HC Deb 05 May 1854 vol 132 cc1375-88
MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, he should endeavour to state, as concisely as he could, the details of the Estimates which it was his duty to move in connection with the Army, in addition to those already gone through. The Committee would see that this additional Estimate entailed an increase of 14,799 men, and an increased charge of 300,000l. This would make the total augmentation of the year rather more than 40,000 men, and increase the total strength of the Army to 142,776 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. He had stated upon a previous occasion that every endeavour would be made, in augmenting the Army, to do so in a manner which should produce the greatest amount of efficiency. Now, they could not, when they made an augmentation so large as that which he had the honour of proposing to the Committee, namely, an augmentation of upwards of 40,000 upon 102,000, do so without a considerable augmentation of officers to command those troops. This had led the Government to consider the present organisation of the regiments, which they had found characterised by the most extraordinary variety, by discrepancies of all sorts, as inconvenient to the public service as they were unjust towards individuals. There were, it appeared, no fewer than six or seven, or even eight, varieties of regimental establishments in our Army. There were some regiments with 1,000 men, others with 800, others with 1,200, divided into two battalions, others with 850, others with 900; and the internal organisation regulating the service battalions and the depôt companies were as various as the numbers of the regiments themselves, a circumstance operating alike against the efficiency of the Army and against the just interests of the officers, who, on the one hand, were liable to undue pressure of employment, or, on the other hand, according to the circumstances, were found crowding the half-pay list, and who, having perhaps bought their Commissions, thus found themselves compulsorily shelved, without the adequate return for their outlay or the adequate use, for the public advantage, of the services they were desirous to render. Such a state of things as this, more especially when we had most arduous and difficult military operations before us, it was out of the question to retain. In the late war the custom in the English service was to have the battalions on service in the field fed by a reserve from the battalions at home; while the French regiments consisted of three battalions, one of which at home fed the other two on service in the field abroad. The English system had been found extremely expensive, and one, moreover, which had entirely failed in its object. The reserve battalions had been sooner or later sent abroad—as a rule, indeed, to sonic spot where it was anticipated they would be exempt from the immediate operations of war, and so might still be considered a reserve; but even this precaution had sometimes been frustrated, as where, at Barossa, the reserve battalion found itself exposed to the brunt of the enemy's attack, and suffered more severely than our other troops. He trusted that the Committee would consent to the adoption of a homogeneous system, pervading the whole Army, and which should not be departed from. The Government proposed to augment every regiment to twelve companies, eight for active service, and four to be as a reserve at home. There would be a great many advantages from this mode of augmentation, and one leading advantage would be that it would put an end to the existing system with regard to the appointment from time to time of additional subalterns, the effect of which was the creation of a number of officers, with whom, when the immediate service was over, you did not know what to do. While, however, providing that the number of companies in each regiment should be the same, it was considered expedient that the numbers composing these companies should be different, according to the service in which they were to be employed. The cadre of the regiment would remain fixed, while, as to the number of its men, it would be capable of expansion in case of war, or of contraction on the return of peace; and the general cadre of the Army would be kept unimpaired, without at any time attracting men into the service with whom, in peace, we knew not what to do. In the French Army they never lessened the number of the officers, and with the establishment now proposed for the English Army, of twelve companies per regiment, that Army would have the power of contraction or expansion, according to circumstances, over the companies to the number of 50,000 men, which, according to all the ordinary conditions of war or peace with us, would be the full additional number we should be likely to require. Should this proposition meet with the approbation of the Committee, he trusted that, when circumstances should enable us to reduce the number of our military force, Parliament would not depart from the principle now introduced, or by capriciously reducing the cadre of the Army and of the regiments, or by capriciously reducing the number of the officers, ruin that efficiency which, he had every confidence, the system proposed would introduce into our Army, far beyond any precedent among us. There had been in the course of the last twenty years various augmentations of the number of our Army officers, as constantly followed by large reductions, attended with great expense to the country, and, above all, with infinite inconvenience, when we were endeavouring, as now, to recruit large numbers of men. The regiments which had gone out now had at present 850 men; it was intended by Government to increase that number to 1,000 per regiment on service, which would give 800 fighting men to each, allowing, as was the rule, 100 deducted for band, orderlies, pioneers, clerks, servants, &c., and 100 for the sick list, a number which was the least that could be allowed for during the operations of the field, the marches, the irregularities of food, the exposure to climate, and so on. There had been cases in which, as at Albuera, one-half the force was disabled, or, as in the Sutlej, where, in six days, one-half of the force was unable to appear, or, as in Scinde in 1843, where, of the 16,000 troops under Sir Charles Napier, all but 2,000 were laid up with sickness at the same time. According to the establishment he proposed for active service, of 1,000 men per regiment, the number of additional men they would have to raise would be 42,000. It was extremely difficult to make any estimate with an assurance of accuracy to cover the number of men voted, because no one could say with what rapidity or otherwise the requisite number would be obtained. It was proposed to raise an additional force of 42,000 over and above the existing force of our Army. The annual casualties from various causes in the Army were estimated at 12,000, and therefore if they succeeded, which he could not predicate, in raising the entire number of men wanted, they would have to raise 52,000 men within the year. When he looked back to the numbers of men raised for the Army in former years, he found that the greatest number obtained in any one year fell much short of the number now required. The number of recruits raised for the regular Army by the ordinary mode of recruiting from 1794 to 1806 had been—

