§ Order for Committee read.
§ House in Committee.
§
Clause 1.
If any person being a trustee of any property for the benefit, either wholly or partially, of some Other person, shall, with intent to defraud, convert or appropriate to his own use or the use of any person other than the person entitled thereto, or shall, with intent aforesaid, otherwise dispose of or employ such property, or any part thereof, to or for his own benefit, use or purposes, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
§ MR. ROLTsaid, his main objection to this clause as it stood was that it would in all probability tend to prevent persons of character and responsibility from accepting the office of trustee; and the object of the Amendment he had to propose, connected, as it was, with another Amendment upon the same clause, which also stood in his name upon the notice-paper, was to diminish that tendency. The extent to which trusts were now created—the desire universally entertained to regulate the enjoyment of property by the objects of our affection and bounty—and the opportunity now afforded us of realizing that desire with comparative certainty by the appointment of trustees—all this combined should lend them to deprecate any measure which would destroy the very basis of the system—namely, the willingness on the part of persons of character and responsibility to accept offices of this kind. He did not desire that a criminal trustee should be relieved from all liability to punishment, but he anticipated that from its one uniform definition and standard of punishment and crime this Bill would sweep into its net offences wholly different in character and degree, at the same time that from attempting to be comprehensive, it reached the region of the indefinite, and would thus both enable and induce many disappointed beneficiaries to bring charges against trustees who had no fraudulent intention whatever. Now he asked the Committee to draw a distinction between trustees and agents 496 for hire—as bankers or others. A gratuitous trustee had at best a fruitless and thankless duty to perform; and it was necessary, moreover, to consider that that duty was not one of a simple character. The charge accepted by him extended over long periods of time, dealing with persons to him at first unknown, and perhaps unborn, involving always questions of great difficulty. It would not do to say merely that, if the trustee were innocent, he would be acquitted, for the mere risk of being subjected to criminal charges under a penal enactment of great severity would probably be the feather which would turn the scale and determine him not to accept the office. According to the interpretation clause, the word "property" comprehended "every description of real and personal property, money, debts, and legacies, and all deeds and instruments relating to or evidencing the title or right to any property, or giving a right to recover or receive any money or goods." Then, to Clause 1 there had been added, since the Bill was last under consideration, the words, "or the use of any person other than the person entitled thereto;" so that, according to the clause as it now stood, if any person being possessed of any money on any trust appropriated it with a fraudulent intent, not for his own benefit but for the benefit of any person other than the person entitled thereto, he would be guilty of a misdemeanour. Now, he wished to draw the attention of the Committee to the distinction between trust-money rightfully in the hands of trustees, and stock which the trustee had no right to convert or to deal with in any way until he handed it over to the cestuique trust. In the former case, if a trustee, having trust money rightfully in his hands, became insolvent while a debtor to his trust, he stood in no worse position in point of real criminality than a man who incurred debts which he knew at the time he contracted them he could not pay, and he ought to be treated as an insolvent or, at most, as a criminal insolvent, and should be dealt with under the bankruptcy or insolvency laws; but under this Bill he would be guilty of a misdemeanour, and would be liable to seven years' penal servitude. In the case of a trustee, however, selling out stock and appropriating it to his own use, hoping to be able to restore it at the proper time, as, for instance, when the infant cestuique trust reached the age of twenty-one, the offence approached the crime of larceny; 497 he had no more right to touch that stock than he had to touch stock standing in the name of another person. The nature of the obligation in the two cases was distinct. In one, the obligation was to pay the debt when it was due, just as there was an obligation upon a man to pay any other debt when it was due; but in the other case the obligation was to render up the specific stock or the specific chattel. Again, let them look at the nature of the evidence as it affected the two cases. The gist of the offence was the intent to defraud, and in the case of a man selling stock and appropriating it to his own use when he ought to hand it over to the child when it attained the age of twenty-one, there would be no difficulty in showing the intent to defraud, because the act of conversion would prove the intent. But in the other case, when the trustee had the money rigtfully in his hands, it would be difficult to prove the intent. Indeed, those words "with intent to defraud" might ultimately save him; but it would involve a nice point, and no man of honour would like to incur the risk of being charged with such an offence as he might be innocently liable to under this Bill. He knew that it would be said that a trustee could protect himself by investing the trust money in a separate account with his banker; but there might be many cases in which persons rightly having money belonging to the trust might be unable to do that—they might not be aware of the necessity of doing so, or they might have no banker, or the money might be paid in such small sums that it would be inconvenient to do so, or debtors to the estate might pay in money to the general account of the trustees with their bankers without their knowledge. He contended that the distinction between these two cases, then, was plainly marked, and