THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN.

HC Deb 01 August 1854 vol 135 cc1096-135

LORD DUDLEY STUART

rose to call the attention of the House to the termination of all obligation on the part of this country, in consequence of the conduct of Russia, to continue the payments on account of the Russo-Dutch Loan; and to move the following Resolutions— That the Treaty of Vienna stipulates that the navigation of rivers which separate or cross the States of Powers parties to the treaty, shall be entirely free along their whole course, from the point where each of them becomes navigable to its mouth, and that each State bordering on the rivers is to be at the expense of maintaining, through the extent of its territory, the necessary works in the channel of the river, in order that no obstacle may be experienced to the navigation. That it appears from official documents laid before this House that Russia has, notwithstanding the reiterated remonstrances of this country, wilfully neglected, for a series of years, the duty thus imposed upon her of maintaining the necessary works in the channel of the Danube, at the mouth of the Sulina branch, thereby violating the Treaty of Vienna, and seriously injuring the commerce of this country. That it appears by returns laid before Parliament, that there has already been paid from the British Treasury, towards the principal and for the interest of the debt called Russo-Dutch Loan, between the years 1810 and 1853, both inclusive, the sum of 47,975,000 florins, equal to 4,110,908l. 5s. 10d. sterling money, and that the liquidation of the remaining part of the Loan, as stipulated by the Act 2 and 3 Will. IV. c. 81, will require further annual payments from the British Treasury until the year 1915, amounting to 39,525,000 florins, equal to 3,386,889l. 9s. 2d. sterling money, making then the aggregate payment 7,291,6566. and the average for each of the 100 years 74,978l. 11s. 6d. That the Convention of the 16th day of November, 1831, between His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and the Emperor of All the Russia, was made to explain the stipulations of the treaty between Great Britain, Russia, and the Netherlands, signed at London on the 19th day of May, 1815; and by that Convention it was agreed by Great Britain to secure to Russia the payment of a portion of her old Dutch debt, in 'consideration of the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, to which she had given her adhesion; arrangements which remain in full force.' That this House is therefore of opinion that Russia having withdrawn that adhesion, and those arrangements being through her act no longer in force, the payments from this country on account of that debt should be henceforth suspended. The noble Lord proceeded to say that, in rising to move these Resolutions, he did not feel that he owed any apology to the House, except en the score of his own want of ability to do justice to the subject. He should have been well pleased had the subject fallen into the hands of some hon. Member of greater weight than himself. Be had given every possible opportunity to other Members to take up the subject, for the Session was considerably advanced before he put any question to Her Majesty's Government relating to it; indeed, it was not until the 6th of May, five or six weeks after the declaration of war, that he ventured to do so; and it was not until a month after he had put the question, that, finding it was the wish of many hon. Members on both sides that the subject should be discussed, he had given notice of a Motion. He had been throughout, not only willing, but exceedingly anxious, to avoid obstructing the course of public business. The Motion was originally fixed for the 27th of June. and at the earnest request of the Government he had consented to take it off Supply, and had postponed it from time to time. The question was one which was deserving of the fullest discussion, inasmuch as it was one which affected both the pockets of the people and the character of the country. Upwards of 4,000,000l. sterling had been already paid on account of the Russo-Dutch Loan, and considerably more than 3,000,000l. remained to be paid; so that when the whole sum should have been paid, this country would have paid over to Russia little less than 7,600;000l. Those payments would not be completed till the year 1915, when their descendants indeed might be affected, but they themselves should all be in their graves. He knew not whether good reasons might be given for continuing those payments; he knew of none; but they owed it to the people of England to discuss the question. At a time when the people of this country were called on to make large sacrifices and submit to heavy burdens for the prosecution of the war, which they had come forward in the most spirited, creditable, and noble manner to sustain, they had a right to expect of; the Government and of the House of Commons, as the guardians of the public purse, that they should inquire whether there was any real necessity for continuing to pay over large sums of money to the Power which was at war with us, and to call on them to state fairly, explicitly, and carefully what was the torture of those reasons. A further reason for bringing forward the Motion was the conduct of the noble Lord the President of the Council, who, in reply to a question he (Lord Dudley Stuart) had put to him on a previous occasion, gave one of those answers which Ministers were too apt to give when disagreeable or inconvenient questions were put to them, and the noble Lord not less than any of his colleagues. The answer, while appearing to reflect upon the person putting the question, in reality supplied no information whatever. He (Lord D. Stuart) asked the noble Lord whether, while we were at war with Russia, it was the intention of the Government to continue these payments, which would in point of fact supply to Russia the means of carrying on the war against us; and the noble Lord replied that it was the intention of the Government to adhere to the faith of treaties. He (Lord D. Stuart) thought that any other answer would have been more becoming and satisfactory. Had he said that he had given his serious attention to the subject since the breaking out of the war, and since the occurrence of the circumstances upon which the opinion that the payments ought not to be continued was grounded—or had he said that he would do so, and bad afterwards given a deliberate, explicit, and intelligent answer—there might have been no occasion for the present Motion. But Ministers would never give their attention to these subjects unless they were forced upon them by the House of Commons; and hence the necessity of Motions like this, The noble Lord's answer certainly enunciated a very honourable and a very creditable sentiment—the determination to adhere to good faith; but he must beg to remind the noble Lord that he bad no monopoly of that sentiment. He (Lord D. Stuart) was quite as anxious as the noble Lord could possibly be to keep faith with all. The perfidy of others could be no reason for our own dishonesty. But the question was, were we really bound in good faith to make those payments? By all means let us keep good faith with our enemies: even with a Power so hateful as Russia; but he believed that we were not bound to make these payments; and f not bound to make them, then the Government was bound not to make them. A proclamation had lately been published, n the Manse Towns and other ports of the Baltic, warning all English subjects that if they advanced any money to the Emperor of Russia during the war they would be guilty of high treason; and in his (Lord D. Stuart's) opinion, if Ministers paid money to the Russian Government without being obliged to do so—without the faith of treaties requiring it—they would be in the same position, and would be guilty of high treason. He hoped to convince the House that we were not bound by good faith to make these payments; he did not wish for any one's vote who was not convinced that there was no obligation of good faith or honour in the matter; and if it could be proved that such an obligation existed, he would at once abandon the Motion. He wished to disabuse their minds of the notion that by withholding these payments we could be violating good faith towards individuals. The fact was that the public faith was in no degree engaged to the creditors—to those who held this stock. This loan was not contracted by England, nor guaranteed by England. It was contracted during the last century, about 1798 or 1799, by Russia, upon her own credit. It was called in the treaty of 1815, "her old Dutch debt," and England had never had anything to do with guaranteeing it. All England had done bad been to agree to pay to Russia some equivalent for the interest of a portion of it, upon certain conditions. The 4th Article of the treaty under which these payments were made was to this effect: "The Russian Government shall continue, as heretofore, to be security to the creditors for the whole of the said loan, and shall he charged with the administration of the same, the Governments of the King of the Netherlands and of His Britannic Majesty remaining liable and bound to the Government of His Imperial Majesty each for the punctual discharge as above of the respective proportions of the said charge." This Article of the treaty proved that the British Government was not liable to the creditors, the holders of stock. That the creditors themselves did not consider the loan guaranteed by this country, was evident from the fact that though this was a five per cent stock, the price at Amsterdam was 98 or 99; while if it were guaranteed by this country there was no reason why it should not ire considerably more than 100. And, no doubt, if these payments were withdrawn, the creditors would not suffer in the smallest degree. There were no such creditors in England; the stock was entirely unknown here. He had sent to the Stock Exchange to inquire about it; they knew nothing of it; its existence was almost denied; and he was obliged to write over to Amsterdam to obtain any information on the subject. But if any was held here, there was no apprehension that, if we discontinued these payments, Russia would refuse the dividend to the creditors. She could no more allege cur refusal as a reason for doing so than she could rely on the general expenses of the war, or the blockade we carried on upon her coast. He should have no difficulty in believing that Russia might be capable of any enormity or any dishonesty; but lie did not believe she would do a thing which would be inimical and ruinous to her own interests; for she was a country constantly requiring loans, and if she withheld the payment of dividends on any such ground as this, she would strike a deadly blow at her own credit, and would never be able to obtain another loan. If there were any breach of faith—which he utterly denied—in withdrawing these payments, it would not be a breach of faith as regarded individuals, but, if at all, as regarded the Russian Government.

