THIRD READING.

HC Deb 20 August 1857 vol 147 cc1898-933

Order for Third Reading read.

COLONEL NORTH

said, he wished to put a question to Her Majesty's Government with reference to the regiments of militia about to be embodied. It was of very great importance to the officers that they should know what regiments were to be selected, in order that they might not be absent from the country in the event of their own regiments being called out. He wished also to inquire what rule was to be followed in this matter, and whether those regiments which had volunteered for service abroad in the late war would have the priority in being embodied at this moment? Those regiments who had had the advantage of doing garrison duty, especially in the Colonies, and of being brigaded for a year and a-half or two years with the line, would necessarily be much more efficient than the others; independent of this consideration, the officers of those regiments had been put to serious expense in fitting themselves for that service, and it was certainly understood that when they returned to this country their regiments would enjoy the benefit of being retained in an embodied state some months after the rest of the militia had been disembodied. Notwithstanding this expectation, however, they had been disembodied just in the same manner as the regiments which had never quitted England. Another point on which he desired information was as to the new Order issued to the militia in regard to recruiting. By that order the adjutants were enabled to recruit for the line within a circle of twelve miles from their headquarters, and the warrant stated, that the recruiting officers would receive no remuneration beyond the sum of 5s. for "bringing money;" and it was also stated in the circular that they would be liable to the same contingencies as the recruiting officers of the line, viz., in case of the recruits not being passed after inspection they would be subject to the expense of enlisting them. It appeared that the surgeons of the militia regiments were to be the surgeons who would pass the recruits; and the Government were entitled to thanks for the concession they had made in this respect. During the late war, it was intimated to the surgeons, both of the militia and the line, that they ought not to be as strict in their examination of recruits as they were in time of peace; but as those officers were to be made responsible for the cost, should the recruits be rejected, they ought to have definite instructions as to whether the ordeal preliminary to the passing of the men should or should not be a stringent one. He had again to express his hope that during the recess Her Majesty's Government would take into consideration the claims of a body of officers to whose case he had recently called their attention. He referred to the lieutenant colonels of the army on whom the warrant of October, 1854, had had a retrospective operation. To show the working of this principle he would instance the case of a colonel who entered the army in 1807, became lieutenant colonel after he had been forty-nine years in the service, was employed in the Peninsula, and was never absent during the campaigns of 1810, 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814. The officer in question was Lieutenant Colonel Alves, now Major General Alves, on the retired list, who was passed over by fifty-three juniors, owing to the retrospective action of the warrant of 6th October, 1854. He entered the army, November 5, 1807; was promoted to be colonel on the 9th of November, 1856; and on the 5th of December, 1856, took the retired full pay, with step of rank. His services were: general actions.—Busaco, Fuentes D'Onor, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, Salamanca, Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, Toulouse. Actions: Retreat to and occupation of Lines of Torres Vedras, Pombal, Redinha, Foz d'Arouce, Guarda, Sabugal, El Bodon, Aldea de Ponte, Capture of Madrid and Retiro, Affairs on retreat from Madrid to Portugal, Passage of the Ebro, Blockade of Pampeluna, Vic Bigorre, and Tarbes. Yet, by the warrant of October, 1854, this distinguished soldier, who had retired when he became a full colonel, was passed over by no fewer than fifty-three other officers, many of whom had joined the army long after the close of the French war. There remained on the same list a great number of other officers who had gained their promotion for distinguished gallantry. Before this warrant came into play nobody could pass over the head of a lieutenant colonel but a Queen's aide-de-camp; and, relying on this rule, many officers had gone upon half-pay. He had brought this subject under the notice of the House in the month of June, when he obtained an assurance that it would receive the attention of the Noble Lord at the head of the War Department. Since then, however, he regretted to say that as many as twenty-five men had been promoted over the head of the senior colonel on this list. No greater pay was given to a colonel than to a lieutenant colonel; and a brevet might easily have been issued by which these officers would have been spared the mortification of seeing young men, who were subalterns when they themselves were lieutenant colonels, preferred over them, merely because they had been in command of regiments for two years and nine months. He therefore trusted that the noble Lord at the head of the Government, who, he was sure, was always disposed to reward the services of the officers of the army in a fitting manner, would take steps in the course of the ensuing recess to remedy so grievous a hardship.

