MILITARY SERVICE AND EXPENDITURE.

HC Deb 02 March 1854 vol 131 cc223-60

MR. HUME

said, he would, according to notice, beg to call the attention of the House to the Report of the Royal Commissioners for inquiring into the practicability and expediency of consolidating the different departments connected with the civil administration of the Army, who recommended that the greater part of the authority, with reference to the Army, which at present belonged to the Secretaries of State, should, for the future, be vested in the Secretary at War, and that in future he should always be a Member of the Cabinet. The Report to which he called the attention of the House was signed by Lord Howick, Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Sir John Hobhouse, and others, and it was presented to Parlia- ment in 1837. The question which he had undertaken to bring before the House was one, in his view, of great importance. It was not a novel question, it was one which he had brought before the House indirectly many years ago, and which he had expected, after the Report of the Commission alluded to in his Resolution, would not have been allowed to remain so long as it had remained without the application of a remedy. At the present moment, perhaps, he should not have interfered, if he had not considered the matter one of the first importance in connection with the military movements which were now going on. It might be all very well that such a complicated system should be allowed to remain as it was in times of peace, but the case was different now; and, in bringing forward this Motion, his object was to strengthen, if possible, the hands of the Government in the administration of the Army, and to enable them to apply the resources of the country in the most direct way, so as to prevent the pecuniary loss which he was prepared to prove had taken place under the existing system. That loss in the various departments of the Army, the Ordnance, and the Commissariat, had been for years past something like 200,000l. or 300,000l. annually; but, although the Commissioners of 1837 were unanimous in recommending the change he was about to suggest, their propositions remained unadopted. He hoped it would not be considered that, in pressing his Resolution at the present moment, he had any idea of throwing difficulties in the way of the Government. On the contrary, he had never known any period during the last thirty years when supplies were granted to any Ministry with so little trouble as in the present Session, and he, for one, wished it to be seen abroad that there was no unwillingness, on the part of the House of Commons, to grant supplies, and that the House would cheerfully give to the Government the means by which they might best act, in the present crisis of affairs, for the honour and interest of the country. It was, therefore, with no hostile spirit that he brought forward this Motion, but only with the view of showing the anomalies of the present system, and the importance of remedying those anomalies. His object was to show the impossibility of allowing these matters to remain in their present condition, and he had no hesitation in saying that, if any gentleman connected with a large establish- ment acted on the principle on which the business relating to the Army was conducted, he would very soon bring himself to ruin. He wished the House to understand clearly what his meaning was, and what he really proposed to do. He wished to propose to the House that the whole department of the Army, consisting, not only of the Guards and regiments of the line, but of the artillery, engineers, and commissariat, should be brought under the control of one responsible individual, and that the whole charge for the maintenance of the forces should be brought under the consideration of Parliament by one person, and that the Army department should be placed in the same position, with regard to the Estimates, as the Navy. The Admiralty had charge of everything connected with the Navy, and he wished the Army Estimates to be dealt with in a similar manner. He entirely concurred in the Report of the Commission which sat in 1837, that the different branches should be brought into one department, and that that department should be under the control of one person, who should receive the title either of Minister of War or Secretary at War, it mattered little which. Under the existing system, the 8,000,000l. required for the maintenance of the forces was divided into different parts, and 4,000,000l. was asked for by one individual, while the remaining 4,000,000l. was asked for by various others. It appeared to him to be entirely opposed to anything like sound financial principles that one department, which consisted of three different branches, should be placed under the orders of different individuals. The whole expenditure ought to be under the control of one person, who would, of course, be responsible to that House for the manner in which he executed the functions of his office. If a question was put to the Secretary at War, he could only answer on certain points. If more information was required, application must be made to the Treasury or the Ordnance, and it was a very difficult matter to ascertain to which department inquiries ought to be addressed. The present system had thrown great difficulties in the way of checking the Army expenditure. That portion under the control of the Secretary at War was voted one month; another month afterwards the barrack vote was proposed; and then, in the course of another month, came the Commissariat; then, at another period, came the Ordnance. There was no means of obtaining a comprehensive view of the depart- ments of the Army. Hon. Members who had read the Report of the Commission of 1837 would have a fair notion of the anomalies and inconsistencies of the present system. That Report was drawn up with considerable ability, and no person, he believed, could read it without being forced into a conviction of the necessity of some change being effected. With regard to the naval department of the service, the orders of the Government were conveyed to the Board of Admiralty, and everything connected with the annual expenditure for the Navy was then under the control of that Board. With regard to the Army, the orders of the Government concerning the employment of troops were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief by a Secretary of State, who was a responsible person, and under whose signature all expenditure was sanctioned; but that Secretary of State was the Secretary for the Colonies, whose attention was more than sufficiently occupied with the business of forty-two colonies. The orders were at the same time communicated to the Master General of the Ordnance, the Ordnance—that was the artillery and engineers—being an entirely distinct branch, under the control of the Board of Ordnance; and it did certainly seem that such an arrangement was liable to be subversive of rapidity and unity of action. It was not so in other countries, and why, he would ask, should it be so in this? The Commander-in-Chief and the Master General of the Ordnance might both be very good men, but he did not see why there should be more than one responsible person. He would call the attention of the House to the real duties performed by the Secretary for the Colonies and the Secretary at War, with regard to the administration of the military establishment of the country. When troops were ordered upon foreign service, it might be imagined that the orders of the Government were communicated by the Secretary at War; but it was not so; they were communicated by the Secretary for the Colonies. The Secretary for the Colonies had, in fact, authority in all matters relating to the Army. He submitted to the Queen the consideration as to the number of the troops to be employed on any service, and made known to the Commander-in-Chief the total number decided upon. In time of war it was his duty to communicate with officers commanding forces in foreign countries, and to convey to them the orders of the Government. All Commissions in the Army were practically issued under his authority. The Commander-in-Chief took the orders of the Queen as to appointments or promotions, and then forwarded a memorandum of names to the War Office. The Secretary of War then made two lists of the new commissions, one for regiments serving in India, Ceylon, or in the other Colonies, and another for the remaining regiments, whether in England, Scotland, or Ireland. The first of these lists was transmitted to the Colonial Office, and the latter to the Home Department, and after the commissions had been prepared in those departments they were forwarded to Her Majesty by the Secretary of State for her signature, then they were countersigned by the Secretary of State, and afterwards sent to the Commander-in-Chief. He was utterly unable to perceive what advantage there could be in such a complication, and, when he considered how often immediate action might be necessary, he was convinced that the delay thus occasioned might be productive of great injury to the public service. Another point to which he wished to direct the attention of the House was, the manner in which the troops were supplied with arms; the Commander-in-Chief informed the Secretary at War that arms were required, the Secretary at War then wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, after having obtained the authority of the Queen, wrote to the Master General of the Board of Ordnance, and, on the authority of that letter, the arms required were supplied. Four different letters must be written before a single musket could be issued to any one regiment in the service. Why should not the Secretary at War have power to act at once in the matter? Such a method must necessarily be productive of delay; and must, consequently, be injurious to the service. What, on the other hand, were the duties of the Secretary at War? He prepared and submitted to Parliament the Army Estimates; but, in doing so, he prepared them under the orders of the Secretary for the Colonies—in fact, he did little more than was done in India by a kerani, who would copy an English letter perfectly, without understanding a word of the language. The detailed estimates were made out under the orders of the Secretary at War, and by some arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief. The expenditure of the sum granted for the Army was made under a warrant issued by the Secretary at War. The accounts of the regimental pay- masters were examined by the War Office. Now, he wished to see the expenditure of every shilling in the War Department brought under some proper check and control. The Secretary at War decided upon all claims as to widows and pensions for the wounded. The Secretary at War, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, with the consent of the Treasury, made from time to time alterations in the rates of pay and allowances. Warrants for payments were prepared by the Secretary at War, and submitted to the Queen. He was required to answer all questions in Parliament connected with the administration of the Army, and could offer such suggestions as he might think fit to the Commander-in-Chief. Now, to make him really efficient, he ought to have the whole of the service under his control. The Secretary at War certainly had some other duty, such as the insertion of military appointments and promotions in the Gazette. He had also to correspond with magistrates respecting any complaints against officers or men. It was his duty also to bring before Parliament the Mutiny Bill, to frame the Articles of War, and to issue routes for the removal of troops. He would now proceed to show some of the anomalies of the present system. There were two sets of regulations—one for the Army under the Commander-in-Chief, the other for that portion of the Army under the Master General of the Ordnance. The latter officer exercised all the powers respecting the artillery and engineers which the Commander-in-Chief exercised with respect to the Army. But then came the civil duties of the office. These were placed under the superintendence of the Board of Ordnance, individual officers composing that Board, each taking and conducting a department. That Board performed for the artillery and engineers all the duties that the War Office did for the Army—made the examination of pay lists