HC Deb 27 March 1855 vol 137 cc1174-91
MR. PHINN

said, he owed an apology to the House for venturing, in a time of critical emergency, to submit to their notice a Motion of such universal interest, and involving such important consequences, as the one which he was about to propose. He should, however, make as calm, temperate, and dispassionate a statement as possible, and should refrain from any language which might prevent the Government carrying out its designs in regard to peace, or might awaken in any degree the sensibilities of foreign nations. He had felt considerable difficulty in submitting this question to the House, because in the first instance a very strong opinion appeared to prevail that the idea of attempting to restore Poland to its former rank and independence was a quixotic notion, that it was speculative and theoretical, and that it was a matter fitter for Utopia rather than for the calm consideration of reflective men, and also because there had always been a certain amount of ridicule thrown upon those who had formed strong and decided opinions on the subject. He felt, however, supported in his attempt from recent occurrences and in answer to such objections, he would appeal to the numerous petitions which had been presented upon the subject to that House, to the declarations of able and distinguished Members, among others to those of the hon. Baronet of an illustrious name, who now held an office in Her Majesty's Government, to the notice which it had attracted in foreign countries as well as in our own, and to the declaration made by the First Minister of the Crown the other night, that he considered the position which was occupied by Russia in Poland as a standing menace to Germany. Surely, if Warsaw were a standing menace to Germany, as Sebastopol was to Constantinople, the question was entitled to be regarded as one of great practical consequence. Another objection to the Motion was, that it was a matter which ought to be left entirely in the hands of the Government, and that it was too delicate for discussion in that House. He altogether repudiated such a false delicacy; he believed that no inconvenience could arise from the mature deliberations of the House upon such a subject, and he would remind it that the public mind was in no temper to accept the arbitrary judgment of statesmen as a solution of every important question relating to foreign policy. The time was past when the Government could say, Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas. He believed it to be of the utmost importance that subjects which were discussed freely in the press and at public meetings should have the advantage of the deliberation of that House, where every question was argued with judgment, and the bane, if any, was certain to find its antidote. He was convinced that the partition of unhappy Poland would never have taken place if the attention of the House of Commons had been directed to the subject, and that that gross infraction of public law and of national rights would never have occurred if a healthy public opinion had found expression in that House. It appeared to him that the object of the present war ought not to be to repel a mere temporary aggression, but that it ought to be conducted with the view of affording securities and guarantees for the future independence of the nations of Europe. The country was engaged in a contest against an enemy who possessed a large and barbarous population, and who moulded them into one vast army, inflamed by fanaticism, for the purpose of aggression. It might appear to some persons a powerless argument, if he were to refer to a document which some believed not to be authentic—he cared not whether this document were authentic or apocryphal, whether it bore its true date or not, whether it were a prophecy or a history. If of its true date, it is a remarkable presage of future policy; if of a later date, an accurate history of Russian aggrandisement. The policy there laid down for the guidance of future generations, was always to keep up an army to aggrandise the country at the expense of Poland, to make war serve the purpose of peace, and peace serve the purpose of war, and, by its alliances with the smaller States of Germany, acquire a footing in that country, and thus, if possible, destroy the unity of action among the various States, forming that great people, who might be called the centre of gravity of Europe. Within fifty years from the death of Peter the Great, the kingdom of Poland was partitioned by an act of lawless aggression of the three great Powers, of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and, by subsequent partitions, a kingdom which extended from the Oder to the Dniester, and from the Baltic to the Carpathians was appropriated by a scandalous violation of public law, and became an integral part of the kingdoms he had just alluded to. That act of