HC Deb 20 July 1857 vol 147 cc28-49
MR. BENTINCK,

in rising to call the attention of the House to the state of the Naval and Military Defences of the Country, said:—Sir, considering the national importance of the subject involved in the present question, I think that I may fairly ask the indulgence of the House while detain them a few moments. It will be in the recollection of the House that when I attempted upon a former occasion to call the attention of the House to the state of the military defences of the country, I then stated that I was anxious to do so in consequence of a certain statement made and certain opinions expressed both by the noble Lord at the head of the Government and by the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty. But, Sir, I was unable to elicit any reply, or rather the reply I received was so unsatisfactory, that I have been again induced to call the attention of the House to the subject, and I trust I shall be able to elicit a clearer and more satisfactory statement. Upon the occasion to which I more particularly refer, I understood from the noble Lord at the head of the Ministry that in the present state of public affairs he saw no reason whatever for embodying the militia this year; and I understood the right hon. Baronet, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to say that he had not at present any steam fleet in that state of preparation that it could be employed for the conveyance of troops to the East. That was the most important part of the statement of the right hon. Baronet. It appears to me that the combined results of these two statements amount to this: that, taking into consideration the drain upon our military resources which has been caused by recent events in India, this country is about to be left almost entirely denuded of all its defences, both by sea and by land. I certainly think that we ought to have some explanation from Her Majesty's Government on that subject. The right hon. Baronet, when he told us that we had no steam line-of-battle ships to convey troops, told us that which was tantamount to saying that none of the now improved steam line-of-battle ships were in a fit state to be used if an emergency occurred with respect to our national defences; for, in fact, our steam ships, which are not in a sufficiently advanced state to be employed at a few days' notice in carrying troops to the East, could not be brought to bear for our national defences. Indeed, with one or two exceptions, I think I can show the House they are in an extremely indifferent condition, and the result is, we are left destitute of that great and most important arm of the service. The noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government told us, that up to the present time the state of public affairs, was such that there was no necessity for calling out the militia. But he did not tell us at the same time what his resources were, or what means he intended to adopt in order to supply the deficiencies in the military force caused by sending such a large number of troops to India. That subject he passed entirely over, and therefore, as respects the military branch of the service, we have the authority of the noble Lord for saying that the country will be left defenceless. I need not say anything with reference to the recent outbreak in India, but it is perfectly obvious that many causes might arise which would result in our finding ourselves engaged in hostilities with the most powerful kingdom in Europe; and, therefore, I think it is the bounden duty of the Government to explain to the House and the country what steps it has taken, or intends to take The noble Lord told us with his usual frankness that there is no probability of an outbreak in Europe; and although I admit that no one is better qualified to give an opinion on foreign affairs, yet the noble Lord is not omniscient, nor omnipotent, and he could not tell what result an unfortunate death might not lead to. It was impossible that he or any one could say what might occur in the next few weeks. No opinion on the probability or improbability of au outbreak in Europe was worth anything, because it could be only a speculation, upon which they would not be justified in acting. Within a few weeks we might be engaged in hostilities with one or two of the most powerful States of Europe, and there ought to be means at our command to insure the safety of the country in the event of the occurrence of such a contingency. The noble Lord seemed to hold doctrines more becoming the Peace-at-any-price party. He said, with reference to the militia, that "We must cut our coat according to our cloth."

MR. SPEAKER

said that he was obliged to interpose, and remind the hon. Member that these constant references to previous debates were contrary to Parliamentary rules.

MR. BENTINCK,

without presuming to dispute the right hon. Gentleman's ruling, would submit that if, on an occasion like this, when he felt it his duty to call their attention to the opinions of the noble Lord, he were not permitted to advert to those opinions, as expressed on former occasions, the rigid enforcement of the rule would put an end to all freedom of debate. He understood the noble Lord, on a former occasion, to say that the expenditure of the country must be calculated by its income; but that appeared to him to be an unsafe principle to be laid down by a Minister. He could not imagine a more dangerous doctrine, and he must say that it was one which he heard with the greatest surprise from the noble Lord, who, he always thought, was disposed to take a more liberal view of public affairs. It was calculated to raise strong doubts as to whether the noble Lord had taken proper means for maintaining our defences by sea and land. His object in bringing forward this question was not so much a desire to explain his own views as to call forth an expression of opinion on the part of those who were better qualified to give one, and to induce Government to give full explanations of their intentions on this important subject. He trusted, therefore, that Go- vernment would fully explain their views as to the mode they intended to adopt for supplying the deficiencies in the naval and military defences of the country, caused by the drain now going on in the prosecution of the Chinese war, and for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion in India.