that while one approached either forgery or larceny in its character the other came within the category of criminal insolvency. He suggested, therefore, that they ought to limit the description of property, the misappropriation of which was to constitute the offence; for by so doing they would meet the great bulk of cases with which they were anxious to deal, while they would exempt from the operation of the Bill that class of offences which properly belonged to criminal insolvency, and they would by that means not deter men of honour from becoming trustees. After all, in legislating upon this subject, it was material to bear 498 in mind that the whole matter was one of trust and confidence, and that when Parliament had done the best it could for those who created trusts they should know that the greatest safeguard was in the simplicity of the trusts they created, and in the trustworthiness of those whom they selected to act as trustees; for it was idle for persons to create intricate and complicated trusts which no one could understand, or to select dishonest persons to discharge duties the very essence and pith of which were trustworthiness and confidence, and then to complain that the trusts had not been properly executed or that the funds had been misappropriated. He would conclude, therefore, by moving—
In line 8, to leave out 'property' and insert 'estate or interest in any land of any tenure, or of any share or interest in any Public Stock or Fund, whether of this Kingdom or of Great Britain or of Ireland, or of any Foreign State, or in any Stock or Fund of any body corporate, company, or society, or of any security for money whatsoever, or of any chattel.'
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, that in the general tendency of the observations of his hon. and learned Friend he concurred, but he could not concur with him in the Amendment he had proposed. He did not think that it would be desirable to substitute particular enumeration for a general denomination, which would include every description of property, because if that were done, however carefully the particular enumeration might be drawn up, the skill of a criminal lawyer might possibly be able to discover a loophole through which an offender might creep. In many cases where fraud was committed money might be lawfully in the hands of the trustees, and the fraud be as great practically as if the trustee had converted securities into money and then appropriated the money to his own use. Suppose, for instance, that a man had collected £500, and having 500 sovereigns, leaves a man his executor, and the executor takes the 500 sovereigns, and applies them to his own use, and robs the widow and orphan of the testator, was he not something more than an insolvent trustee, and was he to be exempted from the operation of this Bill because he had not got the money by the sale of stock? Again, a man died, and directed his trustee to sell his property, to get in his debts, to invest the proceeds and divide them among his children, and the trustee having turned the property into money, and then converted it to his own use, was he to be exempted from the opera- 499 tion of the Bill? How impossible was it to say that if a trustee took money only he incurred a debt, and that a trustee who took stock, or any other security, and turned it into money, and used it for his own purposes, committed a crime. If you left out the word "money," the most painful instances of fraudulent robbery would escape punishment, for he hoped that the Bill would reach numerous cases in which small sums passed into the hands of fraudulent trustees, and were used by them. He objected, therefore, to a particular enumeration of the nature and kinds of property, for his object was to render every fraudulent trustee liable under the Bill, and for that purpose he (the Attorney General) would retain the general word "property." He desired not to interfere with the relations of trustee and cestuique trust, but here there was nothing to frighten the most nervous man; for no one could by possibility come within the scope of the Bill unless he wilfully appropriated to his own use the property of a person which he was bound to protect. He hoped the Committee would not agree to this Amendment, because it would deprive the Bill of its greatest security.
MR. HEADLAMsaid, he thought the whole clause would be productive of more harm than good. There might be extreme cases of fraud which would be met by the Bill, but when it was considered how small the number of these cases would be, and how large would be the number of persons deterred from accepting the office of trustee, he had come to the conclusion that the Bill was calculated to be more prejudicial than advantageous in operation. Trustees would be subject to be charged with a crime subjecting them to seven years of penal servitude, while the difficulty of proving their innocence would be extremely great. That might certainly happen in the case of any complicated trust. He knew the pressure which had been got up and the exggerated language which the press had made use of on the subject, and, therefore, he was not surprised at the stringent character of the Bill. He desired as much as any one to see extreme cases of fraud on the part of trustees adequately punished, but it was not his opinion that the grossest cases would ever be brought into court, for the persons committing them would probably be members of the family of the person beneficially interested, and it would naturally be the wish of the family, after the 500 lapse of some time, that the matter should not be exposed. The practical working of the Bill would have this effect, that a great number of persons would be threatened with indictment, but very few would be convicted. It must not be supposed that there was no punishment under the existing law for dishonest trustees, as in some cases they fell within the jurisdiction of the Insolvent Debtors Court and received punishment there. Indeed, the complaint had hitherto been that the rules of Chancery were too severe in their application to trustees, but the effect of this Bill would be that the proof would be cast upon an honest trustee to show that he was not worthy of seven years' penal servitude.
