HC Deb 03 August 1854 vol 135 cc1261-84

Order for Committee read.

House in Committee.

Clauses agreed to.

Upon Schedule B (schedule of salaries and payments to be provided for by annual Votes or otherwise, as prescribed in Clauses 1 and 7),

MR. SPOONER

rose to move the Amendment of which he had given no- tice; but said that it was not his intention to go into any details on the question of Maynooth, as it was a question he had argued fully before. His views were already well known, but he thought it his duty to take the sense of the Committee on the Amendment of which he had given notice. He would first beg to state that he objected altogether to the grant to Maynooth, and if he did not now go into the subject, it was not because he had in any way altered his opinions. He conscientiously objected to any grant for the education of the people of Ireland, or the education of any of Her Majesty's subjects in the Roman Catholic religion. He objected to it conscientiously, believing it to be a great national sin, and that it was the duty of all the Members in that House to put an end to it. He merely wished to show that his opinions were unchanged and unaltered, and he now objected to leaving the grant to Maynooth as a charge on the Consolidated Fund. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said this was a question of form, but he differed very much from him. It was not a question of form, but a great constitutional one. The alterations in this measure in another place had been so great that the House of Commons could not agree with them, and they were obliged to bring the Bill in again. The question had thus been reopened, and that gave him an opportunity of protesting against the Maynooth grant being taken away from the control of Parliament. Formerly it had been every year subject to the control of Parliament, but in 1845 Sir Robert Peel thought fit to remove it from that control, and fix it on the Consolidated Fund. He had objected to that course at the time, and, consistently with his objection then, he now proposed an Amendment which, if it should be successful, would bring it under the control of Parliament again. The feeling against this grant was daily and hourly increasing, and the majority against it in that House had gone on year by year increasing. It was evident that the Government shrunk from placing it under the control of Parliament, while the country was decidedly against the continuance of the grant. He hoped the practical economists would support his Motion for bringing the practical control of the House to bear upon the expenditure of the country. He called upon the hon. Member for Montrose to support his proposition, as it was in accordance with the opinions he had always expressed with respect to the control that Parliament ought to exercise over that expenditure. If there had been any bargain or contract he would not interpose—if the Vote was in the nature of a pension or reward for services, be would be shy in bringing it under the annual revision of the House. That was not the case here; it was a free gift, granted with the view of conciliating the Roman Catholics, and of putting a stop to the angry discussions in that house. That object had, however, utterly failed; the discussions still continued. The Roman Catholics believed the grant to be their right—they took the money, but it did net conciliate them. They believed that they ought to be the Established Church of Ireland, and they took this money to carry out their own system of education. They did not thank the House for the Vote, and it had not induced them to alter a single opinion. Nothing in the world would satisfy them until they became the supreme Established Church in that country. If hon. Members viewed the question in any other light, they were only blinding and deceiving themselves. If the Government thought they were right in continuing this grant, let them prove their sincerity by bringing it before Parliament annually. The Government might resist the Motion this year or next year, but the Maynooth grant was doomed, its abolition was only a question of time. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving that— In case the House shall sanction the principle of removing any charge from the Consolidated Fund now placed upon it by Act of Parliament, to add to Schedule B—'the president, vice-president, and students of Maynooth College, and the expenses of the establishment, enacted by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 25.'

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, his hon. Friend had stated at the outset of his speech that he would not enter into this question, but he had been more liberal than he had proposed. [Mr. SPOONER: A quarter of an hour.] He had watched the clock more accurately than his hon. Friend, and he could assure him that his observations had extended—not to too great a length, for the observations of his hon. Friend were always pleasant to listen to—but they had extended to about the length of an ordinary sermon. He would repeat the promise of his hon. Friend to be very brief, and he would endeavour to be more successful in keeping it than his hon. Friend had been. He did not feel it at all necessary to enter into the merits of the question which had been raised as to whether the grant to Maynooth ought to remain on the Consolidated Fund or to be placed in the annual Votes. He had a very decided opinion upon that point; but he thought there were reasons applicable to the Motion of his hon. Friend which were sufficient to govern, and which ought to govern, the decision of that Committee. They ought to recollect their position in reference to this Bill. Nothing could be more important and proper than the legitimate and reasonable vindication of the position of the House of Commons in reference to financial measures in the face of the House of Lords. There could not be a more satisfactory vindication of the privileges of the House as regarded financial measures than the Bill now before it; and when the House of Lords altered any financial Bill, it was most important that the House of Commons, when they agreed in the spirit of those alterations, should send up the Bill again in the same form as they received it. Another reason against the Motion was this—it was a most important question whether the grant to Maynooth should be put into the Estimates or remain on the Consolidated Fund; it was also important that when they discussed that weighty question they should do it in a manner and under circumstances which would show a due respect for the people of Ireland. But what had his hon. Friend done? There were grants from the Consolidated Fund in which other religions were interested. There were grants in which the Church of England was interested, and grants in which the Church of Scotland was interested, and he put it to the House that this question of the Maynooth grant was at least entitled to a serious discussion as a substantive proposition; that it ought to be considered upon general grounds, in connection with the other grants to which he had alluded; or that, at all events, it ought to be considered deliberately, upon a measure distinctly submitted to the House for altering the position in which it was at present placed. It ought not to be dealt with by a by-blow in a financial measure, which had been carefully restricted to its character as a financial measure, and from which the Government in framing it had carefully excluded everything upon which a political question could be raised. He hoped that for these reasons the House would summarily reject the Motion of his hon. Friend; but be must add one word with reference to the opinions and inten- tions of the Government. He believed it was the opinion of the House that this Bill contained most important and valuable provisions; but he must say, on the part of the Government, that it would be entirely at variance with their convictions of their duty to promote the further progress of this Bill, or its passing into a law, if it were to carry with it, under circumstances so extraordinary, the Vote which his hon. Friend proposed. It was a measure of fiscal reform; they proposed it as a measure of fiscal reform; and as a measure of fiscal reform he hoped the House would pass it. It would be easy for his hon. Friend, if he thought fit, to raise the question of the Maynooth grant, and to take the opinion of the House upon it; but he trusted that this Bill would be allowed to stand upon the ground upon which it bad been placed. With these observations, he would commit it to the decision of the House.

