PROSECUTION OF THE WAR— ADJOURNED DEBATE (FOURTH NIGHT).

HC Deb 05 June 1855 vol 138 cc1409-86

Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment [25th May] to Amendment [24th May], which was, to leave out from the first word "House," in the Original Question, to the word "feels," in line 5, in order to insert the words, "having seen with regret that the Conferences of Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities,"—(Sir Francis Baring,)—instead thereof:—And to which Amendment, an Amendment had been proposed on the 25th May, to insert, after the words "regret that," the words "owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her Navy in the Black Sea:"—(Mr. Lowe).

Question again proposed, "That these words—namely, 'owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her Navy in the Black Sea,' be inserted in the proposed Amendment."

Debate resumed.

MR. COBDEN

Sir, I consider that the announcement which the noble Lord at the head of the Government has just made ought not to prevent this House from discussing the important subject now before it, for, whatever may be the result of the division here, certainly there is no other topic which now so much engrosses public attention out of doors. The minority of Members of this House who wish to raise this question, and who belong to what is called the Peace party, have been stigmatised as enemies of their country and traitors to the cause in which it is engaged. Why, my impulsive Friend the Member for Lambeth (Mr. Wilkinson), and others who followed him, if they had at all read the recent history of this country, would have been ashamed of the charges they have made, because of their very triteness, and because they have at former periods been levelled at men of undoubted patriotism who were totally undeserving of these reproaches. We know, for example, that it was attributed to Burke that he had caused the American war, and that distinguished man complained feelingly of having been denounced as an American. We know also that the great Chatham himself did not escape that imputation; and I need not tell the occupants of the Treasury Bench that their illustrious chief in former days, Charles Fox, was ridiculed and denounced in every way as having been the hireling tool of France. In one of Gilray's inimitable caricatures Fox is represented as standing on the edge of Dover cliffs, with a lantern in his hand, signalling to the French to come over and invade us; and indeed we read in Horner's Memoirs, that it was seriously discussed whether Fox was not actually in the pay of France. Therefore I say that hon. Gentlemen who have no facts or imagination of their own on which to base their arguments ought really to be ashamed to reproduce absurd and calumnious partisan accusations of this kind in such a debate. I claim, Sir, the same standing ground in discussing this question of peace or war as any other hon. Gentleman. I will deal with it as a politician, strictly on the principles of policy and expediency, and I am prepared to assume that wars may be inevitable and necessary, although I do not admit that all wars are so. We, therefore, who took exception to the commencement of this war on grounds of policy, are not to be classed by individual Members of this House with those who are necessarily opposed to all wars whatever. That is but a device to represent a section of this House as advocates of notions so Utopian that they must be entirely shut out of the arena of modern politics, and their arguments be systematically denied that fair hearing to which all shades of opinion are fairly entitled, no matter from what quarter they may emanate. I say, that we have all one common object in view—we all seek the interest of our country; and the only basis on which this debate should be conducted is that of the honest and just interests of England. Now, the House of Commons is a body which has to deal with nothing but the honest interests of England; and I likewise assert that the honest and just interests of this country and of her inhabitants are the just and honest interests of the whole world. As individuals we may act philanthropically to all the world, and as Christians we may wish well to all, and only desire to have power in order to inflict chastisement on the wrongdoer, and to raise up the down-trodden wherever they may be placed; but I maintain, that we do not come here to lay taxes on the people for the purpose of carrying out schemes of universal benevolence, or to enforce the behests of the Almighty in every part of the globe. We are a body with limited powers and duties—and we must confine ourselves to guarding the just interests of this empire. We ought, therefore, to cast to the winds all the declamatory balderdash and verbiage that we have heard from the Treasury bench as to our fighting for the liberty and independence of the entire world. You do not seriously mean to fight for anything of the kind; and, when you come to examine the grave political discussions of the Vienna Conferences, you find that the statesmen and noble Lords who worked us into this war, and whipped and lashed the country into a warlike temper by exciting appeals to its enthusiasm, hare no real intention to satisfy the expectations which their own public declarations have created, I say we are dealing with a question affecting the interests of the realm, and one which may be discussed without any declamatory appeals to passion from any part of the House. I now wish to refer to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Southwark (Sir W. Molesworth). If there be a right hon. or hon. gentleman in this House whose opinions I have a right to say I understand, it is the right hon. Baronet. I say most deliberately—and he cannot contradict me—that never in this world was there a speech delivered by any hon. Gentleman so utterly at variance with all previous declarations of opinion as that delivered by the right hon. Gentleman last night. Does the right hon. Gentleman remember a jeu d'esprit of the poet Moore, when dealing in 1833 with the Whig occupants of those (the Treasury) benches shortly after they had emerged from a long penance in the dreary wilderness of opposition, and when the Whigs showed themselves to be Tories when in office? Does he remember the jeu d'esprit, and I think he and I have laughed over it when we have been talking over the sudden conversions of right hon. Gentlemen? The poet illustrated the matter by a story of an Irishman who went to the West Indies, and before landing heard some of the blacks speaking tolerably bad English; whereupon, mistaking them for his own countrymen, he exclaimed, "What! black and curly already?" Now, we have all seen metamorphoses upon those benches, how colours have changed and features become deformed when men came under the influence of the Treasury atmosphere, but I must say that never to my knowledge have I seen a change in which there has been so deep a black and so stiff a curl. I confess I should very much like to make the right hon. Gentleman read that admirable speech which he delivered, not merely on the great Pacifico debate, when he denounced an intermeddling policy on the part of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, but also the speech which he made in Yorkshire at the time of the threatened rupture with France upon the Syrian question. I wish the right hon. Gentleman could be forced to read to the House the speech he made in the open air to the people of Leeds about going to war for the Mahomedan race and for the maintenance of its ascendancy in European Turkey. I should like to see the right hon. Gentleman just stand at the table and to hear him read aloud that speech. I will now come to the right hon. Gentleman's arguments. The right hon. Gentleman says the question is now whether the Government did right in refusing to make peace on the terms proposed by Russia. Now, that, I assert, is not the whole question. The real question which is involved in the debate, and which the House has to decide, is, whether the plan proposed by the Government was the best and only one that could be devised, and whether the difference between the plan submitted by Russia and that proposed by our Government was such as warranted a recommencement of the war. What is the difference between those propositions? It is the Government of this country that we have to deal with, and shall have to deal with in future. They must be held responsible for the war; they will reap all the glory if it be successful, and on them must rest the responsibility should it be unhappily unsuccessful. What, then, I ask, is the difference between the propositions of the Government and those of Russia? The difference is this—whether Russia shall keep four ships of the line, four frigates, and a proportional number of smaller vessels in the Black Sea; or whether all the navies of the world shall have free access to the Black Sea, and Russia be left, like any other country, to have as many ships as she pleases. I will not go over the ground already so ably traversed by my right hon. Friend (Mr. M. Gibson), but upon the question of the limitation of force I would wish to make one remark. You offer to allow Russia to have four ships of the line, four frigates, and a proportion of smaller vessels. Now, I have been told by a nautical man, fully competent to give an opinion upon such a subject, that if Russia had accepted your terms, had burnt or sunk all her old 74's and green timber-built ships, and had sent to the United States for four line-of-battle ships of the largest size, fitted with screws, mounting 130 guns of the largest calibre, and for four frigates of that elastic character which the Americans give to their frigates, carrying some 70 or 80 guns of the heaviest calibre, and all those vessels were fitted with screws, she would then have possessed a far better and much more powerful navy than ever she had before in the Black Sea. Such a navy would have been more than a match for double the number of ships such as Russia now has in that sea. If that be the case, what injury will you inflict upon Russia—what diminution of naval power will you enforce—what great reduction of force are you going to demand for the protection of Turkey? I know I maybe told, "Then why did not Russia accede to those terms?" Russia resisted that plan as a point of honour, and not as a question of force; she rejected it on principle. The right hon. Gentleman says, "If you allow Russia to have free action in the Black Sea, and you are to have free access yourself, then you will be obliged to keep up a large navy and a large peace establishment always to watch Russia." But suppose Russia had signed her name to a piece of parchment, would you have such implicit faith in her as to reduce your forces to a peace establishment! I would ask the right hon. Gentleman, who in his inflammatory harangue last night told us we were to have a six years' war, whether if the large sums expended in a six years' war were put out at interest, the yearly return would not be more than sufficient to provide a sufficient force to watch Russia in time of peace? No one supposes for a moment, that if you had come to terms with Russia, you were going at once to reduce your war establishment. You would not believe anything which Russia promised. You say, "It is of no use taking the guarantee of Russia, we must insist on her diminishing the number of her ships in the Black Sea?" And if she did promise to diminish the number, you would not trust her, and, with your present views, properly so. But when you undertake to maintain the independence of Turkey, you have a task upon your hands which is not to be performed without great expense. It cannot be done without great armaments constantly on the watch over Turkey. You have bound yourself to the task of maintaining a tottering empire which cannot support itself, and such a task cannot be accomplished without a vast expenditure. You likewise ask for securities. Now, I ask the noble Lord the Member for the City of London to hear what the great model of the Whigs in opposition said upon that subject. Mr. Fox, when the Tories of his day were urging, as the noble Lord is now urging against Russia, that we must have security against future aggressions of France, said— Security! You have security; the only security that you can ever expect to get. It is the present interest of France to make peace. She will keep it if it be her interest. Such is the state of nations; and you have nothing but your own vigilance for your security. That rule still holds good, and will hold good so long as the world lasts in its present character. I maintain that, whatever parties there he in this House, whether for peace or war, if the majority of this House acknowledges as a duty or a matter of interest or policy to maintain Turkey against the encroachments of Russia, they can never expect to have a small peace establishment; and I will say honestly, if we recognise as part of our policy the sending of armed bodies of land forces to the Continent into the midst of great standing armies, and into countries where the conscription prevails, I should be a hypocrite if I ever said we could expect to continue what has been the maxim of this country—the maintenance of a moderate peace establishment. If that is to be our recognised policy, we must keep up a large standing army, and place ourselves to some extent on a par with Austria, France, and Russia; and if we attempt to interfere in continental politics without such preparations, then I say the country is only preparing a most ignominious and ridiculous exposure of weakness. Is the right hon. Gentleman, who has been equalled by no one in his vituperation of the Emperor of Russia and the Russian Government, aware, as a Cabinet Minister, that the Government has made this country a party to a binding engagement with Russia, to a treaty binding ourselves, in conjunction with Russia, to interfere in the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia? You, who said last night Russia was without shame, and attributed to her every vile principle, I ask, as a Member of the Cabinet, are you aware that a treaty has already been signed and concluded so far as can be at present, in which this country binds itself, in conjunction with Russia, Austria, France, and Turkey, to be the guardian of Wallachia and Moldavia; to act with Russia in interfering by force of arms, and, in fact, forming a tribunal which virtually will constitute the government of Wallachia and Moldavia? I repeat, that by the first protocol, you have bound yourself, in partnership with Russia, to be virtually the governors of Wallachia and Moldavia. I will show you what engagements you entered into with that Government which it suits you for the moment to denounce, because within forty-eight hours the newspapers had brought you the news of some imaginary triumph, but which you would slaver with your praise to-morrow if it suited your purpose. The 7th Article of the 1st Protocol says— In the event of the internal tranquillity of the said Principalities being compromised, no armed intervention shall take place in their territories, without being or becoming the subject of agreement between the high contracting parties. The Courts engage not to afford protection in the Principalities to foreigners whose proceedings might be prejudicial either to the tranquillity of those countries or to the interests of neighbouring States. Disapproving such proceedings, they engage reciprocally to take into serious consideration the representations which may be made on this subject by the Powers, or even by the local authorities. So that if the Governor of Bucharest makes a report of some local émeute, you are bound, in conjunction with Russia, to interfere. But what is the conclusion of the protocol? I blushed when I read it, and I believe there are other hon. Gentlemen who share my feelings. On its side the Sublime Porte will enjoin on the Principalities not to tolerate in their territory "foreigners such as above described, nor"—and this is the gist of the article—"to allow the local inhabitants to meddle with matters dangerous to the tranquillity of their own country or of neighbouring States. And the name of "John Russell" is put at the foot of this protocol, the object of which is to prevent the inhabitants from interfering in matters which may be dangerous to the tranquillity of their own country. Mark the child and champion of revolution when he breathes the air of Vienna. [Mr. LAYARD: Hear, hear.] My hon. Friend (the Member for Aylesbury) cheers these sentiments; he cheers my denunciations of these arrangements, but has my hon. Friend pursued that bold, consistent, and manly course upon this question, which I think, with his declared opinions, he ought to have taken? It is well known that the sympathies of my hon. Friend were in favour of this war, because he believed it would be advantageous to the independence or the good government of such States as Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia. But has my hon. Friend so little sagacity as not to see that all this waste of blood and treasure has had very different objects? And why has my hon. Friend, seeing what is the tendency of the war—seeing, from these protocols, what is to be its conclusion—not denounced it, since he has declared that a war with such objects as the Government have in view would be a wicked war? Before the outbreak of the war I was applied to by some illustrious men and requested not to oppose it, because, as I was hopefully told, it was likely to tend to the emancipation of the down-trodden communities on the Continent. I gave my opinion upon the subject in writing more than eighteen months ago, and I would not now change a word of it. I warned those distinguished persons that if they expected that a war originating in diplomacy as this war has originated, carried on by enormous regular armies as this war has been carried on, and having a direction and a purpose given to it by the men who are now at the head of our Government and of the continental Governments, could by any possibility satisfy their aspirations they would deceive themselves. I said my only fear was that the war would have just the opposite result; that it would strengthen the despotisms they wished to check, and depress still lower the communities they wished to serve. That is the tendency, that is the inevitable destiny of this war. But to revert to my right hon. Friend (Sir W. Molesworth) and his charges against Russia and the Russian Government. I am not here to defend the Russian Government; no one can be more opposed than I am to the policy of Russian despotism, but I must say I think it is unjustifiable, I had almost said scandalous, for a Member of a Cabinet which has been a party to these confidential and, as I think, most unworthy engagements, in conjunction with the Russian Government, to get up in this House and speak of the Russian Government and people as my right hon. Friend spoke of them last night. But this game of seesaw in argument has not been confined to him alone; it has been the characteristic of every Member of the Government. There has been a constant change of tone and argument to suit the momentary impulses of passion out of doors, and of the press. At times, so obvious is the effect produced by a few leading articles that I could almost imagine, if I were living in another country where constitutional government was carried on with less decorum than in this country, that some secrets had oozed out from some Member of the Cabinet or from the wife of some Member of the Cabinet to the editor of a newspaper, to the effect that there were disagreements in the Cabinet, that there was a peace party and a war party, that the war party was less numerous but more active than the peace party, and that the peace party required sometimes to be whipped into capitulation; and I could imagine the newspaper then dealing out a few blows in the shape of leading articles, from day to day, until the peace party had changed its tone and given way to the war party. So complete a change of language have we seen that I can almost imagine the case to have happened even here which I have supposed possible in another country. What has been the language of the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord John Russell)? At the conferences he was as amiable, polite, and agreeable as it is his natural wont to be to those with whom he associates in private. But immediately upon his return to England and to the House of Commons he falls back into his old strain, just as if he had never been to Vienna, and talks of Russia having established great fortifications upon the German frontier and in the Baltic, and of the system of corruption, intimidation, and intrigue carried on by her in the German Courts. Have the noble Lord's logical faculties been so impaired at Vienna that he does not see that the obvious reply to him is, which of the Four Points was to rectify these evils—which of them was to put a stop to the erection of fortifications in the Baltic, or to prevent Russia from interfering with the German Courts? There is surely no guarantee against the rebuilding of Bomarsund or for the security of the Circassians. The independence, freedom, and civilisation of the world seem to be entirely forgotten by the noble Lord when he goes to Vienna, for he then drops down to the sole miserable expedient of limiting the Russian fleet. If we go into another place, what is the language held by Lord Clarendon? I felt great astonishment at the speech that noble Lord made the other night; I suppose it was calculated to attain some object for the moment, but I doubt whether it will attain any permanent object which will be satisfactory to the noble Lord. He talks in the same strain, and denounces Russia as if he had never been a party to these arrangements with regard to Wallachia and Moldavia. Some of the noble Lord's observations with respect to the strength of Sebastopol were, I think, disingenuous, for he asked, why should the Russians have such an immense collection of materials if it was not intended for some great aggression? But the noble Lord could not be ignorant that the great strength of Sebastopol has been created since our army appeared before it, and that ammunition and provisions have been arriving in convoys of from 500 to, as Lord Raglan has himself stated, 2,000 carts at a time. To talk in such a strain so immediately after the conferences was not worthy of the audience the noble Lord addressed, and hardly complimentary to the English public. The noble Lord the Member for London also alluded to Germany in a way which will hardly be looked upon in that country as a proof of his good sense or wisdom. He talked of the corruption of the German Courts, and of the manner in which they were interfered with and controlled by the Russian Government; but, from what we are informed by the newspapers is going on in Germany, I fancy we are much mistaken as to the tendency of public opinion if we suppose there is any difference of views between the people and the Governments of Germany with regard to the war. I am told, and I have taken some pains to inquire—it is our duty to take pains in such a matter—that there is no party in Germany which wants to join in this war. There may be many who are well-wishers to our cause, and others whose sympathies are with Russia, but I am informed, and I believe correctly, that there is no party in Germany who wishes to break the peace and enter into hostilities with Russia in the present quarrel. And if you reflect for a moment upon the past history of Germany in relation to France and Russia, you will see reason why in their traditions there should be no feelings of dread and hostility to Russia. The past recollections of Germany are indeed favourable rather than otherwise to Russia, and hostile to France. It may be thought the wrong moment to say it, but I hold that upon this question and upon all other questions we should speak in this House without reserve, as if our debates were not published; and I say it is very well known that the feeling in Prussia and the north of Germany is one of dread of France. This feeling may have arisen in part from the long sufferings and dreadful sacrifices made by the people of Prussia and Northern Germany in the great revolutionary war with France, but it also arises in part from the circumstance that France is contiguous to the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, and it has been thought that she has rather envious feelings towards them. But, from whatever cause, there is in every cottage of Prussia a recollection rather favourable to Russia than hostile, as compared to France. There is, indeed, hanging in almost every cottage in Prussia some memorial of the atrocities and sufferings caused by the French in the last war, while the traditions with regard to Russia are, that she helped to emancipate them from the rule of Napoleon. This may show why Germany is not so anxious to enter into hostilities with Russia. There is another reason. You forget that in this war you have never committed yourself to any principle which shall be a permanent safeguard to Germany against Russia. You have invited Germany to enter into war with Russia, her next-door neighbour, and a powerful neighbour, for your purposes, but you have given Germany no security that Russia, at the close of the war, will not retaliate upon that Power. And now it may be said, since the result of the conferences is known, that you have gone to Vienna, and, after talking so boldly about fighting the battle of Germany, of Europe, and of the whole civilised world, you have dropped your pretensions, and do not say a word about giving security to any part of the continent of Europe. I was talking the other day to a gentleman in this country, a Prussian, who has more right to speak in the name of his countrymen than any man here. He said, "I confess I think you Englishmen are unreasonable and a little arrogant. You expect us to go to war with Russia—we, a nation of 16,000,000 or 17,000,000, against a nation of 60,000,000. But you do not take into account that when you are tired of the war you can withdraw and occupy an impregnable position, while we are always at the door of this vast empire; and yet you try to hound us into this war, and to force us into it without allowing us a voice in the matter. Your conduct is that of a man who tries to drive a dog to make an attack upon a bull." Well, if we look back upon the course we have pursued, is there not something that warrants this opinion? I warn the noble Lord the Member for the City of London that in dealing with Germany he has to do with an educated people, every man of whom reads his newspaper, and where the middle classes are so educated that you may buy bread in the Latin language if you do not know German. Is it not, then, rather arrogant and unreasonable when the noble Lord in this House denounces the whole German people as having been corrupted by Russia? I say that if the English people had the conscription, as they have in Prussia, so that when war was declared every man in the country would be liable to be called out, and every horse and cart might be taken for the purposes of the army, we should be more chary how we called out for war. Our pot-house politicians would not then be calling out for war with Russia, but we should have a Government who would take a more moderate tone than they do, for they would have required those sacrifices that bring home the miseries of war to the people. I have said from the first, and I said it long before you sent a man from these shores, "If you make war upon Russia, vindicate your rights or avenge your wrongs with your own strong arm—the navy; but do not send a man to the continent of Europe or Turkey in the capacity of a land force. Do not send an army over the backs of the whole population of central Europe where you have 1,000,000 men with bayonets in their hands who stand between you and the gigantic Power that you are opposed to and affect to dread." I say that you ought to have occupied the same gound that Austria and Prussia took, and if you had done so instead of rushing into war—driven into it, I admit, by the populace and the press—you would been been right, for you have it proved now that Austria and Germany would have averted those evils that you dread, for Austria and Prussia would have made it a casus belli if Russia had crossed the Balkan. And why, I want to know, were you not content to remain in England, in your island home, your inaccessible fortress, sending your fleet into the Black Sea, if you choose, and telling Austria and Germany, "Here is a great danger; here is a mighty Power that threatens to engulf this fair Europe; if you take your part for its protection our fleets shall help you, and we will take care that no harm shall come to Turkey by sea, but not a soldier shall move from England until you put yourself in motion for the defence of Turkey?" Why, Sir, will any one now say that this would not have been a wise policy? But then it is said that if we had done this the Russians would have been in Constantinople. No they would not, for this is my whole argument—and I am coming to it—that Austria and Southern Germany have more interest in keeping the Russians from Constantinople than we have. I have heard and read in Hansard that every leading statesman in this or the other House of Parliament within the last eighteen months has declared that Austria and Germany are more interested in this question than we are. It has been stated by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston). It has been asserted by the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell). It has been stated by Lord Clarendon. It has been asserted by Earl Derby. It has been alleged by Lord Lynd-hurst. In fact, there is not a leading mind in either House of Parliament who has not told us that Austria and Germany have a greater interest in this war than we have. Well, then, in the name of common sense, why did not we, who were infinitely safer from this alleged great danger, wait until those, who had a greater interest than we had, chose to move with us? Why should we go from our position of security, if these pusillanimous empires would not step in? I know it has been said that we are fighting the battle of civilisation. Yes, we are fighting the battle of civilisation with 30,000 or 40,000 men; and I believe we have never had more than 30,000 men in the Crimea at any one time. I see it stated by The Times' correspondent, who restates what he has before asserted, that we have lost half our army because we had not sufficient men to do duty in the trenches. But is that the proper function and duty of Englishmen, to fight for Germany because the Germans are corrupt and will not fight for themselves? Give me rather the doctrine propounded by Prince Gortchakoff at Vienna, and let the blood of Englishmen be for England and the English. Now, I do not say this in disparagement of Austria and Germany. I maintain, on the contrary, that they have taken a more enlightened and calmer view of this question than we have. But the English people, partly stimulated by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London—for he has been the great offender—the English people have clamoured for war, and they would not give time for those combinations to be formed that would have averted the danger, and would have enabled us to take common ground with Austria and Germany. But now, I say, that we know Austria and Germany will not act with us, are we to go on pursuing the same course? It most certainly would be a curiosity to go through Hansard during the last eighteen months, and take out the passages in which statesmen have expressed the opinion that Austria was going to join us. The Government put it into the Speech of Her Majesty from the Throne, and, as if that was not sufficient, they have been repeating it in every speech they have made ever since. I cannot even except the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham). The right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) in his celebrated budget speech mentioned it as some compensation for the income-tax, and said that while he was speaking it was probable that Austria had actually joined us. It is impossible to read all these extracts to the House, but here is a specimen from the speech of the noble Lord the Member for London, delivered no later than December 22,1854. The noble Lord said— If, however, Russia should not consent to such very moderate terms as it will be our duty to propose, … I feel convinced that we shall before the opening of the next campaign have the alliance of Austria both in offensive and defensive operations."