THE QUEEN'S MESSAGE—SUPPLY— VOTE OF CREDIT.

HC Deb 25 July 1854 vol 135 cc709-67

Mr. BOUVERIE

brought up the report of the Committee of Supply.

Resolution reported: That a sum, not exceeding three millions, be granted to Her Majesty, to enable Her Majesty to provide for any additional expense which may arise in consequence of the War in which Her Majesty is now engaged against the Emperor of all the Russias. Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Resolution be now read a second time."

LORD DUDLEY STUART

said, he bad given notice of an Amendment to the Resolution, which he would now beg to bring forward. He had, even before last night, considered it proper that an Amendment, such as he now proposed, should be made. Even before last night's debate, he repeatedly considered that a Motion of this kind was proper and desirable; but, if it were proper and desirable before the occurrences of last night, it was, since those occurrences, not only desirable, but necessary. He thought it probable that the annals of Parliament did not present a record of any occurrence similar to that which, to his astonishment, he witnessed last night, when the leader of the Government in that House came down upon a solemn occasion, and not in the heat of controversy—not in reply to observations which had been made by his opponents,—but deliberately, and in the most solemn manner, made an exposition of the objects and policy of the Government—of what the Government proposed to attain by prosecuting the present war, and subsequently, without the lapse of any considerable period, in the same debate, on the spot, and almost within the same hour, gave an explanation which was understood by the House to amount to a retractation.

["No, no!"] Well, at all events, it was so different from what the noble Lord had previously stated, that he did not know by what other word to describe it, except by that he had just used—retractation. Almost every one in the House had understood the noble Lord as he was understood by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the leader of the Opposition. ["No!"] Yes, he did not hesitate to say that the noble Lord was generally so understood. And his observation was confirmed when he looked at the usual sources of information by which the proceedings of that House were recorded and conveyed to the public. He found that the whole of those organs—hon. Gentlemen knew well what he meant—understood the noble Lord in the same manner. Take the noble Lord as he was reported in a journal generally favourable to the Government—

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

Which of them? Name the journal.

LORD DUDLEY STUART

The Times.

MR. SPEAKER

immediately called "order."

LORD DUDLEY STUART

The noble Lord had called upon him to name, and if he had been guilty of a breach of order in acceding to that request, he apologised, and would not further refer to what that journal or organ reported on the subject. [An hon. Member: Go on—read the report.] He would not do so, but would refer to another report in a source or organ at least equally favourable to the Government. He would not mention the name of the source, but lie repeated, it was equally, if not more, favourable to the Government than that to which he had previously adverted. The noble Lord was reported to have said— I say, with the knowledge of such a state of affairs, we ought to endeavour to obtain valid securities against acts of aggression similar to that which have so recently taken place. I hold, therefore, that it is impossible that the arrangements which were made by the Treaty of Adrianople with respect to the Principalities shall again be renewed—arrangements which give the Emperor of Russia a predominant voice in-the political affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia—which give him the power of control in cases where he thinks the affairs are not conducted to his satisfaction, and which, by the destruction of all the Turkish fortresses, give him facilities at any moment for occupying with his army the two provinces, containing 4,000,000 of inhabitants. I say that the integrity of Turkey and the balance of power in Europe could not be secured by reverting to the status quo ante bellum, which would confirm such arrangements as regards Russia and Turkey. But there is another mode in which the position of Russia is menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey. The establishment of a great fortress prepared with all the combinations of art and science, made as impregnable as it is possible for art and science to make it, and containing within its port a very large fleet of line-of-battle ships, ready at any moment to come down with a favourable wind to the Bosphorus—that I consider is a position so menacing to Turkey, that no treaty of peace could be considered safe which left the Emperor of Russia in that same menacing position with respect to Turkey. I have thought it right to state not particularly, but the general view of the Government with respect to the securities which we ought to obtain. What those special securities should be, in what manner they should be gained, and how they should be affirmed, is not a subject upon which I think I can go further than I have already done. I believe we shall be ready, as we have been ready, to communicate with the Government of France on this subject. I have every reason to believe that the views of the Government of the Emperor of France coincide with our own in this respect. [Cheers.] Hon. Gentlemen cheered that declaration. He did not wonder at it. He had cheered it himself on the previous night as heartily and sincerely as any one, for he was delighted at the noble Lord's utterance of such sentiments. But did the noble Lord stand to it? Did the noble Lord stand to his colours? Not at all; for, upon its being repeated, the noble Lord rose and said he had used no such expression. ["No, no!"] Yes, but the noble Lord did say in explanation, that what he meant was, that Russia ought not to be allowed to maintain so menacing an attitude by maintaining so large a fleet in the Black Sea. Did the hon. Gentleman—did any hon. Gentleman—think there was any discrepancy there? Was there no discrepancy between the first version of the noble Lord's sentiments and his subsequent explanation? Why, if Russia laid down one or two sail of the line, that would satisfy, or, at least, come within the terms of the requisitions of the noble Lord, as his explanation conveyed those terms. How the noble Lord had been induced to make an explanation which took away all the value of his first statement—a statement which was spirited, noble, and worthy of him—it was not for him (Lord D. Stuart) to explain. Perhaps the noble Lord had received some hints from his Colleagues as to what the head of the Government had stated in another place; perhaps he felt it to be necessary to retract those noble sentiments, in order to make them more in conformity with the views of the Premier—more in harmony with the ideas of sonic of his Colleagues. This clearly showed that this country was now governed by men who were not in harmony, who could not act in unison one with the other—men who could not agree amongst themselves; that they were governed by men whose councils were, through disunion and difference of views, vacillating and distracted—men who at one time took one view, at another time another. He believed some of them, and, amongst others, the noble Lord, were anxious to carry on the war with the vigour becoming a great country like this, whilst there were others of his Colleagues who were anxious to bring the war to a conclusion, no matter upon what terms or upon what conditions. He believed but one feeling and opinion pervaded the whole nation on this subject, namely, that if there had been a man of firmness, capacity, and resolution at the head of the Government, who would not have been afraid to meet the designs and aggressions of the Czar, who would have used the language of resolve and determination to the Czar, he would never have made an aggression upon Turkey, which, being made, it was necessary to resist, and this country was, consequently, forced into this war. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, he believed, if they had had any other Minister than Lord Aberdeen, this war would not have occurred; but the fluctuating and pusillanimous conduct of the Premier—unworthy as it was of a great country like this—rendered war inevitable, In speaking thus he did not mean to use the slightest disrespect personally to Lord Aberdeen, and only spoke of his conduct as a public man. He believed Lord Aberdeen was most sincerely anxious to prevent the war, but he believed also that the means he took for prevention rendered war necessary. The noble Lord, in his opinion, had not the sagacity to see war in the distance, nor the spirit, nor the courage, nor the determination to meet it when it came, but temporised when he ought to have acted. He (Lord D. Stuart) thought that opinion was supported by facts. We saw great and magnificent armaments sent forth from this country, but we did not find that they had produced any results. We had been at war four months with those great armaments, in conjunction with our great ally, the French, but the results had really been nothing, and they led to the belief that it was the wish of the Government to saddle the country with the maximum of expense, together with the minimum of effect, in order that they might be disgusted with the war and might not on any future occasion be disposed to enter on such hostilities. What success had our armies obtained—what victories could we boast of? Some tar had been destroyed in the Baltic—some of our officers and sailors had vindicated their character for gallantry by some daring exploits, very honourable to them, but certainly not of any very great consequence towards putting an end to the war. In the Black Sea it was much the same. Odessa had been half bombarded; we had certainly taken possession of the forts at the mouths of the Danube; that was an operation no doubt satisfactory, but it ought to have been accomplished long ago. The House had had, to be sure, accounts of important captures. Magniloquent statements were made some time ago by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty about twelve transports taken from the enemy laden with provisions for the enemy and munitions of war; but those twelve transports turned out, when the despatches were laid upon the table, to be miserable coasters picked up here and there at different times by our cruisers. The aggregate number of their crews was fifty-two men, that is to say, about four men each; and the munitions of war proved to be oatmeal. The consequences of the inactivity with which the Government were prosecuting the war had been, that the greatest disgust had been excited among our troops. We had never entered on the war heartily or with an effective plan. We never marched our troops to points where they might assist Omar Pasha. The only achievements of the war had been made by Turkish troops, who had proved that they were in earnest. Those troops had proved their courage, and their commander his ability; and the haughty, arrogant Russians, who boasted they would drive the Turks like chaff before them, and that their march to Constantinople would be nothing but a military promenade—those Russians, who were bold and ferocious enough when they had overwhelming forces, as at Sinope, against a few helpless Turks, or when a British man-of-war was lying disabled on their coast, incapable of making any resistance—those Russians had been ignominiously defeated by the troops of that very "sick man" on whom the Czar looked as moribund. If any one had undertaken to prophesy that the Russians, in 1854, instead of proudly trampling the Turks under foot, would have been reduced to their present humiliating condition, he would have been treated as a dreamer, and unfit to be at large. He perceived that the head of the Government had been talking lately of our carrying the war to a conclusion, with the concurrence of France, and of the "other Powers." He (Lord D. Stuart) did not see that we had got, or even were likely to have, the concurrence of the "other Powers." As for Prussia, she was not in open hostility to us—that was all we could say; and as to Austria, what assistance had she rendered? She was to enter the Principalities if the Russians had left them, and if they had not left them she was to drive them out by force. Had she fulfilled that engagement? Had she made any attempt to drive them out? No such thing. Where, then, was the concurrence of the "other Powers?" Everything was done nowadays to conciliate Austria, and, indeed, it appeared to him that we were almost guided by her counsels. That had been exposed by a noble Lord, now one of the Colleagues of Lord Aberdeen, who made use, in reference to it, of those withering expressions about the councils of this country being guided by "antiquated imbecility." To conciliate Austria, the Turks had been advised not to form a Polish legion, and after Turkey had abandoned that intention it turned out that Austria would have had no objection to it at all. He (Lord D. Stuart) believed that the real way to obtain the concurrence of Austria would be to obtain successes over Russia. Austria was as much interested as any other country in the curbing of the power of Russia, but so long as that Power remained unscathed by the armies of England and France she would be unwilling to declare against her. Let Sebastopol be taken, and then soon enough we should have Austria on our side. The hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) was opposed to the war, and last night he had called certain Gentlemen, who did not agree with him in opinion, his "hon. and deluded" Friends. That hon. Member must pardon him (Lord D. Stuart) if he called him in return his hon. and Philo-Russian Friend. One of that hon. Member's reasons for being against the war was, that it would not be favourable to nationalities. But was not the Emperor of Russia the most determined, the most powerful, and the most unceasing enemy of nationalities? Was he not engaged in oppressing nationalities in all parts of the world? Had he not put down the nationality of Poland, and that of the country to which Kossuth belonged; and would it not, therefore, be of the greatest advantage to nationalities to curb and humble their arch-enemy? It was a very strange thing that the hon. and Philo-Russian Member for the West Riding, who took so great an interest in the Greek populations, and was so constantly decrying their oppression by the Turks, should have no sympathy whatever for the population of the Principalities, who were entirely Christian and of the Greek persuasion. Turkey had always respected the institutions of those provinces, whereas Russia was now infleting on them miseries greater than those suffered by any other people. The hon. and Philo-Russian Member, however, had undergone a great change during the last few years. He said, no great while since, that there was as little chance of Our taking any portion of the Czar's territory as of the possessions of the United States of America. But only a few years ago he stated at a public meeting that it would be the easiest thing in the world to crumple up Russia like a bit of paper. How could these two statements be reconciled? The hon. Member said we had crumpled her up, but he (Lord D. Stuart) could not see it. We had not taken any of her men of war—we had not taken any of her fortresses—nor had we even inflicted any injury on her trade, for he had been told that Russian tallow and Russian hemp were to be had in this metropolis at a very small advance on the former prices. Surely that was not what the hon. and Philo-Russian Member meant when he spoke of "crumpling up." There was now a general distrust of the honesty of the Government in carrying on the war, and a fear that, if Parliament separated, the country might be hurried into some ignominious, unstable, and unsafe peace. This House was also distrusted, and suspected of complicity with the Government, in not pushing on the war with vigour. It was on that account that he had been induced to bring forward the Motion which he now begged to make. It was a perfectly constitutional Motion. There were precedents for it without number, either in reference to a dissolution or a prorogation, which amounted to the same thing; but he would only allude to the taking of the same course as he now took, by Mr. Dunning, in 1780; by Mr. Erskine, in 1783, when the Motion was successful; and to the more modern example of it, in 1802, by Charles, afterwards Lord Grey, whose words he (Lord D. Stuart) had made use of.

SIR JOHN SHELLEY

seconded the Motion.

Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words— an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to return Her Majesty the thanks of this House for Her Most Gracious Message, and to assure Her Majesty, that Her Majesty deeming it expedient to provide for any additional expense which may arise in consequence of the war in which Her Majesty is now engaged against the Emperor of Russia, may fully rely on the cheerful zeal and constant affection of Her faithful Commons, and to assure Her Majesty that they most readily do make provision according to Her Majesty's wishes, and humbly to pray, that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased not to prorogue Her Parliament until She shall have been enabled to afford to this House more full information with respect both to Her Majesty's relations with Foreign Powers, and to Her views and prospects in the contest which Her Majesty is engaged in,"—

instead thereof.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

Mr. Speaker; the noble Lord, in concluding his address, has referred to precedents which he considered justified the course he has taken. I, Sir, have nothing whatever to complain of with respect to the course which he has taken; and many more precedents may, I believe, be readily found than those to which the noble Lord has referred. The noble Lord may, doubtless, find some precedents, not only at a time when the country was engaged in war, and when the parties in opposition had no confidence in the Government, or in the manner in which the war was conducted, and who disapproved of their conduct in having entered into the war; but similar Motions have been made upon almost every possible diversity of occasion, but always with this peculiarity attaching to them, that they were brought forward distinctly by parties who were the opponents of the Government, as a direct censure upon the Government, and intended to be a declaration on the part of the House of Commons of a want of confidence in the Government. The noble Lord having now thrown down the gauntlet on the floor of the House, and challenged a vote of confidence or no confidence, Her Majesty's Government are perfectly willing to take it up. The noble Lord has offered battle fairly, and we accept it upon his own terms, and are willing to be bound by the decision to which the House shall arrive as representing fairly the opinions of the country. But before I proceed further, I am anxious to address one or two observations in continuation, I may say, of the debate which took place last night, and particularly in reference to one or two observations which fell from the hon. Member below the gangway, the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard). I am the more anxious to do so, because I think in a question of confidence in the Government with respect to the proper application of the funds voted for the purpose of the war, I am bound to show that the allegations made to the contrary are not founded in fact, and that the accusations brought against those who are administering the affairs of our army in the East are destitute of foundation. The hon. Member quoted from letters which he had received from some friends of his in the East, and I am not in the least degree desirous of throwing any discredit upon the writers of those letters which the hon. Member has received from friends whose acquaintance he formed during his long residence in the East; and his statements amounted to this—that the Duke of Wellington, during the long period of the Peninsular war, complained greatly of the defective organisation of the Commissariat, and that, with great exertions, he had brought it to a state of perfection at the close of the war; but that, immediately after the cessation of the war, the whole of his administrative labours in this respect were lost to the country, through the defective administration of those intrusted with the responsibility of the management of that branch of the service. Well, I am at a loss to know where the hon. Member obtained the materials for that statement. That system connected with the Commissiariat which the Duke of Wellington consolidated, and brought, as the hon. Member says, to a state of perfection at the end of the war, remains at the present moment unchanged. It is true that in England the Commissariat system has been altogether done away with. [Mr. LAYARD: Hear, hear!] But he could inform the hon. Member that it has been extended to all our Colonies—a field much more calculated to create experienced officers than at home, where such facilities exist for obtaining everything required for the purposes of an army. Throughout the whole of the Colonies this system, so extended, was maintained in the same manner as that in which the Duke of Wellington had left it, and we have found it preserved in the same identical position—all the changes which Her Majesty's Government have made being that of substituting for the head of the Commissariat a responsible Minister of the Crown—one whom, it was thought, ought to be at the head of a department so essential to the well-being of the Army. The officer whom the Government have selected as the chief person to carry out the operations in the East, is Commissary General Filder, an officer formed under the eye of the Duke of Wellington, and one whom the Duke, with his great knowledge of character and sagacity, had singled out as one in whom he could repose implicit confidence. Many gossipping stories have been circulated with respect to the bad management of the Commissariat; but when I shall have shown how utterly devoid of truth are those statements, I trust that justice will be done to those whose difficult task it has been to carry out the arrangements necessary for the army in the East. So far, therefore, from changing the system of the Duke of Wellington, that system, as regards the Commissariat, has been continued; the Government have selected to have charge of the arrangements connected with this department, the one man in whom the Duke placed implicit confidence; and I have reason to hope that time, which, after all, furnishes the best answer to the stories thus circulated, will do justice to the acts of the Government in this respect. But the hon. Member declares, that the Treasury last autumn sent out a gentleman of that department, who wrote an essay upon the manners and customs of Turkey. I will not weary the House by any extracts from that essay; because an essay on such a subject is well calculated to awaken some alarm at the idea of making quotations from it. From the statement of the hon. Member (Mr. Layard) the House would be led to suppose that this essay related to almost everything beside subjects which had connection with the duties of the Commissariat. I will just read a few of the marginal notes of the subject-matter of the paragraphs to which they refer. Here are "locality," "cattle and sheep," "meat—how obtainable;" "supplies of coffee," "preserves," "weights and prices;" "sheep—where to be found;" "what kind of cattle to be found in Asia Minor," "what are the best means of transport;" "roads," "what weight can be put upon a camel, a horse, or an ass;" and so it goes on with all manner of minute details on the subjects useful to Commissariat officers. The hon. Member complained, too, that the book was written by a gentleman who had been but a short time in Turkey. "Only think," said the hon. Member, "of a person writing a book on Turkey, a country in which the longer you live the less you know about it." But it appears, after all, that this pamphlet was actually submitted to the hon. Member for Aylesbury before publishing; and it had the benefit of many of the remarks and convictions which his own long residence in that country was able to afford. I must beg the indulgence of the House for thus occupying their attention; but when attacks of this kind are made, it is essentially necessary that some person should stand up for the defence of those who have been intrusted with those important duties, and should endeavour to ascertain what degree of weight can be attached to the statements of those who say that the British Army has been sent to a distant part of the world without adequate means of subsistence. The hon. Member complained, too, that everything devolved upon one man—our Consul, Mr. Calvert—when the troops arrived at Gallipoli; whereas the fact was, that eight or nine gentlemen had been selected for their knowledge of the Turkish and of the lingua Franca, who were put into communication with Mr. Calvert, a gentleman possessing a thorough knowledge of the locality, and who was the most fit person to be procured to render such services as were required. The hon. Member also made another statement. He said, that an officer had written home stating that they had not the means of sending sick men from the camp to Gallipoli, and had been forced to borrow the means of conveyance from the French. Now I happen to have looked over the list of articles sent out for the hospital establishment, and almost the first thing upon which my eye glanced was forty pair of panniers for the conveyance of the sick. His complaint on this subject, therefore, was not better founded than that which he made with respect to the want of medicines and the large amount of ophthalmia under which the men were suffering from the want of proper medicines. The fact is, hon. Gentlemen got letters, written by officers not upon the spot, but who report the gossip and rumours which they hear; and these reports are instantly set down as having at least some truth in them, because written by persons on the spot. I have heard it stated by no mean authority, and this is an instance in which these things get reported about—by a gentleman who had been connected with the Ordnance—I mean the hon. and learned Member for Portarlington (Col. Dunne)—that we had sent out he did not know how many men, with batteries of only six-pounders, a very inferior calibre to those of the enemy. Now, all this was stated in the most confident manner. Will the House believe, notwithstanding, that, with the exception of the horse artillery, there is not such a thing as a six-pounder in the British service? All the rest of the guns are nine-pounders, with a twenty-four pound howitzer to each battery. This affords another instance of the care with which statements carelessly made should be received by the House and the country. But if it be true that the medical and other departments of the Commissariat are so exceedingly defective, there is one most extraordinary result, and that is, the health of the army, which appears to give a most decided contradiction to any such statement. The last return of the state of health of the whole English army in the East, showed that there were in hospital but four per cent sick; and out of that four per cent nearly one-third were cases of disease which were certainly contracted through no neglect of the Commissariat, or the unhealthiness of the climate, but which might be contracted as easily in the streets of London as in the East. At this moment the health of the army at Varna is as good as the health of the army in any part of England. I do not mean to say that even the greatest care with respect to these things can always ensure health. There are situations in which an army may be placed, in which no amount of care or precaution can ensure health; but if there be neglect with respect to medical assistance, and upon the part of the Commissariat with respect to food—I do not care where placed—you are certain to have sickness. The state of the health of the army, so far as the returns show, prove, however, that the Commissariat and medical departments have not neglected the important duties which have been intrusted to them. The hon. Member and others had also made many comparisons on the organisation of the English army as compared with the superior arrangements of the French service. There is no doubt that in the case of two great armies, both of them kept as efficiently as they can be, those charged with their administration will have much to learn one from the other. I am not contending that the equipment of the English army was faultless in every respect. Why, good God! when a large army has been sent out almost at a moment's notice, a man must be fond indeed of his own performances, and be thoroughly imbued with the notion of his own infallibility, who should for one moment maintain that no error had been committed. I am not such a pedant as to contend that everything which has been done has been perfection. What said Sir William Napier? He said that errors in war are the rules and accuracy the exception. But this I will say, that every effort has been used to avoid these errors, and taking into account the very speedy manner in which the forces have been sent away, the expedition to the East will bear a very fair comparison even with those expeditions which have been sent out in a much longer period. As affecting the condition of the troops in the East, I will, with the permission of the House, read extracts from one or two letters which I have lately received. The first is from a letter written to me by one of the very best paymasters in the service. It states— I am happy to say, that a most excellent feeling exists. Our army is well fed, and there is not the shadow of a complaint. The supplies sent out by the Government have been a great boon, and are highly appreciated. They are all good of their kind; and as Lord Raglan has most judiciously put the issue under regimental arrangements, the most perfect confidence and satisfaction have been the result of the arrangements. Had it been through other channels, the regimental authorities would not have been so interested in the good working of the system, and the men are, moreover, more satisfied to be dealt with regimentally. The complaint can be remedied, if there should be one, without going further; indeed, all works well.

