HC Deb 12 March 1857 vol 144 cc2215-46

Supply—Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

MR. PALK rose to move an Amendment in the form of Resolutions recognizing the value of the services rendered by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, as Commissioners for inquiring into the management of the Commissariat Department of the army in the Crimea. The hon. Member said that no one could have forgotten the return of the Guards to London, and any one who witnessed that event must have been struck by the bronzed and martial appearance of the men, who had gathered fresh laurels in every encounter in which they had been engaged, and must still remember how the caps of the Grenadiers of England were thrown up in order to testify their loyalty to the Queen. It was, however, a still more thrilling and remarkable sight to see the population of London throw aside the bounds of conventional respect, and with loud cries welcome the Guards to their native land. On that occasion the people of London were the faithful representatives of the nation at large. England was not a warlike nation; it delighted most in the arts of peace and in the enterprizes of commerce; yet go where they would—to the manufacturing cities or to the agricultural counties—but one feeling prevailed throughout the length and breadth of the land—namely, honour, respect, and regard for our brave army. The Guards were welcomed to this city on that memorable day; but amid the just elation with which those who had fought for their country were universally received the sad thought intruded itself unbidden of how many of their heroic comrades had been left behind on a distant shore—gallant men who had died, not at the Alma or at Inkerman, not in the trenches or on the battle field, but by the misery and destitution which the inefficiency of our establishments had occasioned. In was in the beginning of 1854 that the sad accounts first reached us which soon convulsed the country from one end of the kingdom to the other. They told of disasters greater than had ever before been encountered by any British force—disasters so great that the miseries of the fatal Walcheren Expedition paled before them; and men stood aghast at the prospect of the further horrors which awaited our army. So extreme was the crisis that an event then happened which was wholly unparalleled. The Times newspaper assumed the Executive of England, and, by its wide circulation and the aid of the means at its disposal, raised a large sum of money, and instantly sent it to the relief of the sufferers. The country was aroused; Parliament was called together; and the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) demanded, and, in spite of all the resistance and the evasions of the Government, carried in that House a Committee of Inquiry as to the state of the British army. The result of that Committee's labours was well known to them all; but one argument used against its appointment, and the argument which, in his opinion, had the greatest force, was that it was unfair for a Committee at home to judge of the acts and proceedings of our officers abroad. In consequence of this the Government ordered a Commission of their own, and sent out Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to investigate the state of affairs on the spot. These two Commissioners accordingly examined, personally or collectively, the commanding officer, surgeon, and quarter-master of every corps in the Crimea, and they reported that the sufferings of the army must have been intense; that the strength of the men had given way under excessive watching, exposure, and privation; they stated that the defective departmental arrangements in the Crimea had contributed in no inconsiderable degree to the sufferings of the troops; and they pointed out that the system hitherto relied on had failed under the exigencies of the Crimean campaign. They further stated that the mortality of the army on all previous occasions sank into comparative insignificance, and by a return lately presented to the House they had a detailed list of the losses sustained. The newspapers of January, 1855, asserted facts connected with the mortality of the army, which were over and over again contradicted in that House; but a few months afterwards the Crimean Commissioners came to conclusions precisely the same as those which had been published by the press; and latterly the statements of the Commissioners were corroborated, in a manner that could not be controverted, by the Returns which had been laid before Parliament:— The general total of all the regiments or corps which originally landed in the East was 55,530; the total of non-commissioned officers and men who were added to these during the progress of the war was 27,371; thus the total of British troops from first to last amounted to no less than 82,901. Of these 18,927 were killed or died. But in another column we have the number killed returned as 2,598, and, as of the 11,361 returned as wounded only 1,848 subsequently died, we can well believe the statement of Colonel Tulloch, that up to the time of his inquiry 10,000 men had perished, independently of the losses inflicted by the enemy. But there is one fact which has not yet been sufficiently brought forward,—how many men were disabled by sickness without actually finding a grave in the East? The answer given in the return is startling. No less than 11,374 men were invalided, or became non-effective up to September, 1855. Put, then, these two numbers together—the 18,927 who actually died, and the 11,374 who were disabled—and we have the total loss of the British army 30,301 for a period of eighteen months, only twelve of which were passed in presence of the enemy. In round numbers, out of 80,000 men we lost 30,000 during the war. This fearful mortality roused the people of England as one man, and induced the Government to send out Commissioners to investigate its causes. The British army landed in the Crimea on the 14th of September, and the first step was to leave their knapsacks behind. He was told that this was sometimes done in order to relieve the soldiers, and that, when done in certain circumstances and under careful provisions, no great misery resulted from it. In this case, however, the commonest precautions were unfortunately omitted. The knapsacks left on board the different transports remained there. Some went to Varna, some to Baltshik, the rest were scattered over the sea; and the soldiers did not receive them for months afterwards, and, indeed, some never received theirs at all. Another curious fact was that the knapsacks on that occasion did not contain the usual amount of necessaries carried by the men. A large quantity of those articles was left in the squad-bags at Scutari. Why these squad-bags were not collected together and conveyed from Scutari for the use of the troops, as they easily might have been in a very few days, he was unable to gather from the voluminous reports before them. This neglect, he firmly believed, was the origin of the disease and distress to which the army was exposed. They commenced a siege without a change of clothing, without the indispensable means of cleanliness, without a second pair of shoes; and from this cause alone they were reduced to a state of wretchedness sufficient to account for a great portion of their mortality, even if there had been no fault to find with their supplies of food. The knapsack of the soldier was, perhaps, of more importance to him than any of his other accoutrements, because through the want of it he was unable to keep his change of linen dry, or to collect and preserve the various articles essential to the maintenance of cleanliness, and therefore of health. The result was that, after two months, the army which had received the adieus of its Queen; which it was the boast of the Minister of the day that he had sent out equipped with every necessary, and rich in everything that could make a force effective; which was, in fact, an expedition the like of which had never before left the British shores—this proud army, the discipline of which no suffering was able to relax, was allowed gradually to sink under cold, starvation, and disease, until it was at length brought, by the accumulated neglect of those whose duty it was to administer to its wants, to the lowest point of human wretchedness. The next circumstance which a careful examination of the reports had strongly impressed upon him was, that although warm clothing to a great amount was upon the spot, yet, for some reason which was not explained, it was never received by the troops. Their clothes were threadbare, their shoes were worn out, they were shivering in the cold, and drenched in the rain. And yet at this very time there was an ample store of greatcoats in the Quartermaster General's department. The Commissioners examined Major Wetherall, the Assistant Quartermaster General, on this point, and on being asked how it was that out of about 12,000 great-coats in store only 2,376 had been issued to the army, that officer stated that, as far as he was aware, it never had been contemplated to give more than one regimental great-coat to each soldier, especially at a time when additional warm clothing was daily expected, and that he thought it absolutely necessary to keep a supply of great-coats in store, to meet the demands which might be made in the ordinary course of the service. To those who were not so well accustomed to all the details of military regulation as this gallant officer it must appear somewhat strange that, because the army might perhaps suffer at some future time for want of great-coats, its present necessities were therefore to be entirely uncared for and unrelieved. Most certainly, had that gallant officer given, out to the soldiers that additional clothing which was then in his stores it would have saved the life of many a poor wretch who had died, not from hunger, but from cold. The next point which remained unexplained, and of which he at once acquitted the heads of departments of the army in the East, was the supply of green coffee to the army. The name of the official who had given that unfortunate order had never yet been mentioned, and for his own sake it was to be hoped that it never would. In the papers laid before Parliament no reasons nor arguments for issuing green coffee to the troops were to be found; all that appeared there was the order itself, which was given by the Treasury, but by what department or what person in the Treasury he had been unable to ascertain. Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch attributed the mortality and distress of the army to certain departmental inefficiencies. The Board of General Officers attributed this distress mainly to the want of forage for the mules and horses of the commissariat department. Taking the view of the Board of General Officers first, whose fault was it that the forage was not sent out? Commissary General Filder made repeated requisitions to the department at home for pressed hay; it was totally impossible for him to carry unpressed hay, and without it the transport animals could not be maintained. So far he agreed with the Board of General Officers that Commissary General Filder had made out a good excuse for himself; but still the blame of the inadequate supply of forage rested somewhere. He was the last man in the world to bring an accusation against absent persons, but it appeared pretty certain from the papers that Commissary General Filder had made repeated requisitions to the department at home; but Sir Charles Trevelyan, reasoning for himself, judging for himself, and believing himself to be a better judge of the wants of the army in the Crimea than the Commissary-General, failed to send out to Mr. Filder those supplies on which, according to the Board of General Officers, the efficiency of the army mainly depended. Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch took a different view, and thought that though hay and chopped straw might have been difficult to procure, yet barley might have been got to any amount, and upon that the transport animals might have been maintained for some months in full vigour. He was not prepared to say that the view of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch was correct; but certainly, however generally free from blame Mr. Filder might have been, there appeared to be a great want of ingenuity and contrivance on his part in this matter. After making all allowances for the difficulty of the position, he was most reluctantly brought to the opinion that the Commissary General had failed to make those great exertions which the exigencies of the case demanded. He had no wish to scan too narrowly the actions of public men, for it was impossible always to be aware of the difficulties which they had to overcome; but it was sufficient for him to have shown, as he thought he had, that the mortality of the British army was great, excessive, and unusual. He did not wish to fix the blame upon any one in particular, but he hoped that the next Parliament would undertake to apply to the British army the only remedy which could insure it against the repetition of disasters of this kind. This, in his opinion, was a complete revision of the army departments—not so much of the regulations and arrangements of the departments themselves as of the officers who were intrusted with the duties of them. If he had the honour of a seat in the next Parliament he should be able to prove to the House from the evidence lately published in the Report of the Commissioners sent to inquire into the education of foreign armies that our system of officering the British army was not adequate to the wants of the present day, and that for the future the army must be officered by men who had been educated for a military career, and who had been trained from early life to look to the army as a profession, in which to strain every nerve and to exert all their abilities in difficult and trying circumstances. If this could be done the efficiency of the army would be greatly increased, without any sacrifice of the high character and gentlemanly bearing which had always distinguished the British officer. Up to lately, England could not be considered a warlike country. Now, however, she must be considered as one of the most warlike in the world, and the improvement of our army ought to be regarded as one of the most important topics which could be considered by the Legislature. Before sitting down he had a few words to address to the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Milner Gibson). It was a sad thing to see a great man in distress, and it was almost as sad to see the right hon. Gentleman in want of a cry with which to go to the hustings. "Peace, retrenchment, and reform!" the right hon. Gentleman said, would no longer do. Peace had been concluded. We had withdrawn our troops from Athens and our Plenipotentiary from Naples; we had engaged in war with Persia, and we had also made peace with that country; but we were now employed in decimating the defenceless barbarians of Canton. He certainly did not think that the peace cry was popular in England. Retrenchment would not do either, for we could not have large armies, great fleets, and squadrons of gunboats without considerable expenditure. With regard to reform, the noble Lord at the head of the Government had declared his opinions so plainly that it was unnecessary for him (Mr. Palk) to say a word on the subject. Hopeless as the case of the right hon. Member for Manchester seemed to be, he (Mr. Palk) thought there was one cry that would move not only Manchester, but every county and borough in the kingdom. Let the right hon. Gentleman take the Report of the Commissioners in the Crimea, and let him tell the people of Manchester that by neglect somewhere—for he (Mr. Palk) could not say positively in what department the neglect was—18,000 men had fallen victims to misery and disease. Let the right hon. Gentleman tell them that the noble Lord at the head of the Government sent out Sir John M'Neill, a man of distinguished ability, and Colonel Tulloch, an officer who had served his country for twenty years, and who during that period had presented to the House six Reports tending to ameliorate the condition of the British army. Under difficulties of no ordinary description those gentlemen carefully and minutely investigated the causes of complaint, and they embodied the results of their inquiries in a Report of some hundred pages. Let the right hon. Gentleman tell the people of Manchester, that when Colonel Tulloch was called before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea, and was asked whether that Report had received the commendation of the Government, in order to meet that question he was obliged to write the following letter to Mr. Peel:— Sir,—I have the honour to state that, when under examination to-day before the Court, I was questioned as to whether I had any evidence to show that the Report of Sir John M'Neill and myself had been approved by Lord Panmure and Her Majesty's Government. I replied that I understood the publication of the Report inferred such approval, as also that Lord Palmerston had expressed it in the House; but as neither of these assertions seemed to be sufficient, and the only evidence I have on the subject is to be inferred from private memoranda, it would be of much service and save discussion if you could forward to me a letter to the Board of General Officers early to-morrow, stating that the Report was approved by Her Majesty's Government before being made public. I will answer the letter relating to legal advice in the course of to-morrow, when I see whether the proceedings in regard to Lord Lucan's complaint are likely to come soon to a close. He (Mr. Palk) would now read the reply sent to this letter by Mr. Peel:— War Department, April 18, 1856. Sir,—Having laid before Lord Panmure your letter of the 17th instant, requesting that a letter may be addressed to the Board of General Officers through you expressing the approval of Her Majesty's Government of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, I am directed by his Lordship to remark to you that all communications with that Board have hitherto passed through the Judge Advocate General, a course from which Lord Panmure does not think it desirable to depart. You have already been informed that all documents in the War Department are at your service, and had there been any formal documentary approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners on record it would be furnished to you according to your request. There is, however, no such document; but the speech of Lord Palmerston to which you refer is as authoritative a statement upon the subject as can be made. It is printed in Hansard's Debates, vol. 140, page 1,658, and Lord Panmure is of opinion that you may appropriately refer to it. Such was the acknowledgment received from the Government by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. He should be most unreasonable if he were to cavil at a letter so carefully and cautiously worded:—but there was not a sentence in the letter conveying any approval beyond that which had been expressed by the First Minister of the Crown; and it was delicately insinuated that Colonel Tulloch had been guilty of a breach of routine. They had heard something of routine and red tape, and he (Mr. Palk) thought the letter of the Undersecretary for War was a good specimen of red-tapeism. Some months afterwards Lord Panmure, the Secretary for War, at a banquet given to him by some enthusiastic admirers in Scotland, made some laudatory remarks in his post-prandial oration with regard to Sir John M'Neill. Since that time they were aware that a much more gracious mark of approbation had been offered by Her Majesty's Government to these two gentlemen—namely, the munificent sum of £1,000 each—which, for some reason with which he (Mr. Palk) was not acquainted, they had declined to accept. Those gentlemen were public servants, who had been called upon to render important services to the country at a period of great difficulty, and under very peculiar circumstances. They performed that duty, and produced a Report. That Report had been laid upon the table of the House, and he maintained that it was the duty of the Government either to controvert or to assent to it. If it was not founded on the evidence—if it was full of faults—it ought not to have been laid upon the table; but when it had been laid before the House, and when the noble Lord at the head of the Government had given his meed of approbation to those who prepared it, he (Mr. Palk) thought it was a cruel injustice to summon a Board of General Officers—none of whom, he believed, had been in the Crimea—to meet in England, not to controvert the Report, but with the view of enabling officers who had, in his opinion, been somewhat distantly maligned in the Report, to make statements in which they were carefully cautioned not to criminate themselves, but by which they shifted the blame from their own shoulders, and by inference threw it upon the Commissioners who drew up the Report. He wished this matter had been placed in abler hands; he had, however, endeavoured to place before the House its principal features, and it only remained to commit his Resolutions to their consideration.

