§ House in Committee; Mr. Bernal in the Chair.
SIR FRANCIS BARING, in proposing the first vote, 718,647l., for the retired Half-pay Allowance of Admirals, Commanders, and Lieutenants in the Navy, said it included the supplemental estimate for retirement.
§ MR. HUMEcomplained that the recommendation of the Select Committee had not been attended to before then, and that the plan of reduction proposed by them had been so long delayed. If the regulations of the Admiralty itself had been carried out—those made by Lord Melville in 1820, those made in 1826, and those made in 1830, a great deal of the injustice that had been done would be obviated. The recommendations of the Select Com- 642 mittee, which he had meant to move for adoption as an Amendment, were—
That in 1792, at the commencement of the war with France, the number of admirals was only sixty-nine; after thirty-three years' peace the present number of admirals is 150, exclusive of the retired admirals, and of these, seventy-five of the effective list are above seventy years of age. A certain proportion of the list of admirals must be composed of officers who have grown old in the service, who deserve well of their country, and who are entitled to higher rank and to higher pay on account of their merits, although they are no longer able to serve afloat; but when it is considered that in the last naval war with France (the greatest on record), not more than thirty-six admirals were employed at any one time, and that at the present moment the services of only fourteen are required, it would not seem unreasonable that the number of admirals now fixed, according to the scheme sanctioned in 1846, at 150, should be gradually reduced to a number not exceeding 100. Your Committee recommended that this gradual reduction should be effected by promoting only one captain to the rank of admiral on the death of three flag officers, according to the rule of promotion adopted in 1830, until the lists shall have been reduced to the maximum of 100; and thenceforth a captain may be promoted to fill each vacancy as it occurs on the lists.On behalf of the naval officers, be (Mr. Hume) felt bound to say that he considered that rule extremely hard which made promotion contingent only upon six years' command of a ship in peace, and four in war, seeing that many of them were within five or six months of that period of service when their command had expired. It had been his intention to have submitted this question to the decision of the House previous to going into Committee, but he lost the opportunity apparently for want of due watchfulness.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that it would be perfectly competent for his hon. Friend, if he entertained an objection to the whole of the scheme, to move a reduction to the extent of the supplementary vote. His hon. Friend had asked why had not the plan recommended by the Committee been adopted? The reason was, that the scheme, as proposed by the Committee, was an imperfect one, inasmuch as it was confined to the list of admirals, and, upon the best consideration he could give it, it appeared to him that it would deal only with a very small part of the question. Under these circumstances, the Admiralty had recommended a plan to the House. Hitherto, under the head of half-pay on the active list, it had been the practice to include many officers who were not really acting, or, in many cases, fitted for active service, and complaints had naturally arisen 643 in the country, and in that House, of the great disproportion of the number of officers employed, and the number maintained on the half-pay active list. It was, therefore, thought advisable to adopt the scheme now recommended, and to remove from the active list those who received and were fully entitled to receive their half-pay for gallant and good service, but who, from age, bodily infirmity, or other grounds, were not fit for active service, should the necessity arise for calling upon them. This was the principle upon which the whole plan proceeded. The Committee would be aware that on the half-pay list of admirals there were some who had never hoisted their flag—that is, they had never been employed, and, wanting the necessary experience to command, it was thought they should be placed on the inactive list. He had felt that when he came to deal with the commanders and lieutenants on the active half-pay list, it would not be proper to have on the active half-pay list of admirals officers who had not been employed, or those who were from other causes unfit for employment. But his hon. Friend himself had admitted that if the recommendation of the Committee were carried out, it would be necessary to remove from the active service list those admirals who were not qualified for service: here, in effect, his hon. Friend recommended the very principle on which he (Sir F. Baring) proposed to act. If, then, there was any hardship in the matter, his hon. Friend must take his share of the responsibility, for he was a party to it as well as the Admiralty. He would not go into cases of alleged hardship, for it was impossible to make any reduction without, to a certain extent, running counter to the feelings of some of the parties who would he affected by it. He would merely observe, that he was not aware of any case of reduction attended with so little of hardship to individuals as that now proposed. But, after all, what was the injustice that would be done? It was not intended to affect the amount of pay. Those officers who were to be removed from the active list would still continue to receive the same pay on the one list as on the other. In point of money, they would in fact he better off than under the plan formerly proposed. And with regard to rank, they would continue to rise according to their seniority. There was another point which should not be lost sight of—that was, that with regard to officers placed on 644 the retired list, though there was of course no prospect of their services being required during peace, yet power was reserved to the Crown to employ them in time of war with their own consent. He wished to abstain from regarding this question with reference to individual cases—it would be invidious to do so. But he could assure the Committee that there were as many officers of high rank who would be removed from the active list by the new arrangement as would remain upon it. He would not deny that there were cases that would read like hardship, but there were many questions to be inquired into before they could arrive at the actual circumstances with sufficient accuracy to enable them to pronounce a judgment. In the case of the last rear-admiral made, that officer had been on the active service list for thirty-five years, during the whole of which he had not been in active employment; and it seemed to him (Sir F. Baring) that whatever the previous services of that officer might have been as a subordinate, it would be a very doubtful proceeding to place him at once in command of a fleet. There were other cases, no doubt, in which the parties had served part of the required time; but were they sure that these parties might not have served the whole time were it not that their own convenience or other duties induced them to avoid active service? On the other hand, he was not disposed to deny that there were cases where the parties had been willing and anxious to serve, but had been unable to obtain employment. But they should remember that that was precisely the hardship he was now seeking to cure for the future. At present, from the great number of officers, it was impossible to give all the captains their fair share of employment, and so long as the present system continued, no First Lord of the Admiralty, whatever might be his purpose and intention, could so arrange as to give constant employment to a list of 800 effective captains. This was a calamity which had arisen from a long war, which brought a large number of officers into the service, and afterwards, from a generosity which could hardly be complained of, by which gallant and meritorious service was rewarded by advanced rank. Doubtless the House of Commons had a perfect right to say, that "in all the branches of the public service, the establishments shall bear a due proportion to the wants of the country." And in this case the reduction in 645 the number of officers was as important to the service as it was in economic considerations to the country. At present, the course was to reward gallant actions or peculiar fitness by promotion; but when afterwards the person so promoted applied for service, he, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was too often compelled to refuse him, on the ground of others having prior claims. This was an unfortunate system for the service, depriving it, as it did, of the exertions of some of the most effective and useful officers. The regulations he now proposed to introduce, though he believed they were not approved of by many officers in the service, would, if carried out, go far to remedy that evil, and, consequently, to render the service more efficient.
§ MR. HUMEthought each officer should be allowed to take his chance of promotion, one in three, like the captains now, instead of placing a certain number on the list compulsory.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that by reducing the list of captains on the efficient list, they should be better able to give active employment to those remaining in it.
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSconsidered the scheme of the right hon. Baronet a practical one; but complained that the Government had thrown almost all the recommendations of the Committee on Official Salaries over. The charge of 6,500l., now proposed to carry out the new arrangement, he for one, was quite prepared to vote, as it would lead to a speedy reduction of expense; but he thought, before they agreed to it, they should have some security, either by an Order in Council or a Resolution of that House, that the scheme would be carried out. He knew very well that it would be carried into effect by the present First Lord of the Admiralty; but, without some such security as that he had suggested, how could they tell that it would not be disregarded by his successor? He did not think it fair that a man who had made frequent applications to the Admiralty for employment, without obtaining it, should be placed on the yellow list; for it was well known that many officers, in every way qualified, but who had not the advantage of Government or Parliamentary influence, found it impossible to get appointed to active service. The scheme now brought forward was far preferable to that of 1846, the object of which was not the benefit of the naval service, but of particular indi- 646 viduals, and under which persons scarcely exceeding fifty years of age were advanced to the rank of rear-admiral, one of them an officer who had not held the rank of post captain, he believed, more than twelve months.