[Sir J. PAKINGTON

When is that letter dated?] The letter was dated the 29th of June, 1854, and the letter ends by saying, "we have now in and about Varna 20,000 men." Let me read, however, from another letter written, like the other, by a person holding an official position in the army, and possessed of means of knowing the actual facts of the case. The letter states— No one can believe, who has not seen it, of what value the Chobham encampment has been to the troops, I am quite sure the health of the troops is in a great degree owing to the know- ledge, now becoming general, of a good system of encamping. Osman Pasha, a most intelligent man, with whom we communicate on all the quartering of the army in and near Scutari, has frequently told us he could not conceive why we had so little illness, and that no Turks could have remained on the Scutari Hill so long in camp with impunity. We can only answer him that he should see the care and attention of our officers, and the advantage of our white cap covers over the senseless fez which his people persist in wearing on their heads, with no protection for the eyes or back of the head, and he would learn the true cause of the difference between us. General Forey called here yesterday to see the barracks; the 95th happened to be parading in their fatigue frocks, which he much admired. I asked—to wheel them into line, and it ended in General Forey being so pleased that he asked for two or three movements, which the regiment executed admirably. I am always glad they should see what our interior really is, and how little we do for show. I will only trouble the House with one more extract, and it is from a letter written by one whose character will ensure due weight from the observations which he makes. Lord Raglan writes to me at the end of a letter, in which he speaks of the impression of the French officers with respect to the manner in which our men are equipped, encamped, and paid, and states— Seeing the abuse that is lavished upon every branch of the British Army, and that we are told all day long that the arrangements and equipments of the French Army are in every way superior, I was surprised to find that we were viewed in a different light by officers of experience in another service, and that justice which is denied to us by many of our own countrymen is readily conceded to us by foreigners. I trust the House will excuse me for having gone into these details, which may, perhaps, be considered as not having a very direct bearing on the Motion before the House, but which I considered it my duty to state to the House. Now, I wish to know whether it can be considered true, as asserted by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) and the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord D. Stuart), that these great armaments have been sent out, and that no result has yet been achieved, and that our country has reaped no laurels from the conduct of these forces. War was declared on the 29th of March. The noble Lord expresses his surprise that in four months Russia has not yet been—to use the expression of the hon. Member for the West Riding, which he has quoted— "crumpled up." He appears to think that in four months a great country, distant and almost inaccessible, should have been brought to an ignominious capitulation. But is it true that nothing has been done? An hon. Gentleman last night said that numerous accidents had taken place, that we had had the monopoly of the accidents, and that our allies had had none. We have, I admit, had some casualties of a grievous nature, both in the North and in the East, where our operations have been carried on. There was no doubt the loss of the Tiger, and the loss of the ship Europa by fire, which carried out a portion of the 6th Dragoons. In mentioning this last loss I may be permitted to say that, however long might be the duration of the war, however brilliant the actions which may take place in the course of it, no one name will live to be more honoured in the British Army than that of the gallant, the unfortunate Colonel Moore, a noble old man, who, having none of the excitement of action, none of the excitement and glory of battle raging round him, in cool blood faced the most terrible death which man can meet, and refused, though solicited by his men, to leave the burning ship while one remained in her alive. It is true, too, that in the Baltic we have had a grievous casualty, and a boat's crew, consisting of a large number of men, was sacrificed in an attempt to cut out some vessels from the enemy's waters. But while we lament these results we should recollect likewise the gallantry and spirit which they display. If it be true—and it is true—that the courage of our seamen amounts almost to fool-hardiness, we must recollect that the great name of the British Navy has been created by a series of exploits directed by courage such as this, and we may rejoice that that spirit which has raised us to the summit of fame as a naval power exists still in our Navy, and that those mighty armaments which have been sent out against our enemy are animated by the same spirit. But have no brilliant results been brought about? Is it nothing after all, in four months to have established a complete, effective, irresistible blockade of the whole of the Russian coast? Hon. Gentlemen who speak with so much impatience appear to forget that the one-half of Nelson's life was spent in establishing blockades. From the impatience manifested by many hon. Members for some great and glorious victory which should conclude everything, one would believe that the battles of Toulouse and the Pyrenees had been fought within the lines of Torres Vedras, and that the victory of Waterloo was achieved in the beginning of the present century, under the administration of Pitt. If you require to have victory after victory followed up with an enemy who dare not meet you, even with his superior numbers, you are exacting impossibilities from your seamen, and from seamen—be it remembered—to whose want of courage it is not owing that these glorious enterprises are not obtained. But have we done nothing else? How many pounds sterling have been expended in the last half-century in erecting those forts along the coast of Cireassia which formed the chains which were to keep the Cireassians bound to them? In one short campaign all but one of these strong places have fallen into our hands, or into those of our allies—the Turks. [Mr. LAYARD: They were abandoned by the Russians.] The hon. Member is not satisfied with the enemy running away. He appears to justify the opinion formed by the Duke of Wellington that the people of England liked "a long butcher's bill." The hon. Member wants, not a great victory, but a great sacrifice of human life. I do not believe, however, that that is the general opinion of the people of England. I believe they rejoice that this chain of forts should have fallen into our hands without such loss of life as should ornament the pages of a Gazette. The hon. Member said that Turkey has shown great courage. Who can doubt the great fortitude and skill of the Turks. It has astonished all Europe to see an army so small as that of the Turks prove itself victorious against such overwhelming numbers as the Russians have brought against them. But had the successful results of the campaign in the Principalities been achieved solely and entirely by the force of the Turks? Had the army of Russia met with no enemy except the Turks? The Power which had wrested from Russia the ability of communicating supplies to its army by the Black Sea had surely had no small shard in that glorious result. I do not know whether hon. Gentlemen have studied the history of this campaign, and observed carefully the manner in which those operations were carried on. In the former wars Russia had many other resources; they had to themselves the whole of the seaboard of the Black Sea. At present the Danube is blockaded, Sebastopol is blockaded; the whole coast of Russia is closely blockaded. Not one grain of wheat, not one pound of meat, not one cartridge, can be brought to them, except by the long journey through Bessarabia by land. I am told by an officer who has witnessed it, that when the supplies are passing—when the flour is passing through the country to the Russian army, the air is tainted with its putridity owing to its having been kept so long, and adulterated probably by the contractors and others furnishing the supplies. But how is this forage and provisions conveyed? It has to be conveyed through a country almost impassable for want of roads, in small carts drawn by one bullock. The distance to be journeyed is so great, and so bad are the roads, and so tedious is the operation, that by the time the bullocks with the carts have arrived at their destination, a very large proportion of them have consumed all the provisions with which they had started for the camp; and are besides reduced to so wretched a condition, that when slaughtered they afford themselves but a little poor and unwholesome meat for the troops. These are not small results. They may not be so brilliant or so rapid as they might have been in the estimation of hon. Gentlemen who think so lightly of the power of the enemy with whom we are engaged; but I must likewise remind the House that we English may claim to have some share of the credit attached to the defence of Silistria through that young man whom I would like to call Major Butler, although, unfortunately, he did not live to hear of his promotion, or of his having been placed, by the desire of her Majesty, in the Guards. That young Irishman, who displayed during the siege of Silistria qualities which marked him out for certain eminence in his profession had he been spared—not merely clogged courage, but likewise a remarkable power to command—he, a stranger, accompanied by another young officer, going to a strange town, not even speaking the Turkish language, by his energy and determination so imposed upon those by whom he was surrounded, that, in point of fact, he had almost the command of the garrison in his hands; and it was by the pertinacity and vigour with which he forced his counsel upon them, that the giving up of those forts, which were the keys of Silistria, was prevented, and that ultimately glorious success was achieved. Well, Sir, the noble Lord who thinks so lightly of all that our army has hitherto done, asserts that the non-success of our arms is owing to the pusillanimity of Lord Aberdeen. Last night we were told that this debate was to be prolonged, because Lord Aberdeen in another place had used language in diametrical opposition to that used by my noble Friend the President of the Council; and an hon. Gentleman who had the good fortune to hear both speeches, got up on the other side of the House to bear witness to what he was pleased to term this singular contradiction. Sir, I confess I was greatly surprised when I read in the newspapers of this morning an account of what took place last night in the House of Parliament; and when I found Lord Aberdeen proposing an Address to Her Majesty in a short speech, consisting of a few plain and strong sentences, in which he urged, that, being engaged in a war, it was necessary for us to carry it on with vigour and determination, and asked their Lordships to assure Her Majesty of their intention to support her in so doing. Well, Sir, did my noble Friend the President of the Council speak in any other tone? Did ho talk of conducting the war in anything but a vigorous manner? Did he falter in that respect? Sir, there was the most complete accordance between the two speeches. It is true that my noble Friend the President of the Council went further into matters than Lord Aberdeen; but so did the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in another place; and both of them, together with Lord Aberdeen, representing the opinions and policy of the Cabinet, gave utterance to them in language which, I think, could not be mistaken. Sir, it has even been objected to that the speech of my noble Friend the President of the Council was too frank. I believe, Sir, that with a generous people a frank policy seldom fails. I am satisfied that the people of England do not believe the idle stories which are so industriously circulated. I am sure they do not believe that, because the Government were reluctant to commence the war, and because they valued and were unwilling to abandon the blessings of peace, they are, therefore, unwilling to carry on with vigour, and to an honourable end, the war into which they have entered with so much reluctance. Why did the Government enter into it reluctantly? Was it because it was a war which might end with a pitched battle after a few days. No: it was because they well knew the power of the enemy whom they had to encounter; because they well knew the difficulties and dangers of enterprises carried on at a great distance from home; because they knew likewise that when once the sword is drawn how difficult it is to sheathe it; and because they knew, and that right well, that when a European quarrel was commenced—commenced upon grounds which are just, and upon grounds which are necessary for the future peace and civilisation of Europe—they could not patch up a hollow truce; as has been well said, they could not conclude that war without obtaining guarantees and conditions which should give some prospect to Europe of peace in future years, and which should give some prospect likewise to the more immediate neighbours of Russia, be they Turks or be they Germans; that the ambition of that power would be curbed, and that the Emperor of Russia would not be allowed to ride at will over the peace and happiness of the nations who have the misfortune to be his neighbours. But, Sir, the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone, who finds such fault with all that has been done—who thinks that everything was wrong from the first day in February when we met, till the 29th of March when war was declared—who thinks that everything has been wrong from the 29th of March up to the present time—who thinks that the negotiations in which we were engaged were nothing but connivance and collusion—and who thinks that the war is conducted in some pusillanimous way—he at least has not said, as some have, that the war is conducted in a traitorous way. He at any rate has not hazarded the insolent absurdity, that English gentlemen are writing to their admirals and generals, telling them to spare their enemy, and not to do him any harm; that the whole transaction is a great blind in the face of Europe; and that from the beginning to the end, not only in negotiation, but in war, we have been acting the infamous game of connivance with our enemy. The noble Lord says, that during the whole Session of Parliament the evils of which he complains had been carried on, and yet he wants the Session continued. He says there is complicity on the part of the House of Commons; that the House stands with the country almost in the same condition as this traitorous Administration; that the House of Commons is conniving with the enemy; and yet it is the body which he asks—after speaking of its Members in terms of respect which must predispose them in favour of his Motion—to sit perpetually and until—no, there is no "until," the noble Lord has placed no limit to the sitting of Parliament—but I suppose he means it to sit, at all events, until he himself is satisfied, and until the affairs of Europe are administered exactly according to his own notions of what is just and what is right. The noble Lord has said that he has no confidence in the Government. Well, Sir, as I before said, we are ready to meet him fairly upon that issue. We are called a Ministry upon sufferance. It is true that, feeling the deep responsibility which lies upon us, and the necessity, having entered into this war, of putting the country into a position, both financially and strategically, in which she might wage war with Russia with good hopes of success, we have felt, even unsupported as we have been in domestic measures, that it was our duty to continue to hold the reins of Government. We have met during that period with contumely and insult; but it is for the House of Commons to decide. If the House does not choose to have a Government upon sufferance, and if we do not choose to be a Government upon sufferance, let the House of Commons manfully and explicitly declare the opinion which it entertains upon that head. We are prepared to meet the noble Lord upon that question; and we are prepared to abide, as we do abide, with confidence by the decision to which this House may come.

MR. LAYARD

said, he could not but express his surprise that the right hon. Gentleman had so entirely misrepresented what fell from him last night. It appeared to be a common habit of certain right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury bench, whenever any facts were mentioned in that House—not, it might be, with any desire to cast blame upon the Government, but for the simple purpose of pointing out defects which might be remedied—to get up, and, instead of answering the observations which had been made, in reference to the facts, to bring forward some individual connected with the department in question, to make some very eulogistic remarks as to his abilities and claims, and, in short, to make it appear as if a gross attack had been made upon that individual, and not upon the system, or a portion of the system, which he administered. That was exactly the mode in which he had been treated by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War. He said last night that certain accidents had occurred to our transports and vessels connected with the fleet. He had no intention to blame the Government, but merely to draw attention to certain facts which he thought deserved consideration. Well, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, in what he evidently meant to be a reply to those remarks, carefully abstained from dwelling upon the circumstances connected with the accidents which had occurred, but spoke as if reflections had been thrown upon the conduct of a very able and very brave man, for whom he had an admiration equal to that of the right hon. Gentleman himself. So, with respect to the other facts he mentioned relative to some deficiencies in the Commissariat. He attributed those deficiencies to the system, not to any misconduct on the part of those who had to administer it; and yet the Secretary at War had immediately inferred that he meant to attack Commissary General Filder. Now, if it were true, as the right hon. Gentleman stated, that the Duke of Wellington had the most implicit confidence in Commissary General Filder, that gentleman must have held a high office during the last war; and if he held a high office some fifty years ago, ho was now placed at an advanced age in a position which assuredly required all the energy and activity of a young man. But the right hon. Gentleman had misrepresented everything he said last night with respect to the Commissariat. When he mentioned as a fact, that the system organised by the Duke of Wellington was allowed to fall into disuse at the close of the last war, he was alluding to a work by Sir Francis Head, in which the writer stated that at the end of the war the Commissariat was transferred to the Treasury, and instead of being intrusted to men in this country who knew how to deal with it, was placed in the hands of clerks in the public offices, who could not by any possibility know anything of active operations in the field. With regard to what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman in reference to what he had stated as to the difficulties of acquiring information of the state of Turkey, he begged to say that he did not state that the longer a person lived in Turkey the less he was likely to know about its condition, but what he had said was, that in a country like Turkey, unless a person was acquainted with every province and all its resources, he could not form any opinion as to the nature of the country. Again, the right hon. Gentleman had spoken as if he complained last night of Mr. Calvert having been put in communication with the Commissariat officers; but what he really did complain of was, that no Commissariat officers were sent to Mr. Calvert at all, and that Mr. Calvert was consequently compelled to do all the work himself. The Secretary at War had also endeavoured to throw some discredit on letters which he read in the course of his speech last night. Now, these letters were from persons in whom he had the fullest reliance, who were far from wishing to throw any odium upon the administration of the Army, and who, moreover, had even cautioned him not to believe all the stories which were flying about. As to making any comparison between the arrangements of the French Army and those of our own, he was glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman of the terms of praise used by French officers with reference to our troops. When he said last night that there was a deficiency of tents, and of the means of providing for the sick—an observation which he made upon the authority of certain letters that had appeared in the public prints, and that he had no doubt were correct—the right hon. Gentleman had now assured the House that the health of the troops was excellent; but it should be borne in mind that this was the season when very little sickness prevailed, and he was afraid that, if the troops were pushed forward to the unhealthy shores of the Danube, they would suffer more from disease than they had hitherto done. It was a mistake, however, to suppose, as the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) did last night, on the authority of Mr. Spencer, that the Crimea was unhealthy. Unquestionably, parts of it were so, but the neighbourhood of Sebastopol was not unhealthy, and he believed that an English army would be in far less danger there, so far as disease was concerned, than it would be on the banks of the Danube. He did not say last night, as the Secretary at War had represented, that nothing whatever had been done in this war. What he said was, that he knew well the difficulties which were to be encountered in a war of this nature, and that they could not expect to achieve a great victory in a day; but he stated at the same time that, having fitted out vast fleets and armies, the country assuredly would expect some results before the termination of the year. The right hon. Gentleman had now told the House that great results had already been gained, and had pointed to what he termed the "most effective blockade" in the Baltic and Black Seas. Now, that was not the case, and hon. Gentlemen in that House connected with the Russian trade would confirm what he said. There was, to a certain extent, a blockade in the Baltic, but it had not stopped Russian commerce, which continued to be carried on through Prussia to almost as great an extent as before the war. Nor was there an effective blockade either in the Black Sea. He would admit that certain English merchants were suffering; but the Greek merchants in this country were carrying on their trade with the Black Sea exactly in the same way as they did last year, and nearly to the same extent. The right hon. Gentleman had talked about the destruction of the forts on the coast of Circassia, and when he had ventured to remind him that those forts had been abandoned by the Russians, he was met by the taunt that he was one of those persons who would not be satisfied without a butcher's bill, and he was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman should have taken such an opportunity of getting a little cheer at his expense. The abandonment of these forts was the act of the Russian Government, and he had stated at the beginning of the Session that those forts ought to be taken, and if his advice had been attended to the garrisons of those forts would have been made prisoners of war. The right hon. Gentleman then repeated the old story— "we have kept the Russian fleets in their ports, and they dare not conic out." Of course not. It was no reflection upon the the courage of the Russian seamen to say that they were unwilling to fight a superior force; and it was absurd to call them cowards because they remained in their harbours. He begged the House to remember that the time was drawing near when our fleet would be compelled to leave the Black Sea. Whenever that event took place, unless something was forthwith done, either to destroy the Russian fleet at Sebastopol, or to prevent it doing any harm, the Russians would take possession of the Black Sea, and might, if they chose, bombard Trebizond, the British fleet not daring to come out of the Bosphorus. That was precisely what they did last year at Sinope. The right hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to lead the House to infer that he (Mr. Layard) did not fully appreciate the services of Captain Butler; but, highly as he did admire those services, he did not see how the Government could claim any credit for them.