aggression was accomplished by precisely similar means and under similar pretexts as the late aggression upon Turkey. Then a part of Poland was the bait held out to Prussia and Austria, as in the later instance Egypt and Candia were the baits held out to this country. At the Treaty of Vienna, after the earnest resistance of Austria, Prussia, and France, a compromise was effected, the kingdom of Poland was to be reconstituted, and guarantees were given which afterwards were entirely disregarded. It might be said, that even admitting the great evil which had been done, how could it be expected that this country should attempt to remedy it, supported by reluctant allies? He had himself been asked to consider what effect the Motion he brought forward might have upon our alliances; and his answer, that the policy of Austria was identical with that of this country, and that she had already sought to restore the part of Poland which she had appropriated, had been received with great incredulity. Maria Theresa, the Empress Queen, had stated to M. de Breteuil, the French Ambassador at the Court of Vienna— 'I know, M. I'Ambassadeur,' says the Empress, 'that I have brought a great stain on my reign by all that has come of this affair with Poland; but I assure you that I should be pardoned were the extent of my repugnance to it known, and how much circumstances have united to force my principles as well as my resolutions against all extreme views of the unjust ambition of Russia and Prussia. Finding no other means of opposing myself alone to the plan of these two Powers, I believed that, in exercising on my part exorbitant demands and pretensions, they would refuse me and break off the negotiation; but my surprise and grief were extreme on receiving, in reply to these demands, the entire consent of the King of Prussia and the Czar. Never have I been so distressed; and I must do justice to M. de Kaunitz for his great trouble at this time. He had always strongly opposed this cruel arrangement.' M. de Kaunitz wrote to the Due de Rohan, the Minister Extraordinary of France— After the efforts which Her Imperial Majesty has made to restrain her neighbours, after having sacrificed enormous sums to restrain an ambitious rival, Her Majesty would have exposed herself by a more prolonged inaction to the total ruin of her finances, to contempt, and the most irreparable disaster. I had no alternative, then, but to take the part my Court determined on, although with real regret and extreme aversion, constrained by the force of circumstances, and free from all personal desire, it contented itself with insuring itself possessions corresponding with those which Prussia has gained. The equilibrium of Europe required that indemnity. From these documents it appeared, that within a short time of the partition of Poland, Austria perceived the mistake which she had made. At the second partition she received no territory at all, and at the third a comparatively small portion. During the Vienna Congress in 1814, Prince Metternich wrote:— Of all the questions to be discussed at this Congress, the King would undoubtedly consider the affair of Poland as incomparably the most important to the interests of Europe, if there be any chance that this nation so worthy of regard, by its antiquity, its valour, its misfortunes, and the services it has formerly rendered to Europe, might be restored to complete independence. The partition, which destroyed its existence as a nation, was the prelude to—in some sense the cause of—the subsequent commotions to which Europe was exposed. Now, when he was told that he endangered the Austrian alliance by bringing this subject before the House, he would call upon them to remember the declarations made by the Government of that country. The Austrian plenipotentiaries, speaking in the name of the Emperor, after Russia had determined to keep her hold upon the Duchy of Warsaw, said:— The conduct of the Austrian Emperor can have left no doubt in the mind of the allied Powers, that the re-establishment of Poland as an independent State, with a national administration of its own, would have fully accomplished the wishes of His Imperial Majesty; and that he would even have been willing to make the greatest sacrifice to promote the restoration of that ancient and beneficial arrangement. This fact must be sufficient to show that the Emperor is very far from entertaining any jealousy or anxiety as to the interference of the Polish nation with this empire. Austria has never considered free and independent Poland as an inimical or rival Power; and the principles on which his illustrious predecessors acted, and which guided His Imperial Majesty himself until the partition in 1773 and 1797, were abandoned only under the pressure of circumstances which the Sovereigns of Austria had it not in their power to control. He might add, as a matter of history, that, after the