MR. SERJEANT KINGLAKEsaid, he was as anxious as any one that the law against the fraudulent conversion of trust property should be made most stringent; but in legislating upon the subject it was necessary to take care that they did not include within the language of the clause the honest as well as the dishonest trustee. He did not think that the words "with intent to defraud" were a sufficient guard and restriction; for who was to decide upon "the intent" but a jury?—a tribunal which, he should say, was not by any means the best fitted to refer such a question to. Cases had been put on the one side, but let him now put a case. Suppose a man died leaving two or three hundred pounds, and appointing his brother as trustee for his widow and family. The brother might put the money into his own business, honestly intending to allow the widow 8 or 10 per cent—more, in fact, than he could invest the money for in any other way. But suppose the man's business failed, and the money was lost; suppose a case like that going to a jury, and an appeal being made to their feelings on the one side or on the other, was it possible to imagine anything more unsatisfactory? It was agreed that it would be unsafe to allow prosecutions to be instituted at the mere motion of any disappointed party; and so Clause 11 provided that the consent of one of the Judges must be obtained previous to the commencement of proceedings. But that clause afforded no adequate protection; for how could a Judge come to a correct decision upon mere ex parte affidavits? Besides, it was wrong to put the Judges in so invidious a position as to call on them to decide in London that there was a primâ facie case of fraud, when it might 501 happen that the very same Judge that authorized the institution of proceedings might have to go down to try the charge. He (the learned Serjeant) had reason to know that this was an objection which was felt by many of the Judges themselves. Under these circumstances he begged to call the attention of the Government to an Amendment, suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Belfast (Mr. Cairns) which, would entirely remove this difficulty. Let the proceedings be instituted only by the direction of a Judge either in Equity or in Bankruptcy, under whose judicial notice the case might have come.
§ MR. BARROWsaid, that from long experience of trustees in the lower ranks of society, he was quite satisfied that this Act would operate most injuriously upon the interests of the widows and orphans on whose behalf the Attorney General had appealed to the House. By discouraging the acceptance of trusts it would do more to injure the lower classes than any legislation which had taken place since he had been in that House. The hon. and learned Attorney General had said that if a gentleman mixed trust funds with his own money at his banker's and afterwards overdrew his account, but was able to pay the money when it was wanted, he would not be liable to a prosecution under this Act; but surely in such a case the offence had been completed, and the subsequent repayment of the money would not prevent its being an offence. He would also observe that the Bill not only involved the responsibility of the trustee himself, who might be able to avoid all irregularity, but it would actually involve his executor. The mere threat of a prosecution would deter many an honest man from consenting to become a trustee; for, he agreed with the learned Serjeant who had just spoken, that a person would run but a poor chance of a favourable construction being put upon his motives, if he happened to be opposed by so eloquent an advocate of the widow and orphan as the hon. and learned Attorney General.
MR. NAPIERsaid, that the objection which had been raised to the Bill ought to have been taken on the Second Reading, because they attacked its entire principle. The essence of the crime was the intent to defraud, and that was only such a question as was ordinarily submitted to a jury, as, for instance, in the case of a person tried for intent to murder, which was itself a 502 capital offence. In such cases the whole question was as to the intent. The question before the Committee was whether the word property should be used with its wide and extended sense, or whether by omitting it the operation of the clause was to be limited in the manner proposed by his hon. and learned Friend. He believed that in Scotland it was made a special reason for prosecuting that a person had been entrusted with property and had fraudulently dealt with it. The essence of the criminal law was the intent, and this clause was intended to bring within the operation of the criminal law a class of offences which had hitherto escaped, and for that reason he should oppose the Amendment. There were quite sufficient safeguards contained in the clause, and he hoped the Attorney General would not consent to have it frittered away.
