SECOND READING.

HC Deb 29 July 1857 vol 147 cc646-82

Order read, for resuming adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [23rd July], "That the Bill be now read a second time; and which Amendment was, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words, "upon this day three months."

Question again proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

Debate resumed.

MR. RICH

said, that when the Bill was last before the House he had no intention to speak against time with the view of preventing a division, but the House would not hear him, and he was therefore compelled to seek another opportunity of making his statement. His objections to the Bill might be summed up in a few words. He objected to it because it was imperfect in its form, would be unjust in its operation, was quite unnecessary, based upon erroneous statements, involved an extravagant expenditure of the public money, and recognized a breach of contract. The Bill was imperfect because, while the public service embraced some 50,000 persons, who received salaries amounting in the aggregate to between £7,000,000 and £8,000,000 per annum, it referred to 16,000 only, receiving emoluments to the amount of about £2,500,000, and it touched those persons upon one particular point alone. His reason for calling the Bill unjust was, that it sought to put a gratuity of £70,000 a year, which soon would rise to £100,000, into the pockets of a fraction of the civil servants, without satisfying the claims of the rest; and his objection to the Bill upon this ground was increased by the fact that the 16,000 whom it proposed to benefit, were probably the best paid of all the public servants. The Bill was unnecessary, because it had not been proved that the persons to whom the House was asked to vote £100,000 per annum were inadequately paid, all the evidence, indeed, tending in the opposite direction. He maintained that the public service was ably manned by the present office-holders, while in the fact that numerous applications were daily made for appointments, he recognized a decisive proof that the salaries were thought sufficiently ample. Such, too, was the opinion of the Commissioners, upon whose Report the Bill was said to be founded, because, although they proposed to do away with the abatements, they likewise recommended that there should be a revision—which meant a reduction—of salaries in all cases of new appointments and promotions. The Bill was founded upon erroneous statements, put forward by an organized committee of public servants, inasmuch as it was mere assumption to say that the engagement entered into by the public and the civil servants had been violated by the former, or that the amount of the deductions was greater than the allowances which would ultimately be received by those entitled to them. According to the statements of the public servants themselves, the charge upon the pension fund, when all the claims fell in, would be about £200,000 a year, and the amount of the deductions £94,000. Whether the accumulations formed before the pensions exceeded the deductions would or would not make up the difference between £200,000 and £94,000 was a question now under the consideration of experienced actuaries. If the balance should turn out to be in favour of the Government, he was sure that the House would assent to any proposal for either increasing the pensions or reducing the abatements; but, in the meantime, there was no foundation for the statement that the civil servants were required to pay more than they ought. He thought the Bill extravagant, because if, as he contended, the salaries of the public servants were now sufficient, every shilling added to them could be nothing else than a pure waste of the public money. Nor was this all. If the House were to grant £100,000 per annum to the richer and more powerful class of public servants, they could not in fairness withhold a similar boon from the weaker and poorer. Now, as the salaries received by the latter amounted to about £5,000,000 a year, or double the sum paid to the former, the effect of putting the two classes upon an equality would be to increase the gratuity granted by Parliament—for he could call it by no other name—by £200,000, or perhaps £250,000. In fact, what they were now asked to do would be a serious addition to the burthens of the country, and might even prove a formidable impediment to the abolition of the income-tax. The Bill likewise involved a breach of contract. If ever there was a contract clearly made and fairly entered into, it was the contract embodied in the Act of 1834, and the public servants, since that time, had had full warning. That Act had been in open and satisfactory operation for upwards of twenty years. During that time applications had been made without end for appointments to public offices by parties well acquainted with the provisions of the Act. Many of those parties had succeeded in their wishes, and now, when they amounted to a large majority of the public servants, as compared with those who entered prior to 1829, they formed themselves into an association for the express purpose of repudiating the contract. If the noble Lord the Member for Cocker-mouth (Lord Naas) had introduced a Bill for doing away, not with the abatements, but with the pensions, would not the public servants have charged him, and justly, with attempting to commit a gross breach of faith? But was it not equally a breach of faith on the part of the public servants to seek to be absolved from the payment of the abatements, and at the same time demand the continuance of the pensions? By complying with such a demand the House would be legalizing a most dangerous principle—dangerous even to the public servants themselves. The immediate effect would be a great increase to the expenses of the Civil Service, and in 1861, when the income tax came to be reconsidered, the House might in one of its cold fits of economy resolve to do away with retiring allowances altogether. The noble Lord's Bill endangered the principle of the fixity of the salaries of the public servants, which it was most important to maintain. The question was not one of abatement, which had been inquired into and decided against; but a question whether £100,000 a year should be added to the salaries of the best paid of the public servants, or about a third of the whole. The Committee appointed to inquire into the subject had reported against the plan, and he trusted the House would support the decision of their own Committee. At the same time he hoped that some one connected with the Government would declare their intention of considering the question in a large and liberal spirit, and to give them an opportunity of discussing it in the next Session. But he objected to this Bill as impolitic, as unjust, and as likely to lead to extravagance, and therefore he hoped that the House would not agree to the second reading.

LORD NAAS

said, that having already stated, upon introducing the Bill, his reason for so doing, he would confine his remarks upon the present occasion to a reply to certain comments which had been made during the debate. It had been said that the Bill did not call upon the House to decide whether or not the system of abatements should be abolished; but the statement was incorrect, for that was the only question the House was called upon to decide: nothing could be clearer from the terms of the Bill itself than that this was the very point they had to determine. The Secretary for the Treasury (Mr. Wilson), whose motives in opposing the Bill no one could doubt were very proper, had, however, made some statements of facts and figures in a manner which tended to create a false impression. The hon. Gentleman had stated that there was "an impression" abroad that the civil servants of the public were called upon to pay more in deductions than they received back as pensions. That was not "an impression," it was a distinct matter of fact, and it could be proved beyond all dispute that the contributions of the civil servants far exceeded in amount the pensions that were granted to them. That matter ought to have been set at rest after the evidence which had been taken before the Committee which sat last year upon the subject. They examined Dr. Fair, Mr. Edmonds, and Mr. Hardy, actuaries of the highest eminence, and documents were produced, showing that six other distinguished actuaries agreed with them in an opinion that the average value of the pensions actually granted was considerably less than what should have been given in return for the contribution paid by the civil servant, even omitting all profits arising from resignations and discharges. It was true that an inquiry was going on, or was supposed to be going on, directed in some measure to that point; but the evidence before the House would lead them to believe that it was unlikely there would be any different conclusion arrived at than had been come to by the Committee. Much had been said in the course of the debate about the present system not being a breach of contract. He had never said it was. He did not think the Government had broken faith with the civil servants, nor did he think the civil servants were seeking to depart from any contract they had made with the Government. What he had said and repeated now was, that the present system was decidedly bad, and he could not show that in better words than by reading to the House the words of Sir Charles Trevelyan:— The arrangement is in its nature inequitable and belongs to that class of bad laws which are contrary to the natural sense of justice of mankind. In criminal jurisprudence the effect of such laws is that juries will not convict upon them. In civil administration the effect is that they obstruct and baffle all our endeavours for the improvement of the civil service,—the fact of the clerk submitting to the condition does not make that justice which is its principle injustice. That was, in a few words, the view which the civil servants took of this question; they contended that the system was a bad one, an unjust one, and detrimental to the public service. The hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for the Treasury, had told the House that the civil servants were perfectly well paid, and that within a few years there had been made a large increase in the salaries of almost every department of the civil service. If that were so—if there had really been a large general increase of salaries within the last few years—that would undoubtedly form a very material element in the consideration of the present measure. But what was the fact? Taking the two large public departments of the Admiralty and the Customs, he found that in 1834, when the superannuation system first came into operation, the business of the Admiralty was conducted by 199 persons, the total amount of whose salaries was £59,266, or an average salary of £297. In 1856 there were 262 persons employed, with salaries amounting to £74,385, being an average salary to each person of £283, actually less than the average salaries of 1834, although the number of ships in commission and men employed had largely increased. In the Revenue department he found that in 1834 the Customs' duties were collected by 4,856 persons, at a cost of £722,507, the average annual salary for each person being £149. In 1856 the number of persons employed had increased to 5,570, and their salaries to £814,000, but the average of the salaries was only £146, being £3 less than the average of 1834. In the mean time the value of the imports and exports had risen from £85,393,000 in 1834 to £291,931,000 in 1856, and the Customs' revenue had increased £2,300,000 during the same period. Thus, there had actually been a diminution on the average salaries paid, while the business of the department had enormously increased. As the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wilson) had told them last Wednesday that there had been a large increase of salaries in almost every department of the public service, he (Lord Naas) would just read to the House a statement made by a very high authority, which was as follows:— There had been a large increase of business within the last few years in all the departments. Exports, 1852, £78,076,854; 1856, £115,890,875. Imports, 1852, £109,345,409; 1856, £172,654,823 and shipping in the same proportion. Notwithstanding this large increase of business, and notwithstanding there had been a revision of these establishments, which had led to an increase in the salaries and incomes of the leading officers, who had intellectual work to perform, there had been little or no increases in the general amount expended for salaries. Notwithstanding a large increase of business, there was, instead of an increase, an absolute diminution in amount of salaries. The House would be surprised to find that the speaker of those words was the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury on the 12th of June last. [Mr. WILSON: I said the salaries of all leading officers were increased.] His Motion did not apply only to leading officers. It was intended mainly to apply to officers receiving small salaries—the poor clerks. The average annual salaries of the 16,000 civil servants who would be affected by this Bill were only £146.