LORD ADOLHPUS VANE-TEMPEST

said, that in deference to the feelings of the House the other evening, he did not persist in his Motion for postponing the Vote for an increase of seamen in our navy, He submitted, however, that in the present critical condition of India, and with hostilities going on in China, the noble Lord at the head of the Government ought to have made a statement to the House with respect to the exigencies of the country, and explained how he proposed to meet them. In lieu of that, when on Friday evening the vote for 2,000 additional seamen was handed to the Chairman in Committee of Supply not a single remark was made by the First Lord of the Admiralty or any other member of the Government, and had he not ventured himself to address a few observations to the House the Vote would have been agreed to in solemn silence. We could not disguise from ourselves the fact that a large military force would be required to suppress the revolt in India, and therefore it was somewhat extraordinary that the only Vote which the Government had proposed for an increase of our armaments was one for an addition of 2,000 seamen to the Navy. It had been stated by the public journals—not by any member of the Government—that 25,000 soldiers were about to proceed to India. He wished to know what measures the Government intended to take in order to fill up the void created at home, and at the same time keep up that large force in a state of efficiency. Nothing could be more dangerous than to denude this country of the whole of its military defences, and yet, while the Government had maintained a studious silence on the subject of any increase to our regular army, the Prime Minister had positively declared that, in his opinion, the calling out of the militia was unnecessary. He wished to warn the noble Lord at the head of the Government that if he looked forward to recruiting the army with the facility which his sanguine temperament led him to suppose, he would be mistaken, as he had reason to know, from personal intercourse with men who had served during the late war, that there was no great desire generally entertained to re-enter the service. The people had not forgotten the excessive favour shown to the soldiers of the Foreign Legion, and the rewards bestowed upon the members of the various civil corps, and they would not be found so ready to enlist into the army as some persons seemed to expect. Moreover, it ought to be remembered that at the close of the last war our army was 50,000 men under the Estimates voted by Parliament—a fact which showed how necessary it was to take immediate measures for replacing the large force about to be sent to India. With respect to the conveyance of troops, he might state that a portion of our Crimean army was brought home in Her Majesty's screw line-of-battle ships, although the First Lord of the Admiralty had previously declared that no vessels belonging to the navy would be used for that purpose, and he was convinced that the employment of screw steamers in conveying troops to India or China at the present time would be productive of both efficiency and economy. He did not look with alarm at the state of India, but he confessed that he saw no intention on the part of the Government to guard against danger that might arise nearer home. He should be wanting in his duty if he did not join in calling the attention of the Government to these points. With regard to the use of screw line-of-battle ships for the conveyance of troops, he might remind the House that when he returned from the Crimea he put a question to the First Lord of the Admiralty in reference to employing those ships in bringing home the army, and asked whether the admirals in the Black Sea and Mediterranean had not recommended their employment. The answer given was that there was no such intention, and that no such official recommendation had been received. Two months after, the Government ordered the ships to be employed to bring home the army; and if they considered the risk the men had been exposed to for that time they must regret it had not been done sooner. If they looked to the Estimates, they would find the advantages on the score of economy in the course which had been adopted during the war both by France and Sardinia. In conclusion, the questions which be begged to ask the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) were, what was the full amount of the force to be sent to India, by what means the Government intended to transmit them, whether by sailing vessels or steamers, or, in fact, by Her Majesty's vessels at all? He wished, also, to know whether the Government had considered any measure with reference to the recruiting of the army, and, if so, to what extent; and, finally, whether the noble Lord was prepared to reconsider his answer with respect to the calling out of the militia?

MR. W. WILLIAMS

said, he was well acquainted with the tendency of some hon. Gentlemen to increase the expenditure for the purpose of keeping up a large standing army; but he would oppose to their opinion the high authority of the Duke of Wellington, who declared that 80,000 men were quite sufficient for all the purposes of the country, including 25,000 stationed in India. The number actually voted this year was 126,000, leaving 46,000 available for India over what the Duke of Wellington had considered necessary. Her Majesty's Government were much better judges of what was required for the purposes of the country than the noble Lord opposite, and he always found them ready enough to make demands, but he had no doubt that if they came down and declared an increase of the army necessary for the defence of India, the House would vote the increase unanimously. It was to be presumed that there was no such necessity.