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, that several naval officers had complained to him of parts of the proposed plan. The object of the Admiralty was eventual economy, and to promote, as far as possible, present as well as eventual efficiency. But he was informed that this scheme was coupled with a provision which was not necessary, either in regard to economy or efficiency. The effect would be, that officers who had distinguished themselves would suffer from the new arrangement. If the admirals were generally employed as were men of similar rank in the Army, there would be no ground for complaint. It occasionally happened that admirals of seventy were appointed to fleets, and it could not be presumed, therefore, that they were inefficient. In the Army officers of seventy were frequently in command; and only the other day an officer above seventy years was appointed to the command of 50,000 or 60,000 men. The physical duties of a general officer were much more severe than those of an admiral, who, in time of peace, was never appealed to for any extraordinary exertion. The right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Baring) had deprecated any allusion to individual cases as invidious; but he (Sir De L. Evans) saw nothing invidious in referring to the grievances of officers who had rendered distinguished services to their country; and there was this advantage in doing so, that the Committee would be better able to understand the manner in which the proposed plan would operate with unnecessary severity on individuals by quoting individual cases than by any other means. He would first refer to the case of Sir George West-phal, an officer with whom Sir G. Pechell had had the honour of serving, who commenced his career under Lord Nelson, and served as first lieutenant in six line-of-battle ships between the years 1809 and 1813, and had served also under Sir George Cockburn. There were only four officers in the Navy List who had been so especially reported for services. Now, an officer who had been first lieutenant under so able a commander as Sir George Cockburn, and who afterwards was selected as Captain of the Fleet, was scarcely one who could be said to be unqualified, or who, if his health was good, should be discarded and rendered incapable 647 of serving hereafter. Then, there was Admiral Watts, who had received seventeen wounds in action against the enemy, and who had served twenty years during the war, and had commanded four ships of war in the space of five years; yet, though he was still a strong and active man, as he had not commanded a rated ship the whole time, the gentlemen of the Admiralty insisted that he was to he held disqualified for service. The right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Baring) had stated that it had been impossible for the Admiralty to find employment for the whole of those who now held the rank of admiral for the time stipulated. Was it not, then, an arbitrary proceeding to tell them, "Because we could not employ you before, therefore we will not employ you hereafter?" He trusted that, in justice to many deserving and efficient naval officers, this part of the scheme would be reconsidered; and unless he had a guarantee to that effect, he should feel it his duty to vote against the proposition.
§ SIR GEORGE PECHELLthought the proposal likely to effect much good; but, on a full consideration of the subject, he did not believe that it could be carried out for any thing like the sum proposed. He believed, too, it was framed without a due regard for the interests of the commanders and subordinate officers, who were the bone and sinew of the service. There was no class of officers who deserved better of their country than the commanders, many of whom had distinguished themselves during the war. The plan of the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, instead of costing only 6,500l., would require 15,180l. No doubt too many instances of individual hardship would occur under this compulsory retirement, and some consideration should be shown, therefore, to those who were able and willing to serve. He believed, that on the retired list there were some who were quite as good as those who were on the active list. The right hon. Baronet said, that officers thus placed on the retired list might be recalled to service. He did not quite understand that part of the right hon. Baronet's statement; but as that opportunity of being recalled was exactly what the officers desired, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would set him right on the point. The right hon. Gentleman also spoke of some officers who might have been employed if they pleased. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would state the names of the officers who had so refused. For the last ten or twelve 648 years the service had been governed by a particular clique at the Admiralty, who obtained the command of the best ships; and, in short, made a sort of active list of their own, qualifying themselves to be brought up for selection, and that was a system of which he complained.
§ MR. SIDNEY HERBERTconfessed he had heard with very great pleasure that the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had undertaken to grapple with the question of the number of officers in the Navy, and the system of promotion; but he was somewhat disappointed with the result, and could not help thinking that if the right hon. Gentleman would bestow more time and attention on the question, he would be able to produce a great improvement in the plan which he had proposed to the Committee. In reply to one of the remarks made by the gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir G. Pechell), he would say there was no popular delusion more widely spread, and in latter days more unfounded, than that everything at the Admiralty was done by interest. He would not speak of the board with which he himself had been connected; but he was bound to say, having watched the promotions that had taken place in the time of Lord Auckland and under the present First Lord of the Admiralty, that there was no ground whatever for saying that Parliamentary or any influence had been used to put incapable officers over the heads of those whose merits were established. Now, the question of retirement was one which was brought under his (Mr. S. Herbert's) notice when at the Admiralty, and the proposition which he made did not touch the question of admirals who had not served their time, because it appeared to the board that the question having been deliberately settled by the Naval and Military Commission, it was most important, in any change that might be made, to reverse as little as possible what had been done by previous authorities, and that they should only take an onward step by reducing the number of officers on the list, and getting younger men up towards the flag, the necessity of which had been admitted. In the year 1811 the average age of the captains promoted to the flags was thirty-nine. Nelson was appointed at that age, so was Sir George Cockburn, and numerous other instances might be adduced. He had no means of knowing at present the average age of the officers promoted; but the result of the retirement of 1846 had 649 been so far satisfactory that it had, he believed, moved the officers up about five years. With respect to the proposed system of putting on a separate list the admirals who have not served six years, he did not see the advantage of taking such a step. It appeared to him merely a question of type, of whether their names should be printed on one side of the list or the other. At present they were eligible for command. It was true that none of them had been selected, but it would be a hardship on them, because there was no necessity to say they should not be eligible to command. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean that they should be ineligible?
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, he thought it might be advisable, with regard to admirals, and more especially with regard to subordinate officers, that in case of a war the Crown might have the power of replacing them on the active list with their own consent.
§ MR. SIDNEY HERBERTBut that would not allow them the right of employment in time of peace, and certainly made their position worse than it was at present. He was not one of those who stood out for the rights of individuals against the good of the service; but in this case individuals would be injured, whilst the effect of the alteration would be to increase, rather than diminish, the number of flag officers. There were now in round numbers 110 active and 40 inactive officers on the list. It was proposed to buy up a number of active officers by pensions of 150l. But it was possible that such a pension might not induce an officer to forego his service, for sometimes aged officers were the least willing to admit or to believe themselves incapable of serving. But supposing ten officers to be bought out, there would still remain 100 on the active list. What then, would happen? There would be 100 active, and 50 inactive. But suppose there stood at the head of the captains' list five men; the four seniors not having served six years, were not entitled to the active list; the fifth would go to the active list, and carry his four seniors to the inactive list, and the result would be, that instead of 100 active and 50 inactive, there would be 100 active and 54 inactive, and this might go on to a very considerable extent. Instead of a diminution, therefore, there would be an increase. When no decided advantage could be given to the public service, the rights of individuals ought to be respected; and he did 650 not see any advantage in separating the names, beyond that of making the Navy list show more clearly those who were in the receipt of a different rate of pay. And that was the grievance of which the officers complained. For instance, it would not be fair to place Admiral Watts, and officers similarly circumstanced, on the separate list; and he did not see why a course should be taken calculated to do violence to the feelings of a great number of officers. Supposing it were desirable to keep the list separate, it might be worthy of consideration whether it would not be better to let the existing officers die off than to remove them suddenly. He did not exactly understand that portion of the plan which related to the other ranks. An extended Navy list was a great evil, not only to the service generally, but to the individuals of whom it was composed. But the difficulty was, how to reduce it. The pressure for promotion was very great on the one hand, and on the other an impatient public did not always do justice to the principles on which promotion should be conducted. It had been said, whatever is done let it be for the promotion of valuable war officers. But it should be remembered that at the close of the war the promotion was so vast, that the list had been clogged ever since. Promotion was not simply a reward to an officer for past services. It is necessary to place in each rank men who are young enough to servo their country. A retirement in the captains' rank was indispensable, because promotion went, according to present custom, by seniority and not by selection. At the same time he admitted the right of selection, which, in case of a war, was absolutely necessary. Indeed, nothing could be more anomalous than our present system, under which a man was selected from the lower ranks when little was known about him, and then went on by seniority. That system, however, could not be touched without a great emergency to justify the interference; but if such emergency should arise, he trusted the Admiralty would not hesitate to go to a lower list, and take the most efficient men. But with respect to the junior ranks, the commanders and lieutenants, where the promotion was by selection, there was no object in a retirement, since you cause and do select for promotion the youngest and most efficient men. It would be bad economy, and inexpedient in other respects, to establish a retirement when it was not absolutely necessary. The 651 smaller the number to which the Navy list could be reduced, provided it presented a sufficient choice of officers, the better could the service be conducted. Of course every man would have more employment and more experience, and the cumbersome arrangement for retirements would be got rid of. With respect to the number now on full pay, he thought the right hon. Gentleman might fix the limit at a lower ratio than he had taken. There were 75 captains on full pay, and 7 employed in the civil service. Surely 350 was an unnecessarily large list from which to select 82. He apprehended the arrangements now made would be binding on all successive Admiralties, as he understood they would have to be carried out by an Order in Council. [Sir FRANCIS BAKING: Certainly.] He did not know whether an Order in Council was required for the abolition of brevets. He thought that brevets were already abolished in the Navy. He believed that a system would soon be adopted in the Army providing for a regular, steady, annual supply of promotions, introducing a stream of young blood from the lower ranks, instead of a periodical, and, as it might be called, a gambling system of promotion. He did not understand whether at present the Admiralty considered that officers going from the active list to the retired list, caused vacancies which enabled them to admit one in three to the active list. The number of those who had already accepted the offer of retirement was 218, and he understood there was a prospect of some 20 more officers availing themselves of the power of doing so. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would make some limitation as to the numbers to whom retirement should be extended, and then that the retirement list should be finally closed, and those who were upon it be allowed to die off without having their places filled up. By the system of promotion at present in operation in the Navy, it was not one in every three that was appointed, as was supposed, but one to every two. He would show how he maintained that allegation. Assuming that 27 captains had died off, there would be nine commanders promoted, and, in their vacancies there would be three lieutenants advanced to the rank of commanders, and one mate made a lieutenant. Thus there would be 13 promotions in all, upon the falling in of the 27 vacancies. Whatever was done now in the 652 way of arranging the Navy List should be done advisedly and with due consideration, for it should be binding on all future Admiralties, because nothing was more mischievous than frequent changes in matters of this nature. It was the more necessary, therefore, that all their plans should be well considered and well devised; and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not object to reconsider part of it, so as to render any future change uncalled for and useless. He would take the liberty of making a few suggestions on the subject. He would propose to leave the whole admirals' list, consisting both of active and non-active officers at 150, as a maximum. But hereafter he would never have the active list exceed 100; and when the 150 came down to that number, he would there have it stop: the non-active officers should be limited to 50, and the existing ones should be allowed to die off from the active list instead of being suddenly removed. The 150 would in a very short time come down to the proposed standard of 100, without doing anything of injustice, or inflicting any unnecessary pain upon the feelings of a body of officers in every way deserving of respect. He would wish to see the captains' list of 350 less than that number, for that was much more than he thought was necessary. On referring to the number of captains, commanders, and lieutenants at present employed, he found it amounted in all to 742. He would, therefore, propose for the captains' active list 250, for the commanders' 300, and for the lieutenants' 1,000; and that, he thought, would be sufficient for all the requirements of the service. It would be perfectly easy to make any selection necessary from these three different ranks. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take his suggestions in good part, and give them due consideration in carrying out this plan.
§ SIR GEORGE TYLERdoubted much whether the plan proposed by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty would have the effect which it was intended, and which the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) desired it should have. It had been said that when captains arrived at the top of their list they were too old, and therefore unfit for active service. This had been ascribed to the great promotions which had taken place in 1815 and subsequently, which had clogged the list. The proposition which was now made was, that all those unfit for employ- 653 ment should he removed to the half-pay list. Now he would ask them to examine in what that alleged unfitness might consist. It might proceed from physical disability or from age, and be well founded or otherwise. He maintained, however, that the act of placing those who had not served on the captains' list, out of the chance of promotion, was an act of injustice to the service. The attainment of a rank on the captains' list was always a great object of ambition in the Navy, and if they removed that they would take away one great incentive to professional advancement. But there were ways and modes of reducing the captains' list without doing so much injustice to the service. An option might be given to captains of retiring if they wished it. Now, that might be a little more expensive, but it would clear the list to the extent required. During the period of the war the average time for remaining on the captains' list was seventeen or eighteen years; whereas an admiral made now-a-days was generally thirty-six years a captain before he got his flag, and under the new system he would be much longer. He would strongly urge upon the Lords of the Admiralty the expediency of reconsidering the arrangements they were now making, with the view of rendering them more just and conclusive. There were services which might be of as much benefit to the country as any other, in which a naval officer might be engaged—such, for instance, as the service of the Customs, or the civil service of the Admiralty; yet the length of time a man might be so employed was never taken into calculation at all. He had been glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman that in case of war those who had been placed on the retired list could be again put on the active list, if they wished it. On the whole, however, he thought the present plan would be better to be reconsidered, and it might then be made less unjust, and more satisfactory to a large class of meritorious officers.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. S. Herbert) had stated his satisfaction that the Admiralty had undertaken to grapple with what he had truly stated to be an evil of immense extent—the state of the Navy List. In undertaking the task he (Sir F. Baring) had been fully aware that the moment he laid upon the table any plan for carrying such an arrangement into effect, he should meet from all quarters— 654 an admission of the evils, indeed—a great many compliments for good intentions, but the greatest disinclination to pass anything which would affect a certain class of those who must be touched. Those objections had been made. He had been asked to reconsider his plan, and he had been told that if he did he would be sure to produce some less objectionable scheme; but none of those gentlemen who had been good enough to give him that advice had proposed any arrangement of their own which they thought would be effectual. It was not to want of consideration that the faults of this plan, if it was faulty, were owing. It was a project which he had refused to bring forward last year, because he was anxious for further information. For a long time it had occupied his attention, and from the middle of last year it had been under consideration at the Admiralty. He might, therefore, say at once that he was not prepared to take this plan back, for there was not one single objection which had been raised that had not been over and over again weighed and considered. If the Committee desired to leave things very much as they were, be it so; but he told them frankly that if they intended to adopt any measure which should be effectual, it would be impossible to do so without dealing with officers high in the service. If there were any parties who had a right to complain, they were the commanders and lieutenants, but especially the commanders, for whom he should have been glad if the circumstances of the case had enabled him to propose a plan more generous. He thought that they had been the most hardly dealt with in the service. Now, what was the proportion? Let them reject the principle if they pleased, but if they adopted it let them act upon it fairly. The principle was, that the Navy List should be reduced—he would not quarrel with a difference of ten or twenty officers—but the list must be reduced to something that should be commensurate with the wants of the service, and for that purpose to remove from the effective list those who were not able to be employed. Now, what did they do with commanders? Those who had not served twenty years were to be placed upon permanent half-pay; yet to that he had not heard one single word of objection. [Mr. S. HERBERT: Upon a higher half-pay?] No; upon the same half-pay as at present, reserving to them all the rights to which they were now entitled upon the active list—reserv- 655 ing to them Greenwich Hospital, a higher rate of pay, and the retirement to a higher rank if they should come to it. Nobody had objected to that. Not a single officer had complained of it; and yet let him repeat that it was among that class of officers that he believed the grievance most materially existed of having frequently asked for service, and been unable to obtain it. But the moment they came to touch the higher classes of the service, then the hardship was spoken of, and he found every sort of objection and difficulty raised. Now he was not prepared, and he would not consent, to deal with the lower class of officers, and to remove them upon permanent half-pay, because they had not served for a certain time, having in many instances most constantly applied at the Admiralty for service, and to leave the higher class of officers untouched. That was his firm determination, and he thought it was not an unfair one. Now let them look at the real hardship—this gross injustice, as it was called. Why, they could not make reductions in any service without, in some cases, running counter to the expectations and feelings of persons. In reducing a civil department, for example, something more was done than hurting the feelings of people, for their pecuniary incomes were touched too, and they were very often thrown upon the world with very small retiring allowances. But in this case no such thing was done. Retired admirals would receive exactly what they now receive. They would rise just as they now would rise; and they would have exactly the same expectations of being employed. He was anxious not to allude to individual cases, but, as two had been mentioned, just let him state, without the slightest disrespect to those gallant officers, the real facts of the case. Admiral Watts was a most gallant officer, but he had been thirty-four years a captain, and during that time he had never served. Could he expect that after thirty-four years, never having been afloat, any Admiralty would think of sending him in command of a fleet?
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSThat is not the question. The grievance is that you publish to the world, by placing him on the yellow list, that you will never employ him.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGWhether it was published or not, the fact was perfectly well known—it was notorious. He had every sympathy with officers who 656 sought service and could not obtain it. With respect to Sir George Westphal, he had been thirty-two years a captain, and served three years afloat: did the hon. and gallant Officer mean to say that he was employed more than that time?