In 1794, 38,563 In 1800, 17,829
1795, 40,463 1801, 17413
1796, 16,366 1802, 7,403
1797, 16,096 1803, 11,253
1798, 21,457 1804, 9,430
1799, 41,316 1805, 11,677
In 1806, 11,875
He therefore trusted that the Committee would bear in mind the difficulties which had been experienced heretofore in raising great numbers of men for the Army, and notwithstanding the superior facilities for that purpose, in many respects, which had existed during the last war, and to which we had now no recourse. In every other country of Europe there existed some compulsory means of recruiting the Army. During the last war we ourselves had one indirect method of doing this—by bribing men out of the Militia with high bounties, and leaving the deficient ranks of the Militia to be filled up by ballot. At the present time we had raised a considerable militia force, nearly numbering 70,000 men, without having had recourse to the ballot at all. We had begun recruiting for the Army under circumstances of great difficulty, because at no period had labour been in such great demand, or so highly remunerated, so that there was great competition to meet in recruiting for the Army. Yet, during the last three months, we had been raising recruits more rapidly than at any former period. We had in that period raised not fewer than 10,000 men, not, however, to be reckoned as all pure gain, because there must be deducted the loss of 1,000 men, from sickness, termination of service, and other causes. On the other hand, in the present mouth there was likely to be a large accession of recruits in the Militia, and when these recruits had been two or three weeks in that force, experience showed that the ties of home became weakened, and the men grew attached to the service, and more and more ready to enter the regular Army, so that a large augmentation might be anticipated from this source. And let him take this opportunity of bearing his warm testimony to the great value to the country of this militia force. He had lately been much in communication with the officers commanding the militia regiments, and he most gladly expressed the sense which Government entertained of the eminent services which these officers had rendered to the State. As a matter of course, it was the general wish of these officers to keep their regiments in the highest possible state of efficiency, and therefore it had been with the utmost reluctance that he had asked them to assist him in recruiting for the line; but he had found, notwithstanding that natural desire of them to which he had adverted, that the becoming emulation which existed among them as to the efficiency of their respective corps was overborne by their patriotic desire to assist the public service by recruiting from their own ranks into the line. He had, then, every reason to hope that, from such sources, we should be able in the course of the year to raise a large proportion of the troops we required. There was a misprint in the Estimate, which it might be as well to notice before putting it into the Chairman's hands. It related to the number of men, which was stated differently in two places. The number actually to be voted amounted to 14,799, which, together with the number voted previously, would make an increase in the year, in all ranks, of 40,493, and a total charge of 7,157,486l., being an increase of 1,132,470l. over the Estimate of last year. He would conclude by moving that a force of 14,799 be raised for the service of Her Majesty.