SIR JAMES FERGUSSON

seconded the Motion.

Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch ably fulfilled the duty entrusted to them of inquiring into the arrangement and management of the Commissariat Department:—That the evidence in their Report proves that in the months of December 1854 and January 1855, the sufferings of the Army must have been intense, and that great mortality was occasioned by overwork and exposure, and want of food and clothing:—That the examination into this statement by the Board of General Officers materially support the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioners as to the want of organisation in the Quartermaster General's, Commissariat, and Transport Services:—That it appears to this House that, from the Report of the Board, this inefficiency must be attributed to the imperfect arrangement or conduct of those Departments,"—instead thereof. Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. BLACK

said, he should not be doing justice to his feelings towards his friend Sir John M 'Neill, nor to his constituents, if he were to remain silent on this Motion. His constituents took great interest in this subject, and he had presented three petitions—one from the Lord Provost and Magistrates of Edinburgh, another from a company of Merchants, and a third from the Dean of Faculties, members of the legal profession, clergymen, and merchants, urging the Government to bestow some sufficient mark of their approbation upon the Commissioners. At the time the Commissioners were sent out the honour of Britain was at stake, and the very existence of one of the finest armies that ever left these shores was imperilled. He thought the Government adopted a judicious course in deputing two gentlemen possessing such undeniable qualifications to investigate the cause of the calamities which had befallen the army. The Commissioners resolved to give up all the comforts of home, in order that they might be useful to the army and their country—and Sir John was at that time in precarious health—and the way in which they had discharged the duty intrusted to them did them the highest honour. They examined 200 witnesses, and spent fifty-five days in the investigation. What added greatly to the credibility of the evidence was, that the notes of every witness's examination were submitted to him to be revised and corrected, and he believed that, with the exception of two, all the witnesses revised in this way their evidence. The Commissioners had conferred an incalculable benefit on their country, and had embodied in the records of that House an invaluable body of suggestions for remedying errors and defects which in future times might be the means of saving the lives of thousands of our countrymen. In making their investigations they did not pursue their inquiries among the men who were grumbling and discontented, but they examined the commanders of divisions and regiments, the doctors, the adjutants, and all whose positions were such as to make them acquainted with the facts. Well might Sir J. M 'Neill say at the Crimean banquet in Edinburgh, that if the Government intended that this inquiry should be a sham, they ought to have employed other instruments for that purpose, because for anything but an honest purpose these men were incapable of acting. After the Report of the inquiry had been laid on the table certain officers thought that it conveyed a censure upon their conduct, and, belonging to high and influential families, they procured a Board of inquiry, with the view of vindicating their conduct. That Board came to the conclusion that for what had occurred in the Crimea there was nobody to blame, but that all the disorders and evils there had arisen from causes which no foresight and no ingenuity could have prevented. But, while they thus vindicated the conduct of the officers, they did not show the same tenderness for the Crimean Commissioners, whose fairness they by inference inculpated. Now, if gentlemen employed in the public service in this way did not find their labours appreciated and rewarded as they ought to be, how could it be expected that others would engage in similar labours? At the present moment who could have been better employed as a Commissioner in China than Sir J. M 'Neill? It has been said these gentlemen did no more than their duty; but he would ask whether Lord Lucan, or Lord Cardigan, or General Airey, or Colonel Gordon, all of whom had obtained honours or promotions, had done more than their duty? He could not but think that there must be some barrier in the way which prevented these two Commissioners from obtaining such a recognition of their services as they deserved; but he trusted the noble Lord would break through all these invisible fences, and that he would not fail to honour those to whom honour was due.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

