§ House in Committee of Supply.
§ 17,300l, War Department.
§ LORD JOHN RUSSELLMr. Bouverie, I am about to place on the table the Estimate for the present year, ending 31st March, 1855, of the sums required to defray the expenses of the Secretary of State for the War Department; and in doing so I beg to recall to the attention of the Committee what has passed on former occasions upon this subject. I think it was my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) who, early in the Session, stated his opinion—repeatedly expressed before—that the military departments in this country ought to be brought together, and that a special Secretary of State for the War Department ought to have efficient control over these military departments. 318 A right hon. Gentleman whom I see opposite (Sir J. Pakington), and who has been Secretary of State for the Colonies, added his opinion, that the Secretary of State for the Colonies, although he was nominally Secretary of State for War, had not the means in his department to carry into effect those resolutions which he might think necessary for the public service. At a later period the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) asked me a question in reference to this subject, and certainly received a very general assent from the House when he said that he hoped there would be a Minister of War. In answer to him, I stated that the subject was under the consideration of the Government. A little later I said that the Government had determined that the departments of Secretary of State for War and the Colonies should be divided, and that further arrangements were in contemplation. I have now to give the Committee a general outline of the changes that have so been made. In the first place, I beg to remind the Committee that I stated that two questions came under consideration together, though of a very different character. The one was, whether in time of war it is desirable to keep united the offices of Secretary for War and for the Colonies; and the other was, whether, with a view to public convenience in the arrangement of the business of the departments, it is desirable to make other changes with regard to the military departments, and to simplify and consolidate the business which they have to transact. With reference to the first question, the Committee is aware that during the late war the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies could devote his time and attention to the business of the war—to the fitting out of expeditions and the other military arrangements—the colonial business at that time occupying only a comparatively small portion of his time. Since the peace, and especially during the last twenty years, the business of the Colonial Secretary has very greatly increased. In almost every colony—even in some of the military colonies—there have been discussions with respect to arrangements for the control of the public expenditure, and many questions, some of the highest and gravest importance, have arisen in our several colonies. It therefore appeared to the Government that, considering that question alone, it was not desirable to keep these offices united, and that, although it was physically possible for a person of great decision, of great habits of business, 319 and of health which should be uninterrupted, to go through the business somehow or other, of the two departments, yet that it was desirable to separate them for the sake of the efficient discharge of the duties of each. The questions that would come before a Secretary of State in each department might be of the utmost importance. The fitting out of an expedition, the troops that are to compose it, the points to which it is to be directed, the means that are to be employed, are all subjects involving questions that would require the sole and undivided attention of a man of the utmost practice in public business. On the other hand, although it might happen that the consideration of ordinary colonial questions might often be postponed, still from time to time there do arise questions that cannot be deferred consistently with the order and with the satisfaction of the Colonies, and which require, both as to their principle and details, the undivided attention of the Secretary of State. On these grounds, therefore, seeing the great war in which we are engaged, the Government thought that these departments should be divided. With reference to the other question—which, as I said, is of a totally different nature—it is one that has from time to time occupied the attention of former Governments. It was not long after Earl Grey's Administration was formed that the Duke of Richmond represented to Earl Grey that it was very desirable to inquire whether the military departments might not be consolidated with considerable advantage to the conduct of public business. A very extensive inquiry was made into that subject by a Commission consisting, besides the Duke of Richmond, of the right hon. Member for Coventry (Mr. Ellice) and of Sir James Kemp. There was also employed, as secretary to the Commission, a gentleman of considerable ability, Mr. John Bissett, once Commissary General in the Peninsula. But, although the Duke of Richmond arrived at conclusions in which I was ready to concur, the Government did not think fit to adopt them, in consequence of the practical difficulty of putting them in force. At a later period of time the present Earl Grey, when Secretary at War, assisted by some of his Colleagues, made very extensive inquiries, and proposed a different scheme of arrangements. To that scheme of arrangements, which consisted mainly in placing the Secretary at War in the position, though with the functions and the proper attributes, of a Secretary of State, there were some 320 objections, arising from the nature of the department, and there were also other practical objections of a most forcible nature which were stated by the late Duke of Wellington and the late Marquess of Londonderry. That plan was not adopted, and I do not know that any subsequent Government has proposed any inquiry into the subject. And although, from time to time, up to the present day, several changes have been under consideration, no material or organic change has been adopted. In considering this subject, it has appeared to the Government that the chief inconvenience that we have to complain of is, that, the military departments being divided into several heads, there is no supreme head to administer those departments generally. I have stated on former occasions that I do not think it is any fault that separate official persons should have separate duties, although they may belong generally to one department. As in the construction of this House, for instance, it would be absurd to endeavour to consolidate and join the departments of the mason, the carpenter, and the bricklayer, but it would be equally absurd to have three or four architects, who should give different opinions as to the general construction of the building. What is wanted, therefore, is one supreme head, who should be able to take into his view the wants, the requirements, and the duties of the several departments, and to govern them with full information and with decision, and be able to come to a final conclusion on the subjects which occupied his attention. One of the departments which it is most obvious should be placed under a Minister of War is the Commissariat, which is now a department of the Treasury. There are reasons for that arrangement, connected not so much with the distribution of provisions and supply of arms, or what the Duke of Richmond called the feeding