Now, to ascertain whether we were bound in good faith to continue these payments, we must go back to the treaties made at the conclusion of the great war in 1814. By the Treaty of Chaumont, between the four Allied Powers, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, signed on the 1st of March, 1814, those Powers bound themselves to maintain an army of 600,000 men to carry on the war. That treaty led to the abdication of Fontainbleau, also to the withdrawal of the French troops front Holland, and ultimately to the union of Belgium with Holland; which was finally settled by the Treaty of Paris, signed on the 30th of May, 1814. Then came the question how the expenses of the war were to be defrayed; and it was arranged that all the States which had benefited by the war should contribute to those expenses. Holland was one of these countries, she not only having regained the territories taken from her, but having acquired a very considerable accession of territory, the whole of Belgium. Subsequent treaties showed that the quota which Holland was to contribute was fixed at 50,000,000 of florins, or, as I will call it for convenience, 5,000;000l. sterling. Then a Convention was signed between England and Holland on the 13th August, 1814, by which it was arranged that, in consideration of Holland ceding to England certain colonies which had been taken by France, and retaken by the arms of England, England should make certain payments to Holland. If England had acted after the fashion of Russia at the Congress of Vienna, she would have insisted upon the uti possi- detis, and have kept all the possessions she had seized without making any compensation whatever. Instead of that she took quite another course; she entered into one of the most improvident, extravagant, and profligate bargains that was ever made by any State, and agreed to pay for those colonies—the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice—so many millions of money, whereas they were not worth so many hundreds of thousands, perhaps not so many shillings. Those colonies produced us nothing except the Cape, which certainly had produced something—a long, dangerous, difficult, and bloody war, that cost this country 2,000.000l. There were great debates in both Houses when these payments were settled; Lord Grey declared that he considered these colonies utterly worthless, and that, had he been a Minister, he would not have accepted them at a gift. Nevertheless, we had entered into the bargain, made the agreement, and as honest men must stand to it. That Convention settled that 1,000,000l. sterling was to be paid to Holland, and should be paid over under the authority of the treaty of the 30th of May, 1814, to Sweden; that 2,000,000l. more were to be paid by this country to Holland, to be employed, in conjunction with an equal sum, in improving the defences of the Low Countries; and that a further sum, not then defined, should be paid, but which was not to exceed 3.000,000l. on the part of England, and which was to be laid out in such a manner as might be agreed upon between England and Holland, and their allies, and this also for the benefit of Holland. Then came a new transaction. Russia was unwilling to accede to the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna. Probably the difficulty arose with regard to provisions for maintaining the nationality of Poland, the object of such sincere regard to Lord Castlereagh, and which had been observed with such scrupulous good faith by the Emperor of Russia. However that might be, the Allied Powers agreed to purchase the consent of Russia by waiving in her favour their claims upon Holland. Russia thereupon withdrew her objections, agreed to the Treaty of Vienna, and she got the Dutch contribution to the expenses of the war, or rather got the sanction of the four Powers to her claim. In plain words she got 5,000,000l. sterling for agreeing to adhere to the Treaty of Vienna. To carry this plan into effect, England, Holland, and Russia, entered into a joint Convention on the 19th of May, 1815, by which Holland agreed to pay to Russia 2.500,000l., the half of her quota towards the expenses of the war; the other half she agreed to pay in another manner. Under the treaty of 1814 she had a claim upon England to an amount not to exceed 3,000,000l. Holland agreed, instead of paying the remaining half of her quota to the Allied Powers, to place this sum at their disposal; and, pursuant to an arrangement with them, England bound herself to pay this sum to Russia, instead of to Holland. Thus Holland was completely paid for her colonies; 3,000,000l. she received down, and the quota actually payable by her to Russia was reduced from 5,000,000l. to 2,500,000l.; thus benefiting her in the whole by 5,500,000l. Therefore, no question could arise as to England keeping good faith with regard to Holland. Then, in what situation were we with regard to Russia? She was to receive the whole of the quota to be paid by Holland for the war; this was by agreement with the four Powers. Without this agreement she would not have had a right to the whole, only to a proportion of it; but it was arranged that she should receive the whole—half from Holland and half from England—on condition of her agreeing to the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna. The particular mode of payment was this: Russia had fifteen years previously contracted a loan in Holland in the usual way, through the house of Hope and Co., of Amsterdam. Holland and England each undertook to pay to the agent of the Russian Government in Holland a sum equal to the interest of a portion of the loan—about 5,000,000l. sterling. England and Holland were each to pay one-half of the interest on this amount, together with certain annual instalments, in liquidation of the principal. Russia was thus to be benefited to the extent of 5,000,000l. sterling. Those payments were to extend over a period of 100 years. Why was this? Was it not clear from this circumstance that they had reference to something that was to be done by Russia, not only at that time, but something that Russia was to continue to do for the next century? That was. Russia was to continue, for at least 100 years, to adhere to the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna. Another condition, and a very important one, was attached to these payments—the continuance of the union of Belgium and Holland. The 5th Article provided as follows— It is hereby understood and agreed between the high contracting Parties that the said payments on the part of their Majesties the King of the Netherlands and the King of Great Britain, as aforesaid, shall cease and determine, should the possession and sovereignty (which God forbid) of the Belgick Provinces at any time pass or be severed from the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands previous to the complete liquidation of the same. In 1830, events arose which occasioned the separation of Belgium from Holland; and when that took place the payments could no longer be made conformably to the letter of the Convention. But as it was felt that Russia had in no degree been instrumental in producing this change of circumstances, but on the contrary, as it was notorious that the separation was extremely disagreeable to Russia, and that Russia had even gone the length of offering to employ an army of 60,000 men to prevent Belgium being separated from Holland, it was thought that it would be extremely unfair and unjust to take advantage of those circumstances in order to withhold the payment from Russia—though certainly, according to the letter of the treaty, that payment might have been withheld, and, in point of fact, could not be continued. A new Convention was accordingly entered into between Russia and England, which stipulated that the payments, notwithstanding the new circumstances of Belgium and Holland, should be continued. Great debates arose on the subject in both Houses of Parliament, and all the most distinguished men of that day took part in them. It was objected by some that the Government was not justified in making these payments under the new Convention until it had received the sanction of Parliament; and Lord Grenville, then the Auditor of the Exchequer, felt this so strongly that he refused to issue the money until he received a sufficient authority. The Government thought they had a right to continue the payments without any Act of Parliament; but at length, after very long, stormy, and acrimonious debates, Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day, acknowledged that he was wrong; the payments were suspended, and a Bill was brought into Parliament and received the Royal Assent sanctioning their renewal. The Convention then entered into was signed on the 16th November, 1831; it was made to explain the original treaties, and a correspondence was also laid upon the table of the House which was intended to explain the explanation. The Convention was as follows— Their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of All the Russias, considering that the events which have occurred in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, since the year 1830, have rendered it necessary that the Courts of Great Britain and Russia should examine the stipulations of their Convention of the 19th May, 1815, as well as of the additional Article annexed thereto; considering that such examination has led the two high contracting Parties to the conclusion that complete agreement does not exist between the letter and the spirit of that Convention, when regarded in connection with the circumstances which have attended the separation that has taken place between the two principal divisions of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands; but that, on referring to the object of the abovementioned Convention of the 19th of May, 1815, it appears that that object was to afford to Great Britain a guarantee that Russia would, on all questions concerning Belgium, identify her policy with that which the Court of London had deemed the best adapted for the maintenance of a just balance of power in Europe; and, on the other hand, to secure to Russia the payment of a portion of her old Dutch debt, in consideration of the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, to which, she had given her adhesion, arrangements which remain in fall force: their said Majesties being desirous at the present moment, that the same principles should continue to govern their relations with each other, and that the special tie which the Convention of the 19th of May, 1815, had formed between the two Courts, should be maintained, have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries—and so on. Article 1. In virtue of the considerations above specified, His Britannic Majesty engages to recommend to his Parliament to enable him to undertake to continue, on his part, the payments stipulated in the Convention of the 19th of May, 1815, according to the mode, and until the completion of the sum fixed for Great Britain in the said Convention. Some very remarkable documents had also been laid on the table of the House, the chief of which was the statement of the agents of Russia herself on this subject—her own explanation of the treaty. The Russian Plenipotentiary, in 1831, addressed the following statement to Viscount Palmerston— The actual separation of Belgium from Holland has not changed the position in which Russia and Great Britain stood towards each other, at the time of the signature of the Convention of the 19th of May, 1815. Of this, the preamble of that Act affords the best proof. It is therein stated, that 'His Majesty the King of the Netherlands being desirous, upon the final union of the Belgic Provinces with Holland, to render to the Allied Powers who were parties to the treaty concluded at Chaumont on the 1st March, 1814, a suitable return for the heavy expenses incurred by them in delivering the said territories from the power of the enemy; and the said Powers having, in consideration of arrangements made with each other, mutually agreed to waive their several pretensions under this head in favour of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, His said Majesty the King of the Netherlands has thereupon resolved to proceed immediately to execute with His Imperial Majesty a Convention to the following effect, to which His Britannic Majesty agrees to be a party, in pursuance of engagements taken by His said Majesty with the King of the Netherlands, in a Convention signed at London on the 13th August, 1814.' It was impossible to define more clearly the position of the three contracting Courts. The King of the Netherlands charged himself with the payment of the expenses incurred in the deliverance of the Provinces, the possession of which had devolved upon him. Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, the Allied Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Chaumont, in consideration, therefore, not of the union of the Belgian Provinces to Holland,^* but of arrangements concluded amongst themselves, renounced all claims to the repayment of the expenses incurred in the deliverance of the said Provinces in favour of one of these Powers exclusively—namely, of Russia. Finally, Great Britain consented to become one of the contracting parties, in consequence of previous engagements made by her towards his Majesty the King of the Netherlands, on the 13th of August, 1814. Now, what were the arrangements between the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Chaumont at the period at which the Convention of 19th of May, 1815, was concluded at London? They were the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, which had just then terminated. In consideration of the facilities which Russia afforded to these arrangements, her allies ceded to her all the pecuniary pretensions to which the deliverance of the Belgian Provinces had given rise. It necessarily follows that these facilities were real and important, as they were made the ground of her liberation from a considerable debt. And what were the prior engagements of the 13th August, 1814, which caused Great Britain to become a contracting Party to the Convention of 19th May, 1815? They were the engagements which we find in the first of the Additional Articles of the Convention signed the 13th August, 1814, between Great Britain and the Netherlands. This article provides, amongst other engagements of Great Britain, 'to bear equally with Holland such further charges as may be agreed upon between the said high contracting Parties and their allies, towards the final and satisfactory settlement of the Low Countries in union with Holland, and under the dominion of the House of Orange, not exceeding in the whole the sum of 3,000,000l. to be defrayed by Great Britain.' In consideration of the above engagements, the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, were ceded to Great Britain. Great Britain had then, on the 13th of August, 1814, contracted an unconditional obliga- ^* "The treaties prove the correctness of this assertion. It was by the Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, that the union of Belgium to Holland was irrevocably decided upon. It did not, and could not, therefore, give rise to any discussion at the Congress of Vienna. Difficulties arose at this Congress on other points. Russia abandoned its demands on those points, and to compensate her for her