—[Hansard, cxxxvi. 874.] Now, I ask, are you going to carry on the war upon land? I mean, are you going to commit yourselves to take Sebastopol? Are you about to recommence the war for an object which you have repudiated? because, although the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentlemen who sit on the Treasury benches come here one day and tell us one story and another day tell us another story (I admit we, on this bench, have been beguiled by them, but I promise them we will behave better and be more cautious for the future)—although, I say, we allow this to go on, foreign Governments are not deceived by such double dealing, and it is seen by these protocols, which are published all over the world, that our Government proposed in the late conferences to withdraw from the Crimea, leaving Sebastopol a "standing menace" as before. That is the proposal made by our own Government. The only difference between us and Russia is the infinitesimal question of the armed ships, and I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson), that, for the safety of Turkey, the Russian proposal is better than that of the Allies. Now, everybody knows that we are recommencing the war with the determination—at least, if we can gather from the language of the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentlemen what they mean—with the determination to take Sebastopol. But, I would ask those upon whom responsibility for the future rests, whether it is worth the blood and treasure which we must pour out like water in order that we may take Sebastopol (if we take it at all), if, on the other hand, the capture of the place is to be accompanied by that policy of the Government which, I think, will prevent as much as anything their obtaining any popular support on the Continent—namely, that under no circumstances will they make any change in the existing territorial arrangements of Europe? If that policy is adhered to, there seems to be no other object in taking Sebastopol than knocking about the ears of brave men a certain amount of bricks, mortar, and rubbish—sacrificing an immense amount of human life in order that we may point to those mounds and say, "We did it;" although Russia may, after the peace, borrow the money of any banking-house in London, and in three years build it up again stronger than ever. Now, what is the plan, what the object of this recommencement of the war? Is it to reduce the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea? Let us discard passion and bring this question to the test of our own homely common sense. Let us take for example some other country. Suppose it was proposed to reduce the preponderance of the United States of America in the Gulf of Mexico; what would be the train of reasoning, in the absence of all passion, and with the benefits of unclouded intellects? Should we not naturally say, the preponderance of America in the Gulf of Mexico springs from her possessing New Orleans, the great outlet of the commerce of the Southern states, and from her having vast and fertile territories on the banks of the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Ohio, where many millions of industrious men are cultivating the soil and adding to the internal wealth of that great empire? And would not the conclusion be, this is a natural preponderance, inherent in the very nature of her territory and her occupation. Now, then, turn your eyes to the Black Sea, and you have precisely the same causes leading to the same consequences. Why has Russia preponderance in the Black Sea? Because she has fertile provinces, which are cultivated and made productive, and rich and prosperous ports and harbours, where her commerce is carried on. I was speaking lately to a gentleman who knows that country well, and has the largest commercial relations with it of any man in England, and he tells me that he does not believe there is any part of the United States of America which has made such rapid progress in wealth and internal production, since the repeal of our corn laws, as those southern provinces of Russia. It was estimated that Russia exported the year before last, from ports in the Black Sea, 5,000,000 quarters of grain of all kinds, and the calculation has been made that if for the next twenty years those exports went on increasing as they have increased during the last five years, Russia would then be exporting from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 quarters of grain annually. Believe me, that is the source of Russian preponderance. The country is developing itself. I admit, if you please, it is a youthful barbarism, but it will doubtless grow into something better; and so long as a vast amount of produce is brought into the Black Sea for shipment to the rest of the world, so long as the territory of Russia borders on that sea, with no other neighbour but Turkey—a country wholly unproductive and unimproving in comparison—all the Powers on earth cannot take away the preponderance of Russia, because it is founded in the inherent nature of things. What, I again ask, are we fighting for? It has been whispered that we are fighting because it is more the wish of France that we should fight than our own. But are we quite sure that the war now carrying on is not against the wishes of the French people? Gentlemen who have communications with France and sources of private information tell me they hear that the war, never looked upon enthusiastically, is regarded with more and more dislike by the French people. What is the wish of the French Government? I know I am about to tread on delicate ground; but I hold it is our duty to speak out in the face of such mighty events and, as I believe, possible calamities impending over this country. I come, then, to this point. Is it the wish of the French Government that this war should be carried on, or is it ours? It is industriously whispered that the French dynasty has so much at stake that it dare not withdraw the army from Sebastopol on account of the moral effect it would produce on the French people and on the army. My hon. Friend (Mr. Bright) and myself received a communication of some authenticity, as we believed, that the French Government had given an intimation to our Government that they were willing, if we were, to accept an alternative upon the terms which are the last published proposals in the protocols which have been presented to us. We all know a meeting of what was called the party supporting the Government was summoned not long since at the noble Lord's office in Downing-street. There and then, after the noble Lord had said it was for the purpose of private and confidential communication, and that the newspaper press were not present, he was asked by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) whether what we had heard and believed to be true was founded upon fact—that intimation had come from the French Government to lead our Government to understand that terms similar to those offered at Vienna by M. Drouyn de Lhuys would be accepted, and that a refusal had been given by our Government. The noble Lord refused to answer that inquiry, though he was pressed to do so. I myself pressed him to answer, and, that it may not be supposed I am committing any breach of confidence, I said if he would answer the question—merely say, no—I should treat it confidentially; but if he allowed me to go out of the room with a confirmed impression of that which I had received from very good sources, I should make no secret of what had passed there. Now, I say this is a most serious thing for this country, for this reason:—You have now contrived to detach all Germany from you—that is to say, you have no hope of Germany or Austria joining you. It is a matter now decided. You cannot delude yourselves now with the hope that Austria or Germany will take part in this contest. But what will be your fate if, by and by, it can be proved that England has been the cause of recommencing this war contrary to the inclinations of the French Government and the French people? May it not by possibility lead to the very opposite of what we are all hoping from this union between the two countries? May it not lead to future estrangement? and then see in what a responsibility it lands you. If you are more than France opposed to coming to terms of peace, does it not throw on you the responsibility of doing something very different from what you are now doing towards carrying on the war? Will it not, by and by, be found that your force is small and the French force is great? I do not think this is the proper time to bring up the whole particulars, but I marked the observations on two particular occasions. The hon. Member for Invernesshire (Mr. H. Baillie) stated that our forces are 40,000 short of the number voted in this House. The noble lord (Lord J. Russell) stated last December that our forces were then 20,000 short of the number voted it this House. The hon. Member for Invernesshire stated that our militia regiments are reduced to mere skeletons, and in Ireland and Scotland are almost disbanded, except the officers. But if this be true—if it be true that you still want 40,000 men to make up the number—may it not be found by and by that you are urging on this war in blind heedlessness, in the same way as everything has been done by this Government from the beginning, and that you have not looked three months before you to see what may be the consequences of the want of that foresight which the Government ought to have shown? I am speaking of the present moment, when the country is under a state of excitement. But those who have intelligence, and those who have studied the maps of the country, may readily understand and see how much has been made out of a little; and that there has been much said within the last few days which it will be found the results do not justify. I have said that I set no limits to the power of France and England, provided they would put out that power and exhibit their strength; but I am not quite sure that you are in a better condition in the Crimea now than you were before this recent achievement at Kertch. I once asked a Russian merchant what were the actual means of supply of food derived by Russia, and I did not learn that Kertch was at all relied upon for any great supply to the army in Sebastopol. I was assured that this was the fact; and if so, it may be accepted as a qualification of the great excitement that has been raised in consequence of our late achievements in the Sea of Azoff. A large holder of corn, deposited at Kertch, told me that the Russian Government had informed him that they could not be responsible for the safety of his corn. This was five months ago. Long before the Conferences at Vienna he gave notice of this to his agents at Kertch, and also at other ports on the coast of the Sea of Azoff. I believe there has been a great deal of exaggeration about this little expedition to the Sea of Azoff; but if there has not been, then greater is the disgrace that attaches to those who had not executed it sooner. I am not sure that this expedition had any higher motive than that of a desire to do something which should gratify the people of this country: the cry of the people always is, "Do something," But my opinion is that, whenever any individual, whether he be a Minister of State, or a Commander in Chief, does something, merely because he is told by somebody else to do it, that that something, in nine cases out of ten, is wrong. I am not sure that even the expedition to Sebastopol itself had any higher motive than that of a wish to do something that should gratify the wishes of the people. But, at all events, I give it as my opinion that, while your expedition in the Sea of Azoff has led to the destruction of a vast amount of private property, and while it will add no renown to your arms, I believe it will have no better effect on the result of the war than your marauding expedition in the Gulf of Finland last year. I believe that the great sources of relief to the army in Sebastopol are Perekop and Simpheropol. Both those places are fortified as well as Sebastopol, and it is through them that supplies of food are obtained for the Russian army. Well, then, about the difficulty of transporting food to the Russian army across the steppes to the Crimea, I was talking to a merchant of Odessa on that subject, and he said that in time of peace thousands of carts and waggons, drawn by bullocks, were employed for conveying articles of commerce over these vast steppes to Odessa, Taganrog, and other ports on the Sea of Azoff; but that the war having suspended all that, the Russian Government would now avail itself of those same means of transportation for conveying supplies from Perekop and Simpheropol to Sebastopol. This, has in fact, been already done. Now, I ask, is it not better for us that we should view these things in this light than give ourselves up to the effervescence prevailing out of doors? Is it not better to look calmly at these things, and consider what it is that Russia can really do, rather than yield up our feelings to a momentary, and, it may be a doubtful triumph? But when I said that the power of England and of France united could hardly be resisted by any single power in Europe or the world, I did not forget that there was one power, a single and a hidden power, by which the mightiest armies may be vanquished—pestilence and disease. I have read an extract from a report of Mr. Spencer, giving an account of a tour in the Crimea, and of the influence of the climate, which had sole reference to the summer season. I never heard of any one necessarily suffering in the winter season. On the contrary, my belief is that, let a man be well fed, well clothed, and well sheltered, he may live anywhere; and there is no necessity that the constitutions of Englishmen should suffer more in winter in the Crimea than in England. But that is not the case in summer. The best authorities tell you that it is hardly possible for an Englishman in the Crimea, or a foreigner, unless he take every possible precaution, to escape infection in the summer months of July, August, and September. You sin against the law of nature if you go out in the sun in the day, and you equally sin if you go out in the night dews. Such, again, is the effect of the climate that if you partake of new corn, or of fruit in undue measure, these things will bring on intermittent fever. Now, these precautions our soldiers disregard, as they ever have disregarded, and therefore is it that I dread the months of July, August, and September, for our troops in the Crimea. Has all this been thought of by the Government? Does it not devolve on them to consider these things? Whatever may be the fate of our army in the Crimea tins summer, upon them, I say, and upon their shoulders, will rest the responsibility. I would not, for all the honour and power which their posts confer upon them, take upon me that responsibility. If they should be fortunate—if pestilence and disease should happily not approach, but a deviation as it were in the succession of the climate should take place, then the honour and the glory, such as it may be, will undoubtedly be shared by them, and any successful enterprise of our army will redound to their repute. But if, on the other hand, your army should be destroyed by pestilence and disease, and if there should be a repetition of the disasters of the last winter, then your power will be at an end; and be assured that, to effect the destruction of your power, there is nothing short of physical violence that may not happen to you. Nothing can happen but disgrace from the miserable pretences advanced in support of this war. When the Government was holding out in magniloquent phrases the great objects of the war, well might the people be deluded; but now they know better the state of things, now they know that the war wholly depends upon so trifling a matter as that of allowing ingress and egress of foreign ships into and from the Black Sea. It is on such an infinitesimal point of difference that this war, involving so vast a sacrifice of life and wealth and human happiness, depends. Is there not, then, I would ask, something resting upon us as the House of Commons in this matter? Have not hon. Gentlemen noticed the state to which the argument has been brought? Have they not observed to what the public opinion has been brought on this subject out of doors? No man seems to know his friend. No man seems to have confidence in public men. One serious difficulty in carrying on this war is the want of an open and frank declaration of opinion on the part of public men. But there are other circumstances that ought to make us reflect. I allude not to the possibility of a bad harvest, but there are possible contingencies which may place this country in a most perilous condition, and that chiefly arising, as I have said, from the utter want of confidence in public men. But how has that want of confidence arisen? My belief is, that it is because public men have been wanting in self-respect. It is because they have too readily yielded up their better judgment to the momentary inspiration or the dictation of others. What are we, the Members of this House, set apart for but to study these high matters, to devote our thoughts to the consideration of questions involving the well being of our countrymen, and to promote to the utmost of our capacity the prosperity of those whose interests are confided to us? It is true the public out of doors have gone heartily with the Government in this war, but we all know that the public have entertained very erroneous notions as to what was the object of the war, and as to what would be its ultimate effect. What was the tone of public opinion when the war broke out? Did it not exhibit the grossest arrogance and ignorance of the enemy we had to contend with? Did we—did the country—did the press speak as if we were going 3,000 miles to invade an empire of 60,000,000 people? I rest my case entirely upon your infatuation in invading Russia with a land force. If you had confined yourselves to naval operations—if you had done that which I believe the House of Commons would have done, if it had acted on its own judgment, in I what a different position you now would have been! There would have been none of this discontent; you would have sent out your ships, the greatest spectacle of a naval armament that ever left your shores; there would have been no misery, no disease, no want of discipline, no disasters there. Your ships rode triumphant upon I every sea, and if they had not come back victorious, owing to the enemy keeping behind his fortifications, they would at least have presented no spectacle of abject I misery and signal distress. It is your attempt to do too much, without knowing what you were about, which has brought this calamity upon you. Much as I blame Lord Raglan for not making a road and for mismanagement in carrying on the war, yet I contend that if you send an army to invade Russia you must prepare yourselves for inevitable disaster. You may repair that disaster possibly. It may be so; but when you determine to invade an empire consisting of 60,000,000 of people 3,000 miles off, I say that the thing was undertaken out of blind obedience to a cry out of doors, when the statesmen of this country ought to have exercised a counteracting influence and control. You sent a land force 3,000 miles away to subdue your colonists in America. That force had a population of from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 to contend with. It was miserably worsted. Mismanagement no doubt existed there; but if there had been no mismanagement, how long, I ask, could that war have endured? We know the history of the invasion of Russia by Napoleon I. He invaded that empire supported by half a million of bayonets, and there was at all events this much logic and argument in his proposition, that he said, "I will strike at the heart of the empire, and will take security for peace in the capital of Russia." But you are not going to the heart of Russia, with all Europe at your back, as he had; for, with the exception of Spain, he had all Europe at his feet and all her legions at his side. You all know the result. You know the spirit of Russia then. Have you any reason to suppose that Russia now, with the stimulus of that example before her, will show a less stubborn resistance to you than she did to Napoleon I.? My firm belief is that she will not. My belief is that you have entered upon a task the most arduous and difficult which this nation ever undertook, and that you will have to put forth more than twice the energy, you will have to send more than twice the men, and to spend more than twice the money in one year than you have yet done, before you will succeed in accomplishing the object you have in view. Ought we not then fairly to tell the people of this country that? Ought we not to subdue them rather than to encourage their exaggerations? Suppose you receive unexpected accounts of disasters from the Crimea, of prostrations from cholera, from intermittent fever, or from the plague—for who can tell what may happen? Is not it wise, instead of cheering the Minister when he tells us that the conferences are at an end, to endeavour to subdue the spirit of the country—I do not say to subdue its spirit in any righteous cause—but to let the people know fully and frankly what they have before them? I blame the Government for having behaved falsely and treacherously to the people, and I tell them that there will be a day of reckoning for them in this matter. What said the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton in one of those declamatory harangues with which he occasionally favours the House? He said, "The people of this country are our reserve force, and we will equip our army from that reserve." I ask him what he is now doing with that reserve? The noble Lord the Member for London said at the end of last year, "We shall have 180,000 or 200,000 Englishmen under arms, and foreign levies to aid them." Where are the 180,000 or 200,000 Englishmen? I say that there has been the same child's play now, up to the last minute, that there has been from the commencement. All that I ask of you is that you will deal candidly with the public. I have noticed in history that if ever the mass of the people have become cruel and revengeful and unreasoning in their violence to Governments, it is invariably because they have been betrayed and deceived by them. There is nothing by which you will so surely risk the loss of public favour, and entail a great public calamity when your influence has gone, as by attempting to conceal from the people of this country the whole amount of difficulties and dangers which are now impending over you. It is in this spirit, and because I will not be responsible in the slightest degree for what may happen in this matter, that I wish to speak out upon this occasion; and I warn the House of Commons that there are no institutions of the land which may not be endangered from the reaction which may result from your over-sanguine confidence in what you are undertaking. I have seen the spirit out of doors taking sudden and strange freaks of revenge under a sense of bitter mortification and disappointment; I have seen those who have been the first to clamour for war, after the earliest disasters of the campaign, meeting together to denounce—not themselves, or taking the slightest discredit upon themselves—but to denounce those who are the highest in the land as the most responsible; and when I see what has been the tone pursued, in the face of what I must believe to be superior knowledge—when I see the way in which, in high places, the passions of the people have been pandered to, and momentary triumph sought at the risk of great future disaster—I must say that I think those who adopt such conduct deserve the retribution which I have spoken of. There was a meeting recently held in Derby which was reported in the London papers, and it was one of those meetings which were described as the beginning of an agitation which was to cover the land. My hon. Friend the Member for Derby was present; and what was the tone of that meeting? It was called, mind you, by the inhabitants of Derby for the purpose of instructing their Members, and the meeting was held up as one which should be imitated throughout the country. It is good and wholesome for us, therefore, to hear what was said upon that occasion. I find the rev. W. Griffiths speaking then after this fashion:— For myself I say that whatever measures are proposed, if they are meant for the benefit of the few and not to promote the interests of the many I would say, down with coronets if they are to ruin the nation! I have no objection to coronets ribands, nor to the gewgaws which illumine certain illustrious houses—illustrious by courtesy—provided they will keep all the pleasure and injury of them to themselves; but if we are to be robbed, over-taxed, and have unjust and unequal laws just because a few coroneted heads choose to have it so, then the time is come when the working men of Great Britain must look the aristocracy in the face, demand the why and the wherefore, and not be content with a shillyshally answer. One word more. There will be more money wanted ere long—the young Prince will want a wife, and then he will want a marriage settlement. I say let him get it from his father and mother, who have enough to keep them all. You must begin there. It is no use cutting off twigs and letting huge branches remain. I, for one, think that one palace is enough for one Sovereign. A Mr. Parkinson seconded the Resolution, saying that— It had been proved to the satisfaction of the meeting that they were governed by an aristocratic Government who were incompetent for their work; therefore it was the duty of every man to endeavour to destroy the system under which they had been so misruled. Now, I have been considered not to have dealt always very gently with the aristocracy of this country; but I should say to that rev. Gentleman, from what I have noticed of his proceedings, that for whatever disasters may happen in this country, there is not one Member of the aristocracy, out of the Cabinet, whom I should consider so responsible as that individual. So far as I am concerned, I will never truckle so low to the popular spirit of the moment as to join in any cry which shall divert the mass of the people from what I believe should be their first thought and consideration—namely, how far they themselves are responsible for the evils which may fall upon the land, and how far they should begin at home before they commence to find fault with others. The first thing that multitudes of men do, when they fall into errors, is to seek for victims, and this ought to be a warning to those who have influence in the land not to stimulate the passions which we have lately seen prevailing in the country, unless they can see some tangible and satisfactory result to arise from it. That is all my case. If the Russians were besieging Portsmouth I should not talk about what was to be done, and if I could not work in the field I would do so in the hospital. I should not then ask for any one to allay the excitement of the people, but I now repeat—and I have repeated it again and again—you have undertaken a war with an empire of 60,000,000 of people 3,000 miles away, and the people of this country and those who guide them do not fully appreciate the importance, the magnitude, and the danger of this undertaking, and that is why I have counselled moderation and caution, and why I have made the present long—and I am afraid somewhat tedious—appeal to the House.