§ MR. AYRTONobserved, that he thought that the difficulty arose from the expression "intent to defraud." On the one hand, it was supposed that every proceeding would be considered a fraud under the Act which was a fraud in a Court of Equity. On the other hand, it was thought that the word fraud merely meant what twelve jurymen would consider to be a fraud. He begged to suggest that the Attorney General should insert words to show that the expression was confined to fraud as determinable by a jury.
§ SIR. GEORGE GREYsuggested that the Committee were not now discussing the clause.
§ MR. WIGRAMsaid, that if the clause were meant to apply to persons who were guilty of the offence of appropriating to their own use property which was not their own—in other words, of embezzlement—he did not care how large its words were, but as that was not quite clear he hoped that the Attorney General would state whether the clause was meant to apply to that class of offences only, or was to extend to cases where persons appropriated property to other persons' use, although, they themselves derived no advantage from it. If the latter effect was meant to be given to it, he doubted whether the Bill would carry public opinion with it. At all events the point should be made clear, for the Committee must remember they were introducing a new class of offences, and, therefore, the country ought to be properly awakened to what those new offences were.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he thought the question of his hon. and learned Friend would be best answered by putting this case. Suppose a person, being a trustee for the sum of £5,000, were on his son's marriage to transfer to him that stock; that would not be an appropriation to his own use, but to the use of some other person, still it would be a fraudulent appropriation, and one which would go unpunished unless the words which he had proposed were inserted in the clause.
§ MR. WIGRAMthought that the case put by the hon. and learned Gentleman amounted, in fact, to an appropriation by a trustee to his own use.
§ MR. CAIRNSsaid, that if ever such a singular case should arise, it would be met by the words to be found later on in the clause,—"otherwise dispose of or destroy such property."
§ MR. WARRENwas of opinion that the majority of the objections urged against the clause were those arising from the timidity of Chancery lawyers in approaching the pale of criminal liability. The essence of the clause, as it seemed to him, lay in the words, "with intent to defraud." That was enough to constitute a misdemeanour. He thought the hon. and learned Attorney General, after much consideration, had hit a class of cases to which the common sense of the public had long since assigned a criminal liability, and he thought he would do well to retain the words.
§ MR. ROLTsaid, he considered that if the law applicable to criminal insolvency was not sufficiently stringent it ought to be rendered more severe; but he did not think that extreme cases should be taken out of the category of offences to which they properly belonged. He was desirous that a sufficiently severe punishment should be imposed to prevent the commission of crime, but he was unwilling to commingle offences of different characters and classes. They should not, in short, confound criminal insolvency and larceny. He would, therefore, press his Amendment.
§ Amendment negatived.
§ MR. BLAKEsaid, he would express his satisfaction that the Bill would apply to Ireland, where there was great necessity for legislation in consequence of the number of defaulting and fraudulent trustees, and in order to prevent the escape from punishment of fraudulent charitable trus- 504 tees, he would move that after the word, "person," in line 9, the words, "or for any public or charitable purpose" be inserted.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, he was ready to assent to the Amendment, unless any of his hon. and learned Friends saw reason to doubt the propriety of inserting the proposed words in the clause. He would also endeavour to carry out the object of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Wigram) by proposing to insert, after the word "appropriate," the words "the same or any part thereof," and to omit the words "or the use of any person other than the person entitled thereto." The clause, with the Amendments, would then stand as follows:—
If any person being a trustee of any property for the benefit, either wholly or partially, of some other person, or for any public or charitable purpose, shall, with intent to defraud, convert or appropriate the same or any part thereof to or for his own use or purposes, or shall, with the intent aforesaid, otherwise dispose of or destroy such property, or any part thereof, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
§ On the Motion that the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill,
§ MR. WALPOLEsaid, he quite agreed with the views generally taken in reference to this clause, but he wished to suggest that the clause, as it stood, did not sufficiently distinguish between an actual and an implied trustee. The consequence might be that a man, who was not really aware that he had all the duties of a trustee cast upon him, might be liable to be indicted under this clause. He suggested that the word "trustee" ought to be more clearly limited and defined.