sacrifices, the Allies resolved to facilitate to her the payment of her ancient Dutch debt." tion of sharing with Holland, to the extent of 3,000,000l. sterling, the charges which burdened the future kingdom of the Netherlands; and this obligation was not gratuitous, for, in exchange, Great Britain obtained the cession of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, and Essequibo, and the Island of Berbice. The Convention of the 19th May, 1815, was, as its preamble proves, as cited above, the effect of this transaction. From whence it results, that Russia obtained the cession of the pretensions which the signing Powers of the Treaty of Chaumont had to put forward at the expense of the prince who should possess Belgium, in consideration of the divers arrangements that it had made with those Powers at the Congress of Vienna, and that England contracted the obligation of satisfying these pretensions to the extent of 25,000,000 of Dutch florins (about 2,000,000l.), in consideration of the cession that had been made of the four colonies. The divers arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, by which Russia acquired the pretensions above mentioned, remain in all their force, notwithstanding the present position of Belgium. Upon what ground, then, could Russia be deprived of the compensation at which those arrangements have been valued to her? The Russian Plenipotentiary thus sums up this most remarkable and very able memoir:— After having proved, first, that the case in which the effect of that Convention would cease has not occurred; secondly, that the arrangements by which Russia rendered facilities which had given her the benefit of the said Convention still exist; thirdly, that Great Britain is in possession of the colonies which she acquired in taking upon herself the obligations which the Convention of 19th May, 1815, impose upon her—the Russian Plenipotentiaries would think that they did not form a just idea of the principles and of the fidelity which always preside over the acts of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, if they were not firmly convinced that the payments established by the Convention, of which they invoke the spirit and the letter, will be made in future as they have been hitherto made. After this it was impossible for Russia to deny that the condition of these payments was her continued adherence to the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna. She might, indeed, and probably—with that regard to truth so aptly pourtrayed by the noble Lord the Home Secretary in reference to recent transactions—would, in the face of facts, deny any violation on her part of the Treaty of Vienna; but she could not possibly deny that the consideration for which this money was paid to her was a continued adherence to the Treaty of Vienna, that being admitted in documents signed by her own Plenipotentiaries. He did not think this had ever been denied in the British Parliament, indeed it had been admitted in a long and interesting debate which took place some time ago on the subject. In 1847 his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) moved a Resolution identical with that which he now proposed to lay before the House—with this difference only, that on that occasion his hon. Friend based his Motion on the annexation of Cracow, which was a gross violation of the Treaty of Vienna, while, in this instance, the violation of the treaty consisted in the obstruction of the navigation of the Danube. In that debate, which lasted three days, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire and the late Lord George Bentinck endeavoured to maintain by very ingenious, but in his (Lord D. Stuart's) opinion very fallacious arguments, that the annexation of Cracow formed no violation of the Treaty of Vienna; but here there could be no doubt that a violation of the treaty had been committed, and therefore if he did not obtain the right hon. Gentleman's vote, at all events he hoped he should not meet with his opposition. The Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose was also resisted by the noble Lord the Leader of the House, and he gave a great many reasons against it—reasons founded upon policy—reasons founded upon expediency—reasons founded upon the want of dignity in England resisting the annexation of Cracow, by discontinuing these payments, unless she were prepared to go further and actually to declare war against Russia—but the noble Lord had only one reason to give against the argument that these payments depended upon the adherence of Russia to the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna. The noble Lord said that Russia had not violated the arrangement contained in the Treaty of Vienna as regarded the union of Holland and Belgium—a reason that, in fact, amounted to this: that the noble Lord considered the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna should be held to mean not a general arrangement, but a particular arrangement, having reference only to Holland and Belgium. But that could not be, because the Convention of 1831 particularly stated "the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, which remain in full force." Now, the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna with regard to Holland and Belgium assuredly did not then remain in full force, because they had been entirely abrogated and swept away; and the very thing which made it necessary to enter into a new Convention on the subject was that all those arrangements had absolutely terminated. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who was then Foreign Secretary, had also a great many reasons to give against the Motion; but, like his noble colleague, he had only one reason to state against the position that these payments depended upon the adherence of Russia to the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna. His reason was not the same as that of his noble colleague. He said that he could not conceive that the violation of a single article of the treaty would be sufficient to justify us in withholding payment of the money. Now, he must say that the noble Lord, with all his great ability and his perfect familiarity with treaties and international law, was certainly very hard pressed when he had no other reason to give than that, because he believed the opinion which the noble Lord expressed—that the violation of one article of a treaty was not sufficient to vitiate the whole arrangement, was entirely at variance with that of all the great authorities upon international law, and of all jurists who had touched upon the subject. For instance, in Vattel's "Law of Nations," book ii. chap. xiii, sec. 202, he found this passage, bearing upon this very point, namely:— We cannot consider the several articles of the same treaty as so many distinct and independent treaties; for though we do not see any immediate connection between some of those articles, they are all connected by this common relation, namely, that the contracting Powers have agreed to some of them in consideration of the others, and by way of compensation. I would, perhaps, never have consented to this article, if my ally had not granted me another, which, in its own nature, has no relation to it. Everything, therefore, which is comprehended in the same treaty is of the same force and nature as a reciprocal promise, unless where a formal exception is made to the contrary. Grotius very properly observes, that 'Every article of a treaty carries with it a condition, by the non-performance of which the treaty is wholly cancelled.' Again, in "Wildman's International Law," vol. i. page 174, he found this passage:— A treaty is an entire contract. All its articles are dependent, and have the force of conditions, so that the violation of any one of them. is a violation of the whole treaty, and renders it voidable at the option of the party injured. It was natural, however, that Ministers of State and diplomatists should allow their opinions, to a certain degree, to be biassed by political considerations. We must always expect that; but he would quote an opinion on this subject of a learned gentleman, who was considered to be a great authority in these matters. It was a professional opinion, given professionally upon this very subject. He referred to Dr. Addams, who had given this opinion upon this very treaty:— It is obvious that upon the separation of Holland and the Netherlands, consequent upon the revolution of September, 1830, it ceased to be obligatory on Great Britain to make any further payments on account of the Russian-Dutch loan, in virtue of the Convention of May, 1815—according to the letter of that Convention—though it was said or intimated that obligation still subsisted, according to the spirit of the Convention. But whether Russia could or could not, founding upon the spirit, as against the latter of the Convention, have justly insisted on such further payments, is a question that merged, upon the execution of the Convention of November, 1831, between Great Britain and Russia, and it is upon this latter Convention that it is now obligatory on Great Britain (if at all) to make any such further payments. Now, in the Convention of November, 1831 (executed by the two Powers), the object of the Convention of 1815 is recited to have been to afford Great Britain a guarantee that Russia would observe a certain policy on all questions respecting Belgium, on the one hand, and, on the other, to secure to Russia the payment of a portion of her old Dutch debt, in consideration of the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, to which she had given her adhesion, arrangements which (says the Convention) still remain in full force. And it is in virtue of this special consideration (Convention of 1831, Article 1) that Great Britain undertakes to continue on her part the payments stipulated in the Convention of May, 1815. It seems to me that the phrase 'arrangements which still remain in full force' pretty plainly implies that if such arrangements had not remained in full force, at any rate through any fault or delinquency on the part of Russia, Great Britain would have declined to enter into such latter Convention. And the language of the whole Convention, according to the true interpretation of it, in my humble judgment, is identical in import with this, that Great Britain undertakes to continue the payments in consideration of Russia maintaining, or by reason that she does maintain, these general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, to which she was originally a party at the time of the holding of such Congress in 1815. And this being so, it also seems to me that a breach or violation of those general arrangements in any material part, though the fault or delinquency of Russia, plainly releases Great Britain from that continuing obligation which she took upon herself; under the Convention of November, 1831, in consideration or by reason of Russia maintaining such general arrangements. Well, now the noble Lord spoke of there being only one article of the Treaty of Vienna which Russia had violated; but so far from that being the case, it would hardly be too much to say that Russia had violated almost every article a the treaty. She had violated the first article, which gave a constitution to Poland; in fact she never adhered to it, but took the very first opportunity of entirely overthrowing that constitution. The conduct of Russia, however, with regard to Poland, was too well known for it to be necessary that he should dwell upon it. It had been remonstrated against by this country, on the ground that it was a violation of the Treaty of Vienna. Then there was her conduct with regard to Cracow, which had also been made the subject of a formal protest on the part of this country; and now he would show that there had been another serious and systematic violation of that treaty since this subject was discussed last in the House by Russia, with regard to the navigation of the Danube. There had been a wilful, deliberate, and long-continued departure from the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna with regard to that river, in defiance of reiterated remonstrances addressed to her by the Powers who were parties to that treaty, and to the palpable and serious detriment of British trade and commerce. That proposition was abundantly proved by the correspondence which had been laid on the table, and to which he was about briefly to refer. He might observe in the first instance that the correspondence extended over a space of four years—namely, from the autumn of 1849, down to within a few months of the breaking out of the war between Russia and Turkey. The first despatch was dated October 17, 1849, and was addressed by Lord Palmerston to Lord Bloomfield as follows— Foreign Office, Oct 17, 1849. My Lord,—I have to acquaint your Lordship that I approve of the representation which, as reported in his despatch of the 2nd instant, Mr. Buchanan made to M. Seniavine relative to the Sulina mouth of the Danube; and I have to instruct you to point out to the Russian Minister that what is required for the purposes of commerce is, not only that the accumulating shoals at that mouth of the Danube should be dredged, so as to deepen the channel, but also that the remains of vessels which have been there wrecked should be removed, it being stated that some of these wrecks still remain in the water-way, and form dangerous obstructions to the navigation. I am, &c. (Signed) "PALMERSTON. The reply was in these terms— St. Petersburg, Oct. 30, 1849. My Lord,—At an interview which I had yesterday with Count Nesselrode, I stated to his Excellency, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, the wishes of Her Majesty's Government respecting the removal of the impediments to commerce which now exist in the Sulina mouth of the Danube, and I especially observed to the Chancellor that great advantage would result to the navigation of that part of the river from the removal of the wrecks which now obstruct the passage. Count Nesselrode replied that orders I bad been given to the local authorities which he hoped would in the end prove satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, but that all that was required could not be effected as speedily as we seemed to expect. I rejoined that your Lordship had frequently, and even long before I came to Russia, called the attention of the Imperial Government to the defective state of the navigation at the Sulina mouth, and therefore it was not to be wondered at if we feared further procrastination. I then left with the Chancellor a copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 17th instant, conceiving that it might be advisable to record the wishes of Her Majesty's Government on this subject in a more formal manner than could be done in a mere conversation.—I have, &c., (Signed) "BLOOMFIELD. So that, in 1849, it was made a subject of accusation against Russia. The next despatch to which he would refer was addressed by Vice Consul Cunningham to Sir Stratford Canning, and it was as follows— Galatz, Sept. 14. 