MR. COLLIER

said, that, whatever difference of opinion there might be on the subject matter of the debate, or whatever the result of that debate might be, the House would agree in this that they were extremely indebted to the right hon. Member for Manchester for having provoked this discussion. It was true that the right hon. Gentleman, startled by the warlike echoes which his trumpet of peace had awakened, had withdrawn his Motion, giving an example in his own person of the policy he would recommend to the country. But the House was determined that this discussion should take place, and it had certainly been one of the most important that had occurred for a number of years. It had explained why our fleet had been useless, not only for purposes of defence, but even of blockade—why Odessa had not been attacked, why the Sea of Azoff had not been sounded, why Kertch had not been visited, why the communications of the garrison of Sebastopol with the sources of supplies and reinforcements had not been intercepted. The real significance of the debate had consisted, not in what had been said by the extreme peace party, but in this—that it had explained the causes of the failure of the war more clearly than the evidence taken by the Sebastopol Committee. These causes were, that they had had up to a short time ago, not only a peace party, but a Russian party in the Government. The policy of Lord Aberdeen's Administration had been shown to have been the result of two conflicting forces—those of war and peace; and the consequence had been that they had had a little war—a starved war—a war to be paid for by the taxes of the year—a war feebly and disgracefully conducted—a war which nothing but good fortune and the extraordinary heroism of our troops had prevented being one of the most disastrous wars in which this country had ever engaged in. The cause of the failure was this—there had been in Lord Aberdeen's Government a set of Gentlemen of, doubtless, high principles and great abilities, but who seemed to have proposed to themelves to weigh with the utmost possible accuracy the exact amount of men, money, and vigour that would be necessary to effect the supposed objects of the war, and carefully to avoid any excess lest it should have the effect of humiliating Russia. They appeared to have thought themselves charged with the maintenance not only of the dignity of this country, but the honour of the Czar, and had acted in the spirit of compromise and conciliation between ourselves and our enemies. This policy had been developed in the speech of the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone), and had been so ably replied to that he (Mr. Collier) would not dwell upon it now, but would merely observe that, however much the House might be disposed to listen to the subtleties and nice distinctions drawn by the right hon. Gentleman, yet he was going rather far when he lectured the people of England for not appreciating those refinements and subtleties, and for having been anxious for the success of the expedition which the right hon. Gentleman had assisted in sending out. The speech, also, of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) had struck him as being one of the most extraordinary that he had heard for a long time. The right hon. Gentleman intimated that it might be his painful duty to abandon the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), and to transfer his allegiance to the other side, because the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) had dwelt upon a war of nationalities, and because the speech of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) was more pacific than those of Her Majesty's Ministers. Now, it appeared to him (Mr. Collier) that if there was one topic that the noble Lord the Member for London had more carefully avoided than another it was the question of a war of nationalities; and that, if the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire had any object, it was to make the most warlike speech possible, in short, to come into power on the war cry. It might indeed be that the right hon. Gentleman was in reality more intent upon storming the Treasury bench than Sebastopol; nevertheless, his "sentence was for open war." But whatever might be the surprise and regret occasioned by the conduct and the speeches of those right hon. Gentlemen, it was matter of congratulation that at length the Russianising element in the Cabinet had been removed, and in the late performances of the troops and their superior condition might be traced the effect of a sounder and abler policy at home. The noble Lord now at the head of the Government had been acquitted of any Russian tendency by the unanimous voice of the country calling him to power. He had been acquitted of any participation in our disasters by the Earl of Derby, who had recommended him to Her Majesty as an important Member of his Government; and he had been acquitted by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, who had, with great magnanimity, agreed to serve under him; and the noble Lord had now nothing to do but to pursue the policy which he had adopted, and to continue to make the straightforward statements which this debate had elicited, in order to carry the country with him in the prosecution of this war. The Manchester school had shown themselves, in his (Mr. Collier's) opinion, as men by no means safe to lead public opinion; they had instructed the country on the great question of our commercial policy, the country had recognised them as teachers and received their instructions with gratitude, but the country felt that these hon. Gentlemen had yet much to learn on more important questions; they had yet to learn that a significance attached to the honour and dignity of the country and the prestige of our arms far wider than that assigned to them in the Manchester dictionary; and that when the country should cease to feel this, when our policy should be based on no higher principles than those purely commercial, our accumulated wealth would be no longer a source of strength, but a temptation to aggression, and might draw down upon us the fate of Carthage or of Tyre. The speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) justified the observation that a bad cause required a sophistical argument—that speech was unworthy of his former days—unworthy of the leader of the Anti-Corn Law League. The hon. Gentleman now talked of the arrogance of England in entering into a war with Russia, although but a short period since he had spoken of Russia as a Power to be crumpled up like a sheet of brown paper! In one breath he told the House that England was too exacting in attempting to limit the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, in the next that that very proposition would be beneficial to Russia. But if those were errors and fallacies to which a passing allusion might be made, the hon. Gentleman had committed errors far more serious. The tone in which he had spoken of our successes had filled him (Mr. Collier) with extreme regret; for the manner in which he endeavoured to frighten the country, and of necessity to encourage Russia, the tone and language which he adopted while dwelling on the horrors of the war and the sufferings of our troops, his assertion that the enthusiasm of the country was exaggerated and should be damped, were most unpatriotic and highly detrimental to the interests of the nation. As to the Resolutions before the House, it seemed to him that the declaration of the noble Lord at the head of the Government that the conferences had been broken off put an end to their importance altogether, although it might be desirable that the Amendment of the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir W. Heathcote) should be negatived by a decisive majority if brought forward. As regarded the other Resolution, the House ought to express clearly its sense upon this great question of the prosecution of the war. His own opinion was, that both the House and the country were heartily sick of negotiations, which no well-informed person ever expected would be attended with success, and were of opinion that the only course open was to prosecute the war with renewed energy, and not to falter until we had brought it to a triumphant termination.

