CONDUCT OF THE WAR. (Hansard, 14 August 1855)

§ SIR DE LACY EVANS

Sir, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to offer a few observations upon a subject which I feel assured must be deeply interesting both to the House and to the country. My object is to elicit from the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown a declaration, which I am convinced he will be most desirous of making, and which will, I think, prove satisfactory to the nation, of the determination of the Government to prosecute the war with vigour during the lengthened Parliamentary recess which is likely to ensue. No 2147 doubt there are some hon. Gentlemen behind the Treasury bench who imagine that the suggestion which I make is superfluous, because the noble Lord has frequently, and as I believe with great sincerity, declared that it was his intention to prosecute the war with vigour. It cannot, however, be forgotten that other Ministers, including the immediate predecessors of the present Government, have frequently spoken of prosecuting the war in such a spirit; notwithstanding which considerable blame was attributed to them for their shortcomings. Sir, I am old enough to recollect the last war; and in contrasting the exertions of the Government of that day in their endeavours to bring to a triumphant issue that great struggle with those of the present Administration, I find considerable difference in the mode in which our troops were employed. In the war which terminated forty years ago there were upon the Eastern coast of Spain 80,000 British troops, besides 40,000 Portuguese, commanded by British officers, and subsidized, paid, and clad from British resources. In addition to maintaining these 120,000 men, we afforded assistance to the Spanish Government, enabling it to keep up an army of 150,000 men, and had, moreover, in the last two years to carry on warlike operations on the Canadian frontier, and to maintain troops in the Mediterranean. If we compare the numbers of the forces then employed with those now engaged in the Crimea, it will be seen that there is a considerable falling off in energy in the conduct of the war. It is not necessary for me to state the actual numbers now before Sebastopol, but I am sorry to say that they form but a small force compared with those which I have enumerated. At that period the population of these kingdoms was not above half what it is at present; the financial resources were not, probably, one-fourth or one-sixth of what they are now; neither was the patriotic feeling at that period one whit more enthusiastic than it is at the present time, I therefore say that it is the bounden duty of the Government to carry out and to realize the expectations of the people in the prosecution of the war, more especially as the circumstances connected with that war are extremely fortunate, and are not, I think, sufficiently appreciated. There is but one point, and that is 3,000 miles from our own soil, about which there is any occasion to feel solicitous. The seas are entirely in the hands of the allies; we 2148 have invaded the enemy's territory, and we have but that portion which is invaded to which we need particularly direct our attention. I am quite sure that the Government have been very desirous to reinforce the army in the East, and that they will feel that there is a very inadequate force there at present. At the same time, it appears to me that sufficiently comprehensive measures for effecting that object have not been adopted. In the matter of enlistment, for example, no doubt great exertions have been made, but I think that more energetic measures may be taken, by augmenting the bounty and affording other facilities, to obtain a larger supply of army recruits than we have had hitherto. It has been objected that a great proportion of the troops we are now obtaining are of rather a youthful character. I do not see, however, why arrangements should not be made by which although the enlistment of those recruits may continue, they may be instructed in their duties before being sent to fight our battles in the Crimea. This brings to my mind the circumstances of the Indian army. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control informed us the other night that there were about 320,000 soldiers now in India, of whom 40,000 were Europeans. He indicated a disposition also to make that very large army available for the purposes of the present war. Hitherto, however, we have done nothing in that direction beyond withdrawing two regiments of cavalry or about 1,200 sabres from India. One hardly knows what assistance we ought to expect from India; but I am of opinion that out of the 40,000 British and Company's European troops 10,000 might, with the greatest possible advantage, be for the present rendered available for this contest. My right hon. Friend also indicated that the irregular Indian cavalry would be extremely useful at the Cape; and, for myself I believe, that 1,000 irregular cavalry there would be far more useful than double the number of British infantry. There are no fewer than seven seasoned English battalions at the Cape, who are stationed there for the purpose of restraining the miserable Kafirs from plundering the flocks of the surrounding farmers. I am convinced that the whole of those seven battalions could, with great advantage to the public, be withdrawn and replaced by an adequate number of native troops from the East Indies. I don't see any objection to garrisoning our Colonies 2149 with British troops in time of peace, because it gives us the opportunity of rendering them more available in time of war; but to keep such troops—the most expensive in the world—in our colonies while a great war like the present is raging is a most unnecessary waste of your military strength. The whole of these seven battalions ought to be replaced by native troops from India. There are two battalions more at the Mauritius, and other British troops also at Ceylon, for which native regiments might surely be substituted. In Hongkong, likewise, you have a European force. In fact, you have available in your Eastern colonies as many as ten battalions of seasoned soldiers. Again, the patriotism and the resources of your Australian colonies would enable you to make arrangements for withdrawing your battalions from that quarter. If measures of this kind were taken, you could have at least 10,000 