the army, as with the financial operations which the Treasury has to perform in distant parts of the empire. Now, although the Treasury should have the general superintendence of the financial concerns of the public, there does not seem any convenience, but the contrary, in an officer of the Treasury having the regulation of the arrangement and distribution of rations to the troops. That is business which does not properly belong to a department which has the general supervision and control of the finances of the country; it is an executive function of itself, and, therefore, should belong rather 321 to an executive Minister, such as a Secretary of State, than to the department of the Treasury. The Government, therefore, are of opinion that, besides what I have stated as to the general direction of the operations of the war, the Minister Secretary of State for War should take the direction of the Commissariat Department. With respect to other questions, there are many changes which have to be considered; but few which can at once be carried into effect. In considering this subject, I remember that the late Duke of Wellington gave the opinion that the Master General of the Ordnance was properly the officer who ought to be the military adviser of the Government, that he, being in possession of the military wants of the country, should be best able from time to time to give the Cabinet such advice as he should think proper on military topics. But although this is apparently, and may be occasionally, a very good arrangement, it is obvious that it can very seldom be practicable. If you could find on ordinary occasions a general who had taken a political part and held the same opinions as the Members of the Government, supposing him to be in the prime of life, and his opinions in regard to military subjects very generally held in esteem, it would seem very fit, whether he were to be called the Master General of the Ordnance or by some other name, that he should be the military adviser of the Government. But such a concurrence of circumstances is very seldom the case, and we generally find that the mode in which the office of Master General has been supplied is this. You find a man of great military distinction—Sir George Murray, or Sir James Kempt, or the Marquess of Anglesey—appointed to fill the office, a man who has won great honours in the field, and who, therefore, is placed at the head of the Ordnance Department. But this will not suffice for more than the most ordinary occasions. What the Government must look to for the present purpose is an officer who can provide for the homogeneous administration of all the arrangements requisite, including all the civil arrangements connected with the office. For, observe, it is not the case of a military chief merely, a general, however distinguished, placed at the head of the artillery and engineers, and intrusted with the supply of arms and the care of fortifications; there are added to the department great civil functions, which con- 322 nect it at once with the political as with the military duties of the State. For instance, take the subject of barrack accommodation for the troops at home and abroad, which is one of high importance, involving various considerations, and for which Estimates are presented to this House involving very considerable expenditure to the country. But the manner in which that question has been generally conducted is one which makes it very difficult to come to a permanently sound conclusion. I mean, for example, that the Secretary of State for the Home Department, finding that there are riots and tumults in a particular district, and being told by persons resident in it that it would be a great security for them to have a garrison at a particular spot for their protection, would naturally take measures to have barracks constructed in that locality. But it is obvious that the question of barrack accommodation in the United Kingdom involves both civil considerations of expense and military considerations as to the stationing of troops at points where they are wanted, and from which a concentration might take place at the shortest notice. So, likewise, with regard to the Colonies. At one time a long and voluminous correspondence occurred, which has been referred to by Earl Grey on a recent occasion, with regard to the best mode of disposing of troops in the island of Jamaica. Opinions were given here on the subject by persons of authority, and those opinions were sent out by the Ordnance Department to the Colony. Reports came back, which were referred to the Treasury. The Treasury then consulted the Secretary at War and the Master General of the Ordnance, and more than a year elapsed without a solution of that question. Now, it is obvious that a Secretary of State for the War Department, having the authority which a Secretary of State has, being also connected with the Government, being by his, office of Secretary of State a Member of the Cabinet, would have brought that question to a very speedy decision; he would have informed himself authoritatively as to what was the salubrity of the position proposed, its fitness for defending the locality from attack, the cost, and all the other circumstances, and, having thus arrived at correct and complete information, he would have been enabled to act at once and authoritatively. Take, again, the question of fortifications; the question of fortifications, both at home 323 and abroad, is one of the very greatest importance. I will not touch now on the question of home fortifications, but I will take the fortifications of distant dependencies—of Corfu, of the Mauritius, with reference to which the Committee on Military Expenditure made a Report, in which they desire the Government fully to consider the subject. It is obvious, that the question of raising or of adding to those fortifications requires very close attention, which attention as obviously is closely mixed up with the policy of the State, the future intentions of the Government as to those Colonies. I remember, with reference to Gibraltar, when I had the honour of being Secretary of State for the Colonies, a Commission was appointed consisting of several high military authorities, and a considerable time passed before they came to any decision. A Master General of the Ordnance, not politically connected with the Government, of course rather hesitates to give an opinion by which very considerable expense may be incurred, without being fully aware of the views of the Cabinet on this subject. A Minister of War would be enabled to collect all the materials necessary for forming a judgment in this case, and before the Estimates for the year were prepared he would have gone over them, and would have informed the Government what measures were in his opinion necessary, and whether it was advisable that any further expenses should be incurred, or whether any retrenchment could be safely effected. So with regard to our West India Islands; several years ago it was found that those islands, having been occupied in time of war by large bodies of troops, had a great number of forts mounted with cannon, which required small parties of artillery to be posted in different places in order to keep them in repair, and questions arose as to the arrangements which should be made for these objects. Upon such points the opinion of a Secretary of State for War would probably be of great use in drawing up the Estimates. With regard to the department of Secretary at War, there are less changes that can be made. The business of the Secretary at War is chiefly one of details; if you have 100,000 men, you