revolt in 1831, a circular, certainly somewhat ambiguous in its language, was addressed to the agents of the Austrian Government at the various Courts of Europe, expressing a sincere desire for an amicable settlement of this great question, in the sense of securing to Poland a complete independence. That was the policy of Austria. What had been the course pursued by England and by France? The policy of England was, no doubt, exceedingly unworthy of so great a nation. The answer made by Lord North to the Russian Minister upon the announcement of the partition was in the following terms:— The King is willing to suppose that the three Courts are convinced of the justice of their respective pretensions, although His Majesty is not informed of the reasons of their conduct. To a most touching appeal from the King of Poland, His Majesty (George III.) replied through his Minister:— I have long since seen with extreme pain the evils which surround your Majesty and which have paralysed Poland. I fear that those ills have arrived at the point at which they cannot be redressed except by the hand of the Almighty, and I see no other intervention which can remedy them. I would willingly exercise mine if I could see the moment at which it might be useful. That was the hypocritical, the ridiculous answer in point of policy which the Ministers of George III. deigned to give to the remonstrances of the Polish nation. But there were great and enlightened statesmen in this country who foresaw the evils which would ensue front the partition of Poland and the dangers which would menace the peace of Europe. Every one was familiar with the picture drawn by Mr. Burke in 1772, of the manner in which this partition would affect Germany and the equilibrium of Europe, and of the unhappy precedent it would afford for attacks upon weaker States. Mr. Fox, Lord Grey, and, he believed, almost every statesman of weight in the councils of the nation, denounced that partition, and our acquiescence in it, as one of the most grievous errors which could be committed. At the Congress of Vienna, there was a most remarkable correspondence, exceedingly little known to the Members of that House and to the general body of the people, which was not published until thirty-two years after the transactions to which it alluded, and which surrounded the memory of Lord Castlereagh with a fame and a glory which he had not hitherto gained among his countrymen, and which placed his anxiety for the maintenance of the rights of public law, and the interests of humanity, in a light that it was difficult to appreciate. The passage which he would quote was contained in a confidential correspondence between the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh. His Lordship said— The forced annexation of nearly the entire of so important and populous a territory as the Duchy of Warsaw, containing about 4,000,000 of people, upon a principle of conquest, to the empire of Russia, so largely increased of late by her conquest of Finland, by her acquisitions in Moldavia, and by her recent extension on the side of Persia, her advance from the Niemen into the very heart of Germany, her possession of all the fortresses of the duchy, and thereby totally exposing to her attack the capitals of Austria and Prussia, with- out any line of defence or frontier; the invitation to the Poles to rally round the Emperor of Russia's standard for the renovation of their kingdom; the giving new hopes and animation and the opening new scenes for the activity and cabals of that light and restless people; the prospect of renewing those tumultuary contests in which the Poles so long embroiled both themselves and their neighbours; the dread that this measure inspires of laying fresh materials for a new and early war; the extinction it produces of any reasonable hope of present tranquillity, confidence, and peace—all these and many more considerations present themselves to the general view and justify the alarms that pervade Europe. Had such a passage been written at the present day it could not have been more applicable and more just. In another part of this correspondence Lord Castlereagh said— If moral duty requires that the situation of the Poles should be ameliorated by so decisive a change as the revival of their monarchy, let it be undertaken on the broad and liberal principle of rendering them again really independent as a nation, instead of making two-thirds of them a more formidable military instrument in the hands of a single Power. Such a measure of liberality would be applauded by all Europe and would not be opposed; but, on the contrary, would be cheerfully acquiesced in both by Austria and Prussia. It would be a measure, it is true, of sacrifice, in the ordinary calculation of States, on the part of Russia; but if His Imperial Majesty is not prepared for such sacrifices to moral duty on the part of his own