MR. WILSON

reminded the noble Lord that the supplemental clerks were not under the Superannuation Act at all.

LORD NAAS

said, he made no distinction between one class of servants and another; and he must say that he trusted that the House would not be led away by the strange statement of the hon. Gentleman that his measure applied only to the better paid portion of the civil servants. He was not asking for any increase of salary for officers who already received large salaries, but he was appealing on behalf of those whose average salaries were £146, and who formed nine-tenths of the class that would be affected by the Bill, and two-thirds of whom received only £80 a year—so that it was to the poorer and not the richer class that the measure chiefly applied. He believed he had shown that there had been no general increase of salaries, although there had been a very considerable increase of labour. The hon. Gentleman had also told the House that the civil servants of the public were paid at higher rates than the clerks in the Bank of England for doing the same description of work. The statement, however, had been disposed of by the Governor of the Bank (Mr. Weguelin), who had proved that the average salary of the clerks in the Bank of England was £196, while that of the public civil servants was only £141. The House must also remember that in the Bank the clerks had their chance of succeeding to the higher positions in the establishment, while in the public offices the chief posts were frequently filled up with persons who bad never served in any subordinate capacity, and sometimes even Members of that House had been appointed to such offices. The Bank of England also gave their clerks superannuation allowances without making any deductions from the clerks' salaries on that account. The clerks of the Bank of England, therefore, received better pay, enjoyed better terms, and were in a more advantageous position in every respect than the civil servants. Another objection urged by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury against the Bill was, that it would produce an indiscriminate increase of salaries throughout the public service. The fact was the Bill only applied to a portion of the civil servants—to 16,000 out of 49,000. The hon. Gentleman should consider this point in connection with the recomendation of the Committee that there ought to be a revision of salaries, and he, for one, could see nothing to prevent such a revision taking place. Possibly, if it were done, the country might gain more than the miserable sum now in dispute. But the hon. Gentleman went on to say that the payments made were in the nature of insurance. Now, what the civil servants complained of was, that they were not in the nature of an insurance at all. Had they been so there would by this time have been more than £1,000,000 at their disposal, and available for the purposes of insurance. In truth, these payments were not an insurance but a tontine, and one of the worst kind, too, for not more than one in seven ever received any benefit from it. Then the hon. Gentleman proceeded to say that the Treasury made provision for widows. Since that statement was made he had seen several gentlemen connected with the Civil Service, and they could not bring to their recollection any cases in which the widows of civil servants were recommended to receive this provision, while the applications that were made were always refused. It was possible there might be exceptional cases, though he did not know of them, but certainly it was not the general practice of the Treasury to provide for the widows of those who contributed to this fund, and a man might have paid all his life 5 per cent to the civil service fund, and die leaving a large family; but at his death his family would not derive one shilling of benefit from his contributions. The hon. Gentleman also said that if these abatements were made into a fund he did not see what difference it could make, as no officer could receive more than the allowance by Act of Parliament. But he (Lord Naas) contended that if the deductions were put into a fund there would be this difference—that there would be a gradually increasing sum placed at the disposal of the civil servants, which in course of time would, by compound interest, swell to an enormous amount for their benefit. The hon. Gentleman referred to the Metropolitan Police Fund, and stated that at this moment it was unable to meet the demands upon it. But that was not a case in point. He asked the House to remember that the mem who contributed to that fund were a class very distinct from the civil servants of the Crown. They entered the service much older than the civil servants did—he believed at least ten years older—and they retired far sooner. From constant exposure to all weathers and from the nature of the duties in which they were employed their constitutions broke down, and they came comparatively early upon the fund, so that the case of the police did not apply to the one now before the House. But the most extraordinary statement of the hon. Gentleman was, that the total compensation and allowances was now £830,000, and he made an ingenious calculation to show that there would be a deficiency of £581,000 in 1891. In making this calculation the hon. Gentleman took the whole charges for the entire service, mixed up all the charges for pensions and compensations and superannuation allowances now granted. But what were the facts of the case? It was shown by a Parliamentary paper that the total amount abated from salaries from August, 1829, to January, 1856, was £843,433, while the total allowances to those who had paid the tax were £92,233; but it would be found that the calculation of the hon. Gentleman applied to the whole service, and not to the simple operation to which his (Lord Naas') Bill referred. The statement of the hon. Gentleman conveyed the idea that the whole of the civil servants were taxed for their pensions, whereas the salaries of those who received pensions without paying for them amounted to £4,910,600, while the salaries of those who paid the tax amounted to £2,426,699; and moreover the pensions of those who did not pay for them were regulated on a much higher scale than those of the contributors. The tax was now £74,212 per annum, while the annual pensions paid to contributors amounted to £12,000, that being the whole sum out of the £830,000 referred to by the hon. Gentleman which would be affected by the Bill before the House, while it did not affect the salaries of more than 16,000 servants. He contended, then, that if the calculation were made on the contributions paid by the civil servants, and on the calculation as to what their allowances would be in 1891, it would be so different from the result represented by the Secretary of the Treasury, that instead of there being an actual deficiency under that head of charge, there would be on the interest of the fund alone a considerable surplus to the Exchequer. But the hon. Gentleman alluded to the pensions for the army, which, he said, amounted to £556,000 a year, while the civil superannuation allowances were £606,000; so that the civil servants received a larger amount in pensions than the whole army. But the hon. Gentleman left out altogether the small item of £1,169,658 paid to out pensioners, and forgot that the total charge for the non-effective service was £2,240,224. He had endeavoured to show to the House that the statements of the hon. Gentleman on this subject ought to be viewed with caution, and that his inferences and deductions were not such as should be received without considerable allowance. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) gave as one of his reasons for supporting the present system of superannuations, that it gave additional security to the civil servants for their pensions; but in this he was at variance with the Commissioners, who plainly stated that they did not think the abatements gave any additional security whatever. It had been objected that the Bill before the House did not deal with the whole question, and did not carry out all the recommendations of the Report of the Commissioners. Now, the principal recommendation of the Commissioners was "the total abolition of deductions for purposes of superannuation, without any corresponding reduction in the salaries on which such deductions are charged." This was the great cardinal recommendation of the Commissioners, and it was embodied in his Bill; and he would undertake in twenty minutes to frame clauses that would embrace all that was necessary in the other recommendations if the House wished it. What were those recommendations? They were, in the first place, that the scale of superannuations recommended by the Committee of last year, which did not differ materially from that at present in force, should be adopted; that superannuations should be given at sixty instead of sixty-five, except in cases of ill health, and that there should be compulsory retirement at sixty-five. Then there were recommendations with regard to gratuities and compensations on loss of office which did not properly come under the head of superannuations, and ought to be made the subject of another Bill. They further recommended that dockyard officers, who rose to the second and third classes, should be placed on the same footing as other civil servants—that the Post Office department should be revised, and that extra clerks should be placed on an equality with the others if they served long enough. Now these were matters that the House could very soon make up its mind upon if it desired to entertain them. There were, however, two points which they had reported upon that would require great attention from the House—namely, that there should be no creation of a fund, and no general revision of salaries. Those who complained that the measure did not settle the whole question nor embrace the whole recommendations of the Commissioners ought to bear in mind that their great leading recommendation was contained in his Bill. If the Bill did not sweep away all the anomalies and inequalities that existed, still it swept away the most grievous anomaly, and he believed it would pave the way for the abolition of all the others. But the question he had now to ask was, what did the Government propose to do? If he understood properly the objection of the Government, they were directed not against the details of the Commissioners' recommendations, but the principles they had laid down. He wished to know from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Government meant to set their face once and for all against every attempt to do away with the abatements made for superannuation allowances? His decided opinion was that they must make up their minds to do away with these abatements or not deal with the question at all; unless they made; the principle of non-abatement the root of their measure it would be unsatisfactory to the civil servants, and, he believed, to the House and country. The system had been condemned by that House, by the press, and by the good sense of the people of this country. In former times it was discussed and disapproved by such men as Lord Sidmouth and Mr. Charles Grant, and by one whose genius and eloquence adorned every subject on which he spoke (Mr. Canning); and in our own days by high authorities in the House of Commons, by the public press, and by petitions to Parliament:—it had been condemned by a Committee of that House, which had given long consideration to the subject; and lastly by a Royal Commission, whose Report should be looked at more in the light of an arbitration than anything else. In fact the whole system of taxing salaries stood condemned; and although there might be hon. Members who thought the system just and proper, he trusted that with the weight of authority to which he had alluded to support them, the Government would put the matter on a satisfactory footing. The continuance of the existing system caused great dissatisfaction among a large and important body of public servants whom it was most desirable to keep contented. They felt they had a grievance to complain of, and the House might depend upon it they would not be satisfied till that grievance was removed. The agitation would go on, and they would not rest contented with less than was now proposed for their relief. Next year the demands of the civil servants instead of being lessened might be enlarged; and the House might find that it was not one grievance only they were called on to redress. We boasted in this country of the stability, the firmness, and the integrity with which the business of every department was conducted. These we owed very much to the exertions and abilities of the civil servants of the Crown, and when they were told by high authorities that this class laboured under an oppressive grievance he maintained that the House ought to redress it at the earliest possible opportunity, and he trusted the House would, by accepting his Bill, put an end to the grievance at once, and thus confer a boon and recognize a right.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, I, for one, admit most freely the right of the civil servants of the Crown to two things—first, to a full and respectful hearing, and, secondly, to a clear and definitive decision. And I must say, as regards a full and respectful hearing from this House, that it was not without surprise I learned that some remarks had been made in the nature of a complaint, that we did not come to a decision on this question on the day when the debate upon it commenced, because I did not think it was a reasonable demand that a debate of this kind, involving so many details and such complicated calculations, and one in which a great number of Members take a very deep interest, should be confined within a period of three hours. I thought it was not right in such circumstances to speak of tactics having been employed to prevent a division upon the subject on that day.