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSHe was in command for about three years, and afterward was captain in the fleet under Sir George Cockburn.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGWhatever might be the length of time he served, would the gallant Officer say that Sir George Westphal was or was not constantly applying for employment, and yet was unable to obtain it?
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, that those officers who had not been employed for thirty-four years could not expect to be now employed; but that was not the situation of Sir George Westphal, for his services did not date thirty-five years ago. If, however, the right hon. Baronet had not concluded his speech, perhaps he (Sir De L. Evans) had better defer any remarks he might have to make.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, he had merely asked the simple question whether Sir George Westphal had been employed for more than three years; and the hon. and gallant Member said he had served under Sir George Cockburn. It appeared, then, as Sir George Cockburn was not inattentive to the claims of officers under his command, that if Sir George Westphal had been anxious to get afloat, he might have got a ship had he applied for one, both on public as well as on private grounds. He (Sir F. Baring) did not think he was called upon to say that that was a case of great grievance. But he did not wish to rest this matter upon personal cases at all. But when personal cases were quoted against him as cases of hardship, he was compelled to comment upon them; and he was desirous of showing that there had been many cases of officers who had been most anxious to servo, and had constantly applied for employment, which they had been unable to obtain. Those who had been the most hardly dealt with were not the persons who had complained the hardest. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. S. Herbert) had made some complaint of the manner in which the lower classes of officers had been dealt with in the plan, and had remarked that it very little mattered whether they were put on the active or the inactive list. The right hon. Gentleman had had experience; but his (Sir F. 657 Baring's) experience certainly did not concur with that of the right hon. Gentleman in this matter. There were many commanders who had served well, and could claim promotion for past services; but if in dealing with their position they were put upon the active list, they would not remain long capable of performing their duties, and his anxiety in the selection he had proposed was to be able to promote a certain number of older commanders, and not to continue them on the active list, but allow them to retire upon the small additional pay of a higher rank, which rank they would value more than emolument as a mark of the approbation of the Admiralty and of the Crown, of their conduct. He believed that this plan would work well. He had very often, in promoting these officers, to feel that his duty and his feelings were hardly tasked, for that while the older men had stronger claims, yet, looking to the future efficiency of the service, it was more desirable to promote the younger; and this difficulty he had thought might be met by giving the retiring rank which he proposed. The arrangements were, that as soon as the list of 200 captains should he filled up, for every two that dropped, one new captain might be placed upon the retired list, and he proposed to keep open that retirement until the captains upon the active list should be brought down to the fixed number; but he did not intend that the retirement should count for promotion until they had got down to that fixed number. It was difficult to determine what that number should be, but he believed that he had not fixed it too high. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) had said that in making this arrangement it would be advisable to come to a final conclusion, but he was not quite sure of that. If it should hereafter appear that there were more on the list than were necessary for the service, he did not consider that any Admiralty would be bound to continue that number; but it would be the duty of those who should be then in office to consider, with reference to the wants of the service, whether they could fairly reduce the number. He was quite convinced that there could be no greater calamity to the service of the Navy than the keeping up of an overgrown list of officers, whom they could not employ, who only clogged the wheels of the fair current of promotion, and thus inflicted a serious injury upon the public service.
§ MR. MACGREGORgave the right hon. 658 Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty great credit for attempting to introduce a plan which would eventually reduce the active list; but he should like to have a guarantee against its increasing in future. He considered the subject to be one of very great importance. What was called the active list comprised no fewer than 140 admirals, besides vice and rear admirals, 1,390 lieutenants, and 231 masters—altogether there were 3,504 officers on the list, exclusive of several others not on the list. This ought not to be called an active list. It should be thinned down, reserving the greatest proportion of commanders and lieutenants. By the plan proposed by the Admiralty, the officers would be placed in a better position than they now enjoyed. There was no immediate economy: the plan would merely operate to prevent the increase of the non-efficient force. Such an active list as ours must be laughed at by every country in Europe. How was the French navy officered? They had two admirals, 10 vice-admirals, 20 rear-admirals; 32 in all. All the others were pensioned off, never to be employed again. They promoted from a list of 100 captains, who ranked as captains of ships of the line. These were supplied from 230 captains of frigates, who were chosen out of 650 lieutenants. These were selected from 550 cadets, not by seniority, but entirely with reference to merit; and again they fell back upon 300 cadets, who were kept at the naval schools, on a model something like that at Woolwich. In all, there were 1,862 officers in the French navy, including those employed at the five marine arsenals. The same system prevailed in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and in the United States of America, only the number was much smaller in proportion. The only country that kept up a large non-effective establishment was Russia. There were 73 admirals upon the Russian list; but three-fourths of those had arrived at the rank without its being ever supposed that it was intended they should go to sea; and several never had been to sea at all. Every Government in Europe was astonished at our having such an establishment. He hoped the Admiralty would be careful not to bring on the Navy such a calamity as occurred in 1815. The greatest credit was due to the right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Baring) and his predecessor (Lord Auckland) for their efforts at economy under a very bad system—efforts which had resulted in a reduction of 2,250,000l. 659 in the Navy and Army expenditure. The present state of our naval force was greater than that of all other countries, and our naval dockyards might be retrenched with advantage. He thought that the Government should go much further in that direction; but he was glad, at the same time, to bear his testimony to the fact that no First Lord of the Admiralty had ever shown more care and earnestness in effecting judicious retrenchments than the right hon. Gentleman who at preent held that office.
MR. CORRYsaid, that if the Government were determined to reduce the active list of admirals to 100, he would decidedly prefer the plan of the Admiralty to that of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), whose proposal would in his opinion, be attended with great injustice to individuals, because, when the plan of retirement of 1846 was introduced, captains upon the active list were told they were to succeed to flags upon certain conditions; and the hon. Gentleman proposed that such successions should only take place in one out of every three vacancies. The hon. Member's proposal would also be injurious to the public service, because it would stagnate promotion, and would neutralise altogether the intention and effects of the retirement of 1846. He (Mr. Corry) considered that, although the rule requiring that an officer should have served six years before he was promoted to a flag might be attended with hardship to individuals, it was a rule which it was most important for the interests of the public service to maintain. He begged to ask the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty how many admirals the right hon. Gentleman meant to have on the active list?
SIR FRANCIS BARINGreplied, that he proposed to reduce the flag list to 99 officers; but if the Committee did not accede to that proposal, the majority against him might be inclined to support the plan of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Hume), to which, however, he entertained strong objections.