MR. DISRAELI

I confess, Sir, I do not agree with many of the sentiments which the right hon. Gentleman has expressed both with regard to this Bill, and with regard to the more important issue that has been somewhat unexpectedly raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwickshire. Summary legislation, at this period of the year, may be very desirable, but I am not of opinion that it will prove easy of attainment. I certainly did not intend to discuss the question which my hon. Friend has raised, for I did not know that it would come on to-day. I, however, had placed on the paper certain Amendments to the Bill which the right hon. Gentleman has now brought before us, and it is my fault certainly that I was not present to move them, but the transaction of business at this moment is carried on with such remarkable rapidity, that it is not always possible to vindicate those Resolutions which you wish the House to adopt. The right hon. Gentleman, in the first place, has laid down a principle the justice of which I must question—namely, that when a Bill has passed through the ordeal of the House of Lords similar to the present, all that the House of Commons has to do, is simply to reproduce the Bill which the House of Lords has virtually sanctioned, or vindicate its privileges by the introduction of a new Bill, but to exempt itself from the privilege of moving Amendments upon it. I very much doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman would be able in an argument to substantiate that position. I have placed certain Amend- ments upon the paper with respect to the Second Consolidated Fund Bill; and I beg the Committee, after what has been said by the right hon. Gentleman, to condescend to look to the nature of those Amendments. As my name has been mentioned in this House, and in another place, with regard to the object of the measure which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has introduced, I beg to state, to prevent any misconception, that this is not a Bill to carry into effect that which the late Government expressed their intention to do. What the late Government intended to do was a very simple, and, I think, a very admirable thing; it was to introduce a Bill which should ensure that the gross revenue of the country should be paid into the Exchequer. We should have proposed that the course of raising that revenue should have become a matter of estimate, and with regard to those charges which formerly, and I believe now, legally press upon the revenue, we should have proposed that some of them should have been placed on the Consolidated Fund, and that the rest should have been brought before the consideration of the House by way of estimate. We did not in any way propose that any charges upon the Consolidated Fund should be transferred to what is now popularly called Schedule B, and become the subject of an annual Vote. It was not at all from the opinion that the charges at present on the Consolidated Fund are not liable, or should not be subject to criticism, for had it been necessary that the charges at present existing on the Consolidated Fund should be subject to Parliamentary criticism, it was our opinion that the best course to have pursued would have been to ask for the institution of a Parliamentary Committee, in order that the whole question of the charges on the Consolidated Fund should have been examined. Now, the fault which I find with the Bill of the Government which has led to the Amendments I have put on the paper is—that, in the first place, it is not a Bill which brings the gross revenue really into the Exchequer. It certainly does provide that there should be an estimate for the cost of the collection, which should be subjected to Parliament, and it also provides that the amount of drawbacks and of bounties—that is, of repayments—should be deducted at the time of collection; but it still leaves a considerable amount of public money, under the name of charges, and so on, to the discretion of the Treasury, and it still leaves the Treasury the power of making considerable payments without the control of Parliament—without the revenue being on the Votes. I think that a great objection, but there is another great objection that I have to this Bill. The reason for taking the course to which I have adverted, and for proposing that Amendment in the preamble, is, that we should have an opportunity of examining the many things that are left out now, that we should state exactly what Parliament means, and what the Government ought to mean—namely, the declaration that it is expedient that the gross revenue of the departments of the Customs, the Inland Revenue, and the Post Office, should be paid into the Exchequer, with the exception of such sums as may be necessary to be retained in order to defray the charges of drawbacks, pensions, and superannuations heretofore charged and paid out of the said branches of the public revenue. Now, the House will observe that the Bill before us has no recital of the kind. If you look at the preamble of the Bill which is in your hands, you would not for a moment guess that that is the object and intention of the Government, for it merely refers to particular charges, divided in a particular manner, and the great object and scope of this financial reform appear to be altogether lost. I have, also, in another clause, or, rather, a proviso added to the clause, proposed that this amount of 4,000,000l., which will now be voted in Parliament as an estimate for the cost of collecting the revenue, should be subject to the same restriction, as far as appropriation is concerned, as the rest of the revenue. I don't think that any hon. Gentleman can doubt the wisdom or the expediency of such a provision. What reason is there that the 4,000,000l. which we are now going, for the first time, to vote as the cost of the collection of the revenue—what reason is there that this 4,000,000l. should not be subject, as respects the issue, to the provisions of the Act of the 4 & 5 Will. IV., the Act which regulates the charges on the Exchequer, in the same manner as all other sums issued for the public service? I think the Government made a very great omission when they did not introduce a provision to that effect, and I cannot understand why there should be any question of the expediency or the importance of such a provision, or why we are to be estopped from now considering it by any idea that we are acting in a manner contrary to our usual course when a Bill has been thrown out of the House of Commons and a second Bill has been sent from the House of Lords in compliance with their suggestions. There is also on the paper a proposal, on my part, that there should be a clause which would place before Parliament the charges on the Consolidated Fund, and when the right hon. Gentleman first introduced this measure of financial reform, he said that Parliament ought to have a due acquaintance, and, I think he said, control with respect to the charges on the Consolidated Fund; but the right hon. Gentleman has made no preparations in this Bill for that purpose. What I propose is a simple matter, perfectly in unison with all other regulations in regard to the revenue—namely, that the quarterly warrants of the Treasury for certain payments out of the Consolidated Fund should be laid on the table of both Houses of Parliament in ten days after the issue of the last warrant; and, of course, if Parliament be not then sitting, taking the first opportunity of doing so. The three Amendments I propose are—first of all, to carry into effect the purpose, which I believe the House has at heart—namely, that the gross revenue shall really be paid into the Exchequer; secondly, that the 4,000,000l., which we now vote by way of estimate should be subjected to the same restriction as the rest of the revenue of the country; and thirdly, that every three months the House should have, not the power of control, but the power of inspection, as regards the charges on the Consolidated Fund. Those are the three Amendments which I have made, and, in my opinion, it is most important that the House should adopt them, and by adopting them, so far as I can learn, being influenced, in my opinion, by the highest authorities, they will not at all interfere as regards the position of this Bill with the other House of Parliament. Now, I felt it my duty to make these observations on a subject of great interest before us, and, as my name has been mentioned with respect to this measure, both by the right hon. Gentleman on another occasion, and also in another places I hope it is no great intrusion on my part to have made them. I must now touch on another topic—and, I think, a much more important topic—that has been introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner). The Chancellor of the Exchequer says, he hopes the House will sum- marily dispose of this question. I don't say I wish the same; and, with great respect for the right hon. Gentleman, I don't think the tone that he has taken on the subject and the language in which he has expressed himself are at all fitted to the occasion or the subject, and I was surprised that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have expressed himself in such a manner and adopted such a tone on one of the most important questions which can possibly interest Parliament. I do not know what hon. Gentlemen on either side of the House feel on the subject; but I am of opinion that none of us have been inattentive observers of what has taken place in the present Session of Parliament, and in the Session of Parliament which preceded this, if not on other occasions. Why, Sir, this Motion of the hon. Gentleman is a repeated Motion; it is made for the second time. I gave a silent vote on the previous occasion when it was introduced to our attention; but I will confess I am not prepared to give a silent vote, and to continue to give silent votes on questions of this nature. Why, Sir, we must have all seen that questions of this character have been repeatedly introduced to our notice in the present and the preceding Sessions of Parliament. One day we have had a discussion whether there should be an endowment for Roman Catholic education; then there has been a question raised as to the inspection of conventual establishments; again, there has been a question regarding