LORD HARRY VANE

said, he felt that the question was being discussed after all hopes of peace were dissipated; but, since the discussion had arisen there was no alternative for him but to declare that he should support the Amendment of the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir W. Heathcote). He was aware that the view which he took of the question was extremely unpopular, but, adhering as he did to that view, it became his duty to declare his opinion that the present war was one fruitful of danger and calamity to the country. He thought had become the duty of those who did no sympathise with the popular enthusiasm who thought that it might lead to great dangers, and who did not see any immediate or near issue from an arduous war and the great calamities it might entail, to express their views and their fears, and to do what they could to moderate that enthusiasm. It had been said they were about to abandon the alliance with France. He should be the last man to recommend that this country should dishonour itself by withdrawing in any respect from the spirit or he letter of the alliance; but, without entering into the delicate question of the feeling of the French Government upon he subject, he thought he might argue that the House of Commons had a right to express the opinion it entertained—not advising the Government to withdraw from the alliance, but expressing its opinion as to the way in which the war should be conducted and the terms upon which peace should be concluded, in order that if the French Government concurred in the wish to terminate the war, it might know what terms that House thought consistent with the honour of the country. The hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire (Sir Bulwer Lytton) had treated the idea of peace not only as illusory but dishonourable, and seemed to think that those who thought that peace ought to have been concluded at Vienna were ready to consent to the dishonour of the country. Such was not the case; for he could assure the hon. Baronet that they were as anxious to maintain the honour of England as was the hon. Baronet or the most warlike of his Friends, and they were no less disinclined than himself to accept conditions in the slightest degree derogatory to the honour of the British nation. They had been told in the course of the debate, and it had been assumed by many, that the Four Points were totally illusory; and that even if they had been conceded, nothing would have been gained by them. He could not think so; for, looking to what was the feeling of Russia, and that she was of nothing more jealous than of any interference with her relations with neighbouring Powers, and Turkey in particular, he believed that her concession of the first point was a material advantage, and that it would in time have produced large effects. With respect to the first point, and to the second, that referring to the navigation of the Danube, he regarded them as large and ample satisfaction on the part of Russia as a treaty could afford to the Western Powers. On the main point, Russia had conceded the demand for the admission of Turkey to the European system and law, and had likewise sanctioned the guarantee of the other Powers, although she herself refused to be one of the guaranteeing parties. It, therefore, appeared to him that a great step had been gained in obtaining the acquiescence of Russia to those propositions. With respect to the putting an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea, that was a subject he would confess very difficult of solution, but it appeared to him that the last proposal made would have effected the object we had in view, as well as the proposal made by the allies for the limitation of Russian vessels—a limitation which might be constantly evaded in a variety of ways. That stipulation would have proved nugatory if it had been accepted, as had been admitted by the hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire. He had heard hon. Gentlemen talk of carrying on the war vigorously, and that we should obtain sufficient guarantees. But what were those guarantees, how were they to be obtained? Could it be supposed that England and France could wrest from Russia any part of her territory? He was long a friend of the alliance and amicable relations with France, but could any one say that contingencies might not arise to disturb them? In such a case, should Russia be inclined to take advantage of circumstances, and should she feel that she had been humiliated on the present occasion, she would certainly seize the first opportunity of emancipating herself from the humiliation which she had been obliged to undergo. He, therefore, contended that they could have no permanent security for that which they laid down as the element of their proposition. However, he did believe that one scheme proposed did afford the means of coming to some final settlement on the subject. He thought, with the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson), that the introduction of a great number of commercial vessels into the Black Sea and the carrying on of a very large trade with the Russian ports would of itself have afforded a large security, especially in connection with the right of the Sultan, under treaty, to summon from the Mediterranean the fleets of England and France, should he at any time apprehend danger. He did not think it was advisable to drive a monarch like the present Emperor of Russia, who was of a peaceable disposition, into the arms of a fanatical party, and that at the very beginning of his reign, and he thought it would have been wiser on the part of France and England to have made a peace which he believed might have been made in a way perfectly honourable, and which would have conferred a great benefit on the world. The hon. and learned Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier) anticipated great successes. He hoped they would be obtained, but he thought with the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) that they should not be doing their duty to the public if they did not warn them against being led astray by their imagination upon the value and the nature of these successes. The hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire had laid down a sound proposition in saying that, considering the position of Austria, we could have hardly hoped that she would have given a decisive and active support to the Western Powers. Some years ago M. Guizot said that there were only three of the great Powers of Europe who could stand alone—France, Russia, and England, and he (Lord H.Vane) believed that these three Powers were quite able to stand alone and singly to defend themselves against all external assaults. But he did not believe the same could be said of Austria. Although she had one of the largest armies, considering that she had to keep numerous forces to maintain order among her subjects, Austria could never be prepared with any great proportion of that large army on a single point. There could be no doubt that the Austrian Government was entirely with us in opinion; but, considering the composition of that great empire, its financial position, its relations to the rest of Germany, and its near neighbourhood to Russia, it was going rather too far to expect her active cooperation, at least in the present position of affairs. Throughout the whole of Germany there was a large Russian party, for all those who feared the spread of democratic opinions, and who had always before their eyes the dread of revolutionary movements and the destruction of constituted authorities, looked to Russia as their great protector. This was the secret of Russian influence. They had had the declaration of the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord John Russell) that, in the Conferences at Vienna, Austria had offered every moral assistance to the Western Powers, and so far she had conferred a great benefit on the cause we had espoused. With respect to the expedition to the Crimea, he was suprised when he first heard of it, and that we went with so small a force. He considered that it would have been better had we confined ourselves to our naval forces, and had we not entered upon an aggressive war. In fact, we had changed the character of the war altogether from a defensive to an aggressive one. Agreeing in much that had fallen from the hon. Member for the West Riding, he did not think that he was justified in the construction he had put on the silence of the noble Lord on the Treasury bench at a private meeting. With regard to the Motion before the House, he (Lord H. Vane) should vote against the proposition of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe). That being the most warlike proposition, he wished to give his opinion upon it, and to state that he looked with great apprehension at the continuance of the war; and he also desired to express his hope that the Government would take the first available opportunity to contract a peace that would be honourable to us, and not of too humiliating a character to Russia.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

said, he agreed with the noble lord, who had just resumed his seat, in his conclusion, but he came to the same conclusion on different grounds. He could not agree in that part of the Resolution of the hon. Member for Kidderminster which asserted or implied that the refusal of Russia to restrict the number of her ships in the Black Sea was the main and distinguishing cause of the failure of the negotiations at Vienna. No doubt that refusal formed one link in the chain of causes which had led to the failure of the negotiations, but the chief cause of their failure was the mistaken foundation on which they were carried on; and the fault lay with the allied Powers in proposing this particular interpretation of the third point, and insisting upon it as a sine quâ non. Lord Aberdeen's Government adopted a plain and intelligible line of policy in seeking to conclude a peace on the basis of the Four Points, although they might not altogether agree with that policy. The point and gist of the argument of the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) had been attempted to be eluded by raising the cry that it was full of subtleties and nice distinctions. But his right hon. Friend—whose courage in advocating unpopular views, which exposed him, as a member of the Cabinet that began the war, to peculiar suspicions and obloquy, all must acknowledge—had contended that we entered into the war for a definite object, viz., the protection of the Ottoman Empire, which could not otherwise be secured; and that when that object was attained we should not be justified in continuing the hostilities. The right hon. gentleman did not say that in no case should their demands anterior to the war be subsequently enlarged, but, on the contrary, that they were so considerably enlarged, in the shape of the Four Points, that at first Russia refused to accede to them, and the expedition to the Crimea was then undertaken. Now, that expedition might not have been altogether compatible with a strictly defensive war, but it had certainly had the effect of inducing Russia to consent to the terms which she would not before entertain. A particular solution of the third point having been proposed to Russia, she rejected it, offering, however, a counter-solution of her own, which, on the other hand, was rejected by the allies, who insisted on their particular interpretation, and the conferences were consequently broken off. There was no subtlety in the course pursued by his right hon. friend. All the nicety and subtlety really lay with those who went along with him up to the acceptance of the Four Points, but turned off from him merely because they objected to the slightest alteration in an interpretation of one of those points which nobody defended as a sufficient or satisfactory solution. The declaration of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) that he wished the door shut on these negotiations, was perfectly consistent with the pacific policy, although some thought it extremely warlike. The right hon. gentleman said the negotiations had been so spoiled and made such a mess of that it was of no use continuing them; that they should be closed, to allow a fresh departure to be taken on an entirely new basis, and one more likely to lead to a satisfactory conclusion. That position was quite unassailable. There had been great confusion between ends and means in that discussion. The ends of the war formed the most important consideration. And here the sentiments of the right hon. member for Buckinghamshire did not much differ from those of Lord Aberdeen's Government at the commencement of the war—viz., that its object was not conquest or the humiliation or dismemberment of Russia, but simply the protection of Turkey. The point upon which his right hon. friend (Mr. Gladstone) differed from the right hon. gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire was not as to the end, but as to the means by which that end should be attained. Upon the question before the House, he (sir S. Northcote) should vote against the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) as he should also against that of the hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Sir W. Heathcote) should that Amendment be pressed, which he hoped would not be the case.

MAJOR REED

said, that he was one of those individuals who were in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war, and that he was rejoiced to see a termination of the Vienna Conferences, in which he never had had a particle of faith. With regard to the language which had been used that evening by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) he was surprised to hear him say that he would not pay attention to the voice of popular clamour, because if there was one Member in that House more than another whom he would have supposed to defer to the voice of the people, it assuredly was the hon. Member. He (Major Reed) believed that the people of this country were in favour of the war, as they had paid their increased taxes without murmur, and would, he doubted not, pay more if necessary. He deprecated, however, the peace-mongering orations of hon. Gentlemen below him, which were calculated to give the people an impression that Parliament was not unaminous on the subject of the war. As to the Amendments before the House, he would support the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster, as he believed it would assist in promoting the vigorous prosecution of the war. As far as Austria was concerned, he believed we could never receive any active support from her; but his conviction was, that if we would only unite heartily with our ancient foe—France—the people of England and France would give their cordial support to their respective Governments until they had secured a just, honourable, and lasting peace.

MR. W. EWART

said, that he had hoped much from diplomacy. But, diplomacy haying failed, the obvious and only course now was an earnest and resolute prosecution of the war. He said this, still continuing to be, as he had always been, an ardent friend of peace. But he though it was a tribute to the cause of peace, when the principle was laid down that no European Power should commit an act of aggression without being made responsible for so doing by the other Powers of Europe. He thought, also, that we were promoting the cause of general peace by acting in combination with France, and cultivating the friendship of the French people. It had been asked whether we were about to enter into war of nationalities, or whether we were going to continue the war until we had conquered Russia? He deprecated a war of nationalities—who could see the end of it if once begun? It would become, what Mr. Canning had foretold, a "war of opinion." If we fanned a local flame, we were responsible for a general conflagration. But were we sure that, if we evoked the "nationalities," the, "nationalities" would answer to our summons? He required precise information on this point before he would assume the responsibility it involved; and he would adopt the well-known question in the dialogue between Hotspur and Owen Glendower— I can call spirits from the vasty deep. But will they come when thou dost call for them? As to our conquering Russia, or taking any portion of her dominions, the idea never entered into our contemplation; the original object we sought to attain by the war was to destroy the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea without in the least disturbing her legitimate dominion, to maintain the independence of Turkey, and to secure the liberty of Europe. He could not, however, concur with the latter part of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe); he thought that it was not sound policy for the House to prescribe to Her Majesty's Government by what means they should carry on the war; but that the House should lay down the general principle that the war should be vigorously conducted, and should leave it to the Executive to determine by what measures and details that principle could be best accomplished. With regard to the general question, he thought that the Earl of Aberdeen's Government was right in doing its utmost to avert the war; but when that war became inevitable he should have liked to have seen it conducted with an energy which should end it. He agreed with the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies that either you should have a Prime Minister who would breathe his resolute spirit into the whole administration, or you should have a War Minister who would wield the executive power of his department with comprehensiveness of mind and vigour of character. We want such a man as the elder William Pitt or as George Canning. He was not an enemy to negotiation; he would lose no opportunity of negotiating while negotiation was possible; yet when war became unavoidable, it was consistent with the doctrines of peace to prosecute the war with such energy as should not only shorten, but should end it. Far be it from him to oppose at any time fair negotiation. It was our first duty to be open to reconciliation, and not "to close be gates of mercy on mankind." But if it must be otherwise, he was for the most vigorous measures, and he was for establishing peace by extinguishing the war.

MR. VANSITTART

said, it was his opinion that we had entered upon this war, not as one of preservation but of aggression, for we had invaded the territory of Russia, and destroyed her navy or locked it up within her ports. The application of steam to our marine had given us ten times the naval power of Russia, and he thought it was impossible we could have any cause to fear the power of Russia in the Black Sea, when our recent successes had placed, in all probability, not only Sebastopol, but the whole Crimea in our hands. It was his belief that the Government had been somewhat too exacting upon the third point, and he was of opinion that they were not justified in declining to put an end to the war simply because the third point was not absolutely acceded to. He considered, however, that it would be too much to call upon the Government to abandon the war; but he certainly thought they should be required to lay down some clear and definite terms upon which they would be prepared to treat, in order that our demands might not, like a sort of political barometer, rise or fall with every loss or gain of a battle on either side. The speech of the noble Lord the Member for London that had been alluded to in the course of these discussions apparently conveyed the impression that a war of nationalities was possible, although the noble Lord, no doubt, did not intend that it should do so. If, at the conclusion of the war, the Crimea were to be occupied by a French army, it was impossible to tell at what time that occupation would be put an end to. When the French first took possession of Algiers they declared that they had no intention to hold it. There could be no doubt that the prolongation of the war would bring inevitable ruin upon Turkey, and he was sure that the interests of civilisation would be less advanced by war than by the instruction of barbarous nations in the arts of peace.

MR. F. SCULLY

said, he had heard the debate from the commencement, and he must say that he thought that a great deal of irrelevant matter had been introduced. He should not have risen at that moment but to express his dissent from the conclusions at which the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) had arrived. He had used much exaggeration, and had unjustly accused the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) of taking a Russian view of certain parts of the question. He (Mr. Scully) saw no harm in allowing Russia to join in the protectorate of the Principalities, along with the Four great Powers. He believed that the noble Lord was justified in accepting the terms of Russia on the first point, and in rejecting them on the third. The question now before the House was, whether the Russian propositions ought to have been entertained. Much confusion was caused by the variety of parties in that House; and the war was waged at a disadvantage in consequence. In both Houses of Parliament Members were continually bringing forward Motions impugning the conduct of the Government in the management of the war. In this respect the Emperor of Russia had a great advantage over us; he had no Houses of Parliament to consult—nothing but his own will. It was true, great mistakes had occurred last year in the Crimea, but they had been atoned for since; and we were now in a condition to carry on the war with vigour and success. That being so, he thought it most improper for that House to advise the Government as to the steps that ought to have been taken consequent on the late negotiations. The making of war or peace was the prerogative of the Crown, and in the way in which that prerogative had been exercised he thought the Government had shown a wise discretion. They were not to be blamed for attempting to negotiate and fight at the same time. He rejoiced to know that the Irish people were unanimous on this question; they were for carrying on the war with vigour and energy; and not one Irish Member had been found to support the "peace at all price" doctrines of Mr. Cobden and his friends. It was preposterous to suppose that any durable peace could have been patched up on such grounds as were proposed by Russia at Vienna. The united power of England and France was abundantly sufficient to reduce Russia to terms, and he saw nothing discouraging in the attitude of Austria. He wished to call the attention of the House to the opinion of Napoleon I., so often referred to in the course of the debate, as to the intention of Russia to overrun Europe, and the consequent necessity of a cordial union between France and England. It had been said that Russia never could attack our possessions in India; but Napoleon thought it quite possible for Russia to march an army of 70,000 or 100,000 men into our Indian Empire. In the opinion of the hon. Member for the West Riding, the German people were in favour of Russia. Now, he Mr. Scully) believed that the reverse was the case. Could the German people do as they chose, they would join the allies; a proof of this was given by the "Foreign Legion," now nearly completed. There was no doubt that, if Russia were victorious in this struggle, she would overrun Prussia and Austria as well as Turkey; and the German people were quite alive to their position. He by no means believed that Austria would not be brought to join in active hostilities against Russia; but it was quite natural that she should do it deliberately. It would be to be regretted if anything said in that House should have a tendency to drive Austria from us. He did not believe that the vote of the House on the Amendment before it would declare the sense of the country as to the necessity of carrying on the war with vigour. He regretted that the Resolution of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) had been persisted in; it had only been meant as an Amendment on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), which had been negatived. Upon this Amendment, no less than three other Amendments had been proposed or given notice of; but he hoped that the House would find some means of declaring that the war ought to be carried on with vigour until a successful issue was gained. Some hon. Gentlemen complained that the terms had been changed in the progress of the war. This we had a perfect right to do; and he did not think that anything less than the terms proposed last April ought to be accepted. Should the war continue another year, he believed the country would not be satisfied with those terms; and it might be necessary to insist on indemnity to Turkey for what she had sufferred. He must express his belief that the statements made by the Gentlemen of the peace party had done more to prolong the war than anything else. They caused it to be believed in Russia that the war was unpopular in this country, and that that House was divided as to its propriety. He had no doubt that the Government were doing all in their power to carry on the war with vigour; and he could not see the necessity of any interference on the part of the House. Should they go to a division, he should vote for the Motion of the right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) as a mere statement of fact. He hoped the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) would not be pressed; its effect would be to tie up the hands of the Government as to future negotiations. Fair terms might hereafter be offered by Russia; and it would be unwise to close the door against them. The hon. Member for the West Riding had described the Irish and Scotch militia as being mere skeletons, and all disbanded but the officers. This was by no means the case. He should be sorry if the impression went abroad that the inhabitants of Ireland were not as enthusiastic in favour of the war as those of England.