and accounts, decided claims of officers for compensation, for loss of horses and baggage, &c., and fixed the amount of passage money. Another anomaly existed with respect to the supply of clothing. In France, Austria, Belgium, and Russia, the supply of clothing was under one management and control. Was that the case in this country? No such thing. The clothing for the engineers was provided by the Ordnance Board; the clothing for the militia was also provided by that Board; and it formerly provided the clothing for the Irish police force. Some of the colonial clothing was also supplied by that Board, and greatcoats for the whole Army. But what was the case with regard to the Army clothing? It was supplied by the colonel. Now, he could not conceive on what grounds there were two departments to perform precisely similar duties. It could not be argued that any particular species of education was required for the control of the Ordnance Department, for neither the present nor late Master General of the Ordnance were artillery or engineer officers. The designs for and erections of barracks and all other buildings connected with the Army were under the control of the Ordnance Department. Now, though he admired the talents and abilities of the engineer corps, he did not think that in many respects they followed up all the improvements of the day, and, consequently, the public benefit was not so great as it would be if the buildings were placed under the superintendence of a Minister of War, and, after being publicly advertised, were completed by contract with the best possible specifications. If the Secretary at War, for instance, had the charge of this department, he would first ascertain what accommodation was wanted, and then he would call on engineers to give specifications according to the newest improvements, taking care to have the buildings erected and completed as cheaply as possible. The anomalies arising from the existing division of military departments were numerous, and he had that day been informed, though he could not undertake to say whether correctly or not, that an engineer or artillery officer could not take the command of the line; so that were Sir John Burgoyne the ablest general in Europe, this country could not avail itself of his service, by placing him at the head of an army. If such a rule had existed in France, Bonaparte, who was an artillery officer, and many other able officers who had figured on the Continent, would never have had the command of armies. When a superior officer or general was required for the forces in the Colonies, what occurred? The Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief determined upon the officer, and the Secretary at War sometimes did not know officially who was appointed, until the officer applied for his passage money? Why should the Secretary of State do more than announce the vacancy and require an efficient officer? for, surely he could not know better the merits of an officer than the Secretary at War, who had so much to do with other applications which made him cognisant of such matters? An army was of very little use without a good commissariat and a proper supply of food; and yet it appeared to him that the supply of food for the Army was conducted in a manner most extraordinarily anomalous. For the Army in England the food was supplied by contract, but in Ireland—though he believed the system was about to be altered—by regimental contracts. The Guards, too, in London, were supplied by regimental contracts, while in the militia the colonels supplied the food as they best could. Why should there be these different modes of supply, and was there any reason why the whole force should not be supplied by contract? He understood that, by a recent arrangement, the Treasury was about to transfer this duty to the Commissariat for Ireland; and then the Commissariat, sitting at the Treasury, would make contracts for Ireland, the Ordnance would make contracts for England, and the Treasury, as usual, would make contracts for the forces abroad. He did not mean to say that every officer engaged did not perform his duty to the best of his power, but these different systems must of necessity occasion mistakes and mismanagement. He was told that it was intended, contrary to the opinion of the Committee of 1851, to introduce the commissariat generally into England, but he trusted he should hear in that House that no such intention existed, for by the evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan, it appeared that the establishment as then conducted was enormously expensive. The Commissariat should be placed under the control of the Treasury, to be checked, but not conducted, by that department. There was nothing to prevent the supplies of food being consolidated in one department, and the Secretary at War, who was at the present moment the Finance Minister for the Army, would, if invested with the powers he proposed, be the proper person to attend to this matter. Another anomaly was, that the Secretary of State had the bestowal of the Order of the Bath—a distinction chiefly conferred for military services. But what could the Secretary of State know of the merits of officers? Those he could only learn from the Commander-in-Chief or Secretary at War, and the latter would be the proper person to have the granting of it, as he was obliged to know the services of officers, for all promotions, sales of commissions, retirements on half-pay, being matters of finance, came under his cognisance. He would now call the attention of the House to the recommendations of the Commission of 1837. That Commission reported:— 1. That the greater part of the authority with reference to the Army, which at present belongs to the Secretaries of State, should, for the future, be vested in the Secretary at War. 2. An alteration should be made in the form of the appointment of the Secretary at War:—1. That he should in future be always a member of the Cabinet. 2. That he should be the Minister by whom the advice of the Cabinet, as to the amount of the military establishments, should be laid before the king. 3. That he should be the person to consider and act on all points with the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Administration, and to be immediately responsible to Parliament for all the measures of the Government with reference to the Army. 4. That he should assume all the merely formal duties relating to the subject now performed by the Secretaries of State, such as the preparing and countersigning of military commissions and the issuing of orders for the delivery of arms to the troops. 3. The Secretary of State, to whom the civil administration of our numerous colonies, with all their complicated interests, is entrusted, cannot possibly give the attention to the subject (amount and distribution of the Army) which it requires. 4. The Secretary at War, by whom the Army Estimates are now moved in the House of Commons, seems to us to be the person to whom the important duty of watching over the whole military administration of the country should properly be committed. 5. To give him, the Secretary at War, a direct control over those large branches of business relating to the military service of the country, which are now managed by the Board of Ordnance and by the Commissariat Department of the Treasury. 6. With respect to the Ordnance, we think this might best be accomplished by dividing the civil from the military duties of that department. 1. The latter (the military duties) should be left, as at present, in charge of the Master General, who should exercise the same authority he now has in all matters of discipline, promotion, &c., subject only to the general orders of the Government, to be conveyed to him, as we have already explained, by the Secretary at War instead of by the Secretary of State. 2. He should also retain under his immediate orders the Inspector General of Fortifications, and be charged with the duty of superintending the execution of all military works. 7. The civil business, on the other hand, should be brought under the more direct control of the Secretary at War, by making the board officers, by whom it is more immediately conducted, subordinate to him instead of the Master General and Board of Ordnance; so that their separate divisions of the business would become branches of the War Office, and the whole expenditure connected therewith would be provided for in the general Army Estimates. Those recommendations appeared to be of vast importance for the purpose of consolidating and bringing under one head these various duties. In the Committee of 1850 Earl Grey, who had been Secretary of State for the Colonies and chairman of the Royal Commission of 1837, in reply to several questions, stated, that so far as respected the inconvenience of the present system, his opinion had not in any way altered, but, on the contrary, was rather confirmed, though, at the same time, he believed that the difficulty of making any alteration was, perhaps, greater than it was at that time supposed. He would read the following extract from Earl Grey's evidence:— In consolidating the two branches of the War Office and the office of the Secretary at War, your Lordship contemplated, I think, still retaining the office of the Master General of the Ordnance as a separate department?—That was proposed. Leaving the military part of the Ordnance still under the Master General of the Ordnance?—Yes, but making the Secretary at War the person answerable to Parliament for the whole military expenditure as well that of the Ordnance as for the Army. In making him responsible to Parliament for the military expenditure, did your Lordship mean that he should regulate the amount of force to be sent to the different colonies?—My notion at that time was that, with regard to the Army, as with regard to the Navy, it requires some one authority which shall manage the whole business, which shall be both responsible to Parliament for the amount of expense, and shall be bound to consider what the most economical mode of providing for the service which is required may be. At present the Admiralty, as you are aware, has complete control over the management of the whole naval service; but the different Secretaries of State, as the organs of the Government, signify the Queen's commands to the Lords of the Admiralty as to the force to be employed for particular purposes and in particular parts of the world. In the same manner it appeared to me that there ought to be some one authority to have a general cognisance of all military affairs; to receive in the same way the orders of the Government from the Secretary of State, but to be responsible to Parliament for the economy and for the efficiency with which the service is conducted. He thought that what he had adduced to the House showed that the system, as now conducted, was contrary to sound principles of finance, and calculated to throw difficulties in the way of a thorough investigation by Parliament of the military expenditure. He had waited patiently during many years for the necessary reforms to take place. He knew that there were at the present time impediments in the way, but he did hope that when these impediments were removed the requisite changes would be made, so as to prepare in a time of peace for such an emergency as had now come upon them. They were now called upon to extend their force, and a Supplementary Estimate to the extent of 80,000l. was about to be laid before them, which would raise the Army Estimates to between 8,000,000l. and 9,000,000l., and, therefore, he thought that, on the score of economy, these changes should be carried into effect as speedily as possible. He asked, fourteen days ago, whether it was the intention of Government to carry out any of these changes, and the answer he received was, "No." That being so, he had no alternative but to propose the Motion which he had brought forward, not in hostility to the Government, but to urge them on to the performance of their duties in a more efficient and economical manner. It was said that this was not the time for these changes. He differed entirely from that opinion, for he thought that no time could be better than the present, when they were called upon so largely to extend the Army. With regard to the word "forthwith," which appeared in his Motion, he was willing to leave that out if any objection were taken to it.