the Roman Catholic oath—as to what it really means—what is its main purpose and import; that is hardly noticed before we have some other question respecting the establishment of Roman Catholic chaplains in gaols. All these questions are brought forward by what are called independent Members of Parliament; not Members associated in the same particular connection, but sitting on different sides of the House, and influenced generally by different political opinions. Is it possible to be blind to circumstances so strange as these? Is it a wise thing for a Minister of the Crown to get up and treat a question of this kind by saying, "This must be summarily disposed of? It is August—Parliament won't be sitting for six months; the country will have no means, therefore, of expressing its opinion, and we really cannot listen to these questions, which in a thousand forms have already worried and perplexed us." I, Sir, come to quite a different conclusion from that of the right hon. Gentleman. I think these are perplexing questions; they are very serious questions, and I do not think it is at all desirable that we should evade this discussion or endeavour to evade coming to some conclusion on them; I think it a most unfortunate thing that in the first instance, when the hon. Member for Warwickshire made his Motion, from causes which I need not now dwell upon, but which are numerous, the House and the country were baulked of any decision on that question. Now, Sir, what are these various Motions, all of an analogous character? What are they symbolical of? What are the consequences to which they will lead? Surely they are questions not unworthy of the closest attention of statesmen. I think they are significant of this, that the people of this country are dissatisfied with the political status, if I may use such an expression, which our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects occupy with respect to the Protestant constitution of this country. In whatever form the question presents itself I find that at the bottom; and what, I ask, will be the probable consequence of this uneasiness expressing itself in all these various modes of inquiries as to the expediency of the endowment of Roman Catholic colleges, of the inspection of Roman Catholic convents, of the interpretation of Roman Catholic oaths, or of the establishment of Roman Catholic chaplains? What must be the necessary consequence of such questions being left in perpetual controversy without any one coming forward with authority to lead or to inform public opinion on the subject? What must be the consequence? It denotes, in my mind, internal dissensions, perhaps violence and disorder, and as I sincerely believe, great injury to the principles of civil and religious liberty. Well, Sir, I confess, as this question is brought before us in a summary way, and, as we are told, in a manner which does not at all take away from its importance, I think we are bound, particularly as it has been so often repeated, finally to meet it. I don't want at all to dwell on my individual feelings on this subject. I am rather placing the question on broader considerations, and I will not say in vindication, but in explanation of my vote with respect to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman which I gave some weeks ago, and which I shall give to-night, that it is the same I gave originally on the Motion of Sir R. Peel, with regard to the endowment of Maynooth. I shall not go into the reasons which influenced me then, and which influence me now, on the subject, not wishing to introduce individual feelings into the question; but what I want to press on the House is, that it cannot be permitted—it cannot be tolerated with any regard to the public safety—that Session after Session, an important question with respect to the relations, I may say, which exist between our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects and the Protestant constitution of this country should be left in doubt, matter of public controversy, so that every Member of Parliament, whatever may be his general political opinions, may rise and excite the public mind, interrupting by such discussions the whole course of public business. I think this question has come to such a pass that it is the duty of the Government to come forward to meet and solve this difficulty, and so to determine this controversy which breaks out in so many forms and from so many sides. Have we or have we not a Protestant constitution? If we have a Protestant constitution, what does it mean? Let Government come forward—let it declare by legislation what are the functions, what the attributes, what the influence, and what is the bearing of that Protestant constitution. Let every man, whether he be a Protestant or a Roman Catholic, clearly understand what are the rights and privileges which he enjoys under that constitution—what he may do and what he may not do. I think that this is a question which ought to be solved, that these are matters which do demand the consideration of statesmen, which ought to be met without reserve, and settled in a manner which shall satisfy the public mind—I say, without the slightest reserve, for I know no public man of the times in which we live, who I think is placed, and has been placed, in a more happy position to attempt the solution of this question than the noble Lord the Lord President of the Council. The noble Lord has associated his name through a long career with his successful labours in favour of religious liberty; he is, therefore, entitled, and justly entitled to, and I believe he possesses the confidence of a large body of his countrymen, who look up to him with respect and reverence. The noble Lord is an eminent Member of a party which half a century ago offered him power in order to secure the political privileges of their Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen, and that is a claim to the confidence of the Roman Catholics of this country which may be forgotten in moments of passion, but which, on the whole, I think, must last in the grateful feelings of a nation. Well then, if the noble Lord, both as regards the question of religious liberty and as regards the question of the political franchise of the Roman Catholics, can come forward on a matter of this imperial importance, with circumstances of great advantage, when he addresses the public mind and attempts to lead it to a result which he desires, it cannot be forgotten that the noble Lord is the individual who, when he was Prime Minister of this country, felt it to be his duty, in the name of his Sovereign, in the Parliament of England, to denounce the Ultramontane conspiracy against the liberties of Europe. The noble Lord has never for a moment shrunk, and I am sure never will shrink, from that most solemn expression of his, which, during the existence of the present Government, in conjunction with a similar expression of his opinion, led to such a misconception and misunderstanding, that some of the subordinate Members of the Government even resigned their posts, were only induced to return to their position by an assurance from the First Minister of the Crown that the Protestant opinions of the noble Lord were not shared by his colleagues. I only refer to that to show that the noble Lord has on this subject been influenced by strong predilections, and I think it is due from the noble Lord to come forward—not now—not in a summary manner, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, but after due reflection and study of this question—after examining it in all its bearings and during the recess—I think it is the duty of the noble Lord, and the duty of the existing Government, that they should come forward and lay down some principle of regulation which shall precisely define the rights and privileges of Her Majesty's subjects, whether they are Protestants or whether they are members of the Roman Catholic Church, and that it should not become a subject of controversy every night almost of the Session whether the Roman Catholics should enjoy the privilege of conventual establishments, whether colleges should be endowed by the State in order to educate the priesthood who are not the priesthood of the State, whether there is any meaning in the oath that is taken by Roman Catholic Members, or whether all these regulations with re- spect to our prisons or other establishments involve or do not involve a breach of the Protestant constitution of the country? Sir, I hold that—and I know not whether I agree with the opinions on this side of the House or that—in saying you are prepared to maintain the Protestant constitution of this country, you are advocating the rights and privileges of the Roman Catholic subjects of Her Majesty as well as her Protestant subjects. I look upon the Protestant constitution to be the guarantee of the civil and religious liberty of the people of this country, and because I am of this opinion, I feel that if the Government neglect their duty, and if these fragmentary parts of the question are, under its various shapes and aspects, brought under public discussion and Parliamentary debate, the result will be a heavy blow and great discouragement to civil and religious liberty. It is because I see the danger ahead, and because we cannot avoid it, that I call upon the Government, not in haste, or prematurely—not in a "summary manner"—not to tell us in August what they will do, but I call upon the noble Lord, in whom I have great confidence, upon this question to come forward and say, on the part of the Administration, that he will at the earliest period, notwithstanding the smiles and whispers of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, come forward on the part of the Government and propose a measure that will be satisfactory to the public mind, and attempt to solve these difficulties, and not leave any gentleman to agitate the public mind on questions of this importance, but that he will be prepared on the part of the Government to bring forward such pleasures as will vindicate the Protestant constitution, and prove that the enduring existence of that constitution is not only consistent with civil and religious liberty, but is the only security also, and the guarantee, that we have for these unspeakable blessings.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