I am anxious, in the first place, to remove an impression which seems to have been produced on the mind of my hon. Friend who has just sat down that, either in point of intention or in point of fact, there was anything in the instructions given to these two Commissioners that could be called a sham. There was nothing in the manner in which they were appointed, or in the manner in which their instructions were given to them, or in the manner in which the investigation was conducted, or in the manner in which their Report was received and acted upon, that could in the slightest degree justify such an assertion. The Commissioners were selected from a regard to their knowledge and their competence for the task which they had to discharge. That task was accomplished with credit to themselves and advantage to the public, and Her Majesty's Government have fully expressed their sense of the great services so rendered. With regard to the speech of the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Palk), it really seemed to me to be a complete anachronism. It was a speech that would have been very much in point two years ago, when the sufferings of the army were such as he has described them to have been—when all the attention of the Government, stimulated by the impulse of this House, was necessary to relieve those sufferings at a moment when they had not yet received their appropriate remedies. But really, at this time of day, when the war has been concluded and peace established, when a year has elapsed since the termination of the war—to go back upon the state of things that existed in December, 1854, does seem to me to be not the most useful application of the time of this House. My first answer to the hon. Gentleman is, that these sufferings ceased nearly two months before the Commissioners got to the Crimea; that whereas in the first winter the army was in a state of great misery and destitution and severe suffering, after that it was in a condition that excited the envy and admiration of all who saw it—infinitely better than that of the French army, infinitely better than that of the Russian army; and that, in point of fact, at the end of the war it was in every respect in a condition not equalled by any number of troops in any part of the world—not even by troops at home. Therefore, the speech of the hon. Gentleman is only a recital of calamities past and gone, and which were remedied on the very spot and in the very service to which his speech relates. It is quite true that the sufferings of our soldiers were great. The hon. Gentleman has gone through the details with which we are all familiar. It is quite true that the knapsacks were left on board the ships at the landing which took place before the battle of the Alma, and it is quite true that those knapsacks, for some reason, did not reach the men for two or three months after they had landed. But that is not an unexampled state of things. I was conversing a day or two ago with an hon. and gallant Friend of mine who served in one of the campaigns at the Cape, and he assured me that throughout that campaign the troops had no knapsacks and no tents, and had only their blankets to screen them from the weather; but that, nevertheless, they did not suffer from the exposure. It is true that ample supplies were sent from this country to the Crimea, but that from want of arrangements on the spot the troops there derived no advantage from them. It is true there were 10,000 great-coats sent which might have been served out, but were kept in store. It is quite true, likewise, that there were boots in store that no one knew anything about, and that there was forage at Constantinople while the animals were starving in the Crimea. It is true, also, that a ship loaded with rice, was sent to convey an officer from Constantinople to Beicos. All this arose from local confusion, arising from the pressure of great and important services suddenly thrown upon men not accustomed to the details of such services. That was the real cause of the confusion that occurred—not any want of arrangement at home. The different departments sent out ample stores of all kinds for the wants of the army; but, partly in consequence of the rapid transfers of the army from one scene of operations to another, as from Turkey to the Crimea, the necessary separation of parties, and various other reasons, it is true there was not that arrangement and that foresight exhibited, which afterwards, when the officials became accustomed to their duties, fortunately prevailed. The supply of animals for fresh meat was at the beginning not properly arranged, the hospitals were not properly arranged, or cleansed, or ventilated, and the sick did not derive that advantage from them which they ought to have done. But when the hon. Gentleman speaks of the mortality of the army and of the great losses we sustained—deeply as I lament that mortality, and readily acknowledging that in great part it might have been prevented by better arrangements—he is much mistaken if he imagines that those losses were at all greater than those of the French or the Russian army. So far from that, they were less in proportion than those of our ally, whose arrangements were at one time held up as very models for imitation. With regard to the two Commissioners, no doubt they did their duty exceedingly well; but when did they go out? They went out in April and returned in July. These gentlemen, no doubt, suggested very material alterations while they were there; yet in so far as their Report furnished the Government at home with the elements of better arrangements, those arrangements had already been carried out, many important improvements had been carried out before they returned home—at any rate before their Report was sent in. Moreover, they were not the only Commissioners. There was a Medical Commission, consisting of Dr. Sutherland, Dr. Gavin, who unfortunately lost his life, and Mr. Rawlinson, an engineer, who was wounded in action in which he had unnecessarily placed himself. I am bound to say, without disparagement to Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, that the Medical Commissioners conferred greater advantages upon the public at home and upon the army in the Crimea than it was possible for them to accomplish. Dr. Sutherland and his associates took the medical arrangements of the hospitals and of the camp into immediate consideration, and suggested improvements which were of the utmost consequence to the troops in the field as well as to the sick and wounded. Then it is said that it was a great injustice to Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to appoint the Board of General Officers which held its sittings at Chelsea. That Board, however, was not appointed to revise the Report of the Commissioners. There were certain officers of rank—rank, if you will, both social and military—whose reputation was of course most dear to them, who had left the Crimea before Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch began their inquiries, whom, therefore, they could not examine on the spot, but with regard to whose conduct certain statements, direct or indirect, had been made to the Commissioners which were included in their Report; and when that Report was published those officers, jealous of their honour and reputation, asked for an opportunity of giving that explanation of their conduct which, not having been in the Crimea at the time when the investigation took place, it was absolutely and physically impossible they could have given to the Commissioners. That request was not made in secret or without public discussion; for it was in this House we were called upon to appoint some authority to whom these officers should make their statement. It was held not to be decorous that they should write letters in the newspapers in answer to the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, or that those who happened to be Members of Parliament should take advantage of their position as such to deliver speeches in their own defence. It was felt that the only just course towards them would be to appoint some Board of military officers, competent to be judges, to receive their statements and to hear what they had to say in exoneration of that part of their conduct which they believed to be impugned by the Report of the Crimean Commissioners. The Board of General Officers, therefore, was not appointed to sit in judgment upon Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch; on the contrary, its appointment was an act of simple justice to those officers who desired to explain their conduct in the Crimea, and was an act, moreover, which seemed to receive the sanction of Parliament at the time. The Motion of the hon. Gentleman is not one, I submit, which ought to be assented to by the House at the present moment. The first part of it records facts which nobody disputes—namely, the sufferings of the army at the time to which the Motion refers—but the latter part consists of censures upon certain officers belonging to certain branches of the service. I think it would be ungenerous at this time of day to go back to a consideration of a subject which involves a censure upon these officers after it has been subjected to investigation, and after the whole subject has, to a certain degree, passed into the domain of history. The hon. Gentleman, towards the conclusion of his speech, expressed a hope that arrangements might be made for the better instruction of officers of the army; that young men might no longer enter the army for the mere gratification of their vanity, intending to remain for two or three years only, but that all officers might in future make the military profession the serious business of their lives, devoting their whole thoughts to it. That is certainly the system in foreign countries, but it is not the case in England, and you may depend upon it, never will be. In foreign countries large standing armies are kept up in time of peace; when a man embraces the military profession he knows that he will be a soldier as long as health and strength remain, and he therefore devotes all his thoughts to it, in order to obtain promotion in the service and reputation among his fellow-citizens. The army is his permanent profession and his condition in life. In England we pursue a different course. We have in times of peace a very small army, and when war comes we are obliged to increase it, sometimes very rapidly. Officers who enter the army during war must expect when peace arrives to have their services dispensed with. It is a great object also to have our service voluntary, not compulsory; for voluntary service has something inspiriting in itself, and if it has its inconveniences it has likewise its advantages, the loss of which would be dearly purchased by the adoption of the continental system. Therefore, whatever arrangements we may make—and I trust the Government will be able to make them—for imparting to our military officers more professional instruction than hitherto they have had either the means or the inducement to acquire, depend upon it that the system which the hon. Gentleman wishes to see prevail—namely, that none should enter the army except those who intend to make it the study and business of their lives—is a principle which never can prevail in England. It is not consistent with the nature of our institutions or with our national character and habits. We must take advantage of the voluntary service of those who go into the army, whether they mean to remain a long or a short time, and make it as efficient as possible. We cannot be a military nation, but depend upon it we are a fighting nation; and depend upon it those very men who in time of peace may enter the army as a means of amusement for a short time, and, as the hon. Gentleman says, for the pleasure of wearing a red coat, if war should come, would be found most determined to brave the call. They will shrink not from the duty, but will distinguish themselves for bravery in the field, for endurance of fatigue, and for their submission to all the hardships of military life, quite as readily as the officers of any continental army, who have been drilled and tutored, and lectured into a better abstract notion of soldiers. They will be found equally gallant, whether they are placed at the head of a troop in battle, or conducting a charge, or defending a position against a hostile attack, whatever differences may exist between them in point of technical instruction or the knowledge of military details. I should hope, Sir, that the hon. Gentleman having satisfied his mind by making such honourable mention of the Commissioners—with which I fully concur—having expressed his regret at the sufferings of the army in the early period of the war—but forgetting to congratulate the country for the great improvement in its position in the latter period of the war, which I am sure he intended to have done—I trust it passed through his mind; very often hon. Gentlemen sit down without having said all they intended—having, I say, so far effected his object, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not think it necessary to press his Motion to a division, but will let us go into Committee of Supply without dividing on his Resolution.

