THE CAVALRY IN THE EAST. (Hansard, 7 March 1855)

§ MR. PALK

said, he rose to call the attention of the Government to the state of the cavalry in the East, and also to the nature of the reinforcements about to be sent there. In his opinion, no calamity had 227 ever befallen the British army more serious than that which was experienced in the loss of the light cavalry at Balaklava. No doubt, an opportunity would be given to the public of forming an opinion as to the cause of that calamity; whether it arose from misconception of an order, or from inability, or from the order which was given being of such a nature that it was impossible to understand it, would, no doubt, be brought to light; but in the meantime he could not but lament that a force originally too small to be of any great assistance to the army to which it was attached had been, from various causes, reduced practically to almost a perfect non-entity. He found from a statement which he had in his possession that one cavalry regiment on the heights of Sebastopol, to complete its effective force, required no less than 283 privates and 403 horses, and he wished to urge upon the Government the inefficient nature of the reinforcements to be sent out. Those reinforcements consisted of young men who had not completed the usual drill which was considered necessary to enable them to perform their regimental duties, far less to engage the enemy in a foreign country. The horses required by the regiment to which he had referred were, he understood, to be sent out under the care of recruits; but in a long voyage like that which they would have to make, the care of old, experienced soldiers was peculiarly requisite. This regiment wanted twenty sergeants and forty corporals, and consequently from this want of non-commissioned officers it appeared that it would become necessary to raise men to that position who had not perfected their drill, and who had no experience in those various duties which a non-commissioned officer was called upon to perform, and he could state, from having served in the cavalry himself, that those duties were of great importance. That course must either be adopted, or noncommissioned officers must be taken from other regiments, the effect of which would be to weaken the reserve, and to destroy all esprit de corps. These were subjects well worthy of the attention of the Government, and it ought at the same time to be considered how long it took to make a cavalry soldier. The best authorities were agreed, that to make a cavalry soldier required at least eighteen months; although in a few cases—such as those of men who were accustomed to horses—he might perhaps be thoroughly drilled in one 228 year. In his opinion, the whole system of recruiting for the cavalry was most injurious. It was well known that there was nothing old and well-drilled soldiers disliked so much as the riding-school and constant drilling and riding lessons; but at present the old soldiers were occupied in breaking horses for those regiments on service, and well-broken horses were placed in the hands of raw recruits. He knew nothing more irritating to an old trooper than to know that the animal which he had broken in was placed in the hands of a young recruit, who knew nothing of the management of a horse, and who perhaps would soon ruin it. As to the state of the cavalry force at home, he ventured to say, from the pressure upon it, that it was less fitted to go into action now than it was twelve months ago. These things must sooner or later force themselves on the ear of the Government, and there was a power to which they must succumb again, as they had succumbed before—the national voice. When the Government at home neglected the common means of ensuring success, then he thought it was fairly reasonable to censure them for neglect, and bring their conduct under the consideration of the House of Commons.

Report agreed to.