SIR FREDERICK SMITH

said, he begged to tender his Congratulations to the noble Lord at the head of the Government on the introduction of the present measure. No sounder arrangement could be made than to embody a portion of the militia. He believed that the recruiting of the regular army would, at the same time, be carried on with great success. During the late war 40,000 men were enlisted in the regiments of the line, and we then had as many as 800 different recruiting detachments. When the mutiny broke out in India we had only twenty-six such detachments, but since that time the number had been rapidly increased, and now amounted to between 300 and 400. Within the last fortnight we had obtained upwards of 1,000 recruits, although the circumstances were unfavourable for procuring them. When the harvest was completed, we should no doubt get a great many more, under the auspices of that distinguished officer, Colonel Kelly, who presided over our recruiting operations. The Government had despatched to India an augmentation of troops of the line, and also of cavalry. They were likewise, for the first time,—it being an exception to the ordinary rule, indeed, he believed, the first time in the history of the country,—sending out a force of the Royal Artillery. He did not find, however, that any officers or men of the Engineer corps were being despatched to that country, and consequently he must venture to remind the Government of the need there was of Engineers at such a moment as the present in India. There were 3,000 Sappers and Miners attached to our army, and he was quite certain 1,000 might be spared for India. He might be told that the East India Company had a sufficient number of Engineers in India, but he believed that that was not the fact. He had reason to know that there was a great demand for Engineers in India. Of course, if Delhi had fallen, and he hoped it had, there would not be so great a necessity for their services; but every military man, and no man better than the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, knew that there were but four ways by which Delhi could be reduced, first by a capitulation, which was highly improbable, and which would be very impolitic for us to accept, be the terms what they might; next, by investing it, and reducing the mutineers by famine, which would be a long operation, and one that would not keep up the prestige of the British Army in India; thirdly, by the assault of a breach, and fourthly by escalade. The last-named plan, that of escalade, would not be very easy for us to accomplish, owing to the present position of our army in India. It would seem, then, that the most advisable means of reducing Delhi was that of making a breach, with a view to its capture. Of course it was very well known that the whole of the native Sappers and Miners belonging to the East India Company's service in the Bengal army had deserted with the rest of the rebels, and were now in Delhi. Every military man knew that the sorties at Delhi had been conducted with considerable skill. One of our flanks had been attacked, and another flank turned, and if that flank had not been composed of British soldiers the men belonging to it would have been doubled up and utterly destroyed. He should not be at all surprised if the engineering skill of the mutineers now within the walls of Delhi, made it another Saragossa. General Barnard had not, so far as he knew, a single soldier who was able to do the work of a sapper and miner. He trusted that as soon as Delhi was taken, it would be razed to the ground, and for this purpose also engineers would be necessary. For all these reasons he hoped that Her Majesty's Government would send out a large body of men thoroughly qualified to do this sort of work. Perhaps he might be told that a European sapper could not work in the hot climate of India; but he did not believe anything of the kind. If we sent out European gunners to work in the field surely our sappers could perform the less severe work of carrying on sapping and mining operations at night. The work of the miner was invariably done under cover. Moreover, he had been assured on the high authority of a gentleman who had charge of the railway works in India, that the whole of the Indian railways could be constructed entirely by European labour. He therefore begged most respectfully to suggest to Her Majesty's Government the great desirableness of sending out to India a portion of our Sappers and Miners, who, he was satisfied, would well discharge their duty.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he fully concurred in the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman as to the sending nut of Sappers and Miners to India, for it was quite clear that there were no longer any sappers at the disposal of the Indian Government. Even if Delhi were taken before the Sappers and Miners arrived there, he was prepared to contend that a regular system of fortified posts ought to be established throughout the country, and surely, if that were so, it was desirable hat engineer officers, and a body of skilled artificers should assist in these operations; while as we had at present a body of 3,000 sappers and Miners in a state of comparative idleness at home, it was obviously desirable that a portion of them should be thus employed. Europeans might not be able to work so continuously in India as the Natives of that country, but their work, he was sure, would be more solid and finished than that done by the Natives. They were now on the subject of the militia, which was intimately connected with the whole of the Indian question, because the militia was to be embodied for the very purpose of meeting the state of things which the mutiny in India had occasioned. He was very much astonished to find that the noble Lord at the Head of the War Department had stated that the number of militiamen proposed to be called out for the present was only 10,000. That number appeared to him to be totally and absurdly inadequate. He recollected that complaints were made by naval officers almost on the eve of the declaration of war against Russia of the insufficient number of sailors in the Royal Navy, but not a sailor was added to it, and the Government attempted to justify their supineness by giving this very wise reason—that the increase of our navy at that time might create irritation and thus affect the negotiations then being carried on with the Emperor of Russia. He really thought that the addition of merely 2,000 men to our navy was not much wiser conduct than that of the Government immediately previous to the war with Russia. He begged also to suggest to the Government that there was a great want of small steamers to carry on our river operations against the mutineers in India. We had several such vessels, if not rotting, at least lying idle, which might be turned to excellent account if they were sent to take part in the operations in India. By their means our men could penetrate far into the interior of India, and a moral as well as a physical effect would thereby be produced upon the people of India. There were already a few there, and as an instance of what they might effect he would draw attention to the fact of a small steamer with one heavy gun and 100 picked men, armed with rifles, having been recently despatched from Allahabad to Cawnpore, and that it was hoped that by this means the garrison of the latter place might be relieved. It had been most sensibly suggested in some of the public journals that, with a view to the protection of Calcutta, as well as to cause a strong moral effect on the native population of India, there should be a display in those waters of our maritime power. He had also heard naval and military officers at Portsmouth remarking on the circumstance that when transport vessels of 500 tons burthen were being employed to take out 120 or 140 men to India, observe how much better it would be if our great screw steamers of war were employed for the purpose; moreover, that these vessels might be stationed at Calcutta and Bombay with great advantage; but he did not believe that any of that class of vessels which were lying (if not rotting) quite idle, had been put into commission. The sort of prejudice which existed in our navy against carrying troops in Queen's ships had been made to give way in bringing back our troops from the Crimea, and he hoped that example would be followed on the present occasion. The French did not allow any such prejudice to interfere with their ships of war carrying troops, and though it was possible that the discipline of the ships might be in some little degree affected, yet that would be more than compensated by the advantage to the public service which must result from this measure. The French forces could not have got to the Crimea unless they had been conveyed in their ships of war. We, however, were guided in this matter by old absurd professional notions, and were thus comparatively deprived of the use of our ships of war. Lord Raglan could have had a much larger force at his command, and available in landing in the Crimea, if ships of war had been employed, as they ought to have been, in assisting to convey our troops. He hoped, therefore, the Government would take into consideration the advantage of employing our large and powerful war steamers in the conveyance of troops. Every exertion ought to be made on this occasion. The conflicts which have taken place before Delhi and in other places were, he found, of a vigorously contested description, and the heroic valour displayed by our soldiers of every class in the face of vastly superior numbers was most gratifying. On this point he would remind the noble Lord that a year or two ago Her Majesty determined to grant what was styled the Victoria Cross for acts of special valour. In future that reward was to be given on the field by the General commanding, and this was a most desirable mode of distribution. He would therefore recommend it to the consideration of the noble Lord that authority be given to confer freely, though discriminately, this Victoria Cross, for the most conspicuous of the gallant acts lately recorded. He thought also that on such an emergency as this the Government should consider the propriety of removing the ground of complaint which was made more than once by the Duke of Wellington in his despatches—namely, that he had not the power of giving the smallest promotion. It would be well to give the Commander in Chief in India the power not only to fill up vacancies, but to grant promotion, subject, of course, to the confirmation of the Sovereign and the Government. He saw by the public journals that the force in the Persian Gulf had been ordered back to India. The statement was, he hoped, correct. General Jacob, who was in command of that force, was a man of great experience, of great scientific attainments, and of undoubted ability; and no man in the Indian army stood higher in the service. Independently, therefore, of the great advantage which would be gained from his presence in Scinde, where he was so well known, or that his services elsewhere might be made available in some high command. The mention of this officer's name likewise reminded him of the statement that these mutinies had taken the Indian Government by surprise. There must, however, have been some extraordinary inattention in high quarters to passing events on this point, for the whole state of things had been laid bare seven years ago in a pamphlet of a very striking character published by General Jacob. The statements also made by Sir Charles Napier and other officers on the same subject, ought surely to have induced the Government to take preparations to avert the dangers pointed out. Upon the question of caste, which had so much to do in this matter, he saw it reported in the newspapers that the Commander of the Forces in Bombay had lately issued an order of a character quite new in that Presidency—namely, that recruits only of high caste should in future be raised for the Bombay army. He spoke somewhat vaguely on the subject, but he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) could state that this was not the case, or otherwise it would afford a strong proof to his mind of the unfitness of the officer he alluded to for the high command held by him. Nothing could be more obvious than the inconsistency and the imprudence of attempting to engraft upon the Bombay army that preference of high caste which had led apparently to such fatal results in the army of Bengal. On another point connected with India he must express his satisfaction with the statement of the noble Lord the other evening, that the Government intended to give pecuniary aid for the establishment of the telegraph between Suez and Aden. It was true that this would only apply to some thirteen hundred miles of the route to India, but no doubt it would greatly facilitate and accelerate the communication, and he earnestly trusted, therefore, the Government would see that the undertaking was carried out with despatch. With regard to what had been said on a former occasion as to the conveyance of troops through Egypt, he confessed that the statement of the noble Lord respecting the difficulties by no means convinced him of the impracticability of adopting this route. In his opinion, a portion of the troops might with great advantage have been sent through Egypt, and as the necessity for reinforcements would undoubtedly continue he hoped the Government would reconsider this subject. Other points connected with the state of affairs in India had been touched in the discussions which had taken place, but to these he would not refer. He had neither the ability nor the disposition to enter into the question of policy raised the other evening by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli); but there were one or two matters relating to Indian policy which it would be well not to lose sight of. It appeared that some of the Native Princes, even among those residing close upon the scene of conflict, had remained perfectly loyal in the midst of the disturbances which had taken place. Among them were Holkar, Scindiah, the Rajahs of Gwalior and Pataalla, and others; and he thought it would be politic, without waiting for ulterior events, that those Princes were informed that their loyal co-operation would hereafter be appreciated by extension of territory or in some other way. At all events, some declaration of the intention of the Government to evince their satisfaction at and their gratitude for the course pursued by these Princes ought not to be delayed, because it was of the utmost importance to us that they should remain steady to our alliance. Then, again, he ventured to think the Government ought to make arrangements to finish this matter, certainly if possible within the first campaign. By next November our troops should be sufficiently numerous to march with triumph through every part of the disturbed districts. As to the reinforcements he hoped these would not be despatched by driblets, but that every exertion would be made, without reference to money, to place the largest possible amount of naval and military force at the disposal of the Indian Government. He had expressed his satisfaction the other day that a large reinforcement of artillery—consisting, he believed, of seventeen troops—was to be sent out. It appeared, however, that those troops were weak in number, and were only to muster 134 gunners each. Now, the strength of the troops of artillery in the Crimea was eventually 204 men. In the present case no margin was left for losses by sickness or other causes, and he should not be surprised if it were shortly found necessary to form two of these troops into one. It was most essential for the Government to bear in mind that from various causes heavy losses must be looked for in the force despatched to India, and adequate provision must be made to supply these losses.