COLONEL KNOX

said, he was surprised that the hon. Member should talk so superficially upon the subject. From the numbers of the army voted the 30,000 men sent to India or China must be deducted. The hon. Member allowed civil service votes to pass without objection, but had a hobby of his own—that was, the decrease of the army. The men sent to China and India must be replaced, or the army would not be adequate to its duties. The noble Lord stated the other night that when the proper time arrived he should not fail to increase the army, but he (Colonel Knox) would remind the noble Lord that during the late war the country had to pay exorbitantly for men, and was obliged even to have recourse to a foreign legion. If Government did not at once begin to fill the vacancies constantly occurring, they would find considerable difficulty in so doing at a later period; and he could assure the House that this was a subject which occupied the serious attention of experienced and military men.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

—Sir, it is, I think, not usual for men who have at any time been anxious for the attainment of a certain object to become less eager for it, when they are placed in a position which makes them personally responsible for its attainment. Now, at a moment when the question of adequate national defences was not quite so popular as it is now, I was one of those who, out of office, as before that; time when I was in office, urged upon Parliament the necessity of making more ample provision for the defences of the country. I retain that opinion now, and, being a member of the Government and more responsible for providing adequate defences, I hope hon. Gentlemen will give us credit for not being neglectful in accomplishing an object which all must admit to be of paramount importance. Now, the hon. Gentleman who spoke last seemed disposed to taunt us with evincing an inclination to too much economy in our arrangements. I have always felt and urged that Parliament ought to provide ample funds for whatever may be necessary in the way of the military or naval defences of the kingdom. I can only say that the experience of the past leads me confidently to rely upon the fact that Parliament never is backward in answering the calls of the Government, whatever that Government may be, whenever it is felt that increased exertions are necessary to enable the Government to provide adequate means for the national defences. But, Sir, it is one thing to call on Parliament in a great emergency to increase the burdens of the country, with a view to protect the country from danger; it is another thing, in ordinary times, to call on Parliament to go beyond that amount which the Government, acting upon its own responsibility, has deemed to be sufficient for defence, although perhaps they might have an opinion that the amount was not quite so large as they would have desired had there been more ample means at their disposal. At the beginning of this year Her Majesty's Government laid before Parliament a statement of the amount of military and naval force with which we agreed to be responsible for carrying on the service of the country, both with regard to the defence of the realm and those other exigencies to meet which we in time of peace are likely to be called upon. Therefore, as far as the defences of the country are concerned, looking at the state of Europe, I see no reason why we should call upon Parliament to give us a greater number of men than we asked for originally. The hon. Gentleman who Commenced this discussion thinks we do not look with sufficient foresight to events which might happen to disturb the tranquillity of Europe and involve this country in the necessity of making greater exertions. I can only say I see no prospect at present—no question impending which is likely to involve us in any struggle in Europe. I trust the hand of Providence will protect us from any of those events which may unexpectedly produce a state of convulsion. But if such an emergency should arise, Parliament is sitting, to whom we could at once apply; and if Parliament were not sitting, we have the power of calling it together and asking its advice and assistance. Upon these grounds I feel there is no immediate cause for us to apply to Parliament for a greater amount of force for the service of the United Kingdom than that which we asked for at the beginning of this year. But it is quite true that events unexpectedly arising in India have compelled us to send from this country a portion of that force which had been intended to remain here for the purposes of national defence or for furnishing reliefs upon those stations where they might be needed. We, however, took steps to fill up the gap that would be created. We at once ordered the most active recruiting to take place. The only immediate way in which a drain of this kind can be met is by enlisting fresh recruits to augment the establishment of regiments remaining at home and in other places, or for the purpose, if it becomes necessary, of raising second battalions with a view of increasing the number of corps for relief abroad; but that operation will go on without any assistance from Parliament up to the amount which Parliament has already sanctioned for the military establishment of the country. Parliament has voted a certain number of men and given us the means of paying them, and although the position of affairs in India has rendered it necessary that a portion of that number should be sent out to that country, we are still at liberty to fill up by recruitments the gap thus created, and to restore the establishment to the same amount at which it stood before these events occurred. I entertain very sanguine hopes that at an early period that gap will be filled up by the ordinary process of recruiting. If not, it will become the duty of the Government to see what other steps may be required. One of the methods which has been suggested, and which has been much pressed upon us by hon. Members on the other side of the House, is that we should have recourse to the militia. I think hon. Gentlemen do not accurately picture to themselves a distinct idea of what it is they recommend. If they recommend that the militia should be called out for training and exercise for the limited period of twenty-eight or fifty-six days, to which in time of peace they are confined, is that intended as a means of inducing the men of those regiments to volunteer for the line? I dare say, if we were to call out a large body of the militia for training and exercise, many of them would volunteer into the line; but it would be a most expensive mode of raising men, because, in order to recruit 100 or 200 men, you would have to pay the full establishment of the militia regiment for twenty-eight or fifty-six days. Thus, the two-thirds or three-fourths of the regiment who would not volunteer must be paid in order to induce the remaining one-fourth or one-third to join the line. I apprehend that will strike every hon. Gentleman as being a most expensive mode of adding to the strength of the army. Other hon. Gentlemen say we ought to embody the militia as a permanent part of the home garrison; but if they looked at the Act of Parliament they would see that we have no power to do so. The law gives the Crown the power of embodying the militia in case of war with some foreign power, or in case of insurrection or danger at home. We are not at war. I see no likelihood of our being engaged in a European war, and certainly there never was a moment when the country was less likely to see an insurrection at home. It is possible, no doubt, that events may have happened in India, of which we may receive information before Parliament rises, which will necessitate so large a detachment of forces from this country that the ordinary process of recruiting will not be likely to fill up the gap; and I admit that, without any apprehension of particular danger at home, or anticipating any unfavourable change of political circumstances in Europe, it would not be right and fitting to leave this country, I will not say entirely destitute, but with any diminution for any length of time of the force that is necessary for its home defence. It might, therefore, in such a case be proper to ask Parliament to give the Crown for a limited period powers to embody a portion of the militia, though not in a state of war. I merely mention that as one of the possible events that might make a recourse to Parliament necessary, though I hope no such necessity will arise. The noble Lord (Lord A. V. Tempest) opposite has asked me to tell him the number of troops going to India—a question which I beg to say I have already answered. The force sent out, or being sent out, is, in round numbers, 20,000, consisting partly of recruits for the European corps in the service of the Company—recruits however they can be hardly called, seeing they have been a long time under training—partly of infantry of the line, partly of cavalry, and also of artillery, all of which latter belong to the Queen's service. There are about 1,000 artillery, consisting of six companies of foot, and two troops of horse artillery; there are three regiments of cavalry going, and the rest will be infantry of the line. We have, sent out what we think to be sufficient to meet the emergency, judging from the last communications we had from India, and the amount of force sent rather exceeds that which the Governor General in his last communication thought it was essential he should have. If, unfortunately, further accounts should necessitate our sending larger reinforcements, we shall then consider what steps we ought to take, and whether it may not be necessary to have recourse to Parliament for further powers.