European troops out of the 40,000 in India removed to the Bosphorus; and in three months you might have more than 20,000 men ready for service in the Crimea or elsewhere. You have also a battalion of the line still at Gibraltar, one at Corfu, and a third at the Piræus. I am sure that the same high spirit which induced the militia force to volunteer would enable you to replace these three battalions, and to send them also to the Bosphorus. Many militia regiments are already serving on the Mediterranean stations much to their honour. Of course, if European troops were to be transferred from India and the Eastern colonies to the seat of war, an increase in the native army would be requisite; but we all know the facilities that exist for augmenting our native forces in India. No bounty whatever has to be given; the men are eager to enter our service, considering it to offer them a provision for life, and, therefore there would be no difficulty in rapidly supplying any deficiency that might take place by the withdrawal of the European troops. These are measures which at least deserve consideration, and I have no doubt they could be carried out without creating the slightest political danger. I dare say the governors and officers in command in our colonies would object to these alterations, for I hardly ever heard of their approving the removal or the reduction of their forces; but a very praiseworthy exception to this occurred in the case of Sir William Reid, the Governor of Malta, and 2150 Sir James Ferguson, the commandant of the garrison there, who, last winter, when our army in the Crimea urgently required reinforcements, sent away to the East every regiment stationed there, and relied upon the inhabitants of the island for its defence in case of necessity. This was a most spirited and commendable proceeding; it had the best possible effect on the loyalty of the people of Malta; and I only wish that other colonial governors may take a lesson from this excellent example. With regard to bounty—an important matter—we gave from 18l. to 25l. during the last war. Now we give only I0l. Whatever may be the effect of the amount of the bounty upon desertion, certainly greater exertions are demanded for reinforcing our army, and for turning to account seasoned troops wherever we can obtain them. I am very glad to learn that 3,000 of the foreign legion are now in an effective state of discipline, which is very creditable to their officers; and I hope they will soon be sent to the seat of war. It must be remembered that we had 52,000 foreign troops in our pay at the end of the last war. I am gratified to hear such good accounts of the Turkish Contingent, and that it is 10,000 or 12,000 strong. [Colonel DUNNE dissented.] The hon. and gallant Gentleman shakes his head; but certainly the reports are satisfactory as to the number. I regret, however, that the Contingent has not been armed with the Minie rifle; and I hear that within the last few days only a small portion of the Foreign Legion has been furnished with that weapon. The Turkish Contingent should be provided with the Minie as speedily as possible; and the greatest exertions should be made in Birmingham and elsewhere to expedite the manufacture of a larger supply of that article, in the arrangements for obtaining which, I think, there has been much misplaced economy. It would be a prudent measure for us to supply the whole Turkish army with this improved weapon. The Turkish Contingent is under a very competent commander. The great efficiency of our Portuguese comrades in the last war was ascribed by the late Duke of Wellington to the care taken that they should be well fed, well clothed, and well provided for. I hope the noble Lord at the head of the Government will remember that those corps which do not belong to our regular army, and which do 2151 not have the same morale, require even greater attention than our own troops; and I trust that huts will be equally provided for both. [An hon. Member here directed the hon. and gallant General's attention to the clock.] I am warned that my time is nearly exhausted, but I wish to say a word respecting the Irish Constabulary force. It is, without exception, one of the finest corps in Europe; and I think the Government might easily form an Irish Brigade from it. Not that you should concede to the officers the privileges of the Guards; but there is nothing to prevent the organisation of 5,000 of this admirable corps, which would make a splendid division for the Crimea if certain advantages were held out to it, and if facilities for afterwards returning to its former service were also offered. I believe, also, that a handsome force might be obtained from Canada, if due encouragement were given; and, on political and other grounds, it is desirable to enlist the sympathy and the patriotism of our colonists on our side. I see that an Italian Legion is about to be formed; and something is likewise said as to enlisting for German and Polish Legions. I, for one, cannot understand the extreme delicacy felt as to raising a Polish Legion. All Poland does, not belong to Austria. You might have a Polish Legion from Russia, and thus you would give to those Poles who are anxious to raise the standard of their country the nucleus of a force that would materially assist you. If you wish to show great deference for Austria, let there be a special provision that no subjects of the Galician provinces shall be enrolled, but that you will only enlist Russian Poles. Surely there cannot be the slightest objection to an organisation of that character. We have recently listened to gloomy speeches respecting the prospects of the war from gentlemen who were lately Members of the Government, and also from the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) who distinguished, or rather extinguished, himself at Vienna; and we ought, therefore, to take an opportunity of showing to Europe how extremely small is the minority who concur in such views. My own opinion is, that if we were not to prosecute this war when we have the incalculable advantage of the co-operation of our most faithful, gallant, and powerful ally, the Emperor of the French, the next generation would have to wage this con- 2152 test under less favourable circumstances, at a cost of perhaps 500,000,000l. or 600,000,000l. sterling, and with prospects of success far inferior to any we now enjoy.