SIR JOHN FITZGERALD

thought that the inquiry conducted by Sir J. M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch in the Crimea was subversive of the discipline of the army, and he certainly would never consent to a Resolution which censured officers who acted under the authority of official superiors.

GENERAL PEEL

Sir, I cannot agree with the noble Lord at the head of the Government, that the time of this House can be misspent in inquiries into the causes of the calamities which befell our army in the Crimea. I am aware of the ridicule to which I should naturally and justly expose myself if I were to offer any professional opinion upon the events of the Crimean campaign, and I am aware of the difficulties under which I labour in speaking of those occurrences, in the presence of some distinguished officers who were actual witnesses of those facts. But we may depend upon it that the military profession is as subject to the ordinary rules of common sense as any other; and I see no reason why any Member of this House, who has carefully examined the evidence laid on the table, should not be in a condition to form an opinion upon the question before us. For my own part, having passed two whole summers in investigating most minutely the facts that have been given in evidence, contrary, I may be permitted to say, to my own wishes, and contrary to my expressed opinion as to any advantage to be derived from our inquiries—I have arrived at the opinion that the calamities which occurred in the Crimea arose from circumstances which it was not in the power of any individual in the Crimea to control. I am happy to find that the noble Lord at the head of the War Department (Lord Panmure) expressed the same opinion in the speech which he made a short time ago at Arbroath. The mistake of those who have been foremost in demanding inquiry into the sufferings of the Crimean army consists in the attempt to throw the blame upon individuals. The first person sacrificed in consequence of these calamities was the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary for War. I am certain that anybody who reads the evidence given by the noble Duke before the Chelsea Board of Commissioners, must admit that he did everything in his power to avert the calamities that befell the army, and that he was only responsible with the rest of the Government for what took place. I also believe that Admiral Boxer, Captain Christie, and Lord Raglan fell victims to that senseless clamour which was raised against them in this country upon anonymous authority. Now, Sir, I have always attempted to remodel had systems, instead of attacking the individuals who had to work them. Let it not for a moment be supposed that I underrate the hardships and privations to which the army was subject during the winter of 1854–5. So far from underrating them, I think it is impossible to exaggerate them; and equally impossible would it be to exaggerate the patience and heroism with which they were endured. But, admitting the hardships endured by this army, I believe that no individual in the Crimea was responsible for them. I am perfectly aware that when I say so I may well be asked, "What then were, in your opinion, the causes of those hardships?" I think that the time has gone by when there ought to be any delicacy whatever in answering that question. I believe that the chief cause was your commencement of a great war with little means—in sending out a larger army than our peace establishment could afford. The army was deficient in everything but in the bravery, discipline, and devotedness of its troops. With that army suffering much from sickness you undertook a great military operation without any reserve whatever. The Government were not so responsible for that as the country, which raised the universal cry that the war should be carried on with vigour. But I think that the Government were to blame not so much for anything of their own defects, but for having given way to that absurd cry of the country for carrying on such a war with economy. I think also they were to blame for not having foreseen at an earlier period the possibility of the army having to remain in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–5. I am perfectly aware that there was a general belief that the army would not have to remain there during that winter, and that it was not till after the battle of Inker-man that it became certain that it would have to winter in the Crimea; nor was it until after that great victory that the necessities of the army became known. It is to the position in which the army then was that I attribute the calamities which afterwards inevitably occurred. That illustrious man struggled against the most tremendous difficulties which he had no power to assuage, and which were enough to appall as well as disgust any man placed in his position. Lord Raglan had no resources whatever with which to overcome the difficulties by which he was surrounded; nor was he the man to abandon his guns, his allies, and the honour of his country by endeavouring to re-embark his army. I do not think that he would have succeeded in that endeavour; but, whatever might be the severity of the hardships which he had to endure, anybody who knew Lord Raglan must feel that he would have maintained his position as long as he had a single regiment left. The army was exhausted by work beyond its strength. It was not even able to keep up that road of communication which lay between it and the harbour of Balaklava, where the provisions intended for it were landed. An outcry was raised in this country against the War Department because that road to Balaklava was almost impassable; but that cry only showed the injustice of blaming individuals for occurrences over which they had no control. The want of that road added in a frightful degree to the inefficiency of the land carriage. From want of a system of sufficient land carriage the horses belonging to the cavalry had to struggle to their knees in mud under burdens of provision for the army. The want of that land carriage is admitted, I believe, on all hands, to have been the principal cause of the misfortunes of the army, and it therefore well deserves the consideration of this House. It does not appear to have originated, in the first instance, from a want of animals, for you had 2,000 at Constantinople; it appears to have originated from the impossibility of providing forage for more than a small number of animals in the Crimea, and that number was already exceeded by the cavalry and those used by the military staff. I think, then, that a commonsense view of that position of affairs would have led to the reduction of the number of the horses, as you had not the power of keeping them in the Crimea. This brings me to another great cause of the hardships endured by the army. It struck me from the first moment that the wisest plan under these circumstances would have been to re-embark the cavalry and send them to Varna or to Constantinople during the winter, and to take baggage animals to the Crimea for the purpose of affording communication between the army and Balaklava. It struck me that it was worse than useless to keep the cavalry horses in the Crimea during the winter, for, supposing even that there had not been any danger of their starvation, the mere exposure of them to a Crimean winter, and use of them as baggage animals, would render them useless in battle. I therefore put the question to the first cavalry officer that was examined before the Crimean Commission, whether I had not formed a correct opinion as to what ought to have been done in this respect? His answer was that it would have no doubt been beneficial to the cavalry if such a course had been adopted, but that the moral effect of it would have been bad. It seems to me, however, that the moral effect of our horses dying of starvation and eating one another's tails could not have been very beneficial. I perfectly understood the meaning of that answer to be, that it would have had a bad effect upon our allies if we had endeavoured to re-embark any portion of our army. And this brings me to another subject, and that is the evil that always must arise from the action of combined armies serving under two distinct commanders. Depend upon it that, however cordial, however perfectly allied, however perfectly united the forces may be, there always must be separate interests and separate views. It must be evident to everybody who has read the evidence laid before the House, that the loss of the Light Brigade of cavalry during the earlier part of the winter was in consequence of the position which was assigned to the British army. That position was the result of an agreement between Lord Raglan and the French General. The danger to which the cavalry was exposed was pointed out to Lord Raglan, but he did not consider himself at liberty to change its position. I believe that the agreement is no secret whatever. I have heard it repeated fifty times. I have heard that its history was this: when Lord Raglan found his army sinking from overwork and dying in the trenches, he applied to the French General for assistance, or rather for a fresh division of the labour according to the strength of the army, the French army having received an accession of a great number of troops that were carried by our own transports at a time when they were most required for our own army. The answer was as satisfactory as could be expected under the circumstances. It is said that the division of labour was promised on condition that our cavalry was to be at the immediate service of the French army. The difficulty of foraging the cavalry was pointed out; but the answer was very laconic—"No cavalry, no division of labour." Although our cavalry was then put in a position where it must of necessity starve, yet I think that it perfectly fulfilled the purpose for which it was used, namely, that of acting like a scarecrow and frightening the Russians away. I believe that the calamities which befell our army during the winter of 1854–5 are attributable, not to the heads of our military departments, but to the organization and arrangements of those departments. Into