MR. W. WILLIAMS

seconded the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed— That it is the opinion of this House, that, in accordance with the Report of the Commission for inquiring into the practicability and expediency of consolidating the different departments connected with the civil administration of the Army, dated the 21st day of February, 1837, confirmed by Evidence taken before the Committee on the Naval, Military, and Ordnance Expenditure in the years 1848–50, measures should forthwith be taken to consolidate the different branches of the Military Service and Expenditure, and to place the whole under the superintendence and control of one efficient and responsible department.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

Mr. Speaker, I certainly agree much more with many of the opinions which my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose has indicated in the course of his speech than with the Motion with which he has concluded. My hon. Friend, I think, differs in some material portions from the Report which he asks us to adopt, and he has stated those grounds of difference with great frankness and in much detail; and I confess with equal frankness that I concur with him in many of the objections to that Report. First of all, let me say what were the circumstances under which the Report of 1837 was made. At that time there is no doubt—and, in fact, it is alluded to in the Report—there had been great impediments placed in the way of carrying on the public business, and that differences and controversies had arisen between the different branches of the war department. It was also true—though the evidence on that head was drawn from a remote source—that in 1812 serious differences had arisen between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary at War; and I believe that at a later period, though anterior to the sitting of the Commission of 1837, grave differences of opinion and serious controversies had arisen between the Secretary at War and the Commander-in-Chief. At that time there was a great indisposition on the part of the military authorities to adopt improvements and to listen to the advice which came from the War Office; and as the recommendations which Lord Howick, the then Secretary at War, proposed, and which he ultimately carried to a successful issue, were then thwarted, he was led to propose such a charge in the organisation of the system as would be necessary to carry on the plans which he was convinced, and rightly convinced, were necessary for the wellbeing of the Army. Now, it has been my fortune, on more occasions than one, to speak in very high terms, though not more high than they deserved, of the efforts which Lord Howick made to promote the efficiency of the Army. But if controversies existed then to such an extent as to render the appointment of a Commission necessary, see how these difficulties have been got over. We are now, I am glad to say, in an entirely different state of things. In the first place, those very plans in which Lord Howick was opposed, he by his energy and determination succeeded, in spite of the opposition, in carrying into effect. At present, therefore, these grounds of complaint no longer exist. If you look to the proceedings of the last few years, you will find that great changes have from time to time originated at the War Office, and that these changes have ultimately been invariably successful. During the administration of the present Lord Panmure, two of the greatest changes that could be conceived in the condition of the Army were proposed by him and ultimately carried out—that is, the abolition of military service for life, and the substitution instead of a limited service of ten years; and next, the introduction of an examination of officers before receiving their commissions. These changes were vital in their nature; the first altered the whole system which had subsisted during the late war and since till the change was made. The military authorities at the time thought that service for life was almost necessary not only for the efficiency, but even for the very existence, of the Army; but, in spite of that opinion, Mr. Fox Maule succeeded in carrying this change, and at the present day there is a complete harmony between the military and civil departments, arising out of more enlightened and extended means on the part of the military authorities; the indisposition to change has entirely disappeared; and as far as the differences and controversies are concerned, there is no longer any ground for change. But my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose says, he thinks the Army ought to be under one head, the same as the Navy. Now, I must remind him that the Navy is not under one head in the same sense in which he proposes that the Army should be under one head. The Navy is, and is by this very Report proposed to be, under two heads—for the personnel is under one department, and the matériel under another department. Everything relating to the artillery, and to the science of projectiles, which is more likely to be understood by men who have devoted their whole time to the investigation of these subjects, than by the officers of the Navy, was, according to the recommendation of the Commission of 1837, to be taken under the charge of the Ordnance Department. But, more than that—when I was Secretary to the Admiralty, applications were coming to us from the Colonial Office constantly, and which we used to think exceedingly inconvenient, to the effect that the political necessities of the country rendered it necessary to send ships and officers to stations where, if regard was had only to the efficiency of the force, they ought not to go. I remember, when an insurrection broke out in the Ionian Islands, the Secretary for the Colonies issued his orders that the Admiralty should send ships from other parts of the Mediterranean for the purpose of putting down the insurrection in those islands. So, when the famine took place in Ireland, ships were sent to Ireland by the orders of the Home Secretary, to furnish a supply of food at the different ports on the Irish coast. Well, then, it is not correct to say that if you were to constitute the Secretary at War a Secretary of State he would be in the same position with the First Lord of the Admiralty, because the First Lord of the Admiralty takes his orders from the Secretary of State; while if you created one officer for the whole department, he would take no orders from the Secretary of State, but his office would absorb into itself all the duties connected with the Secretary at War—all the duties performed by the Master General of the Ordnance—all the duties performed by the civil portion of the Ordnance—all the duties connected with the Army now performed by the Treasury and by the Commissariat; and in addition to this vast increase of duties he would have to take on himself the duties now performed by the different Secretaries of State, and would be required to be responsible for the distribution of the whole force throughout the country. Let the House consider, for one moment, the increasing and complicated machinery with which the Secretary at War would be encumbered, if he were required to discharge all these various duties. Let us see if there would be any increase in promptitude by the substitution of this new officer in place of the Secretaries of State and the Commander-in-Chief. How is the Secretary at War to judge whether or not there is an additional force required in any part of England? You may have disturbances in Lancashire; you may have strikes; you may have an uneasy feeling between the men and their masters; you may have Rebecca riots in Wales; you may have an insurrection in Ireland. The Secretary at War could only obtain his information on these points from the Secretary of State for the Home Department. You may say that he is to issue his orders, and that he alone is responsible for them; but in point of fact he is not responsible, for he can only get his information from the Home Secretary, and he must take his word for what is going on. Or suppose that there is a disturbance in some part of our Colonial Empire. The new Secretary of War must then be the mere go-between between the Colonial Secretary and the Commander-in-Chief. In point of fact, the Colonial Secretary would dictate then to the Commander-in-Chief as he does now—the Home Secretary would dictate as he does now; but in place of doing that directly—in place of making his own explanations, and receiving explanations from the Commander-in-Chief as to the difficulty of moving troops, and so coming to a mutual understanding, all this would then have to be filtered and strained from one to the other through this new Secretary of State, who would be a third party placed between two parties who had hitherto worked sympathetically with each other, and the result would be that you would infuse difficulty where there is now simplicity, and a cumbrous mode of arriving at an object where there is now directness. My hon. Friend stated with great frankness in what he differed from the Report of the Commissioners, and I think I cannot do better than follow his example and state, with equal frankness, the course which I would follow. I do not say that the present system is a perfect system. Theoretically, no doubt, it has many faults, but practically it works very well—though my conviction is that by certain well-considered changes it may be made practically to work much better. Let me first of all say that, having given my opinion as regards the question of the abolition of the present authority of the Secretaries of State, I would like to fortify it by quoting the opinion of Lord Panmure, who has a great leaning towards the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, and who, when examined before the very Committee of 1837, whose recommendations my hon. Friend (Mr. Hume) wishes the House to adopt, on being asked the question, "With reference to the maintenance of the public peace at home, is there any Member of the Government more competent to form an opinion upon that point than the Home Secretary?" replied— Certainly not; the Home Secretary is the most capable, and he ought to be the person who should advise the Crown with reference to all matters connected with the preservation of the peace of the country. Is not he in constant communication with the lord-lieutenants of counties, and with the magistrates generally?