SIR WILLIAM WILLIAMS

said, that he also quite concurred in the remarks made by the hon. and gallant Member for Chatham (Sir If. Smith) upon the necessity of sending out Sappers and Miners to India. When they remembered the number of strong places which were now in the hands of the rebels, hon. Gentlemen might well imagine the efforts which must be made before they could be dislodged by troops of this description. In his opinion, it would, be necessary to send out at least 1,000 of this admirable corps, with a proper proportion of officers, as soon as possible. He concurred also in the remarks of the hon. and gallant General (Sir De Lacy Evans) as to the strength of the troops of horse artillery and companies of foot artillery which were to be despatched. Those troops were about to embark for a country the climate of which, in some districts, was of a most deadly character, and therefore, not only ought they to leave England in as efficient a state as possible, but every calculation should be made for the casualties which might be anticipated in their ranks. He did not concur in the hope expressed by the gallant General (Sir F. Smith), that if Delhi were taken, not one stone should be left upon another. It contained arsenals and works which had been prepared with great care and at great expense; it contained, also, a large amount of stores and ammunition; and a more serious mistake had not been made, of late years, than leaving such a place, full of such matériel, in the charge of Native troops. Instead of Delhi being destroyed, and not one stone being left upon another, he hoped that it might be preserved with very great care, and that if, with the blessing of God, we once got possession of it again, we should never allow an enemy to be seen within its walls. He agreed in all that had been said with respect to the want of fortified places in India. He had been in all the Presidencies of that country, and he had seen, so to speak, the nakedness of the land—station after station without a single stronghold. The consequence was, that when we were attacked, all went over like a pack of cards. He hoped that Parliament would turn their attention to this subject, and that we should never again permit so great a calamity—he might say disgrace—to fall upon the nation. He was perfectly sure that Her Majesty's Government would never, at the commencement of this Session, have reduced so many of the regular troops of Great Britain had it not been for the pressure from without. He was satisfied, therefore, that it was not their fault. He remembered how the noble Lord the Member for London, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, vied with each other—bade as it were against each other—with regard to those reductions; and he was persuaded that, had the Government attempted at that time to retain those troops, they would have been defeated. Let them hope that what had taken place would be a warning to them ["Hear, hear!" from the Opposition]; and he trusted that hon. Gentleman opposite who said "Hear, hear!" would assist them not only with their cheers, but with their votes, when these matters came under consideration in future. [An hon. MEMBER on the Opposition side: We have never done otherwise.] With regard to the Sappers and Miners going to India, he remembered that, when Aldershot was being discussed in that House, he stated that he was in favour of Aldershot on condition that the troops of the line should be instructed in a certain amount of sapping and mining, in making gabions, and in other things that might be useful when they went to India. He only hoped that they had been so instructed, and that the authorities at Aldershot had taken those steps. If they had not, they might probably hear opinions expressed, when they came to discuss these subjects next Sessions which would not be agreeable.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

said, he was satisfied that whatever exertions Her Majesty's Government might think fit to make to meet the present crisis in India, to render our troops victorious, and to restore that government and dominion which we had so long enjoyed there, would meet with the cordial co-operation of the House and of the country. He could not entirely concur with his gallant Friend who had last spoken in saying that the Government were not to blame for cutting down our establishments, because he did not believe that they would listen to representations made on either side of the House unless they conceived that those representations were founded on justice and truth, and he contended that it was upon their responsibility and that of no one else that the reductions had taken place. He thought, however, that they should now inquire, not so much who was to blame for the frightful calamity that had taken place, as what measures could be adopted to remedy the present state of things and as soon as possible to give protection to our countrymen in India. He desired to see for example, not only large steamers employed upon the large rivers, but small steamers sent up all the small rivers where our stations mostly were established. Such steamers going up, well armed and well manned, would afford the greatest possible protection to those stations. He knew well the frightful calamities to which our countrymen were exposed, and he trusted, therefore, that there would be nothing like vacillation or want of strength, determination, or vigour exhibited on the part of the Government at home, or of the authorities in India. He was quite sure that when the tale of this Indian warfare should be told, we should find that there had been performed acts of heroic valour and wonderful fortitude on the part of both soldiers and civilians which would fill us with admiration and with national pride. In conclusion, he trusted that the gallant army which was about to proceed to India would be provided with adequate medical assistance and with every comfort and necessary that could be required, and that they would hear no more of such complaints as had been made on former occasions.

SIR JOHN RAMSDEN

said, that in reply to the question of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, (Sir De Lacy Evans) he begged to state that the Government only intended to call out 10,000 militia at present. The principle upon which they were acting was this; that the number of militia embodied should bear a proportion to the number of troops sent out to India. Now, according to the number already sent out, the Government thought that 10,000 of the militia would be sufficient to do the garrison duty of the troops that were gone. If it be found afterwards necessary to despatch a larger number of troops to India, then it would be also necessary to draw more largely on the services of the militia. As to the question put to him by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) in respect to the instructions given to the surgeons of the militia, in order to direct them in the recruiting service, he had not received any information as to the instructions ordinarily issued being insufficient; but if any of those gentlemen considered that those instructions were not sufficiently precise, on application at the War Office they would receive every information they required. In respect to the other question of the hon. and gallant Member—namely, what regiments it was intended to embody—he could not now give any answer to that inquiry. The Government were fully aware that it was inconvenient to the militia officers to be kept in doubt. He could only say that, as soon as the public interests would permit it to be done, the earliest information on the subject would be given. As to the principle which would guide the Government in calling out the regiments that were to be embodied, the first point for consideration was, which regiment was able to perform the most efficient service when called out. The Government in these respects would be regulated by the reports they received as to which regiments were in the most efficient condition for the discharge of the duties that would be required of them.

COLONEL NORTH,

in explanation, said, he was not aware of any complaints having been made of the insufficiency of those instructions issued to the militia surgeons. He, however, thought that the surgeons should have more precise information than what had been given them at the close of the last war, as to what sort of men they should enlist, because the onus of responsibility rested on the adjutant as to the kind of men that were enlisted.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