I confess I was certainly somewhat alarmed until the right hon. Gentleman arrived towards the end of his speech, because, until the right hon. Gentleman said that this was not a question to be considered in the month of August, I thought he proposed that in the month of August the Government should introduce a Bill to define the whole bearings of the Protestant constitution, how far Roman Catholic endowments were compatible with, and how far the payment of Roman Catholic chaplains might be reconciled with that constitution, how far, in all respects, the limits of this Protestant constitution might be extended, and how far it might be reconciled with the general principles of civil and religious liberty. That was the task which I thought the right hon. Gentleman was about to enforce upon the Government at the beginning of August. But I rejoiced to find that the right hon. Gentleman gives us some months of respite before that task is to be performed. I cannot promise the right hon. Gentleman, nor can I hold out a prospect, that so gigantic a task will be undertaken by the Government. At all events, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Spooner), who brought forward this discussion, proposed a different course, because his proposal was that the Vote to Maynooth should be an annual Vote, in order that he may have the opportunity of making a speech annually upon Maynooth, and that after ten years of agitation the question may be brought to a conclusion. But if he were triumphant in this proposal, and if he were the slayer of Maynooth, we should still have those other questions of the Roman Catholic chaplains and the Protestant constitution unsettled. I must remind the right hon. Gentleman that I have not had great encouragement this Session to undertake questions of this kind, because, with regard to one of them, I proposed that we should have civil equality among Members of this House, and that when hon. Members came to the table we should not inquire into their religious opinions and persuasions, and that we should all take one civil oath. I found a very strong opponent in the right hon. Gentleman, and it discouraged me so much that I am not disposed to bring in a code beginning with the rights of man, and ending with the privileges and limits of each religious persuasion, defining the bearing of the constitution on each of the different sects. I own that the discouragement that I have received from the right hon. Gentleman will prevent me from bringing in any such measure.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, that Parliament bad placed the property of the University of Oxford in a Commission, and it would in that form come under the consideration of Parliament, and what was claimed with regard to Maynooth was, that, as in the case of Oxford, Parliament had based its proceedings on the Report of a Commission, and as a Commission had been issued to inquire into Maynooth, the House of Commons should, preparatory to the Report of that Commission, place the Vote to Maynooth upon the footing of an annual payment within the command of Parliament, so that the whole subject might be fairly considered when the Report of the Commission was in the hands of hon. Members next Session. It was quite certain that the public would have an investigation into the education given at Maynooth and its tendency, and they would consider the opposition to the present Motion as an attempt to evade that which could not long be successfully evaded.