COLONEL DUNNE

said, he would not follow the right hon. Gentleman into all his statements. Several regiments had different establishments, but they had never been used since the war to supply the battalions on service. He was aware that in most French regiments there were three battalions, and he was also aware that it was the rule in France to keep the third battalion in reserve. He wished to ask whether it was intended to do away with the second battalion of the Rifles, the 60th, and the Royal Regiment. He also wished to know what depôts were to be kept up at home, and whether two out of every twelve companies were to form the provisional battalion. He did not attempt to give an opinion on the system, but it certainly was at variance with the provisions of the Duke of Wellington. He did not apprehend that the right hon. Gentleman would find anything like the number of men he proposed. He certainly would get some from the militia; but then the Government had cut off a large source of supply by excluding Ireland from the militia. He was aware this was done on the ground of saving expense; but it showed a want of confidence which would, he was satisfied, act on the recruiting service in Ireland. He likewise wished to know, if 412 officers were to be added to the Army, how they were to be added to each regiment; and whether the officers of each regiment would be promoted in the order of succession? There were many officers on half-pay who would sell out and join the Army if assured of full pay, which would furnish experienced officers, and, at the same time, lighten the dead weight on the country. He also wished to know if it was the intention of the Government to augment the cavalry, which, though 31,000 at the close of the last war, was now not 7,000, and none of the regiments of which it consisted could bring more than 300 sabres into the field. The artillery was the most perfect in the world—thanks to the present Commander in Chief—and the troops of that arm that had gone to the East could not be surpassed in the world.

COLONEL LINDSAY

wished to put a question to the right hon. Gentleman as to the distribution of officers. He found that two companies were to be added to every regiment in the service, making twelve companies instead of ten. The natural inference was that six officers would be added to each regiment. He wished to ask if it were the intention to add the same increase of officers to regiments serving abroad, or to confine the number to the present establishment serving in the field? Three officers a company would not, in his opinion, be sufficient to perform the duties in time of war.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, he would answer the last question first. It was intended that every regiment should consist of twelve companies. The service companies would be eight and the depôt companies four. The depôt companies being four, and being joined together, would constitute the provisional battalion. The hon. and gallant Member for Portarlington (Col. Dunne) appeared to doubt whether that was a good arrangement, and he (Mr. S. Herbert), being a civilian, did not set up his judgment against the hon. and gallant Officer's; but he must say that, in his opinion, the balance of evidence was in favour of the depôt battalion. He believed, though he was afraid that it would be considered almost heresy to say so in the presence of so many officers, that the drill in the English service extended to an unnecessarily long period, and that the recruits were frequently driven to desperation by the mere force of being perpetually drilled without learning battalion movements. The companies abroad would have three officers, but if it should be necessary, as he feared it might, to augment them, it must be recollected that there would be going out constantly numbers of recruits, accompanied by officers; and it was thought, on the whole, to be more advantageous, by persons who had the experience of the last war, that the formation of an additional body of officers was a better mode of strengthening the service companies than giving additional subalterns to each company. The hon. and gallant Member had also asked if the cavalry would be augmented. He (Mr. S. Herbert) believed it was intended to make an augmentation to the cavalry, though not of course on such an extended scale as in the infantry regiments. With respect to the mode of augmentation, he thought the gallant Officer was perfectly right in some of the suggestions he had made. He thought that in making the augmentation they were bound to make it in a manlier the most efficient, and at the same time the least costly to the country. It was necessary they should take care that no officer remained on half-pay when there was an opportunity of serving on full pay, if he were efficient for service. In the case of those efficient for service, they would be transferred to those additional companies; but of those ranks there were very few officers on the half-pay list efficient for service, they being generally superannuated. In such augmentation the regiment should have advantage from the increase of officers, but at the same tune they would relieve the half-pay list as far as was consistent with the efficiency of the regiments.