MR. CROSSLEY

said, he had expressed his opinion when the war was declared that the interests of this country would be best served by acting solely on the defensive, and nothing that had occurred since had altered his views. In Paris, last week, while inspecting the Napoleon relics, he had been led to reflect on how much blood and treasure had been wasted in the wars of that period, and he feared the same thing was about to be repeated. When Russia entered the Principalities, we ought to have kept aloof, and not mixed up ourselves with the politics of Europe. The war being declared, he thought the best interests of humanity demanded that we should prosecute it with vigour. On looking at the Vienna protocols he came to the conclusion that the third proposition of the allies was not calculated to secure a durable peace. He thought so because it was contrary to the golden rule of doing to others as we would be done by. The allies asked Russia to reduce her forces in the Black Sea. Suppose she had asked us to reduce the number of our ships, there was not a man who would not fight to the death sooner than consent to such a degrading proposal. And we ought not to make a proposition which we would not submit to ourselves, and which was humiliating to the Power to whom it was made. The noble Lord (Lord John Russell) said that the motive of Russia's keeping up a large fleet in the Black Sea was to attack Constantinople. But Russia was equally well entitled to impute the same motives to us; and surely the antecedents of the allies in India, in Africa, in Algiers, and in Rome, were such as to justify Russia in imputing motives of aggression to them. He thought the House and the country had a right to know from Her Majesty's Government what were to be the terms of peace now. He would support the Government in prosecuting the war with vigour, if they proposed terms which it would be honourable for them to offer, and not dishonourable for Russia to accept.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE

said, he rose to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), which he thought ought at once to be adopted. It was said that the hon. Member's proposal was unconstitutional, because it interfered with the prerogative of the Crown. Now he (Mr. Phillimore) challenged any person to dispute what he now said—namely, that so far from that proposition being an interference with the prerogative of the Crown, it involved a right which the House of Commons had exercised in the brightest periods of its history over and over again, and with great advantage to the interests of the country. In the war which terminated with the Treaty of Utrecht, the House of Commons had agreed to an Address, drawn up by Lord Somers, which declared that no peace could be safe and honourable to the allies so long as Spain or the West Indies were suffered to remain under the power of a Bourbon. Although the opinion conveyed in that Address was disregarded, the principle involved was never once disputed. That Address, however, ended by advising the destruction of the fortifications of Dunkirk, which was carried out. He had listened with much regret, but without surprise, to some hon. Gentlemen who doubted the justice of the war. With regard to England never interfering by means of standing armies, he would remind the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) that history proved we owed our liberties to such interference,—as when Queen Elizabeth supported the Dutch in their struggle with Philip of Spain; and William III. supported the same Power in its struggle with Louis XIV. He thought the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) was marked by all the skill and dexterity which had made him one of the most accomplished debaters; but a speech breathing a more pusillanimous spirit, containing views more unstatesmanlike, involving more fallacies in the cloud of words by which they were disguised, and furnishing more materials for severe reprobation, had seldom been uttered within the walls of Parliament. When he heard the speech of the right hon. Gentleman he was at no loss to account for the conduct of the noble Lord the Member for London upon a recent occasion, or to understand how it came to pass that our great operations had shrunk into miserable disasters, or how our miserable disasters had sprung from the bosom of victory. No one who listened to the right hon. Gentleman's speech, could doubt for a moment that the Emperor of Russia had lost some excellent auxiliaries in some of those Members of the Cabinet which had been overthrown on the occasion to which he had referred. When hon. Members spoke of the war as being one of extermination, he would remind them of the wars in which we had formerly been engaged. He would first of all ask them if there was no difference between a war of extermination and the reduction of the enemy's power to fair and natural limits. Was the war carried on with France a war of extermination? At the glorious treaty of Paris did not France make concessions to us, which we accepted? And at the treaty of Versailles did we not make concessions to France? Was there anything dishonourable or derogatory to the dignity of either country by the offer or acceptance of those concessions? Was not the honour of England to be considered now as well as the honour of Russia? Did the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) desire to convince the House that the moment he left the Cabinet the war had ceased to be a righteous war? Whilst a Member of the Cabinet he concurs in the declaration of war against Russia; but after he retires from that Cabinet he pronounces a eulogium upon the moderation of Russia, the most grasping and insatiable power of modern history, whose policy was a combination of force and fraud, wielded with a systematic disregard of justice. The hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire in his speech that evening cautioned the Government not to rely upon the feelings of the people in the carrying on of this war. The feelings of the people of this country were not the mere ebullition of a public sentiment, but the spirit of a great nation, which was not to be quenched by obstacles or seduced by compromise. The people of this country feel that there was nothing to be ashamed of or to fear in such a sentiment. They had granted, and were ready to grant, the most ample funds to meet the expenses of the war. He trusted and believed that what was granted so liberally would be applied wisely—that it would be applied with a vigour suited to the magnitude of the duties the noble Lord at the head of the Government was called upon to discharge. He believed that Under a wise and vigorous Government the resources of England would be enabled to carry on the War in which we were engaged to a just arid glorious termination. Having once drawn the sword, let us not sheathe it again but as conquerors, and upon terms guaranteeing our own peace as well as the tranquillity of Europe. By adopting the principle of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster we should leave that spirit untouched. By adopting, on the contrary, the proposition of that party to which he alluded, we should be bringing a lasting Calamity, hot only upon England, but upon the whole of the European family.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM

I can assure you, Sir, that I never rose in this House with feelings of greater embarrassment or of greater pain than those which I experience on the present occasion, and, like my hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), I shall appeal to the generosity of this House, inasmuch as I am well aware that the opinions which I am about to express are not in accordance with those entertained by a majority of the Members of the House, and I shall make this appeal with confidence, because, being in the minority, I am sure of a disposition on the part of the House to deal fairly, if not generously, with me. It is painful to undergo taunts such as those which both last night and this evening have fallen from hon. Members on opposite sides of the House, who have accused these who are anxious, even in present circumstances, to obtain a peace which appears to them honourable, as being the auxiliaries and the friends of Russia. Now, Sir, it is necessary, however, to submit to taunts of this description, and the only consolation is, that in similar circumstances wiser and better men that I have had to undergo the pain of observations of a like nature. But I feel that I should not be the friend of Russia but the enemy of my own country, that I should be a traitor to the interests of the people I represent, and should be guilty of the basest of all fears—the fear of being thought afraid—if I were not ready to state my opinion in the existing circumstances of the Country with reference to the policy of the continuance of the present war. My position is quite different from that of the hon. Gentleman who sit on the lower portion of this bench. They are of opinion that the late negotiations should have led to peace, but they have also, with great consistency, from the very commencement of the war, objected to its being waged. I, on the contrary, have entertained the opinion that the war declared against Russia last year was a just and necessary war. I adhere to that opinion; and the real question now at issue, in my tumble judgment, is this, have the objects for which that war was undertaken been attained, or did the Conferences of Vienna give fair ground for believing that the opportunity of bringing the war to an honourable termination had been presented? Besides having entertained and expressed the opinions to which I still adhere, that the war originally was a just and necessary war, it was my duty in the Government of Lord Aberdeen to fill an important post connected with the conduct of the war; and when the hon. and learned Members for Leominster (Mr. J. G. Phillimore and Plymouth (Mr. Collier) have asserted that it is now quite plain what were the causes which led to failure, while I arid those who act with me, and who with me left the Government of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, occupied a position in the administration of affairs, I tell them, in reply, that, although it would ill become me to speak of my own efforts or my own conduct, still this much I can say, that from the first moment when I went to the Admiralty I used my best exertions to prepare the naval forces of this country for any emergency which might arise. My efforts were sincerely and constantly directed to that object long before the commencement of the war; and during its progress I endeavoured to provide ample means to meet all the wants of the public service, and when I left office I think that the means so provided were not deficient, and have not been found in the least deficient by my successor. Having made this short comment on matters personal to myself, I shall now pass on to the observations which I conceive it to be my duty to submit for the consideration of the House. On a former evening, before the commencement of the recess, I urged upon the Government the propriety of adjourning this debate, because I was of opinion that a subject of such magnitude and importance ought not to be hurriedly discussed, and it appeared to me impossible that in the short remains of One evening nearly exhausted in a preceding debate, it could meet with sufficient consideration, and I therefore pressed the adjournment of this great question. During the interval a very important change has taken place in the state of affairs. The Conferences at Vienna were then open; they are now closed. It appears that, since the conference of the 26th of April, a proposition has been made by the Austrian Government to the Governments of England arid France which, in the opinion of Austria, ought to have been submitted to the Russian envoys, and which afforded a hope, at least, of an adjustment of the difference not being impossible, and we now hear from the noble Lord at the head of the Government that England and France have rejected that proposition, and that the conferences are closed. As matters, therefore, now stand, a new point of departure is before us, and I think that if it was important before the recess that time should be given for discussion and deliberation, the circumstances to which I have adverted add greatly to the gravity of the present conjuncture, and demand not only discussion and deliberation, but further explanation on the part of the advisers of Her Majesty. In the first place, I should wish to know what was the precise proposition made by Austria, which England has rejected; next, whether, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Four Points, about which we have heard so much, are still to be maintained as the basis of any future arrangement with Russia, or are now abandoned, so that fresh terms alone will be entertained. I cannot conceive a question of greater gravity, or one which demands, on the part of Government, a more frank and speedy explanation. Just observe how, in the progress of this debate, and with what rapidity, the inclination has shown itself of raising the terms which are to be demanded from Russia. I do not see the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) in his place, but before the recess a speech was made by him, remarkable for its energy, eloquence, and force, worthy of the occasion and of the place occupied by that hon. and learned Gentleman at the bar of Ireland, yet that speech was so impassioned as to open to me the view of interminable hostilities with Russia. For the hon. and learned Gentleman said it was no longer a question of terms, that Russia was perfidious and a violator of treaties, that she was, therefore, not to be held within the comity of nations, and that we were now really fighting, not for any treaty stipulations, but for the power, glory, and supremacy of England throughout the world. Well, Sir, this appears certainly an alarming prospect; it opens the view of endless warfare. Again, in the progress of the debate, there was an hon. Gentleman, who spoke for the first time, with remarkable perspicuity and effect, the hon. Member for Montrose borough (Mr.Baxter): he declared last night that the time had arrived when it would not be safe to conclude a peace with Russia whilst she held a ship, a port, or a fortress within the limits of the Black Sea. In this state of the facts, and of avowed intentions and opinions, I am really at a loss now to understand what is the precise definite object for which this war is to be carried on. It is a trite observation, yet surely one not improper to be made on an occasion of this kind, that it is always easy for any minister to involve this country in a war; but if history be philosophy teaching by examples, then let me remind you that history and experience prove to us that it is very difficult to carry on a war with the full and cordial support of the people of this country for any great length of time. That observation may appear at variance with several historical facts, but I will illustrate it by one striking example. The longest peace, I believe, since the great rebellion, was the peace which terminated in 1739 under the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole. He was a most popular, and in peace a most successful Minister, and in that year he was led most reluctantly to declare war against Spain. Nothing ever exceeded the popularity of that war at its commencement. All classes of society rivalled each other in their manifestations of joy at its declaration; the leading Members of opposition took a most active part in support of the measure, and even a Prince of the Blood joined in the procession which took place on the declaration of war. Sir Robert Walpole had acted against his better judgment in declaring war, and within two years from having been the most popular of Ministers, he was left without any support in any quarter, and was driven from power amidst a storm of public disapprobation. After his overthrow the country became discontented with the whole course of the operations; the war dragged its length along for seven or eight years amidst the execrations of the people, and the country at length drifted by common consent into an ignominious peace. Although the Conferences at Aixla-Chapelle were studiously kept open, with the view of obtaining some decisive success which might influence the negotiations, fortune did not smile upon our arms, and the war closed with a peace ignominious beyond any other recorded in our history, two hostages being actually sent to Paris as security for the particular article of the treaty which stipulated the surrender of Cape Breton. The Earl of Suffolk and Lord Cathcart were sent as hostages, and we have it on the authority of the British ambassador in Paris, that the Pretender openly declared:—"If ever the day should return on which I shall recover the throne of my ancestors, my first desire will be to wipe out the stain which this disgraceful peace leaves on my country, and to take care that hostages shall be sent from Paris to London, as they are now sent from London to Paris." Well, Sir, this was the result of the war of Sir Robert Walpole. Allusion has been made to the American war, and to the last and longest war, namely, that with France, but it should be remembered that in the case of both those wars there were palpable and direct British objects deeply involved. The American war was a struggle for empire, on the result of which the destinies of no less than thirteen colonies depended, and the Sovereign of this country declared that he never could consent by any act of his to forfeit the brightest jewels of his Crown. During that war we suffered many disasters; we had thousands of miles of ocean to traverse, and we protracted the struggle in vain. The war finally ended in disaster, the effects of which are still regretted, and by many believed to be almost irreparable. But it was contended, and justly at the time, that honourable terms might at the commencement have been possible. That, however, was a war in which England was fighting for an empire. Then, what was the case in regard to the war of the French Revolution? That was a struggle of another kind; but still its object was direct and immediate as touching the safety of our native land. ["No, no!"] I hear an expression of dissent from an hon. Member below me, but I must beg to state what the cause of that war appears to me to have been. In this world of ours the pride of empire has proved to be the source of great commotion and productive of deadly consequences; but there is another passion of the human mind which has produced equally important consequences, I mean the inglorious passion of fear—"Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor." Fear has subdued empires, fear has made wars, and it was the fear entertained of the dangerous principles that existed at the period of the French Revolution which involved this country in that long and expensive war. What was that fear? Was it a groundless fear? I think that fear was rightly entertained, and the danger boldly met. There was a regicide, there was the blood-stained guillotine, there was the declaration of Jacquerie, there was the declaration of the Social Propaganda, there were all the horrors of the French Revolution. Those apprehensions were not ill-founded which led to the commencement of the French war. In its progress it became an internecine war, and afterwards a struggle between the first Napoleon and the rest of the Powers of Europe, the question, so far as this country was concerned, being whether England should be a free and independent nation or should become an appanage and mere domain of France? Reference has been made to the vast cost of the French war. It has been stated, and truly, that no less a debt than 500,000,000l. has been incurred to maintain the Bourbons on the Throne of France, which was rescued from the great conqueror Napoleon I. by the glorious successes of our arms, led on by one of the greatest generals that the world has known for these 1,800 years—a general equal, at least, to Cæsar, and only inferior, if inferior, to Napoleon himself. But, having succeeded in establishing the Bourbons on the Throne of France at the cost of enormous sacrifices, after a struggle of twenty years' duration, by the conquest and overthrow of Napoleon, O! miseras hominum mentes, O! pectora cæca. It so happens that the very next heir of Napoleon himself is now on the Throne of France; and not only on the throne of France, but is our powerful, our cordial, and, I must add, our faithful ally. This surely suggests some serious considerations why we should reflect, first of all, upon the facility with which war is waged in this country, and then proceed to ask what is the definite object which you have in view in the prosecution of the present contest. You perceive that the wars to which I have alluded have been national and directly affecting British interests, but the war which we are now waging with Russia is one in which our interest is remote and contingent—distant and not immediate. I have already said that I am one of those who are responsible for the declaration of this war. I do not regret it, but I think it ought to be always borne in mind what was the precise object of that war at its commencement. Now, Sir, I must take exception to some doctrines which I have heard advanced. I am not one of those who believe that during the progress of a war it is not perfectly legitimate to vary your terms according to the degree of success attending your operations; but, while I say I think your terms may vary, I am strongly of opinion that the object for which you embarked in a war should be kept steadily in view, and that that object should not vary, whatever may be the success of your arms. Now, the object for which we embarked in this war was the maintenance of the independence and the integrity of Turkey. That was the avowed object, and, I contend, the sole object, of the war. I consider that the war waged for this object was necessary and just, and that the reasons for it were twofold. First, there were the covert intentions of Russia, which were scarcely concealed from the English Government; and, secondly, there was the overt act of the invasion of the Principalities. Now, Sir, it will become my duty shortly to refer to the negotiations which have taken place. I will not enter into details as to the settlement of the first point in reference to the Principalities—the immediate object of the war; for, though exceptions could be taken to that arrangement with reference to certain particulars on which the hon. Member for the West Riding commented, yet in the main the settlement proposed did secure the perfect independence of the Principalities, and, instead of placing them under the protectorate of Russia, it placed them under that of the four contracting European Powers, and it was stipulated that no negotiations should take place with reference to the Principalities henceforth without the whole question being laid before the four contracting Powers. The second point with reference to the navigation of the Danube I will not discuss at any length, but merely state that in the main the propositions of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, the British Plenipotentiary, were acceded to. It was agreed that the navigation should he placed under a European Commission, in which England was to have a voice, and precautions were taken with respect to keeping open, not only the course of the river, but also its mouth, where impediments had arisen. The management of this was to be placed under a Local Committee, to be created by a European Commission, which could not be dissolved except by the consent of the four contracting Powers. It was erroneously stated on a former evening that the question of a naval force to be kept at the mouth of the river constantly to watch the faithful performance of these stipulations was negatived by Russia; it was not so, the question was only reserved till after the settlement of the third point. I think, moreover, Sir, I am authorised to state to the House the spirit in which the Russian envoy accepted the Four Points. On the 3rd of December, immediately after the signature of the treaty of Austria, France, and England, the Russian envoy, in accepting the terms of negotiation as contained in the Four Points, distinctly announced that he accepted them, renouncing, on the part of his Government, the spirit of the religious protectorate of Russia over the Christian subjects of Turkey, renouncing the political protectorate of the Principalities, consenting to the free navigation of the Danube, and also consenting to the revision of the treaty of 1841. These were the declarations made by the Russian envoy who accepted these bases, and I consider it important that they should be borne in mind during this discussion, because I think that it will be found, after a careful investigation of the negotiations, that the Russian envoy did adhere in the main throughout these discussions to the concessions which he made at their commencement, and that the concessions cover all the objects sought by the war when it was declared. He consented to that which was the most important of all the concessions—namely, a limitation of the exclusive religious protectorate claimed by Russia over the Christian subject of the Turks, which, in point of fact, was the immediate origin of the war. I will not go back to the disputed question as to what took place with respect to the discussions as to the holy places—for it was stated by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, who then held the seals of the Foreign Department, that, in the opinion of England, at the commencement of the quarrel, the first threat of force did not proceed from Russia but from France, and that Russia was in the right and France was in the wrong. The Emperor of the French, with great magnanimity in the spirit of peace, which cannot be too highly commended, on consideration of the whole question and the conduct of his Ambassador at Constantinople, receded from the claims of his Ambassador, whose acts he disavowed, and he placed France in the right by so doing, whereas she had originally been in the wrong. Russia had a distinct and just cause of complaint against Turkey with reference to the transaction to which I have alluded; but I think the tone adopted by Prince Menchikoff on his mission to the Porte was wholly inconsistent with the respect due to an independent Power. This insolence—for I can call it by no other term—coupled with the invasion of the Principalities, rendered it a paramount—an imperative duty on the part of the allies of Turkey—England and France—to come forward in its defence, and to secure its independence, which had been so violated. Now, Sir, will the House permit me to state what in my opinion is the strongest part of the present case, and which deserves most careful consideration? I agreed with the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Sir B. Lytton), when he said it was necessary by force of arms, when engaged in war, to humble your adversary, and more especially necessary in a case of this kind where insolence was followed by aggression. But look at the result of the last year's war with Russia, and contrast her claims at the commencement of the war with the terms on which she was willing to conclude peace at Vienna, and I think you will not find that the history of any war shows greater alterations in tone and terms than those which have been obtained in the late Conferences of Vienna from Russia, and obtained, as I contend, by force of arms. Now, Sir, will the House permit me—because this is a very essential part of the subject—somewhat to investigate this point in detail? I will, first of all, state the original demands of Russia, and I will contrast those demands with the concessions she was willing to make. But here, before I do so, I must state that in my opinion the test by which you ought to try negotiations of this kind was wisely and well laid down by the noble Lord the British Plenipotentiary on that occasion, when he declared that, in his judgment, at the commencement of negotiations no treaty of peace could be sound or permanent in which the honour of the adversary was not consulted and duly considered. The noble Lord then went on to make another observation, to which I call attention, and to which I most cordially and entirely subscribe. He said, with reference to this question of honour, that the defence of Sebastopol, on the one hand, and the attack on the other, had covered the contending armies with equal glory and that the military honour of Russia, France, and England, was safe when tested by those operations. I will now recall in detail to the recollection of the House what were the demands and language of Russia at the commencement of the war, and what, after a year's hard fighting, were her submissions—for I can give them no other name—on which she was willing to conclude peace at Vienna. I will go through the demands seriatim. Her first pretension was that no other Power should be permitted to interfere in any negotiation between to interfere in any negotiation between Russia and the Sublime Porte. That pretension was stated repeatedly in the most distinct, arrogant, and offensive terms. Now let us contrast the result. All the negotiations for the last two years, by the forced consent of Russia, have been conducted by England, France, and Austria on behalf and in aid of the Sultan. The next pretension of Russia was that the Turkish Ambassador must sue for peace either at St. Pettersburg or at the head-quarters of the Russian army. A more arrogant pretension than this was never put forward. How much is her tone abated now. Actually, through the mediation of Austria, Russia, if she did not ask, at all events suggested, the opening of the Conference of Vienna, and the Turkish Plenipotentiary, instead of suing for peace at the headquarters of the Russian army, met the Russian envoys in the capital of the Austrian Emperor, and treated with them on terms of perfect equality. What was the next pretension of Russia? She refused to meet the Turkish envoys in any conference on equal terms with the representatives of other Powers, Russia holding that Turkey was not entitled to rank on terms of equality with other European States. Ask the noble Lord the British Plenipotentiary, who has just returned from a conference at which the Turkish Ambassador sat at the same table with the Russian envoys, and discussed conditions of peace with them on equal terms, in the presence of the noble Lord the British plenipotentiary, of the French envoy M. Drouyn de Lhuys, of M. Buol, the First Minister of the Emperor of Austria, and the other Plenipotentiaries there assembled. This monstrous pretension of Russia was thus not only modified but practically negatived in the unquestionable and decisive manner. The next pretension was that the Principalities should be occupied by Russia as a material guarantee. The conference is opened at Vienna, and the Russian army is found expelled from the Principalities altogether, and those provinces occupied by the allied troops. But Russia, not satisfied with occupying the Principalities, had passed the Danube, and had invaded Bulgaria. How was that met? By a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, to which even Prussia was a party as well as Austria, stipulating, in express terms, that if Russia passed the Balkan a casus belli would arise involving the necessity of those great European Powers, in addition to the forces which England and France had sent to the aid of Turkey, taking part in the war. Have there been, I ask, no military successes? Has there been for the last nine months a single Russian on the rights bank of the Danube, and has not the valour of the Turks themselves achieved this victory? By the gallant defence of Silistria, Russia was expelled, not only from the Principalities by Austria, but from Turkish territory by a Turkish army. Then, as to the fleets in the Baltic and the Black Sea. It was the boast of Russia that the Black Sea was virtually in her possession; her commanding naval force had been held by her to give her a complete dominion over that sea; and her boast was that in the Baltic, whenever the weather would permit the navigation of the waters, she had at all times ready a fleet amounting to thirty sail of the line prepared to close that sea against a hostile invader. Now, Sir, I ask, what has become of those fleets? They have been destroyed, by the suicidal policy of Russia herself from fear of an attack. Talk of prestige! The naval prestige of Russia, whether in the East or in the Baltic, has been destroyed by the superiority of the arms of the allied Powers of France and England, and I do not think we shall hear much more of Russian naval celebrity or power in any waters. Now, the noble Lord, I think, mentioned the threatening character of the works at Bomarsund, which were indeed, of the most alarming nature. They were erected in defiance of a treaty with Sweden, and nothing could prove more clearly the justice of the war at its commencement than the very fact of the existence of such works in defiance of a treaty with a friendly Power. But where is that fortress now? Razed to the ground by the attack of France and England; and a practical lesson has thus been given which will not be forgotten speedily by Russia, with whom we are at war, or by Sweden, whose alliance we seek. Then, Sir, as to the river Danube. For the last three or four years the command of the month of that river, and of the lower portion of it (the most important portion in regard to the trade of the Principalities), was in the hands of Russia; by various artifices, and by the establishment of a system of quarantine, by the possession of both sides of the Sulina mouth, and by a number of fortresses erected on the Bessarabian shore, the whole command of the river was in the hand of Russia only. But what were the terms which the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) negotiated successfully with respect to the Danube? Russia consented to remove her line of frontier works, to have no fortifications at the Sulina mouth, and to place the navigation under a free commission of the European powers, in which England should have a voice. The fourth point, Sir, to which I have already adverted, is with respect to the rights, privileges, and immunities of members of the orthodox Russo-Greek faith within the dominions of the Truck, claimed as being placed under the peculiar protection of Russia ab antiquo in force of treaty engagements, and especially that of Kainardji, with Count Nesselrode's enforcement of his demand on rejection of the Turkish amendments of the Vienna note. It will be remembered, with respect to this particular claim, it was alluded to in the terms in which have stated it to the House when made by the Emperor Nicholas himself at an audience which Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador had with the Emperor, and it was also so reported by Colonel Rose to Lord Malmesbury as made at Constantinople so far back as 1852. Now, Sir, I very much regret that the British and French Governments did not consent at the conferences to the proposal to proceed, pending the reference to the respective Governments of the question regarding the third point, to the exhaustion of the ground of difference with regard to the fourth point. I think that if the negotiators had proceeded to discuss that point there is every reason to believe that no practical difficulty would have arisen in its adjustment. All doubt would have been removed with respect to the remaining matters of difference between the contending parties, the ground would have been cleared, and a nearer approximation to a peace would have been obtained. The Austrian Government was anxious that that point should be discussed; Russia was willing to discuss it; but it was France and England alone that interposed objections. However, Prince Gortchakoff, on the part of Russia, did make an important declaration with regard to this fourth point. He regretted that any delay should take place in the discussion, said he was ready to discuss the matter at once, and declared that he attached no political importance to this fourth article. Recollect what had been the language of the Emperor of Russia to Sir Hamilton Seymour in respect to it, and what had been the language also of the Russian Envoy at Constantinople to Colonel Rose; and contrast that language with the tone of Prince Gortchakoff, who accepted the four bases, foreseeing the necessity that Russia should renounce her exclusive protectorate, and who went on to make this further declaration, that nothing would give greater security to the Sultan in governing his empire than that he should act without foreign intervention for the happiness of his Christian subjects. Thus, not only on the first and second points our claims were fully satisfied, but my belief is, that this fourth point presented no insuperable obstacle to the complete and final settlement. But now, Sir, we arrive at the third point. The pretension of Russia was that the independence and integrity of Turkey were not guaranteed by any stipulation of the treaty of 1841; that that integrity and independence were assumed in the preamble, but not sanctioned or ratified by any specific engagement. Now, on that branch of the subject a complete and specific engagement was stipulated in the presence of the noble Lord the British Plenipotentiary, and what was the result of that engagement? So far from allowing the declaration with respect to the independence and integrity of Turkey to remain excluded from the body of the treaty, Prince Gortchakoff consented that the independence and integrity of Turkey should be guaranteed by a treaty engagement on the part of Russia satisfactory to Turkey; and what is most remarkable is, that the form of guarantee proposed by Russia was varied by the Turkish Plenipotentiary, and the form suggested by the Turkish Plenipotentiary was the form adopted by the conference. Now I have gone seriatim through the pretensions of Russia at the commencement of the war, and the submission of that Power at the conclusion of this conference to the terms specified in the manner which I have already stated. There remains only a portion of the third point, namely, the means by which the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should be abated. Now, Sir, I was a party, while a Member of the Government of Lord Aberdeen, to the propositions made to France with reference to the mode of giving effect to this third article. I am a party to the proposition of this question of limitation, and, as such, I am bound to state that it was never regarded by me as an ultimatum; that it was not submitted to France, and not accepted by her as an ultimatum; and that it was not proposed at Vienna by either France or England in the character of an ultimatum. It would have been preposterous to have begun a conference with an ultimatum, and inconsistent with the whole proceedings of a negotiation. If ever there was a negotiation clear on the face of it from such an absurdity, it was the Conference at Vienna, because in good faith, and on the very face of the stipulation with respect to the third point, it was stated that the parties proposing terms should have the right to vary them in accordance with the events of the war which was being carried on. It is clear, therefore, that it was no ultimatum, and, not being an ultimatum, I come to the consideration, this being the only ground of difference, was it prudent to break off the Conferences at Vienna on this sole ground? The result of the discussion has convinced me that, as an ultimatum, it was not tenable, and I think the observations made by my hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) are so strong and well-founded that it is impossible to overlook them. Steam makes an immense difference in this matter, and if you give Russia a power to keep up four ships of the line of the largest size, with all the advantages of steam, and with smaller vessels in a like proportion—and such was the limitation proposed by France and England—if she be perfidious, with limitations such as these she can accomplish all her objects. You mark your distrust and you do not take adequate precautions. If, on the other hand, she is not perfidious, but trustworthy—and remember that for forty years she has been your ally, and you have never had to complain of perfidy on her part—no such stipulation is in fact required. Another observation was made in the course of the debate to which I attach great importance, because I consider it to be perfectly well-founded—it is this, that if you obtain that stipulation, and peace be once made, a ship of the line or two more added by Russia to her naval force in the Black Sea would never induce England to go to war again upon that account. Now, it is admitted on all hands that the interest of England, in this matter, is remote and contingent, while the interest of Austria is direct and immediate. Austria has a far deeper interest in this question than either France or England, and let me observe that the position of Austria at the abrupt close of these negotiations is not at all that which it was at their commencement. She was then actively co-operating with you; she is now severed and estranged from you by the rupture of the negotiations. I thought that the observations of the hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire (Sir B. Lytton) last night were most wise and judicious with respect to Austria. I think that she has been under very trying circumstances a faithful friend to England. Her position is very peculiar. She stands, as it were, a narrow isthmus between the two raging seas, of Russian aggression upon the one side and the military pride and ambition of the Western Powers upon the other. It is a narrow and difficult position, and I contend that she is entitled to the utmost forbearance. I hold that peace—a great blessing to all nations—is in a paramount degree the policy of England. Peace is, also, the policy and interest of Austria. She, therefore, is a natural ally and constant friend to England; and we ought to bear with her infirmities, to consider her position, and, above all things, not to quarrel or come to a hasty rupture with her unnecessarily. For these reasons I thought that the policy indicated by the hon. Baronet was both wise and judicious. Now, Sir, I think that we are entitled to know what is the proposition which Austria has made to England and France at the close of the conference. She has the greatest and most direct interest in the matter, and I regret that the noble Lord was not present on the 26th of April when the Russian Envoy made his last proposition. I quite agree with the noble Lord in the policy of rejecting the proposition of the 21st of April. I think that there were grave objections to it, and that France and England were perfectly justified in their peremptory rejection of it. I entertain quite a different opinion of the proposition of the 26th of April, and I think that proposition is not to be regarded as an ultimatum, because Russia was, no more than France or England, justified in making an ultimatum at that stage of the negotiation. I think that that proposition, as Count Buol and M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, did contain the elements of an adjustment. There is another matter of importance, with reference to this, which ought to be considered. M. Drouyn de Lhuys having heard that proposition, and having declared that it offered the elements of a settlement, proceeded to Paris, as the noble Lord did to London, but he had the advantage of discussing the question with the Russian Envoy in detail, and he had the still greater advantage, after the proposition was made, of hearing the opinion of the Austrian Government respecting it. He returned to Paris, and the rumour is—I am only speaking from rumour, but it is rumour which is confirmed by publication in the newspapers on the Continent, and by the absence of any denial—that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was so well satisfied with the last proposition as moulded by Austria, that he submitted it to his Government; that the Emperor of the French was not unwilling to accept it; that the French Emperor proposed to the English Government that it should be accepted; and that its rejection took place in consequence of the influence of the English Government being actively exerted both in London and at Paris against it. I have no information upon the subject, and I speak only from report; but let the House remember what is the position of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He, having brought the proposition from Vienna, having, as I believe, thought it acceptable and proposed it to his Government, and that proposition being rejected by the advice of England, has retired from the councils of the Emperor. Surely then, Sir, we are bound to speak out upon this occasion. I have endeavoured to use no concealment; I have stated without reserve my own position and feelings with respect to this question; I am not a slavish admirer of Russian tyranny; I am not the auxiliary of Russia; I am not the friend of Russia; but I am the sincere advocate of peace on honourable terms. I think that a golden opportunity has been lost for securing this the greatest of all blessings without the sacrifice of one particle of national honour. I hear much about fighting for prestige. I must say that a more dangerous doctrine was never broached. I think you must adhere most strictly to the definite object of the war; but, while adhering to that object, I admit that the terms may vary with a view to effect that object, and those terms will naturally vary with the events and successes of the war. But there is something in the present balanced state of affairs in the Crimea, which, as it appears to me, makes the juncture favourable to a settlement. The honour of England, I think, is sustained by the victories which she has gained whenever she has come in contact with the enemy—by the advantages which those victories have won for her in the lowered tone of the enemy, who was originally aggressive and insulting. I must say that I think, although no friend to Russia, that the honour of Russia must be considered, and that if we push her to the wall there will be something passive and dogged in her resistance. Although vanquished, she will not yield. I am by no means satisfied that this opportunity once lost, even although our I wish all taunts and party feeling on this occasion to be cast aside. It is a great crisis and emergency in public affairs. Sursum corda; let us elevate our minds and thoughts beyond the passions and party feelings of the day; the interests of a great nation and the cause of humanity are at stake, and I am confident that we shall best serve our country by such a course—that country which, whatever other differences we may have, is still dearer to us than life itself. Let us consider the interests of our country and the interests of our country only, and let us be satisfied that the greatest blessing which we can confer on the nation both with respect to it internal prosperity and its foreign relations, is the restoration of peace. I believe the opportunity is favourable, and I shall to the last hour of my life, regret the loss of this opportunity, if it be allowed to pass away. I know that the feelings of the country—of a gallant and noble people—have been pricked and wounded by the want of greater military successes and by the occurrence of certain exaggerated disasters; but I do not think that all the money we have expended, and the losses we have sustained, will, if peace were made to-morrow, be thrown away. I think both England and Russia have been taught some useful lessons. I think that Russia has been taught that her arrogance and her pretensions cannot be sustained by the successes of her arms. I think England has also learned a useful lesson, and that past evils will be turned into national benefits if we improve the opportunity of correcting our errors and of profiting by experience. I hope that if peace be restored she will not hastily reduce her establishments, certainly not her naval, and in a very small degree her military, establishment. I think that, consistently with her position amongst the great nations of the world, both her naval and her military establishments were too much reduced at the close of the last war. I think, also, that a more perfect military organization is necessary, and I hope it will be effected. If our object is to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey, which is a legitimate object, you must set aside your trust in treaties and negotiations, and not return too soon to a small naval and military force. It is not to be dissembled that when once a weak power calls in its last extremity for the assistance of powerful auxiliaries, just in proportion to the length of time which she depends on such support she becomes more and more dependent on it, till at last she cannot exist without it. Now, whether you adopt the policy of limitation, or whether you devise some other expedient, still I am decidedly of opinion that the maintenance of Turkey becomes day by day more difficult, and as Lord Clarendon warned the Turkish Government, when it was bent upon rushing into war against the advice of both England and France, its position has become so critical that its ruin will be inevitable and its maintenance all but impossible. Sir, I am sure that the great test of statesmanship in the rising generation will be to make provision for the fall of that empire in Europe, to take care that Constantinople does not become the prey of Russia on the one hand or of any great naval Western Power on the other—that this test of statesmanship and this policy, whatever be the conditions of peace, cannot be maintained unless the English Minister is backed by an adequate force both by land and sea, and, above all, by having at his command an army of reserve. Sir, I do not think that it is necessary for me to trouble the House with any further observations. I have endeavoured to express my opinions dispassionately and openly, I have endeavoured not to say anything which can give offence to any Gentleman who has heard me, and I return to the House my cordial thanks for the patience with which it has listened to my observations, which perhaps, are not in accordance with the views of a majority of the House.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE

said, he must beg to explain that he had made no reflections on the management of the navy by the right hon. Baronet, which he was ready to confess had been most admirable.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

Sir, the many references which have been made to the late negotiations, and especially the observations made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), make it incumbent on me to address some explanation to the House; and in so doing I shall endeavour to imitate the calm spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has discussed this matter; because, as he has observed, we are not now considering any question of party triumph or party politics—we are looking to the great question of the conditions of peace which might be obtained, or to the nature of the war which we have to wage. It seems to me that these are the two great questions we have to consider. If you are determined to have peace, upon what conditions can you obtain it? If you mean to carry on the war, for what objects is that war to be carried on? Now, Sir, with respect to the first of those questions, let it be remembered that, although, as my right hon. Friend (Sir, J. Graham) has truly said, we have already in a short period grained very great objects—although Russia, which began with saying she would not negotiate except with Turkey alone, and with Turkey at no other place than at St. Petersburg, or the head-quarters of the Russian army, afterwards consented to sit with Turkey as her equal in the conference—that although Russia, which at first maintained that her ancient treaties with Turkey should not be disturbed, was quite willing to consent to renounce the pretension which she had so proudly exercised, whether rightly or wrongly I will not dispute, over the Principalities, and to renounce the articles of treaties which, in the course of nearly a century, she had carefully, by means of her victories in the field and her skill in the Cabinet, been able to effect—these concessions and some others of great importance Russia made in consequence of the league that was formed against her, and the success of the war, still I could not help feeling that we were in this position—and I stated it very soon after my arrival at Vienna to Count Buol as a reason why I could not entertain very sanguine hopes of success in the negotiations—I said, the bellingerent Powers had had success enough to justify them in not making peace, except on terms that would convey full security to Turkey against future aggression; but that, at the same time, Russia had not had such reverses as we could expect would lead her to make such concessions as would satisfy the alternatives we were bound to demand. That was the position in which I felt we were when the position in which I felt we were when the negotiations began. It may be said, then why begin negotiations at such a time and under such circumstances? That was a necessity imposed on us by the treaty with Austria of the 2nd of December. That treaty pointed out that in a certain case Austria should join us to obtain the Four Points, even by force of arms; but Austria said, naturally, and I think wisely for her own interests, and with full consideration of the great importance of entering into a war, "It must first be ascertained that Russia is not willing to make peace on terms that we may think sufficient before we carry out the treaty into which we have entered." It was necessary, therefore, to ascertain that point, and for that purpose the Conferences at Vienna commenced. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Graham) has said truly that, with regard to the first point, we placed the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia under the protection of the five Powers, instead of under the sole protectorate of Russia, according to former treaties. We provided, though the hon. Member for the West Riding is very ill-satisfied with the terms, for free legislation, for liberty of worship, and for freedom of trade to those Principalities. There was perfect willingness on the part of all the members of the conference—Russia amongst the rest—that the administration and legislation of those provinces should be entirely national, and not interfered with by any other Power. The hon. Gentleman has criticised some of the provisions of the protocols with respect to the Principalities. Now, let me in the first place say that I am entirely responsible for having agreed to those terms. They were agreed to by me at Vienna, and do not implicate the Government to which I belong. I am ready to take the whole responsibility that attaches to them. But, at the same time, I must say that those terms do not bear the sense which the hon. Member for the West Riding has placed on them. He said the natives were not to meddle in matters that might be dangerous to the tranquillity of their country; but our engagement was that they should not engage in intrigues that would be dangerous to the tranquillity of their country. These were the terms. I consider that the position of these provinces is a very critical one—that, in the close neighbourhood of Russia, Austria, and Turkey, it is very difficult, and will be very difficult, to maintain independence in matters of legislation and government in those Principalities. In the first place, neither Russia nor Austria would allow any intrigues to be carried on in those Principalities against the security and tranquillity of their own provinces; and, in the next place, Turkey presented an article of a treaty by which she could require that no foreigners should enter into the Principalities. I felt, therefore, that it was a difficult thing to make an arrangement in these circumstances, and the Ambassador of the Porte at Vienna not being ready with any final proposal, it was agreed, with the consent of Austria and Russia, that a future arrangement on this subject should be made at Constantinople, with the concurrence of the Ambassadors of all the Christian Powers there. Some persons imagine that it would be better to make these Principalities entirely independent; but my belief is that, if this were attempted, their independence would not be secured, and that they would fall in a very short time into the power either of Russia or Austria. There would be a contention, perhaps, between those two Powers as to which they should belong to, but they would maintain no permanent independence. Therefore I think the suzerain system was necessary in the arrangement of those Principalities; but I thought it was for their happiness and security to provide all freedom in religion, in trade, and in legislation. With respect to the Danube, it was said the other day that the Russians only gave up the power of quarantine; but that is only half the truth, because by the Treaty of Adrianople Russia agreed to have no other fortifications but those connected with the quarantine. [An hon. MEMBER: No!] If the hon. Gentleman reads the Treaty of Adrianople he will see that that is the case, and he will find, in consequence, that Russia had fortifications; and that point was what she surrendered in the Conferences at Vienna. We agreed, also, that, with respect to general supervision, there should be both an English and a French Commissioner; and it was also agreed, on a proposal of mine, that that Commission should only be dissolved by the general agreement of all the Powers. Thus the freedom of the navigation of the Danube had increased securities. We came next to the great point which is called the third point; but before I touch upon that I must allude to a statement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle to the effect that he regrets that the Governments of England and France did not permit and sanction the conference going into the question of the fourth point, and did not endeavour to settle that before discussing the third. Now, on that subject I must remark that that point was far from being so easy of settlement as my right hon. Friend supposes. I had several conversations on that subject with the very intelligent Ambassador of the Porte, who arrived at a later period, after the first point had been discussed, and who, when there was a question of considering the fourth point, talked to me very earnestly on the subject and protested against any article being inserted in a treaty by which the Porte should renounce in any way its independence and be made to depend on Christian Powers with respect to its own internal affairs. I thought that objection—though I will not call it objection, but suggestion—with respect to the fourth point a very reasonable one; and at the same time I saw that the Plenipotentiary of Russia, and probably the Plenipotentiary of Austria, would be very anxious to obtain such a settlement of the fourth point as would have enabled them in some way to control the legislation of the Porte as regards the Principalities. We therefore should have been in very considerable difficulty in discussing that fourth point, and I certainly could not have consented to any arrangement of the fourth point which, on the one hand, did not provide that such a legislation should be introduced into Turkey as would give fair and equal privileges to Christians along with Mahomedans, and, on the other hand, enable those other two Powers constantly to interfere in the internal affairs. I come now to the third point, on which so much discussion has turned, and on which we have the misfortune not to arrive at any conclusion; and here I think my right hon. Friend rather takes advantage of the moderation displayed by the Western Powers, in order to say that as they are willing to concede so much and as their terms are so moderate, why should they not make them still more moderate, and so moderate, indeed, that they should be useless. The proposition which was suggested by the French Government, though not regularly put in the form of a proposition in the protocol, but more than once stated with great eloquence and ability by the French Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was this—that there should be what he called a neutralisation of the Black Sea; that it should be a neutral sea for the purposes of commerce only; and, being so, that arsenals and fortifications for the purpose of war should be destroyed, and that no establishment should exist there except for the peaceful purpose of trade. Now that, Sir, was a large and, I must say, in itself a good proposition; but the moment it was mentioned the Russian Minister at once declared that he never could agree to any measure which would put an end to the military fortresses on the Black Sea, and prevent the Russians maintaining a force there capable of repelling the insults even of a small Power. Now, Sir, it was in order to meet that objection, and in order, too, to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea—those being the very terms to which all the Powers had agreed and Russia had consented—that we proposed that her naval force should be limited. I ask, therefore, how else were you to obtain the cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea? I have heard many Gentlemen say that this plan would have been inefficient. I do not think it would have been so in effect, because I believe that immediately Russia tried, I will not say by increasing her strength by one ship, but by three or four ships, or even by a large force, to show her intentions of aggression, then the suspicions of Europe would have been raised, and that which does not seem at the first view to be a perfect security would have turned out in practice quite a sufficient safeguard for Turkey in the Black Sea, and, consequently, for the peace of Europe. But, supposing that plan was not to be insisted upon, in what manner was this third point to be carried out? I think, notwithstanding what has been said by various hon. Gentlemen, that we should not insist any longer on that article. I think no Gentleman will maintain that it was my business, as representative of the Government of Her Majesty, to give up that which we thought, perhaps, the most essential of all the propositions in the Four Points, with a view to put an end to the preponderance and aggressive ambition of Russia. Well, Sir, how was that to be effected? My right hon. Friend says, and with great truth, that it would not have done to have accepted the first proposition of Russia, and to have allowed the Russian fleet to pass from the Bosphorus to the Dardanelles, and also from the Dardanelles to the Bosphorus at their pleasure. It is obvious that if we had consented to those terms we should have thus increased to a large amount the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and have allowed the Black Sea fleet to come out from time to time, passing close to the Sultan's palace, and parading the waters of Greece to raise discontent and disaffection among the subjects of the Porte. Thus the facility of menace would have been increased whenever the Czar of Russia might think proper to send a fleet to Constantinople in order to enforce unjust demands. I think, therefore, that the first plan proposed by Russia would not have been sufficient. Let me here observe, that the notion which the hon. Member for the West Riding entertains, that those great ships he spoke of with 130 guns each could be built in America and sent into the Black Sea, could not be practically carried into effect so long as the Dardanelles were closed against Russia; and unless we admit the opening of the Dardanelles it is impossible that ships of war built in America could pass into the Black Sea, or could furnish the great fleet to which the hon. Member has alluded. Then we come to the second proposition made by Russia on the 26th of April. My right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) and others think that was a good proposition to accent, but it is impossible to say that it would have effected any real difference in the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. The only pretended difference is this—that in case of menace the Sultan might call up the fleets of his allies; but, in ordinary circumstances, there would have been no difference whatever. The same preponderance would have existed, and, therefore, how was it possible for myself or for Lord Westmorland, after I left Vienna, to say, "We insist that the predominance of Russia shall cease in the Black Sea, and at the same time we consent to place Russia in exactly the same position in which she stood before the war." My right hon. Friend thinks that Count Buol was satisfied with this proposition, but I beg the House to listen to what Count Buol actually did say:— Count Buol resumes by reiterating the opinions pronounced by him; adds that the project developed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, and declined by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia, contained a complete and efficacious system; that he could not say as much of the propositions put forward this day; that Russia, in attaching to the mutual guarantee the value only of an engagement not to encroach on the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, reduces it, in fact, to an obligation which may be said to be self-evident; that the arrangement proposed to act as an application of the principle of the cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea limits itself to the power reserved to the Sultan of calling foreign fleets to his aid whenever the preponderance of the Russian fleet should become threatening to him, which, in fact, would only tend to augment the chances of a misunderstanding; that, to sum up, the Russian propositions could only be considered as including principles of a nature to be introduced into a general and complete system. That was the opinion which the Austrian Plenipotentiary gave of this Russian proposal. How, then if we were to insist on the most material part of the third point, could we agree to this Russian proposition? As my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) said the other night, "You may call this half a point. It does not matter what is its material check is would give to the power of Russia in the Black Sea." I have now stated why I think that we could not agree to the condition of peace proposed by Russia. Of course, as Russia chose to consider that she was not sufficiently defeated in the war to agree to our terms, she had a right to refuse them. I have been somewhat ciriticised for having alluded even to somewhat similar conditions in the treaty of Utrecht, when the fortifications of Dunkirk were destroyed, but I thereby obtained what was a virtual admission from Prince Gortchakoff that this is not a question of honour, but more or less of defeat and inferiority in the war, because no one maintains that Louis XIV, in agreeing to the treaty of Utrecht signed a peace inconsistent with his honour. On the contrary, I believe it was a peace very creditable and almost glorious to Louis XIV. He agreed to those terms, and he agreed that they were the consequences of defeat, and the Russian Plenipotentiary, by the objection which he made when I brought forward that instance, admitted that that which he refused now might be admitted, only with the proviso that Russia had been more defeated, and had received more checks in the course of the war. I believe, therefore, that it is not at all a question of the honour of Russia, but, on the contrary, that it is that Russia sees that she has no reason as the war at present stands, to renounce in any way those aggressive projects which she has sedulously entertained, which she intermits and lays by for a time, but which Catherine entertained, and which the Emperor Nicholas, in the latter years of his life, entertained, and which the present Emperor, on coming to the throne almost avowed that he meant to cherish as the objects of his reign, and which he is now endeavouring to carry into effect. That, I believe, is the reason, and not any question of insulted dignity or offended honour, which has led Russia to refuse the propositions of the Western Powers. We come now, Sir, to consider that serious question upon which I must decline to give that very definite answer which an hon. Gentleman asked from me—namely, "If you are forced to continue the war, and if you find that the only terms which you can propose, which really give security to Turkey, are refused, what is your object in that war?" My answer to that question must be a very general one, that it is still as it has been—a security for Turkey against Russia, and, therefore, a security for the peace of Europe. I cannot believe that if Russia were left to work her way undisturbedly to the capital of the Turkish Empire—making, perhaps, a little progress in 1855, greater progress ten years, hence, and still further twenty years hence—the independence of Europe would be secure. Every one has read the incident—and I believe it has lately appreared in the public papers—of the first Napolean, when engaged with the Emperor Alexander in considering this great question, calling for a map, putting his finger on Constantinople, abd, after some moments' meditation, exclaiming, "Constantinople! No, it is the empire of the world." I remember too another great man, the Duke of Wellington, saying—I cannot remember exactly on what occasion—that if, in addition to the forces of Russia in the Baltic, she were also by means of Constantinople to obtain the command of the Mediterranean, she would be too strong for the rest of the world. That, I believe, is not only the recognized opinion of great statesmen, but it is also the pervading sense of this country, and we must not, therefore, allow Russia, either by a simulated peace or by open war to effect the conquest of Constantinople. It may be said that the terms which we proposed were not effectual for that end; but if you say so you will blame us, not for our harshness to Russia, but for our over-moderation in not asking for stronger terms and for more powerful guarantees. There are, no doubt, other guarantees besides those contained in the limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea; but it has been stated in that Third Point, where we proposed that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea should cease, that the particular mode of carrying out that basis must depend on the events of the war, and cannot be determined beforehand. When we were compelled by the circumstances I have stated to enter into negotiations, we were then obliged to specify the particular security we wished to have; that negotiation is over, and it will be for us to consider, according to the events of the war, what will be the security which we shall, at any future negotiation, demand for the protection of Turkey. My right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) the other day said, to my repeated it after my contradiction, that I had spoken the other evening as if I wished to make this a war of nationalities. Sir, I never uttered a single word of the sort. I have looked back to my speech, and I cannot see that I used a single word or phrase which would bear such an interpretation. I certainly mentioned the word "Poland" in my description of the power of Russia, for I thought it necessary to give a description of the power of Russia, in order, in the first place, to show how difficult it was to obtain by negotiation form such a Power sufficient terms of security, and thereby to justify myself in some degree against the accusations made in a speech of two hours and a half by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire; and, in the next place, to show how necessary it was to obtain some security against further aggressions on the part of that great Power. But in mentioned the fortresses which Russia had in Poland. I stated the means used by her to conciliate the affections of the peasantry to the Russian rule, and the means employed by her to take away the young men from their country; but these were facts, and am I forbidden in this House to relate facts which I believe necessary to strengthen my argument? If there, was any inference to be drawn from my remarks, it was that the cause of Poland is one which is hopeless, and therefore that it would be madness in England and France to take any part in promoting resistance in that country. But, Sir, be that as it may, without at all intending any war of nationalities—and never having said anything of the kind—I still do think that it will be necessary to obtain some, material guarantees against the aggressions of Russia on Turkey. What we have to consider is, how far those Four Points provide a security for Europe against that aggression. It is an advantage that Russia should be compelled not to renew those treaties with Turkey by which she has managed to advance claims from which Turkey wishes to be freed; it is of importance that the navigation of the Danube should be free, in order that there should be no monopoly for the producing provinces of Russia, and it is of importance that the Sultan should give such privileges to his Christian subjects that they should be attached to him and ready to defend his empire against an enemy. My right hon. Friend has said that it will be the duty of future English statesmen to provide for the fall of Turkey; but I can assure him that it has been the view of English, and French statesmen—and it is certainly the view of those Austrian statesmen who preside and who have presided over the Councils of the Emperor of Austria—that there is no reason why Turkey should not be maintained, and why her integrity and independence should not continue to exist. That is the language which I heard at Vienna; that is the language which I heard from Prince Metternich and Count Buol. They both of them repudiated the doctrine of the late Emperor Nicholas, that Turkey was sure to fall, and therefore that some provision should be made for the succession. I certainly believe that they are well acquainted with the state of Turkey; they have an interest in being so, and I believe both in the sincerity of their opinion and in the sagacity with which that opinion has been formed. I must say here that I entirely agree that Austria, in these negotiations, has been sincerely endeavouring to provide with us securities against the aggressive ambition of Russia. Everything I saw at Vienna induced me to believe that, averse as Austria was to war, and anxious, perhaps, rather beyond the bounds of fair reason to find elements of peace, she was most sincerely desirous to obtain the objects which we desire, and to obtain them by effectual means. The position of Austria, having so many enemies as she has in Germany, is one which is, at the same time, very critical; and, much as I wish that the present war should be brought to a speedy conclusion—much as I desire that Austria should take part with the allies—I should most sincerely lament anything which should at all weaken the power of that empire in the great European system. Placed as she is in the centre of Europe, and having frequently taken part in the great wars that have arisen with the view of maintaining the balance of power, I believe that her existence is of the greatest value to Europe, and that other Powers—ourselves among the rest—are interested in that policy of Austria which has for its object the maintenance of the general equilibrium. Our aim in continuing the war will, therefore, be to keep the same object in view. The means of doing so must vary according to the events of the war, and I think it would be idle, ridiculous, and even presumptuous, in us to point out now what are the other terms of peace which England, in conjunction with her allies, should consider it necessary to demand. But this point, I think, has been secured even by these abortive negotiations, that from this time forward Turkey will be reckoned one of the Powers of Europe, forming an integral part of the general system of the balance of power—that her internal legislative authority will be preserved to her, and her independence and integrity recognised; and that, thereby, partly by the events of the war, and partly also by means of negotiation, we have already gained very great and material advantages. We have not yet, indeed, obtained that amount of advantage which would render Turkey secure; and I am forced to admit that I do not think we are likely to make a peace until we have gained such terms as would be safe for the Ottoman Empire. Be it remembered always that we are seeking no object of our own—that when peace is concluded we shall not have acquired one acre of new territory, or secured any advantage whatever for ourselves. It is for Turkey and the general system of Europe that we are endeavouring to obtain security. And now, Sir, let me address a few words to the House on the peculiar position of this question at the present moment. It seems to me that we began this debate on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) because the Whitsuntide holidays were at hand, and because the conferences were not closed. We have now arrived at a period when, the Whisuntide holidays being over, and the conferences entirely concluded, the various Motions and Amendments now before the House are not befitting to the present state of affairs. I own it appears to me that it would be far more regular, after the Ministers of the Crown have been enabled to bring down the final records of the Vienna Conferences containing the last proposition, which my right hon. Friend is so anxious to see, together with the declarations of Her Majesty's Ministers upon it, for this House, then, with all the papers in its possession, to proceed to address the Sovereign, assuring Her Majesty of its co-operation in the vigorous prosecution of the war. Of course it is open to those hon. Gentlemen who wish to force the Government into the resumption of the late negotiations to advocate a different view; but, having consulted with my noble Friend at the head of the Government on this subject, I know that he is of opinion that such a course as I have just described would be more regular and more conformable with the orderly proceedings of this House than the further discussion of the present series of Motions. If, however, the House chooses to go on with this debate, it is out of our power to prevent it; but it certainly appears to us that the course I have suggested would be the more regular one to pursue, and that we should decide, "Aye" or "No," whether we shall address the Crown, and then declare in what spirit we shall support Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war.