LORD ADOLPHUS VANE-TEMPEST

said, the noble Lord had by no means answered the question—(Order).

MR. LINDSAY

said, hon. Members seemed to think that there was a dread of invasion, from France or elsewhere. But in case of invasion there would be no difficulty in equipping in a couple of months an enormous naval force from the mercantile marine. The real question, however, which the House had to consider, was, what was the best mode of sending our troops to India, He was one of those who were of opinion that troops could not be conveyed in screw line-of-battle ships, except at a far greater expense than in merchant vessels. A merchant in tendering for this service made allowance for the home freight which his ship would earn, but a man-of-war would get nothing of the kind. Another question was, as to the employment of steamers or sailing vessels. From inquiries which he had made, he found that in the month of January last, twenty-three sailing ships had arrived at Calcutta, after an average passage of 132½ days; in the same month two steamers had arrived whose passages averaged only ninety-four days, including ten days' stoppages at various ports, showing an advantage of thirty- eight days in favour of the steamers. But throwing aside stoppages, there would be a saving of forty-five days by sending troops to India in screw-steamers. This, he thought, was a matter of grave consideration at the present moment. The passage homewards from India showed nearly the same results, and the returns he had went to prove that in the passage out and home by screw-steamers there would be a saving of about one-third in point of time. The Government ought also to consider that the sailing ships now leaving this country would arrive in the Bay of Bengal in October, when the north-east monsoon was blowing, and would be detained for a considerable time.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

said, he was of opinion that, if the home squadron had been, as it ought to have been, maintained, the whole of the force mentioned by the noble Lord might have been, within a space of forty-eight hours after the receipt of the news from India, placed on board of the vessels composing it, and be now as far on the way out as the Cape of Good Hope. That was the course which he should have adopted, but as matters stood he considered it impossible to send the troops to India by line-of-battle ships, as they could not be fitted out in less than three-months from the day the order was given. Great difficulty too, would he found in raising men, and he therefore thought the Admiralty were right in going into the market to hire vessels. He did not care what the cost was, but he thought the Government ought to send out screw ships, and, in order to save their coals, they should take care to have them towed out to catch the trade winds; they would then be able to start with a full supply of coals, and make the voyage without putting in anywhere. With respect to the defences of the country he had always been of opinion, and he believed that the Government themselves were of the same opinion, if they would only speak out, that this country never ought to be left without a Channel squadron for an emergency. It was no use for the Government of England to rely upon sailing ships when other nations had steam, and, instead of paying off our steam vessels, he contended that we should have paid off our sailing vessels, and have maintained our screw ships. Our station blockships, as they were called, were not blockships in reality, but were only bad steamers, fitted out on an emergency, and had not sufficient power to enable them to keep off the coast in bad weather. Instead of such inefficient craft, we ought to have first-rate screw ships at every out-port, and as the coast-guard were now a well-organized corps, they would have been competent to man the ships, if the ships only had been ready for their reception, He trusted that the Government would recall from the outports those bad and useless vessels, and that they would substitute for them the best steamers at their disposal. It was well known that ships in commission with their full crews aboard did not wear out as fast as ships that were laid up in ordinary; nevertheless it had been the custom of this country to have the best ships laid up in ordinary, while the worst ships were in commission. In conclusion, he again pressed upon the Government the absolute necessity of embarking the troops for India in screw ships.