Question put, "That those words be there added."

The Committee divided:—Ayes 43; Noes 108: Majority 65.

MR. DISRAELI

said, that his proviso to be added to Clause 1 would now stand as a separate clause. It was as follows— That all Sums voted for the charges and payments set forth in Schedule B shall be subject, as respects their issues, to the provisions of the Act of 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 15, intituled 'An Act to regulate the Office of the Receipt of the Exchequer at Westminster,' in the same manner as all other Sums voted for any specified branch of the Public Service. The object of the clause was, that all sums brought into the Exchequer under this new Act should be subject to the same restrictions as regarded appropriation as the rest of the revenue, and he therefore could not understand that there could be any objection to the clause.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, it was quite impossible that he could accede to any part of any one of the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman, and he was only surprised that he should have made them. He did not know whether the person who had drawn the present clause for the right hon. Gentleman had accurately fulfilled the intentions he was supposed to entertain, but the clause was entirely and absolutely useless. It would produce no legislative effect, except an effect which was already secured by the present law, because the present law provided, in terms most explicit, that all sums of money voted by that House must uniformly go through the forms of the Exchequer issue and payment. The object with which the clause was drawn seemed to him one of which the right hon. Gentleman was probably not aware. It was to create a new Parliamentary title for the present Exchequer system, the utility of which was, to his mind, somewhat less than doubtful. He had not yet been enabled to discover any useful purpose that the Amendment would serve, but it would be very easy to show much mischief that it would do. The effect of the clause would be a new recognition by Parliament of the propriety of adopting provisions with regard to money which now passed through the Exchequer, and he hoped the House would not be induced to frame a system in respect of which it was more than doubtful whether it would be beneficial for the public service or not. He protested against any new recognition of the principles upon which repayment of money into the Exchequer now rested.