empire, he has no moral right to make such experiments at the expense of his allies and neighbours. The result of these discussions was, that the aid of France, at that time humbled by recent events, was invoked to resist the insidious designs of Russia. It was not, perhaps, generally known that Talleyrand, at the Vienna Congress, said:—"Of all the questions to be discussed, the King would undoubtedly consider the affair of Poland as incomparably the most important to the interests of Europe." When it was found that Russia was determined upon securing the whole duchy of Warsaw, a treaty was entered into between the representatives of France, Austria, and England to repress the designs of Russia; but that treaty was not acted upon in consequence of the return of Napoleon from Elba. The final result was, that Poland, guaranteed by the most solemn treaties, had been, on the most fraudulent pretences, entirely suppressed. At this moment, when we were invoking the aid of all the nations of Europe to assert the supremacy of public law, he certainly thought it was desirable that the Government should recollect what little attention had been paid to the Treaty of Vienna on the part of Russia. The policy of France on the subject had been invariable. Napoleon restored a very considerable territory to Poland from the spoils of Prussia and Austria, and erected it into a grand duchy in 1807, and again in 1812, promising to secure the nationality of Poland as the price of her co-operation against Russia. Subsequently at the Vienna Congress, and again in 1831, France always upheld the independence of the kingdom of Poland. In one of the earliest speeches of Louis Philippe to the Chamber of Deputies, the King stated that he had endeavoured by an offer of his mediation to assure to Poland "that nationality which resisted all times and changes;" and the Chamber, in their reply stated, that they rejoiced to hear the assurance "that the nationality of Poland shall not perish." When the destinies of Poland were trembling in the balance, Louis Philippe sent here as an Ambassador Count Walewski, himself of Polish origin, who appealed to the noble Lord now at the head of Her Majesty's Government, and then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His Lordship, however, refused to interfere at that moment, on the ground that Russia was then a friendly Power, and that the preservation of Polish independence did not come within the scope of British policy. His Lordship added, however, that he viewed with the greatest regret these attempts to repress the nationality of Poland, and would cause representations to be made to the European Courts on the subject. He thought he had now proved, that three great Powers of Europe, two of whom were now united in arms, and had entered into a cordial alliance, consecrated by blood shed on the field of battle, and which he hoped would insure peace to both countries for ages to come—he had now proved that these two Powers, joined by a third, whose good offices at any rate, were professed to be exercised in our behalf, had always been united in the opinion that the maintenance of Poland in some shape as a distinct and separate nationality was essential, not merely to the interests of Germany, but to the maintenance of public law and tranquillity in Europe. But there was another Power which he should have thought would have been more interested in the question than any other—a Power of whose conduct and vacillation he would not say a word, after the eloquent denunciation of that vacillation in another place by a noble Lord, whom he might pronounce, truly, the Nestor of his day, the "old man eloquent" in Parliament. If it were necessary to gain the assistance of any Power for the maintenance of the integrity of Poland, he should have thought that Power would have been the first to join in any co-operation for the attainment of the object. But throughout all the successive attacks which had been made upon the independence of Poland, the conduct of Prussia had been characterised by cowardice and a slavish submission to the will of Russia. When, however, she found that the distance from Warsaw to Berlin was only about 300 miles, that she had hardly a fortress to resist the march of the invader, that upon the side of France there were no slight aspirations, if she were to betray herself and Europe, for her Rhenish provinces, and that upon the north her treacherous conduct had irreparably offended Denmark, on the south her policy in 1850 had thoroughly aroused the scarce dormant jealousies of Austria, and the memory that Silesia had been stolen from her, he thought she would hesitate before committing political suicide, nay, political parricide, and would find it to her interest to support any representations which might be made by Her Majesty's envoy at this present time, at the Court of Vienna. He knew it might be said, "We are