—Certainly. With reference to the aid which may be required from the military branch of the public service, for the maintenance of peace and the support of the civil power, is there any one so immediately responsible as the Home Secretary?—No one can be. Therefore, upon the question of the quantity of military force that will be required in aid of the civil power, is not he the most competent judge?—Whoever may be the party to decide upon what force is to be maintained in the country, he is, and of course must be, guided by the advice of the Home Secretary as to what force should be maintained in the home districts. If there were transferred from the Home Secretary to the Secretary at War, for instance, the duty of judging of the quantity of force to be maintained at home, would not the Secretary at War want that correspondence which takes place with the Home Office, for the guidance of his judgment?—I take it that he would go to the Home Secretary to furnish him with that information to guide his judgment upon that point. Then at last it would come to a mere shifting of the responsibility from one Minister to another, but a communication with the Home Office would be necessary to enable the war department to form a judgment with reference to the quantity of the home force that may be required?—A war Minister placed in the position supposed in Mr. Ellice's question, would be informed by the Home Office that so many troops were required in such a district; and then he would distribute those troops as economically as he could upon his own responsibility. But what then would his responsibility amount to? If he were called upon to answer for his distribution of forces in the country, his answer would be—I was told by the Home Secretary that he required a certain number of men in certain districts, and I furnished them. The Home Secretary is the man who governs the country—he is the man who is responsible—you may call the Secretary at War responsible if you please, but he is a mere go-between between the man who is really and virtually responsible for the peace of the country and the Commander-in-Chief, who provides the troops that are required. I will now state what are my own views on this subject. I do not believe that it would be safe to add very largely to the existing consolidation of the duties of the Ordnance Department. The Ordnance Department has had placed upon it, since 1815, the care of the barrack departments in England, Ireland, Scotland, and the Colonies, and the care of providing fuel and light, both in England and the Colonies, important duties which were formerly discharged by other departments. As far as I have had the opportunity of judging of the working of that department, I think there are certain great objects which we ought constantly to keep in view. If I had the power, by a magician's wand, to rearrange the department without reference to existing circumstances, and especially without reference to the difficulties of the present moment, when it becomes necessary not to change our tools, but to use them, I should say that a change in the interior arrangement of the Ordnance Office would be far more important than any change in the office of the Commander-in-Chief. Now there is a broad line of distinction between the Master General of the Ordnance and the Commander-in-Chief. At present the business of the Commander-in-Chief is very much of the nature of routine. He can make no alteration in the army which carries with it any expense, without the sanction of the Secretary at War. He can promote to a vacancy, but that vacancy, so far as it is caused by retirement, can only be created with the consent of the Secretary at War. He can remove no officer to half-pay. Similar duties fall to be discharged by the Master General of the Ordnance, though not to the same extent; but then there is no such check upon him. But the duties of the Master General are ten times more important; they are such that, though they require him to be a military man in a great degree, yet the civil element enters largely into them. The providing of ammunition and the care and maintenance of fortifications both come under the cognisance and await the decision, of the Master General of the Ordnance. His duties, in fact, are of the most complicated nature, and require the advice of men eminent in science, and they often demand a nice judgment to decide. If a fortification be commenced which turns out in the end to be useless, there is great harm done, for it is not merely the waste of time and labour, consumed in erecting the fortification, but that fortification must be maintained, and it will abstract men who might be employed in other and more valuable services. I say, therefore, that, though it does not rank so high, the office of Master General of the Ordnance is of more importance to the State than that of the Commander-in-Chief. I confess that as far as I have seen the working of the War Office in connection with the Horse Guards, I would attribute its great financial success to this fact, that the one office incurs the expense, while the other checks it. My hon. Friend has been pleased to undervalue the duties of the Secretary at War; but I believe that the main reason why the administration of the Army is more economical than that of the Navy is this, that the Secretary at War watches over every step of the Commander-in-Chief, and checks his course whenever it is inconsistent with economy. I think that this check, which is applied by the War Office to the Horse Guards, ought also to be applied by the War Office to the Ordnance. I confess again—but this is my private opinion, and I pledge no Member of the Government to it—that I think a further division might be made, though there would be great difficulties attending the arrangement, which would give the Commander-in-Chief the command of the whole personnel, and the Master General of the Ordnance the direction and control of the matériel, so that the whole of the artillery, for instance, as troops, should be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. But I am aware that that is an opinion not shared in by others, though it is an opinion I have come to from all the means I have had of judging. However, it is a change not so indispensable as that which I mentioned before, which is a sound, and I believe an undisputed opinion—that the check on the army expenditure at the Horse Guards might be applied with advantage to the Ordnance. There are other and minor points to which my hon. Friend alluded, and in which I should hardly think of following him, if I did not wish to state my opinions with equal frankness to his own. He has spoken about a change in the mode of drawing up commissions. The commissions are now drawn up in the Home Office, and I know no reason why they should not be drawn up in the office of the Secretary at War, and countersigned by him, rather than by the Home Secretary. The general process of providing stores was well described in the Report of the Commission of 1837, which stated that, when arms were required by the Commander-in-Chief, he wrote to the Secretary at War, and the Secretary at War wrote to the Home Secretary, and there the thing stopped. Properly speaking, the Home Secretary ought to have taken the Sovereign's pleasure on the subject, and on the Sovereign's signing the warrant the arms would be delivered. But it was known that King George IV. had a very great aversion to the frequent signing of his name, and as he would not sign the warrants, the Home Secretary ceased to send them. The warrants became mere waste paper, and the arms were sent on the authority of the Secretary at War. But when Her Most Gracious Majesty came to the Throne, with that punctuality in business which has always characterised her, and with that desire which she has ever shown to identify herself with everything that relates to the comfort and well-being of the Army, she desired that the warrants might be sent to her for her signature, and they have been sent ever since. My hon. Friend has referred to another matter with regard to the Commissariat. The Commissariat department supplies stores throughout the Colonies; but the Commissariat Commission, over which my noble Friend the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) presided, recommended several alterations, by which considerable reductions have been effected. The result of those alterations has been that we have the services of some reduced officers and officers upon half-pay in the Commissariat, whose assistance is economically used for the purveying of food for the troops, while a fixed stoppage has been substituted for the regulated system of contract. And further, in the expedition which is now proceeding to the East we have found that we have the services of an ample number of able and experienced men, who have effectually organised the Commissariat establishment. But I confess with reference to this branch of the service I never could understand why Commissariat officers, whose business it is to provide food and forage for troops, should act as bankers to the Treasury. That is a practice I cannot understand. I should be glad, therefore, to see the Commissariat put upon another footing in that respect. Suppose the course was taken which I have suggested—that is, that the command of the artillery should be taken from the Ordnance, and put upon the Horse Guards; in other words, that the Commander-in-Chief should have under his control the personnel of the Army, and the Ordnance the matériel. This would be a proper division, and in this sense the Commissariat would serve under the Ordnance; and then would apply the formal check of the Secretary at War as to finance in the same manner as it is applied at the Horse Guards. I now come to the course proposed to be taken immediately, at this particular juncture. My hon. Friend has alluded to the evidence which was given by Lord Grey in 1849. I will also read one or two passages from Lord Grey's evidence, because if Lord Grey thinks there is a time when no alterations should be made à fortiori the present is a moment when, in my opinion at least, it would be dangerous to make such a change as that proposed by my hon. Friend. Lord Grey is asked:— Is your Lordship aware that any alteration has been made since that waste of time and paper was pointed out in 1837?