§ MR. SIDNEY HERBERTthought it was not fair on the part of the right hon. Baronet to charge those who objected to his plan with wishing to treat on a different principle the case of officers of the higher and the lower ranks.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, admitting that the Government were taking a right course in grappling with what had long been felt as 660 a great grievance, he could not see what advantage there was in creating two lists when the Commission of 1840 had set aside the system of two lists, which previously existed, and had established one list. He wished to know what security the country was to have that promotions would not be carried on as they hitherto had been? He considered promotion by brevet to be one of the great grievances of the service, and one which occasioned an enormous increase of the list of officers; he therefore was very well pleased to hear that promotion by brevet was to be abolished. In 1833, a Committee, consisting principally of naval and military officers, recommended that, in consequence of the number of flag officers, no further promotions should take place; but extensive brevet promotions had since been made. In 1837, there were 193 officers promoted in the Navy by brevet, many of whom were known to be altogether unfit for service. In 1838 170 more were promoted; in 1841, 293; and in 1846, 246 in the Navy alone. The Committee of 1838 recommended, as one mode of stopping the increase of officers, that the number of cadets should be limited. If the order of the Admiralty of the 27th of February, 1830, were carried out, the reduction would easily be effected, for their Lordships then determined that no promotion should be made unless for special brilliant services in any rank of commissioned officers, save flag officers, except in the proportion of one promotion to every three vacancies. He wished to know why that order had not been acted upon? It was impossible to avoid seeing that promotion in the Navy had been given to serve individuals, and not for the advantage of the public, because, if the promotion had been made for the sake of the public, the officers promoted would have been employed. It was stated before the Commission in 1840, that of 683 naval captains, 313 had never served one day after their promotion, 260 had served less than five years, 92 between five and ten years, and eighteen between ten and eighteen years. Of 806 commanders then on the list, seventeen had served from five to fifteen years, 297 from one to five years, and 492 had never served a day after their promotion. Did not this show that promotion was given upon a vicious principle? They knew that aristocratic influence prevailed, that certain families were able to get their relatives made lieutenants or captains, and that from the moment of their 661 promotion such officers became pensioners upon the public for life. Hon. Gentlemen would be surprised, he had no doubt, if he were to show them the mode in which these promotions had taken place. Many officers had been promoted to the rank of admirals after two, three, and four years' service. It appeared from a return published in 1848 that one admiral who had entered the Navy in 1780 had served as lieutenant for three years, as commander for seven months, as captain for seven years, and had received half-pay for forty-nine years. Another, who had only served one year and five months, had received half-pay for more than fifty years. Another retired rear-admiral, who had only served six years and eight months, had received half-pay for thirty-seven years. He found that twenty-one officers mentioned in that return had served on the average six years and nine months each, and had been in the receipt of half-pay for forty-two years and two months each. Now, was it possible that the revenue of any country could sustain such a system as this? Then many commanders and captains had only served four years, three years, or two years, and one only for eleven months. He found a case of a commander who entered the Navy in May, 1810, who served for eight months as lieutenant, for two years as commander, and had enjoyed half-pay for twenty-one years and ten months. One commander had served four years, and had received half-pay for thirty-seven years, and another had served two years, and had been in receipt of half-pay for thirty-eight years and a half. One lieutenant had served a year and three months, and had received half-pay for thirty-five years, and another had served fifteen months, and had received half-pay for thirty-eight years. The First Lord of the Admiralty had more patronage than the Queen, the Commander-in-Chief, or the Master General of the Ordnance; and he (Mr. Hume) considered that officers now on the list ought to be called upon to serve, instead of new officers being appointed merely for the purpose of being pensioned off. During the war they had never more than thirty admirals, of whom only fourteen were employed, and he proposed that no more promotions should take place till the number of admirals was reduced to fifty. He (Mr. Hume) should be sorry to divide the Committee, and hardly saw why there should be any division. All were agreed 662 as to the evil, and desired to apply a remedy with as little hardship upon individuals as possible. All he wanted was, that the Admiralty order of 1830 should be carried out; and if that were done, the objections of his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir De L. Evans) would be removed, as well as the objections of the officers generally, and the Admiralty would have it in their power to infuse new blood into the service.
ADMIRAL GORDONsaid, he was aware of the great difficulty of devising any means of dealing with that question which might not appear to operate severely against some individuals. But it should be remembered that it was the paramount duty of the Admiralty to secure the services of efficient officers. He knew of no better means of effecting that object than the adoption of an extensive system of retirement in time of peace. Without any wish to say anything that could be offensive to individuals, he believed it might with perfect truth be stated that not many of our admirals at present possessed that activity of body and of mind which had so eminently characterised our admirals throughout the war. He was not disposed to criticise the details of this measure very closely; but he should be glad to find the plan of the Admiralty, as explained to them that evening by the right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Baring), come into operation at an earlier period than the right hon. Gentleman had proposed. The plan would come into effect so gradually that it would not afford an early opportunity of bringing forward young and efficient officers. He thought that some modification might reasonably be made in the proposal, under which a service of six years would be required on the part of captains before they could be promoted to the rank of admirals. In his opinion the time ought to be reduced, or the service of a commander ought to some extent to be allowed to count in the matter. But, in any case, he thought that the service required should be actual service in a sea-going ship, and not with a pennant flying without ever putting out to sea.
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSsaid, there had been a general admission on both sides of the House that the plan of the Admiralty was desirable; the opinion was equally general against that part of it which referred to compulsory retirement, and in favour of its modification. All the Committees which had sat had concurred in thinking that the 663 regulation adopted in the Army was the preferable one. The allowance of 400l. a year to general officers was only given after six years' service as a field officer; but there was a regulation, that if they had been withdrawn from active service as field officers, in consequence of a Governmental reduction of the Army, they should be allowed the benefit of six years' service, inasmuch as their withdrawal from service was not an act of their own, but one over which they had no control. As there was no regulation of this sort at the Admiralty, many meritorious officers were precluded from employment.
§ SIR G. PECHELLsaid, the right hon. Gentleman (Sir F. Baring) had challenged him to produce a plan of his own. He would, therefore, refer the right hon. Gentleman to the plan which he had already proposed in the year 1847 for dealing with the old commanders and lieutenants. That was that the large amount annually received as freight money for the conveyance of treasure should be applied to the payment of old commanders and lieutenants, from the year 1819 to 1851. 1,440,000l. had been received for the conveyance of specie; of that sum, 361,000l. had gone to Greenwich Hospital, a like sum to admirals and commanders, and 72,000l. to the captains of the vessels who brought the treasure. It was clear, therefore, that 1,000,000l. might have been applied within those years to the payment of old war officers. If the amount derivable from this source were to be distributed among the service, it would be productive of advantage; but as long as it was given to favourite captains, admirals, and commodores, the service could not be benefited. He saw no reason why the captains of Queen's ships should be paid freight money. Within the last couple of years the sum of 17,000l. had been shared among six captains. Unless some steps were taken to prevent it, this fund would soon slip out of their hands.
§ MR. COBDENthought it was understood when the Committee was appointed, that reduction, not increase, of expenditure, in the Navy was contemplated. The Report of that Committee, which he held in his hand, referred to the subject of the reduction of the number of admirals and commanders, and to the policy of promoting only one captain to the rank of admiral on three vacancies in the list of admirals. He had heard no good or sufficient reason why that suggestion was not acted upon. 664 A similar recommendation was made by a Minute of Council in 1830, but there seemed some insuperable objection to adopting it. He admitted there was great difficulty in dealing with the claims of officers who were in the service, and who, by reason of that service, expected to derive advantages; and the most ardent financial reformer would acknowledge that there might be some injustice and inhumanity in effecting any considerable immediate saving. But the proposition then before the Committee was to increase the charge by 6,500l. per annum; so that it was clear, if any benefit was to be derived to the country by economy, it would be prospective. Whilst he was not prepared to offer any opposition to the vote claimed by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir F. Baring), yet he wished to stipulate that, in future, they should have all the advantages to be derived from the system. If hon. Members referred to the Minutes of the Committee, of which Lord Castlereagh and Sir George Cockburn were Members, they would find that a reduction in the number of cadets was also recommended; so that the recommendation to diminish the number of admirals was accompanied by a recommendation to diminish the number of cadets also. However, he feared that, if they continued to go on as at present, they would find themselves at the end of the next ten years in no better position than they were now. Besides, they would have this immense incumbrance of officers who had entered the service, having their claims to half-pay, and looking out for promotion; and then exactly the same appeal that was made now would be made over again. The recommendation of the Committee as to the cadets was to the effect that, in fixing the number of cadets to be annually admitted to the Navy, a margin must be left to the Lords of the Admiralty, because any immutable rule would admit a number that might be too many in one year, and that might be too few in a subsequent year; but that great care should be taken not to go beyond the average of a given number of years to any extent. Lord Auckland considered 100 as the maximum number of first entries of cadets that was either necessary or desirable. Now, last year the number admitted was 92, which was much too near the maximum. He thought, allowing for casualties, they might calculate on 60 cadet applicants setting up their claims annually. But, in his opinion, the time was fast approaching when the public 665 would regard this question very differently from the light in which they at present viewed it. If persons entered the Navy, without there being service for them, the same rule would before long be applied to them as to parties in the civil service; and if the services of such gentlemen were not needed in the Navy, the public, he thought, would not consent to pay them in any way, either on half-pay or otherwise. Therefore, in justice to those young men who were about to enter as cadets, as well as to the public, the Board of Admiralty should adopt some measure to restrict their admission to the naval service.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, it was quite true that Lord Auckland had named 100 as the maximum number of cadets to be admitted. His (Sir F. Baring's) experience of two years led him to believe that the Navy did not want so many as that; and therefore since he had been in office the Admiralty had not come to Parliament with reference to the number of cadets, but had already reduced it. His impression was, that some little experience would be necessary before they could ascertain what the real number requisite was; but he entirely concurred in the view, that although there might be some hardship to certain' parties in the service in making changes, yet it was necessary that the first admission to the service should be checked.
§ SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFEthought the right hon. Baronet deserved great praise for dealing with the commanders and the lieutenants in the same manner. But why, when he was making a new rule for one class, did he not make a new rule for another class? Why did he not say, if a captain had not served for thirty years afloat, that that should debar him from hoisting his flag? But why should the existing old Order in Council continue in force, which might deprive one class of officers of the advantages which all other classes received? He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would reconsider that part of his plan.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGwas sorry to say that he could not consent to reconsider that part of the plan which the hon. Gentleman had referred to.
§ Vote agreed to.
§
(2). Motion made, and Question proposed—
That a sum, not exceeding 842,193l. be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Naval Stores for the Building, Repair, and Outfit of the
666
Fleet, the Purchase of Steam Machinery, and for other purposes connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1852.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, that he should propose to the Committee a reduction of one-third of the amount required. Upon a former vote being brought forward he had submitted to the Committee the propriety of reducing, if possible, the amount of the Naval Estimates, as he thought a great reduction might be effected in that department. He was sorry to say that very little had, however, been effected, but he thought this was a good opportunity to make a reduction, without at all interfering with the efficiency of the Navy. The Committee to which allusion had before been made, had called attention to the large amount of the Estimates for Stores. They said that the gross estimate for 1840–1 was under 1,000,000l., and in 1837 was under 500,000l. Since then an immense number of ships had been built, and a large number were lying in ordinary. He asked why they were not to reduce the number of ships being built to what was actually required by the service? It appeared by the first paragraph in that report that the expenses of the Navy Estimates, which were pointed out as being very heavy, were then 8,800,000l. In 1832 they amounted to 4,000,000l., and had never exceeded 5,000,000l. after 1839 until the year before the Committee, when they were increased to 8,000,000l. Why was this expenditure continued? The number of ships that had been launched increased the expenses to a frightful amount. He wished to return, as recommended by the Committee of that House, to the standard of former times, and to reduce the amount of stores and the number of workmen in accordance with the wants of the service. In 1833 the number of shipwrights was 2,650; but at the time when the Committee on the Navy Estimates sat, the number was 3,372, being an increase of 722. In 1833 the quantity of oak timber used was 18,000 loads, and in 1847 it was 33,000 loads, causing the amount of expenditure to be increased by more than 500,000l. In 1833, the whole of the Naval Stores amounted to 400,000l.; in 1837, they were 500,000l.; and after 1847 they exceeded 1,000,000l. Ships were now built only to rot and decay; and the public had to bear a great unnecessary expense. He should be glad to hear why the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of 667 the Admiralty had not agreed to the suggestion of the Committee, who said that, as soon as certain ships were built, they were satisfied that considerable economy might be effected. Why should we have more ships than we could manage? There were fifty-five line-of-battle ships now ready for service; and five more were being built. He thought we ought to adopt the example set by the United States, in which country, as soon as the war terminated, the building of ships of war was put a stop to, their dockyards reduced nearly one-half, and two line-of-battle ships then afloat were put out of commission. The amount of our expenditure being 8,000,000l., when formerly it was only 4,000,000l., he thought that some reduction ought to take place, and should move that the sum required to be now voted should be reduced by one-third.
§
Afterwards Motion made, and Question put—
That a sum, not exceeding 561,462l. be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Naval Stores for the Building, Repair, and Outfit of the Fleet, the Purchase of Steam Machinery, and for other purposes connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1852.
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSquite agreed with his hon. Friend (Mr. Hume) that no portion of our naval expenses required so much reduction as our Naval Stores. The amount expended on our dockyards, and the wages paid to the workmen, amounted, since 1816, to the enormous sum of 56,200,000l. If they took stock of their ships, during the peace, they would not be able to account for two-thirds of that money. The amount of timber and stores furnished to the dockyards during the last ten years, was 12,574,000l., and during the ten preceding-years, from 1820 to 1830, was 5,400,000l.; giving a larger amount on the average than during the ten years from 1830 to 1840. The Committee should now put a stop to this system of wasteful expenditure in our dockyards. The amount he had mentioned did not include the armament of the Navy, which came under the Ordnance Department. Referring to the period when the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon (Sir J. Graham) was the First Lord of the Admiralty, there had been a reduction in the Naval Stores in 1832 to the amount of 477,000l., and 1837 to 391,000l. He cordially supported the proposition of his hon. Friend. The timber had been supplied to the dockyards for a long succession of years from the same house, and he did 668 not believe that any one house could always supply such a quantity of timber cheaper than another if the contracts were properly advertised and made public.
§ MR. TRELAWNYsaid, that several circumstances connected with our dockyards had come under his own observation. There was one thing in which he thought that more economy was practicable, namely, in re-commissioning ships. A ship came home in an efficient state, her standing rigging being in good order, and she might be capable of work for years to come, but her rigging was taken down, cut to pieces, and thrown aside. He had been told by some common sailors who had seen it done, that "it made their hair stand on end to see such quantities of good rope thrown away." He believed that the Government were now in the habit of re-commissioning ships. He also thought that by hauling the ships upon slips while they were in harbour considerable expense in coppering and in wear and tear might be saved. An enormous sum of money had been wasted in constructing artificial docks at Plymouth, instead of taking advantage of the natural dock existing in Plymouth Sound, which, at a small expense, might have been made the finest dock in the world. He also thought that our smaller ships might be built by contract, and he believed some of them were now so built. There was another thing in which a saving might be effected. No common fisherman would go to sea until he had tanned his sails, and sails so tanned would last considerably longer than if they remained white. He saw no reason, as it would look just as picturesque, why a man-of-war should not have her sails tanned. At present, after a certain number of years' service, the harbour-masters were changed or dismissed, and thus were deprived of their situation just when they had become acquainted with the local peculiarities of the harbour under their charge, and which it would take some years for any other person to learn. He wished to mention another thing with regard to our harbours. A quantity of mud was allowed to collect near them, and some time or other a man-of-war would be striking against one of them. He hoped that this would soon be remedied by the Government.
ADMIRAL BERKELEYsaid, that the attack which had been made upon the Government in regard to the naval force that was to be maintained by the country, 669 had been so frequently urged and answered, that he had little to say on the present occasion. It was very clear that if, unfortunately, this country should be again involved in war, they must have a fleet of twenty-four or twenty-five sail of the line in the Mediterranean, and at least thirty-five sail of the line in the English Channel. That being so, the Committee could not well say that the present number of ships was more than necessary, in case such an event should unhappily come to pass. The total amount of our line-of-battle ships was seventy sail. Of these there were some twelve or fourteen small seventy-fours, which had been left since the last war. Those ships could no longer go into line to cope with the ships of other nations, which were of a much superior class and heavier tonnage. It was not the fault of the Government that those ships now existed. They had been kept through a long protracted war, while other nations whose ships had been destroyed had been supplied with a new and a better navy. Looking to the position of this country in regard to other nations, he did not think the Committee would be of opinion that the Government maintained one ship too many. It was true they had twenty ships on the stocks, but those were not to be launched, except such as were being built with screw propellers; and, that being a new invention, it was deemed right that one or two of those large class ships should he launched, to ascertain how the screw would act with vessels of that size. A great deal had been said about the large sums wasted in building ships; but it should be remembered that only one-fourth of the expense was incurred by the building of the ship; the other three-fourths were swallowed up in the repairs. Hon. Gentlemen had talked about the increase of expense for the Navy in building, and for the wear and tear; but they forgot, while comparing the expense of the present day with that incurred some eighteen or twenty years ago, that there was at that period no such thing as a steam navy. The expense of a steamship was twice that of a sailing ship. It had been proposed that the ships should be hauled up on slips, which it was alleged would save the copper bottoms and wear and tear in harbour. He agreed that that would be an economical plan, so far as the ships themselves were concerned, if those who suggested it could prevail upon the House of Commons to vote the requisite sum of money to de- 670 fray the expense, which he believed would be enormous. Then, again, it was proposed by the hon. Gentleman who spoke last that the sails should be tanned. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman had never been upon a topsail-yard reefing a sail? He (Admiral Berkeley) should like to see the hon. Gentleman gather up a tanned sail in a gale of wind.