aware of the desirability of securing the independence of Poland as a guarantee for the future peace and tranquillity of Europe, but you have now only to deal with the Four Points. We have expressed our readiness to negotiate on the Four Points, but this does not form one of them, and we are now only trying to secure the independence of Turkey and the future equilibrium of power in Europe." That this might be said, he was perfectly well aware; but, as had been remarked by M. de Talleyrand, the centre of political gravity in Europe was neither on the Elbe nor on the Adige, but on the Lower Danube, and to restore that, the reconstitution of Poland was necessary. It might be true that this question did not come within the Four Points, but the Four Points were merely the basis of negotiations, and there was no reason wily an alternative proposition could not be propounded. Perhaps Russia might not concede all that was desired to secure the independence of Turkey, and then the position of Europe, as it existed at the treaty of Vienna, might be restored. It would be well to have a kind of menace in the background against Russia, and let that Power know what might happen if she did not consent to uphold the faith of public treaties and the equilibrium of Europe. It was important in reference to a question of this nature to see what had been said by one of the ablest Ministers Russia ever had. Count Pozzo de Borgo, in a secret despatch observed— The modern history of Russia has for its objects nearly exclusively the destruction of Poland. It has achieved that destruction to bring itself into contact with the western nations of Europe, and to gain a larger field for the development of its forces, its talents, its ambition, its passions, and its interests. The present position of Russia with regard to Poland was a menace to England and France, just as much as her maintenance of Sebastopol and her ascendancy over the Black Sea was a menace to the rest of Europe. In any negotiations for peace which might be entered into at Vienna, he trusted that the interests of the Circassian tribes would not be neglected. He thought, however, that the Government would hardly advise Her Majesty to sign a treaty in which the independence of that brave race was not secured. After having encouraged their resistance, supplied them with arms, and enlisted their sympathies in the cause for which this country was fighting, we could never be so base as to abandon them to the ultimate designs of Russia. He knew he had obtruded an unpleasant topic upon the House, and, perhaps, on Her Majesty's Ministers. But he made his appeal particularly to the noble Lord who, at a critical period, had been, by the united voice of every branch of Her Majesty's subjects, placed at the head of public affairs. The people of this country looked upon the noble Lord as— A daring pilot in extremity. Pleased with the danger when the waves run high, He courts the storm. He knew they would see in the noble Lord a worthy Minister of the Queen, as Burleigh was in the time of Elizabeth—that Minister who, by strongly knitting an alliance between England and France, paralysed the power of the great Emperor of his day, and supported the independence of the provinces of the Low Countries at the risk of the invasion of England and Ireland. They saw, also, in the noble Lord a descendant, of that able man who, in framing the triple curbed the rising ambition of Louis XIV., a worthy pupil of that great man who boasted that he would redress the balance of the old world by creating a new. They looked to the noble Lord for a peace which would not be a vain, empty, and temporary truce, but a solid peace, embracing advantages and securities that would maintain for years to come the tranquillity and independence of Europe. He knew the noble Lord might say, "This is all very right, but we have not the means of saving Poland from destruction and of raising the Poles again into a free and independent kingdom." He, however, believed that the noble Lord was a greater kingmaker than Warwick himself. He had raised up the kingdom of Belgium, had been a party to the upholding of the kingdom of Greece, and by the Quadruple Treaty had maintained the independence of Spain and Portugal. The noble Lord told them that difficulties were but obstacles that were to be overcome, and he believed all the difficulties of this case might be surmounted by the noble Lord. He (Mr. Phinn) did not wish to put the matter as a question of sentiment or sympathy with a great and gallant people, but as a question of European law, involving the interests of England and of the whole of Europe. It was a question which he was perfectly ready to leave in the hands of the noble Lord, feeling confident that the noble Lord would take such measures as the state of negotiation would permit for carrying out the wishes and feelings of the people of this country.