§ MR. NEATEobjected to the clause on the ground that it brought the criminal law into operation in reference to transactions which had been hitherto exempt from the interference of that branch of the law. That, too, was an application of the criminal law which did not meet with the unanimous concurrence of the members of the legal profession. He also understood that the Judges were opposed to it, while it was proposed by an hon. and learned Gentleman who had been chiefly concerned with civil law. The great objection to the clause was, that it did not recognise the difference between trusteeships of a public character and those of a private character. He approved of its application to the 505 former. In the case of a bank or a railway company, confidence was placed in the directors, not from any knowledge of the private character of individuals, as was the case in private trusteeships; therefore in the former case it was necessary that the law should interpose to protect the public. Nor did the clause sufficiently recognise the distinction between direct trusts of property, and indirect and resulting trusts. He did not deny the necessity of legislation, but thought it would be sufficient to give Equity Judges the same jurisdiction over defaulting trustees as the insolvent Commissioners had over insolvent debtors. As regarded fraudulent transfers of stock, he thought it would be wise to compel the Bank of England to take notice of trusteeships, by entering such stock in a separate book, and allowing no sale without the concurrence of all the trustees. He would suggest to the Attorney General that it would be better to confine the Bill to public trusteeships, and reserve for future consideration that which was really a difficult subject—how far private trustees should be subjected to what was entirely a new state of the law.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clause 2.
§ MR. HENLEYsaid, with reference to frauds on the part of bankers he wished to ask, supposing a man put £1,000 into a banker's hands in the ordinary way, expecting to get it back again when he wanted it, and the banker, as was usual in such cases, applied the money in any way he liked while it was in his possession, and supposing the bank went on for ten years and then the bank broke, what constituted in that case the act of fraud?
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, if a person left money in a banker's hands in the ordinary way, that money was in law a loan from the customer to the banker—it was lent to the banker expressly to be used in the ordinary way by him, and he was bound to repay it to the customer in the way he might direct; for if he lent money to a man without stating the express manner in which he should employ that money, there would be no fraud in the appropriation of the money, nor would there be a fraud though the borrower, when the customer asked for his money, should be unable to meet the debt.
§ MR. HENLEYsaid, he must repeat his question. He wished to know what 506 were the circumstances under which a banker might apply money to his own use? and what was it that constituted a fraud when he did so?
§ MR. WARRENsaid, the words of the clause disposed of the difficulty. When any person intrusted with money converted it to his own use "with intent to defraud" then he came under the provisions of the Bill.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, if he took a bag of money tied at the mouth to a banker, and said to him, "There, keep that for me as it is," and the banker cut open the bag and took out the money, he would be applying it to his own use, and come within the meaning of the clause. The difference lay between money lent in the ordinary way and money deposited. If he packed twelve bills of exchange in a parcel and deposited them with a banker to be kept by him, he would be guilty of a misdemeanour if he appropriated those bills. The principle was well understood in the City, where a parcel of bills was frequently paid into a bank as depositum, as it was called; but a single bill paid in without any condition was subjected to a different treatment, and might be negotiated by the banker.
§ MR. HENLEYsaid, that was an offence now; but this clause seemed to go a great deal further. If it was meant to apply to a special deposit made with a banker, that was one thing; but if it applied to the banker who, being possessed of money appropriated it to his own use, then it would apply to all money paid over the counter.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, the words of the clause as it stood would not interfere with any of the ordinary transactions of trade; neither would they interfere with anything that might be wrongfully done, if it was not done with intent to defraud. It would apply to transactions that were wrongfully done by the banker, and to which the law would attach the character of being done with intent to defraud.
§ MR. AYRTONsaid, he would refer to a clause in the Bankers Act (7th and 8th of Geo. IV.) to show that the offence to which the clause related was already an offence. He thought the terms of that clause more clear and explicit than the terms of the clause in this Bill, and would suggest that they should either repeal the existing law, or make some reference to it. 507 He feared that the language of the clause as it stood was so comprehensive that if disputes arose in the course of mercantile transactions persons would be liable to be taken to a police court, and have all their affairs exposed there.
MR. NAPIERremarked that the case put by his right hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire came within the law of debtor and creditor, and the money so deposited ceased to be the property of the depositor. The transaction contemplated by the clause was one between bailor and bailee.