LORD NAAS

said, he had not used any such expression; all he said was, that he thought the House might have come to a division that day.

MR. GLADSTONE

I am glad to hear that the noble Lord did not make use of any such expression, and I shall, therefore, say no more on that subject. On one point I agree with the noble Lord. It is impossible that this House or the Government should hold anything but intelligible language on this question; and I must say that I experience none of the difficulty which the noble Lord seems to feel with regard to the intentions of the Government upon it. I have no doubt whatever that it is the intention of the Government to abide firmly in its substance by the present system, and that they intend to retain the remuneration of the public servants in the main on its present basis. If they had intended to make great changes in that system, it would have been their duty to let those intentions be known to the House; but, judging from the Bill which the Government brought in last year, and from what has since taken place, there can be no doubt, as I have said, that they mean in the main to keep the remuneration of the public servants as it is; and I have no doubt we shall hear that intention announced to us by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the clearest and firmest language; for it is not just or fair to the civil servants or for the public interest, that any uncertainty should be allowed to exist with regard to the views either of the Government or the House of Commons on that point. The noble Lord said he was disposed to regard the Report of the Commissioners on this question in the light of an arbitration. I must confess it was with some surprise that I heard him use that expression. This House must have fallen very low indeed if it requires to submit to arbitrators the question what shall be the proper remuneration to be given to the public servants. If the responsible officers of the Crown and the representatives of the people are not fit to decide that question without reference to arbitrators, what question are they fit to decide? Is it not the prime purpose of our mission to hear the demands made by the Government to enable them to meet the exigencies of the State, and to vote the sums which may be required? but the noble Lord will say that in that case this question ought never to have been referred to a Royal Commission at all. I frankly own my regret that such a course was taken. There are many complicated questions of statistics connected with the subject, such as those having reference to contributions and pensions which might have been dealt with by a Commission; but I think it was a great error to refer anything else but those minor details to a Commission. I was no party to that step, and I entirely protest against the delegation of one of the prime functions of this House to any Royal Commission whatever. When this subject was under discussion the hon. Member for Horsham, (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald), detailed to us, with great pathos, the case of a widow who had been compelled, upon the lamented death of her husband, to receive his salary subject to deductions, and who never received any benefit from the fund which those deductions went to swell. But I must remind the House that there was a Bill introduced last year which would have met that very case, and under the provisions of which the widow would have received a gratuity, and that that Bill failed to receive the assent of the House, not on account of the disinclination of the Government, but of those who were acting on behalf of the civil servants. My hon. Friend, following in the steps of the Royal Commission, said that the salaries of the public officers had been revised by Sir Charles Trevelyan, and that the new salaries had been fixed by him without the smallest reference to the deductions paid by the civil servants. To say that Sir Charles Trevelyan is the fixer of the salaries of the public officers is an idea conceived much in the same spirit as that which governed the noble Lord opposite when he said that he looked upon the Report of the Royal Commission in the light of an arbitration. I object to fastening upon Sir Charles Trevelyan the responsibility for these salaries. I heard Sir Charles Trevelyan give his evidence before the Committee, and, as I myself had been the responsible assenting party to the arrangement proposed by him, I at once stated, in the face of the Committee, that Sir Charles Trevelyan was not the responsible party, but the Finance Minister who had assented to the arrangements; and that those salaries had been fixed, not without reference to the deductions, but with express reference to them. It is not Sir Charles Trevelyan who is to be called to account, but the Government of the day who gave their assent to the arrangement. The noble Lord says that we are not to suppose that the question raised is one of the indiscriminate increase of salaries: I am glad to hear that that is his opinion; but I must say that I cannot possibly distinguish between his Bill and an indiscriminate increase, nor did I ever see a Bill which bore so exclusively that construction. The noble Lord quotes the opinion of the Royal Commissioners, that there ought to be an abolition of the deductions without a corresponding revision of salaries; but he knows quite well that the recommendation of the Committee of last year was directly in the teeth of the Report of the Commission. It was to this effect, that the deductions should be abolished, but that there should be a corresponding revision of salaries. Against the authority of the Commission I place the authority of this House, and I know no reason why the authority of a Committee of this House, presided over by the responsible Minister of the Crown, and comprising among its members many of the most eminent and experienced men in this House, should be postponed for one moment to the authority of any Royal Commission. The House must understand, therefore, that the Bill is in diametrical opposition to the Committee of the House of Commons, and that the Committee provided by a clause which they inserted in the Bill, that there should be an equivalent given to the public, for the abolition of those deductions, in the shape of a decrease of salaries. The noble Lord tells us vaguely that it is possible to revise all political salaries, beginning with that of the Prime Minister, so as to make a saving greatly exceeding the paltry £70,000 now asked for. The language of the noble Lord appears to me to be in the clouds, but his Bill is upon earth; and if we were to call upon an actuary—since they are invited to solve so many questions—to turn into figures the value of the noble Lord's declaration is to the saving which we might effect by a judicious revision of political salaries, I am afraid he would tell us that it was not capable of being made a matter of calculation. The noble Lord says he would begin his revision with the salary of the Prime Minister. What would he do with it? I suppose he would reduce it. The noble Lord shakes his head. I suppose, therefore, that he would increase it. [Laughter.] This is no laughing matter. There is infection in diseases of this kind, and when you begin to tamper with the rights of the public upon a scale like this, the spirit in which you act is not contented with the food upon which it is first fed, but spreads from one subject to another, and runs through all the departments of the public expenditure. We see here the first fruits of a movement which has appeared in other places. It has been encouraged, I fear, by many votes of this House, but if we give way to it now it will be the fertile parent of many others. The wise heads of the country, I sec, have begun to calculate how much they are worth, and it has been shown, I am informed, that the average value of the Premiership is £318 a year. Upon this a proposal is made that there should be a considerable increase of political salaries, and that proposal has, at any rate, been thought sufficiently practical and sensible to be received with favourable notice by a very important portion of the press. Do not let us be surprised, therefore, if we encourage this proceeding, should the result be an augmentation, or at least a proposal for an augmentation, of the salaries of the political officers of the State. But I take this early opportunity of giving notice that if that proposal ever does assume body and substance and make its appearance in this House, I shall be among the first and the last to resist it. I believe there is no country in the world which uses its servants with more liberality than England. If there are cases where salaries are insufficient, those cases are exceptions; but with regard both to salaries and pensions the people of England and this House have ever been most liberal. The question raised upon this case appears to be raised in this form. It is stated or assumed that the system of making deductions from the salaries of the civil servants with a view to providing funds for superannuation is a system which has been condemned on all hands. It has been condemned, it is said, by a Parliamentary Committee, by the Royal Commission, and it is assumed to have been condemned by the Government. It was condemned, I am sorry to say, by the Parliamentary Committee—I greatly regret that such should have been the case—it has been condemned by a Royal Commission, which I look upon as being of less authority; whether it has been condemned by the Government or not I am not aware. But the system which at present exists was founded under recommendations entitled to quite as much weight as any of the recommendations which have been made in the opposite direction. I will read to the House the answer given by Sir James Graham on this point before the Committee. The right hon. Gentleman was asked,— With regard to the policy of making deductions from a salary as an equivalent for a prospective superannuation, do you think that that is a sound policy? And his answer to that question was:— Much higher authorities than I, and authorities which I most respect, namely—those who formed the Committee in 1828, and who were some of the ablest and best men that I have ever known in public life, such as Mr. Tierney, Mr. A. Baring, Lord Althorp, Mr. Herries, Mr. Goulburn, and Sir Henry Parnell, all concurred in the opinion which I have adopted, that it is sound in principle, and in effect is excellent. It acts as a powerful moral check upon the civil servants, as a penalty for misconduct, and as a reward for good conduct. When they retire from age and infirmity, and their case is brought under the notice of the Treasury, as it is in each individual case specially brought, the heads of departments are bound to give a report as to the past conduct of that individual, and, if it be favourable, it is carried to his credit, and an increased superannuation is given to him. Therefore I think that, both financially and morally, the arrangement is good. Although the world goes onward or backward—which ever it may be—at a very considerable pace in these days, I do not think that the House of Commons will be inclined to put aside the authority of the names quoted by my right hon. Friend in his answer. They were men, most of them, among the most experienced administrators of their day, and one or more of them had originally belonged to the permanent civil service. The weight of testimony, therefore, in favour of this system is sufficiently strong, not perhaps to induce you to maintain it under all circumstances, but at least entirely to deprive the noble Lord of the right of saying that it is a condemned system. The noble Lord and those who go with him argue that the pensions which are to be awarded out of the fund accumulated by the deductions will not in the long run exhaust the whole proceeds of the fund. In the first place that fact has never been proved, and if it had it would not affect the question. The noble Lord quoted the opinions of certain actuaries, and he says that these opinions ought to settle the question; but the noble Lord was very glad to fall back upon the Royal Commissioners as arbitrators when it suited the purposes of his argument. But the Royal Commissioners do not state that this was a settled fact; on the contrary, in the last page of their Report, they treat it as a matter not yet cleared up. The Committee of last year did not treat it as a question which was decided. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) a great authority, is distinctly and strongly of opinion that the money value acquired in respect of pensions is greater than the money value paid in deductions. The truth is that the whole of this estimate proceeds upon an entirely erroneous apprehension of what took place when the Superannuation Act was passed. It proceeds upon the idea, that by that Act certain persons who had entered the public service after a certain day were to be liable to a deduction from their salaries with a view to the formation of a fund for their own benefit exclusively. But that was not the intention of the Bill, so far as can be known from the intentions of its authors. The letter of the Act contains nothing which tends to support that doctrine, and we have express evidence from my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham), who was the author of the Bill, acting under Lord Grey, to the contrary effect. My right hon. Friend when giving evidence before the Committee, was asked,— Supposing a special fund had been created, and it had happened that the payments to that fund were more than enough to meet the charges upon it, would it not have appeared equitable either to increase the payment to the civil servants, or to reduce the payments which they made to the fund? And his answer was— That is not the view that I took at the time, or that I now take. I think that the deduction then made prospectively was such as would not only cover the payments to be made to the individuals, but would diminish the dead-weight charge for superannuations generally; and that course was taken in preference io a larger reduction of salary, which would have been made, had not the provisions stood as they now stand in the Act of Parliament. That statement my right hon. Friend has also repeated, I believe, in his place in this House. I look upon that as an historical declaration, and if the House will recollect the circumstances of the time at which the Act was passed they will see that that declaration is quite in conformity with them. The tendency of those times was very different from that of our days. There was a strong economical movement going on in the public mind, and the Government of Lord Grey did much to favour that movement, and at the same time to restrain it within salutary bounds. The salaries of high political officers were reduced, and then came the question what was to be done with the salaries of the lower officials—should they be reduced, or should a deduction be imposed on them which might go towards lightening the burden on the public funds for superannuations? My noble Friend the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell), who was then a distinguished member of the Government of Lord Grey, will confirm me in saying that it was then decided that these deductions should be imposed upon the civil servants in lieu of a diminution of salary, which would otherwise have taken place, and which would have amounted to much more. But really the civil servants are not the only persons to be considered in the matter. We must have some regard for the public. We must ask ourselves what is the principle upon which remuneration is to be allotted for the discharge of public duties. We are told that the public pays less liberally than other establishments, and the case of the Bank has been quoted. The Governor of the Bank himself drew a parallel of this sort. I do not doubt that the Bank is a liberal pay-master, and I do not enter into the question whether there has been an increase of salaries in the public service or not. In some respects there has been an increase and in some a decrease. There have been savings going on by the reduction of important offices, such as commissionerships of Excise and Customs, though they are not the product of the virtue of the present day, but the remainder of a process put in motion twenty-five years ago. The process of reduction was then put into action with a wise regard for vested interests, and as those vested interests die out the country obtains the benefit. The disappearance of two or three offices of £1,000 or £2,000 a year is not without considerable effect in producing your average of £141 for civil service salaries. But I deny entirely the justice of any comparison with the Bank, because the servants of the Bank, with very few exceptions, are employed in what we call head-work, whereas a great number of the civil servants are paid for what is little more than manual labour. I asked the Governor of the Bank, before the Committee, what proportion of hand labourers there was among those whom he calculated as receiving an average salary of £186 from the Bank. He could not give me a very distinct answer, but the fact speaks for itself. The Bank is full of clerks, with a porter or two here and there to show you the way in and out; but is that the case with the 16,000 civil servants? We are not dealing now with the head-workers at the Treasury or the Home Office, but with immense departments, particularly the Customs, containing many thousands of public servants who do nothing but manual labour; and it is by means of these that you contrive to pull down your average to £141 a year. Strike out all but those who do the work of the head, and I venture to say you will find that average payments in the public offices are considerably larger than those in private establishments. I hope therefore that the House will not be misled by any fallacy of this kind. I cannot dismiss altogether from my mind the old idea of the relation which ought to exist between supply and demand. It is all very well to come down here and say with a chivalrous air that it is beneath the House of Commons to inquire what is the value of labour in the market—that we ought to be above such consideration in fixing the payments of our public servants. That would be all very well if we were dealing with our own private fortunes, but we happen to be dealing with the public taxes. The bulk of these taxes are levied upon the wages of the labourers of England, which are regulated by supply and demand; and if the labourer, whether artisan, mechanic, or peasant, can obtain no more than his labour is worth in open market, what right have we to make deductions from the fruit of his labour, and deliver them to servants of the Crown, according to our own ideas of generosity? There is no doubt that the civil servant gets at least what his labour is worth in the market. Here let me draw a distinction. There is a labour so valuable that you cannot pay for it in money. There are men who devote themselves to the civil service with so much enthusiasm, with such ability, and with such an entire absence of the ordinary motives which a prospect of fame affords, that it is impossible to commend or to pay them too highly. Men of that order we must set aside. You may give them salaries which are liberal according to the estimate of the world, but I grant that such salaries, even in the present liberal humour of Parliament, must fall far short of the value of the services which these persons render. I am not here to discredit the civil service in general. At the same time I must say that, so far as my experience has gone, the civil servants of the Crown are not only not an ill paid, but are, having reference to their great mass, a well paid body of servants. Recollect what has happened within the last two years. There is no reason to suppose that the candidates presented for employment in the civil service during that period have been inferior to those presented in previous years; but the establishment of the test of an independent examination has led to the rejection of one-third of them as unfit to enter the civil service of the country. At any rate, there is no doubt that these persons do not enter the civil service by compulsion. After listening to the debates in this House one would really suppose that the ballot, which has been abolished as regards the militia, had been established for the civil service; that every parish, every hundred, was called upon year by year to supply two or three young men for that service against their will; and that the grievance of receiving only £141 per annum, taking tidewaiters and all together, was so great that there would be a market for substitutes, and that large payments would be made to induce persons to relieve the individuals chosen by ballot from this frightful evil. It would be needless to detain the House with a description of what is really the state of the case; but, while the quality of your candidates is improving, and their quantity undiminished, I want to know what will be our justification to the taxpaying constituencies, to the labouring classes of England, if we accede to the representation of the noble Lord and pass a Bill which, without reference to merit—on the contrary, with a decided preference of the higher classes of officers, to whom we are to make a double payment—will place a certain sum in the pocket of every civil servant? Moreover, I cannot admit that this Bill, which proposes to increase the remuneration of the civil servants at the expense of the public, is substantially a legitimate Bill. Of course, I do not for a moment question the decision which I understand you, Sir, have given that the noble Lord is technically justified in introducing a Bill which proposes the abolition of these deductions; but, supposing he had asked leave to introduce a Bill, or had given notice of a Resolution in Committee, providing that £75,000 a year should be added to the salaries of the civil servants at the expense of the Consolidated Fund, he would at once have been asked whether he had the consent of the Crown to his Motion, and would have been informed that if he had not that consent it was not within his competency as a Member of Parliament to propose an addition to the burdens of the people. The noble Lord is enabled to propose, under cover of a mere technicality, a Motion which in substance is what the rules of the House prohibit. Of course he does not for a moment dispute that the effect of that Bill is precisely the same as if he in terms imposed a charge upon the Consolidated Fund. It is precisely the same thing to prevent the deductions reaching that Fund and to take them out after they have got there; therefore substantially his purpose is one which is prohibited by the rules of the House of Commons. Are those rules mere technicalities? Is it a mere technical rule which provides that only the Crown shall make to this House proposals which tend to augment the burdens of the people? Why, Sir, I know no rule which is more deeply founded in the spirit of the constitution, which is more obviously required; which is more absolutely necessary to prevent the grossest abuses. If you surrender that rule what will follow? You will have constituencies in every part of the country acting upon almost every Member of this House. These Members will be more or less disposed to lend a favourable ear to such representations; many of them will act simultaneously and will thus produce what we are always told is a great proof of a strong concurrence of public opinion. The evil of this will be that the proposals for spending the public money will be made by persons who are not responsible for providing it. You are to-day asking to add £75,000 a year to the public charge. That will increase to £100,000, and even that is but a small part of the expenditure to which this Bill will lead. The movement will extend to other departments of the public service. This Bill only professes to deal with one-third of the civil servants; when these deductions are abolished will not the other two-thirds demand a similar measure of relief, and how will you resist their claims? It is all very well for me, for my noble Friend, or for my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Mr. S. FitzGerald), to make fine speeches about equity, generosity, and so forth, and then to pass Bills which impose a charge upon the Consolidated Fund; but what is my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to do when he has to provide the ways and means for meeting these additions to the annual expenditure of the country—or what will the House say when the right hon. Gentleman brings forward a Resolution of increased taxation for the purpose? We are not called upon to propose a budget next year. We have nothing to do with the embarrassment which I am afraid he will feel about the month of March or April next. Nay, more, in all probability, when my right hon. Friend proposes an increase of taxes to meet our increased expenditure we shall all be ready to rise in our places and make popular speeches showing the impolicy of his proposals and the cruelty of the burdens they entail, visiting upon him the consequences of our own folly and extravagance. I hope that my right hon. Friend will hold clear, firm, and strong language upon this subject. I am not speaking now of amendments as to details. Do not remind me of the case of the widows, because I have shown that they would have been provided for if you had not prevented it. Many of the details are susceptible of improvement; but what I am dealing with is the proposal to increase outright and wholesale the salaries of the civil servants who pay deductions, subject only to this variation, that the addition is to be £2 10s. per cent in the case of men receiving £100 a year, and £5 per cent in the case of those receiving more than that sum. I protest against that as being unjust to the public and unsupported by anything which has occurred in former times. I do not say that it is a breach of contract on the part of the civil servants, because, in point of fact, the public is in the unfortunate position that it makes contracts which bind it, but do not bind its servants. Any man is at liberty to ask for an increase of salary, but the public can never turn upon him and propose its diminution. The noble Lord does not deny that every one of these gentlemen has from the first been perfectly acquainted with the terms upon which he entered the public service. On every ground of justice and expediency I protest against this Bill; but I protest against it most of all upon the ground that it practically, although not intentionally, is a complete evasion of the rule of this House, which prohibits private Members from proposing augmentations of the public burdens, that it takes that function out of the hands of those who are responsible to the country, and that it is our duty, if we wish to maintain a wholesome spirit in the administration of the public service, to leave that office where it now is—namely, in the hands of Her Majesty's Government.