the Commissariat Department there have already been introduced changes which I trust will prove to be beneficial. The Commissariat has already been removed from the Treasury and placed under the control of the Secretary for War. The Transport Service has been removed from the Commissariat, and a special force raised for that service. I trust that the anomalies in the Quartermaster General's Department will be done away with. There is no department on which the comfort of the army is more dependent than on that of the Quartermaster General, and yet he has not the power of executing upon his own responsibility any one of the duties which he has to perform; he is dependent upon other departments for the performance of those duties for which he is responsible. I believe that we shall profit by the experience which we have gained in the Crimea. With regard to the Crimean Commission, the noble Lord has truly stated what was the duty of the Board of General Officers. We were not directed to try the accuracy of the Report of Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. All that was done in respect to those Commissioners arose from a question put by the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. T. Duncombe), who asked whether or no the Commissioners would be permitted to be present at that inquiry. We would not take upon ourselves the responsibility of either inviting them or of refusing them admission; but we said that if they chose to attend they should have the fullest power of calling witnesses, and examining them upon any points they pleased. The Board of General Officers was constituted for the purpose of receiving the explanations of certain officers, whose conduct was impugned; and those officers were fully justified in demanding such a tribunal. It seems, from the first paragraph of a work lately published, that considerable excitement has been created by the Report of the Commission against the officers supposed to be responsible for the Crimean Report. Great objections have been taken to the formation of that Board; and the Judge Advocate has stated that the officers composing it were all of the same political opinion as the two noble Lords who appeared before it. I do not know where my right hon. Friend obtained that information; but I am afraid that if Colonel Tulloch had known the real truth we should have been subjected to a much graver charge—that of being a coalition. Persons of the same political views may come to any conclusion they please without being stigmatized; but if the case be so strong as to induce persons of different political opinions to agree there must be a coalition. I am afraid, then, that I coalesced upon that occasion, for I have the authority of three out of the other four officers who composed the Board for denying altogether that they are of the same political opinions as myself. At all events, we were not in a position to show our politics there, and—what is more—a soldier has no politics connected with his profession. I am really surprised, therefore, at the repetition of such a charge, even in this book, which professes to be an attack upon the Board of General Officers. I should be quite ready, if necessary, to go through and to verify every opinion which was expressed by that Board; but that would be only a waste of time, and I shall confine myself, therefore, to dealing very shortly with each case, showing the best reasons why we came to the conclusions that we did. With reference to Lord Lucan's case, it is only necessary, I think, to quote one authority, which it is impossible to oppose, and which Colonel Tulloch, who has contradicted everything else, will, I have no doubt, admit. The authority to which I allude is the following statement, which was made by Lord Lucan in the House of Lords. His Lordship said:— For himself he felt little concern, because, immediately after the conclusion of the evidence, Colonel Tulloch came over to him, and, although he had never said a word or communicated with that gallant officer before, he, Colonel Tulloch, said he thought it due to him (the Earl of Lucan) to state that had he not been misled by the evidence given him in the Crimea by General Airey and Colonel Gordon, he or the other Commissioner would never have said a word to his (the Earl of Lucan's) disadvantage. Therefore it appears that, according to Colonel Tulloch's own view, Lord Lucan had perfectly justified himself. With regard to Lord Cardigan, it seems to me that his is just the case of a man who gave the very good reason for not paying his debts—that he had no money. Lord Cardigan did not do certain things that were suggested, because he had no authority; and it was proved that he had no power to do more than he did. As to General Airey, the House will remember that when these Commissioners went to the Crimea to inquire into the case of the stores and the Commissariat Department, another officer was sent out with the full authority of the Government to inquire into the conduct of the staff officers; and when I read to you the instructions which were given to General Simpson, and his Report upon the subject, I think that the House will see that that is far better evidence as to the conduct of the staff officers than any which could possibly be given by the Commissioners. Moreover, those officers never received any intimation of any charge being brought against them, and the first syllable which they heard about it was upon the appearance of the bluebook. The instructions which were given to General Simpson in the Crimea, at the same time that the Commissioners went out, were in these words: — It will be your duty to look into the composition of the general staff of the army and report your opinion of any change which it may occur to you to think necessary to Field Marshal Raglan. All appointments and removals from the general staff of the army will rest with the officers in supreme command; but you will not fail, if you find any officer in your opinion unfit on trial for the duties intrusted to him, to report the same without favour or affection to the Commander in Chief. Then General Simpson, on the 26th of April, reported to Lord Raglan as follows: Ever since my arrival in the camp, it has been my daily custom, by personal intercourse, to make myself acquainted with every officer employed on the general staff of this army, and there is not one of them I would wish to see removed. I confess myself to have come among those officers with some degree of prejudice against them in my mind by the gross misrepresentations current in England respecting them. I do not think a better selection of staff officers could be made. Now, I really would ask my hon. Friend who brought forward this Motion whether with this testimony before him he would ask the House to commit such an act of injustice as to say that the calamities in the Crimea arose from the conduct of the heads of the departments that are mentioned? Whatever he does with the remainder of his Resolution, I trust that he will strike out that portion of it. Allow me, in justice to Mr. Commissary General Filder—whom I never saw in my life—to say that I think he was exceedingly hardly used; because just at the moment when things were improving and the whole Commissariat Department was rearranged, he was removed, and others were sent out to the Crimea who reaped the benefit of his experience and of all that he had done. I am perfectly willing to admit that the Crimean Commissioners have done their duty most conscientiously and most fearlessly, and no doubt that duty was a most anxious one; but I must say that I think the extent of their services has been somewhat overrated. I see, for example, that the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. J. Ewart), and some hundred other most respectable gentlemen connected with that great town, have agreed to the following resolution:— Looking back to and comparing the condition of the army previous to the commencement of your labours with the state in which you left it, it is not too much to say that to your exertions we owe the preservation of the remnant of that noble body of men, and the rescue of the country from impending failure and disgrace. I beg to say that the army never heard before that they had been rescued from "impending failure and disgrace" by the exertions of the Commissioners. Those gentlemen did not arrive in the Crimea until the 13th of March, by which time the former evils had been remedied, the men were actually overladen with clothing, and the army altogether in as good a condition as any army could possibly be expected to be. But it was not in the power of the Commissioners, according to their instructions, whatever their intentions might have been, to have done what is supposed. Their instructions were to inquire, report, and make suggestions; and the only suggestions which they made upon the spot which I can trace were something about ovens and quinine. The Commissioners never themselves attributed blame to any of those gentlemen who appeared before the Board at Chelsea; but they were in haste to submit their Report to the House before it was laid before the Commander in Chief, and if, when presented, it had been accompanied by that expression of the noble Lord at the head of the War Department, that the calamities in the Crimea arose from circumstances which no one could control, I think that that would have been quite sufficient, and that the inquiry which took place at Chelsea never need have occurred. With reference to that inquiry I will only add, for myself, that I have been actuated by no personal feeling whatever respecting any person. I had as many friends and near relations, perhaps, in the Crimea as most people, and they were all regimental officers serving in the trenches; but, owing to the length of time that I have been on half-pay, I had not the honour of anything but the slightest personal acquaintance with a single officer on the staff in the Crimea. Regardless of private friendships, however, I trust that I shall always have moral courage enough to do justice to everybody who I think has been wronged.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