Captain Butler went to Silistria through love of his profession, without any hope of reward, and, as he had been informed, after the Government had refused to send him there; and on what ground could they now claim credit for his conduct? With regard to the other officer, Captain Nasmyth, he was one of a class who were, he understood, to be shortly expelled from the British camp; he was a correspondent of the Times, and had in that capacity gone to Silistria. He did not consider himself to have been fairly treated by the right hon. Gentleman, for he had not wished in the remarks he made on a previous occasion to cast any blame upon the Government. He must apologise to the House for dwelling upon what was not in reality the subject of the debate that evening, but he felt bound to make a few observations on what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman. He (Mr. Layard) had come down to that House on the previous evening with the intention of taking part in the discussion, and the noble Lord the President of the Council made a speech which all must have listened to with attention. When the noble Lord concluded he had felt that there was so much in that speech which he approved, and so much that would be approved by the country at large, that he could not, consistently with the strong feelings he entertained upon the subject, make any remarks which might have the effect of interfering with the impression which that speech must have made. The noble Lord said— There is another mode in which the position of Russia is menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey; the establishment of a great fortress, prepared with all the combinations of art, and science, made as impregnable as it is possible for art and science to make it, and containing within its port a very large fleet of line-of-battle ships, ready at any moment to come down with a favourable wind to the Bosphorus, that, I consider is a position so menacing to Turkey, that no treaty of peace could be considered safe which left the Emperor of Russia in that same menacing position with respect to Turkey. Now, taking the most limited reasons given by the Government for the war—namely, that we were fighting for the independence and integrity of Turkey, it would seem that they could not be secured until this menacing fortress of Sebastopol, and the fleet contained in its port, were destroyed; and he defied any man to attach any other meaning to the words of the noble Lord. But when the noble Lord explained that he meant no such thing, and all that he said was, that Russia must not be allowed to maintain a position so menacing to Turkey—so that the maintenance of a smaller fleet at Sebastopol might be taken as satisfying the noble Lord's views—all the impression which had been created on his (Mr. Layard's) mind by the noble Lord's words was completely destroyed. Without wishing to cast blame on the noble Lord, he must say that, since the noble Lord thought it necessary to make this explanation, it would have been infinitely more satisfactory to the country if the declaration had not been made in the first instance, because the very fact of explaining away the declaration led one to believe that the Minister had said too much, and that the independence and integrity of Turkey need not be secured by any peace that might be concluded. He (Mr. Layard) went at some length into the question last night, and after he had made his speech be was somewhat doubtful whether he was right in dwelling so long on it; but when he had heard the noble Lord's explanation he felt himself perfectly justified, because his object was to show that the noble Lord might express certain opinions in that House, and it was difficult altogether to believe that those opinions were the opinions of the Government. He had read the speech delivered by Lord Aberdeen in another place last night. It contained nothing, and, therefore, he was forced to go back to the explanatory speech made by the noble Earl some time ago in the House of Lords. Last night the noble Lord the President of the Council spoke a great deal about Austria. Among other things, he said— Whether Austria may act with that hesitation and delay which have been unfortunately already prolonged too much, or should attempt to gain from St. Petersburg some better and more satisfactory assurances, I am unable to say. We have, of course, no control over the councils of the Emperor of Austria. He could have told the noble Lord that months ago. At the present moment Austria had a perfect right to say, "We are ready to do what we promised to do, namely, to get the Russians out of the Principalities—we have promised nothing more—on the contrary, we have always given you to understand that the status quo ante bellum is all we will fight for." More than that, Her Majesty's Government had agreed to those terms, and whenever the Principalities were evacuated, Austria would have a right to call upon England to conclude a peace. Here he might be allowed to call their attention to a very curious and suspicious passage in a treaty recently formed between Austria and Prussia. It was to the following effect:—" Austria and Prussia are united to oppose any hostile attacks upon their kingdoms from any quarter whatever." Observe, it was not "from Russia," but "from any quarter whatever," and, therefore, if hereafter England became the enemy of Prussia, Austria will be bound to take part against her. None of the protocols signed at Vienna by the representatives of the Four Powers, any more than the independent declarations issued by Austria, went further than this—that the Principalities should be evacuated. At the time when Austria was commencing the concentration of her troops, Count Buol distinctly declared that that step was not to be considered as of a hostile nature to either of the belligerents, but was dictated by a desire to preserve intact in all respects the status quo as established by treaties—an object in which the representatives of the Four Powers, in that unhappy Congress at Vienna which again threatened to impede the free action of this country, expressed their entire concurrence. That protocol was signed before the breaking out of war; but in the next protocol, after the commencement of hostilities, it was stated that, in consequence of the change of circumstances, it had been considered necessary again to declare the union of the Four Powers on the principles contained in the protocols of the 5th of December and the 13th of January. They had, therefore, after the declaration of war, a solemn declaration, signed by the representatives of the Four Powers, that the status quo ante bellum was all that they were contending for. He begged the House, at the same time, to remember that he was not seeking to cast doubts on the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, though it certainly was very curious that, after the war broke out, Her Majesty's representative should have signed that last protocol. But his object was to show that we had no right to complain of Austria if Austria deserted us, as she inevitably would, and he would point out why she would desert us. The only article in the convention between Austria and the Porte which affected Austria, was, that Austria should exhaust the means of negotiation, and then take other means to ensure the evacuation of the Principalities. It was true the first article in the treaty between England and France went a step further, and bound those Powers to do all that depended on them to bring about peace upon a solid and durable basis, and to guarantee Europe against future complications; but he must repeat he was not arguing the question as regarded England and France, but as regarded Austria. He pointed out last night why Austria should be a neutral Power. He showed that she would never go with Russia, and that she would never go against Russia, and he pointed out that inasmuch as the incorporation of the Principalities with Russia would be against her interest, she would go as far as to obtain the evacuation of those Principalities, though she would never take any step to engage in hostilities either with Russia or with this country. The interests of Austria in Turkey were identical with those of Russia. Austria had for years been endeavouring to obtain paramount influence in Servia, in Bosnia, and in the Sclavonian provinces of Turkey, and to prevent Russian influence counteracting her own. A very remarkable document—a protest from the Servian Government against the occupation of Servia by Austrian troops—had just been laid upon the table. He would quote from it a sentence most applicable to the present state of things, but it was so important that he would recommend hon. Members to read the whole memorandum, completely showing, as it did, the policy of Austria in the Turkish provinces. In this paper occurred the following paragraph— Any auxiliary troops whatever would be preferable to those of Austria. The Servian nation has so decided a mistrust, if not a hatred, of Austria, that the entrance of the Austrians into Servia would be immediately considered by every one as so imminent a danger, so great a misfortune, that all the proceedings of the Servians would be directed against the Austrian troops, all the energy of the nation would be employed in resisting those enemies in whom is always supposed to be personified that cupidity which urges Austria to seek to exercise in Servia, no matter under what patronage, an egotistic influence. In the same degree as the co-operation of the Austrians might be useful to the cause of the Sublime Porte, if it was given at a suitable time and place, would it beget difficulties and complications, if, despite of all that has been said, it were displayed at Servia. This document he was led to believe was a secret document, communicated by the Servian Government to the Turkish Minister, which the Servian Government never intended should see the light. It appeared, however, that a correspondent of the Morning Chronicle managed to get hold of it, as a correspondent of the same paper some years ago contrived to obtain a copy of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, long before the Government had received it. In consequence of this document being made public, it was laid upon the table of the House, and it so completely exposed the views of Austria, that it was with the greatest alarm Austria found such a paper was known to the rest of Europe. The occupation of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian troops would be as distasteful to the Wallachians and Moldavians, as the idea of the occupation of Servia by Austrian troops seemed to be to the Servians; yet we had counselled the Porte, for without our advice it would not have been done, to consent to a treaty with Austria for the occupation of those Principalities. Whether, if Austria were once there, she would ever leave again, was another question. But whether she did or did not, she would never go beyond that; and the very moment the Principalities were evacuated, all our difficulties would begin over again. He must assert that the true policy, which would be followed by every statesman acquainted with the real position of Austria, would be to leave Austria a great neutral Power. In that position she would be of great use; but as to forcing her into an alliance, the attempt was as hopeless as it was vain. She would go to a certain point; beyond that point she would not go; and if you attempted to force her further she might turn on you. And that was the danger incurred, and that was the false policy which had been pursued, in seeking to compel Austria to act against her manifold interests, which were apparent to any one who had studied the subject. It was with very great pain that he found his noble Friend (Lord D. Stuart) making the Motion he had submitted that evening. It placed him (Mr. Layard) in a very awkward position. He was only a young man. He was, he hoped, a Member of the Liberal party. He had carefully avoided speaking in that House on subjects in which he did not take a deep interest. He had troubled the House on this subject because he had studied it for many years, identifying himself with it; and last year he received the kind indulgence of the House, of which no Member stood more in need. He had never been a man of speech—to a certain extent more a man of action—and he apprehended that he might have used expressions not entirely in conformity with the rules of the House. If so, upon that score he had again to trespass on their indulgence. But he could not refrain from taking a part on this subject. He was convinced that there were great objects at stake in this war. He believed this country was deeply interested in its results, and he wished there was some statesman, as of yore, who, rightly understanding the principles involved in this war, would not be satisfied to secure sonic five-and-twenty years' feverish peace, but would look forward to futurity and to the means of enabling this country still to bear her part as defender of the independence of Europe. This country never had such an opportunity as the present. He believed she was never furnished with a better ally, for the interest and policy of the Emperor Napoleon were identical with our own, and the House of Commons had been unanimous in forwarding the views of the Government. Nothing had been done by Gentlemen on the opposite side to impede Her Majesty's Government. ["oh, oh!"] Well, if Her Majesty's Government had been impeded, it had been by himself and those near him. He did not wish to impede Her Majesty's Government, but he did wish to exert all the influence he could command to induce Her Majesty's Government to take an enlarged view of this important subject. The choice appeared to him to lie between England remaining a first-rate Power, the defender of the liberties and civilisation of Europe, and England becoming a third-rate Power, the mere brokers and commission agents of the world. He called upon the Government to take advantage of public feeling, and to act irrespective of Austria, for Austria had other and despotic views which were hateful to this country. In spite of Austria, let the Government carry the war to a proper and just conclusion. Everything he had heard in the last few hours tended to shake the confidence of the country in the Government. He did not mean to say that the country generally was mad enough to suppose the operations were carried on as a ruse, and that all these great preparations were a sham. He believed British troops would conduct themselves as British troops always had conducted themselves, if their energies were directed by hands equal to what the country expected. It was with the deepest regret that he heard of speeches delivered in another place with respect to the object and purpose of this war, and he rejoiced in the declaration of the noble Lord in his first speech last night. He anticipated that those words would ring through the country, and excite still more enthusiasm. With what pain, then, had he heard, and would the country hear, that the noble Lord had been compelled by some reason, not his own, to get up and unsay what he had said. ["Oh, oh!" and cheers.] The country would see that the noble Lord had been unsaying what be had said. He had shown the difference between the statement and the explanation of the noble Lord, and he defied any one to say a difference did not exist. If the noble Lord would get up and repeat solemnly the words of his first speech, then he would believe that the last statement did not differ from the first. He believed some undue influence had been used to induce the noble Lord to retract what in the warmth of his own feelings he had stated to the House. To say that he had no confidence in the Government would be false. He had confidence in the noble Lord and some of his colleagues, but he was not afraid to confess he had no confidence in Lord Aberdeen. He might be wrong, and the country might be wrong, in attributing motives and opinions to Lord Aberdeen which he did not possess; but whether from inability to express himself, or to carry on the affairs of the country, it was certain doubts prevailed throughout the country as to the real intention of carrying on the war. He trusted they were mistaken. He could not believe that all these preparations had been undertaken for nothing. He thought there might be some scheme, he could not say what; but one thing he could say, and that was, the country was distrustful of Lord Aberdeen. Whatever course he (Mr. Layard) took, he took as an independent man. He might have intruded himself too much upon the House, and for which he once more asked their indulgence; but, in conclusion, he felt the greatest difficulty in dealing with the Motion before them. It was said the Government would take it as a vote of want of confidence, and, if carried, resign. It was most painful to him to join in that vote. Yet he felt no shame in confessing that, under the circumstances, considering the discrepancy between the statements of the various Members of Her Majesty's Government, he thought the country would not be satisfied if their representatives left the conduct of the war and all these critical negotiations—because they were told negotiations were still going on—if they left these weighty affairs, in which the honour and credit, and perhaps the existence, Of the country were concerned, in the hands of a man in whom the country had no confidence for a long period, when the House did not meet, and there would be no means of bringing the action of Parliament to bear upon them. If, therefore, the noble Lord pressed his Motion to a division, he felt he must either vote with him, or abstain from voting altogether.