1850. Sir,—The steamer from Constantinople has arrived, and I have informed myself particularly regarding the depth of water on the bar of Sulina; it is reported to be decreasing, and that there is now less than eight feet Venetian, or very little over nine feet English. There can be no doubt that it is very easy to keep the water on the Sulina bar at fourteen feet English, by merely stirring the mud. While the Turks had possession of the Sulina, they kept the water on the bar at fourteen feet English, and, it is said, even fourteen feet Venetian, or sixteen and a half feet English, without incurring the slightest expense, by merely making every vessel going out of the river drag a heavy iron rake after her over the bar. These rakes still exist at Sulina, or at least did so some years ago, as I myself have seen them there. To my knowledge, fifteen years ago, English vessels went out of the Danube, drawing between fourteen and fifteen feet water. It is also to my knowledge that about ten years ago nearly 100 vessels of different nations were detained in Sulina waiting an opportunity of going out, and the masters agreed among themselves to endeavour to deepen the bar; whereon the boats and crews of all the vessels went one day to the bar, and, merely with boat-hooks, or what else they had on board of the vessels, they in one day considerably deepened the bar—I cannot at present say to what extent; my impression is that it was to nearly a foot. It is quite certain that nothing is wanted but to keep stirring the mud; the only question is, who is to stir the mud, and who is to pay the expense, The expense, however, cannot be great. As to what the Russian captain of a steamer pretends to have discovered, that the bar is of stone, and not of mud, it is quite certain there cannot be any stone within sixteen feet English of the surface of the water; once that depth is obtained, it is time to consider whether a greater depth is required, and a charge of gunpowder, properly applied, will easily make twenty feet of water. The difference of nine feet on the bar of Sulina, in comparison of eleven, will cause an expense to British trade and shipping of at least 30,000l. sterling this autumn.—I have, &c. (signed) "CHARLES CUNNINGHAM. The Vice Consul also inclosed a table, stating the number of vessels, British and others, which departed from Galatz during a series of years, and from this table it appeared that in 1843 there were seven British vessels cleared out, while in 1849 the number had increased to 128, and the number of vessels of all nations to 297. The number of tons in 1843 was 1,432; in 1849 it had reached to 85,370. See how immensely this trade was increasing, and what great importance it would have been to the commerce of this country, if it had not been the policy of the Emperor of Russia to cause the mouth of the Danube to be obstructed, in order, as much as possible, to turn the course of trade towards his own port of Odessa. The next despatch he would read was from Vice Consul Lloyd to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 4th June, 1853, which contained this passage— Vessels outward bound, which had lightened to ten feet water, and had been, during the contrary wind, accumulating at Sulina, waiting for the first change of wind to go out, have found themselves unable to proceed, all the lighters being engaged. This has happened to a remarkable extent the last few days; there had been ten feet water, as usual, on the bar; but the wind being easterly, the vessels accumulated at Sulina; on a change of wind, there was found to be but eight feet water, and the Austrian weekly steamer from Constantinople, with goods and passengers for the Danube, having arrived off the bar last Thursday, the 2nd instant, was unable to enter the river, the passengers having nearly all landed here, unable to proceed, and greatly embarrassed for want of accommodation, the steamer having discharged her cargo into vessels employed as lighters, but still unable to pass the bar. Yesterday, the 3rd, the wind shifted to the west, and the bar was tolerably smooth, but there was only eight and a half English feet upon it; there is an immense number of vessels here outward bound; indeed, the river is crowded with them for a couple of miles, and about five and twenty English vessels in the number, none lightened sufficiently to go out, and many not at all, and every lighter in the place, or free vessel engaged as lighter, already taken up. On the 15th July, 1853, Sir H. Seymour writes in these terms to the Earl of Clarendon— In obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 5th instant, I have taken the earliest opportunity which presented itself for representing to Count Nesselrode the grievous injury inflicted upon English navigation, as upon that of other countries, by the neglect of the ordinary precautions necessary for clearing away the obstacles which are allowed to obstruct the Sulina pass. A few references to the despatch addressed by Mr. Vice Consul Lloyd were sufficient to establish the urgency of a remedy for the evil complained of being provided by the Russian Government, and I must say that the statement appeared to produce considerable effect upon the Chancellor, and his Excellency assured me that the matter should be carefully examined. I have thought it advisable to communicate Mr. Vice Consul Lloyd's despatches to Baron Lebzeltern, the Austrian mission having been repeatedly enjoined to make representations upon the subject, of such deep interest to all countries trading on the Danube. So that it would be seen that not only British interests, but the interests of other countries, had been injured by these improper proceedings of Russia. Well, now, having shown beyond all dispute that the Danube had been obstructed, it remained for him to show that the obstruction was a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and for that purpose he must refer shortly to the treaty itself. There were several articles in the Treaty of Vienna referring to rivers, and their provisions were these— Art. 108. The Powers whose States are separated or crossed by the same navigable river, engage to regulate, by common consent, all that regards its navigation—Art. 109. The navigation of the rivers along their whole course referred to in the preceding article from the point where each of them becomes navigable to its mouth, shall be entirely free.—Art. 113. Each State bordering on the rivers is to be at the expense of keeping in good repair the towing paths which pass through its territory, and of maintaining the necessary works through the same extent in the channels of the river in order that no obstacle may be experienced to the navigation. It was perfectly true that at the time this treaty was signed the Danube did not come under the description which was here given of rivers. At that time the Sulina mouth of the Danube was not in the possession of Russia; but although the noble Earl at the head of the Government had stated in another place that Russia, by the Treaty of Adrianople, had acquired no territorial possessions in Europe whatever, it was, nevertheless, true that, by the Treaty of Adrianople, she did acquire possession of the Delta of the Danube, which she had not before. That was a position of no trifling importance, because it had enabled Russia to work injury to our trade; and Russia had otherwise reaped the fruits of her bad faith, because she had rendered the river impassable at its mouth, so that England had not been able, until very lately, to send a vessel of war up the Danube, which, if she had done, she might have given important co-operation to Turkey in the campaign against Russia, and might possibly have prevented the Russian army from passing into Bulgaria at all. But although the Sulina mouth did not come under the description he had read. it had, nevertheless, been held by cabinets and diplomatists that these articles were of so general a nature, that they must be held to be applicable to any river which might, in the course of time, come under the description given in these articles. This also showed that the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna as to rivers were general arrangements, since they were to take effect not only at the time the treaty was made, but in all times to come. If he wanted any support for that opinion, he had only to refer to a despatch written upon this subject by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he was at the Foreign Office. The noble Lord stated in distinct terms his opinion upon the subject in a despatch dated October 4, 1850, and addressed by him to Lord Bloomfield, as follows— Foreign Office, October 4, 1850. My Lord—With reference to my despatch of the 2nd instant, instructing you to remind the Russian Government of its promise to take measures for clearing the Sulina channel of the Danube, I inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a further despatch trom the British Vice Consul at Galatz, stating the injury which the present state of that channel occasions to commerce, and the measures by which, at a trifling expense, the channel might be deepened. I have to instruct your lordship to communicate to the Russian Government the substance of the inclosed despatch, and to express the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Government will feel that it is not right that its possession of the mouth of the river, the navigation of which ought, by the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, to be free and accessible to the commerce of all nations, should become the means of obstructing the navigation of that river, and of virtually shutting out from it a large portion of the commerce which would otherwise pass up and down its channel.—I am, &c. (signed) "PALMERSTON. Then Lord Bloomfield shortly afterwards states— St. Petersburg, October 22, 1850. In pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatches of the 2nd and of the 4th instant, respecting the obstructions in the Sulina channel of the Danube, I last week drew the attention of M. Séniavine to the dilatory proceedings of the Russian authorities in Bessarabia in carrying out the intention which the Imperial Government had so frequently expressed to me of deepening the channel and rendering it navigable for vessels of large burthen. I read to his Excellency your Lordship's two above-mentioned despatches, and begged him especially to remark the severe loss to which our trade had been subjected. It would be seen from this correspondence that the Government of England had always maintained that the conduct of Russia with regard to the Danube was a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, while the Russian diplomatists themselves had never attempted to contest that position; it was clear, then, that they could not, or they would have been the first to say—"Although we are ready to do what you desire, we must at the same time protest against the reasons which you give for calling upon us to do so." But they did not say that, and therefore he was justified in contending that the position he laid down was admitted by Russia as well as by the British Government. But. after all, those with whom he had to deal were Her Majesty's Government; and the way he put the matter to the Government was this—"How can you, when you state that what Russia has done is a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, how can you take the money of the people of England and give it to Russia when it is only payable to her upon the condition that she shall adhere to the Treaty of Vienna?" That was the case he had to put before the House, though he thought there were other reasons that might be urged for withholding this money from Russia. It might be justified on two other grounds. He thought, firstly, that inasmuch as Russia had failed in her duty towards us, we should be perfectly justified by the doctrine of reprisals, even if we were at peace, in withholding the money; we should be perfectly justified in saying to Russia, "You have not done your duty with regard to the Danube, and thereby you have injured our commerce and inflicted disadvantages upon us. Without reference, therefore, to the special conditions of the treaty, we will make reprisals upon you by not paying you money which you are entitled to under this treaty." That course would be perfectly justifiable, because the highest authorities upon international law allowed, that the breaking of one treaty was quite sufficient to justify the violation of another by the country first aggrieved. Secondly, it might be perfectly well urged that the war was a sufficient excuse for withholding the money, because it abrogated all treaties. It was perfectly true that in the general treaty of 1815 there was an article expressly providing that these payments should continue, even in a state of war; but that which legalised these payments was not the treaty of 1815, but, as stated in the opinion of Dr. Addams, it was the subse- quent Convention of 1831, and that Convention did not repeat the article about continuing the payments in a time of war. These two reasons ought to be taken into consideration, but he confessed that he did not wish to rest his case upon them; he wished rather to argue it as if we were at peace, and upon grounds irrespective of the war, namely, upon the ground that the conditions upon which we stipulated to pay the money not having been fulfilled, we were conscientiously justified in withholding it. Now, he was supposed to he a most violent and most reckless enemy of Russia. Some people, indeed, went the length of supposing that there was nothing he would not do in order to carry out his hostility to that Power. Well, it was perfectly true that he entertained strong convictions on the subject of Russia; and he had never concealed them; on the contrary, he had spent the whole of his life in proclaiming them, and the opinions which he held had come very much to be entertained by the country and the noble Lord the President of the Council; at the same time, he had no wish to take any unfair advantage of Russia, nor did he wish to recommend any course to be taken towards her which was not strictly founded in equity and justice. He had shown that the claims of Russia to this money arose out of the circumstance of her allies waiving certain of their rights, and that upon the faith of that surrender, Russia obtained her claim to this money, but the conditions upon which she obtained it being violated, her claim had disappeared, and so disappearing, the claim, or rather the money, reverted to those who were originally entitled to it. These were the four Powers who signed the Treaty of Chaumont; no doubt Russia was one of these, and on that account she might have a claim to a portion of the money, though not to the whole. If that were so, he should be quite prepared to agree that the money should be invested until such time as it should be decided by the other Powers what proportion might be due to Russia; and if the House assented to the Resolutions he was now proposing, he should be ready to move another, which he had already proposed, to that effect. It should be remembered, however, that Russia, having received more than half of the whole, could hardly be entitled to much of the residue. However, he did not bring this subject forward from motives of economy alone; he did not say that the adoption of his Motion would produce a great saving of money, but at least it would relieve the country from the absurdity of supplying the enemy with means to enable him to carry on the war, while it would also relieve her from the degrading position which she had now so many years occupied, of having to pay tribute to Russia. The noble Lord concluded by moving his Resolutions.

