recall of the Governor General, that question was pending during three months without the fact of its pendency being disclosed, and when it was disclosed at last the disclosure was traced, not to the Court of Directors, but to the Board of Control. With that example before him he had perfect confidence that if the Minister communicated to the Council any despatch which he desired to be kept secret, secrecy would be strictly preserved. Nor could he admit that the responsibility of the Minister would be maintained by the retention of the power of secrecy; while, on the other hand, in many cases the advice and action of the Council might advantageously restrain the action of the Minister. The power of giving a character of secrecy to a despatch rested at present with the Governor General of India, as well as with the President of the Board of Control; and thus the Governor General and the President might come to an understanding by means of private letters, make any despatch they pleased a matter of secrecy, and in this way the purpose of the Council would be defeated, while the responsibility of the Minister would not be increased. He believed that on the whole the safest course would be to deprive the Queen's Executive Government of the power of imposing in- violable secrecy on communications with the Governor General, apart from the Council; and he came to that opinion from the experience of the past. He believed that no event in the history of India had so shaken our power in India as the Affghan war. He believed it was the commencement of the great evil in which we were now involved; and he believed that if before the Affghan war was decided upon by the Government, and the order to commence it conveyed to the Governor General by a secret despatch, and the question had been raised before the Court of Directors, the wiser and safer counsel would have been adopted, and that great disaster would have been avoided. So, also, as to the recent war with Persia, he believed that a mutinous spirit was smouldering in the India army, that an opportunity of revolt was sought and desired, and that that opportunity was afforded by the withdrawal of a large portion of the European force at that juncture from India to Persia, in conjunction with the struggle then taking place in China. That afforded to the indisposed the opportunity they desired. He believed that if that abstraction of that force from India had been brought before the Directors, that expedition would have been averted. He believed, also, that if on a recent occasion Lord Ellenborough had submitted to the Court of Directors, instead of sending through the Secret Committee, his despatch relative to the affairs of Oude, that despatch in its objectionable form would never have been sent to India. The Earl of Ellenborough had previously sent to India through the Secret Committee a despatch recommending clemency. He approved of it; but he could see no reason why it should have been sent through the Secret Committee. And this was a proof of the tendency which would always exist on the part of a Minister to push secrecy to an extreme—which was another argument against the retention by the Minister of such a power at all. If, therefore, it was impossible to impose those limitations which the noble Lord thought desirable in the exercise of this power of secrecy, and if the alternative was that of having no Secret Committee, or of maintaining secrecy in its present form liable to evil consequences, such as experience had demonstrated to be, not only possible, but probable, he could not hesitate to vote for striking the clause out of the Bill, and thereby abolishing secrecy. He had no doubt that if an emergency arose, the Minister would always be able to obtain secrecy from a Council composed, as this would be, of men of the highest character and standing. To violate it would, on the part of any Member, be a gross act of misbehaviour, and if convicted he would no doubt be at once removed. He believed that would be ample security for the preservation of secrecy when desirable. He believed that those occasions would be very rare, and that the more rarely a Minister resorted to secrecy, the more he consulted his Council, the sounder would be his policy; and, therefore, on the whole, his conclusion was, that secrecy should be abolished.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

said, that by Clause 27, as it now stood, it was competent to the Secretary of State, through the Secret Committee, to order the Governor General to undertake a war in India; but, by a clause to which they had agreed that night, that power was only to be exercised with the assent of Parliament. Therefore, if the powers, given in an unlimited form by Clause 27, were exercised with reference to the clause inserted that night, they must suppose that the Minister was relieved from the necessity of communicating with the Council on the question of war. He would then send out his instructions; but when the orders arrived out in India, the Governor General would find he could not act upon them without writing home for the assent of Parliament. If the clause was retained in its present form, they must come to the absurd conclusion that the Secretary of State, in order to obtain secrecy, would be relieved from the necessity of consulting his Council in a matter on which there must be an appeal to Parliament. In his opinion the better course would be to reject the powers of the Secret Committee and stand by the clause to which they had already agreed. There was another point upon which he was anxious to ascertain the views of the Government. In Committee on the Bill a question was raised of which he had not heard any explanation given. There were two powers with regard to secrecy. There was, first, the power of the President of the Board of Control to send out instructions to the Governor General; and there was, next, the power of the Governor General to send home information to the Board of Control. These powers were not exactly co-extensive. The President of the Board of Control had power to send out orders to the Governor General with respect to making war, concluding peace, or negotiations with Native States; and the Governor General had a corresponding power of secret communication with the President of the Board of Control. But in addition to these three heads of information, he might correspond secretly "concerning the government of the said territories and acquisitions." Therefore it was competent to the Governor General to send secret despatches respecting the revenue or police of India. What he understood to be the argument used by some persons in defence of the practice which had prevailed of correspondence in the Secret Committee was, that when the President of the Board of Control received a despatch respecting the internal government of the Indian territories it was competent to him to answer that despatch in the Secret Committee, because the information received related to the internal government of India. Now, it appeared to him (Sir G. Lewis) that, according to the fair construction of these two clauses, the power of the President of the Board of Control to send out instructions to India was limited to the three questions of war, of peace, and of negotiations with Native States; but, that he had no power to send out instructions on questions relating to the internal government of India, and therefore the power of the President of the Board of Control to send secret orders was not co-extensive with the power of secret correspondence on the part of the Governor General. It was important that that question should be decided, because, if all the powers of the Secret Committee were to be maintained in activity, and if it was to be held that the Secretary of State would have power to send out instructions on all matters relating to the internal government of India, as well as to questions of war, of peace, and of negotiations with Native States, it seemed to him that the powers of the Council would be nugatory, and that the Secretary of State would have absolute power to send out instructions upon every question that could come under his consideration. He should therefore wish to know from the Government what construction they put upon this clause, and if they thought it was competent, under its provisions, for the President of the Board of Control to exercise, by despatches sent out to India, all the powers that were contained in the clause which related to the powers of the Governor General, and not to the powers of the President of the Board of Control.