MR. SCHOLEFIELD

seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to command that, in the event of negotiations being commenced with a view to peace, Her Majesty's Envoys should use their best exertions for the reconstitution of the Kingdom of Poland within its ancient limits, as a measure just and necessary in itself, in accordance with the ancient policy of this country, and as absolutely essential to the due maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES

said, it had been his lot on former occasions, when the question was brought forward by his noble Friend the late Lord Dudley Stuart, whose memory was linked to an unselfish devotion to the case, to express his opinions on the question of Poland. But he was anxious, before the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) spoke, to say two or three words on the subject, for he thought his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Phinn) was right in bringing the subject before the attention of the House. Taking the words of the Resolution, they enunciated facts on which all were agreed. The historical summary which his hon. and learned Friend gave to the House was also such as they could all agree upon, and he could not see how his hon. and learned Friend was wrong in suggesting to Her Majesty's Government that this was a question which should obtain serious attention during the negotiations which were now proceeding. Every Member of that House would agree that the partition of Poland had been a great public calamity, that it had given rise to a series of most lamentable events, and that it had endangered the peace and tranquillity of Europe. At the same time, he was bound to say that it was impossible for any man who knew the history of Europe of late years not to see the difficulties which surrounded the question. His hon. and learned Friend might not, perhaps, be aware that there was in the Foreign Office of Paris a despatch in which the French Ambassador related that, having had an interview with George III., after the peace concluded with France in 1783, the King said to him—"Sir, if France and England had been allied there would not have been a first partition of Poland; let us keep friends, and then there will not be a second." He (Mr. Milnes) believed that it was only by a firm maintenance of the French and English alliance that they could entertain any hope of pressing this important subject upon the attention of the Russian Government. It had been said the other night that this was a German question, but where were the allied Powers now negotiating conditions of peace? Why, in the very heart of Germany, and it was in a great measure from the influence of Germany that a favourable result of these negotiations might be anticipated. But Poland had always been regarded with jealousy by the German Powers whose territories were contiguous to those of that great and compact kingdom, and, therefore, Prussia and Austria had been ready to concede to Russia a large portion of Poland, on condition that they should themselves have a considerable share of that country. If, however, the position of Poland with respect to the German States was dangerous before the partition, was it less menacing now? Russian Poland was, at the present time, one enormous fortification. Russian Poland, at the present moment, threatened Germany with exactly the same kind of menace as Sebastopol threatened Turkey. He did not wish the people of England should be deceived on this point, and he thought that in the case both of Poland and Sebastopol they could make no demand requiring the disarmament of the one or the other, unless they were prepared to conduct the present war otherwise than as they had conducted it—unless they could conduct it with military genius and official aptitude. It was idle to talk of Sebastopol on the one hand, or of Poland on the other, unless they could show that they could back up brave words with brave deeds, maintain their armies in the field, and protect their soldiers under the hardships and misfortunes of war. If they could not do these things, the sooner they made peace the better. Still, he firmly believed, the efforts that had been made on the part of Poland, and the deep faith of the Polish emigrants in the restoration of their country, afforded an earnest of the future destiny of that country, and that it would yet play a great part either for weal or for woe.

LORD ROBERT CECIL

said, he certainly could not coincide in the doctrine laid down by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bath, that his proposal was demanded by the policy of the in the country, or that the reconstitution of Poland was just and necessary in itself. It appeared to him that if we could not take a town within six miles distance of the port at which we had disembarked, without our army being left to perish in the snow, it was useless to talk of entering upon an attempt which had foiled the genius of Napoleon. With regard to the Austrian portion of Poland, perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Phinn) was not aware that those provinces were highly fertile and productive; it was, therefore, not very likely that she would yield them up without a struggle; and he could not believe that it would be deemed very advisable for this country to rush into war on behalf of Poland with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in arms against us. He was most anxious to say a word or two on the reconstitution of Poland, bearing upon the remarks of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. The partition of Poland had been called a scandalous violation of public law, and a great public crime; but was the hon. Gentleman prepared to justify his doctrine on that point, as of universal application, and to say that it was to be enforced in every country, in every case, and at every time. Why, let them look at the projects in which England herself had engaged during the last two centuries, before this country ventured to accuse others. There