said, he was of opinion that instructions should be immediately sent out to Admiral Seymour to despatch all the small steamers and gunboats which he had at Hong-kong to India. They would be of immense use in India, while, as to the Chinese, we could take them in hand at any time, and thrash them at our leisure. He was perfectly satisfied that we might remove a large portion of our force in China. He would take this opportunity of expressing the high opinion which he entertained of the gallantry and judgment which had been exhibited by Admiral Seymour and by the officers, both of the navy and marines, under his command, who had been engaged in the operations in the Chinese waters.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for War has explained generally the points of detail which have been referred to in the course of this debate. I can only repeat what he has said, that in fixing the number of the militia, which we in the first instance think it expedient to embody, we by no means bind ourselves not to call out more if circumstances should render it expedient to do so. However, recruiting has gone on with great success in spite of the harvest, and we entertain no doubt that when the operations incident to this period of the year are completed, the number enrolled will very rapidly increase, and we shall within a very limited period be able to place in the ranks a number of men equal to that which has been sent to India. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) repeated to-night a very natural suggestion which was made on a previous evening, that these troops should be sent to India in screw line-of-battle ships, which could easily be adapted to that purpose, which could be navigated by a small crew, and would carry a large number of men with convenience and despatch. In the first instance such an arrangement may appear to be very advantageous, but I would request the Mouse to bear in mind those other considerations in regard to the amount of our military force at home which have been very forcibly dwelt upon. We were reminded that we had been compelled to despatch to distant stations a large portion of the military force for which we asked, and which Parliament granted, for the general purposes of the country in time of peace, and it was said, "By so doing you have greatly weakened your defensive means at home, and foreign countries may take advantage of your apparent weakness, and either hold language which you ought not to bear or do things to which yon ought not to submit." The answer which I gave to that was, that the people of this country would not endure conduct of that sort, and that if an emergency should require it men would be raised rapidly and upon the sudden. That very consideration, however, shows how inexpedient it would be to send to the other end of the world the greater portion of our naval force, because, although these steam line-of-battle ships are, it is true, lying in ordinary and of no immediate use, yet if any of these events should occur we should want suddenly to put to sea a large fleet, and how could we do that if the line-of-battle ships which we should require were doing duty as transports in the Indian Seas? Therefore I think that prudence shows that the despatch of these ships to the East would have been a very inexpedient course,—in fact, it would have been falling into the error which the great orator of Greece imputed to the Persians. He said,— When you strike a blow at one part of them they put their hand to that part and leave exposed every other, which may be struck in turn. Do not, you Athenians, follow so unwise and foolish an example. I think that we should have fallen into an error of the same kind if we had sent to India the fleet which circumstances occurring in Europe might, at short notice, render necessary for our defence at home. The suggestion of the hon. and gallant Officer as to the sending of troops across Egypt is well worthy of consideration. On a previous occasion I stated the objections to such a proceeding. These objections it may be possible to overcome, especially if you can make arrangements beforehand. If a small force were required speedily at a particular station arrangements might be made for sending it across from Alexandria to Suez. With regard to the general question, I think that the House ought to take a larger view than hon. Members have generally been disposed to adopt. We have been reproached for precipitately reducing our army and navy upon the return of peace. Some have said that in doing so we yielded to pressure from particular Members of this House, while others have attributed it to a want of foresight on our part. The course which we have adopted is really the only one which any Government acting under a representative system, such as ours, will ever be able to pursue. Different forms of Government have their different advantages and disadvantages according to the particular circumstances of the times. Undoubtedly a despotic Government is the best for providing in time of peace the means and preparations for war, because such a Government, being subject to no control but its own will, and possessing the foresight which you must assume all governors of countries to have, keep up in time of peace a larger force than is actually required for defence, and when war unfortunately occurs it is at once ready to meet the pressure which is thereby occasioned. On the other hand, when war docs break out, then comes the advantage of representative institutions, because then it is that the whole nation rallying round the Government gives to it a support and a force which no despotic Government can by any means or by any possibility possess. In time of peace, however, a representative Government is comparatively weak. It is not that if we were to press this House we might not persuade it to vote men in Committee of Supply. We might induce it to give us a larger peace establishment both of army and navy, but your Votes of Supply are of no use whatever unless they are accompanied by Votes in Ways and Means. That is the limit of your peace establishment. What happens when peace arrives? What took place last year? During the war the country was ready to submit to any reasonable and necessary sacrifice to carry it to a successful issue. It bore great burdens and would have endured greater still if it had been satisfied that they were necessary for the vindication of the national honour and the assertion of national interests. Nations, however, have no foresight, or, at least, very little. Individuals may have, but multitudes have none. The consequence was that the moment peace was made everybody, from one end of the country to the other, cried out for the remission of the war income tax. That was a cry which this House was neither disposed nor able to resist; the consequence was that the Government found it absolutely necessary to bow to the national will, and the war income tax was given up. That reduced our income, and we were necessarily compelled to proportion our peace establishment to the income which Parliament, as the organ of the country, chose to give us. That was the real reason of the reduction of our military and naval establishments to an amount lower than would have been expedient at the present moment. Still, with all the inconveniences which these changes of opinion and of system may produce, there are inherent in a representative assembly so many advantages that these should be regarded only as defects which the country must at all times be ready to repair by prompt and speedy measures; and I am quite sure that those exertions will never be wanting when the occasion may require them. The present emergency, however, is not one of so much difficulty as was presented at the breaking out of the Russian war, because when that war began all the addition to our military was to be made at the expense of the country. The expense of any additions made now falls, not upon the revenues of the empire, but upon those of the East India Company. Therefore, no additional expenditure is required on the part of the nation, and all that we have to do is, as troops are from time to time withdrawn for action abroad, to keep up our establishments at the numbers voted by the Committee of Supply. That I think we shall be able to do; but this House has already unanimously voted an Address to the Crown assuring Her Majesty that nothing shall be wanting on our part to enable her to carry on operations in India with vigour and success; and if between this and the period at which Parliament usually meets it should be necessary to ask for further assistance, I am quite sure that no Members of this House would grudge the attendance which might be necessary to afford that assistance to the Government. My hon. and gallant Friend thinks that a large naval force ought to be sent to India, as a flotilla, which should operate in the rivers. The House must, however, recollect what I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend from his experience knows very well, that the Indus and the Ganges, although they figure very well upon a map, and are really very large streams, are not generally of such a depth as to be navigable by ships which we could send from home. Their navigation is impeded by sandbanks, shoals, rocks, and shallows, and any ships which we could send from this country would be perfectly useless except just at their mouths. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has sent, or is sending out, a flotilla from England to act, as far as it is possible for sea-going ships to do, but it must be remembered that the East India Company have a navy of their own. All their ships were employed in the Persian expedition, but the greater portion of them must by this time have returned to India, and therefore their crews can be placed in their shallow boats or rafts, which alone are useful for the navigation of the rivers of India, and by which any operations in those rivers can best be performed. With respect to Persia, the engagements embodied in the recent treaty have not yet been fulfilled. Herat has not yet been evacuated. On the contrary, there are reports which affirm that additional troops have been sent by Persia to Herat. That has been denied by the Persian Ambassador at Paris; but still the whole of the engagements of the treaty have not been carried into effect; great doubts are entertained as to the good faith of the Persian Government; and therefore, until the stipulations of the treaty have been complied with, it is perfectly clear that the British force cannot and will not be withdrawn. That force is under the command of General Jacob, a most distinguished general officer, and until that force has been withdrawn it will be necessary to have there an officer of the great military skill and experience which General Jacob possesses. Well, then, I say we are thankful for the suggestions which have been made this evening, coming as they do from persons who are so well competent to make them; and I can assure those who have offered them and the House that they shall receive every attention from Her Majesty's Government, who will take advantage of such of those suggestions as they think likely to conduce to the efficiency of the public service. But I entreat the House to believe that the attentions of Her Majesty's Government shall be most carefully and anxiously directed day by day to these sad events. We feel not only how afflicting are the details which reach us from time to time, but also the vast importance of the conflict now going on. We have no doubt, however, of our ultimate success. We are confident that the strength and power of this country will be put forth to suppress this insurrection, let the causes of it be what they may, whether they be religious or political, or from whatever quarter or source they may have sprung. I shall not enter into those causes now; but I can assure the House that we feel the full importance of maintaining the Indian empire of this country, that no exertions towards that end shall be wanting on our part, and I have the most perfect confidence that those exertions will be attended with complete success.