—I am not aware that there has been any change made. Does your Lordship's recollection enable you to state whether the subject has ever been before the Government of which you have been a Member so long?—I do not think that the subject has ever been taken up lately. After the Report was issued, it was considered in the beginning of the year 1838, and there was an intention of making rather an extensive change, but it was found that there was so much objection entertained to it, I believe throughout the Army and throughout the Ordnance, that the intention was abandoned, and I am not aware that it has ever been revived. Were not, in fact, five of the seven Commis- sioners in 1837 Cabinet Ministers at the time, and have they not remained so while that Administration was in office?—They are now again Cabinet Ministers; they have been so all the time. Is your Lordship's own opinion, as expressed in that Report, in any way altered by anything that has occurred since which leads you to approve of that system being continued?—My opinion is certainly not altered as to the cumbrous and imperfect nature of the existing arrangements. I am not prepared to say that it is impossible to devise a better mode of improving the system than was suggested in this Report. That is a very difficult question. Although you retain your opinion as to the cumbrous nature of the present arrangements, you have never, during the interval which has elapsed, thought it sufficiently embarrassing and prejudicial to the public service to render it your duty to bring it before the Cabinet of which you have been a Member?—No, I have not. I believe that in peace the present arrangement, though certainly very imperfect, works tolerably well; and it is always right to have a good deal of consideration for the feeling of the profession; and I believe the profession is very much against any such change as was proposed in the Report. Such was the evidence of Lord Grey on this subject, and it should be received with all that respect and deference which is due to so eminent and experienced an authority on such matters. I have already explained to the House the opinion which I myself have formed from having paid some attention to this subject during the past year. At any time I think you ought to proceed step by step. The process should be gradual. But at this moment I do not believe you could undertake a more rash experiment than when you are about to enter upon a serious contest, and when you will have the greatest pressure upon your machinery from being engaged in a very hot war. I believe you have a system in operation which practically works well, though there are defects in it which I have endeavoured to point out—defects, however, which may be remedied—and which, in an emergency like the present, will give efficient results. It certainly occurs that in manufactures, for example, there is great power in the division of labour, and that great results are obtained from it; but the question here is, whether the greatest results cannot be obtained rather by combination than division. Well, if colleagues are thoroughly imbued with a strong desire to carry out great objects for the benefit of the public service, they will act just as harmoniously in three different departments as if you had them all concentrated in one. Since I have been in office, for example, it has been the custom for the Master General of the Ordnance, the Inspector General of Fortifications, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Commander-in-Chief, and myself, to meet periodically at the War Office, and go carefully through all the different changes which were being made with regard to our home defences. Whenever we had colonial questions of a like character to consider, we did the same in conjunction with the Colonial Secretary. And so everything has gone on harmoniously, and, I trust, efficiently. Recollect that the Colonial Secretary is, to a great degree, necessarily a War Minister. He certainly governs large colonies which have no garrisons, and which are strictly colonies; but he also governs colonies which are not colonies, but garrisons. Such are Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands, Bermuda, and Mauritius—though the latter is both a colony and a garrison. These places are held for war purposes; but they are governed by the Colonial Secretary, and nobody has yet dreamt of putting them into the hands of the Secretary at War. If you think the Secretary of the Colonies is unable to carry on the duties of a War Minister because he is overworked, you must likewise recollect, that of the three Secretaries of State, the Colonial Secretary is the only one whose work must ultimately become much lighter. The work of the Foreign Secretary is the heaviest of all; and that of the Home Secretary is rapidly accumulating. With respect to the Colonial Secretary, however, the House must remember that in every case where you give responsible government to a colony, you cast that colony, as it were, away; her connection with you exists in an imperial sense, but administratively she is almost entirely cut off, and thus consequently the work for a Colonial Minister becomes lighter. Fifteen or sixteen years ago, I believe, Canada gave more trouble, occupied more time, and inspired more anxiety in the breast of the Colonial Minister, than all the rest of the colonies put together. But I apprehend that at this moment there is no part of our colonial empire which gives so little anxiety, which consumes so little time, and gives so little trouble to the Colonial Minister as Canada. The Cape of Good Hope has been got into the groove of self-government, and the same thing will happen there. The same result will ultimately take place with regard to Australia, Van Diemen's Land, and other colonies. Under such circumstances, I say you must not consider the Colonial Minister unfitted to undertake the charge of direct operations in war. As far as we have had experience—and we have had the opportunity of judging for the last few weeks how the existing machinery will work under what may be called very high pressure—we are satisfied it has worked well. The Government, as the House knows, have been engaged in sending out the largest military force that has been sent out of this country for many years. It is a larger British force than that which the Duke of Wellington took with him to Portugal, or than he had with him at Waterloo; and it has been fitted out with greater attention to efficiency and to health than any that ever previously left our shores. This was done in an unprecedented short time; and all who have seen the troops will admit that an army never went forth in a higher state of efficiency both in the personnel and the matériel. We know, therefore, by practical experience, at the present moment, that these different departments can work together harmoniously and efficiently. I confess, then, that, holding the opinions which I have frankly stated to the House, wishing to carry them out, and hoping to see them effected, I should look with great alarm upon the success of a Motion which pledged us instantly to put the whole of this machinery out of gear in order to introduce what I dare say might in some respects be an improvement, but which as a whole can only be regarded as a theoretical proposition. There is another consideration, also, in reference to my hon. Friend's proposed reformations, which ought to be most seriously and gravely reflected upon, and that is, that you can seldom make any very great changes, such as those suggested, in Government offices, suddenly and at once, because, if you do attempt to do so, you run the risk of disturbing that accurate knowledge of routine business which is most important, and can scarcely be overrated. The success of the conduct of a department depends, as the House must be aware, in no slight measure upon an accurate knowledge of routine. We have in every department men who may be called only men of routine. But yet they are men of ability. Their eyes have long been fixed upon particular objects; their duties have trained them to it, they are thoroughly masters of details, and they are consequently of the greatest use in administering the affairs of the department. But change their position, ask them to originate a new routine; take them off the rails, do this, and you will soon find the whole establishment in confusion. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty effected the greatest change made in modern times in the organisation of that department; and I have asked him how it was effected. The answer he gave to me was, that it took years of difficulty to get over the changes which he introduced; that it took years of labour before he got things to run in their accustomed course; that it took years of trouble before the men got used to the new machine; and that it would have been totally impossible to have made such a change under the pressure of war. My hon. Friend the Member for Montrose has said, that he has no wish to embarrass the Government; and that the House has consented to vote the supplies, we have asked, cheerfully. I am prepared to acknowledge that. I think the conduct of this House in general, and that of my hon. Friend under existing circumstances, has been most honourable to them. They have most laudably supported the Government in this emergency. But I must confess that if an immediate adoption of the very large change now recommended, and the consequent abolition of three or four existing posts, be forced upon the Government—although the changes were feasible, which I doubt—the efficiency of the public service would be impaired. Having expressed these opinions with entire unreserve, but always bearing in mind that we ought gradually to approach towards a better state of things, I hope my hon. Friend will allow me to ask him not to press this Motion.