MR. DIGBY SEYMOUR

seconded the Motion.

SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH

The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord D. Stuart) commenced his speech by saying that the question raised by his Motion is one which affects the character of this House. I agree with him. I think the question raised by his Motion sill very injuriously affect the character of this House, if it should be carried. For what is the object of the Motion? It is expressed in the last words of the noble Lord's Resolutions, that the payments from this country to Russia on account of the Russian-Dutch debt should be henceforth suspended. Now, to suspend the payment of a debt is the usual and polite phrase which debtors adopt when they make the disagreeable fact known to their creditors that they are not going to pay their debts. Those who do not pay their debts are of two classes. The first are those who cannot pay, and they are called bankrupts; the second are those who will not pay, and they are called repudiators. The noble Lord proposes that we should join the class of repudiators.

The Motion of the noble Lord is nearly the same as one which was made in 1847. In that year it was proposed that we should repudiate our Russian-Dutch debt, because Russia had violated the rules of international law by breaking the stipulations of the treaty of Vienna of the 9th of June, 1815, with regard to the Republic of Cracow. Now, it is proposed to repudiate that debt because Russia has violated the rules of international law by breaking the stipulations of the treaty of Vienna with regard to the navigation of rivers. I resisted the Motion of 1847 for the same reasons that I resist the present Motion. The House rejected the Motion of 1847; it ought, without hesitation, to reject this Motion, for I think that this Motion is more objectionable than that of 1847, because in 1847 we were at peace, and now we are at war with Russia; and, in consequence of our being at war with Russia, I hold that we are more bound in honour to pay this debt than if we were at peace.

Sir, it is the modern rule of civilised war that a belligerent State should pay to an enemy debts contracted during peace. In former times this rule did not exist. Eminent publicists held that a belligerent State was entitled to make reprisals upon every kind of property belonging to an enemy, and to confiscate debts due to an enemy on the breaking out of a war. But for the last two centuries it has been the established rule of civilised nations that public debts should be paid to an enemy during war. During the whole of that period the only attempt to break that rule was in the famous case of the Silesian loan. I must call the attention of the House for one minute to that case. because it bears some analogy to that of the Russian-Dutch loan; and because, in the case of the Silesian loan, eminent law officers of the British Crown distinctly laid down the rule that public debts ought to be paid during war. When they laid down that rule its observance was for our pecuniary advantage, now its observance would be for our pecuniary disadvantage; therefore we are now specially bound to adhere to a rule which we originally upheld for our own benefit. I will state the case of the Silesian loan in a very few words. It was made in the year 1735, by English merchants, to the Emperor of Germany, on the security of the revenues of the Duchy of Silesia. In 1742 Silesia was ceded to Prussia by the treaty of Breslau. One of the conditions of that cession was, that the King of Prussia should become responsible for the Silesian debt, and should undertake the payment of it. In 1752, in consequence of the capture of Prussian vessels by British cruisers—a capture which a Commission of Prussian officers asserted to be in violation of the law of nations—the King of Prussia made reprisals on the Silesian debt, and suspended the payment of it; at the same time, he sent to the British Government the Report of the Prussian Commission as a justification of his conduct, based upon the law of nations. That Report was referred to a Commission of eminent English lawyers, of whom the Attorney General (Ryder) was one, and the Solicitor General (Murray), afterwards Lord Mansfield, was another. Their reply to the Prussian Report is celebrated, and was much praised both by Vattel and Montesquieu. In the opinion of Chancellor Kent, it "showed unanswerably that the King of Prussia could not lawfully seize the mortgaged revenues or debt by way of reprisal, and that he was bound by the law of nations, and every principle of justice, to pay the British creditors." In that reply, the law officers of the British Crown stated, "So scrupulously did England and France adhere to public faith, that even during the war"—the war which was terminated by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle—"they suffered no inquiry to be made whether any part of the public debt was due to the subjects of the enemy, though it is certain many English had money in the French funds. and many French had money in ours." In all subsequent wars we adhered to this rule, and paid our public debts, without inquiry, alike to friends and foes. In the last European war it is said that the Emperor Napoleon I. had large sums of money in our funds, and regularly received his dividends. If the present Emperor of Russia holds any stock, he would also regularly receive his dividends, and would only be mulcted in the additional income tax as long as he is at war with us. I cannot discover any difference in principle between paying the Emperor of Russia, or his subjects, dividends on our consolidated debt, and paying to the Czar the interest of our Russian-Dutch debt.