have a certain Estimate and various arrangements consequent on that number, and so if you have 20,000, or 30,000, or 40,000. A good deal of consideration is required in order to fix the point at which your establishment should be kept; but that having 324 been done, there are few questions of difficulty which arise. Except in regard to the Commissariat, I cannot now enter into any outline of the official arrangements which will be made. The question has been found one of much difficulty by the Governments of Earl Grey and Lord Melbourne, and I think it better that the head of the department, an active man of business—such as my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle, who is now at the bead of it—should take into his consideration what changes are expedient in the whole department, and should propose them when they are required. With regard to the Commissariat, I see no objection which can be made to the change we propose. I do not see that there is any other change that can be made in the official arrangements, and I will only say that there is no person who is in the Government charged with any department who will make any personal objection to such arrangements as may be thought necessary for the public service, and that whatever arrangement shall be thought desirable, it will be cheerfully acceded to. With respect to another part of the arrangement—namely, that relating to the militia—I think the arrangement prevailing at present is, that the embodied militia comes under the Secretary at War and the Commander in Chief, but the disembodied militia is under the Secretary for the Home Department. As at present advised, we do not think it expedient that any change should be made in that respect; if it should be thought necessary, it can be made at any time; but the present arrangement being one that concerns the colonels of militia, and other officers who are in the habit of transacting business with the Home Department, there appears no advantage in making any other change. The great benefit which I think will be gained by our measure is the separating the civil from the military department, a great part of the business now done at the Board of Ordnance under a military chief being entirely of a civil nature. It appears to me, whatever may be the mode in which you arrive at the result, that the Commander in Chief and the Master General of the Ordnance, if those two offices are to continue separate, or the head of both combined if they are to be united, should have the whole control of the discipline and patronage of the Army, including the artillery and engineers, and that, on the other hand, the civil depart- 325 ments should have the whole of the arrangements that are necessary for the lodging of the Army, the fortifications at home and abroad, the provisioning and pay of the troops. When these changes shall have been effected, the House of Commons will then have before it, on the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the War Department, the whole military expenditure of the country. Therefore, if there should be any complaint with respect to furnishing provisions for the troops, for instance, instead of saying that the arrangements of the Treasury have been defective, the House will be enabled to call on the Secretary for the War Department to answer, and will consider him responsible, for arrangements which must at all times entail a very heavy burden on the country. These, Sir, are the general arrangements which are in contemplation. I have already said that I think there are others which must be carried into effect from time to time. It would be impossible to carry them into effect at present, now that we are at the beginning of a war, when the Secretary of State is fully employed by those urgent and important duties which belong to the Minister who is to superintend the military expenditure of the country, and give directions for the employment of our forces. Having explained the general views of the Government, what I have to ask of this Committee, therefore, is to afford time, in order that new arrangements may be carried into effect on the responsibility of the Government. Every question of this kind must be duly weighed by the Government. There are, at present, two offices at the Board of Ordnance usually held by Members of the House of Commons, which are now vacant. There is the office of Surveyor General, and there is the office of Secretary to the Master General of the Ordnance. It is not intended, without full consideration, to fill up those offices. When I say this, I mean it is not intended to fill them up in the way in which they have been filled up hitherto. At present the only information I can give is, that, while we think it is not necessary to keep up the office of Secretary to the Master General of the Ordnance with so large a salary as he has received hitherto, it will be necessary to appoint a Surveyor General for the Ordnance Department. If, however, the Ordnance Department is kept up as it is constituted at present, it may be advisable rather to appoint a person who has special know- 326 ledge with regard to the important duties which belong to that office, than to appoint a Member of this House who is not equally conversant with those duties. I think the efficiency of the department might be served if a change of this kind were made, but I am asking now that the whole subject may be reserved for the consideration of the Government, and I shall put the Vote on that understanding. I should say, however, having regard to the amount of the Vote, that a considerable part of the expense has been already voted. We considered it right that it should come again before the House in the shape of this Estimate, and that it was desirable the House should have all the details of expenditure connected with the department at one time under its observation; but I think to the amount of about 2,000l. a year or more of the salaries contained in this Estimate have been already voted among the Estimates relating to the Colonial Department. There are other salaries—of which I cannot tell the exact amount—which have already been voted under the heads of other departments, the Treasury and the Home Office. With regard to the offices vacant, I should state, first, that the military Under-Secretary was appointed by the Duke of Newcastle when he was Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. As respects the other Under-Secretary, the proposal is to appoint a gentleman to that office that he may conduct the correspondence, and have charge of the arrangements with regard to other offices which must be placed under the control of the Secretary of State. It is at the same time intended, however, that the person who is to fill that office shall be told that he will have no longer tenure of office than until the final arrangements are made; that those final arrangements may provide other duties which he will have to discharge, and that, therefore, for the present, it will be only a provisional appointment. With regard to the senior clerks, the assistant senior clerks, and the junior clerks—three classes of clerks—it is intended that they shall all of them be appointed from offices where they are at present employed as clerks. It is not proposed to appoint any new persons to these duties. There will be a fourth class of probationary clerks, with salaries of from 100l. to 150l. a year. With this explanation, I beg, Sir, to move the Vote of 17,300l. for the salaries and other expenses in the department of Her Majesty's 327 Secretary of State for War, from the 12th of June, 1854, to the 31st of March, 1855.