THE ATTORNEY GENERALsaid, the clauses in the Bankers Act were limited entirely to cases where directions were given in writing and where the property was specially entrusted to a banker. In this clause the language had been most carefully selected to meet the case of a banker "who becomes possessed of the property of another person," and was much more comprehensive than the language of the clauses in the Act of George IV., in order to include a large class of offences which, under the interpretation put upon that Act, escaped punishment. In prosecutions against bankers or agents under the present law it was necessary to prove the character of banker or agent, the special entrustment of money or security for money, the direction in writing for the application of the same, and the conversion of the same in violation of good faith and contrary to the purpose specified. In point of fact, theft might be committed in a great variety of cases without falling within the existing enactment.
§ MR. HENLEYsaid, he entertained doubts whether the clause carried out what the Attorney General said was intended. Would it not be better to state distinctly that it should be no longer necessary to prove that the directions were in writing? How could it be shown that this clause would not include every case of payment of money into the hands of a banker across the counter? The words seemed to him to be too general.
MR. NAPIERexplained that the clause could not include ordinary payments of money over the counter, because in such cases the property changed owners. The moment the money was handed over it became the property of the banker, and he could not be said to be "possessed of the property of another person."
§ MR. MALINSsaid, that the distinction between the two cases was obvious enough. A man who added £1,000 to his drawing account did so for the express purpose that the money might become the property of the banker and be appropriated to his use, the sole condition being that the whole or any portion of it should be repaid upon demand. It was different, however, with other kinds of property—Exchequer bills, for example—deposited for security merely, and the banker who should sell such property, and appropriate the proceeds to his own use, would be guilty of a misdemeanour.
§ MR. CAIRNSsaid, that the explanation which had been given of the clause had made it much worse. The Attorney General had stated that money lodged with a banker became his property, and a debt due to the customer. Now, the interpretation clause said, that the word "property" should include debt, and therefore the banker who appropriated deposits to his own use would render himself liable to the penalty imposed by the present Bill. The consequence would be that, if a banker having a number of customers should fail, he would be subject to an indictment by every one of them. The question was too serious to be left where it was, and he would suggest that the wording of the clause should be altered.
MR. GURNEYasked whether, supposing a banker fraudulently negotiated a Bill lodged with him for collection before it arrived at maturity, and appropriated the proceeds to his own use, be would render himself liable to the penalty imposed by the Bill?
§ MR. GRIFFITHsaid, that in order to meet the difficulty, he would suggest the insertion, after the word "property," of the qualifying phrase, "not being money on current account."
§ MR. J. D. FITZGERALDsaid, that in reply to the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Belfast, he would observe, that if the money deposited with a banker became a debt due to his customer he could not understand how the banker could appropriate a debt he owed. A banker who, with intent to defraud the depositor, negotiated a bill lodged with him under the circumstances stated by the hon. Member who spoke last but one, would undoubtedly fall within the second section of the Bill. The Act 7 & 8 Geo. IV. had been constantly evaded in consequence of 509 what the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) had called its careful and precise language. The merit of the present Bill was that it was expressed in general language, sufficiently wide to include all cases, but guarding the public against oppression by the words "with a fraudulent intent."
§ MR. WALPOLEsaid, he would suppose that a banker received from his customer £1,000 across the counter, knowing that he was to break at the end of that day. He would also suppose that he appropriated that £1,000 to his own use and stopped payment on the following day. The question he wished to ask was, whether the reception of the money and the appropriation of it to his own use would or would not be an offence within the meaning of the Bill?
THE ATTORNEY GENERALreplied, that it would not. The offence of the banker in the case supposed would consist in the concealment of his insolvency, but that concealment was not described as a crime within the meaning of the Bill.
§ MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALDthought, the clause being couched in such general terms was the cause of difference of opinion as to its operation. He agreed with the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) that the clause exposed bankers to extreme danger. If money was paid across the counter to a banker, he received it as such, and was liable to the operation of the clause; but if money was paid with special directions, then the clause would constitute an offence which the framers of the Bankers Act did not contemplate, as that act required the directions to be in writing. If money was paid over to a banker in a bag, it was not received as money, but was a chattel of which the banker was baillee.
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ The House resumed.
§ Committee report progress; to sit again on Thursday next.