MR. DISRAELI

was understood to say: I am not at all disposed to find fault with the Government for embodying the militia. I only wish they had done so on a larger scale and to a greater extent. I only wish our home defences were at this moment not inferior to what they were during the late war, for we had then three great sources of home defence—our Artillery, our Marines, and our Channel fleet. But now our Artillery has gone to India, our Marines are in China, and our Channel fleet does not exist. With respect to the transmission of troops by ships of war of the highest class, according to the reports we have, there are ships of that character quite sufficient to secure an efficient defence of our own country, and yet to act in the manner which the gallant General suggested. Nor do I see why, because some of the ships might be occupied in the manner so suggested, we should not at the same time have the great advantage of a Channel fleet. I think everybody must admit that, in an emergency of this kind, after all we have heard during the last few years of the application of science to the purposes of war, after all we have heard of screw-propellers and overland routes to India, it is extremely mortifying to find that we cannot have recourse to any of those new sources of strength; but are driven to take advantage of the same means of conveyance which those who preceded us were compelled to employ. I think that is very much to be regretted; and, although we may not, be able to send 30,000 or 40,000 men over-land, yet there can be no doubt that 5,000 men, if they had been sent through Egypt, would have been a most valuable addition to the force which we have in India, and arriving there very shortly after the troops we had sent to China, there would have been a force of 10,000 men, which might have had a very considerable effect on the fortunes of the war. I am very glad to hear that this militia force is to supply the place of our regular garrisons. I think it is much to be regretted that it has been too prevalent of late to look upon the militia merely as a means of recruiting the line. The highest function of the militia, that they are the constitutional defenders of our country, ought never to be lost sight of. During the late war, it was to be regretted that at no time was there a militia regiment that was not pestered by a parcel of recruiting agents, and that the tone and character of our militia regiments in the service were lessened and degraded to a degree of which every officer who commanded a militia regiment is aware. All this might have been avoided, and greater support given to the regular army, if there had been a nearer relation between the militia regiments and the line. In the old revolutionary war, there were certain relations between the militia regiments and the regiments of the line, which acted reciprocally and most beneficially on each other. The regiments of the line were recruited from the militia of their respective counties, and the tone and character of the militia regiments were much higher during the revolutionary war than during the war with Russia. Complete militia regiments at that time were enlisted for active service, and I believe there was then a greater and more continuous supply of men, although those arts of enlistment which were practised daring the late war were not had recourse to. However, the militia is to be embodied, and that is a wise and proper measure. I wish it had been on a greater scale; but, at the same time, it is to be embodied for a great public purpose, and I have no doubt the result will be highly satisfactory. It is unnecessary for me to enter into any discussion with regard to our position in India. The gallant General has spoken on that subject with authority, and also with great courtesy, in reference to some observations which I recently addressed to the House. Nothing that has since occurred has at all modified the opinions to which I then gave expression; but I don't think it expedient to enter now into any farther discussion on that subject. We have only one object before us, and that is, so far as the House of Commons is concerned, to let the Government understand that we are most anxious to forward all those measures which are calculated to bring the efforts now making to suppress this revolt to a successful termination. But, in doing so, we should remember the responsibility which devolves on us all freely to express our opinions, if at any time we should think the Government not acting with sufficient energy and in a manner tending to produce the results we all earnestly desire. I very much doubt whether the suggestion of the gallant General, with respect to sending a steamboat flotilla to Cawnpore, armed as he stated, could be carried into effect. But there is no doubt that, at this moment, much depends on the fate of Cawnpore. I think it is a much more important question than that of Delhi. There is a railroad from Allahabad to Cawnpore to the extent of sixty miles; and, although the locomotives are liable to destruction, it might still be used as a tramroad. There will be sixty or seventy miles more, over which the troops would have to march, and through a country where the population is to a great extent in insurrection; but it may be assumed that in five or six days the force from Allahabad would arrive at Cawnpore, and we will not doubt but that their arrival there would be the signal for success. It appears to me that on the fate of Cawnpore much, if not everything, depends. If we can maintain our post there until November, when the advance of the army takes place, we may indulge confident hopes of success. But in so doing it is of the utmost importance that we should in November make an advance, both by the Indus and through Bengal which will demonstrate to the whole Peninsula of India that our force is comprehensive and irresistible. I trust the plans of Her Majesty's Ministers will justify these expectations. I am not entirely satisfied, however, as to the sources from which their support is to be gathered. The other night inquiry was made as to what might be expected from the Cape. We have a very considerable force at the Cape, and the policy of the Government to keep a large military force at that point, is well calculated for emergencies similar to the present. But I have never heard or have been able to collect from Her Majesty's Ministers whether we really are to expect any assistance or any contribution from the garrison of the Cape to this army which we are collecting in India. The hon. and gallant General the other night pressed on the House the expediency of sending some regiments from the Cape, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies, who followed him, I think, said the Government had pointed out the importance of this policy to Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape, and had left the matter to his discretion. I repeat, I should like very much to know whether the Government can tell us whether the Governor of the Cape is taking any steps in this emergency, and what proportion of the forces under his control he is prepared to contribute to our Indian army. There is an impression abroad that the Governor of the Cape is not inclined to sec his forces diminished, and as the importance of the question can hardly be exaggerated I should be glad if her Majesty's Ministers could satisfy the House and the country upon the point. We may be told there is some danger of a Kaffir war. Of course, if we are officially informed that there is such danger we must give great weight to the assertion; but from all the information which reaches me—and which is unofficial—I should say that there is no danger of a Kaffir war. Probably at this moment there is less expectation of such a war than there has been for many years past, and I am therefore desirous of knowing why so many regiments are retained at the Cape at a crisis like the present. I ask this question because I remember that the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope—a gentleman of great energy, who has shown, on many occasions that he possesses qualities which entitle him to command—was for some time Governor of the settlement of New Zealand, and that during the period of his governorship he maintained the largest military force ever assembled in that colony. At one time, I believe, there were at least six regiments in New Zealand, and the prosperity of the colony and the great increase of revenue were perpetually pressed upon our attention; but this prosperity turned out to be mainly, if not entirely, attributable to the expenditure of this large military force. I now find the same Governor at the Cape of Good Hope, with a still greater military force. I know that the expenditure of a regiment at the Cape is calculated, on the lowest estimate, at £30,000 a year; and I can understand that a gentleman who has the reputation of great energy, and who has a large military force under his command, would feel—if it were left to his discretion—very much indisposed to decrease that force. I should therefore be glad to learn whether Her Majesty's Government—from general information, and upon their responsibility—have given more definite directions for the despatch of troops to India from the Cape than a mere appeal to the discretion of the Governor. In touching on this subject I cannot help referring to a point upon which I should have been glad to hear the opinions of hon. Gentlemen of the military profession. I allude to the term of military service of regiments in our Colonies. Some of the regiments sent to our Colonies are kept there a much longer time than is just or politic, or for the interest of the country. I remember that at the beginning of the Session, an hon. Friend of mine, the hon. and gallant Member for Honiton (Major Stuart Wortley) asked the noble Lord opposite whether it was the intention of the Government to recall the 45th Regiment from the Cape of Good Hope, but the noble Lord very properly replied that he had nothing to do with the disposition of Her Majesty's troops, and that the question was one for the Horse Guards to determine. This is an occasion on which that subject may be referred to, and I must say that the position of the 45th—a very gallant regiment, and one of high character—ought not to be unnoticed in such a discussion as the present. The usual term of service for an infantry regiment in such a colony as the Cape is, I understand, ten years, but the 45th has been at the Cape for fifteen years, and I believe there is no prospect of its relief. The consequences of such service, protracted beyond the intentions of the Government and of the country, are most serious and injurious; and if a regiment in these circumstances falls under a Governor who likes to be at the head of an army and to exercise very great influence and authority, the prospect of relief is so slight that unless its position is brought under the notice of