MR. DISRAELI

said, the right hon. Gentleman never gave hint credit either for drawing clauses or anything else; but he gave the right hon. Gentleman credit for being too clever by half. The clause of the 4& 5 Will. IV. had been submitted to men of good reputation as lawyers, who had very grave doubts whether its, provisions would apply to the 4,000,000l. which had been referred to. He had, therefore, proposed a new clause, in order to bring this 4,000,000l. under the same restrictions as the rest of the revenue. He granted that it might not be necessary, but every one would agree that it was a surplusage in the right direction. In his opinion, in order to have the same restrictions upon the appropriation of the 4,000,000l. which were placed upon the rest of the revenue, it was necessary that they should have the clause he proposed.

MR. HUME

opposed the Amendment, and thought the regulations ought to remain as they were at present until the whole subject could be considered and decided upon. He thought the time had arrived for dealing with the question of bringing the whole gross revenue under the eye of Parliament.

MR. DISRAELI

saw no reason why, because it was desirable to have a full and ample inquiry, that he should be supposed to agree in crude measures. It was for the Committee to decide whether this sum of 4,000,000l. of new Estimates, now brought for the first time under the control of Parliament, should be subjected to the same restrictions as the rest of the revenue with regard to its issue and appropriation. If the financial reformers were not disposed to support him in this he should not press his proposal to a division.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

reminded the House that the exist- ing law contained words to the effect that any new sums of money granted hereafter should pass through the same channel as the rest of the revenue.

MR. BOWYER

thought it satisfactory that the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire had called the attention of the House to the importance, of the gross revenue of the country passing through the Exchequer. It was said that there was 5,000,000l. or 6,000,000l. of money which never found its way into the Exchequer at all, but which was disposed of by different departments without being ever voted by Parliament. He thought the system of auditing the public accounts required reconsideration, with a view to the reconstruction of that branch of the public service.

Clause negatived.

MR. VINCENT SCULLY

proposed the addition of a clause, to the effect that nothing in the Act contained should have the effect of facilitating any changes in the existing establishments of any of the superior courts of law in Ireland, without a certificate from the Judges to the Treasury having first set forth the circumstances rendering such changes necessary. If the clause was not carried, he should give notice of Amendments to place the English courts on the same footing as the Irish courts. He should also move to put in the English Court of Chancery, which was entirely omitted in the Act, but he trusted his clause would be so received as to render his Amendments unnecessary.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

would not complain that the hon. Gentleman had brought forward this clause without notice, because he felt it was desirable that all Amendments should be brought forward now rather than on the third reading. It was, however, impossible for him to agree with this clause. The purpose of the clause referred to by the hon. Gentleman was to impose restrictions upon an increase of salaries. The purpose of the clause, as proposed by the hon. Gentleman, was to fetter the discretion of Parliament, whether in the increase or in the diminution of salaries. The only argument used by the hon. Gentleman which was of any weight was, that the Bill, as it at present stood, dealt unequally with the English and the Irish courts. The fact, however, was, that owing to the difference of circumstances, it was necessary to create a nominal inequality in order to do substantial justice. In Ireland they had proceeded further in the abolition of fees than they had done in England; and, therefore, the clause was accommodated to that altered state of things. When the fees in the English courts were dealt with in the same manner as the fees in the Irish courts, they would be put upon the same footing also with regard to this Bill.

MR. VINCENT SCULLY

said, that he did not mean to increase, but to diminish, the charges, and his clause would have no other effect.

Clause negatived.

MR. DISRAELI

proposed the clause of which he had given notice— Copies of each of the Quarterly Warrants of the Treasury, issued under the Act 57 Geo. III. c. 84, and the 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 15, to the Controller General of the Receipt and Issue of Her Majesty's Exchequer, shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within ten days after such Warrants shall be issued, if Parliament shall then be sitting, otherwise within ten days after the commencement of the next Session, together with a Copy or statement of the disbursements actually made in virtue of the Treasury Warrant during the antecedent quarter. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced this measure he impressed the importance of a periodical inspection or supervision, on the part of the House of Commons, with regard to the charges on the Consolidated Fund. That was a feature of this measure of financial reform. Now, the Committee would observe that in the Bill before them there was no provision at all to effect this object. The object of the clause he proposed was, that quarterly warrants of the Treasury should be laid upon the table of the House, so that they might know every three months what were the charges on the Consolidated Fund. This was the only mode he could see by which they could attain the object in view, and he was sure the House of Commons must wish to exercise the power and the supervision to which he had alluded.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, it was a very invidious task to oppose proposals of this kind, but he must say he entirely objected to this proposal. Before he proceeded further, however, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman under what section or sections of the Acts of the 57 Geo. III. and the 4 & 5 Will. IV. he referred when he spoke of these quarterly warrants as being, issued under these Acts?