was not a quarter of the globe in which England had not increased her territory by precisely the same process of aggression; and at this very moment maintained her dominions by the repression of oppressed nationalities. At the end of the last century she took the Cape by force, and at that very moment she kept it by force; and her dominion there was maintained over a population which detested her as much as they detested the false humanity which prevented them from protecting themselves against the Kafirs. He presumed, too, that it was not with a very good will that the inhabitants of French Canada had accepted our domination; yet there was a case which had never been designated as great public crime. Our possessions in India, Ceylon, and the Ionian Islands were acquired by military power. In Ceylon and in the Ionian Islands punishments had been inflicted by the authority of English Governors almost as severe as any that Constantine had inflicted in Poland, and it was evident that the population of those islands were oppressed in the strictest sense of the word. Therefore, it appeared to him a very gross piece of hypocrisy to say that England upon all occasions was to come forward in defence of oppressed nationalities when a great portion of her empire was constituted of them. For 400 years Turkey had continued to oppress one of the greatest nations the world had ever seen, and she had maintained her rule without an effort to reconstitute or absorb it; and this war which the country had engaged in would tend to rivet those chains on a nation one of the most oppressed in the world. They were very fond of reproving the Americans for their hypocrisy in proclaiming their love of freedom with the maintenance of slavery. It behoved England to consider whether or not, by proclaiming herself the champion of oppressed nationalties—while in every quarter of the world she had in her own person played the part of the oppressor—she was not alike guilty and hypocritical.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

I cannot, Sir, at all concur in the observations which have been made by the noble Lord who has just sat down, and who had compared the progress of the British arms in different parts of the world with that transaction which had obtained the reprobation of all Europe—the different partitions of the independent kingdom of Poland. The con- quests which we have made have been made against great and powerful enemies—they have been wars that have been undertaken for our own defence, and in vindication of the liberty and independence of nations. Some of the conquests we made from the enemy we kept; some of them we gave up; but to talk of the nationality of conquered colonies taken either from France or Holland, or from any other power with which we were engaged in war, is really a total misapplication of the term. Again, in regard to India, so far from our conquests there being attended with the oppression of nationalities, I ask any man who knows anything of the interior of India, and the comparative modes of administration of our Government and those of the native princes whose territories have been acquired in the progress of war, whether, so far as the inhabitants of these countries are concerned, it has not been a blessing to them to be relieved from the tyranny of some of those native chiefs under whose oppression they had previously groaned? With regard, however, to the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Phinn), I perfectly agree with the observation with which he commenced his speech, namely, there is no reason—there is no sound policy—there is no good sense—in any man who will endeavour or wish to shut out this House from the fullest discussion of diplomatic and international questions. I am perfectly ready to agree with him that those discussions, when conducted with temper and moderation, and illustrated by that range of knowledge which has distinguished the speech of my hon. and learned Friend, must tend to good instead of being accompanied by public mischief. But with regard to this Motion, it is not my intention to go at length into those topics which my hon. and learned Friend has discussed. I hope that no man will suppose that Her Majesty's Government differ in opinion with him as to the violation of public right, and the violation of moral law, which was committed when those different partitions of Poland took place in past times. I do not differ with him also in opinion as to the policy of the course the Government of Austria at that time pursued. It is perfectly demonstrable that neither with regard to Austria or Prussia was any adequate compensation of interests acquired to counterbalance the blow that was inflicted upon the moral principle by that spoliation in which they allowed themselves to be made parties. But with regard to the practical Motion now before us, the House must see what the tendency and natural consequences of agreeing to such a Motion must be. I hold, in the first place, it is neither desirable nor advisable for this House to dictate to the Executive Government what course it is to pursue in regard to negotiations pending upon matters of deep national interest. It is impossible for the House of Commons to be in possession of all those various considerations upon the bearings of which must depend the expediency of this or that demand—of this or that condition in the negotiations for peace. This balance of considerations must depend upon information which the Executive Government can alone possess; and it is for the Executive Government, when it has advised the Crown to conclude an arrangement or break off an arrangement, to show to this House that there were sufficient grounds either one way or the other—either for conclusions that led to peace or that the arrangements proposed were of a kind which the Government had thought it necessary to reject. But the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend I take to be chiefly made for the purpose of enabling him to express in