LORD SEYMOUR

said, he had listened to the speech of his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War with great pleasure, though it contained some points with which he could not concur. His right hon. Friend had expressed his willingness to consider any suggestions for the improvement of the departments referred to, and to deter unnecessary expenditure. He could not object to the statements by which this assurance was qualified; and when his right hon. Friend added that this was not the right time, though when the right time came he should be prepared to make a change, he (Lord Seymour) heard with no dissatisfaction an argument which had lately been treated with scorn and contempt. He wished, however, to call attention to two or three points on which his right hon. Friend had touched. Circum- stances, he said, had very much altered since the Commission of 1837, which had been referred to so often both by his right hon. Friend as well as by the hon. Member for Montrose. In considering this subject, he (Lord Seymour) would refer to these altered circumstances since the military affairs of the country had been put under the Secretary of the Colonies. The Secretary of War was an office created, he believed, about the year 1795; and in the year 1800 the business of the Colonies was transferred to the Secretary of War. But at that time the Secretary of War had little to do as regarded the Colonies, for they did not give the same amount of trouble which they did in later periods. His right hon. Friend hoped that the Colonies would hereafter give less trouble. He trusted this idea might prove correct; but, considering that we had forty-two colonies, with only one Secretary of State to read and answer all the correspondence relating to them, he thought they provided work enough for one man without making him also responsible for the management of a great war. Lord Grey had stated to the Committee of 1849 that, in his opinion— it was absolutely impossible for the Colonial Secretary to exercise a constant supervision over the arrangements with regard to the military forces of the country. But Lord Grey, who had given this opinion, was himself in a favourable position, if any man ever was, for exercising this supervision, for he had previously been Secretary at War, he was familiar with the details of the organisation of the Army; yet when he became Colonial Secretary, he felt he could not, with all his previous knowledge, exercise a proper superintendence over matters connected with the Army. And he (Lord Seymour) would ask whether it was possible that a Secretary of State, who was generally chosen not on account of his military knowledge, but for the sake of his general wisdom and judgment, could be the fittest person to manage and conduct the affairs of war? In the last war the Colonial Secretary had, he believed, an Under Secretary, who was an eminent military man; but at the present moment there was nothing of the kind. Now, he wanted to know whether any assistance was to be afforded to the Colonial Secretary in this respect, so that he might not be at a disadvantage on account of his want of military knowledge? Then, he would ask, how had the present system worked? Had it worked well? We had had the Duke of Wellington Prime Minister; Sir George Murray, Colonial Minister; Sir Henry Hardinge, Secretary at War, at the same time; yet Lord Grey stated that, even at that time, with these great military authorities in the Government, the arrangements were so complicated between the different departments connected with the Army, that it was impossible business could go on well. Lord Grey had given some information which proved this statement. He referred, for instance, to several cases in different colonies, which showed the inconvenience of arrangements by which not only purely military matters, but matters affecting the health of the troops, and even their lives, were delayed, and eventually forgotten. In 1836, on the 18th of July, Colonel Nicholls, stationed in Bahama, wrote to the War Office respecting an officer's room in the barracks; it was a most unwholesome place, destructive to health; the officer who occupied it was sick and dying; and he wished for the necessary authority to have it put into a proper condition. One would have expected that such a notice, coming as it did from an officer who then held the position of Lieutenant-Governor, would have met with some consideration; but the letter remained unnoticed for a whole year; disputes going on all the time between the different departments, who referred it from one to another, whether the room should be washed, cleaned, and ventilated. At last, in the following year, another letter was sent, reminding the authorities of that sent in July, 1836, and earnestly calling attention to the inconvenience which the delay had created. Several more letters and explanations passed between the different departments; and at length this small matter, which affected the health of officers serving upon a distant station, was accorded. Another case was also mentioned by Lord Grey. Colonel-Commandant Cockburn wrote to the Treasury about the state of the barracks at Bahama; and in his letter he said that plans had been sent in year after year, and that life after life I had been sacrificed, still no order had been given upon the subject. When gallant officers were writing in this way, and the facts were brought under the notice of the Committee of 1849, it was natural that Parliament should be anxious to know whether any steps had been taken to remedy so discreditable a state of things. There were other cases to which he might refer, but in this very correspondence about the barracks the Ordnance referred to the Colonial Secretary; then it appeared the Colonial Secretary could not find the earlier letters, and so the whole thing was stopped, because the earlier letters could not be found. Next, the Ordnance were obliged to ask what was the question. The question was, whether the troops did not want new barracks; but this question had not been answered in 1838. The correspondence on this subject passed through no less than five departments—the Secretary of the Colonies, the Treasury, the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary at War, and the Master General of the Ordnance—besides through the offices of the civil governor, and the officer commanding in the colony. Very truly was it said by Lord Raglan, then Lord Fitzroy Somerset, in one of his usual business-like letters, that "the multiplicity and complexity of correspondence must always tend to inconvenience and delay." Another and a similar instance occurred with regard to the barracks in Turk's Island. Barracks were much wanted there, and in December, 1838, a letter was written to the Treasury, requesting them to make provision in the Estimates for the erection of the necessary buildings. The letter was referred to the Ordnance, and they said it had been brought under the notice of the Master General, but that, in the absence of instructions from the Colonial Secretary and the Lords of the Treasury, they were unable to issue any order. Consequently, nothing was done. A long correspondence then took place between the Ordnance, the Colonial Secretary, and the Treasury; and then the Ordnance wrote another letter, stating they possessed no information; and at last it was discovered that Turk's Island was not under the Ordnance at all. These were cases which proved that some general control and superintendence were necessary. Such things could not have happened if only his right hon. Friend had been responsible; for he would have taken care that the decisions were given either one way or the other at the earliest moment. A question next arose as to the food of the troops. There had been complaints of illness for nineteen years; the medical department reported the health of the troops, and pointed out various things that might be done in the barracks and elsewhere for the benefit of the troops. The representation came to the War Office that it was necessary to substitute fresh meat for salt provisions. This took a long time to effect. There really appeared no end to the correspondence between the Commissioners of Audit, the Treasury, the Ordnance, the Colonial Secretary, and the War Office. At last the change was effected which ought to have been effected nineteen years before, and then, instead of being attended with an increase of expense, as expected, it was found to be absolutely more economical. What his right hon. Friend (Mr. Sidney Herbert) had said that he was ready to do was good so far as it went, but he (Lord Seymour) should have liked the duties connected with the Army, now performed by the Secretary of the Colonies, to be transferred to the office of the Secretary at War, leaving the Secretary of the Colonies to state what force was required in the different colonies, and, of course, empowering him in cases of emergency to communicate directly with the Horse Guards without the interposition of the Secretary at War. He was convinced that there could be no economy until we had some more general superintendence over the administration of the Army. The relief of troops might also be more economically managed under the direction of the Secretary at War, who had the military authorities immediately at hand to consult, than under that of the Colonial Secretary, who, from not being well acquainted with the subject, might give orders which would entail additional expense on the public. He was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman state that he was in his own mind inclined to divide the Commissariat department; to place, as he (Lord Seymour) understood him, that portion which belonged to the supply of the troops under the Ordnance, keeping the Ordnance under the check of the Secretary at War, and leaving to the Treasury that which might be called the banking department. At the same time, he hoped that the Commissariat officers would not be allowed to contract for the supply of all consumable articles to the troops at borne. He knew that at the Treasury there was a great love for the Commissariat, and it was thought that nothing could be done except by its officers. Sir Charles Trevelyan said that he thought it was but fair to the Commissariat officers that they should have the supply of the troops at Home, on account of their having had so much service abroad; but Lord Fitzroy Somerset had recommended that the troops should be supplied on the regimental system. He believed that every Member of the Committee upon this subject was satisfied with the ability of the gentlemen in the office of the Secretary at War, and he should be glad to see them relieve the Colonial Secretary of some of those duties which he could not properly perform. He did not go the whole length of the Report of the Commission upon this subject; but he supposed that Report was well considered, and he should like to hear what were the present opinions of those who signed it. He should especially like to hear whether his noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Lord Palmerston), who had had many years' experience in the War Office, retained the opinions which he entertained when he signed the Report of that Commission, and how far he agreed with the opinions which his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War had expressed on this subject. He quite agreed with his right hon. Friend, that this was not a convenient time for remodelling great departments, but he thought that we might now relieve the Secretary of the Colonies, either by transferring some of the duties at present discharged by him to the Secretary at War, or by the appointment of a military secretary to assist him. After the speech of his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, he thought that it would be impolitic on the part of the hon. Member for Montrose to put the House to the trouble of dividing; and he hoped that, after a little more consideration, the Government would be prepared to go a step further in that consolidation of departments which, as regarded finance, would be satisfactory to that House and the country.