MR. HUME

said, he did not grudge the men that were asked, but as they were told that great changes were to take place, he wished to know who was to be responsible. The right hon. Gentleman had said that they were about to do so and so, but that he was a civilian and could not answer. [Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: I did not say that.] A Commission that sat to inquire into the administration of the Army recommended certain changes. The Committee that sat in 1848 and 1849 had also recommended an entire change; but up to that hour they had got no change. Now, they were told a great change would take place, and he wanted to know if the Puke of Newcastle, or the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, or the Commander in Chief, was to be responsible for it. He could not help thinking that they were acting very unwisely in voting money, and allowing changes to be made, without having those changes fairly and properly considered, or without giving to the Army an opportunity of knowing by whom the changes wore recommended. He did not pretend himself to offer an opinion on the subject, yet he felt a deep interest in having the Army efficient, and wished to reduce the class that had been alluded to by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Col. Dunne), because he knew that complaints were made by officers that were placed on half-pay because they were not enabled to get on service. They now proposed to have the Army put on a proper footing, but was that the time to put the Army on a proper footing, when they were going into the field? What he complained of was, that it had not been done before, but he wished to see unanimity on the Vote, and that there should be no division whatever. The efficiency of war depended upon unity of action, but every part of their establishment was clogged with impediments, and by correspondence between the different authorities that exist. There was no part of the world in which the Army was so badly managed, where the public expenditure was more in proportion to the service, or where the officers employed had more injustice done to them. In Austria, France, or Prussia, the officers who wish to go on in their profession were not turned out by any casual reductions. He did not make these observations through any desire to throw blame on any particular person, but he was anxious that some one should be appointed to manage the whole details of the military service. The Secretary for the Colonies was also Secretary at War, but he had to manage the affairs of forty Colonies; and what time could he have to attend to the duties of Secretary at War? He had got an assistant at that moment, but was he the man they were to look to? No; the Government were decidedly wrong in not having some responsible Minister at War.