LORD CLAUD HAMILTON

said, that before agreeing to the reception of the Report, he wished to ask this plain and practical question—what was the advantage gained by this country by the expenditure of the money in the Persian war which they were now asked to sanction? £500,000 was not the whole vote which they would be called upon to provide—it was only an instalment of a larger sum which already amounted to £930,000; and, as it was one of the most important duties of the House of Commons to see that the public funds were not wasted, he could not conscientiously consent to this Vote until he had heard some explanation with respect to the value received from; the outlay. He was not going to discuss the policy of the Persian war; but he wished to know what was the difference between the terms agreed to at Paris, and those which were offered and were within our grasp at Constantinople. As far as he understood the papers which had been submitted, he gathered that the terms which we had accepted at Paris were not nearly so advantageous as those which had been offered at Constantinople. At Constantinople we demanded compensation for certain inhabitants at Herat, and we peremptorily demanded the dismissal of the Prime Minister. Both those points were conceded at Constantinople, but they were not insisted upon at Paris; while by the 12th article of the Paris treaty, England gave up a right which at Constantinople she was not asked to concede—the right of protectorate over certain per- sons in Persia. That being so, he asked how the House could be justified in sanctioning the expenditure of this £500,000. The only plea on which it could be justified was, that Ferukh Khan, the Persian ambassador at Constantinople, had not full powers. In the event of such a statement being put forward, however, he begged to remind the House that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, writing to the Earl of Clarendon on the 2nd of January, said that— Were his Excellency to accept the whole of our terms, he would engage that upon those being immediately complied with, no further demand should be made. Thus showing that, in the opinion of Lord Stratford, Ferukh Khan possessed full powers. Moreover, he, (Lord C. Hamilton) found that on three separate occasions Ferukh Khan himself stated that he was armed with full power. This was a commercial country, and he begged to repeat in plain terms the question which he had already asked—what had this country gained by the expenditure which Parliament was now called upon to sanction?