MR. WILKINSON

said, he wished to state what was his impression as to what had fallen from the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) yesterday. It appeared to him that the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) put a perverted construction upon some words which had been used by the noble Lord, and hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House adopted that construction; whereupon the noble Lord rose for the purpose of explanation, and it appeared to him that the noble Lord repeated exactly what he had previously stated.

COLONEL DUNNE

said, that looking to the remarkable apathy of the House towards the Motion, he should not have risen but for an observation made by the right hon. Secretary at War, that some person Connected with the Ordnance had said that there were only six-pounders out with the British army in Turkey. It was impossible that any such statement could have been made. But what was said was, that there was no battering-train with the army, and that when it was proposed to take Sebastopol, it was stated that the army was not prepared to carry on the seige operations. The right hon. Gentleman had complained of misrepresentations having been made against the commanders of our army in the East, and with regard to the army itself. He (Colonel Dunne) had seen no misrepresentation with respect to the army or its commanders. He believed everybody relied upon the skill and ability of those commanders, and was convinced that the army was as well ordered, equipped, and as well organised as any army in Europe. Much as he respected the French army, he was surprised that any one should consider it to be better in any respect than the British army. He believed that no man in that House or connected with the press had ever found fault with the commanders of the army, or with the army itself. But what had always been said was, and what he feared was the truth, that they had sent out that army so unprepared with everything that, now, towards the end of the campaign, they were placed in a situation in which they were so destitute of means of conveyance that they could not move. That he believed to be perfectly true; and, although the Secretary at War had given an answer to reports in newspapers, yet he had not given any answer to the allegation, that the army was not supplied with a proper commissariat nor with a proper field train. The reason why the army could not advance was, that they were not supplied with mules and horses to carry the baggage, and other necessaries required by an army on its march; and the Government must know well from the reports of the officers in command, that the army would not be able to move until those means were supplied. The country between Devna and Varna, which was about ninety miles from Silistria, was so destitute of the ordinary means of supplying water, that it would take ten hours to draw water for the horses of a cavalry regiment, unless they were provided with cattle to bring the water to them. If there existed such a difficulty in getting up a few squadrons of cavalry, how could they expect to be able to move a whole army towards the Danube without more ample means of supply than our army in Turkey at present possessed? It was obvious, therefore, that, with the means and appliances that were now available, the army could not advance. Then, with respect to Sebastopol—as long as they were sure that Austria would preserve them on the Danube, they might direct their army to the Crimea; but if they were not perfectly secure on the line of the Danube, which he apprehended they were not, the army could not with safety move towards Sebastopol. There were only three months remaining in which the campaign could be carried on, and he must say that, for the safety of the army, he looked forward with great anxiety to the operations that would take place in the next three months. He saw the whole of the difficulties in which they were plunged, all of which had arisen from no preparations having been made at the proper time. The Government at first seemed to think that there would be no war, and, therefore, they appointed no Commissariat until after several divisions of troops had been sent out, and portions of our fleets were at Constantinople. The information which the right hon. Gentleman had read was nothing more than a common report of what an outpost officer ought to have sent in, and which ought to have been known perfectly well by the authorities before the army left this country. When our Ministers and Consuls at the different Courts were reporting that large masses of Russian troops were being concentrated on the frontiers, why were not Commissaries sent out then? The only answer given to that question was, that there was at that time no prospect of a war. But war was always a contingency that might arise, and a prudent Government would ever keep that contingency in view. But, no; the Government did not look forward to events, and were consequently unprepared when those events occurred. Supposing this country had expended a large sum of money in sending out a Commissariat, Russia would then have believed that the Government were serious in their intentions; but, seeing the course which was actually pursued, Russia did not believe that you had any serious intentions of going to war, and that if you did you would not carry it on with earnestness. The consequence was, that when the troops were sent out, they were totally unprovided with the means of carrying on the war, for they had not even the means of supplying themselves with food, and an army without food and without an efficient field-train must be paralysed. He had seen an officer who had been well accustomed to the duties of supplying everything that was requisite for an army, and he said that our army in Turkey was a magnificent army to be in garrison, but that it was unprovided with anything to enable it to carry on a war; and he added that the Commander in Chief left England on the 29th of April, and that the troops had been stationed in one place nearly two months, but they could not advance, although they were almost within cannon shot of the half-starved enemy. It was not, therefore, the fault of the commanders, every one of whom was fit for the duties he had to perform, that the army had not advanced, but it was that everything which was necessary for an army had not been supplied in time. He believed that now the period for attacking Sebastopol had passed by. With regard to Circassia, he considered that a wrong course had been taken in that direction. They had destroyed every fort but the one which they ought to have destroyed, or, at least, have taken, which was Anapa. It was the only one, by means of which they could communicate with the Circassians. If nothing more were done at present than the taking of that fort, the people of this country would be satisfied.

It would be considered as a great point gained, as it would be throwing back the Russians. With regard to our fleet in the Black Sea, he considered that it had done everything that could be done there. From the moment it entered that sea, the power of the Russian fleet was paralysed. In three months' time that fleet must withdraw, and it would then be seen what system Russia would adopt with her at present shut-up fleet. With regard to the Motion before the House, he must say he could not give a negative to it, for it was expressive only of the general opinion of the country. He had seen the proposition put forth in every newspaper, for the war had, in fact, been carried on more by the people than by the Government of the country.

ADMIRAL BERKELEY

said, he should not have troubled the House with many words had it not been that the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had thought proper, in endeavouring to show his antipathy towards the head of the Government, to lay about him right and left upon every party belonging to it. He was glad to see the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord D. Stuart) return to his place. Both the noble Lord and the hon. Gentleman had attacked the Navy, not sparing that department to which he (Admiral Berkeley) had the honour to belong. He would not indulge in insinuations, nor would he state facts which he could not vouch for. He would not follow the course of the hon. Member for Aylesbury, who stated things as facts, and when they were contradicted said, "Well, I heard so." The hon. Gentleman had complained of the Admiralty having conferred a decoration on the gallant officer who had served at Odessa. He begged leave to tell the hon. Gentleman that the decoration was not conferred upon that gallant officer for his conduct before Odessa, but that the late First Lord of the Admiralty had made up his mind to confer that honour upon him for the services he had performed at Lagos, and surely there could be no objection to Odessa being added to Lagos as a ground for that distinction. The hon. Member for Aylesbury had also stated that various sums of money had been paid for demurrage owing to the delays of the Admiralty; he stated that between 20,000l. and 30,000l. had been paid in consequence of those delays. He begged again to tell the hon. Gentleman that no demurrage whatsoever had been paid. It was true that transports which had taken the troops to Constantinople had been detained there in order to convey those troops to Varna; and he would ask the hon. Gentleman, whether he would have sent those transports about their business, or would have retained them till the army no longer required their services? The hon. Gentleman was also very unfortunate in his remarks respecting the Himalaya. That vessel, having performed its duty to the Government, returned to Malta, when it so happened that the party who had chartered her wished her to go to Alexandria on packet service, she not being wanted by the Government at that time to return with troops to Constantinople. She went to Alexandria, and then returned to perform those duties for which she had been engaged. The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone said, last night, that although the army as a demonstration was very good it was not fit for action, and that the same observation applied to the Navy. Now, he ventured to tell the noble Lord, in the face of the House and the country, that we never had finer fleets, or Admirals more firmly resolved to carry on the war in the manner which the country expected it to be conducted.

LORD DUDLEY STUART

said, he could assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman he had mistaken his observations; he had never said that the British fleet was not fit for action. What he said was, that it had not the vessels necessary to conduct operations in shallow water.

ADMIRAL BERKELEY

Since the noble Lord disclaimed the language, he would not further advert to it. The noble Lord, however, proceeded to say that— There was a great deficiency of vessels of shallow draught of water and of mortars. He was assured that Cronstadt was accessible on the south side to vessels of very considerable size, and, that if twenty vessels with mortars were sent there, the place might be successfully bombarded, and the Russian fleets and arsenals might have been laid in ruins before this, had the gallant officer in command of the fleet been supplied with requisite means by the Government, and not received orders to hold his hands. The noble Lord likewise said— He believed it would be possible to procure steamers of 200 tons, drawing only three feet of water, which would carry one or two heavy guns. Now, he was certain, that the country would be extremely obliged to the noble Lord if he would teach the Surveyor of the Navy how to build steamboats, drawing only three feet of water, which would be able to carry two very heavy guns besides engine-boilers, coals, and stores. Then, as to the statement that Cronstadt might be successfully bombarded by twenty vessels, he would beg to read to the House an extract from a letter written by the gallant Admiral in command of the Baltic fleet. He had served with the gallant Admiral; he knew his determination, and he was sure that he would leave nothing undone on his part to enable him to get at the enemy. Before the noble Lord again talked of knocking down Cronstadt, let him ponder on the passage he (Admiral Berkeley) was about to read. Admiral Napier said— It has not been in my power to do anything with this powerful fleet; for attacking either Cronstadt or Sweaborg would have been certain destruction. This was not all; Admiral Chads—than whom no man possessed a greater amount of scientific knowledge—wrote also in these terms— After two days' inspection from the lighthouse, and full views of the forts and ships, the former are too substantial for the fire of ships to make any impression. They are large masses of granite. With respect to an attack on the ships where they are, it is not to be entertained. It was said that the Government was not in earnest in the prosecution of the war, and that Sir Charles Napier had not been supplied with everything he wanted. Upon this point be must trouble the House with another extract from a report written by Admiral Seymour, who was Captain of the Fleet, and whose duty it was to see that the fleet was provided with everything necessary for the operations of war and the comfort of the seamen. Admiral Seymour wrote— We have never been at any time in want of anything, thanks to the provident measures adopted by the Admiralty. The passages which he had read proved how unfounded the statements were which had been made on the subject, and yet those statements, unless they received a positive contradiction, such as that he had been able to give, made an impression on the country. The Secretary at War had completely rebutted the erroneous statements put forth respecting the Army, and he trusted that he had done the same service for the Navy. Only one observation further he felt it necessary to make respecting the noble Lord's insinuation, that Sir Charles Napier had received instructions from the Government "to hold his hands." In the strongest language which man can use (continued the hon. and gallant Admiral) I declare—and as it is part of my duty to draw up orders for the Admirals, I can speak with authority on this point—that there never was a British officer who had more completely a carte blanche to undertake what he pleased. So far from his hands being tied up by the Government, they have afforded him every encouragement to proceed.