MR. DISRAELI

As time is very valuable, and as we are all anxious to hear the opinion of Her Majesty's Ministers, I shall trouble the House for only a few moments; but having taken some part in these debates on previous occasions, I should hardly perform my public duty if I were to remain altogether silent. I shall endeavour to place the question upon which we are about to vote upon its right and legitimate footing. I did not, nor do I now understand that the principle of making these deductions from the salaries of the civil servants is really the question which is before us. With much that the right hon. Gentleman has said I entirely agree. I am prepared to admit that the persons employed in the public service ought to be subject to the same principles as regards supply and demand as are applied to persons in all employments, or to the ordinary relations of life; but that is not so much the question which we are now considering. We know that a particular class of the public services have for a long time felt that an injustice was being done to them in making them subject to a tax from which their fellow public servants were exempted. It cannot be denied that 16,000 out of 50,000 public servants are subject to a particular impost, nor can it be denied that they do not receive the advantage which they have a right to expect from the fund of which they are mulcted; and it cannot be denied, as has been stated by my noble Friend, who has treated this subject with great ability and knowledge of the subject, that the arrangements connected with the superannuation fund are, to say the least of them, so clumsy, that on an average only one man in every seven who paid the tax derived any benefit whatever from it. These are, however, matters which have been the materials of old discussions, and I will not presume at this hour, with the division impending, and with the great importance of being favoured with the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the present Bill, to enter into any new discussion upon these somewhat ancient topics. In fact, I think these are subjects which have been removed from the discussions of this House by the Government having come forward and announced that they were prepared to legislate upon the subject. In fact, the Government, after discussions had taken place in this House, having collected that the feeling of the house was in favour of that legislation, did introduce a Bill upon the subject, which, after lying on the table for some time, was referred to a Select Committee, who were to consider the whole subject. From that time think that what had hitherto furnished material for debate ceased to be the consideration with which we had directly to deal. The Government submitted the Bill to a Committee, and that Committee reported in favour of the principle which is now advocated by my noble Friend—I mean the principle that these deductions should not be made from the salaries of persons employed in the public service for the sake of the superannuation fund. It is perfectly true, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone) says, they did not recommend that the salaries of those persons who had to contribute to the superannuation fund should remain at the same rate as they were at that time. I admit that there was a majority of one against that principle, but what I contend is, that no one can deny that a Parliamentary Committee has decided in favour of the abolition of deduction from the salaries of public servants. Under these circumstances, the House expected that the Government would once more attempt to legislate upon the subject, and carry into effect the principal recommendations of that Committee. The Government, however, did not appear to be satisfied with the Report of that Committee, and they thought it proper that a subject of such great importance should not be precipitately dealt with, and that, as even the decision of a Parliamentary Committee, in the face of awakened public sympathy, might not be above suspicion, they thought it best to submit the subject to the investigation of a Royal Commission. Now, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, appears much to disapprove the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into a subject upon which the opinion of Parliament or the policy of a Minister ought to be sufficient ground for action, and I am not disposed to question the soundness of his judgment upon that head. I think that of late years there has been too much laxity in casting the responsibility which ought properly to attach to this House and to the Government upon Select Committees and Royal Commissions. The very question which is now under discussion is one which need never have been referred to a Committee or a Commission at all. It is one upon which the Government, who had ample information upon the subject, ought to have made up their mind and formed their judgment; and having formed their judgment, they should have vindicated it in the face of the House. I confess I look with some distrust to these frequent references to Parliamentary Committees; but I look with still more distrust upon referring a question to the investigation of a Royal Commission which has already been reported upon by a Parliamentary Committee. I think, speaking generally, that nothing can be more unsatisfactory to this House or to the country than to attempt by the decision of a Royal Commission to set aside a Report of a Committee of this House. When, however, I find that a Parliamentary Committee has reported upon the subject now before us, that that Report has been referred to a Royal Commission, which has sanctioned the opinion of the Parliamentary Committee, so far as the main question is concerned, I think that such irresistible authority is brought to bear upon the opinion of the House, as to preclude us from recommencing ab initio the investigation upon which we originally entered. Under these circumstances, the Government introduced another Bill; and I must beg the House to remember that that Bill recognized the controverted principle which is the main feature of the present proposal—namely, that these deductions in the salaries of a certain class I of public servants should be abolished. We have that principle, therefore, sanctioned by a Parliamentary Committee; we have the sanction of a Royal Commission to the same effect; and we have the approbation of the Minister to the recommendations of the Commission.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

I introduced the Bill to which the right hon. Gentleman refers before the Royal Commission reported.