SIR CHARLES WOOD

said, he thought that it would be very inexpedient at the present moment to resucitate the past or anticipate any future debate upon the Persian war. However, the question which the noble Lord had asked would be easily answered. What we had gained by the war was the exaction of a promise from Persia that she would perform the solemn engagement which she had broken—not again to occupy Herat, an engagement the performance of which all persons who were acquainted with the interests of India considered to be indispensable for the safety of our empire in the East. Quitting that subject, then, and referring to the questions which had been raised with respect to the transport of the troops to India and the defences of the country, he must say that he adhered to the opinion which he had before expressed, that it was undesirable to employ Queen's ships in conveying troops, but that it was far better to engage transports for that purpose and employ Queen's ships in providing naval assistance in the war. The hon. and gallant Admiral and the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Lindsay) had adverted to the question of sending troops in sailing or steam ships, and it had been said that the average length of the voyage to India, as taken by sailing vessels was 132 days, and that screw ships took only ninety-seven. But the whole question was one of date. If the sailing vessel could avoid the monsoon, then, as he had stated so lately as Friday last, the average time taken in the passage to Calcutta by the fastest sailing ships, starting at this period of the year, was from ninety to 100 days. Now, he had a return of the times occupied by auxiliary crews in that passage. They were bound by contract to deliver the mails in Calcutta in seventy-four days; but the first performed it in 107 days; the second, the Tynemouth, in 121; the third, the Robert Lowe, in 100 days; and the fourth, in ninety days. He had stated the other night that some clipper ships had been taken up for the conveyance of troops, and the owners were willing to be bound to pay heavy penalties if they did not beat the screw ships starting at the same time. Therefore, the certain advantage of employing screw ships was not so great as had been represented. He must remind the House, too, of the exceeding difficulty of finding coal for so large a number of vessels. The Government had stores at the Cape, but they had been largely drawn on by the steam vessels proceeding to China. Large additional stores had been sent out; but, taking into consideration the two circumstances, that starting at this time sailing vessels were as quick as steam vessels, and that there was a possibility of the supply of coal falling short, he thought the East India Company had done well in determining in reference to expedition to send a portion of the troops in sailing vessels. With respect to the question of defence, it was quite true that he admitted the other night that there were not at present in commission sufficient line-of-battle ships fit to carry troops to India, but he was far from wishing to convey the impression that there were not sufficient in commission for the defence of the coast. He agreed with the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Lindsay) that it was not likely the people of this country would awaken some morning and find their country invaded, or a Russian or French fleet bearing down upon their shores. War did not break out in that way, for before any such step took place there would be diplomatic notes to be exchanged, friendly relations to be broken off, and the other formalities which civilized countries invariably observed on such occasions: and if the country was always to be prepared to meet the utmost amount of force that might be brought against it, where would be the possibility of attaining—what it was the aspiration of the country to accomplish—a peace establishment and peace estimates? It was perfectly impossible and absurd to suppose that in the midst of profound peace the country should be as ready to meet an attack as it would be in a time of war. In estimating the amount of preparation necessary to be made, common sense and the ordinary run of affairs must be taken into account. A man might be knocked down in the streets of London, but every person would not on that account walk the streets with a revolver in his pocket. They trusted, and with wisdom, to their experience, which taught them the improbability of such an occurrence. What were the circustances of the country at the present moment? It had lately emerged from a great continental war, and he had a suspicion that the great Powers were unwilling to involve themselves in war again. There was as little danger of war between this country and any, European Power as there had been at any time during the last forty years; yet the country was in a far better state of preparation than at any period during the last forty years. Though there were not sufficient ships in commission fit to carry troops to India, still there were a considerable number of the finest screw ships in a state of forwardness, with a view to being commissioned if needed; there were sailing ships in different ports, and there were, moreover, in commission, eight steam line-of-battle ships called block ships, which the country never had before. These last might not be fit to cruise in the Atlantic, although two of them had been across, but they had done good service in the Baltic, and were efficient and formidable vessels for home defence. The hon. and gallant Admiral said that vessels kept better in commission than in ordinary. That was an entire mistake. When he was Secretary to the Admiralty in 1836 it was thought necessary to increase the number of vessels in commission. There were then a number of vessels called "advanced ships," being vessels in some state of preparation, and on examination it was found that the tanks of the ships had gone to decay and that the rigging was rotten. The Government, then, instead of having to commence with empty vessels and getting for them whatever was necessary, had first of all to get the decayed things out and then to start de novo. Those ships were in some degree filled up, and decay was the consequence, for it was the free circulation of air that preserved the ships. Therefore, if the Government kept the ships in the way proposed by the hon. and gallant Admiral they would only be wasting away the ships, which would not be found in time of war so serviceable as they would under the system now pursued. Of course, if war threatened it would be the duty of the Government to bring the ships into a more forward state, and as a few weeks were sure to elapse between a quarrel and hostilities, there would be ample time to prepare them. With respect to men, let the number now maintained be compared with the number during any period of the last forty years. At one time in that period, when there was the greatest apprehension of interruption of peace, the number of seamen and marines voted was 43,000; the number this year voted was, together with the addition recently proposed, 50,000, being 7,000 more than were voted at a time when, for the last forty years, the apprehension of war was the greatest. Under these circumstances he thought neither the House nor the Government could be reproached with having neglected to provide ample means for the defence of the country. He had no doubt the House would authorize any expenditure which might be requisite in order to place the national defences in a state of efficiency, but he thought Her Majesty's Government would not be justified in calling upon the country to make sacrifices which were not absolutely necessary, inasmuch as such preparations had been already made as would be sufficient to meet any emergency. He had not yet adverted to the naval reserve which had been recently established—the coastguard and coast volunteers. The first of these forces had been organized by the present Government. The establishment of coast volunteers had been proposed by the right hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham), but during the war the suggestion had not been carried out. He (Sir C. Wood) was happy to say the enrolment of those forces had been successful beyond his warmest expectations. He had asked for 8,000 men for the coastguard, of whom 5,700 were seamen and 2,300 civilians, who would, he hoped, be gradually replaced by seamen. He found from a return he had received to-day that the whole 8,000 men had been raised with the exception of seven. He had asked the House to vote as many men as he thought he could obtain in the course of the year, but men had come in much more rapidly than had been expected, and three months after the Vote had been sanctioned there was only a deficiency of seven men out of 8,000. During the war, some 2,000 men, not in all cases the most efficient, had been draughted from the coastguard into the Baltic fleet, and they had formed a solid and steady nucleus for the crews of the different ships. At this moment, however, if it were necessary, he could put on board ship 5,000 picked seamen, many of them wearing medals, clasps, and the legion of honour, most of which distinctions had been gained during the late war. With regard to the Naval Coast Volunteers, it had not been found possible in several districts to call out that force; but up to this time more than 1,200 men had been called out and trained, and he was sure the House would be happy to hear that the greatest readiness had been evinced to enter that branch of the public service. They had in that force a body of men who would be prepared upon any emergency to defend the shores of this country. If the crews of the block ships were transferred to seagoing ships the coast volunteers would be available for manning the block ships, and he ventured to say that so far as coast defences were concerned the country had never at any former period been so well prepared as it was at present. He was glad the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bcntinck) had brought this subject under the notice of the House, and had afforded him (Sir C. Wood) the opportunity of making a statement which he thought could not fail to be satisfactory to the House and to the country. He hoped that when next year he proposed an addition to the number of the coastguard and of the coast volunteers he should receive the support of the House in strengthening a reserve force, which was as cheap and efficient as any to which they could have recourse.