§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONI have listened, Sir, to the statement of the noble Lord with feelings of the greatest astonishment and disappointment. The noble Lord has told us that he has stated the views of the Government. It appears to me, however, that that is exactly what the noble Lord has not told us. I can only understand from the speech of the noble Lord that, with the single exception that the Commissariat is to be transferred from the Treasury to the new department, the Government have formed no views on this subject, and that they have called into existence a new department of the State and have established a new Secretary of State—an officer of the highest class—without having at all determined what are to be the duties of that office, or what are to be the new arrangements upon this subject which, under the force of existing circumstances, has become one of the most important which can come under the consideration of this House. The noble Lord, in the outset of his observations, did me the honour to refer to some remarks which fell from me in a former discussion during the present Session upon this subject. So far as the remarks which then fell from me are concerned, I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to the course of the Government—namely, that now we are unhappily involved in war it has become impossible for any public servant holding the position of Secretary of State for the Colonies adequately to fulfil the duties of that office in conjunction with the duties which devolve upon the War Minister, by whatever title he may be designated. I pointed this out as strongly as I could upon the occasion to which the noble Lord has referred. The noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) and others spoke to the same effect; similar views have also been expressed with the greatest force in another place by my predecessor in the Colonial Office (Earl Grey); and it is impossible for any one conversant with the arduous duties of the Colonial Minister to suppose that that Minister could satisfactorily conduct the affairs of a serious war. But I think the Government ought not to have been content with stating their opinion that now we are involved in a great war the duties of the Minister of War ought to be taken away from the Minister charged with administering the affairs of our Colonies. I think we had a right to 328 expect that, before the Government came down to this House and asked us to vote an Estimate for the establishment of a Secretary of State and of a new department, they were bound to have made up their minds what were to be the duties of that Secretary of State, and how and in what manner the present anomalous and inconvenient management of the Army was to be reconstructed. But the noble Lord has done nothing of the kind. The noble Lord has scarcely dwelt upon two considerations which bear upon this subject, and upon which I for one confidently expected that he was about to enter into the fullest details and to give the most ample explanation. Are the Committee and the country aware—I hardly think they can be—that the present arrangements connected with the government of our military forces may be divided into six different classes—namely, those connected with the Army (the regular Army, that is, of cavalry and infantry), the artillery, the pensioners (who have lately been embodied in a distinct corps), the yeomanry and militia, the Commissariat, and the dockyard battalions? Under the present anomalous government of our military forces every one of these different branches of the military service is under a different head and subject to a distinct authority. The Army is mainly managed by the Commander in Chief; the artillery is managed by the Master General and the Board of Ordnance; the pensioners, I believe, are under the direction of the Secretary at War; the dockyard battalions are under that of the Admiralty; the Commissariat is subject to the supervision of the Treasury; and, as to the yeomanry and militia, I think it would be very difficult indeed to say under whose authority they are. Here you have these six different branches of the military force of the country under six different departments connected with the Government of this country. Then, how is the administration of the Army itself conducted? Why, for the conduct of the Army there are no less than five different departments. I speak now, of course, of what has been the state of things up to the establishment of this new War Department. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was theoretically and nominally the War Minister. You then bad the Horse Guards, with the Commander in Chief; the Ordnance, under the Master General; the Commissariat, under the Treasury; and you had the office of Secretary at War distinct from 329 all. Well, I do think, if this subject was to be broached by the Government, that the Government were bound to have made up their minds in what manner they would amalgamate and consolidate these six different branches of our military forces and these five different authorities, among which heretofore all these branches of our military establishment had been divided. Let me remind the Committee that this is by no means a new subject. It is a subject to which, for very many years the attention of the Government, of Parliament, and of the country has been at different seasons directed. The noble Lord opposite has reminded us to-day of the fact that, so long ago as the time when the Duke of Richmond held office under the Administration of Earl Grey, a Commission was appointed upon this subject, of which Commission the Duke of Richmond was Chairman, and of which the noble Lord himself was a Member. The noble Lord has adverted also to a subsequent Commission appointed in 1836, of which the present Earl Grey, then Lord Howick, and also, I think, then Secretary at War, officiated as Chairman. Of that Commission the noble Lord himself and the noble Lord now Secretary of State for the Home Department were Members. In 1837 this Commission made a very able and elaborate Report. The recommendations of that Report were distinct and strong. They recommended that the anomalous state of things to which I have adverted should be put an end to; that the Master General of the Ordnance and the Commander in Chief should continue to fulfil their present executive functions with regard to the military branches of these two departments; but the Commission recommended that the civil duties of the various departments connected with the Army should be consolidated; that the anomalous and inconvenient duties of the Secretary of State fur the Colonies should be put an end to; that the Secretary at War should be made an important officer, with a seat in the Cabinet, as the responsible War Minister in this House, though not a Secretary of State, the Commission recommending that the directions of the Sovereign for the movements and employment of the troops should still be conveyed through one of the Secretaries of State; and, if I remember right, the Commission also recommended that the Commissariat should be transferred to a new department, and should be taken away from the Trea- 330 sury. The noble Lord told us that, in consequence of objections on the part of the Duke of Wellington, the recommendations of that Commission were not carried into effect; but the noble Lord did not tell us that he, as a Member of that Commission, and having concurred in its Report, now dissents from the recommendations to which he was then a party. I heard nothing from the noble Lord at all to imply that he had changed his mind. The only reason he assigned for not having carried out the recommendations contained in the Report to which I refer was, that the Duke of Wellington objected to them. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: I said that the Duke of Wellington gave very good reasons for objecting to them.] Well, but the noble Lord did not tell us that he dissents from those reasons and did not now concur in the Report of the Commission of 1837; neither did the noble Lord refer to the important fact that in the year 1850 a Committee of this House was appointed to inquire into the details of our Army and Ordnance expenditure. Of this Committee the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) was the very able Chairman; it was selected with great care; it contained Members most competent to form a judgment upon the subject intrusted to their consideration; and that Committee recited in their Report the recommendations of the Commission of 1837, repeating those recommendations, and advising that the Report of that Commission should be acted upon. Here you have a third competent authority showing you distinctly how these anomalies might be got rid of, and how the inconveniences hitherto existing might be obviated; but to the fact of the Report of that Committee the noble Lord has made no reference whatever. Perhaps the Committee will allow me, however, to recall its attention to what passed upon a previous occasion, during the present Session, upon this subject. I was one, in common with many other Members of this House, who were greatly surprised that with a war already imminent—a war which too probably will be a very protracted one—the Government had not directed their attention to this subject before Parliament met, while they had the leisure of the recess, and that they were not prepared, upon the meeting of Parliament, to present a complete scheme for the consolidation of these different departments, and at once to put the Army in a position better fitted for the arduous duties upon which they are now 331 embarked than they can be expected to be under their present conflicting and anomalous administration. But the Government had not, as I think they ought to have done, directed their attention to this subject, and had not made up their minds how they would deal with it before the present Session of Parliament met. After Parliament had met, of course this unsatisfactory state of the Government of the Army became the subject of comment and debate in both Houses. It was adverted to with extraordinary ability in the other House of Parliament, while in this House our attention was directed to it by the hon. Member for Montrose (whom I regret not to see in his place), and that debate took place to which the noble Lord has already referred. Let me remind the Committee of the language held on that occasion by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War and by the noble Lord himself. We complained of the unsatisfactory state of affairs connected with the administration of the Army, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at right made a strong speech in answer to those complaints, declaring that, though there might be anomalies, the existing state of things ought to continue. He referred to the great advantages which arose from the division of labour, deducing from his arguments the opinion that it would be better to go on as we were; and he quoted some opinions expressed by the present Lord Grey upon the subject—
If," he said," Lord Grey thinks there is a time when no alteration should be made, a fortiori, the present is a moment when, in my opinion at least, it would be dangerous to make such a change as that proposed by my hon. Friend" [namely, a change in the management of the Army, and the consolidation of the various branches of the service]. "At any time I think you ought to proceed step by step. The process should be gradual; but, at this moment, I do not believe you could undertake a more rash experiment than when you are about to enter upon a serious contest, and when you will have the greatest pressure upon your machinery from being engaged in a very hot war."—[3 Hansard, cxxxi. 241.]The noble Lord followed, with very similar language—My right hon. Friend," he said, "has explained the great difficulty and inconvenience that would arise from attempting to carry into effect a new organisation of the departments at a moment when they are all required to make the utmost exertions in the preparation of the expedition now on its way to the East.…. Instead of its being a great public convenience, I believe it would be a great public inconvenience, if the carrying out of these arrangements were to be 332 transferred to any other department."—[3 Hansard, cxxxi. 259.]In the course of a previous debate it has been announced that the pressure of business upon the Colonial Secretary was so great that the Government intended to add a new clerk to that department, and I then yielded to the force of the arguments used. I believe that the plan then proposed by the Government was a prudent and a wise one, and that it would have been a proper course in the existing state of things to wait until the recess enabled the Government to devote their whole attention to the subject, and to frame some definite plan to lay before Parliament and before the country. I heard with astonishment, however, that during the Whitsuntide recess the reluctance of Her Majesty's Ministers to make any changes had vanished, and that in the course of those few days the Government had determined to establish a new department and a new Secretary of State, and I am bound to say that, in my opinion, the speech of the noble Lord has gone far to prove that his first intentions were wiser than those which he has since adopted. It would have been far better, I think, if the noble Lord had deferred until after the Session the consideration of this subject, and had then framed some definite measure, instead of coming to this House with an imperfect proposal for establishing a new department without having determined, except in one trifling respect—namely, the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the new War Department—what are to be the duties of that department. The noble Lord has adverted to the subject of barracks and fortifications, but I did not understand him to say that, either barracks or fortifications were to be transferred to this new department—indeed, what I did understand was, that they were to continue to be under the Board of Ordnance. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL expressed dissent.] Well, at all events, I did not understand the noble Lord to express any very decided opinion that barracks and fortifications were to be transferred to the new department, or that the Government had at all made up their minds except with regard to the Commissariat. There is one circumstance, however, which must have struck everybody who has heard the speech of the noble Lord, and I myself listened with the greatest anxiety to hear if anything should fall from the noble 333 Lord with regard to the anomalous position in which they have placed the Secretary at War. The country must have been surprised to find that, when the Government had so far matured their plans as to constitute a new department, the office of Secretary at War was still to be allowed to continue; that that Minister was still to be left at the head of an important public department, and to hold the position of a Cabinet Minister. What authority, I must ask, does the noble Lord find for that arrangement in any of the Reports to which I have just referred? One of the suggestions which has been thrown out by authorities competent to deal with the subject is, that there should be a new Secretary of State, but that he should discharge those duties which had hitherto been performed by the Secretary at War, and that the latter should cease to be an office any longer recognised after the office of the new Minister had been established. Another plan which has been suggested is, that the new Secretary of War should become an important officer, but not a Secretary of State. I know of no recommendation, however, having been made by any Commission in which the simultaneous existence in the Cabinet of a War Secretary and a Secretary at War was urged as advisable. I cannot, indeed, help thinking that the anomalous position in which matters then stood is the strongest proof that can be furnished in support of the supposition that the Government have, from some motive or another, changed their mode of action, in order to add an additional Cabinet Minister to their ranks during the Whitsuntide recess. As a consequence of that step, the Committee are now called upon to vote a sum of money to defray the expenses of a new department, and to contribute to the support of a Secretary of State whose duties it is perfectly clear that even the Government themselves have not defined. I think we have great reason to feel extremely dissatisfied with the statement which the noble Lord has made this evening, and that we have a right to demand that some explanation should be given as to what distinction, if any, exists between the duties of the new Minister and those which devolve upon the Secretary at War, both these functionaries being Cabinet Ministers. I shall, therefore, resume my seat in the hope that before the Government call upon the Committee to grant the Estimate for 334 which they have asked we should receive some explanation upon the changes which have lately taken place in the War Department of a more satisfactory nature than those which have been afforded by the speech of the noble Lord.