MR. DISRAELI

Well, then, we have three great authorities, although not in the order in which I placed them. We have the sanction of a Parliamentary Committee, Her Majesty's Government, and a Royal Commission, and substantially my statement was correct. Well, then, under these circumstances, what takes place? No doubt there has been much anxiety and agitation among that particular class of persons who are immediately interested, and in those who are connected with them—indeed I may say in the House and the country generally; and this, no doubt, has occupied the serious attention of the Government, because they must know that it is most inexpedient that there should be any chronic discontent among so useful a class of persons as the public servants of the country, arising from the feeling that injustice was being exercised towards them. Every one is agreed that, one way or another, this question ought to be settled. But when an inquiry was addressed to the Government, whether they were prepared to legislate in settlement of the question, a most unsatisfactory answer was received; and we were told that the Government were not prepared to legislate on the subject, as they thought some further inquiry was requisite relative to what were admitted to be very minor details. Now, those details are not in any way vital to the main issue, and I think, therefore, that my noble Friend, in asking the House to divide upon the main question, and thereby put an end to a long and painful struggle, has adopted a wise and expedient course. If the Bill of my noble Friend, which repeals the clause of the Act justifying these deductions from salaries, is passed, in that case it will be perfectly open to the Government hereafter to legislate upon those minor points to which the Report of the Commission refers. Well, Sir, it is said that to adopt the course which is now proposed by my noble Friend, would be to add greatly to the public expenditure. I confess that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gladstone) that, considering not only the present state of our finances, but the gloomy future in prospect with regard to expenditure, it would be most unwise thoughtlessly to increase the expenditure of the country; but I do not think that any Member of this House, if he thinks that this is an unjust and impolitic tax, and who remembers the opinion of this House as reflected by a Select Committee, of a Commission of the Crown, and of the Government—I do not think there is any Gentleman here who is prepared to refuse to perform an act of justice on considerations of mere economy. Nor can it be said, if we adopt the principle which is now before us, that we shall be acting upon impulse or without consideration or inquiry. This has been a matter of painful inquiry and mature deliberation. Nor can I agree with the right hon. Gentleman and those who preceded him, that the abolition of this tax will otherwise lead to a large expenditure. It is said by some, that if we put an end to these deductions, all those public servants who do not share that boon will ask for an increase of salary. Now, I cannot admit the force of that objection, nor do I think that the inference is irresistible. 16,000 of these servants complain that these deductions are made from their salaries on the ground that it is not just that they should be subject to a tax which the remaining two-thirds of the public servants are exempt from, and they ask to be put in the same position as the rest of the Civil Service. But it by no means follows that, because these deductions are abolished, therefore the remaining two-thirds (who at present have a superannuation fund of which they may avail themselves) will claim an increase of salary. I do not say that the Government will be precluded from revising the salaries of the 16,000; on the contrary, I think that it will be perfectly open to them to adopt that course which they may think fit with regard to that question. I myself am not one of that school which holds that a revision of the salaries of all public men—from the Prime Minister to the lowest tide-waiter—is cither desirable or practicable; but I think that an occasional and periodical revision of the salaries paid in the different branches of the public service might be expedient. With regard to the salaries of the high officers of the State, they have been revised within the last seven or eight years; some of those salaries have been reduced and some have been abolished. Now, I can see no reason why the salaries of those 16,000 civil servants should not also undergo revision, and should not even be reduced, if such a proceeding should be considered just. But that is a matter which has no connection whatever with the question whether we ought or ought not to free these civil servants from a tax which previous discussions in this House, as well as the investigations of Committees and Commissions and the opinions entertained with regard to it by successive Ministries, testify to be an imposition which is both unjust and impolitic. Under these circumstances, I trust my noble Friend will upon this occasion succeed in obtaining the assent of the House to a measure the operation of which, I think, will be virtually to settle this important question. I may remind hon. Members that, even should that measure pass into a law, it will still be open to the Government to carry out all those other arrangements with respect to the civil service which have been recommended by the various Committees and Commissions, or which they themselves may deem it desirable to introduce. It will be perfectly in their power to take that course with the concurrence of Parliament, and they may even without that sanction revise the salaries of those officers who would be affected by the proposal which is made by my noble Friend. In conclusion, I have only to say that, if this Bill be carried, the result will be to terminate a controversy which is at once painful and impolitic, and, believing myself that we shall thereby be doing an act of justice, I shall give to the measure my cordial support.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

It appears to me, Sir, that the question which has been submitted to the consideration of the House by the noble Lord the Member for Cockermouth in the Bill which is now before us, may be regarded under three different aspects. It may be looked upon as a question of feeling, as a question of equity, or as a question of expediency. Now, if we view it as a question of feeling I can only say, that so far as I individually am concerned, nothing could afford me greater satisfaction than to accede to the Motion of the noble Lord to make that addition to the salaries of the civil servants which his Bill proposes. It is my lot to be in daily communication with the members of that body, and while for many of them I entertain the highest respect, my feelings towards others are those of friendship and regard. If, then, I were to give way to mere personal considerations I could perform no act which, to me, would be more gratifying than to vote for the second reading of this Bill. But, Sir, although there may be many hon. Members who would feel that they were justified in giving their votes upon the ground which I have just mentioned, no one who has a public duty to discharge would venture to yield to the influence of mere individual inclination. The Government must therefore be guided exclusively by reasons of public policy with respect to the decision in reference to this Bill at which they may arrive. Now, the next point which we have to consider is, whether this claim, put forward upon the part of the civil service, is or is not founded upon principles of equity and justice. When it was first submitted to Parliament it was, to the best of my recollection, based altogether upon that ground. It was treated as a grievance—it was put forward as a right. The civil servants contended that the Government, by a misinterpretation of an act of the Legislature, had virtually defrauded them of a portion of the emoluments to which they were entitled. They alleged that the Executive had acted improperly in making deductions from their salaries for the formation of a fund which had never been created. In consequence of the existence of that most serious charge it was that I deemed it to be my duty to ask this House to refer the Bill which I introduced in connection with this subject last year, to a Select Committee, in order that these allegations might be examined. Before that Committee the principal members of the Civil Service, from whom the charge to which I have just alluded had emanated, were examined, and every opportunity was afforded to them to lay their cause before Parliament. Now, whatever may be the policy of delegating the responsibilities of Government to a Committee of the House, it seems to me that so long as such serious allegations remained unexamined by a competent tribunal, it would not have been satisfactory to the House to have come to a decision on the subject. Well, the Committee had a large amount of evidence brought under their consideration, and not being able to make up their minds as to that which I may term the question of insurance—that is to say, the question whether the deductions which had been made from the salaries of the civil servants were or were not greater in value than the pensions to which they would become entitled as an equivalent,—resolved to refer the matter to two actuaries, who were to be furnished with the whole evidence, and to report thereupon. The noble Lord the Member for Cockermouth has indeed quoted the testimony of the actuaries who were examined before the Committee, to prove that its members were satisfied with the information which had been laid before them; but I appeal to the recollection of those hon. Gentlemen who were members of the Committee to corroborate the statement which I have made, that the Committee not being satisfied with the evidence before them, came to a deliberate resolution to refer the question for the report of two actuaries specially selected, who were to be furnished with the evidence for that purpose. I therefore entirely dispute the statement that the Select Committee were satisfied upon the ground of equity and justice. The result of the investigation of the Committee was, in my opinion, to leave the question of insurance quite undetermined, and I may add that their labours were brought to a close before the report of the two actuaries to whom the point had been submitted could be received. The claim of the Civil Service has nevertheless been re-argued in this House upon the ground of justice, and upon that footing it was placed by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hereford (Mr. Clive), who spoke on the first day of this debate, and by the noble Lord the Member for Cocker-mouth in his speech upon this occasion. Now, I utterly deny the validity of the claim of the civil servants upon the ground upon which both the hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord have put it. I maintain that the contract which was entered into with them by Act of Parliament is, in its terms, perfectly clear and precise; that every one of them who has taken office since the passing of that Act has accepted it upon conditions which were well known; that those conditions have been strictly adhered to by successive Governments; and that it is absolutely impossible to prove that even if a fund had been created, any additional benefit to the members of the Civil Service would be the result. The noble Lord the Member for Cockermouth has, indeed, criticised the figures which my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Wilson) submitted to the House—in what I think a very clear and conclusive manner—upon the first day of this debate, and I shall proceed, with the permission of the House, briefly to repeat the grounds upon which the calculation of my hon. Friend was based. The total amount of the pensions under the operation of the Superannuation Act for this year, exclusive of compensation for abolished offices and other charges, we calculate at £606,000. I may, perhaps, remind the House that the calculation which is made by the advocates of the Civil Service refers, not to the present time, but to a period when the present system may be expected to come to maturity; when the whole of the civil servants will be in the receipt of pensions under the Act; and when those who receive pensions will be placed upon a reduced scale, and will during their entire tenure of office be entitled to an abatement. Now, we have calculated what would be the result of the supposed accumulation of a fund of £5,000,000 and the pensions which may exist at a future time. I shall, in the first place, take the calculation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, (Sir F. Baring) who contends that we ought to deduct one-third from the £606,000 which we say is the amount of the existing pensions. That would leave a sum of £404,000, which amount would, according to the supposition of the advocates of the Civil Service, be payable when the system reached maturity. Well, there is a sum of £94,000 to be taken for contributions, which added to £150,000, the interest of the £5,000,000 at the rate of 3 percent, would make a sum of £244,000; thus leaving a deficiency of £160,000 as compared with the £404,000 which I have just mentioned. Such is the result, taking the calculation of the advocates of the Civil Service in connection with the principle of my right hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth. I now come to the calculation which they themselves make. They assume that the pensions will, when the system reaches maturity, be reduced to half their present amount, or, in other words, to a sum of £303,000; from which sum, if you deduct £94,000 for contributions, and £150,000, the interest of £5,000,000 at 3 per cent., together £244,000, a deficiency of £59,000 is created, by which amount the Government would be a loser. It is therefore, I think, quite clear that taking the calculation of the civil servants themselves, we should have a deficiency when the system comes to maturity.