ADMIRAL DUNCOMBE

observed that the statement of the right hon. Baronet was extremely satisfactory. He believed that the ships to be engaged in conveying troops to India would be taken up by the East India Company, and examined by Admiralty inspectors, and he wished to impress upon the Government the importance of employing none but first-class ships in this service. He had before him a list of the ships already taken up, and he found among them the Robert Lowe, of only 100- horse power, another ship of only 150-horse power, and sailing ships of 600 and 700 tons. It was only by embarking the troops; in efficient vessels that due regard to the, comfort and cleanliness of the men could, in any degree, be had.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

said the First Lord of the Admiralty had stated that sailing ships were best adapted for the conveyance of troops from England to Calcutta, but as three weeks must elapse before many of those ships could be despatched, it was scarcely likely they would arrive at Point de Galle before the north-east monsoon set in, and if they did not do so it would take them from a fortnight to three weeks to beat up to their destination, while by steamers the distance could be accomplished in a week or ten days. It was of the first importance that the strength and discipline of the troops should not be impaired when they arrived at their destination, and he thought on that ground the advantages of steam-vessels could not be overrated. Certainly sailing ships of 600 or 700 tons were not calculated for the conveyance of troops to India. He had made the voyage to India, and had been for three weeks in a dead calm on the equator; but a ship which could employ steam power for one hundred miles might get into a wind which would enable her to proceed rapidly on her voyage. The right hon. Baronet had stated that the voyage to India could be made by sailing ships in 101 days. The quickest passage he (Admiral Walcott) had heard of was made by the Medusa frigate, which took out a Governor General, and which made the passage out in eighty-four days, and the passage home in eighty-seven days; but that was an unparalleled circumstance. He agreed with the First Lord of the Admiralty, that it was not generally advisable to employ ships of war in the conveyance of troops, because he must say, without any imputation upon the soldiers, that it was almost impossible to maintain proper discipline in a crowded vessel. He did not wish to create any alarm, but it was necessary that they should not regard the existing crisis lightly, and if the troops were to be sent out in ships of the mercantile navy, he earnestly entreated the Government to take care that the ships were efficient and properly adapted for the conveyance of soldiers. The First Lord of the Admiralty had said that the ships would be engaged under contract to land the troops within a certain time. He hoped the right hon. Baronet would not excite a spirit of competition among the commanders of these vessels. In the day time all hands would be ready to shorten sail if a squall came on, but at night there would be few hands on deck, and the system of contract to which he had referred might induce the captains to incur risks which sound prudence would condemn, by carrying a heavy press of sail during the night. He thought, therefore, that such rivalry should not be excited, but that the commanders of these vessels should feel that full reliance was placed upon their ability, zeal, and promptitude for reaching their destinations at the earliest possible period consistent with due regard for the safety and the lives of those committed to their charge. He would have been much gratified if a number of our screw line-of-battle ships could have been employed in the conveyance of troops. They were ships of unrivalled strength and speed, and commanded by officers upon whom the fullest reliance could be placed. During the voyage of such ships at this period of the year from England to Calcutta there would scarcely be nine days during which the lower deck ports could not be open on each side, which would give a circulation of air of the greatest advantage to the health of the troops. This class of ships would also afford accommodation for one thousand men, or an entire regiment, and military officers justly attached great importance to the shipment of large numbers of troops in the same vessel, in consequence of the facilities afforded for the maintenance of discipline. The First Lord of the Admiralty said, however, that he had not screw ships sufficiently manned for the conveyance of troops. He (Admiral Walcot) held that the whole House, and not the Government alone, were responsible for the diminution of the income tax in such a manner as to render the reduction of our naval and military forces unavoidable. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) always contended for such reductions, but it was a penny wise and pound foolish system. That was proved in the case of the Crimean war, when enormous sums were expended in raising recruits and in obtaining stores and provisions. He thought that a great maritime country like this ought always to be prepared to maintain its naval superiority, and the expense of a few more thousand soldiers and sailors would be amply returned in case any emergency arose. He therefore submitted that, though he was no advocate for keeping up a large army or navy in time of peace, we ought at all times to be prepared for every emergency. Each of those line-of-battle ships could carry one thousand men. The First Lord of the Admiralty had stated he had not men at his disposal to man them all; but the right hon. Baronet might remove all the seamen from the block ships, and put on board of them the volunteers of whom he had spoken. With five thousand men those line-of-battle ships could he readily brought into commission, and if steam-ships could not be provided in time to take the troops in question to India, he thought it would be imperative on the part of the Government at once to have recourse to the screw ships.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he had heard it stated, with considerable surprise, that the average passage to India with steam-ships was beyond one hundred days. As he knew something of the subject, having been sixteen years in the Company's service, and having made eight voyages to India, and China, he was able to state that only on one occasion were they one hundred days at sea. That was in a sailing vessel. [Sir C. Wood: Hear, hear!] Some years ago, also, he had occasion to investigate the logs of a considerable number of ships, for the purpose of assisting a friend of his who was interested in the result, and he found that, on an average of one hundred voyages, with ships fitted with small auxiliary steamengines, the calm weather in which it would be necessary to get up steam was about twelve days. He considered our system of transports was entirely wrong. In the first place, he thought that iron transports were entirely a mistake. It was perfectly impossible that they could touch ground in the Indian Seas, where coral reefs abounded, without sustaining such damage as to risk the loss of a whole regiment at once. Moreover, they were very hot, and rolled very heavily. These were faults and defects which it was difficult to remedy. The Transit, of which they had heard so much, he believed was originally an efficient vessel; but with her large heavy forecastle and square quarters it was utterly impossible that she could be otherwise than unsuitable for carrying troops. He was able to bear out, from his own experience, what had fallen from the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Walcott) as to the condition of the men on landing in India. It was requisite that they should be allowed during the voyage as much exercise as could be had on board ship, such as dancing and other games, in order that they might be able to land in a condition to enable them to carry their knapsacks for the first five miles. We had the most perfect means of remedying the existing state of things. There was a class of ships in the navy which went by the name of "The Forty Thieves," and which would make the fincst transports in the world. They had two tiers of ports, and with engines which would enable them to make over fourteen days of calm weather, they would perform the whole passage in from seventy to eighty days. He would put it to the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in sending out these troops to India, it would not be desirable to tow nil the ships round Cape Finisterre, which would have the effect of materially accelerating their speed. If twelve or fifteen line-of-battle ships were fitted up with auxiliary screw engines, and were manned with 250 able seamen each, and with officers accustomed to the passage, a great result would be achieved, because the House must hold in view that they must be in a condition to send troops to India in larger numbers and more continuously than they had ever done before. He had always observed that the system of taking up ships for the transport of troops was a commercial error, for it raised the price of freights, kept our own ships out of commission, and prevented us having a large additional reserve of able seamen who would be able to man them. If the House would give him 250 men for each of those line-of-battle ships he had referred to, he would undertake to navigate any one of them with the greatest possible case.