§ MR. SIDNEY HERBERTI am afraid, Mr. Bouverie, after the statement of the right hon. Gentleman as to the astonishment, regret, and surprise, with which he heard what fell from my noble Friend—astonishment in which the right hon. Gentleman usually finds himself when any proposal is made to the House to which he cannot assent—that I shall not be able to remove that astonishment by anything which I am about to address to the Committee; but I hope I shall be able to make clear to the great body of the Committee what are the intentions of the Government, and to defend the course taken by the Government, which has been so impugned by the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet said he was surprised that we, who so short a time ago expressed opinions diametrically opposed to making any change in the military departments, should now suddenly propose to make a complete reconstruction of those departments. The right hon. Baronet quoted one or two extracts from a speech that I had made on this subject, in order to show that I, at least, had expressed an opinion that the present system was perfect and ought to continue. I think the Committee will do me the justice to believe that at the time when we before discussed this question there was no want of frankness on my part in stating my opinions on the subject. I have held my present office in the Government on two separate occasions, and having turned my attention a good deal to this subject, I thought it would not be inopportune in me, though not speaking with the authority of the Government, to give a general outline of what appeared to me were the principal defects of the existing system, and of the measures which seemed to me necessary to remedy those defects. Now, it is quite true, as stated by the right hon. Baronet, that I had spoken in reprobation of the arguments used for a consolidation of the military departments, grounded on the misunderstandings which had arisen between the different military and civil officers at the commencement of the present century. Now, a great deal of public feeling has been excited upon this subject, which is entirely uncalled for. We have great difficulties to contend with 335 in dealing with these departments; and I say, let us apply ourselves to that task, but let us first get rid of all those pre-Adamite anecdotes, founded on conversations of old in which some hon. Gentlemen are wont to indulge, but which are wholly foreign to the purpose in hand. What I stated to the House on that occasion was, that, so far from difficulties being caused by the distinctions between the heads of the military department, nothing could have worked more harmoniously; but I also said that I was quite willing to allow the inconvenience of the present system, that the Commander in Chief has not that knowledge of the Ordnance Department, and not that combination between men and matériel, which ought to exist. It is true that, if a fortification be built by the Board of Ordnance, the Commander in Chief may disapprove of it, and that he may not view it with the same scientific eyes as the Ordnance authorities; but I much question if it is always desirable that things should be regarded by scientific eyes alone. I think that it is a great evil to have the separate action of two departments not controlled by one superintending authority, but at the same time that superintending authority is not necessarily to be procured by consolidation alone. For some years past, when there has been work to be done, and the other departments have been much employed, it has been intrusted to the Ordnance, and any one who will look to the Report of the Commission will see what additional duties have been placed upon the Ordnance Department; and, indeed, I am not sure that we do not now suffer from over-consolidation rather than the want of it. What you most want is, not so much the consolidation of the different departments, but one supervising authority, with a view to make all of them act in harmonious combination. I said at that time that it appeared to me the provisioning of our troops in the field and at home by a department which has, practically, nothing at all to do with that subject, but which has a great deal to do with it in reference to the cash supplies far carrying it on, was wrong in principle. I think the department of the Treasury, which is a department of check, but which is not an administrative department, should not be intrusted with a duty of that kind; and I suggested that the direction of the Commissariat should be removed from the Treasury to the military departments. I may here also state that I have expressed my opinion that the Board 336 of Ordnance might be divided into two portions. It is now, practically speaking, divided into the civil and military departments, and nothing can be more distinct than their operation; for, while both are governed by the same man, they are not governed in the same manner. There is, then, a clear distinction between these portions of the Ordnance Department; but to what extent that distinction should be carried is a matter which ought to be carefully inquired into before any decision is arrived at. It is a question of great importance as to whether the Commander in Chief shall have the control over the engineers and artillery, and the Commission of 1837 had recommended that they should be continued under the authority of the Master General of the Ordnance. I have no doubt that there are some sound reasons for that opinion, although personally I have thought that the Commander in Chief is the proper person to command the whole personnel of the army, and, in that discussion to which I have already referred, I proposed that the military portion of the Ordnance Department should be transferred to the Commander in Chief, while the civil portion should continue under the control of the Board of Ordnance. That I thought was a clear and distinct settlement; but that the right hon. Gentleman should have interpreted it as implying my complete adhesion to the existing system, does for the moment inspire me with some of that surprise which so constantly agitates his own bosom, The right hon. Baronet says the Government ought to have been in a condition to act immediately on the spur of the moment in this matter, or not at all. The Report of the Committee to which he has referred was published in 1837. Well, what happened in the case? The Committee came to no decision upon the subject, but there were one or two Reports drawn up by different Members of that Committee; and when the Commission sat which subsequently reported, they dissented from those views, and substituted one of their own. At any rate, therefore, the subject was not so easy of decision as the right hon. Baronet seems to think. This Commission having reported, no Government that succeeded it has ever attempted to carry that Report into effect—and why? Because they felt the change