MR. F. SCULLY

said, he thought that if it had not been for the speech of the noble Lord (Lord D. Stuart), the House would not have heard such unexpected and unwelcome intelligence as that which had been delivered with respect to its being useless to attempt to take Cronstadt or Sebastopol. If hon. Members had taken into consideration the difficulties which the Government had to contend against as regarded foreign Powers, they would not have blamed them so severely for the course which they had taken; but after looking at the questions involved, his opinion was, that if this country had compelled all those great Powers to commence active operations, very great responsibilities would have rested upon their shoulders. For his part, he considered that, taking into account all the difficulties with which the Government had to contend in their relations with foreign Powers, they had acted throughout with great prudence and propriety, and that Lord Aberdeen especially, though avowedly a man of peace, had acted, now that war had unfortunately broken out, with all necessary promptitude and vigour. Above all, he would remind the House that Lord Aberdeen only formed one of a Cabinet; and he could not understand the system which accused lately to have come into fashion, of making one individual responsible, and not the whole body of the Government. If the hon. Member for Aylesbury or the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone had any direct charge to make, let them move an impeachment, or at least bring forward some distinct Motion of censure. But he protested against these sidewind attacks, which raised the question of want of confidence indirectly. For his part, he would vote against the Motion of the noble Lord if for no other reason than this, that he protested against sitting there till Christmas. The effect of carrying such a Motion as the noble Lord's (Lord D. Stuart's) would have a most injurious and damaging effect, and he should therefore oppose it. He wished to call the atten- tion of the House to the words of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) last night. The noble Lord then contended that the powers of Russia should be diminished to a considerable extent in the force which she had in the Black Sea. To that statement, he believed, the noble Lord still adhered. The noble Lord alluded to the manner in which this was to be attained. He could not see anything in the words of the noble Lord which, fairly interpreted, went to the taking of the Crimea and the destruction of Sebastopol, though be (Mr. F. Scully) thought that the very best course of operations which could be adopted. This Motion had not, he thought, been fairly put before the House, and he regretted that the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone should have brought forward a Motion which would be taken advantage of by the opponents of the Government. If the Motion were carried, it would be by strategy, and the Motion was by no means a fair mode of testing the question. He had heard the noble Duke the Secretary of State for the War Department praised for his conduct of the war, nor was the Government blamed for the conduct of operations. Then what was the charge—what was the statement of neglect or misconduct? What were they called upon to find fault with? This was a most important question. They were asked to resist the prerogative of the Crown, and no ground whatever had been laid for it. They ought to have strong grounds indeed for sanctioning such a course. The whole attack to-night had dwindled into mere matters of detail. Why not, he repeated, bring the conduct of the war, if they really found fault with it, fairly and intelligibly before Parliament? He was conscientiously opposed to the Motion.

SIR JOHN SHELLEY

said, he could not support this Motion if it was intended to signify a want of confidence in the Government; but if it was intended as a vote of want of confidence in Lord Aberdeen, he would vote for it with all his heart and soul. He believed that a general feeling of distrust with reference to that noble Earl existed in this metropolis; at any rate, in that part of it which he represented, except, in some of the dark passages about Downing Sreet. Lord Aberdeen had never taken such opportunities as fell in his way to remove that impression, if it were a wrong one. Last night he had such an opportunity; he might have spoken in the gallant and plucky way in which the noble Lord the leader of the House had spoken; but he had taken no pains to do so. He could not deny that there were men of talent, of ability, and of world-wide reputation in the present Cabinet; but still it was impossible to deny that though singly they were men of great reputation, yet collectively they were not successful, and were unable to command a majority in that House. The position of the Ministers reminded him of an answer made by a lessee holding under a dean and chapter. The lessee was about to renew his lease, and thinking that the dean and chapter were inclined to take some little advantage of him upon some points, he demanded a written agreement. They said to him, "Surely you will be satisfied with our promise." "No," said he; "taken singly you are very good honest men, and individually I would take any of your words; but, collectively, I have no faith in you." They were like a dozen different sorts of wine, very good and excellent if drank singly, but when all mixed together neither agreeable to the palate nor good for the stomach. As an Administration they had neither suited the taste nor the constitution of the people. The war, he admitted, was popular with John Bull. John Bull thought the gallant little Turk had been bullied by the great Emperor of all the Russias, and therefore he backed the Turk; but John Bull was a man of business, and he looked for some return for the money he had himself spent in the cause. He had spent his money willingly, because he expected some return for it. The tax-gatherer was coming round again: and when John Bull found his burdens doubled, he would naturally ask what he had got for his money; he would ask if no battles were to be fought except by the Turks, if Omar Pasha was to be left unsupported, and how it was ce cher Aberdeen, the sincere friend of forty years' standing of the Emperor of all the Russias, remained at the head of the Government? Another question would also force itself upon the attention of the taxpayer. It was this—how a noble Lord, who ought at this moment to be carrying on the administration of the War Department, was left to waste his energies upon Chadwickian vagaries and the removal of nuisances at the Home Office? The Queen, he knew, had the right to call whomsoever She pleased to Her counsels; but the Members of that House had also the right of comment upon the advice given to Her in the selection of Her Ministers. Exercising this privilege, he would state that a report was current which, if not true, could be contradicted; but which, if true, would afford a clue in unravelling the intrigues that had brought about the late changes in the Administration. When war was declared, it became apparent that some alteration must take place in the management of the War Department; and Lord Grey made in the other House a forcible speech on the subject, in which he introduced various recommendations. Nothing, however, was done; but at last public attention was roused to the subject, and the noble Lord the Lord President, on the 8th of June, announced the appointment of the new War Minister. The arrangement, however, greatly disappointed the people, for Lord Palmerston was left at the Home Office, whilst the Duke of Newcastle was appointed the new Minister of War. It was the general opinion that when the question was brought before the Cabinet, two or three Members of it pressed upon Lord Aderdeen the fitness of Lord Palmerston for the office; that Lord Aberdeen said that so long as he held the office of Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston should never be Minister of War; and that he insisted upon the Duke of Newcastle taking the department, though his Grace was ready to resign in favour of the noble Lord. If this report were true, the Duke of Newcastle should not be blamed for having accepted the appointment. With regard to the question immediately before the House, he considered that, though Parliament ought to leave the Government all the responsibilities of the war, the Government were bound to consult the wishes of Parliament upon the subject of an adjournment. There should be an adjournment for two months, or some given period, instead of a prorogation, because the advantage of an adjournment was, that Parliament would reassemble at the appointed time whether the Government liked it or not. And he observed that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) had declared that the Motion for an adjournment could not be considered as an interference with the Queen's prerogative. He desired, however, to press upon Her Majesty's Ministers, and particularly upon the Liberal party in the Administration, that the course they were pursuing was by degrees ruining the Liberal interest. Whenever the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) had taunted them with the nonperformance of the promises they had made, they had replied by asking him why he did not bring forward a Motion of want of confidence. The right hon. Gentleman showed great discretion, generalship, and tact in not accepting the challenge. The real truth being that the places of the Government were not yet quite ready for himself and his party, and that they were not ready for the places. The right hon. Gentleman thought, and possibly correctly, that if the Government held out a little longer, the course they were pursuing constantly leaving them in minorities, the Liberal party would be so thoroughly smashed, that of necessity he must come in. Such an event he (Sir J. Shelley) believed would be opposed to the feelings of the country. His object was to keep the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends out of the Government; but for this end, and in order to secure popularity, the best course to be taken by Her Majesty's Ministers was to cause the noble Earl at the head of the Government to disabuse the public mind of the impressions abroad respecting his views, and then the country would feel assured that the war would be vigorously carried on until a just, honourable, and permanent peace had been obtained.

SIR JOHN WALSH

said, the great bulk of the Conservative party, with which he was connected, had acted throughout this question upon one principle. They felt that the interests involved were too great, and the stake for which the country was playing far too precious, to permit them to select it as a battle field for the contests of party. He gave great credit to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of War for the warmth and sincerity of his feelings, but he had, however, placed him in a somewhat difficult and embarrassing situation by placing the question upon the ground of a general vote of confidence in the Administration. Now who, looking at the course they had taken this Session, could have confidence either in their strength, in their numerical majorities, or in their power of commanding support? They were in minorities every other night. Who, too, could feel any confidence in their consistency when they embraced every possible variety and shade of opinion? Who could feel confidence in their firmness of purpose, even as regarded the war, when different Members of the Cabinet held language which it was impossible to reconcile. If, therefore, the question was placed upon the single issue of want of confidence, he should be sorry to imply by his vote that he intended to express confidence in Her Majesty's Ministers; and he was therefore forced into this embarrassing situation—that he was either obliged to vote for a Motion which he did not approve, or express a confidence which he did not feel. With regard to the speech of the noble Lord the Lord President last night, perhaps he, as an humble auditor, might be permitted to give his version of what had created a considerable degree of doubt. He certainly thought, when the noble Lord spoke of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Crimea, and that her strength consisted in the fortifications of Sebastopol and in the power of her fleet, it was intended to remove that menace by destroying both the fleet and the fortifications. But, on reflection, he thought the noble Lord had left himself a mousehole to creep out of. The noble Lord had been led into making these observations by his desire to court popularity—one of the cardinal points of his political career, for he had always shown a disposition to use language calculated to catch the public mind out of doors, and to chime in with current opinion; but which, at the seine time, went beyond his own real convictions. He. (Sir J. Walsh) should, however, ask what had been the conduct of Ministers in the present war, and whether they were entitled to the credit which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) had claimed for them. He admitted that they had had great difficulties to contend with. He admitted that it was particularly difficult for Her Majesty's Ministers, who, in a great degree, had given in to the cry of peace and retrenchment, all of a sudden to alter their tone, and to call upon the country to make sacrifices for the purpose of carrying on the war. At the same time he must admit that they had made very considerable exertions, and had accomplished the fitting out of a very considerable armament; but they had been very far indeed from accomplishing that amount of military preparation which was necessary to our entering, as we ought to enter, upon this great contest. What was the state at this moment of our army in the East? It was true that Her Majesty's Ministers had sent out to the East a very considerable army in a very short space of time. That army amounted to between 30,000 and 40,000 men: and the world had probably never seen, in proportion to its num- bers, a finer body of infantry than that which was now assembled under the British flag at Varna. But to do this they had stripped the country of almost every soldier which it possessed; the depôts at home were deserted, and, what was more, the army which the Government had so sent out was not properly sustained by cavalry. He had called attention very early in the Session to the fact that, at a time when they were called upon to strengthen as much as possible the military force of the country, the number of cavalry proposed to be provided by the Government, instead of being increased, was actually diminished. The diminution, it was true, was not considerable; it amounted to a few hundred sabres only; but still there was a diminution, and the fact was of considerable importance, because an adequate supply of cavalry was essential to the operations of an army, and was more particularly essential to the success of those operations in the countries in which we were about to enter upon the campaign. Those countries were particularly favourable to cavalry operations, and as Russia had an ample cavalry force, an army which was deficient in cavalry would enter into contest with her under the greatest possible disadvantages. Now, so far from having begun to recruit their cavalry, and to supply what was an undoubted deficiency, the Government—because it was an expensive force, and because they did not like to ask for the amount of money which would be necessary for the purpose—had sent out regiment after regiment to the East, which were upon the peace establishment, which were in fact not real regiments, but mere squadrons or skeletons of regiments—kept in that state during peace, but always intended to be increased in case necessity should call for it, yet now made available in time of war without being placed upon a war footing. While, therefore, they were stripping this country of every regiment of cavalry, they were still not sending out to the army in the East the cavalry force which they ought to send, in order to support the exertions of their infantry. He would next come to the artillery, the supply of which was also inadequate. The artillery of England was, without doubt, the best in the world. General Foy, after the Peninsular war, paid the highest compliments to our artillery, and it was a fact that there was no similar force in which the horses and appointments were better, or the artillery- men more skilful. But the number of guns which had been sent out to Turkey was too small, not only in proportion to the number of infantry employed, but in proportion also to the relative number of guns and men in a Russian corps d'armée. Every Russian corps d'armée of 40,000 men had 120 pieces of artillery; but how many pieces of artillery had the 40,000 men who were at Varna, or on their way thither? Then, again, with respect to the Commissariat. Whether it was owing to the circumstances of the country, or to the inefficiency of the parties employed, he would not pretend to say, but the fact was, that they had not an efficient Commissariat. They were under the same difficulty with respect to transport, for they had not succeeded in obtaining a sufficient number of beasts of burden to enable the army to move, and it was therefore placed in a very mortifying position, while they had held themselves up to the eyes of Europe in a not very creditable light, inasmuch as, while the Turks had achieved the triumphs to which reference had been made, it appeared as if the English army had gone back—as if it were not willing to give assistance to its allies, whereas the fact was, that it was not able to assist them, owing to the indifferent arrangements which the Government had made. All this depended on considerations of money, and they had come now for a Vote of 3,000,000l., because they were afraid to let the people of England know the entire extent of the struggle in which they were engaged, and were, in fact, deluding them, by telling them that this 3,000,000l. would suffice to accomplish all the objects of the next six months. He would now say a few words upon the Motion of the noble Lord opposite (Lord D. Stuart). That noble Lord was the advocate of a set of opinions to which he (Sir J. Walsh) was entirely opposed, and he could not separate the noble Lord and his opinions from the Motion now before the House, He rather suspected propositions emanating from that quarter; and he must say, that the noble Lord had not at all disguised the object with which he had brought forward his Motion, because he had stated that he wished to raise a struggle in behalf of "oppressed nationalities." Now, what the noble Lord meant by that was, that he would plunge Europe again into all the troubles and storms of the year 1848. Now he would tell the noble Lord what would be the conse- quences of such a line of policy. In the first place Austria—whose material interests were engaged in checking the progress of Russian ambition, although her conduct had to some extent been vacillating and uncertain—would be decidedly against us, if the noble Lord should succeed in raising this question of "oppressed nationalities." It was equally certain that Prussia would also be against us, and we should at the same time lose the support of that ally upon whom, more than upon any other, all our hopes of success in this great struggle turned. If England were to adopt the views of M. Kossuth and of M. Mazzini—["Question, question!"]—he maintained that he was speaking to the question—did the hon. Member who cried "Question" mean to say that the observations he was making did not bear directly on the question before the House? If England, then, were to adopt the views of M. Kossuth and M. Mazzini, she would certainly lose the support of the Emperor of the French, who had risen to the great position which he held, not only in France, but in Europe, by controlling and by crushing that revolutionary spirit which the noble Lord on the present occasion seemed so desirous to revive. One consequence of the success of that agitating policy which the noble Lord would seek to act upon, would be to alienate that great Power, and to turn it into the opposite scale; and this country would be left alone to struggle through this contest as best she might, with the support of M. Kossuth and M. Mazzini. He thought the noble Lord's Motion was liable to the further objection that, by adopting it, they would be approaching to an interference with the prerogative of the Crown. He did not say that, under very strong and special circumstances, the House might not be called upon to vote such an Address, but to attempt to dictate to the Crown when Parliament should be prorogued, except upon very strong and urgent grounds indeed, appeared to him to be approaching towards a vote that the House of Commons should be permanent. If, therefore, the Motion should be pressed to a division, it would be his duty to vote against it.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES

said, he could not think that the present thinly attended state of the House enabled them seriously to regard the present question as a vote of confidence in the Government. He had not been cager to take a part in the debates upon the war. He had given a good deal of attention to this subject, and knew something about the countries in which the war is going on, but he did not regard that House as a place for crude speculations, or for literary or political dissertations upon the causes of the war. For himself, he had looked upon this war as one of the greatest misfortunes that had ever befallen this country, and he still regarded it in this light. Feeling the enormous hazards of the contest, he could not blame the conduct of those Ministers who did all they could to avert from Europe the misery of war. If he could believe that this war was likely to be of benefit to the oppressed nationalities of Europe, he might not think this benefit dearly purchased at the price we should pay for it; but he could not see daylight through the difficulties of this question, or perceive by what practicable settlement of Europe we could secure the power of Russia from such future preponderance as would enable her to renew, at no distant period, all those efforts which had on the present occasion led to our interference. There was only one power that could be called into action to check the power of Russia—a power which he was not prepared to call into action, and which he was sure the Government would not. He had joined heartily with the House of Commons in supporting the Government with all the sinews of war, which had enabled them to carry out their measures with so much success. He wished he could regard with the same satisfaction the diplomatic proceedings of Her Majesty's Government. The diplomatic action of this country with the German Powers had proceeded upon erroneous principles, which he feared would end, not only in complicating this question, but in involving this country in dishonour. If we had undertaken this war in a single alliance with our manly and straightforward ally, France, why then there would have been no distrust as to the course into which the country would have been led; but we had entered into a very different course. He did not find fault with the course of diplomacy before the war; then it was right, in the endeavour to maintain an honourable peace, that the moral weight of every Power in Europe should be invoked. But when war was once entered upon, he thought that both prudence and justice ought to have forbidden this country from entering upon a course of diplomatic action with any German Power. He believed that the withdrawal of Austria and Prussia from a common action with England and France in the earlier part of the negotiations upon this question had brought about the war. At that moment the proper policy for this country to pursue, and a policy dictated by prudence, would have been to tell Austria that nothing was asked from her then, and that if she came against us with arms, we were perfectly ready to meet her with arms. Such a step would not have complicated the negotiations, but, on the contrary, the action of Austria would have been further advanced. He had no hesitation whatever in saying that the unfortunate mistake in our diplomatic action of mixing ourselves up in German questions must result in great complications and difficulties to this country, and would enable the German Powers, who had no great good-will towards us, to prevent the war from coming to a speedy termination. He wished hon. Gentlemen would for a moment seriously consider what was the position of Austria in this matter. From the very commencement Austria had acted solely in advancing her own interests, and had been actuated by the most selfish principles; and the advantages which had accrued to the Allied Powers went no further than to enable the noble Lord the President of the Council and the noble Lord at the head of the Government to express a hope that we should have the co-operation and assistance of Austria. He believed that a remark which had fallen from the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had been misunderstood by those who followed him. The hon. Gentleman did not consider that the blockade of the Russian ports was entirely inefficient, but he said that no blockade, however nautically complete, would be effectual unless it entirely impeded the trade of Russia. If the commerce of Russia were really suspended, and the export of her productions and commodities prevented, she might be brought to sue for peace; but, unfortunately, no progress had been made in that direction. In fact, some advantage had accrued to Russia in her goods passing by land instead of sea, and so long as perfect freedom was given to Prussian and other German bottoms to carry Russian goods, nothing would have been done in the way of placing a material pressure upon her trade. He (Mr. M. Milnes) much regretted that, when the law as to neutrals was brought before the House on a previous occasion, it had not received from hon. Members that consi- deration which it deserved, for he feared that the regulations fixed on by the Government, although they were made in the cause of humanity, would turn out to be inhuman in truth. They would, it was to be feared, have the effect of prolonging the war to an indefinite extent. A great deal of personal matter had been introduced into the debate, and he could not say that it had been introduced unjustly or inopportunely, inasmuch as, when a Cabinet Minister considered the Motion to be one of want of confidence, it was reasonable and proper for Parliament to review the conduct of individual Members of the Government. He did not, however, look upon the question as a vote of want of confidence, but he must be allowed to say that he thought. some Members of Her Majesty's Government were affected in public opinion by their antecedent public conduct. It was impossible to deny that the Earl of Aberdeen, in coming forward POW as the enemy of Russia and the defender of the Turks, stood in a very different position from that, which he occupied when Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But since the Earl of Aberdeen had undertaken the great task which he had now in hand, he (Mr. M. Milnes) had not seen that he had in any way practically failed in carrying out the real objects of the war, and he should not consider himself justified if he were to presume that the exertions of the noble Lord would be relaxed. He did not believe that the noble Lord the President of the Council, or the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston), would feel inclined to retain office longer than they could do so with honour, and he thought they would abandon the Cabinet of the Earl of Aberdeen the moment anything was proposed to be done unworthy of the dignity and honour of the country. For these reasons he was unwilling to vote for the Amendment of his noble Friend (Lord D. Stuart). As to the question of adjournment, instead of prorogation, he was bound to say that there might be many advantages in favour of adjournment. It enabled Ministers, in case of necessity, to take the advice of Parliament; it put it in their power to correct false statements, which were certain to get abroad in time of war, and it gave them a means of strengthening their position in the country at large. He believed that if the Ministry had taken Parliament into their confidence in the question of the war at an earlier period than they did, many of the difficulties which they now experienced would never have occurred. This consideration ought to influence their future conduct. There was but one other circumstance to which he would allude, and that was as to the statement of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) with regard to Sebastopol. He (Mr. Milnes) had never understood the noble Lord to say that that place must be taken. He stated this, not that he thought the explanation of the noble Lord required confirmation, but because every hon. Member had thought it right to advert to the matter in that evening's debate, and he could do no less than follow their example.

MR. HILDYARD

said, he had been present when the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Gloucester addressed the House, and, as an independent Member, he could not refrain from protesting against what ho considered to he the greatest indiscretion ever committed by a Member of a Government. ["Oh, oh!"] If hon. Gentlemen who cried "Oh!" were in the House at the time the gallant Admiral made his speech and did not concur with him (Mr. Hildyard), he must say he could have no respect whatever for their understanding. The hon. and gallant Admiral, in commenting upon certain imputations which had been made against the efficiency of our fleet, and the manner in which it had been sent forth, read two extracts from private despatches of Sir Charles Napier and Admiral Chads, which stated that if an attack were made either upon the fortresses of Sweaborg or Cronstadt, the destruction of our fleet would be inevitable. Now he wished to ask those hon. Gentlemen who had thought proper to interrupt him if they considered that that was a prudent declaration to make? The House were now assembled to receive the Report of a Committee which had granted a Vote of Credit to her Majesty for the purpose of carrying on the war efficiently and of bringing it to a speedy termination, but how were they to hope for the attainment of that end if such declarations as this were to be made by Members of the Government? What effect would it have to-morrow across the Channel, in France, when the people of that country found it announced by a Lord of the Admiralty that the combined fleet of England and France could not attack Russia on any of those points on which it was desirable to operate? What effect would it have across the Rhine, in Germany, in those countries which had been described by the hon. Member who had just sat down as selfish and desirous only of advancing their own interests? What effect must be produced in the Russian territories by the declaration of the gallant Admiral, which would reach Cronstadt in a week? Every one was hoping that the reverses which Russia had experienced would bring the Czar to his senses, and that the war might speedily be concluded; but nothing could be more calculated to confirm the Russian Emperor in his present course than a declaration that Russia need entertain no apprehension for her fleet at Sweaborg, and that Cronstadt could not be attacked without risking the destruction of the united naval armaments of France and England. It was well known that Sebastopol was a fortress of the first class, and therefore the Russians might be pretty certain that their position at that point was secure. He regarded the indiscretion of the hon. and gallant Admiral as of so grave a nature that he hoped the Government would be enabled in some measure to qualify the statement he had made. There was an old maxim— "Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?" and he hoped it might turn out that Sir Charles Napier had suggested that the hon. and gallant Member for Gloucester (Admiral Berkeley) should endeavour to throw the Russians off their guard by telling them that they need entertain no apprehension for their fleets. He hoped that the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell), or the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty (Sir J. Graham), would be able to qualify the statement of the hon. and gallant Admiral, for an hon. Gentleman who sat next him (Mr. Hildyard), when that statement was made, remarked to him, "I think in the whole course of my life I never heard such indiscretion."

ADMIRAL BERKELEY

said, he hoped the House would permit him to say a few words in explanation, in reply to the attack which had been made upon him with so much warmth by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. He (Admiral Berkeley) had not referred to any official communication, but to private letters addressed to him by officers of the fleet, and it was for those officers to deal with him if he had read private letters improperly. He had read those letters in order to refute the charge or imputation that Sir Charles Napier's hands were tied by the Government, and he thought the letters proved that the gallant Admiral's hands were not so tied. Those letters showed that, situated as Sir Charles Napier then was, an attack upon either Cronstadt or Sweaborg would risk the destruction of the British and French fleets. Since he (Admiral Berkeley) had received the letters, however, a large French force had been embarked at Calais, and had gone to reinforce the gallant Admiral Sir Charles Napier; and he (Admiral Berkeley) would answer for it, that whatever could be done by two gallant nations in arms would be accomplished in the Baltic, notwithstanding the great indiscretion of Admiral Berkeley in having backed up Sir Charles Napier's opinions, that Cronstadt and Sweaborg were not to be attacked by ships alone.