LORD NAAS

Does that statement apply to the pensions of the whole Civil Service, or merely to those of the £16,000?

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

It applies to all the members of the Civil Service who would receive pensions under the operation of the Superannuation Act; I suppose that the whole of the Civil Service when the system comes to maturity, will be superannuated on the reduced scale—that is the only way the calculation can be made, and that is the principle on which the Civil Service bases its calculation. I maintain therefore, with the utmost confidence that, looking upon the question as a matter of right as between the civil servants and the Government, no case whatever has been made out for the unconditional abolition of the abatements. Another ground of justice upon which we are told the abatements ought to be abolished is that the Civil Service is underpaid, that the salaries are too low, and that there ought to be a rateable addition of 5 per cent to salaries above £100, and of 2½ per cent to salaries under £100. In order to prove that proposition it must, in the first place, be shown that the higher paid class of civil servants require a greater addition to their salaries than the lower paid servants, which it would, I think, be difficult to establish. But, Sir, I wholly deny that any such general case of insufficiency of pay can be established with respect to the civil servants of the Crown. In the first place there is the well-known fact of the general desire on the part of the public to obtain offices under Government; and in the next place, if we are to suppose that the whole of the civil servants are underpaid, how are we to account for the stress which has been laid in this House upon the adoption of the principle of competition for admission to the Civil Service? Do men compete for that which they do not value? Are men willing to come forward as candidates in a competitive examination for offices that are underpaid, in which the duty exceeds the remuneration, and where they are, indeed, remunerated less liberally than in the mercantile service? A special statement has been made with reference to the Bank of England, upon which I should be glad to say a word. My hon. Friend the late Governor of the Bank of England (Mr. Weguelin) has quoted the salaries of the clerks in that establishment to show that the officers of the Bank of England are better paid than the corresponding class of civil servants. The average amount of the salaries of the clerks in the Bank is £196 a year, and this average my hon. Friend compared with the general average of the whole Civil Service, including the tide-waiters, warehousemen, and all the inferior officers of the Board of Customs, and Excise. Now, first observing that such a comparison could only lead to a fallacious result, let me compare the average salaries of the Bank of England with the salaries of those officers of the Government which properly enter into the comparison. I have before me the average salaries of some of the principal departments of the State, and when I make a comparison between those salaries and the salaries of the persons employed in the Bank of England the House will see how much the payment of public servants exceeds that of the clerks of the Bank of England. The salaries of the persons employed at the Treasury, excluding the political officers, but including the messengers, average £358. The salaries, of the Foreign Office average £355; the Colonial Office, £397; and the Privy Council, £400. In some Government offices the average is lower, but the two lowest averages that I hold in my hand are £260 and £280. Therefore, if a comparison be made between the salaries of the Bank of England, which are analogous to those of the Government offices and not wholly dissimilar, it will not be found that the comparison will be unfavourable to the civil servants of the Crown.

MR. WEGUELIN

I would wish to explain that in the average which I calculated I did not include the managers of country banks in connection with the Bank of England, some of whom receive very large salaries.

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

And in the average I have given the salaries of the political officers of Departments are also excluded. But be that as it may, looking at this question as one of justice—of an equitable claim on the part of the civil servants for a rateable increase of salaries, made by way of universal percentage, without reference either to service or to individual merit, it seems to me that this claim altogether fails. We then come to the ground of expediency, upon which the claim is placed by the Commissioners. But, before I address myself to that part of the subject, I take the liberty of calling the attention of the House to the course of proceeding which has been followed in this House with respect to the whole inquiry. The Bill which I first introduced into this House, and which was referred to a Select Committee, proposed to make some alterations in the scale of pensions, but did not touch the question of abatements. The Committee went very fully into the question. They examined many witnesses, and agreed to certain Resolutions, one of which condemned the principle of abatements of salaries, but affirmed the policy of a revision of salaries with reference to the abatements. Therefore the Committee, in recommending the abolition of abatements, at the same time recommended that a corresponding reduction should be made in the salaries of the civil servants. They did not recommend an absolute remission of abatements, but a qualified and conditional remission—that qualification and condition being that the salaries of the entire Civil Service should be revised with regard to the deductions. After the Report of the Committee had been presented, it became my duty, as Chairman of the Committee, to introduce a Bill embodying the decision of the Committee, and the Bill I introduced at the end of last Session contained a clause that the Commissioners of the Treasury should, with all convenient speed after the passing of the Act, cause the salaries or rates of payment of the Civil Service to be revised, with due regard to the deductions which should be remitted. The principle embodied in the Bill was that the Treasury, after the deductions had been abolished, were to revise the salaries according to the remission of those deductions, thereby engrafting upon the Act the principle on which the revision of salaries was to be effected; and that was the principle, and no more, to which I assented. The result, then, was this—that I prepared a Bill which contained the principle of abatement; the Select Committee, however, determined not to uphold that principle, but they accompanied their reversal with a decision that the salaries of the Civil Service should be revised. The Bill was introduced at the end of the Session, when there was no sufficient time for its consideration. It did not receive any general support in this House, and, with the concurrence of both sides of the House, I abstained from any attempt to proceed with it. Finding that the proposal I made did not receive the approbation of the House, and being unwilling to adhere obstinately to the principle that I originally proposed, I thought it my duty to propose that the matter should be referred to a Royal Commission, believing that the inquiries of impartial persons would afford the best means of assisting and advising the Government in the difficulty in which they were placed. The appointment of that Commission has been objected to upon different grounds. Tin hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. S. FitzGerald) says that it was disrespectful to the House to appoint a Commission after the opinion expressed by the Committee. But, if it be disrespectful to this House to refer a question to a Royal Commission after a Committee has reported upon it, I must be permitted to say that this House has on many occasions been the first to sanction that course, and, if I may so say, to treat its own decisions with a want of respect. I will only remind the House that last Session it carried an Address to the Crown, to appoint a Royal Commission to consider the site of the National Gallery, after a Committee of this House had inquired and made a report on that subject. During the present Session, the other House of Parliament has addressed the Crown for a Commission respecting the Ordnance Survey for Scotland, which has also been the subject of inquiry before a Committee. There are, therefore, ample precedents for referring to a Commission subjects which have already been examined by a Committee. My right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) objects to the appointment of a Commission, and says that the Government ought to have decided this matter upon their own responsibility. But the reason that induced me to desire the appointment of a Royal Commission was, that the principle which I originally proposed—namely, that of maintaining the abatements from salaries—had been condemned by the Committee; it seemed to me desirable, therefore, that the matter should be referred to a Commission. The noble Lord himself has admitted that the Commission was composed of impartial persons, and he paid them what was only a just tribute of praise. Indeed, I need only appeal to their decision, which did not accord with the opinion I had previously expressed, as showing that I did not select the Commissioners with any view to a foregone conclusion. Having investigated the subject, they entirely repudiate the claim of the Civil Service to the abolition of these deductions on the ground of right. If the House will refer to page 9 of their Report, it will find a most explicit declaration on this subject—namely, that the Civil Service has no grievance of which to complain, and that it cannot demand the cessation of the annual abatements on the score of right. But if such a claim is to be raised, I can only say that I altogether dispute it, that the matter is still sub judice, and that we ought in fairness to await the second Report of the Commissioners, in which they promise the further report of the actuaries, to whom has been referred the whole question whether the deductions taken under the Act of 1834 are more than adequate to meet the charge contemplated by that statute. Therefore, if the House are disposed to deal with the question of equity, I think they are bound, supposing them to be governed by any regard for the public purse, to postpone their decision until they have seen the finding of the actuaries. The basis upon which the Commissioners rest their recommendation is expediency. They say that the present system is objectionable—is full of anomalies. They advise the Legislature to consent to the loss of a certain annual sum in order to get rid of a defective and vicious system. In a few words, their recommendation amounts to this:—The Civil Service cannot on the ground of right demand the remission of the abatements; but, as the system is faulty and open to misunderstanding, the country should, as it were, pay forfeit, and thus put an end to that system. My hon. Friend (Mr. Weguelin) says that this would entail a temporary loss only, and in order to make good that position he accompanies the recommendation with a condition which would introduce a new class of anomalies into the Civil Service—namely, a diminution of the salaries upon promotion, thereby creating a qualified reduction in the rate of remuneration with a view to meet the remission of the abatements. This brings me to the last point which I have now to put before the House, namely, whether they are prepared to agree to the measure proposed by the noble Lord, which involves the simple and unconditional abolition of the deductions now made from the pay of the Civil Service. I have already stated my opinion that the right of the Civil Service to such a concession cannot be established; and in the official position which I hold, I do not feel myself justified in asking the House to be generous with the public money. If the House think fit to perform an act of liberality and generosity, it is no doubt competent for the House so to act; but it would ill beseem me, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, to propose any increase in the salaries of the Civil Service, except upon the ground of justice, or of the insufficiency of the present scale of remuneration. No doubt it is perfectly competent for the House of Commons, if it think fit, in a spirit of gratuitous liberality, to bestow upon the civil servants of the country this annual sum in addition to their existing salaries, and to diffuse the increase rateably over the whole service without any reference to individual merit, or to any augmentation in the amount of work performed. On the other hand, if the House is not disposed to take that step they may accompany the remission of these abatements by the principle which was adopted by the Committee of last Session—that is to say, they may call on the Government to make a reduction in the salaries equivalent to the abatements remitted. In that manner either the whole or a considerable part of the deductions to be abolished would be recovered in the shape of a diminution in the regular rate of pay. That, however, is a matter entirely for the House to consider. For my own part, standing in the situation which I have the honour to fill, I see no sufficient ground to justify me in acceding to the proposition of the noble Lord, and therefore I shall support the Amendment of my hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson) that the Bill be read a second time this day three months.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 171; Noes 111: Majority 60.