was so great, involving, as it did, the remodelling of every military department, and their consequent consolidation, that unless they had 337 a great deal of concurrence of opinion in favour of that specific plan, and unless there was a great change of feeling, it would be in vain to attempt to carry it out. Four Governments succeeded to the appointment of that Commission, but none of them attempted to make the change which had been suggested. It might be possible to do a great deal, and I hope it is so, at the present moment; but, I must say, at the moment when every department was strained to its utmost, for the purpose of sending out, on a great emergency, a force amounting to nearly 40,000 men, under very great difficulty with regard to ships, but I hope and believe in a state of very great efficiency—if we had chosen that as the time, as suggested by the right hon. Baronet, for carrying into practical effect certain theoretical improvements in this and that particular subject—if we had, regardless of delay, and of the great emergency, set about squaring all these departments to a model suggested twenty-five years ago, the Government would have been unworthy of the position they hold, and unworthy of the confidence of the country. The Government felt, and justly felt, that the first thing to do was that which pressed most. There is no doubt about it, that the duties of a Minister charged with the management of the Colonies, are so great and so numerous as to be incompatible with those of carrying on a war. In former years, when this country was at war, the Colonial Minister, it is true, carried on the war; but for the simplest of all reasons, that he neglected the business of the Colonial Department. But that cannot be done now. That, as I have said, was the first thing to be done, because it was necessary to the efficiency of the service, and therefore we did that first. My noble Friend the Lord President stated, that the Government would then take care, after due consideration, and step by step, to put the new departments on another system, which should free them from the recurrence of acknowledged evils; but he declined to state exactly how he would distribute the various duties, and what changes he would make in the different departments. And he was quite right in acting on general principles; for I may remind the right hon. Baronet that this paragraph appears in the Report of the Committee which sat three years ago—
Your Committee refrain from pointing out any detailed course of action on this subject, 338 leaving the responsibility of that to those whose official position and authority can alone guide them in applying a remedy to the present state of things.I stated at the commencement of the Session, when the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) raised this question, what were my views on the subject generally, and what were the views of the Government. From none of those views have I seen any reason to depart. We have already taken this great step—we have disconnected the Colonial from the War Department. We have, therefore, established an officer who will be the responsible head, who can supervise all these establishments, and who can supervise all the changes which are to be affected in these departments. He will at once have the Commissariat put under his authority. That is a great and important step. He will then have the means of examining to what extent the consolidation of the military and civil portions of the Ordnance can be carried into effect. But if you ask us to put the whole machinery out of gear for the sake of introducing some theory which the right hon. Baronet might easily in a few moments sketch out on a sheet of paper, I say I think the subject is by far too important to be treated so lightly as that; and on such an emergency the Government are bound to feel their way as they go on. They would not risk the efficiency of those departments, on the efficiency of which the safety and success of our arms at this moment so materially depend. The right hon. Baronet complains of the position of the Secretary at War, and says that, in his opinion, the office ought to be abolished, or else that the full control of the War Department should be intrusted to him; and the right hon. Gentleman went on to say, that he could not understand how two Cabinet Ministers could be engaged in the military department. With regard to the first complaint, I can only say that the Secretary at War has nothing whatever to do with the management of war. The duties of the Secretary at War are duties delegated to him by the Treasury. The Treasury has the great financial check and control over all the expenditure of the country; but the expenditure of the country is too great and too minute in its details to be susceptible of being checked by any officer of the Treasury, and therefore they delegate to the Secretary at War, with reference to the Army, all the 339 powers which they exercise themselves in respect to other departments of expenditure, and he checks and controls the expenditure with a view to proper economy and efficiency. If, therefore, you have him doing the duties of both departments, he ceases to have any check or control. I have heard the hon. Member for Montrose constantly complain that the management of the Navy was far more expensive than that of the Army. I have no doubt the management of the Army has been far more closely looked into than that of the Navy, because in the case of the Army one man expends the money and another holds the purse; not a regulation can be made by the Commander in Chief without the consent of the Finance Minister, in the person of the Secretary at War; and that is the secret of much of the economy in the military department, which had been practised for a great number of years. If, therefore, you combine the two things, you do away with that whole system of economical control in the management of the Army which has done so much to enhance its efficiency. Again, the right hon. Baronet says you ought not to have two Cabinet Ministers in the War Department. But why does he assume we are going to constitute departments which must be held by two Cabinet Ministers? The right hon. Baronet objects to the office of Secretary at War, and says it is useless, and if it is useless, why not abolish it? I think I have satisfied the Committee that, financially speaking, the existence of the office of Secretary at War is vital to the cause of economy and efficiency in the administration of the Army. The Secretary at War now exercises a very wholesome check over the expenditure of the Army; and I am clearly of opinion that the control which the Secretary at War has over the expenditure of the Army, under the Commander in Chief, ought to be extended to the expenditure which is now under the Master General of the Ordnance, as the Commander in Chief of the Artillery and Engineers. I do not see why the