Although I would willingly not trespass upon the time of the House, I think, considering my past relation with the military department of the Government, that I may be allowed to say a few words with respect to the Motion under discussion. I agree with a great deal that has fallen from my hon. and gallant Friend opposite, and I confess that the first impression which the proposed Resolutions made on my mind was one of regret at the re-opening of questions which I hoped had been settled, and were not again to be adverted to. I think that we must all feel a desire, having passed through the Crimean campaign, to draw the veil of oblivion over everything which would appear to imply blame or censure to individuals. No doubt, when, after a long peace, an army suddenly takes the field, there must be great inexperience, great deficiencies, and great confusion; and I agree with the gallant Officer, that the error which was made by the Government of which I was a member was in attempting too much. I say frankly that I think we were to blame for so doing. But it appears to me that in all these discussions the main difficulty which besets us is, that we have never had a clear idea whom we are to try. From the speeches of some hon. Gentlemen it seems to be their opinion that we ought to try the Chelsea Board; but with that I have nothing to do—the General Officers who constituted that Board have concluded their inquiry, and I have no doubt that they have acted conscientiously to the best of their ability. They may have fallen into error, but whether they did or not, with that we have nothing to do. It is quite true, as has been stated, that the changes which were made in the management of the army—such as the division of the Land Transport from the Commissariat, the ordering of the railway, the improved clothing, and so on—were made previously to the arrival of the Commissioners in the Crimea, because they were sent out in the autumn, and the Commissioners did not arrive till the following March. I again say we are not here to judge the Chelsea Commissioners, or to say whether or not they executed their duty to the utmost of their ability; but I think that all persons in this House, not excepting the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) will freely admit the faithfulness and ability with which Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch fulfilled a difficult, a delicate, and a most invidious task, and the question we have to consider now is, not whether certain officers in the Crimea were to blame—not whether the Board of Officers at Chelsea were to blame—but whether two gentlemen who were sent from this country to discharge a most arduous and invidious duty did discharge that duty faithfully and ably; and, if so, has the country, and has the Crown, marked in an unmistakeable manner their approbation of the services performed? I confess I heard with great pain the noble Lord at the head of the Government speak depreciatingly of the services of these gentlemen. [Viscount PALMERSTON: Not only have I not done so, but I stated the exact contrary.] Well, I am willing to do justice to the noble Lord, and I hope he will do me the justice of admitting that I have done my utmost to prevent this question being brought before the House, because I have repeatedly pressed upon him in private the course which I hoped he would have adopted with regard to these gentlemen. The question, however, now is before the House, and I am bound to express my opinion with regard to it. The noble Lord spoke of the Report of Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch as being a valuable Report, but at the same time as not being more valuable than many other Reports which had been made. Now, the House should remember, firstly, that the subject of this inquiry was far more important in its character, altogether differed from the subjects of ordinary Reports; and secondly, that the services of these gentlemen were not confined to the inquiry they have made, nor is the whole result embodied in their Report, though their Report contains a mine of information upon which, no doubt, many important changes in our military administration will be founded. I have been told by medical men in whose judgment I place great confidence, that although without doubt a great deal of suffering in the Crimea was produced by privation and overwork, yet if there was one cause which more than any other contributed to the mortality of the army, it was scurvy, owing to the troops being kept so long feeding upon salt meat. I believe that it is not denied that when Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch arrived in the Crimea the Commissariat were still issuing hard biscuit and salt meat, and hard biscuit was entirely useless to men whose gums were affected by scurvy. It may appear from statistics that deaths among the troops arose from a great variety of diseases, but I believe that those diseases were only the result of scurvy, and that scurvy was therefore the original cause of the destruction of the army. Well, Sir, these gentlemen immediately effected the introduction to a great extent of fresh meat and bread in lieu of salt meat and biscuits. I have heard military men say that there is this peculiarity about every commissariat, which is, that as long as they can get people to eat it they will always issue salt meat and biscuits; and the reason is, obviously, because it entails less trouble in collection and no more trouble in issue than any other articles of food. This being so, Sir John M 'Neill took measures that tenders might be sent in to Mr. Filder from persons offering to supply fresh meat, and at the same time Colonel Tulloch introduced the practice of baking fresh bread, and established bakeries to supply the troops with fresh bread two or three days in the week; and thus these two gentlemen rendered a most important service in addition to preparing their Report. Now, Sir, do not let us consider who was to blame. I have frankly said that in one respect I think the Government were to blame, and with regard to other matters I wish to cast blame upon no man. The Report of the Commissioners, except in one single sentence, and then only by implication, brings no charge against any one; and I bring no charge, for I have too strong a feeling of sympathy for men engaged in so difficult and dangerous duties to impute blame to them when they endeavour to discharge their duty to the utmost of their ability. Let me however, ask the House if it does not think it fitting that it should express some opinion in approbation of the service of these two gentlemen? I would venture to suggest to the hon. Gentleman who has moved these Resolutions to withdraw all but the first, and to engraft upon that the Resolution of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. J. Ewart), with the exception of the first two lines, so that it would read thus:— That Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch ably fulfilled the duty intrusted to them of inquiring into the arrangement and management of the Commissariat Department; and that, considering the able services rendered by them as commissioners in the Crimea, and the testimony in their favour of Her Majesty's Government, an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that some especial mark of approbation be conferred upon them. I confess that I entertain strong feelings upon this subject. It is by no means easy to find gentlemen who will make a Report which by implication affects persons of high standing; and if you wish in future to have true and faithful reports you must show your appreciation of men who are willing rather to encounter obloquy than to conceal or gloss over that which they ought in duty to make known; and I must say that, looking at the services which have been rendered by these gentlemen, it does not appear to me that they have received justice at our hands. I again repeat that we are not here to sit in judgment upon the Chelsea Board of Officers, but the question for us to consider is, ought not these Commissioners, who had to discharge a most delicate, a most difficult, and a most invidious duty, and who discharged that duty with the utmost faithfulness and ability, to receive from the country some mark of approbation?