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he considered that the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) had done a service both to the House and to the country, by calling attention to this question at the present moment; and, though he readily admitted the candid and fair spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had met the speech of the hon. Member for Montrose, he must at the same time say he did not think the right hon. Gentleman had been altogether successful in meeting the statements and arguments which the hon. Member for Montrose had urged upon the House. With regard to several of these statements and arguments the right hon. Gentleman had not offered any answer at all. Every one must feel that at the present moment public attention would be directed more urgently than ever to the state of the Army, and the manner in which the Army was governed and conducted; and he was afraid all must admit that, great as the efficiency of that Army was, there were several points connected with its government and its management which could not be regarded as satisfactory. The hon. Member for Montrose had adverted tonight to several of these points; among others, to the system by which the army was clothed. There were also other points which from time to time had occasioned a considerable amount of scandal, and nothing that excited public disapprobation could occur without being more or less injurious to the public service. These, however, were not the chief points raised in the speech of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hume), but the points specially raised in the speech of the hon. Gentleman were the questions with regard to the parties by whom the Army was managed and governed. He (Sir J. Pakington) thought the Members of the present Government would not find fault with him if he attached weight to and expressed his approval of a document that bore the signatures of "Palmerston" and "John Russell." Their signatures were attached to the Report of the Commission of 1837; but, if he was to judge from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, those noble Lords were not now disposed to carry out the views they urged in 1837, but were rather disposed to contend that this was not the time for such changes, although, as the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) remarked, Government had not lately shown themselves very accessible to arguments as to the inopportuneness of the present time for particular and very important measures. And what was the state of things which the two noble Lords he had named disapproved in 1837, but which they appeared to be unwilling to depart from or change now? Could it be contended that the present mode of carrying on the government of the Army was satisfactory, or could conduce to efficiency? We had an Army governed—first of all, by a Secretary of State for the Colonies, as Secretary of War; then, we had the distinct office of Secretary at War; then the distinct office of Commander-in-Chief; and finally, the distinct office of the Board of Ordnance. And what, then, was the in- evitable result of having these numerous distinct authorities to carry on that which, he confessed he believed, like any other great public department, would be much better and much more efficiently carried on by one authority. The noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) had made statements upon this subject which he himself (Sir J. Pakington) was enabled to confirm, from the experience he had gained, during the time he had the honour of holding the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies. Upon two occasions, which he now bore in mind, he happened to receive applications of an urgent nature, relating to the health of our troops in the Colonies—in fact, to the effect that our troops in different parts of the world were suffering from sickness and other causes brought on by deficiency of barrack accommodation. He was anxious, of course, to adopt remedial measures as soon as possible, but, on inquiry, he found that, although he was nominally War Minister, he had no power, and he was obliged to refer the matter to another department, which department referred it to another. It appeared that no department was really responsible, and while the various departments were pressing questions upon one another, it was found practically impossible to remedy the evil, perhaps not practically impossible to remedy the evil, but, at any rate, to remedy it with that promptness and despatch which in such a case was highly necessary. The evil was, consequently, obliged to remain for some time unchecked. He quite concurred with what had fallen from the noble Lord (Lord Seymour) upon this subject, and he thought the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, in endeavouring to answer the objections of the hon. Member for Montrose, had only confirmed them and shown their full force. "Very true," the right hon. Gentleman said, "we have these various departments, but they are now acting in perfect harmony together;" but at the same time the right hon. Gentleman admitted that at no distant day, instead of acting harmoniously together, there had been great discord in these several departments. The discord which had occurred at one period might occur again, and he thought the right hon. Gentleman had shown no reason why the harmonious action now existing must be permanent. He (Sir J. Pakington) could not but think that anything like the want of harmonious action when our forces were in the field could only he attended with serious injury to the public service. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) said no sufficient reason had been urged for creating a Secretary of State for the War Department. Now, the Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose did not, as he (Sir J. Pakington) read and understood it, require the appointment of a Secretary of State for the War Department, but what the right hon. Gentleman himself said showed the necessity of placing that great department under the superintendence and control of one efficient office. That was alone the object sought for by the hon. Member for Montrose, and he (Sir J. Pakington) thought that, when the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had shown that the Queen's commands were conveyed through different Secretaries of State, sometimes the Home Secretary, sometimes the Foreign Secretary, and sometimes the Colonial Secretary, according to the portion of Her Majesty's dominions in which the action of a military force was required, no argument could seriously be brought forward to show that the Secretary for the Colonies should continue in the anomalous and inconvenient position of being Secretary for the War Department. The Secretary to whom the civil administration of our numerous Colonies, with all their complicated interests, was intrusted, could not possibly give that attention to the efficient management and government of the Army, in a time of war, which the importance of the subject demanded. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Seymour) had stated with perfect and unanswerable truth that which he (Sir J. Pakington) could confirm from experience, namely, that the correspondence of the Colonial Department, taking only the colonial duties in it, was already too much by itself, and ought not to be mixed up with duties of a totally different nature. His right hon. Friend (the Secretary at War), when he referred to the business of the Colonial Department, and expressed an opinion that now we bad given free institutions to many of our Colonies, the business of that department would partially diminish, could have but little idea of the amount of correspondence of that office, and he would ask the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell), who had himself held the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies, if he was disposed to confirm the view the Secretary at War appeared disposed to entertain. He believed the right hon. Gentleman would then make the admission that certainly in the day about to arrive it would be unwise for the office of Secretary at War to be held by the Colonial Secretary. In a time of peace the Secretary of State for the Colonies might continue to act as Secretary at War, but he confessed that very frequently, during the time he held the office of Colonial Secretary, the thought had crossed his mind, "This may do very well in a time of peace, but, if ever we again encounter the misfortune of war, it will be impossible for the Minister of this department to carry on also the duties of Secretary at War." The House had been told to-night that George IV. was tired of so often signing his name, and he (Sir J. Pakington) thought any man who had held the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies would imbibe the same extreme dislike to so often signing his name, Much of the time of the Colonial Secretary was occupied in signing commissions, in attending to details of the Order of the Bath, and in other matters which would be much better transacted by some other department. In a time of peace it would even be wise to relieve the Colonial Secretary from these vexatious duties; but, in a time of war, he believed it would be impossible for any man to discharge both functions. In a time of war, with armies in the field, the duties of the War Minister must necessarily be greatly increased, and he appealed to the Government whether it would be possible in a time of war for the same individual to discharge the duties of Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also those of chief Minister for the War Department. The House was told that this was not a time for change. In 1837 a Commission reported that a change ought to be made; and why had it not been made then? Why, because it was a time of peace, and because it was then thought that nothing very pressing existed calling for a change. The country was now, however, unhappily involved in war, and still the House were told that a change must not be made, because it would be extremely inconvenient to have a change in a time of war. Thus, at one time because we were at peace, and at another time because we were at war, we were to be told that no change ought to be made. The country would not be satisfied to see a question involving the administration of so important a department—he would not say trifled with—but they would expect, and had a right to expect, that that department should be properly and efficiently conducted. With these views, he trusted the Government would seriously consider, if they really thought it would be unwise at this moment to organise a new department, whether some change might not be made, consistent with safety and prudence, that would relieve the Colonial Department of duties that they could not properly discharge, and adopt the suggestion of the noble Lord opposite by the appointment of a Secretary who might transact the war business of the country. In conclusion, he must observe that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had met the suggestions of the hon. Member (Mr. Hume) in a candid and fair spirit, and he had made the important admission that the present system was clumsy and bad, and ought to be changed. He (Sir J. Pakington), therefore, hoped that the House might trust to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government to make those changes as quickly and as effectively as they prudently could, at the same time adding a hope that the hon. Member for Montrose would not feel himself called upon to press his Motion to a division.