whole expenditure for the matériel and personnel of the Ordnance should not be placed under the control of the Secretary at War. With regard to the office of Secretary at War losing, as the right hon. Baronet complains, some of its importance, that is a subject upon which I will not trouble the Committee, but I think that some additional duties might be imposed upon him, such as moving the Commissariat Estimates, and that the whole of the War 340 Estimates should, as nearly as possible, be laid before the House as a whole. I should be inclined to say, therefore, retain the office of Secretary at War as a finance officer, while those ditties of a half military character which were attached to the office might be transferred from it, such as that relating to the pensioners; but I must still stand out that if you want to continue that which has so much contributed to causing economy in the administration of the Army, and to promote that steadiness by which a financial check has been brought to bear upon the whole of the expenditure, you must maintain the office of Secretary at War as a separate office. With regard to the question, as to whether the Secretary of State for War and Secretary at War should be Cabinet Ministers, that is a point upon which I shall not enter, and, with regard to the general question, I can only say that I have looked at it and considered it with perfect impartiality. So far from attempting to prevent changes being made in the present system, I have urged the necessity of change, and I have in Parliament spoken very freely as to what were the evils to be remedied. I am sorry that the right hon. Baronet objects that there should be two Cabinet Ministers connected with the War Department; but it appeared to me, and I hope that I shall not be thought guilty of self-sufficiency, that, having been for a long time Secretary at War, and having, during that time, received most cordial support from every one connected with the Army, that having bestowed a very considerable amount of attention on this subject, and from my knowledge of the details of the business of the War Office, I thought that my services might be of great value to assist not only in promoting the efficiency of the Army, but also in assisting the Government in arranging in a final and satisfactory manner the various duties of the War Department. I thought, also, that I should not be justified in resigning an office because it had become of, perhaps, a little less importance, and, therefore, I undertook to carry on the duties of Secretary at War, and, if the right hon. Gentleman disapproves of my doing so, I regret it; but I can only say that the assistance which I may have given to the Government shall continue to be given, and I hope that the result will be, that we shall shortly be able to lay upon the table of the House a detailed plan of the entire change. I trust that this House will not deprive the Go- 341 vernment of that assistance and confidence which are necessary to enable them to bring this change to a good issue, by giving their utmost attention to the subject, and by taking every step to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Give us time—that is only fair—and I am satisfied that we can introduce into the military department changes which will promote the efficiency of the service, and which will enable the Government and people to look with perfect confidence, as to efficiency in every respect, upon those forces upon whom now the honour and safety of this country depend.
COLONEL DUNNEsaid, he believed that the explanations given by the noble Lord the Member for London and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War were not calculated to give satisfaction either to that House or to the country. It would appear from those explanations that the only tangible change which had been effected in the case was the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the new War Minister. Now, he entirely approved of that measure, and believed that it would greatly tend to increase the efficiency of the Army. But that surely was not the only reform they had a right to expect under the new system. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had also shadowed forth a separation of the civil and military departments of the Ordnance. He (Col. Dunne) believed, however, that those two departments were so closely interwoven that it would be very difficult, and even detrimental, to separate them. He entirely approved of the proposal that the embodiment of the militia should remain under the control of the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
§ MR. G. BUTTsaid, he had a few words to say upon the subject, although it was one with which he was not much acquainted. He was surprised at the statement which the noble Lord the President of the Council and the right hon. Secretary at War had made, because the Committee had a right to expect that when a new office like that of Minister of War was created, the duties of the office would be clearly defined; but neither the noble Lord nor the right hon. Gentleman had let them into that secret. The noble Lord says—"Appoint the new officer, and from time to time he will consider what duties it will be convenient for him to undertake;" while the right hon. the Secretary at War said—"We cannot tell what duties are to 342 be assigned to this new officer, hut give us time and we will find him something to do, although I may state at once that there will be no consolidation of duties yet." Now that was the sum and substance of the two speeches, which contained no explanation whatever that could he satisfactory, either to the Committee or the country. What he wanted to know was, the nature of the duties which this new Minister would have to perform for the remuneration he would receive and the honour of a seat in the Cabinet. The noble Lord in his ingenious speech was elaborate about the clerks, but he said nothing about the duties of the Minister at War, which was just what the country required to know, but which neither the noble Lord nor time right hon. Gentleman had thought fit to explain, or even to shadow forth. It was only natural to suppose that there would have been a consolidation of the business of our War Department in the newly-created War Secretary. But no such consolidation had, it appeared, taken place, and they had not even been led to think that any such consolidation was contemplated by the Government. It was clear that no attention had been paid in that case to the recommendations of the Committee over which the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) had presided. What was wanted was, not merely that the supervision of the Commissariat should be transferred to the new Minister, but that he should be intrusted with the superintendence of all our preparations for the conduct of the war.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ The House resumed.