§ MR. MACGREGORsaid, that he wished to dispel the idea that the hon. and gallant Admiral had given of the naval weakness of England. The speech of the hon. and gallant Admiral, he thought, was as superannuated a one as he had ever heard. He said that we required a fleet in the Channel and in the Mediterranean to defend us against invasion. He (Mr. Macgregor) readily admitted that we ought to be prepared to repel any invasion, and would prove that we were able to do so against the united fleets of Europe. He bad no charge to bring against the Admiralty; but he wished to show to the country that the condition of our naval force was strong, and not weak, as the hon. and gallant Admiral attempted to make it out; nor was it creditable to us to be declaring to the world that we had no efficient defence against invasion. What was the condition of the British Navy? There were 11 ships of the line, of 120 guns, one of 110 guns, 50 of 104 guns, four of 92, two of 90, 11 of 84, nine of 80, seven of 78, 18 of 72, two of 70, being 70 of the line, and 13 on the stocks and nearly finished, which gives a total of 83 sailing ships of the line. Frigates afloat—25 of 50, 10 of 44, 22 of 42, four of 40, one of 38, one of 36; total, 63 frigates afloat. On the stocks we had two double-banked 60 gun frigates, equal to ships of the line, and six of 50, making altogether 71 frigates, 65 of which would be found far more than sufficient to destroy the whole Russian fleet. Besides the foregoing we have 21 corvettes of 24 to 28 guns, eight of 18 to 22, 18 sloops of war from 14 to 18, 59 brigs of 6 to 16, 11 sailing packets, besides surveying ships, troop ships, yachts, and tenders. In all 78,407 tons in commission, and 25,630 tons in ordinary; or, in all, 329,020 tons, exclusive of ships on the stocks and steamships. Now, he believed that Sir William Symonds and others considered that 60 of our largest frigates were sufficiently powerful to plant them against all the ships of the line belonging to Russia. They were, in fact, fully equal to ships of the line of any other Power but 671 Prance and America; and there were only four American ships superior to them. The steam fleet of England is formidable; but we are building war steamers with such rapidity as to render many of them obsolete, when compared with merchant steamships that were building, with improvements made every day in their machinery. We had also a great number of ships belonging to private merchants and companies which were equal to most of the war ships of any country in Europe. We had 147 steamships belonging to the Royal Navy (including three in Canada), and 32 iron steamers, 11 ranging from 1,547 to 1,980. Of these four wore formerly 76 gunships, and have now engines of 450 horse-power. The largest of our steam ships of war, the Simoom, of 1,980 tons, has only 350 horse-power. The Terrible, however, of 1,850 tons, has engines of 800 horse-power; the Termagant, of 1,547, has 620 horse-power; while the Arrogant, 1,872, has only 360 horse-power. The Retribution, of 1,641 tons, has 400 horsepower. One of the above 11, the Penelope, was a 46 gun frigate; besides which we had 15 war steamers from above 1,200 and under 1,500 tons, 27 above 1,000 and under 1,200 tons, 23 above 700 and under 1,000 tons, nine above 500 and under 700 tons, 27 from 250 and under 500 tons, 22 from 150 and under 250 tons, four from 42 to 149; three on the Lakes of Canada, one of 406 and of 90 horse-power, and one of 750 and 200 horse-power; 12 packets, 237 to 720, some of which are very fine vessels; 58,643 in commission, to 58,501 in ordinary. Of these steamships, there are built of iron the Simoom, 1,984, and the Vulture, 1,764, both 350 horse-power; the Greenock, 1,418, and 550 horse-power; the Birkenhead, 1,405, and 556 horsepower; the Niagara, 1,395, and 35 horsepower; the Trident, 850, and 350 horsepower; the Antelope, 650, and 264 horsepower; the Jackal, and Lizard, 340, and 150 horse-power; the Bloodhound, 378, and 150 horse-power; the Grappler, 557 tons, and 200 horse-power; the Sharpshooter, 503, and 202 horse-power; the Harpey, 344, and 220 horse-power; the Myrmidon, about 350, and 180 horsepower; the Sphinx and Fairy, about 300, and about 110 horse-power; and four small vessels of 20 to 90 horsepower. Six of the packets are iron vessels. We have also several screw steamers on the stocks, viz., one 80 guns screw at 672 Devonport, one 80 guns screw at Woolwich, and one 80 guns at Pembroke. In all we have 150 steamships. Then there was the mercantile steam power, all ready for to defend our coasts and trade. These steam-vessels registered in the port of London on the 1st of January. 1851, was 333; 117 under 100 tons, 64 from 100 to 200, 26 from 200 to 250, 27 from 250 to 300, 16 from 300 to 350, 9 from 350 to 400, 10 from 400 to 450, 8 from 450 to 500, 3 from 500 to 550, 7 from 550 to 600, 3 from 600 to 650,6 from 650 to 700, 2 from 700 to 750, 5 from 750 to 800, 3 from 850 to 900, 1 from 900 to 950, 8 from 1,000 to 1,500, 6 from 1,500 to 1,800, 11 from 1,800 to 2,000, and 1 above 2,000 tons. In Liverpool, there were 92 steam vessels, 20 under 100 tons, 49 from 100 to 200, 12 from 200 to 400, 6 from 400 to 600, 3 from 600 to 800, 1 of 1,300 tons, and 1 of 1,609 tons. At Bristol there were 31 steam-vessels, 11 under 100 tons, 14 above 100 tons and under 300, 3 from 300 to 500, 2 from 500 to 600,1 (Great Britain) of 2,936. At Hull there were 34 steam-vessels, 8 under 100 tons, 7 from 100 to 200 tons, 8 from 200 to 400, 8 from 400 to 700, 2 from 700 to 1,000, and 1 of 1,320 tons. At Shields there were 50 steam vessels, 48 under 100 tons, 1 of 388, and 1 of 106 tons. At Sunderland there were 32 steam vessels under 100 tons. At Newcastle-on-Tyne there were 138 steam vessels, 130 under 100 tons, 6 from 100 to 300, 2 from 300 to 500; at Southampton there were 23 steam vessels, 9 under 100 tons, 9 from 100 to 300, 5 from 300 to 500; at Glasgow there were 88 steam vessels, 14 under 100 tons, 48 from 100 to 300,16 from 300 to 700. 3 from 700 to 1,000, 5 from 1,000 to 2,000, 2 from 2,000 to 2,500; at Leith there were 23 steam vessels, 8 under 100 tons, 12 from 100 to 500 tons, 3 from 500 to 1,000 tons; at Aberdeen there were 16 steam vessels, 3 under 100 tons, 4 from 100 to 300, 3 from 300 to 600, 5 from 600 to 1,000, and 1 of 1,117 tons; at Dublin there were 44 steam vessels, 3 under 100 tons, 15 from 100 to 300, 13 from 300 to 500, 13 from 500 to 800 tons; at Dundee there were 10 steam vessels, 5 under 100 tons, 2 from 100 to 300, 3 from 500 to 800; at other ports there were 270 steam vessels, 139 under 100 tons, 61 above 100 and under 250, 45 from 250 to 500, 22 from 500 to 750, and 3 from 750 to 1,000. That was the whole mercantile naval power of England. We had a 673 powerful fleet, equal to large ships of war, of merchant sailing ships, constructed so as to be used as double-banked frigates; Such were the fleets of Messrs. Green, Somes, and other firms in London; of Smiths, of Newcastle; of shipowners in the Clyde, Liverpool, and Bristol. With respect to the Naval Expenditure, the present First Lord of the Admiralty had proved an economist; but he had to contend with a vicious system. We had created far too many admirals and other officers, without any possibility of their being ever required for service. Let us look to this. Of flag-officers in commission, there were 2 admirals, whose pay was 5,340l.; 3 vice-admirals, 7,665l.; 4 rear-admirals, 8,760l.; 1 rear-admiral, 1,825l.; 5 commodores, 3,285l.; 11 flag lieutenants, 2,207l. 10s.; in dockyards, 2 rear-admirals, 2,190l.; 2 commodores, 1,277l. 10s.; 3 flag lieutenants, 565l. 15s.; 58 captains, 30,124l. 13s. 4d.; 82 commanders, 24,692l. 5s.; 376 lieutenants, 13,249l. 10s. Total 540, pay 101,482l. 3s. 4d. There were on the active list, 140 admirals, whose pay was76,040l. 7s. 6d.; 399 captains,82,371l. 7s. 6d.; 669 commanders, 107,830l. 2s. 6d.; 1,390 lieutenants, 13,462l. 15s.; 231 masters, 23,889l. 5s.; 5 mates, 228l. 2s. 6d.; 47 chaplains, 5,529l. 15s.; 4 inspectors of hospitals, 1,332l. 5s.; 237 surgeons, 31,262l. 5s.; 43 assistant surgeons, 2,655l. 7s. 6d.; 317 paymasters and pursers, 34,602l.; 6 secretaries, 1,058l. 10s.; 15 naval instructors, 855l. 2s. 6d. Total, 3,504, and 506,711l. 5s. Retired List—50 captains, 9,581l. 5s.; 314 commanders, 42,769l. 5s.; 47 commanders (late masters), 7,747l. 2s. 6d.; 7 lieutenants in holy orders, 666l. 2s. 6d.; 2 masters in holy orders, 237l. 5s.; 4 inspectors of hospitals, 935l. 6s. 3d.; 7 deputy inspectors of hospitals, 1,843l. 5s.; 2 physicians, 547l. 10s.; 48 surgeons, 5,675l. 15s.; 116 surgeons unfit for further service, 12,464l. 15s.; 33 assistant surgeons, 1,825l.; 4 dispensers, 365l.; 29 paymasters and pursers, 4,498l. 12s. 6d.