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

I agree generally with what has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wilts; but I am not quite sure that I agree with him that a veil of oblivion ought to be cast over all the transactions of the campaign of 1854–5. But, although I hope and believe that those events will never be forgotten, I so far agree with the right hon. Gentleman as to consider that it is not advisable now to bring them under the consideration of the House of Commons. There can be no doubt as to the sympathy entertained by the House and by the country for the sufferings of the army; but I am disposed to agree with my hon. and gallant Friend (General Peel) that the events of that campaign should only be referred to for the purpose of effecting certain changes in the organization of our military departments; but I take a different view from him as to whether the services of these Gentlemen ought to receive a fuller measure of recognition than they have received as yet. The question is one which this House, and, I believe, the country generally, regard with great interest. Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch were selected by the Government at a moment of great difficulty and great anxiety to conduct a most delicate, a most difficult, and a most invidious inquiry, and I believe that no two public functionaries ever discharged a difficult duty with more ability or with more honesty than they did. When they published their Report the Board of Officers at Chelsea was appointed to inquire into certain charges which it was alleged were contained in it against certain officers holding a high position in the army. I have not the least intention of casting any censure upon that Board; on the, contrary, I heard with great interest what fell from my gallant Friend, and I am quite convinced, and I believe that the country is convinced, that the duties of that Board were ably and honourably discharged. My gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon has stated that it was not the intention of that Board to inquire into the conduct of Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch; but, at the same time, they communicated to those Gentlemen that they were at liberty to appear before them. I think that in that respect the Board of Officers acted with perfect fairness; but I must confess that, under all the circumstances of the case, I think that Sir John M 'Neill exercised a wise discretion in trusting to the opinion which had been privately expressed to him by the Government, and not appearing before the Board. Colonel Tulloch adopted a different course, animated, I believe, by a feeling highly becoming to him as an officer; but still I think that he would better have consulted his own dignity if he had followed the example of Sir John M 'Neill. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. S. Herbert) has borne testimony, and the House responded to his statement, to the services of these gentlemen; and the question now before the House is, whether those services have been adequately recognized? I will not enter into the rumours with regard to some supposed understanding with Colonel Tulloch before he went out, that higher military rank would be conferred upon him on his return. I see that the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) dissents from that proposition, and I am not prepared to say that there was any such understanding. After the language of the noble Lord this evening I am not disposed to impute to him unwillingness to do justice to these Gentlemen; but I must express my opinion, which I believe is one very generally entertained, that the Government have not recognized their services with the promptitude or generosity, or to the extent which they ought to have done. It is perfectly true, as has been stated by my hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Palk), that, on the part of the noble Lord at the head of the War Department, no public recognition of these services was made until, I believe, a year after the Report was presented, and certainly six months after the appointment of the Chelsea Board; and, if I recollect rightly, it was not until this very Session that the noble Lord opposite made in Parliament any declaration of the approbation of Her Majesty's Government. [Viscount PALMERSTON: Last year.] I beg pardon; but, beyond that verbal recognition, no reward, no compensation has been given to these officers, and I heard this evening with very great regret the answer which was given by the noble Lord to the question put to him by the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. J. Ewart). When I saw that question on the paper I did most earnestly hope that the hon. Gentleman had some good reason for putting it, and I anxiously expected that the answer of the noble Lord would have been different from what it was. Under these circumstances I would join my right hon. Friend the Member for Wiltshire in pressing my hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Palk) to alter the terms of his Motion. I am not disposed to be a party to the unnecessary revival of painful questions with regard to the conduct of the war; but, on the subject now before the House—the claims of the Commissioners—I am disposed to have a very clear opinion. I believe it would be inconsistent with the forms of the House for the hon. Member for Liverpool to move the Amendment of which he has given notice upon the Motion of my hon. Friend, which is itself an Amendment; but I think the objects of both hon. Gentlemen will be answered if my hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Palk) will drop the paragraphs of his Resolution referring to the conduct of the war, and add to his first paragraph relating to Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch the words of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Liverpool, If my hon. Friend will adopt that course I shall give him my vote.

MR. J. EWART

said, that he had heard with great pain the answer given by the noble Lord at the head of the Government to the question which he had put to him that evening. He should certainly never have asked that question had he not had strong reasons for believing that some proper mark of distinction would be conferred, at all events, upon Colonel Tulloch. The Crimean Commissioners undertook a most painful and arduous duty, and they discharged it in a manner which justified the confidence which had been reposed in them by the Government, and entitled them to the eternal gratitude of the country. Far be it from him to say anything against those officers who were alluded to in the Report. The judgment of the country was, he believed, against them, and that was sufficient. He could not, however, help expressing his deep regret that the distinguished men who undertook that arduous duty should have been so entirely passed over, and that no proper recognition of their merits should have been made. He had hoped that the noble Lord would have met this question in a different manner. He could assure him that there was a very strong feeling about it in the country, and that the people would not be satisfied until there had been made to these two gentlemen some proper recognition of the valuable services they had rendered. He entirely approved of the course which had been suggested by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert), and he hoped that, altered as that right hon. Gentleman had suggested, the Resolutions would be agreed to by the House.

MR. PALK

said, that if the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wiltshire had not fully coincided with his own opinions he should still have considered it his duty to defer to the judgment of those who had much better means of forming an opinion upon this subject than he himself possessed. As it was, however, that concurrence did exist, and he, therefore, had no difficulty in acceding to the suggestion which had been made.

Another Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch ably fulfilled the duty entrusted to them of inquiring into the arrangement and management of the Commissariat Department; and that, considering the able services rendered by Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, as Commissioners in the Crimea, and the high testimony in their favour by Her Majesty's Government, an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that some especial mark of approbation be conferred upon them."—instead thereof.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put and negatived:—

Words added.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

I had hoped to have had a more decided expression of the opinions and feelings of the House upon the proposal of my right hon. Friend (Mr. S. Herbert), but if I am to infer from the calls for a division that the feeling of the House is decidedly in its favour I shall not oppose it. I have no wish to stand between the generous feelings of this House and the accomplishment of its wishes. Nobody more heartily desides than I do that the services of these two gentlemen should be recognized. I did certainly think that the offer made to them was the more natural and appropriate acknowledgment for services of that description; but, at the same time, if the House is of opinion that the Resolution as amended should be adopted, I for one shall not oppose it. Resolved, "That Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch ably fulfilled the duty entrusted to them of inquiring into the arrangement and management of the Commissariat Department; and that, considering the able services rendered by Sir John M 'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, as Commissioners in the Crimea, and the high testimony in their favour by Her Majesty's Government, an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that some especial mark of approbation be conferred upon them.