the detailed form he has expressed them, his sentiments upon the general question of the partition or possible restoration of Poland. But the Motion itself is one which—even if it were in principle desirable and proper that this House should dictate to Government the specific condition upon which they should negotiate for peace—the House should be very slow and careful and cautious to admit; for what are the words which my hon. and learned Friend proposes to put into the mouth of the House? They are to this effect—"That the reconstruction of the kingdom of Poland within its ancient limits is just and necessary, and is absolutely essential to the balance of power in Europe." If the House were to adopt that opinion, and to carry that opinion by an Address to the foot of the throne, that Resolution ought not to stop where it does. My hon. and learned Friend ought to propose that it should go on to say that the House should enable Her Majesty to carry on the war until she had accomplished this object, which the House thus declared to be absolutely necessary and essential for the welfare and interest of Europe. Therefore, Sir, I think that, on general grounds of expediency and of propriety, as well as with regard to the particular words of the Motion, it is impossible for the House to concur in the proposal of my hon. and learned Friend. It is well known that the Government of this country has, in conjunction with the Government of France, and in connection with the Government of Austria, agreed to enter into negotiations with the Government of Russia, on the arrangement which is generally known under the denomination of the "Four Points;" but the restoration of Poland does not enter among those "Four Points." I think the House would not deem it expedient (considering the great difficulties which there may be found to exist in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion of the war even upon the conditions comprised in those "Four Points") to add to those difficulties by declaring it to be absolutely necessary to restore—what? Not merely to detach the kingdom of Poland, or the former Duchy of Warsaw, from that connection with Russia that was established by the treaty of Vienna, but my hon. and learned Friend goes on to say—to re-establish Poland in its ancient limits, and to wrest from Russia provinces which for a great length of years have been incorporated in, and formed an integral part of, the body and frame of the Russian Empire. I doubt very much whether this house would agree to impose such a condition upon Government as being essentially and absolutely necessary. The war in which we are engaged was undertaken for the protection of Turkey against the aggression and invasion of Russia. That was the immediate danger, and the Government thought that the object was of sufficient importance to justify them in calling upon the country to furnish them with the means of endeavouring to assert in that respect the principles of international law. Government thought there was an interest of Great Britain sufficiently important involved in that question which justified them in having recourse to arms. The question of Poland (the importance and interest of which to Germany, and through Germany to Europe, and through European interests to this country, I do not wish to underrate) is a question not of yesterday or the day before—not of this year or that year—but is dated, as my hon. and learned Friend's historical narrative shows, from a former, earlier, and more remote period. That is not the danger that has suddenly or recently grown upon the world, and enters not into the motives that justified and required the present appeal to arms, and therefore, I think, the House will not be disposed to require imperatively of Her Majesty's Government that they should mix up that question with the negotiations which are now pending. Whatever may be the feelings and opinions which Englishmen must necessarily entertain on the general question of Poland, I should be very unwilling in anything I might say on this general question to enter into a discussion that might have the least effect upon the negotiations which are now pending. I trust the House will forgive me, therefore, if I do not follow my hon. and learned Friend through that question, which he has so ably and fully discussed. I confine myself, therefore, simply to saying that it is impossible, in my opinion, for the House to agree to the Resolution he has proposed, because it would lead to objectionable consequences in regard to the continuance of hostilities, by the introduction of an Object which it might be out of the power of any means England could supply to obtain. Therefore, to agree to the Address would be highly inexpedient, and at variance with the interests of the country. I do not, therefore, feel myself at liberty to agree to the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend, and I trust that my hon. and learned Friend, having satisfied the feelings of his mind by the speech which we have listened to with great pleasure—admiring, an we do, the ability with which he has placed upon record the sentiments that animate him on this subject—will not put the House to the necessity of a vision, the effect of which might be misconstrued. If the House should negative the proposal upon the grounds I have stated as an objection to it, that negative might be misconstrued as implying a difference of opinion with him on the abstract question of justice—a difference which I am persuaded would not be found to exist in the minds of Members of this House.

MR. PHINN

said, that after the appeal which the noble Lord had made, he felt that he had no alternative but to withdraw the Motion. But he must protest against the suggestion that he had a great wish to make his speech. He had no desire to obtrude himself on the House, but he con- sidered that there was a strong feeling in the country on the subject he had called their attention to.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.