such an assembly as this it is likely to remain without redress. The 45th Regiment which went out to the Cape in the expectation of remaining there for ten years, has already been on the station fifteen years. The men have no quarters; they are scattered in detachments over South Africa, leading lives of continual hardship; incurring physical and moral disorganization, yet they are Englishmen, officered by English gentlemen, and there is no prospect held out to them of any redress. At the commencement of this year, in May, I believe, there was a sort of unofficial announcement that they were about to be relieved, and I am told that the scene which took place between the officers and men—such of them, at least, as could be collected, for so scattered were the detachments that it would have required two months to assemble the entire regiment—affected all those by whom it was witnessed. I should be very glad to hear that they were going to India. It would at any rate be a change of scene to besiege Delhi or to relieve Cawnpore. After undergoing years of toilsome duty they had no opportunity of gaining promotion in the Crimea, or of attaining that distinction which all Englishmen covet, and which is the main reward of public duty and service. I believe the position of this gallant regiment is truly heartrending, and I trust the Government will consider the circumstances to which I have called attention. The hon. and gallant General (Sir William F. Williams) who spoke in defence of the Government, and who vindicates his friends in a manner which I should be very sorry, were I in their position, to experience, has accounted for the reduction of the military and naval forces of the country on grounds which, I confess, somewhat astonished me. I understood from him that the Government were fully sensible that the military forces of the country ought to have been maintained in much greater strength, but that the House of Commons would not support the necessary establishments; and that, notwithstanding the conviction of the Government that reductions were impolitic and injurious, yet, preferring place and power to the policy which they thought right, they yielded their convictions to a Parliamentary necessity. Now, I am not a supporter of Her Majesty's Government, but if I had the honour of sitting behind the noble Lord, I should do him and his colleagues the justice of saying that they were never influenced by any such considerations. I am sure that the present Ministry, or any other Ministry, would upon so grave a subject be influenced only by their opinions as to what was necessary for the advantage and welfare of the empire. I deny that the Members of Parliament, who have been referred to, were not perfectly justified in the course they adopted. When we were engaged in a most expensive and arduous struggle, during which no one can pretend that the House of Commons did not give the Government every support they required, the Members who sat behind the Government, and the Opposition vied in placing at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ministers all the means which were necessary for bringing the struggle to a successful issue. That object was attained. I have before expressed an opinion, which I now repeat, that the settlement of Paris—although there might be objections to points of detail—was such as to give us the expectation of a long and permanent peace. What was, then, the duty of the House of Commons? Our highest function is that of guardians of the public purse. Surely, when war had ceased, and when we were told and believed that there was an expectation of an enduring peace, our first duty was to enforce economy—and the most rigid economy—upon the Government, and to diminish the pressure of taxation upon the people as much as possible. The only return we could make to the people for the zeal and patriotism with which they came forward in the emergency was by showing that, when the crisis was past, we were mindful of our duty as stewards of the public purse; that we were not debauched by the habit which prevails in Parliament during the time of war, of easily voting public money; but that we were prepared to enforce upon the Government a system of reduction and economy. This was the first duty of Parliament; and it was the first duty of Government, if they believed that peace was secured, to respond to our wishes. I say, therefore, so far as the House of Commons was concerned, that we acted wisely in the course we took; because, what excites in emergencies a prompt and passionate response to the appeals of the Government on the part of the community, who have been described by the noble Lord as so shortsighted, but the conviction that advantage will not be taken of their generosity, and that when the desired result has been accomplished their interests will be consulted, and that they will be allowed to husband those resources which, if an emergency should again rise, can alone enable them to afford similar assistance to the Government? It is the economy, the retrenchment, and the reductions of taxation effected after a war which enable the community, when an emergency again arises, to come promptly and powerfully to the aid of the Government. I conceive, therefore, that when, as Members of the House of Commons, we impress upon the Government the necessity of reductions, we merely do our duty; and not only do we do our duty to our constituents, who have the first claim upon our consideration, but generally and abstractedly we adopt a politic course, because we enrich the community, and enable them, when a necessity again arises, to supply the resources which may be required. There is, however, some distinction between the position in this respect, of a mere Member of Parliament and that of a Minister of the Crown. A Member of Parliament deems it his duty on the termination of a great struggle, and after the commencement of peace, to enforce reduction and retrenchment. Something more is to he expected from the Minister of the Crown. He has sources of information not open to us, and he has a policy in his mind of which we are not the sharers. He has a responsibility on him ten thousand times greater than all the Members of Parliament put together; and if the Minister believes it to be not wise or expedient to effect reduction or retrenchment, the Minister under those circumstances is bound to come forward, and if he has that conviction it is not only his duty, but, in my opinion, it would be on his part a duty which he could successfully fulfil, to impress that conviction on Parliament. If Parliament pressed the Government for reductions which they believed would be injurious to the country it would be in the power of a Minister—and I am sure it would be in the power of the noble Lord, addressing the House in a warning and monitory tone, without making revelations inconvenient to the public service—to make such an impression on Parliament as to induce Members to relax in the efforts they were making and in the opinion they were urging. I do not say that Her Majesty's Ministers had a consciousness of the danger of the course they were taking. I commenced by expressing my perfect belief that they had not, though as to some points of degree or of time I might have some difference of opinion; but in the main the Ministers thought that the time had come when economy ought to be enforced and reduction practised. But did the circumstances of the empire justify the Ministers in having that opinion? Did the circumstances of the empire justify the Ministers in those reductions? I express my conviction that they did not. I think the Ministers ought to have been more aware of the condition of our Indian empire than they were; or, if they were really aware of the condition of that empire, I do not think they were justified in the course they pursued and the policy they recommended to Parliament. It is easy to say that it is of no use now to inquire into the cause of what has occurred; but in the long run we must inquire what has been the cause of the convulsion which has taken place. Then we are told that the events were such as on one could guard against; but if we maintain that argument we put ourselves in a false position; for if these things could happen without any human being anticipating them, what use is there for any Government? If without the slightest expectation twenty-four hours beforehand an insurrection can take place, extending over a country nearly as large as Europe, and with a populatihn of 180,000,000 of souls—if such a thing could happen without those who are responsible for the administration of that country having the slightest previous knowledge or suspicion of it—I want to know of what use or value is an administration under circumstances of that kind. Every day something oozes out which shows that the administration of India ought to have been, if not absolutely prepared for all that has occurred, most suspicious and prescient of what has happened. You cannot justify now, when you are more acquainted with the circumstances—you cannot, with your knowledge of the insubordination of the Bengal army, justify that Administration in permitting a post like Delhi, the arsenal of the empire, to be garrisoned solely by Native troops, when they must have had information of the mystical symbols of combination and conspiracy circulating in that very city at the commencement of this year. These are questions not very convenient now to urge, but when attacks are made on Members of Parliament because they performed their duty, after the conclusion of the war, in enforcing economy and retrenchment on Ministers, and when it is said that the fault of our present position is due to Members of Parliament doing their duty, it is right for us in our defence to make these remarks, and to impress on the country other considerations besides those which were submitted by the hon. and gallant General. I repeat, we did our duty in enforcing economy on the Government, though it is very much to be regretted, considering what has happened, that we were successful in our policy. I doubt not that the Government of this country acted fairly and candidly by the House in consenting to that great reduction of taxation and to those general measures of economy which were adopted. They did believe, no doubt, that they had provided sufficiently for all the exigencies of the country; but the Ministers cannot relieve themselves from this grave responsibility which devolves on them, for having, in consequence of their fatal ignorance of the condition of a great portion of Her Majesty's empire, and of their total negligence and inadvertence, sanctioned the policy, which Parliament commenced, of reduction, at a time when it is quite clear that if they had been in possession of that information, which I maintain they ought to have been in possession of, must have appeared a most unwise policy, and which has proved most injurious to this country.