Sir, the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone proposes to depart from our established usage with regard to the payment of our public debts—to depart from the modern rule of civilisation, and to resort to the ancient practice of barbarism. To justify such backsliding, so contrary to the spirit of the age, to that spirit of progress of which the noble Lord is supposed to be an advocate, the noble Lord ought to be able to assign some very special and valid reason. What reason has the noble Lord assigned? A considerable portion of his speech consisted of condemnation of the conduct of Russia. I agree with the noble Lord in condemning the conduct of Russia. I assent to the first three of the noble Lord's Resolutions. I admit that Russia was bound by the 118th article and the 16th annex of the Treaty of Vienna to be at the expense of maintaining the necessary works, through the extent of her territory, in the bed of the river Danube, in order that no obstacle may be experienced in the navigation. I acknowledge that Russia has broken this engagement, and I will assume that the conduct of Russia with regard to the bed of the Danube has been such as to constitute a casus belli. But I deny that a casus belli or war itself would entitle us to depart from the established usage of civilised nations by making reprisals on our Russian Dutch debt. The noble Lord, however, affirms that Russia has broken the specific engagement. in consideration of which we agreed to pay the Russian-Dutch debt. On this position I join issue with the noble Lord. I deny that Russia has broken the specific engagement, in consideration of which we became responsible for the payment of the Russian-Dutch debt. I assert that we are bound by treaties and Acts of Parliament, by the rules of international law and by honour, to continue to pay that debt.

In order to prove this position, I must ask permission to state, as briefly as I can, the origin and history of our engagements with regard to the Russian-Ditch loan, and in so doing I undertake to show—I. That we purchased from the Netherlands the four colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, on condition that we should make certain payments on account of the Netherlands. 2. That one of the payments which we agreed to make for the Netherlands was for the purpose of discharging certain pecuniary obligations of the Netherlands to Russia; and the mode in which we engaged to make that payment was, by undertaking to pay off, by annual instalments, through the agency of Russia, a portion of the debt due by Russia on account of the Russian-Dutch loan. 3. That we engaged to continue those payments in every contingency, except that of Russia ceasing to identify her policy with that of Great Britain on all questions concerning Belgium. 4. That this contingency has not occurred; therefore we are bound by international law to continue those payments, because we have engaged to continue them in every other contingency, even in that of war, Russia being actually bound to her creditors by a similar agreement to continue her payments during war.

First, I have to show that we purchased front the Netherlands the four colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, by agreeing to make certain payments on account of the Netherlands. To do so, I must observe that in the wars of the French Revolution we took possession of the colonies belonging to the Dutch, not because we were at war with Holland, but to preserve them from France when France took possession of Holland. Consequently, when in 1814 Holland was liberated from the dominion of France, we were bound in honour to restore to Holland her colonies of which we had taken possession. Therefore, on the 13th of August, 1814, we concluded a convention with the Netherlands, in the first article of which we engaged to restore to the Netherlands all the colonies which were possessed by Holland on the 1st of January, 1803, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, which possessions were to be disposed of by a supplementary convention. That supplementary convention was contained in the first additional article to the convention to which I have just referred—namely, of the 13th of August, 1814. By that additional article we engaged, first, to pay 1,000,000l. to Sweden; secondly, to advance 2,000,000l. to be applied towards augmenting and improving the defences of the Low Countries; thirdly—and to this engagement I beg especial attention—to bear equally with Holland such further charges as might be agreed upon towards the final and satisfactory settlement of the Low Countries, in union with Holland, &c., not exceeding in the whole the sum of 3,000,000l., to be defrayed by Great Britain. In consideration of these engagements, the Netherlands agreed to cede in full sovereignty to His Britannic Majesty the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice.

I have shown that we bought from the Netherlands four colonies for a sum not exceeding 6,000,000l., of which a sum not exceeding 3,000,000l. was to be expended in promoting the final and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of Holland and Belgium. The manner in which that sum was to be expended for the purpose in question was determined by a convention signed at London on the 19th of May, 1815, between Great Britain and the Netherlands and Russia. The noble Lord asserts in his fourth Resolution that the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, was included in the Treaty of Vienna of the 9th of June, 1815. I think the noble Lord is mistaken. I cannot find any article which makes the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, a part of the Treaty of Vienna. In the preamble to that convention it was stated that His Majesty the King of the Netherlands was desirous to render to the Allied Powers, who were parties to the treaty concluded at Chaumont on the 1st of March, 1814, a suitable return for the heavy expense incurred by them in delivering his territories from the power of the enemy; and that the said Powers had, in consideration of arrangements made with each other, mutually agreed to waive their several pretensions under this head in favour of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias. Now, what were the arrangements between the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Chaumont at the period at which the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, was concluded at London? They were not the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna of the 9th of June, 1815, for that treaty had not then been signed; but they were general territorial arrangements of the Congress of Vienna. One of those territorial arrangements was the union of Holland and Belgium. It is evident from Lord Castlereagh's despatch of the 13th of February, 1815, that he was anxious to obtain the approval by Russia of that territorial arrangement. With that object in view, Lord Castlereagh expressed to Lord Liverpool his persuasion of the policy and necessity of such a measure as that of the convention of the 19th of May, 1815. He declared that it was impossible, after the principles laid down in our convention with the Netherlands of August 13, 1814, that we could retain the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, without incurring some charge for them; and his despatch shows that he thought that the charge had best be incurred for the objects of the convention of May 19, 1815. What were those objects? According to the preamble of the convention of 1815, it was executed by Great Britain in pursuance of engagements taken by His Britannic Majesty with the King of the Netherlands, in a convention signed at London on the 13th of August, 1814—those engagements being (as I have already said), to pay a sum not exceeding 6,000,000l. for retaining the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, of which a sum not exceeding 3,000,000l. was to be applied to bring about the final and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the Netherlands. To accomplish these objects, and to make a suitable return to Russia for the heavy expense incurred by her in delivering the Netherlands from the power of the enemy—in the first article the King of the Netherlands engaged to take upon himself a part of the capital, &c., of the Russian loan made in Holland through the intervention of the house of Hope and Co. in Amsterdam; and the King of Great Bri- tain engaged on his part to recommend to his Parliament to enable him to take upon himself an equal capital of the Russian loan—namely 25,000,000 florins, equal to about 2,080,000l, In the second article their Belgic and Britannic Majesties engaged to pay an annual interest of 5 per cent on the said capitals, together with a sinking fund of 1 per cent. In the third and fourth articles it was agreed that these payments should be made through the agency of Russia, and that Russia should "continue as heretofore to be security to the creditors for the whole of the said loan, and shall be charged with the administration of the same, their Belgic and Britannic Majesties remaining liable to His Imperial Majesty, each for the punctual discharge of the respective proportions of the said charge." In the fifth article it was agreed—evidently with the view of bringing about the final and satisfactory settlement of the Low Countries in union with Holland, and of giving to Russia a strong pecuniary motive to identify her policy with ours respecting Belgium—that the payments in question should cease and determine, should the sovereignty of the Belgic provinces be severed from the dominions of the King of the Netherlands previously to the liquidation of the debt in question. And it was also agreed in the fifth article that the payments in question should not be interrupted in the event of a war breaking out between any of the three contracting parties; the Government of Russia being (to use the words of the fifth article) actually bound to its creditors by a similar agreement. This article, therefore, assigns as a reason why we should continue our payments during war, that Russia is bound to continue her payments during war. And, consequently, if we were to interrupt our payments during war, Russia might consider herself entitled to imitate our example; for, by the terms of the convention of 1815, Russia, merely became our agent for the payment of a debt which we had taken upon ourselves for the valuable consideration of four colonies. Therefore, if we were to cease to supply Russia with the funds for making the payments in question, Russia might plead that she was simply our agent, and interrupt her payments to her creditors on account of the Russian-Dutch loan.

Sir, effect was given to the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, by the Act 55 Geo. III. chap. 115. By that Act we bound ourselves, for whatever cause we might go to war with Russia, whether for the violation by Russia of any or of every one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, to continue during war to pay, through the agency of Russia, the interest, &c., of our portion of the Russian-Dutch debt as long as Holland and Belgium were united. As we were not entitled to discontinue those payments on account of any act of Russia which would have caused us to engage in a war with Russia, à fortiori we were not entitled to discontinue those payments on account of any act of Russia which would not have caused us to engage in war with Russia. Consequently, under the Convention and Act of 1815, we were bound to continue to pay, through the agency of Russia, the interest, &c., of our portion of the Russian-Dutch debt till that portion was liquidated, in every conceivable contingency, except that of the separation of Holland and Belgium. But that contingency did occur in the year 1830.

Sir, in the year 1830, Holland was separated from Belgium; therefore, by the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, we were then released from the obligation of making any further payments on account of the Russian-Dutch debt. But we were not so released by the spirit of the convention of 1815; for I have shown that one of the objects of that convention was to make the policy of Russia the same as that of England with regard to Holland and Belgium. We thought, in 1815, that this object would be best attained by binding Russia under pecuniary penalties to uphold and maintain the union of Holland and Belgium. In 1831, we changed our mind upon this subject, and thought that Holland and Belgium should be permanently separated. That separation took place in 1830, not from any fault of Russia, but in spite of the wishes of Russia; for Russia had offered to send an army of 60,000 men to prevent that separation, and had only desisted from so doing in consequence of the representations of her allies, and especially of Great Britain. Therefore, Russia, by not sending an army to prevent the separation of Holland and Belgium, acted in accordance with the spirit, though not with the letter, of the convention of 1815. For, as I have already said, one of the objects of that convention was to induce Russia to adopt our policy with regard to Holland and Belgium. Consequently, we could not accuse Russia of having in any way acted contrary to the spirit of the convention of 1815; and, therefore, we could not with honour have refused to continue the payments on account of the Russian-Dutch loan, in consequence of the occurrence of an event which Russia was willing to prevent, but which we approved, and which we desired Russia not to attempt to prevent, but, on the contrary, to assent to. For these objects and reasons we concluded with Russia two engagements in 1831—first, on the 15th of November, 1831, a treaty with Russia and other Powers relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland; and, on the following day, a convention with Russia alone relative to the Russian-Dutch debt. There can be no doubt that one of the considerations which induced us to agree to the convention of the 16th of November, 1831, was that Russia had agreed to the treaty of the 15th of November, 1831.