GENERAL PEEL

said, he wished briefly to impress upon the noble Lord at the head of the Government the urgent necessity there was for making arrangements for the systematic relief of the large number of troops that would henceforward be permanently employed in India.

MR. G. DUNDAS

said, he thought the character of these auxiliary screw ships was hardly understood, for they were, to all intents and purposes, sailing vessels of a very high class. A vessel of that description, under sail alone, had frequently gone fourteen miles an hour, while she had the additional advantage of small engines, and consumed a very limited quantity of coals—just sufficient to carry her into the trade winds, and from thence her passage to India was short and easy. Just before he rose he had a return put into his hand of the number of vessels which had sailed from London to Calcutta between the 1st of July, 1856, and January, 1857, from which it appeared that ninety-eight sailing ships had performed the voyage during that period, the average passage of each being 130 days, and that seven auxiliary screw steamers had performed it on an average of ninety-three days, showing a difference in favour of the latter of thirty-seven days. The hon. Baronet (Sir J. Elphinstone) said he disapproved of iron ships, but the ships to which he (Mr. Dundas) alluded were altogether of iron. It was curious to contrast the passages made by Her Majesty's steamers to the Cape of Good Hope with those of the auxiliary screws. The Hermes made the passage in fifty-four days. The Vulcan made the passage out in seventy-two days, and home in sixty-four days. The auxiliary screws, to which the First Lord of the Admiralty had referred, made the passage in thirty-eight days. It was a marked difference, and confirmed the statements which had been made of the advantage of employing auxiliary screw in preference to sailing ships.

First Resolution, with regard to the Persian war, agreed to.