MR. DISRAELI

said, he had not those Acts then by him.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Here they are, at the service of the right hon. Gentleman. I took care to have them at hand for him; for I am rather curious to learn under what sections the right hon. Gentleman finds the authority for the issue of those warrants.

MR. G. A. HAMILTON

asked, whether it was not the fact that these warrants were issued under the authority of those Acts of Parliament?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

declined to be the interpreter of the law as stated by others, but wished to know the authority for the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that these quarterly warrants were issued under the Acts in question?

MR. DISRAELI

referred to the 12th section of the 4 & 5 Will. IV.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

would assure the right hon. Gentleman that he was entirely misinformed as to the application of the Act. The section quoted by the right hon. Gentleman referred to ordinary Treasury warrants, which in every case were required before an issue of money could take place. But these quarterly Treasury warrants which the right hon. Gentleman said were issued under the Act 4 & 5 Will. IV. were warrants of an entirely different description, and did not, in point of fact, cause the issue of any money whatever. He therefore again asked the right hon. Gentleman under what portion of the Act referred to so authoritatively by him it was that he considered these quarterly warrants of the Treasury were either authorised or required? As at present informed, he demurred altogether to the recital of the right hon. Gentleman that these quarterly Treasury warrants were issued under the authority of these Acts. His opinion was, that these warrants were not required by the law. They were certainly issued in principle; and he would go further, and admit that the form of the warrants and the words of the warrants might certainly be construed in favour of the position that they were issued under the authority of the law; but he knew of no ground for stating that they were either required or authorised by the law. What he said was this—that these were documents of a description the most complex, the most antiquated, the most absurd, the most calculated to maintain deception and mystification in matters of public accounts that this House could possibly conceive; and he did not hesitate to state—whether it were the object of this clause or not to do so he did not know, but its effect would be to give a legal sanction and authority to these Treasury warrants, which, in his judgment, at the present moment, they did not possess.

MR. DISRAELI

would withdraw his clause, as it was wrong in point of form; but this he clearly saw, from every observation which fell from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the right hon. Gentleman was determined to put an end to the restriction which at present existed as to the issue of public money from the Exchequer, which restriction he believed to be of the greatest importance, and which he applied to these 4,000,000l. of new revenue which was to be brought under the control of the Exchequer. Of course, it was useless to attempt to come to any decision now upon any particular point, but he begged the Committee to bear this in mind—that the principles of the right hon. Gentleman would render it impossible for him to go on for another year without bringing forward some Bill, the object of which would be to diminish the restriction upon the issue of public money which at present existed.

Clause negatived.