Sir, in the preamble of the convention of November 16, 1831, it is stated that "complete agreement did not exist between the letter and the spirit of the convention of May 19, 1815;" that, "on referring to the object of the above mentioned convention, it appeared that that object was to afford to Great Britain a guarantee that Russia would, on all questions concerning Belgium, identify her policy with that which the Court of London had deemed the best adapted for the maintenance, of a just balance of power in Europe." I have shown that one of the chief objects of the convention of 1815 was to give effect to the stipulations of the convention of the 13th of August, 1814, that England should apply a portion of the purchase-money of the Dutch colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, towards the final and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the Netherlands; and I have also shown that we endeavoured to attain this object by stipulating that our payments on account of the Russian-Dutch loan should cease in the event of the separation of Holland and Belgium, and that thus we held out a strong inducement to Russia to maintain that union.

The other chief object of the convention of 1815, according to the preamble of the convention of 1831, was "to secure to Russia the payment of a portion of her old Dutch debt in consideration of the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna to which she had given her adhesion—arrangements which remain in full force." The precise meaning of these words has been misunderstood. The arrangements here mentioned are the same as those referred to in the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, and not the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna as to the navigation of rivers, which treaty was not signed till the 9th of June, 1815. They were the arrangements between the Allied Powers who concluded the treaty of Chaumont, in consideration of which arrangements the Allied Powers waived in favour of Russia their pecuniary claims on the Netherlands for the expense incurred by them in delivering the Netherlands from the enemy. In order to satisfy a portion of those claims, the Netherlands transferred to Russia a portion of the claims of the Netherlands on Great Britain, on account of the sale to Great Britain of the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. In consequence of this transfer we became indebted to Russia, and to liquidate our debt to Russia we agreed by the convention of 1815 to pay, through the agency of Russia, the interest, &c., of a portion of the Russian-Dutch debt. When that convention became null in 1830, we then contracted with Russia a new engagement for a new consideration.

Sir, in the first article of the convention of the 16th of November, 1831, His Britannic Majesty engaged to recommend to his Parliament to enable him to undertake to continue, on his part, the payments stipulated in the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, according to the mode, and until the completion of the sum fixed for Great Britain in the said convention. And, on the other hand, in the second article the Emperor of Russia engaged that, "if the arrangements agreed upon for the independence and neutrality of Belgium should be endangered by the course of events, and to the maintenance of which the two high Powers are equally bound," by the treaty of the previous day, "he will not contract any other engagement without a previous agreement with His Britannic Majesty and his formal assent." Thus in 1831 we contracted a new engagement with Russia for a new consideration. Parliament confirmed that contract in 1832 by the Act 2 & 3 Will. IV. chap. 81, in which we recited at length—first, the convention of the 16th of November, 1831; next, the stipulations of the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, and among them we recited the engagement that our payments on account of the Russian-Dutch debt should not be interrupted in the event of a war breaking out between us and Russia, the Emperor of All the Russias being, as we asserted, actually bound to his creditors by a similar agreement; and we enacted "to continue the payments stipulated in the convention of the 19th of May, 1815, according to the mode, and until the completion of the sum fixed for Great Britain in the said last-mentioned convention, and to complete and carry into effect in all other respects the stipulations of the said last-mentioned convention, and of the said convention of the 16th of November, 1831." Therefore, by this Act of Parliament, we are bound to carry into effect every stipulation of the convention of 1815, except that which has reference to the separation of Holland and Belgium, and consequently we are bound to carry into effect the stipulation of the fifth article, that we should continue our payments, through the agency of Russia, in the event of a war breaking out with Russia. Now, I must observe that in the convention of the 16th of November, 1831, no event is specified in which our payments on account of the Russian-Dutch loan shall cease and determine before the completion of the sum fixed for Great Britain. In that convention we merely engaged to continue our payments on account of the Russian-Dutch debt, Russia, on the other hand, engaging not to contract any new engagement respecting Belgium without a previous agreement with His Britannic Majesty and his formal consent. Therefore, as long as Russia fulfils this specific engagement, we are bound to fulfil our engagement to make the payments in question, even during war. We are bound by conventions and an Act of Parliament to continue those payments during war, irrespectively of the cause of war. Therefore we should have been bound to continue those payments, if we had gone to war with Russia on account of the violation by Russia of all or any of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. Therefore, assuming, for the sake of argument with the noble Lord, that the conduct of Russia with regard to the bed of the Danube was such a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Vienna that we ought to lave made it a casus belli, still I have shown that, in the event of such a war, of any war, we should have been bound to continue our payments through the agency of Russia as long as Russia did not violate the engagement contained in the second article of the convention of 1831. Now, Russia has not violated that engagement, for the arrangements agreed upon in 1831 for the independence and neutrality of Belgium, and to the maintenance of which Great Britain and Russia are equally bound by the treaty of the 15th of November, 1831, have not been endangered by the course of events, and Russia has not contracted any other engagement respecting Belgium without a previous agreement with His Britannic Majesty and his formal consent.

Sir, I have proved that by the conventions of 1814, 1815, and 1831, we first agreed to purchase from the Netherlands the four colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; secondly, we agreed to apply a portion of the purchase-money towards the final and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the Netherlands, and towards discharging a portion of the pecuniary obligations of the Netherlands to Russia on account of the expense incurred by Russia and her allies in delivering the Netherlands from the dominion of France; thirdly, with these objects in view, we agreed to pay off, by annual instalments, through the agency of Russia, the capital and interest of a portion of a debt due by Russia on account of a loan raised in Holland; fourthly, that we engaged to continue those payments during war (Russia being actually bound to her creditors by a similar engagement), and in every other contingency, except that of Russia ceasing to identify her policy with that of Great Britain respecting Belgium. I have therefore shown that, by agreeing to make and continue the payments in question, we not only partly purchased four colonies, but that we also purchased, in the first instance, in 1815, the assent of Russia to the union of Belgium and Holland, and bound Russia to uphold that union; and, in the second instance, in 1831, we purchased the assent of Russia to the separation of Belgium and Holland, and bound Russia not to contract any new engagement with respect to Belgium without our previous agreement and formal consent. Therefore I contend that we are now bound by treaties and Acts of Parliament, by the rules of international law and by honour, to continue the payments in question, though we are at war with Russia; Russia being actually bound to her creditors, by a similar engagement, to continue her payments during war. Therefore, if we were to cease to pay Russia, Russia might plead our repudiation of our debt as an excuse for her repudiation of her debt; and if she were not to do so, but were to continue her payments in spite of our repudiation, what a sorry figure we should cut among the nations of the earth!

Sir, we have engaged in this war, not for any petty personal motive, nor for any miserable pecuniary interest, but for high and noble objects—to protect the weak, to humble the pride of the strong—for the lasting benefit of Europe, to prevent the dangerous aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of the Ottoman empire. We are determined to prosecute this war vigorously and fearlessly till we have accomplished our great and noble ends. Let us not, by agreeing to this Motion, expose ourselves to the suspicion that we wish to make a pretext of this war to escape from the payment of a just debt due on account of the purchase of four great colonies, of which we retain undisputed possession. Be assured that the pecuniary benefit to be gained by the repudiation of this debt would be dearly purchased by the loss of the reputation which we should acquire by a scrupulous and punctilious fulfilment of engagements, and by the example of good faith which we should set to the nations of the world. The argument of the noble Lord is, Russia has broken treaties, therefore we ought to break treaties; Russia has been faithless, therefore we ought to be faithless; Russia has done wrong, therefore we ought to do wrong. Now, from the same premises, I arrive at conclusions diametrically opposed to those of the noble Lord. I say, because Russia has disregarded the stipulations of treaties, we ought even to be punctilious in fulfilling our engagements; because Russia has set an example of bad faith to Europe, we ought to set an example of good faith to the world; because Russia has been a wrongdoer, we ought to be most careful to do right, so that we may have reason and justice completely on our side. I therefore ask the House to reject the Motion of the noble Lord, a Motion which would better become the delegate of some obscure and bankrupt Transatlantic constituency than the representative of the wealth—the noble representative of the intelligence—of a portion of the great metropolis of this vast commercial empire. I offer my hearty opposition to the Motion, not merely as a Minister of the Crown, but also as one of the representatives of this metropolis, which the noble Lord misrepresents when he proposes to repudiate a debt which we are bound in honour and by treaty to pay.