MR. ELLICE

said, he would also entreat his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose not to divide the House on this question. It did appear, however, that, if the Motion was pressed to a division upon the question whether the military administration of the country should remain on the footing upon which it now was, the Government would be left in a minority. At the same time, there was no concealing the fact that the impression out of doors, as well as the decisions come to in the Reports of every Commission and every Committee that had considered the subject, were, that it was impossible, in a rational country, long to continue a confused and perplexed administration like that the merits of which they were discussing. Take, for example, the department of the Commissariat. It was shown before the Committee to which reference had so often been made in the course of this discussion that civil officers in departments both of the Ordnance and Commissariat were doing almost the same duties in different parts of the world, that a Commissariat officer in Canada, for instance, was doing the duty that Ordnance officers were doing at home. Now, surely one of these departments might be made to carry into execution all the duties of the other. It would appear, however, that the opinions of Sir Charles Trevelyan exerted great influence over all Governments. No one had greater respect than he had for the talents and devotion to the public service of Sir Charles Trevelyan; but if the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who appeared to have adopted some of his views, would look into the evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan before the Committee on Army Expenditure, he would see how ready he was to suggest plenty of business, though it was not always so clear how that business would be discharged. He remembered hearing Mr. Sheridan once say to Mr. Whitbread that he was so fond of labour that he thought, if he had been wrought in a dray belonging to his own establishment in Chiswell Street, he would have been for doing all the work of the dray-horses himself. It was pretty much the same with Sir Charles Trevelyan, who seemed equally fond of work, for he would take not only the Commissariat, but the whole banking business and emigration establishments of the country under the superintendence of the public. He must say, he thought it high time to begin the work of reformation with regard to some of these departments, and he was happy to find that his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War would not be a laggard at the work. It could not be denied, however, that great difficulty was experienced in moving some of our public departments. It was hardly necessary to remind the House of the communication which recently appeared from Mr. Guthrie, the surgeon, in the public press relative to ambulances for the wounded. He stated that he was unable to get any satisfactory result from his communications to the Commander-in-Chief and the Board of Ordnance; but no sooner did Mr. Guthrie state his complaints in the newspapers than the noble Duke at the head of the Colonial Office, with that good feeling and attention to the public service which distinguished him on all occasions, immediately attended to the communication, and issued an order upon the subject. Had it not been for Mr. Guthrie's letter in the public papers, however, the matter would, in all probability, not have been attended to. With regard to the system of clothing by the colonels, the Committee of which he and the hon. Member for Montrose were Members unanimously came to the conclusion that the clothing of the Army should remain as it was; but it did not follow from this that alterations should not from time to time be made in the system. No change in this respect could be determined on, however, except by a committee of general officers. All these matters depended on so many parties, that the consequence was a system of administration not to be found in any other country in the world. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War said they wished to interfere with the duties of the three Secretaries of State. That, however, was not correct. No one wished to take from the Secretary of State the duty of providing for what was requisite within his own department. If the Secretary of State for the Home Department wanted troops for the interior service of the country, he ought still to have the power of obtaining those troops from some department competent to supply; and so also with the Colonial Secretary, if he desired to send troops to the Colonies. But what they wanted to see was the appointment of a reponsible department, to which all military authorities should report, and to which the Secretary of State should be able to say, "I want 20,000 men," instead of having to go for these 20,000 men to the Commander-in-Chief, to the Ordnance, the Commissariat, and he knew not how many other quarters. The great expedition just fitting out had been placed under the command of one of the best officers in the country, and not only so, but one of the best men of business in it. There would be no divided authority in that force. The noble Lord who commanded it would have the entire control of the Ordnance, the Commissariat, the paymasters, the doctors, and everything else. This was what ought to be, and what they wanted was, to see the same rule adopted with respect to the administration of all these departments at home.

COLONEL KNOX

said, he must entreat the Government to take into their serious consideration the recommendations of the Committee some years ago to put the Ordnance under the same department with the war establishment. At present not even a gun could be removed from Woolwich without applications going from one office to another on the subject. He trusted that the right hon. Secretary at War would urge on the Ministry the necessity of bringing under one head the different departments of the Army. He thought it was rather late that, now that they were embarking a great number of troops on foreign service, the Government had not made up their minds as to what arms they should have. He hoped this would be at once decided upon, for uniformity of arms and ammunition was the mainstay of an army. If this was not attended to, it would lead to the most disastrous results. He thought also, that the Minié rifle ought to be looked into, as he had been told on good authority, that these rifles required, in connection with the ball and ammunition, a quantity of grease. In a warm climate there would be some difficulty probably on that score, and then, after a few rounds, the weapon would be rendered useless, as without the grease it was impossible to force the ball into the rifle. He threw out this suggestion for the consideration of the Ordnance department, as it was most important that the soldiers should be furnished with efficient arms.

COLONEL MAULE

said that the soldiers had only been supplied with two sorts of arms, consequently there would only be two descriptions of ammunition. Various experiments had been made at the firing school at Hythe, and he could assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the result of these proved that there was not the slightest difficulty in firing or loading the Minié rifle.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

Sir, I confess that my opinion as to the general evils of the present state of the war department is not very much altered from what it was when the subject was inquired into some time ago. As to the remedy which was then proposed, I have some doubts certainly with regard to a part of the authority which it was suggested should be given to the Secretary at War. I think that other arrangements might, perhaps, be better for the attainment of the object we have in view. At all events, I consider it is very clear from what has happened at various times—with respect more particularly to the Ordnance department, and the difficulty of making arrangements for the health of the troops—that a more efficient and more direct authority is required. My right hon. friend the Secretary at War has stated that he thinks the Ordnance ought to be more connected with the Secretary at War than it now is—that as the Secretary at War checks all the expenditure of the Commander in Chief, so he ought also to check the expenditure of the Ordnance. I believe if this were done, it would not only serve as a check, but the operations of the Ordnance department would be much facilitated and made more effective than they now are. It has been asked why it was that the Report of the Commission of 1837 has not been carried into effect. The reason was this: The first consideration of that report came naturally before Lord Melbourne, who was then the head of the Government and he immediately entered into a correspondence with the Duke of Wellington on the subject. The Duke of Wellington wrote two or three letters to Lord Melbourne who found that those letters contained many objections to the Report. They were chiefly objections of a constitutional nature, as relating to the functions of the Secretary at War. His Grace thought that certain things could only be done by the Secretary at War—that he was the proper person to take Her Majesty's pleasure, and to give directions to the Commander-in-Chief. These objections proceeding from so high an authority, and being enforced by able arguments, induced Lord Melbourne to think it better at that time not to take steps to carry out the Report. I quite concurred in Lord Melbourne's opinion, and would not have liked to be a party to enforce the new arrangement against the authority of the Duke of Wellington, who, on this point, entertained very decided objections. With respect to the arrangement now proposed, my right hon. Friend has explained the great difficulty and inconvenience that would arise from attempting to carry into effect a new organisation of the departments at a moment when they are all required to make the utmost exertions in the preparation of the expedition now on its way to the East. But there is one suggestion which has been made in this House that has already been taken into consideration, namely, the suggestion that there should be, and especially in time of war, another Under Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, and that that Under Secretary should be a military Secretary attached to the office of my noble Friend the noble Duke at the head of the War and Colonial departments. That suggestion has been already taken into consideration, and will, I trust, in a very short time be adopted. I believe it is necessary that some arrangement of that kind should be made to enable the noble Duke to carry into effect the preparations in which he has been so busily engaged. My noble Friend, having charge of the War and Colonial departments, has paid the utmost attention to all the arrangements which are necessary at this moment. Instead of its being a great public convenience, I believe it would be a great public inconvenience, if the carrying out of these ar- rangements were to be transferred to any other department; but I quite agree with my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Montrose, that better arrangements are required, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman and the House will feel satisfied after the speech of my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, that no want of attention will be shown to this subject.

MR. HUME

said that, after the statements which had been made to the House on the part of the Government, he would not at present persevere any further with his Motion.

Motion by leave withdrawn.

The House adjourned at a quarter before Twelve o'clock.