COLONEL NORTH

said, he wished to know whether the depôt companies of those regiments when they returned from foreign service would be joined with the service companies or be independent of them? He asked these questions, as already inconvenience had occurred by the two battalions of the same regiment in the same garrison, the one commanded by the lieutenant colonel, the other by the major, being independent of each other. He hoped that the Government intended, instead of reducing the second battalions of Rifles, to increase that arm considerably. He was sure that no regiment which had been called upon to volunteer upon its return from foreign service would have hesitated to do so, but it was a great hardship upon the Rifle Brigade, that on their return from a severe campaign, almost at the very moment of their landing, that the exigencies of the service required, that they should re-embark immediately, without even visiting their families, Another circumstance, which added to the credit of the Rifle Brigade, was, that the men who volunteered into the other battalions did not receive the bounty which soldiers of other regiments received, the reason for this being, as he believed, that they would not have to change their uniforms or buy other necessaries. The right hon. Secretary at War had alluded to the militia service in which he had the honour of holding a Commission, and with regard to the present circumstances of which he wished to offer a few remarks. The present position of the militia force was very different to what it had been this time last year. A large portion of the regular Army was then at home, and the militia had received great assistance from it, and had also acquired a sort of military tone from the excellent example of the men who had been detached from the different regiments to it. The regiment now out under his orders consisted of 1,235 men, and, in mentioning some details connected with his own regiment, he believed he might add that there were a great number of regiments similarly circumstanced. The means he had of getting the regiment into any sort of order were these:—the major and one of the captains had served in the Army, one of the captains (a most excellent officer) had served in the Austrian Army, and the remaining captains, the whole of the lieutenants, and the two ensigns, had never worn a red coat in their lives until last May. The present staff of non-commissioned officers consisted of twenty men, and he had several vacancies which he could not fill because no sergeant of the line would come to him, as lie found that it would not pay. He had received the other day, as a great boon, an order to the effect that the volunteer sergeants and corporals should be allowed twenty-eight days' pay and be attached to regiments of the Army, so as to learn their drill and be able to instruct the men when they assembled. In the regular Army three months was allowed to teach a recruit his drills before he took his regimental duties, and then he was not expected to be able to teach others; but these volunteer sergeants and corporals were to be able in twenty-eight days to learn their own drills and be able to teach others. The thing was impossible, and either the regular Army was a humbug or militiamen heaven-born soldiers. It might be supposed that volunteer sergeants and corporals were men who had seine idea of military discipline, but it was quite the Contrary. The volunteer sergeants and corporals whom he had appointed were men who had decent coats to their backs and seemed rather superior to the rest of the regiment, but they were totally ignorant of the commonest rudiments of discipline. To show the sort of persons who were expected to keep the men in order, he would read a letter which he had received from one of them. He had seen upon parade last year a respectable looking man, and, finding that lie bore a good character, he had made him a sergeant. Three weeks ago he had received a letter from this man, asking him to recommend him to an ensigncy. He replied that he was sorry this could not be done, upon which he had received a most insolent letter, which he would beg leave to read to the Committee. It was in the following terms:— April 17, 1854. Sir—In reply to your letter of the 14th instant, stating 'I regret I cannot recommend you,' such an assertion must be incorrect, as you know nothing whatever against me, but might be justified in saying that you would not recommend me. I voluntarily placed myself in a position subordinate to yourself—I voluntarily forbore to appropriate whatever pecuniary recompense might be attached to my services—and now you insinuate by your remark that I have failed in my duty, and imply by your regret that there is something still worse, which you do not divulge. You have, however, learned from my former letter that I am totally independent of any recommendation that can proceed from you; and, as to your kind promise 'I will take care that every difficulty is removed from your receiving your discharge from your present regiment,' as I have legally ceased to belong to your regiment I shall never accept that or any other favour at your hands; and can only regret that I have been in any way connected with you. "Yours, &c. Colonel J. S. North, M.P. Another letter had been received by his adjutant the day before yesterday front another volunteer sergeant, stating that he was about to embark, as a gentlemen's servant, to America, and he hoped his situation would be kept open until his return. He did not wish to find fault with the Government, from all the departments of which he had received the greatest attention and assistance, but he was sure the country would be better pleased to give the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston), who had rendered such distinguished services to the country, the entire management of the militia, than to have the responsibility placed upon the Secretary at War, or upon the commanding officers of the militia. He would not willingly speak disparagingly of a force in which he had the honour to serve, but he believed that the present system was faulty, and that, if persevered in, it would sooner or later result in disaster and disgrace. It was of the utmost importance that discipline should be properly enforced. How was it that a mob of a thousand men would run away, and had often run away, before a corporal's guard? Because the mob knew that the disciplined soldiers would stick by each other to the last. How was it possible, however, to depend upon fellows who wrote such letters as the one he had just read to the Committee? He believed that if the plan suggested by the noble Home Secretary the year before last had been adopted, the efficiency of militia regiments would have been greatly promoted. He would venture to say that no colonel of a militia regiment had been better supported by his officers than he had been. They had joined depôts of line regiments, and had made themselves thoroughly acquainted with their duties theoretically, but they required that confidence in themselves Which practical experience alone could give. The men, when they were dis- missed from parade, had no resource, for there were no barracks to receive them, while, if they were in barracks, they might amuse themselves in their own rooms, instead of being compelled to live in gin-shops and beer-houses. In his regiment he was ordered to have ten buglers, but he had no bugle major, and by whom were the buglers to be instructed? He had 1,235 stand of arms, but he was not allowed an armourer. The men took their firelocks to their billets at gin-shops and public-houses, where every idle fellow might snap them and play all sorts of tricks with them. [Laughter.] That was no laughing matter to captains of companies who had a certain sum allowed for keeping the arms in order. In the line, where soldiers were taught the value of their arms, they did all in their power to keep them in efficient condition; but in the militia more damage was done in one day to half-a-dozen firelocks than could be repaired for the whole amount of the allowance received by the captain of a company.