MR. MANGLES

said, that having been, at a very recent period, a Member of the Secret Committee, he could take upon himself to assert that, whilst he was so, there were very few matters which came before that Committee that might not have been made known to the entire Court of Directors, and even proclaimed to the public at Charing Cross. With regard to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement, that there was not likely to be any abuse of power in these days, all he (Mr. Mangles) could say was, that not only was the conquest of Scinde carried on by the Secret Department, but the whole of the affairs of the province were administered for some years altogether beyond the cognizance of the Court of Directors by the then President of the Board of Control. What had been done once, then, it was not impossible might be done again. The Governors General of India had power to write home on any subject whatever to the Secret Department, and the power of answering that Department had been always assumed by the Board of Control; but in the clause which gave that power of writing home from India to the Governors General, no power was given to the President of the Board of Control to answer in the same Department. With regard to the trust that might be reposed in a Council, such as it ought to be for India, the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) had understated the case of the recall of Lord Ellen-borough; inasmuch as that matter was not only known to the twenty-four Directors for the time being, but it so happened that, whilst the subject was under discussion in the Court of Directors, six Directors went out by rotation and six others were elected in their room—so that instead of twenty-four, not less than thirty were cognisant of the transaction; and yet it was never made public by them! Surely, then, if thirty gentlemen could keep a secret for several months without its transpiring, the fifteen Members of Council for India—a higher power and loftier body than the Court of Directors could possibly be—might be trusted with perfect safety.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

, in answer to the question of the right hon. Gentleman, said, that what the clause was intended to carry out, and did carry out, was the conveyance to the Secretary of State of the same powers, and no higher or more extensive ones, as regarded secrecy, as were given by the Act of 1853 to the Committee of Secrecy of that day.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, he thought the House did not very clearly understand the proposition before them. As Indian affairs had hitherto been managed, the Ministers of the Crown had only an incidental power of management through the Board of Control, and, therefore, it was necessary by special enactment to give to the Cabinet, through its organ the Secretary of the Board of Control, certain powers of action in certain cases. All these arrangements were now about to be altered. They were now going to abolish the Court of Directors, and transfer the Government of India, like the Government of any other part of the dominions of the Crown, to the responsible Ministers of the Crown; and they were asked to enact, with regard to the affairs of India, that which was not enacted, and ought not to be enacted, with regard to the affairs of any other part of the dominions of the Crown—namely, that the Cabinet—for he refused to draw any distinction between the Secretary of State for India and the rest of the Ministers—should place in their confidence and communicate freely, entirely, and unreservedly, all they intended to do, all they heard, and all they proposed, to fifteen gentlemen who were not members of the Cabinet and not responsible to either Parliament or the country. Now, that appeared to him to be a total departure from the existing state of the British constitution. It ought to rest with the Cabinet to make such communications to the Council as they might think expedient for the purpose of guiding them in their conduct; but it would be a complete solecism in regard to the working of the British constitution to compel the Cabinet to take into their confidence any given number of persons whom they did not wish of their own accord to consult. With regard to the recall of Lord Ellenborough, everybody knew that people could keep their own secrets; but it did not therefore follow that they would keep the secrets of others; and it so happened, that in the case of Lord Ellenborough the secret was one which belonged to the Court of Directors themselves, and it did not follow that they would have been equally scrupulous about preserving the secrets of the Government. His objection to the proposal was, that it introduced a new principle in the working of the administrative system of the country, by compelling by law the Cabinet, who were responsible for everything that was done, to take into their entire and unreserved confidence in the administration of a large and important portion of the dominions of the Crown fifteen gentlemen, who were not Members of the Government, and who did not hold their offices upon the responsibility of the Government, but were fixed in their tenures, and therefore had not a common interest with the Cabinet whose secrets they were required to keep.

Question put, "That Clause 27 stand part of the Bill."

The House divided:—Ayes 176; Noes 149: Majority 27.

Clause 33,

MR. T. BARING moved to leave out the words "in the Engineers and in the Artillery," and to insert the words "to the Military College at Addiscombe." At the end of the clause add "and not less than one-half of the vacancies in the said College shall be filled up by the appointment of persons so selected." He did not wish to alter the number of appointments open to public competition.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Bill."

LORD STANLEY

said, that there was nothing in the words of the clause as it then stood to prevent the proper authorities from making a regulation to the effect that cadets should pass through the College of Addiscombe; but he thought it was not necessary to make any provision of this kind in the Act of Parliament.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill to be read 3^o on Thursday.