List of the AYES.
Adair, H. E.	De Vere, S. E.
Adderley, C. B.	Disraeli, rt. hon. B.
Arbuthnott, hon. Gen.	Dod, J. W.
Ashley, Lord	Du Cane, C.
Ball, E.	Dunbar, Sir W.
Baxter, W. E.	Dundas, F.
Bernard, hon. W. S.	Dunlop, A. M.
Bective, Earl of	Du Pre, C. G.
Beecroft, G. S.	Dutton, hon. R. H.
Bentinck, G. W. P.	Ebrington, Visct.
Beresford, rt. hon. W.	Elphinstone, Sir J.
Berkeley, hon. H. F.	Esmonde, J.
Berkeley, F. W. F.	Ewart, W.
Black, A.	Ewart, J. C.
Blake, J.	Farnham, E. B.
Booth, Sir R. G.	Farquhar, Sir M.
Bowyer, G.	Ferguson, Sir R.
Bridges, Sir B. W.	FitzGerald, W. R. S.
Bruce, H. A.	Forster, C.
Buller, Sir J. Y.	Freestun, Col.
Burghley, Lord	Gard, R. S.
Burrell, Sir C. M.	Gaskell, J. M.
Butler, C. S.	Gilpin, C.
Caird, J.	Glyn, G. G.
Carden, Sir R. W.	Goddard, A. L.
Charlesworth, J. C. D.	Greene, J.
Churchill, Lord A. S.	Grenfell, C. W.
Clay, J.	Greville, Col. F.
Clifford, H. M.	Gray, Capt.
Clive, G.	Grogan, E.
Close, M. C.	Grosvenor, Lord R.
Cobbett, J. M.	Gurney, J. H.
Cobbold, J. C.	Gurney, S.
Cole, hon. H. A.	Hall, Gen.
Colvile, C. R.	Hamilton, G. A.
Conyngham, Lord F.	Hamilton, J. H.
Corry, rt. hon. H. L.	Hardy, G.
Cotterell, Sir H. G.	Hassard, M.
Cox, W.	Hay, Lord J.
Craufurd, E. H. J.	Hildyard, R. C.
Cross, R. A.	Hodgson, W. N.
Denison, hon. W. H. F.	Hope, A. J. B.
Dering, Sir E.	Hopwood, J. T.

Horsfall, T. B.	Pechell, Sir G. B.
Hudson, G.	Pevensey, Visct.
Ingestre, Visct.	Raynham, Visct.
Ingham, R.	Ridley, G.
Johnstone, hon. H.	Robertson, P. F.
Johnstone, Sir J.	Roebuck, J. A.
Kendall, N.	Roupell, W.
King, J. K.	Russell, F. W.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F.	Scholefield, W.
Knox, Col.	Sclater, G.
Langton, W. G.	Scott, hon. F.
Langton, H. G.	Scott, Capt. E.
Levinge, Sir R.	Sheridan, H. B.
Liddell, hon. H. G.	Smith, Sir F.
Lindsay, W. S.	Spooner, R.
Locke, Jno.	Stafford, A.
Lowther, hon. Col.	Stanley, Lord
Lygon, hon. F.	Stephenson, R.
Macartney, G.	Stuart, L. J.
M'Cann, J.	Sullivan, M.
Mackie, J.	Sykes, Col. W. H.
Maguire, J. F.	Taylor, Col.
Malins, R.	Thesiger, Sir F.
Manners, Lord J.	Thompson, Gen.
Marjoribanks, D. C.	Trefusis, hon. C. H. R.
Martin, C. W.	Vance, J.
Martin, P. W.	Vansittart, W.
Maxwell, hon. Col.	Verner, Sir W.
Miles, W.	Waddington, H. S.
Miller, T. J.	Walcott, Admiral
Miller, S. B.	Warren, S.
Morgan, O.	Weguelin, T. M.
Morris, D.	Whatman, J.
Napier, rt. hon. J.	White, J.
Napier, Sir C.	Whiteside, J.
Newark, Visct.	Whitmore, H.
Noel, hon. G. J.	Willcox, B. M'Ghie
North, Col.	Willyams, E. W. B.
O'Brien, P.	Wise, J. A.
Ogilvy, Sir J.	Woodd, B. T.
Pakenham, Col.	Wyndham, H.
Palmer, R.	TELLERS.
Palmer, R. W.	Naas, Lord
Paull, H.	Hankey, T.

List of the NOES.
Anderson, Sir J.	Emlyn, Visct.
Antrobus, E.	Evans, T. W.
Ayrton, A. S.	FitzGerald, rt. hon. J. D.
Baines, rt. hon. M. T.	Foley, J. H.
Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T.	Foley, H. J. W.
Baring, T. G.	Foster, W. O.
Barnard, T.	Fortescuc, C. S.
Bass, M. T.	Garnett, W. J.
Biggs, J.	Gladstone, rt. hon. W.
Bouverie, hon. P. P.	Gordon, L. D.
Brand, hon. H.	Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.
Briscoe, J. I.	Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Bruce, Lord E.	Grey, R. W.
Buller, J. W.	Griffith, C. D.
Buxton, C.	Gurdon, B.
Byng, hon. G.	Hackblock, W.
Castlerosse, Visct.	Hadfield, G.
Cheetham, J.	Hall, rt. hon. Sir B.
Cholmeley, Sir M. J.	Handley, J.
Clifford, C. C.	Hardcastle, J. A.
Collins, T.	Hatchell, J.
Cowper, rt. hon. W. F.	Heathcote, Sir W.
Davey, R.	Heathcote, hon. G. H.
Davie, Sir H. R. F.	Henley, rt. hon. J. W.
Dodson, J. G.	Herbert, rt. hon. H. A.
Duncan, Visct.	Herbert, Col.
Egerton, W. T.	Holland, E.

Jackson, W.	Russell, Lord J.
Jermyn, Earl	Russell, H.
Jervoise, Sir J. C.	Russell, Sir W.
Keating, Sir H. S.	Smith, J. B.
Kershaw, J.	Smith, rt. hon. R. V.
Labouchere, rt. hon. H.	Smith, A.
Langston, J. H.	Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W.
Lewis, rt. hn. Sir G. C.	Stapleton, J.
Lockhart, A. E.	Thorneley, T.
Lowe, rt. hon. R.	Tite, W.
Marshall, W.	Trelawny, Sir J. S.
Martin, J.	Turner, J. A.
Massey, W. N.	Walter, J.
Mills, T.	Warburton, G. D.
Mitchell, T. A.	Watkins, Col. L.
Montgomery, Sir G.	Western, S.
Mowbray, J. R.	Williams, M.
Nicoll, D.	Williams, W.
Nisbet, R. P.	Williams, Sir W. F.
Osborne, R.	Willoughby, Sir H.
Ossulston, Lord	Willoughby, J. P.
Paget, C.	Wilson, A.
Palmerston, Visct.	Wilson, J.
Patten, Col. W.	Wingfield, R. B.
Paxton, Sir J.	Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.
Pilkington, J.	Wood, W.
Powell, F. S.	Wrightson, W. B.
Pugh, D.	TELLERS.
Ramsden, Sir J. W.	Hayter, W. G.
Ramsay, Sir A.	Mulgrave, Earl of

Main Question put and agreed to.

Bill read 2°, and committed for Tomorrow.