COLONEL SIBTHORP

said, he must express the gratification with which he had listened to the speech of the right hon. Secretary at War, who had declared, on the part of the Government, a determination to make the Army efficient enough to resist the Russian forces. He was willing to assent to larger Votes than were now demanded by the Government, and, if it were necessary, he was ready on his own part to subscribe to promote the efficiency of the military resources of the country. He thanked the Government for the manner in which they had come forward with measures which he thought were necessary to maintain the character of the country, and the security of the Throne and of the Church. He considered that the country was greatly indebted to the noble Home Secretary for the energy, ability, determination, and perseverance he had manifested with reference to these matters. He wished he could say the same of the other Members of the Government, among whom the noble Lord was a rara avis. Every hon. Gentleman who had occasion to apply to the noble Lord for his advice and assistance was fully aware to what an extent he combined the suaviter in modo with the fortiter in re.

SIR JOHN FITZGERALD

said, he must urge upon the Government the necessity of adopting measures for increasing the efficiency of the cavalry. The strength of cavalry regiments at present seldom exceeded 300 men, and he hoped the Secretary at War would consider the importance of placing this branch of the service in a more efficient condition.

LORD HOTHAM

said, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had stated that in making the proposed augmentation to the Army it was the duty of the Government to take care that no officer who was young enough and fit to serve should be left on the half-pay list. Now, he (Lord Hotham) hoped that some rule would be adopted, in giving promotion, that would pay due regard to the period of an officer's standing in the Army. Otherwise, in some regiments it would happen that promotion would be given to officers of very junior standing, whereas in other regiments there would be two or three lieutenants who would be passed over, who had rendered longer service, and who had remained on the top of the list of lieutenants, from inability, perhaps, to purchase, and may possibly have looked forward to such a case as the present as their only chance of ever rising to the command of a company. He hoped, therefore, that the Government would take this subject into consideration, and have regard to standing in the Army as a principle in promotion.

MR. HENLEY

said, that the papers on the table with respect to the proposed increase of 14,000 men to the Army, were very meagre, and no one could have inferred from them that such a change was to be made in the whole organisation of the Army as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had sketched. The proposal to create a permanent staff for these 14,000 was a very important measure, and the Committee ought not to be asked to decide upon it without due deliberation.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henley) must have collected from the papers that the augmentation would not be confined to men alone, because care had been taken to state in the Estimate the number of officers who would be added to the force. The proposal was only the assimilation of the English regiments to those in India and in the Colonies as regarded the number of officers to be attached to them.

SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFE

said, he thought that, as far as the regiments of the line were concerned, the proposed changes would be an improvement on the present system. He hoped the Secretary at War would more fully explain what was intended with regard to the Rifle corps, as, from what the hon. and gallant Member for Portarlington (Colonel Dunne) had said, it would appear as though he had understood that they were to be reduced. He trusted that such was not the case, but that the Rifle corps would be considerably increased, and that, as was the case in France, the necessary grounds, with a sufficient range, would be provided for the practising and training up of this valuable arm of the service. He took a deep interest in the Army, and thought something ought to be done to increase the efficiency of our cavalry regiments. It was a reform that required immediate attention, for the Committee could not but be aware how long it took to train up the cavalry.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, the alteration of the officers would apply to all the regiments of the line and to Ireland; there was no intention of reducing the second battalion of Rifles or the First Foot; with respect to the cavalry, more attention was required to the subject of horses than anything else.

LORD LOVAINE

said, that as they were sending out troops into active service, it was most important that they should have the proper number of officers.

COLONEL SIBTHORP

said, that, speaking from nineteen years' experience, he could inform the House that to make the horse and the soldier fit for the cavalry service, it took three years and a half.

The following Votes were then agreed to—

(13.) 14,799l., additional Land Forces.

(14.) 300,000l., Charge of Land Forces.