MR. VERNON SMITH

The present debate began by the hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North), and by another hon. Member (Sir F. Smith,) offering some useful suggestions on the question how the revolt in India might be put an end to in a tone for which the Government could not be otherwise than grateful; and the right hon. Gentleman when he commenced, assumed the same tone, and, as I understood, deprecated the discussion at the present time of the causes of the Indian mutinies. At the close of his speech, however, the right hon. Gentleman forgot his opening warning, and fell into that line of observations in which he had on a former occasion indulged. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Calne (Sir William F. Williams), whom he represented as saying that the Government, being perfectly aware of the great need of troops, had cut down the force from fear of the House of Commons. Now, I understood the hon. and gallant Gentleman to say no such thing; but at all events, I am sure the Government had no intention so to act. My noble Friend at the head of the Government has stated what I believe to be a perfectly acknowledged constitutional doctrine, which the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire has himself adopted—namely, that, though it is the duty of the House of Commons to enforce economy on the Ministers, yet, if the Ministers are aware that the state of affairs in Europe or in any of Her Majesty's dominions makes it unsafe to diminish the military forces, they are bound to defy—if I may use that expression—even the House of Commons, and to force on the House those considerations which appear to them important. The Ministers, however, were aware of no such considerations. They proposed a peace establishment which they arc still disposed to think was a sufficient peace establishment, which happened to be above the peace establishment existing before the commencement of the war, and which the advocates of economy in this House complained of as being too large. But the right hon. Gentleman says that the Government ought to have been aware of the probability of the events which have occurred in India. Now, if the right hon. Gentleman enters into that argument, and states the reasons why he thinks so, I hope I shall be prepared to meet him; but on the present occasion he had only adverted to one circumstance in connection with that point, and that is, that Delhi being a large arsenal, had been left unprotected by European troops. I shall only say, that if the Government in 1857 could have been aware of any danger existing in that circumstance, every Government for many years ought to have been equally cognizant of it; but they never were, and I deny that there existed any particular circumstances attracting the attention of Government to the inexpediency of allowing Native troops to garrison Delhi. It had always been notorious throughout India that Delhi was an unsafe and unhealthy station for European troops, and the late Sir Charles Napier, whose opinion on Indian affairs were much referred to, desired a large arsenal there, to be protected by twelve Native regiments, and never proposed to place European troops at that station. This may be a question of policy, but neither the present nor preceding Governments should be blamed with reference to this point. The right hon. Gentleman has defended himself from a supposed attack for having enforced economy. The Government do not make any charge against him upon that ground. They think it is the duty of a Member of the House of Commons to consider economy in all these matters, and when we are told that the Government diminished the forces too much, I refer, in reply, to the statement of my noble Friend, who pointed out that, though the House might tell the Government that it would vote a larger number of troops, yet the House was not ready to tell him how it would vote larger Ways and Means to maintain them. Hon. Members surely cannot have forgotten the cry of "the war ninepence." The country called out to the Government to get rid of the war ninepence, and I think that that cry was perfectly fair at the time, after the termination of all the calamities which had occurred, and there being no circumstances in Europe or in any of Her Majesty's possessions which indicated any cause of alarm rendering it necessary to keep up that tax. If, therefore, any Minister had come down to the House under those circumstances, and stated that he would not take off the war ninepence, because the arsenal of Delhi was unprotected by European troops, such a plea would have been scouted by the House of Commons, and he would have been accused of putting it forward merely for the purpose of keeping up large establishments. It would have been said this was a plain imposition on the part of the Government, for no outbreak there could possibly be anticipated at the present moment any more than in former years. The right hon. Gentleman echoed a statement made by my noble Friend the Member for the City of London, who expressed his surprise—at which I do not wonder—that, considering all the inventions of modern science, we should have no better means of despatching troops to India than by sailing vessels. The assumption, however, is not quite accurate, for great care was taken in the consideration of this question, and a number of troops were sent out in screw steamers, the others being sent in clipper sailing vessels. But the right hon. Gentleman forgets that there are many advantages in sending out the troops by good clippers. They were not only more economical—which I admit is not itself a sufficient consideration—but regard being had to the season of the year, to the want of coal, and other circumstances, the passage is said to be as likely to be made by them in seventy days as by the screw steamers themselves. Every consideration was given to the matter with the view of expediting the transport of troops to India, and considering the season of the year and other circumstances, the clippers were thought to be as likely to succeed as steamers. With regard to the question whether the troops ought to have been sent through Egypt the House must look at all the circumstances. If we had had steamers in the Red Sea to convey the troops from Suez to India, it is perfectly true that that would have been the more expeditions mode of transit, and we might have overcome the political difficulties attendant upon the passage of troops through a foreign country. But we had no such steamers ready, and if we had communicated with the Indian Government, desiring that they should be sent, or if we had sent them ourselves we should have lost as much time as in sending the troops by the usual route by the Cape. There was another reason in the unhealthiness of the Red Sea at that season of the year, which rendered it undesirable to send troops by this route. We could not by any degree of foresight have been provided with ships at Suez, nor, if we had sent out screw steamers, would there have been a sufficient provision of coal at the usual coaling stations, since the coal provided for those steamers, which usually run, would have been entirely insufficient for the large system of transport rendered necessary by the recent occurrences. There has, therefore, been no neglect of the modern inventions of science, nor any of that dulness, ignorance, or prejudice which might be presumed. All that can be said is that, under the circumstances, we have not been able to deal with the modern inventions of science so amply as we might otherwise have done. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that troops ought to have been sent to India from the Cape. I can assure him that the Government lost no time in sending the most positive instructions to Sir George Grey at the Cape to forward two regiments immediately to India. It has been left in Sir George Grey's discretion to send more than two regiments, or not; but he is instructed to send as many more as he can spare. I do not think that more distinct instructions could have been sent to the Governor of the Cape. At the same time it happens, by a curious coincidence, that Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, with an energy and discretion that cannot be too highly applauded, sent for two regiments from the Cape, and also despatched steamers with the troops, so that they might be forwarded to Bombay with the least possible delay. I do not think, therefore, that the Government can be justly charged with any want of energy and foresight in respect to the Cape. But the right hon. Gentleman has thrown out a charge and has led us by implication to suppose that Governor Sir George Grey is not likely to act on these instructions, or to send as many troops from the colony as he can spare. I have the honour of Governor Grey's acquaintance, and I do not believe there is any man more ready to act on his own responsibility. Sir George Grey is not only a man of judgment, but of undoubted nerve and high courage. He is not likely to be alarmed at the position of affairs in the colony, and there is no doubt that if he can spare more than two regiments he will send them to India. Governor Grey, in all the offices he has filled, has executed his duties to the satisfaction of his superiors and the public. I happened to be attached to the Colonial office when he was first appointed to a colonial government by my noble Friend the Member for the City of London. That appointment was given to him from a knowledge of the energy and skill he had displayed in his journeys in Western Australia. At that time Governor Grey was unknown to my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell), but since that time every Colonial Secretary retained him in some colonial government until he was appointed Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, in which post he has acted with courage, spirit, and judgment. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) has referred to the Native Princes of India, and he says that we ought to manifest our satisfaction with their services and fidelity by giving them an increase of territory. Well, that may come hereafter, but it is at present doubtful whether it would be expedient to exhibit in that manner our acknowledgment of their conduct. Many of the Native Princes have, no doubt, behaved with great gallantry, generosity, and friendship to the Government of India. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has referred to Holkar. That chief has, no doubt, maintained his allegiance and behaved with sincerity to the Government of India, but it also happens that Holkar's troops have all turned against us; and it would, therefore, be rather premature to give him an increase of territory, [Sir De L. EVANS: These troops have boon put upon him.] They are supposed to be under him, and in such a state of things it would be premature to give increased territory to any chiefs who have exhibited their goodwill in so unsupported a manner. Many of the suggestions of my hon. and gallant Friend, however, will be valuable as objects of future policy. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Chatham (Sir F. Smith) recommends us to send out sappers and miners. That suggestion, coming from so experienced an authority, no doubt deserves, and will receive, due attention. The right hon. Gentleman has suggested that steps ought to be taken, and troops sent out for the relief of Cawnpore. That is a question which it would be difficult to entertain here; but I have no doubt that, by this time, the question must have been settled there, and I trust in our favour, by Cawnpore being relieved. [Mr. DISRAELI: I did not say anything about sending out troops.] I regard the remarks of my hon. and gallant Friend as suggestions rather than attacks upon Her Majesty's Government; but when my hon. and gallant Friend says that he agrees with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire in thinking that the Government ought to provide for a second and a third campaign. [Sir De L. EVANS: I did not say a third: I said a second campaign.] I must state that the Government have provided a force which they consider sufficient, and which they are assured by all the authorities upon Indian subjects will be amply sufficient to extinguish the flame of insurrection in India. We have sent out an officer of undoubted ability—Sir Colin Campbell—to take the command of the army in India. There is already in the command of that army Sir Patrick Grant, also a gentleman of undoubted ability, and well acquainted with the Indian army. It would not be wise to predict the course which it may be necessary to pursue hereafter. The Government will despatch a sufficient force to India, but before they send the larger reinforcements, which some persons think necessary, it may appear that the distinguished officers to whom I have alluded may be of a different opinion. We shall be prepared to act on the suggestions of those officers who are most competent to inform us, but I hope that the House and the country will feel assured that there has been no lack of consideration as to the amount of force necessary to put an end to the revolt. An ample force has been sent out for this purpose, and our reinforcements will arrive at the best season of the year. They will, I cannot doubt, display those military qualities which lead to success, and, although I would not hold out hopes that might be falsified by the event, I will assure the House that this question has not been treated lightly by Her Majesty's Government, but has been regarded by them as one of the saddest and most serious events that has ever occurred to this country. These difficulties will, however, be surmounted, for I am certain we shall be backed by the House in every endeavour to overcome them. And when Her Majesty's Government turn their minds to the reorganization of the Indian army, and to the question whether it will not be their duty, by a large addition to the European force in that country, to keep down the appearance of insurrection on the part of the Native regiments, they will at the same time consider by what means they can best secure and advance the happiness, comfort, and well-being of the Natives of India.