MR. DISRAELI

had now to allude to another point of great importance. They were all agreed that the object of the great change which, he might observe, he had had the honour of first bringing forward, was, that the gross revenue of the country should be brought into the Exchequer. The fault he found with this Bill was, that it evaded this great object. It certainly brought into the annual statement of public accounts a large amount which hitherto had not found its way there, but it still left a great portion of the public revenue under the name of charges, pensions, and superannuations, at the disposition of the Treasury, free from the control and cognisance of Parliament, and which amount of public money was still under the immediate control of the Treasury alone. Now, he proposed that the preamble of this Bill should express the meaning of Parliament upon this subject, and therefore he had placed upon the paper a preamble which should state that— It is expedient that the gross revenue of the Departments of Customs, Inland Revenue, and Post Office should be paid into the Exchequer, with the exception of such sums as may be necessary to be retained in order to defray the charges of drawbacks, repayments, pensions, and superannuations heretofore charged upon and paid out of the said branches of the public revenue. Now, this was a simple and clear declaration. He proposed to have a public expression of the opinion of Parliament on the subject. He wanted, and he understood the House of Commons wanted, that the gross revenue of the Departments of Customs, Inland Revenue, and Post-office should be paid into the Exchequer. He had been informed since he entered the House that the preamble of the Bill was couched, if not in identical, in similar language to his own. He begged the Committee would observe the remarkable difference between the language in the preamble of the Bill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and that he had proposed. The preamble of the Bill said— And whereas it is expedient, in order to bring the gross income and expenditure of the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man under the more immediate view and control of Parliament. Now, he said, that the object of the House of Commons was not that the gross income and expenditure of the United Kingdom should be brought" under the more immediate view and control of Parliament;" their object was that the gross national income should be brought into the Exchequer. Such words as "the more immediate view and control of Parliament," might bring a large amount of that revenue under their control, but it would leave a very large portion beyond their control. The words which the Committee ought to adopt were the simple and plain words, that they would bring the gross income of the country into Her Majesty's Exchequer. The words in the preamble of the Bill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer were so essentially evasive and equivocal that you might really draw almost any meaning you pleased from them, and he thought it would be much better to adopt the plain, straightforward language he had placed on the paper. He, therefore, begged to propose the alteration in the preamble of which he had given notice.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, he felt bound to take the same course with this as with the right hon. Gentleman's previous Amendment. There were two important points, which, so far as a declaration of law was concerned, were raised by this Amendment. The preamble which the right hon. Gentleman proposed enunciated the principle that pensions and superannuations upon the reve- nue departments—that was to say, the great bulk of all the pensions and superannuations paid throughout the kingdom—something like five-sixths of the whole amount—should not be brought under the control of Parliament. Now, he demurred altogether to that object of the right hon. Gentleman, and he thought the right hon. Gentleman ought to have stated it, and to have made the House acquainted with the omissions which were included in his Amendment. In stating what he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not before aware of, that the right hon. Gentleman was the first to bring forward a change like that now proposed, the right hon. Gentleman should have declared that his object was to remove from the control of Parliament pensions and superannuations chargeable upon the revenue departments, and which amounted, he believed, to something like 500,000l. or 700,000l. a year. On this ground he objected to the preamble of the right hon. Gentleman. The Committee of the House of Lords had made in this Bill a most injudicious change, founded upon most insufficient grounds, for they reported that they had not sufficient information before them in order to enable them to determine whether it was proper that these pensions and superannuations should remain upon the gross revenue, or whether they should be voted in the Estimates; and, instead of sending to the Treasury for the information they required, they struck out of the Bill these clauses altogether. Now, he must say, that unless his anxiety had been so great to carry out what remained of this Bill, nothing would have induced him to acquiesce in such a change introduced into a money Bill, not by the House of Lords, but by a Committee of the House of Lords. This change certainly left the Bill incomplete. These pensions and superannuations would be left chargeable on the gross revenue. On another occasion it would be necessary to attempt to make clearer work upon this point, but the preamble of the right hon. Gentleman would tie the House, as a matter of principle, to that which the House of Lords had forced upon them as a matter of fact. But another point was involved in the preamble of the right hon. Gentleman. When this Act was introduced it was met by this objection on the part of those who wished to adhere to the present system. Those persons always said it would be most inconvenient to have all the money received at the various outports sent up to London, and then to send back again that part of it which was necessary for the maintenance of the establishments at those outports. Thus, at Liverpool, something like 70,000l. was required to pay the charges of the establishments there, and this amount, it was said, would be most irrational to send up to London from Liverpool and then back again. Now, nobody had ever said it was rational to do so. All they wanted was the control of Parliament over this money. That being settled, they left the money received at the outports to be dealt with in the most economical manner in which it could be dealt with. It might be paid where it was received, but it would have to be accounted for, and a balance struck between the local and the central fund. That was the principle on which his Bill was framed. Lord Monteagle, who had always been a steady opponent of this change, had stated before a Commission, which was appointed to investigate the subject, this very objection, and urged the absurdity and expense of sending more work forward in this way. It was to avoid this absurdity and expense that he had framed the Bill in the way he had done. The inconvenience of the plan objected to by the noble Lord would be very great, and nobody—he was going to say—was foolish enough to propose it; but as the right hon. Gentleman had now proposed that very plan, he must withdraw the word "foolish," though he hoped the House would not adopt the Amendment.

Motion negatived.

MR. BOWYER

said, he had seen a report published by some persons who were anxious for a reform in the Customs in which credit was given to the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposing to transfer the whole gross revenue of the country to the Exchequer which formerly has not been so paid into the public Treasury. The Commissioners of Public Accounts, in 1831, laid it down as a principle that the whole of the public revenue ought to be paid into the Exchequer, and then paid out of the Exchequer for the public service. No doubt there might be particular instances where it might be convenient that small local payments should be made on the spot; but the general principle ought to be that the whole of the receipts should be paid into the Exchequer. It would be satisfactory to know whether it was intended that this should be the case.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

thought he had already explained in distinct terms that the expense of collection was to be defrayed at the ports, leaving the balance to be settled as a matter of account, while the authority of Parliament was applied to the expenditure through the machinery of the Votes.

MR. HUME

suggested that every accountant, and every other person who had any public money in his possession, should render his accounts regularly, in order that they might be settled. If this had been done, the country would not have lost so much by Mr. Swaby. He ought also to be called upon to give security, and that the securities ought to be revised from time to time. He submitted that it was the duty of the Government to have all public charges, whether fees, prize-money, or other payments, brought into the Exchequer.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, he was not surprised to hear his hon. Friend advert to this subject, and in reference to which he hoped the Committee would bear in mind that that case was one of the consequences of the mode of dealing with public money which had been fashionable in past years—that of disposing of it either by placing the charge upon the Consolidated Fund, or by some permanent Act of Parliament which effectually removed it from the control of the House of Commons. That was a lesson which he hoped would not be forgotten. It also illustrated another dangerous practice which the House ought to correct—that of entrusting the management of public money to persons who were appointed for other purposes. It was not fair to cause large sums of money to be held under the responsibility of the Judges of courts of law. Their duty was to administer the law—a duty difficult enough for any man; and they ought not in any way to be responsible for the control and management of public money. With regard to the immediate question, the case did not admit of being dealt with upon a general rule. In some instances the amounts were too large to be dealt with by way of security, and other modes must be adopted; but certainly he thought there ought to be some review of the securities under which public money was held.

House resumed.

Bill reported without Amendment.