COLONEL BLAIR,

said, if he supported the Motion of the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone, he would not feel that he supported a Motion implying want of confidence in the Government. He should feel that he was only giving his support to that which many persons in this country greatly desired—an autumn Session of Parliament. With regard to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the Secretary at War, to whose speech he had listened with great admiration, he should have gone into the lobby with the noble Lord with perfect satisfaction to himself that in so doing he was not voting a want of confidence in the Government. If the House met in autumn, and if, in the interval, the Government had carried on the war successfully, they could only expect the congratulations of the representatives of the people. If, on the contrary, the country had sustained reverses in the interval, (which Heaven forbid!) then to whom could the Government look with more propriety for counsel and assistance than to the representatives of the people? He saw the question entirely in that light, and not as a vote of confidence or want of confidence. But after the observation of the right hon. Gentleman he could not give a silent vote; and if the question went to a division he should vote for the Motion of the noble Lord for these reasons.

MR. PETO

said, he considered that there was no ground whatever for a vote of want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government with regard to the conduct of the war, for he considered that they had done everything that prudence and foresight could suggest to promote the success of our naval and military operations. In considering a question of this nature, the House should bear in mind the difficulties which the Government had to encounter. He had had much to do with the construction of works in foreign countries upon which large numbers of workmen were employed, and he could, therefore, form an idea of the difficulty the Government must have had in carrying out their plans at so great a distance. He considered that the complaints which had been made, that the Government had done nothing, were most unreasonable and unjust. If Her Majesty's Government had adopted any rash measures which had jeopardised the interests of this country, no one would have been more ready to express want of confidence in them than the very persons who now charged them with inaction. Four months had elapsed since this country engaged in hostilities, and during that period nothing had occurred which could shake the confidence of the people in the Government with regard to the prosecution of the war. He thought, then, that the Government were perfectly correct in treating this Motion as a vote of want of confidence. He conceived that no Ministry, composed of high-minded and honourable individuals, could submit to have their hands tied and the discretion of the Sovereign fettered with regard to the prorogation of Parliament. He must say he thought that a great deal of mischief arose from discussions of this kind. Some hon. Members, it appeared, would not be content until they forced the Government to make disclosures, and then, when Gentlemen were placed in the painful position in which the hon. and gallant Member for Gloucester (Admiral Berkeley) had been placed to-night, and were obliged, in vindication of the Government, to mention certain facts, hon. Gentlemen opposite at once exclaimed, "Oh, here is indiscretion!" He considered that the House should either place entire confidence in time honour of the Government, and enable them to conduct the war to a successful termination, or they should say to Her Majesty's Ministers, "We won't supply you with the means of carrying on the war, unless you tell us everything you are going to do and the way in which you propose to do it." He regretted to hear the continued imputations to which the Government were subjected by certain professed supporters of theirs, who, he was sorry to say, continued to sit on that (the Ministerial) side of the House. He could easily understand opposition and declaration of want of confidence from the other side. He quite understood the attacks which were made upon the Ministry, fairly, openly, and manfully, by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), but when such Motions as that now before the House were brought forward by a noble Lord who was a professed supporter of the Government, he must say that he thought the noble Lord (Lord D. Stuart) would act with more candour if, being unwilling to leave the conduct of the war in the hands of Her Majesty's present Ministers, he at once said, "I once was a supporter of the Government, but I am so no longer; I am now their determined opponent; I have no confidence in them, and I ask those who entertain the same feelings to support my proposition." The country would understand such a course as that, but he (Mr. Peto) must say that he believed the country had given to Her Majesty's Ministers their most unreserved confidence with regard to the conduct of the war. He was satisfied that the country properly estimated the hesitation with which the Government had entered upon this war, and he was also convinced that the country would continue to repose confidence in the Ministry with regard to the arrangements for the prosecution of the war, until some better reasons than had yet been adduced were shown for the withdrawal of that confidence. From what he knew of the state of feeling in France, he felt certain that there was a cordiality growing up between the two countries which would be worth all the risk of the war, and which, indeed, if it continued, as he believed it was likely to do, would set the result of the war beyond all fear. There would be no cause for regret, he felt assured, if what was now going on led to the establishment of a frank and cordial intercourse and a united action between the two countries.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

Mr. Speaker, there are but few things which I find it necessary to say at this stage of the debate, and I shall certainly not accept the invitation of my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) that I should make over again the speech which I made last night. I certainly do not think it necessary to give any further explanation of the statement which I then made. I have seen this morning reports of what I then stated, and they appear to me to be accurate, and by that statement I am quite willing to abide. The hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Cobden), following another hon. Member who assumed that the object of the war was the dismemberment of Russia, proclaimed last night that our object was the destruction of Sebastopol, the occupation of the Crimea, and, I think, the transference of the Crimea to some other Power. Such was the inference which that hon. Member drew from what I said; but it was a perfectly gratuitous inference, for the statement which I made did not bear that construction. But we have, certainly, every kind of opponent to deal with. There are some who tell us that it is wrong to go to war for the dismemberment of Russia; others there are who tell us that we are not seriously at war, and that we are unwilling to do any injury to Russia. In this state of affairs, I certainly thought it due to the House of Commons, now almost on the eve of prorogation, that I should enter more fully than is usually done into the question of the objects of the war, and into the present state of our foreign relations. I did so as fully as it was possible to do, and I am willing to bear the consequences if I made that statement to the House with too little reserve. I believe that, in carrying on a war in which the feelings of this country are engaged, it is not imprudent to state at large to the country what are the general objects which we have in view, and what are the ultimate ends which we hope to attain. My hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury says, indeed, that he wishes that there were some statesmen among us who could take a statesmanlike view of the objects of this war, and who could take that view which statesmen alone can take of the importance of the objects and the magnitude of the contest If, indeed, we who belong to the Ministry are entirely blind on these points—if, in all the debates which have occurred, we have never expressed properly why it is we went to war, and what should be the objects we should look to in concluding peace, then that hon. Gentleman, who is so much more enlightened than we whose views are so much more enlarged, and who has calculated the interests of all the Powers of Europe, should have told us what those objects ought to be, and in what manner we were to carry on this contest. He has not so enlightened us, I am sorry to say. It appears to me, however, that the general case may be stated in very simple language, and without any very great profun- dity of view. The Sultan of Turkey has been attacked by the Emperor of Russia. Has he been unjustly attacked? Yes, he has. Have we any interest in defending him? Yes, we have. This, it appears to me, is a very plain and simple case, and one with which the mind of the people of this country is perfectly satisfied, without resorting to any of those profound calculations in which the hon. Member for Aylesbury indulges, or to any of those mysterious views which he entertains in his own breast, but which he so carefully conceals from us, who, no doubt, are his inferiors in personal knowledge, discernment, and farsightedness. Well, then, Sir, with regard to the conduct of this war, in stating generally the reasons for asking the House to agree to this Vote of Supply, I refrained purposely from entering into any observations on those anonymous accusations which have been made either against the Government which has sent out our fleets and armies, or against those who have the command of them. There had been no such accusations made in this House, and I thought it was unbecoming my position to expect that such accusations would be made. I regret, however, that some of those accusations have been repeated here, but my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has given so ample and so full an explanation on those points that it is not necessary for me to add a word on that part of the subject. Why, Sir, we know, or at least we ought to have known—and if we had not found it out for ourselves, one hon. Member of this House, the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) pointed it out to us—that this war is not at all similar to others in which we have been before engaged. If, for instance, Sir Charles Napier, instead of having to encounter dangerous shoals, granite-built forts, narrow channels, and continual fogs, had had but to sail into distant seas, I have no doubt that before this a whole archipelago of islands would have yielded to his valour; but we have now a sort of rhinoceros to deal with, and to strike an effectual blow upon an animal of so thick a hide is by no means an easy task. And with regard to the Black Sea also, it has been considered as no inconsiderable advantage that those forts which Russia has for many years constructed, and has kept up with so much care with a view of maintaining and extending her power in those quarters, have been yielded by that Government, and yielded, too, without a blow. The Emperor of Russia has, at least, felt this—the inferiority of his force in the Black Sea. But, Sir, without wishing to enter into any further argument on the conduct of the war, there is one topic which has been dwelt upon both last night and tonight, on which I think it absolutely necessary that I should address a few words to the House. Some hon. Members have singled out the noble Lord at the head of the Administration, and have made him the peculiar object of their attacks. Now, Sir, whatever may be the constitutional nature of this Motion—and I do not deny that as a Motion of want of confidence it is a constitutional Motion—yet there is nothing constitutional in the attempt to separate the Cabinet from the noble Lord who is at the head of it, and to make him alone responsible for that in which all his colleagues must share his responsibility. With regard to the general measures of the war, those measures have been considered step by step by those advisers of Her Majesty who are usually called the Cabinet, and for the decisions which have been adopted all the colleagues of Lord Aberdeen are alike responsible to this House and the country with that noble Lord. With regard to the particular departments—with regard to the Minister of War, and with regard to the Lords of the Admiralty, who are the officers chiefly charged with the conduct of measures relating to this war—I am sure that I am perfectly justified in saying that there is no measure which they have proposed in order to give greater vigour to the operations of the war, and in order to ensure the success of that war, which my noble Friend at the head of the Government has not most readily concurred in and zealously encouraged. That my noble Friend for a long while believed in the possibility of peace, and wished to avert war, is a reproach which he can very well afford to bear. But with regard to any delay that has taken place with respect to the commencement of the war, the colleagues of Lord Aberdeen are alike chargeable with that delay. This, too, I may remark, because it has something to do with this Motion, that that which for some time was the great object of attack—namely, that when the Pruth was passed we did not at once advise Her Majesty either to declare war or to take such steps as should show that we are determined to incur the risk of hostilities—I may remark, I say, that that event took place when Parliament was sitting, and when Parliament could, if it had pleased, have interfered to give advice to the Crown, and also that the more vigorous measures of sending the fleet first to the Bosphorus, and afterwards into the Black Sea, were taken during the recess, when Parliament was not sitting. It is not, however, to the particular terms of the Motion that I wish now to address myself. I wish only to state that the Government do consider themselves responsible for the conduct of this war with regard to all its operations, and that they consider themselves responsible for accepting or refusing any terms of peace that may be offered. I have already stated enough, I think, to show that we should look for guarantees and ample securities in any such terms of peace. But, reverting again to that which has been stated in order to make comparisons between different Members of the Government, we were told last night that there was a great difference between the language which I held in this House and that which was held in the other House of Parliament. With regard to what I stated in this House, I can only say that I stated as much as I thought it was necessary to state in order to justify me in asking for a large vote of money from this House whose peculiar function it is to make grants of money, and, if necessary, to impose burdens on the people. The question that had to be asked in the other House of Parliament was, that they should concur in and support such measures as should be deemed indispensable for carrying on the war, and I think it was perfectly judicious on the part of the noble Lord who had to ask for that concurrence merely to make such a statement as was necessary for the purpose which he had in view. I do not, therefore, think that it was either constitutional or judicious to be drawing distinctions between different Members of the Administration, and to be holding up certain Members of the Administration as objects of suspicion or as objects of attack, while others are not to be rendered liable to the same attack or to the same suspicion. If the House is not satisfied with the Administration, let it vote this Address, which would serve the purpose as well as any other. After all, it is not very appropriate to the occasion, because it so happens that such Addresses have only been voted generally in cases where a Minister has thought it his duty to refrain from giving information as to the state of our foreign relations and the general prospects of the war. Everything that could be said has been said on this occasion, and therefore the noble Lord (Lord D. Stuart) has done what a great historian says is one of the most common, but also one of the most grievous of errors—the taking of a precedent which is fit for another occasion and applying it to an occasion for which it is not fit. However, Sir, as I have already said, I do not wish to prolong what I have to address to the House, and the House has now to say whether it will confide to us the disposition of these 3,000,000l.—whether it will confide to us the discretion of advising Her Majesty to call Parliament together, in case it should be necessary, or to refrain from calling Parliament together if, in our judgment, the public welfare does not require it. If we are fit to be the Ministers of the Crown, we are fit to have that discretion; if we are not fit to have that discretion, on the other hand, we are no longer fit to remain the Ministers of the Crown. My noble Friend the Member for Marylebone has chosen, I know not exactly why, to bring the matter to this issue. By the decision of the House upon that issue we shall cheerfully abide.

LORD DUDLEY STUART,

in explanation, said, the first naval Lord (Admiral Berkeley) had with some indignation represented him as stating that the fleets of this country had been sent forth in a condition that was not fit for action. If he (Lord D. Stuart) had said anything of the sort, it was far from his intention to do so. What he meant to say, at all events, was, that he believed the fleets were sent forth in a state of efficiency such as enabled them to meet any fleets in the world, and give an excellent account of them, but that they were not fit for the particular service in which they were employed, and for which vessels of lighter draft of water and mortars for bombarding land fortifications were most required. In conclusion, he begged to state that he was satisfied with the declarations which had been made to the House on the part of the Government, and particularly with the statement of the first naval Lord. He would, therefore, ask leave to withdraw his Motion.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.

Resolution read 2°, and agreed to.

House adjourned at a quarter after Twelve o'clock.