MR. HENLEY

said, it would be out of place for him to offer an opinion on military affairs, but he felt bound to take some notice of the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Calne (Sir William F. Williams). He did not know whether the hon. and gallant Gentleman intended to make an attack upon his Friends on the Ministerial beaches, for providing insufficient means for putting down this revolt, but he did make an attack upon the House of Commons for having put a pressure upon the Government, and for having cut down the establishments too low; and he, for one, protested against any such conclusion. What had since taken place completely negatived such a conclusion, unless, indeed, the hon. and gallant Gentleman (General Williams) was of opinion that the Government ought to have foreseen the danger of this outbreak in India. The Government were now despatching between 20,000 and 30,000 men to the East, and yet they had not felt it necessary to call out the Militia—they had merely asked for the power to call it out at some future period. Surely, when it had furnished the means, in time of peace, of sending out a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men to the other end of the globe, the House of Commons could not fairly be charged with having cut down the establishments of the country too far. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) had backed up the statements of the hon. and gallant General, and, in so doing, had made a hash of two things that were totally distinct. When asked why a European force had not been stationd at Delhi, the right hon. Gentleman's answer was, that that could not be done consistently with the remission of "the war ninepence." Now, whatever might have been the information possessed by the Government, as to the necessity for garrisoning the scat of the ancient Mogul empire, it was plain that the war ninepence could have had no possible connection with the matter, because they all knew, and the noble Lord the Prime Minister had that very night assured them, that the cost of providing additional regiments for India fell exclusively upon the Indian treasury. He denied, then, that pressure had been put upon the Government by any part of the House, to compel them to reduce the military force of the country below the proper limits. Whether the Government might have had reason to anticipate such an outbreak as had since occurred in the East, was quite another question, into which he would not now enter; but, whatever might he the requirements of India, that House ought not to be reproached with having forced the Government to cut down the military strength of the kingdom to a point incompatible with the national safety and honour. Indeed, the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown had himself entirely exonerated the House of Commons from the charge which the hon. and gallant Gentleman had thought fit to bring against it.

SIR WILLIAM WILLIAMS

said, he rose to observe that what he had said had been misapprehended by two right hon. Gentlemen who had addressed the House. He had made no attack upon the House of Commons. He had merely stated his opinion, as a Member of that Assembly, that the reductions which had been effected were unfortunate and precipitate; and he had added, so great was the pressure from without, that if the Government had thought it necessary to have a larger body of troops, they would not, from the spirit of certain parties in the House, have been able to obtain them.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

explained, that what he had said in regard to Holkar was, that that chief had been personally faithful to us, and that he had proved his fidelity by sending his treasure from Indore, his own capital, to our fort at Mhow. He was quite aware, however, that Holkar's regiments had mutinied.

MR. DISRAELI

said, he was sure the hon. and gallant Member would not believe him guilty of any wilful misrepresentation with respect to the statements of the right hon. Gentleman as to what had fallen from him (Mr. Disraeli) on the subject of a third campaign. He (Mr. Disraeli) had not said that he anticipated a third campaign; quite the reverse. He said he hoped the war would be finished in the second campaign, because if it were allowed to extend to a third, the results might be most disastrous.

MR. SPOONER

said, that, without imputing to the noble Lord at the head of the Government, or the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, any want of a proper feeling on the subject, would observe that it would have been very gratifying to both the House and the country if the Ministers of a Christian nation had, while talking of the means taken to quell the Indian mutiny, acknowledged in terms that all those preparations and exertions would prove utterly futile if they did not receive the blessing of Divine Providence. An expression of their dependence on the great Disposer of events—that it was not on the national strength, or the national valour, but to the providence of God, they looked for a successful termination of the struggle, would have been only becoming on the part of the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman, and only what the country would have expected. He was very glad to hear the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir W. F. Williams) use the expression, that he trusted those measures would, by the blessing of Providence, prove successful; and he only regretted that the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman had not openly declared—what he did not accuse them of not feeling—the same confidence in the Almighty.

Bill read 3^o, and passed with Amendments.