MR. DIGBY SEYMOUR

said, the right hon. Baronet had done justice neither to the arguments nor to the motives of his noble Friend (Lord Dudley Stuart) in bringing this subject before the House. Every argument of the speech of the right hon. Baronet was distinctly contrary to the views of the question taken by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who took for one of the grounds of the present war with Russia the conditions made for the preservation of the navigation of the rivers by the Treaty of Vienna, and considered the condition to which Russia had reduced the navigation of the Danube as a direct violation of that treaty. And again, in 1846, Her Majesty, in the Speech from the Throne, distinctly stated that the annexation of the State of Cracow was a violation of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. The right hon. Baronet had therefore proved too much, because he had admitted that there had been distinct violations of the Treaty of Vienna on more than one occasion. Neither could the noble Lord be justly accused of advising the country to a system of repudiation. His noble Friend did not ask the House to repudiate anything, but he asked them not to continue paying out of the public purse, of which they were the conservators, a sum of money to Russia, when the conditions upon which the obligation to make such payment had originally attached had been broken by the wilful misconduct of Russia. The argument of the right hon. Baronet in reference to Silesia were inapplicable to the question now before the House, for his noble Friend did not put it as a question of reprisals, but as one of the violation of a solemn covenant and the forfeiture of its conditions. He denied that there was any analogy between this case and that of the fundholder, and the right hon. Baronet, without having grappled with the real question before them, had given an opinion directly opposed to that delivered by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) in his despatches to foreign Ministers with regard to the construction of the Treaty of Vienna. After the separation between Holland and Belgium it was admitted that, under the strict letter of the convention of 1815, the obli- gation of England to pay her quota was dissolved; but Lord Althorp and other eminent statesmen held that the spirit of the convention had not been violated by Russia, she not having been a party to promoting the separation between the two countries, and therefore that it would not be becoming in this country to take advantage of it. He quite concurred in that view; but a special Act had to be obtained to sanction a new convention, based upon the alterations which then took place in the relations between the two countries. He then came to the important debate of 1847, in which the most competent legal authorities and the most eminent statesmen took the view which his noble Friend had taken to-night with regard to the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna being identical with the question of the annexation of the free State of Cracow. The noble Lord the Leader of the House then said, it was true that the annexation of Cracow was a violation of the convention of 1831, but they would do well to satisfy themselves with a protest instead of taking advantage of that breach; for by so doing they would probably prevent a similar occurrence at a future time. Russia had again taken a similar course, so that the argument of the noble Lord the Leader of the House would not now be applicable. The opinion of the noble Lord and that of the noble Lord the Member fur Tiverton, as expressed in his despatches, together with the statement contained in the Queen's Speech in 1846, that the annexation of Cracow was in direct violation of the general arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna, were strong arguments in favour of his noble Friend's proposition. Another argument was the tacit admission of Russia herself; for if it were true that the keeping clear of the Sulina mouths of the Danube was not one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, how was it that Count Nesselrode had not attempted to dispute the liability of Russia to keep them clear? With regard to the question of a breach of faith with the public creditor, he would quote a passage from the speech of the Recorder of London, in the debate of 1847. The right hon. Gentleman said:— England was not security for Holland, nor Holland for England. The debt was due to subjects of the King of the Netherlands by the Crown of Russia; the amount was 25,000,000 florins, and, in consideration of the kingdom of Holland being fortified, England entered into a distinct understanding to make a separate payment to the Dutch creditors of Russia; but neither England nor Holland was security for the other. Russia, however, might be said to be security for both; because, without the grossest breach of faith which any nation could commit, she could not evade the payment of that debt which she had contracted to certain subjects of the Crown of Holland. England might fail to make good her part of the contract; the King of the Netherlands might not succeed in performing all that he had undertaken; but such failures on the part of others would never excuse Russia from the discharge of all the obligations which she had contracted. Russia could not for a moment refuse to comply with the terms to which she had bound herself, without at once giving ground for a casus Belli." It was agreed on all hands that by the Treaty of Vienna the mouths of the Danube were not to be closed; it was also admitted that those mouths were now choked up by the wilful negligence of Russia; and there could be no question, therefore, that the Treaty of Vienna had been violated. Another violation of the treaty consisted in the seizure of the free town of Cracow; so that all these cases would now justify England in standing upon her strict rights, quite irrespective of the question of war or peace, and refusing to pay the forthcoming instalment to Russia.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

said, the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had wholly misconceived the argument of his right hon. Friend (Sir W. Molesworth) in supposing that he had attempted to maintain that the closure by Russia of the mouths of the Danube was not a violation of the Treaty of Vienna. His right hon. Friend had throughout his speech admitted that the treaty had been violated, and therefore all the energy and all the vehemence which the hon. Gentleman had expended on the point was altogether thrown away. No doubt Russia was bound to keep the mouths of the Danube open—no doubt her closing of them was a violation of the Treaty of Vienna. The difficulty was to prove that this violation of the Treaty of Vienna would justify England in withholding the payment of the loan. To make out this they must first of all show that the engagement to pay the loan was based upon the Treaty of Vienna. His right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark had clearly shown that that was not the case, and nothing could be plainer than the statement which he made. England stood indebted to Holland in the sum of 3,000,000l. sterling as the price of four colonies. It was now said that these colonies were worthless. Well, such was the revulsion of feeling upon colonial subjects, that he would not now undertake to say whether the people of England now considered the Cape Colony worthless or not. But, at any rate, if that was a bargain, it did not lie in their mouths to say that the Colony was not worth the price, and that, therefore, they would repudiate the debt. Whatever they might think of the Cape Colony now, at the time the engagement was entered into it was considered to be a very valuable acquisition, and they must be bound by the bargain. Well, to return to the statement—this country agreed to pay Holland 3,000,000l. sterling as the price of these four colonies, to be applied as Holland might prescribe. It happened that at the close of the war the Allied Powers claimed from Holland some compensation for the expenses of the war, and at the same time they agreed to transfer their claims to Russia. After some negotiation Holland consented that we should pay the 3,000,000l. which we owed to her to Russia in lieu of her contribution towards the expenses of the war; and all these negotiations, be it understood, were anterior to, and independent of the Treaty of Vienna. But if the arrangement had been originally based upon that treaty, still his right hon. Friend had clearly shown that in 1831 a new arrangement was entered into, by which, on condition that Russia would unite her policy to England on the subject of the separation between Holland and Belgium, England would still continue to pay the money. Even if the question had, therefore, originally rested upon the Treaty of Vienna, it had been removed from that basis by the treaty of 1831. And if it were not so, still it would ill become this country at the present conjuncture to repudiate her engagements. Did they suppose that we should be able to persuade the other countries of Europe that if peace had been maintained we should have set up the closing of the Sulina mouth of the Danube as a reason for not continuing to pay this loan? The pretext was so hollow that all the world would see through it. Even with the clearest and strongest grounds for refusing payment, England ought to be most chary, scrupulous, and punctilious in refusing payment of her engagements in the time of war. And why? Because in war no opportunity was afforded for those communications and explanations which in a time of peace would be sure to precede such a rupture as this. If a difference of opinion on such a subject took place be- tween two Powers in a time of peace, there could be no doubt that they would make every exertion and use every argument to make the other Power see the impropriety of their conduct before coming to an open rupture. But all opportunity for such explanations was now closed, and England would stand before Europe in the position of a country which took advantage of war to violate engagements to which they were bound by the most solemn consideration of honour and good faith to adhere.

LORD DUDLEY STUART,

in reply, said, if it had been shown that they were bound in honour to fulfil this engagement, he should abandon his Motion, as he desired nothing but what was just and equitable, and would do nothing which could fairly subject his fellow-countrymen to the odious appellation which the right hon. Baronet had applied to himself of a repudiator. He must distinctly assert that there was no repudiation whatever in his proposal. The right hon. Gentleman had referred with an air of triumph to the case of the Silesian loan: but there was no affinity whatever between that case and the present. In that case the question was between a State and individuals; in this case the question was between one State and another, and, as he had before observed, what they had to consider was whether the conditions on which the money was payable had been fulfilled or been violated. It appeared as though there were always to be reasons why it was necessary to continue paying this money. Some years ago it was urged that they must pay, because they were at peace; the reason now assigned was that they were at war. It would be better if there were no conditions at all attached to the payment. Let them say at once, "No matter what happens, the payments shall continue to be made—the treaties are so much waste paper." As to the value of the colonies obtained from Holland, the late Earl Grey and the entire Opposition of the day, said the arrangement was a most improvident one. The right hon. Baronet and the hon. and learned Attorney General had carefully avoided saying one word respecting the document on which he (Lord Dudley Stuart) had almost entirely rested his case, namely, the statement respecting the nature of the Convention made by the Russian Plenipotentiary himself. It was tolerably clear, therefore, that his opponents found them selves entirely unable to answer the argument which he had founded upon that document. He was glad that by introducing the subject he had elicited the opinion of a Cabinet Minister, but he had heard nothing which had altered his opinion on the subject, and he must therefore divide the House.

MR. CAYLEY

said, he hoped that the noble Lord would not carry his intention of dividing into effect. England was not more distinguished for her good faith than for her arts, arms, or sciences, and the noble Lord's Motion went directly to impugn that good faith. The Emperor of Russia would accept such a Motion, if carried, as a compensation for all his losses in the war. It would ill become us to repudiate a payment because we happened to be at war with our creditor. If the noble Lord did divide, he hoped there would be nobody on his side but the mover and seconder.

SIR DENHAM NORREYS

also urged the noble Lord not to divide.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 5; Noes 57: Majority 52.

List of the AYES.
Hume, W. F.	Wise, A.
Langton, H. G.	TELLERS.
Morris, D.	Stuart, Lord D.
Murrough, J. P.	Seymour, D.