MR. ROEBUCK

I beg, Sir, to move the adjournment of this debate till Thursday next.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Sir, I agree with my noble Friend, that, under the altered circumstances in which we at present stand—that, seeing that the conferences have been finally closed, and that negotiations are at an end—that the course which was suggested by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli), under very different circumstances, when the negotiations had not terminated, and when the conferences were not concluded, would now be the simplest and plainest course for us to pursue. We are at present discussing a series of Amendments, and many hon. Gentlemen have great difficulty in coming to a conclusion upon them. The question which the House has the right to consider is, how the Government has conducted these negotiations, and whether the House, under the circumstances in which the country is placed, is willing to give to Her Majesty that assurance of support in the prosecution of the war which I think the House will be disposed, by a great majority, to affirm. The course, therefore, I propose would be to agree to the adjournment proposed by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield. We shall, in the course of a day or two, receive the protocol of that conference which took place yesterday. We shall then be in a condition to advise Her Majesty to submit to Parliament those papers which will show the course of negotiation up to the last moment, and then Parliament will be in a condition to judge of the course which ought to be pursued.

MR. DISRAELI

Sir, the suggestion of the noble Lord appears to me to be very unsatisfactory. More than three weeks ago I made a suggestion to the noble Lord, he having by command of Her Majesty placed certain papers on the table, that he should follow the usual course of ministers in his position, and move an Address to the Crown on the subject, so that the House might have the opportunity of expressing an opinion on the manner in which the affairs of the country had been transacted, and also of expressing their determination to support Her Majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the war, if she should think it necessary to carry it on. But how did the noble Lord receive the suggestion? First, in silence; and then when he broke through his taciturnity, in a spirit of jocularity and of levity. The noble Lord has given no reason why the debate should not proceed. If the noble Lord had placed these papers on the table—which he ought not to have done if the negotiations had not been concluded—if he had said, while placing the papers on the table, negotiations are going on, and it will probably be my duty to place other papers on the table—nobody would have urged the noble Lord to take the step which I suggested, and I should not have made the Motion which I thought it my duty to submit to the House. But the noble Lord placed the papers on the table, the Plenipotentiary Extraordinary has returned to his place in this House, and it was legitimate and necessary for the House to express its opinion on the negotiations, and all that has occurred has occurred in consequence of the conduct of the noble Lord. There has been an attempt made to distinguish between the Ministerial question and what is called the other question. I do not understand how the distinction is established. If we discuss the policy of the Government, that is as much a Ministerial question as the one in which we proposed to visit the conduct of the administration with censure. Now, what is the position in which the House is placed? We have before us an Amendment of an hon. Member which the noble Lord has publicly said he shall support. That Motion introduces the main question of the negotiations that have proved abortive at the conference, and whether we adopt the first or second Amendment, or both, the sense is the same. We declare that if Russia rejects the principle of a diminution of her naval force in the Black Sea, the means of negotiation are exhausted. The question having been discussed for two nights whether the House of Commons will sanction as a sine quâ non the strange proposition made by the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) in his character of Plenipotentiary—it is trifling with the House now to propose that the debate should not be brought to its legitimate conclusion, and that our opinion should not be taken on this important question. There are no papers that can be placed on the table of the House which can lessen the paramount character of the question raised by the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminister (Mr. Lowe). I trust the House Will not agree so to stultify itself after a debate of two nights, during which some of the most eminent members of the House have given their opinions, and the Minister himself has accepted this Amendment as an opportunity upon which the discussion of the whole question of the negotiations could be raised,—I hope the House will hot stultify itself by allowing this debate to be made a tabula rasa, in order that the noble lord may place one more protocol to which the Plenipotentiary Extraordinary is not a party—as a completion of negotiations which are described by the Government themselves as utterly abortive. I feel assured the House will feel it a duty to continue the debate to its legitimate end, and come to a distinct opinion upon this issue—whether the limitation which the noble Lord, the Plenipotentiary, raised at the congress—a limitation affecting the naval force of Russia in the Black Sea—should be of Should not be a sine quâ non for the settlement of peace between the two countries. That has been the issue which has been discussed for two nights—it is of the utmost importance, and I am of opinion we should come to a definite conclusion upon it.

MR. BRIGHT

Sir, I entirely agree with the observations of the right hon. Gentleman that a more extraordinary proposition never came from the Ministerial bench, and that is saying a good deal. The noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies has just made a speech of nearly an Hour in length. I did not particularly look at the clock, but I know it seemed long to me. Like almost every other speech which I have heard the noble Lord make upon this most serious question, in it he laid himself open to a satisfactory and Conclusive reply, and I should like an opportunity on some evening this week to make some observations upon that speech, and also upon settle other passages in the recent life of the noble Lord. We are asked to discuss a proposition of Gentlemen supposed to be acting strongly in the interest of the noble Lord. It is a joint proposition from the right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring), who is an old ally and Friend of the party of the noble Lord, and from the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe). But the question we have been discussing is this—was the Government acting for the true interests of the country in laying down at Vienna, as a sine quâ non, that a limitation of the Russian Black Sea fleet should be enforced? That is the question—it is one of the highest importance—of most momentous interst—10,000 times more important than the convenience of a Minister or the existence of a Cabinet. I must say I never heard a proposition which so astonished me as that this House, full to overflowing, having for two nights discussed this question, and opinions so various having been started by the most eminent Members of the House, the country reading every Word uttered with the intensest interest, that now, because the Government is in a sort of hocus pocus, into Which it invites the House to plunge; we are to give up the question until some other time. The noble Lord at the head of the Government is very fertile in expedients—I must almost use another term, and say evasions—in this matter. I think we have a right, seeing we have as much interest in this question as the Minister for the Crown, to say it ought to be freely discussed; and I may add, I have not the slightest expectation that this debate can be concluded before Friday night. We must, of course, have the opinion of the House upon this particular proposition of the hon. Member for Kidderminster. We are almost bullied upon these benches because we venture to think, what every hour proves, that the proposition made were unwise; but night after night, as we discuss it, the intelligent people of this country will come to the conclusion, either that the Government was frightened by leading articles, or that the Ministry think their places in danger—and, therefore, war is to be carried on, it may be for six years, as alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Southwark (Sir W. Moles-worth)—a war most expensive in treasure, and still more costly in a more sacred matter in my eyes—expensive in blood, and it may be also dangerous to that which the Ministry affects to prize so much—the honour, the glory, and the prestige of the country. I hope, whatever opinions we may hold in this House, whether we be for peace or for war, for a termination of bloodshed, or for ruining the country by a prolongation of hostilities, let us at any rate give out our own opinions, stand by our own honest convictions, and give to this great question the fullest and freest discussion which it is in the power of the House of Commons to give it.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I apprehend, Sir, the question before the House is, whether the debate be adjourned to Thursday. I confess I was strongly of opinion that it should be adjourned before the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire addressed the House, but after he concluded, that opinion was completely confirmed. I find the right hon. Gentleman purposes to attach to the first portion of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Kidderminster—for reasons which no doubt appear valid to him—a sense and meaning in which I think he will find few Members disposed to agree. I can conceive nothing more important than that this House should on the present occasion express its sentiments in language clear and not ambiguous, the country would be ill satisfied with anything which bore the appearance of being done only for a party triumph, or to swell the number of a division, for or against the Government, upon a question of this kind. Our object ought to be, without reference to any Government, to speak in language which fully expresses the sentiments of the House of Commons on the present State of affairs. I can truly say, without assuming any particular patriotism, I regard these discussions with feelings far deeper and more solemn than any which can belong to any party attachment, or to any Government which can be formed. I think, therefore, it is most important we should discuss this question fully and with all the facts before us. I think it is clear we shall on Thursday, after what has fallen from the noble Lord at the head of the Government, have all the circumstances more completely before us. I think I understood the noble Lord to say it was probable that the Government themselves, when they had laid on the table all the papers relating to the negotiations; might propose to the House an expression of its opinion to be given to the Crown. I do not know how that may be; I am not for giving up a discussion merely to accommodate any Government and by adjourning the debate we shall not do so, but the matter will still be left in the hands of the House to deal with as it may think fit, with all the circumstances before it, and the Government will have time to make any proposal it chooses, while we shall have an opportunity of judging whether we shall support it or not. At any rate, I do not see that we shall lose anything.

MR. LOWE

I think, Sir, it may be for the convenience of the House that I should say one Word on the subject, although the Amendment which I have proposed is not now in my hands, but in those of the House. I think if the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) is in any danger of being bullied, I, at all events, am in danger of being circumvented. The noble Lord at the head of the Government has—not to quibble upon words—expressed an opinion very gratifying to me as to the first part of my proposition. With such encouragement, believing that my proposition contains the truth, which it is very desirable to state, and hoping that on some future occasion the House will give me an opportunity of clearing myself from some aspersions which have been cast upon me, I feel inclined to persevere. I am advised to give up my Amendment. Why? That the noble Lord may move an Address to the Crown for the vigorous prosecution of the war—that is, that the noble Lord may get rid of my Amendment. I did not move that Amendment lightly, not until after I had taken the opportunity of suggesting to the noble Lord that the conduct of the Conference at Vienna having been brought before the House by the papers laid upon the table by order of Her Majesty, it was a proper subject for this House to give an opinion upon. I believe it to be a proper subject of discussion, and, however unfit I may be to bring it before the House, I did so under the strong conviction that we should not be doing our duty if we passed the subject without consideration. Unless I have an assurance from the Government that in any Address they may move the question shall be fairly brought under our notice for debate, I shall feel it my duty to persevere.

Question put, and agreed to.

Debate further adjourned till Thursday.