—total 653, pay 89,183l. 3s. 9d. Marine officers—7 major generals, 4,744l. 7s. 6d.; 4 colonels, 2,472l. 17s. 6d.; 6 lieutenant-colonels, 1,878l. 4s. 6d.; 2 majors, 465l. 7s. 6d.; 12 captains (brevet majors), 2,743l. his. 8d.; 108 captains, 17,288l. 16s. 8d.; 135 first lieutenants, 11,509l. 13s. 4d.; 102 second lieutenants, 5,627l. 2s. 6d. Total 1,029, pay 135,903l. 5s. Retirement under Admiralty circular of August, 1846–44 rear-admirals, 20,075l.; 95 captains (36 674 with rank of admiral with increase of pay), 3,465l.; 45 captains, 1,478l. 2s. 10d. Total, 184,69,532l. 10s. Abstract—Active list, not in service, 3,504, at a cost of 506,711l. 5s.; retired list, 1,024, 135,903l. 5s.; ditto under circular, 184, 69,532l. 10s. 9d. Total pay for officers not employed, 712,147l. Now, passing over this expenditure, let them compare our efficient naval strength with that of other countries. With respect to the Russian navy, the present Emperor seems endeavouring to realise the favourite object of Peter I. "But," it has been said by M. Custine, "however powerful the man may be, he has, sooner or later, to acknowledge that nature is more powerful still." As long as Russia keeps within her natural limits, the Russian navy will continue the mere hobby of the Emperor; and in his (Mr. Macgregor's) mind the view of the naval power of Russia, gathered together at the cul-de-sac of the Gulf for the amusement of the Czar, at the gate of his capital, had caused only a painful impression. "The vessels," says M. Custine, "which will inevitably be lost in a few winters, without having rendered any service, suggested to his mind images, not of the power of a great country, but of the useless toils of the poor unfortunate people condemned to labour. The ice is a more terrible enemy to this navy than a foreign Power; for a time the pupil returns to his prison, the plaything to its owner, and the first begins to wage its more serious war upon the Imperial finances." Lord Durham once remarked, that "the Russian ships of war were but the playthings of the Russian Sovereign. During three months' naval exercise the young pupils remain performing evolutions in the neighbourhood of Cronstadt, the more advanced extend their voyage of discovery to Riga, and some few ships go as far as Copenhagen, and a solitary ship now and then strays into the Atlantic. To admire Russia in approaching it by water, it is necessary to forget the approach to England by the Thames—the first is the image of death, the last of life. The thoughts of the navy being destined to perish without ever having been in action, appeared to him like a dream. If the sight of such an armament impressed him with any sentiment, it was not the fear of war, but the curse of tyranny." The maxim of Peter the Great was, "The sea at any cost;" and he founded the maritime capital of the Sclavonians in a marsh, among the Finns, and in 675 the vicinity of the Swedes. But the outlet to the sea is closed during eight months in the year. The Russian navy had been made into a great bugbear; but if they investigated it they would find that much more had been made of it than it really called for. The last return of the state of the Russian navy in 1850, showed that this force consisted of four ships of the line of 120 guns, one in the Baltic, and three in the Black Sea; six of the line of 110 guns, three in the Baltic, and three in the Black Sea; 15 84 gunships in the Baltic (none in the Black Sea); 19 74 gunships, 12 in the Baltic, and 7 in the Black Sea; 48 frigates, ranging from 44 to 60 guns, 30 in the Baltic, and 18 in the Black Sea; and about 60 smaller vessels. Twenty-two steamboats in all, great and small, about half of which were built in England. Upon the whole naval list, there were 63 admirals, three-fourths of whom have never been at sea, many of whom, being civilians, hold commissions merely to give them rank; 72 captains of the first class, 80 of the second, and 211 lieutenants. The number of men decreed by ukase for the fleet is fixed at 50,000, but at least 40,000 of these have not been brought up to the sea; and, according to the report which he had received, the officers have little scientific skill, and less nautical experience; and even sailors on board of the Russian ships are considered as destitute of maritime knowledge and activity, and without practice in the art of gunnery. The navy of Sweden was as follows:—10 ships, 8 frigates, 8 brigs and corvettes, 6 schooners, 8 mortar boats, 22 transports, 256 gunboats, &c, 12 steamers; total, 330. The navy of Norway was 2 frigates, 3 corvettes, 1 brig, 5 schooners, 4 steamers, 4 steam packets, 132 gunboats; seamen, 5,000, from 16 to 30 years of age. The Danish navy was 5 ships of the line of 84, 1 of 66, 2 frigates of 48, 3 of 46, 2 of 40, 1 corvette of 26, 4 of 20, 2 brigs of 16, 2 of 12, 1 schooner of 8, 2 of 6, 1 cutter of 6, 1 of 4, 2 of 2. Total, 29 ships, and 996 guns; 18 mortar boats, 15 mortar barques, 41 gunboats, 4 gunships, 4 steamers. The navy of Holland was 2 first class of the line of 84 guns, 5 second class of 74 (3 in building), 3 first class frigates of 60 and 54, 12 second class (6 in building) of 44 and 38 guns, 2 frigates of 28 guns, 12 corvettes (3 in building) of 28 and 26 guns, 3 corvettes of 22 and 20 guns, 17 brigs and packet ships of 18, 14, 676 and 12 guns, 24 galleys of 14 and 3 guns, 1 corvette for naval instruction, 7 first class steamboats (in building) 7 second class, and 4 third class; 1 admiral, 3 vice-admirals, 20 captains of the line, 31 captains of frigates, 292 lieutenants, 139 midshipmen, 85 medical officers, 50 administrative officers, 5,692 men and boys, 1,524 marines, 400 seamen, in Java, East Indies. The navy of France amounts to 226 ships; consisting of 40 ships of the line (10 of the first, 10 of the second, 15 of the third, and 5 of the fourth class), 50 frigates (15 of the first, 20 of the second, and 15 of the third), 40 corvettes (20 of the first, and 20 of the second), 50 brigs (30 of the first, and 20 of the second), 16 transports, 600 tons, and 30 tenders; 102 steamships, 10 frigates, of from 600 to 450 horse-power; 20 corvettes, from 300 to 220 horse-power; 30 cutters, 200 to 160 horse-power; 20 cutters, 120 horsepower and upwards. Total, 226 ships of the line, and 102 steamships—328. The preceding was the number of ships of war, including steamships, which was decreed to constitute the French navy, by the ordinance of the 22nd November, 1846; but the whole number were not yet completed. By the announcement of the marine department, it appears that in the year 1850 the French Government were prepared for putting into commission 23 ships of the line, 31 frigates, 35 corvettes, 47 brigs, ? and that others were partially ready in the dockyards and ports. The following is the number of French naval officers and seamen: —2 admirals, 10 vice-admirals, 20 rear-admirals, 100 captains of ships of the line, 230 captains of frigates, 650 lieutenants, 550 midshipmen, 300 cadets—total, 1,862 officers, and 20,000 seamen of all kinds in the sea service and in the ports. The five I naval ports are Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon. By the order of the 6th of June, 1849, the following number of ships were directed to he in commission:—10 ships of the line, 8 frigates, 18 corvettes, 24 brigs, 12 transports, 24 tenders—total, 96 sailing vessels. The steam ships ordered to be in commission were 14 frigates, 13 corvettes, 84 packet boats—total 111 steamships. The naval expenditure of France, which includes that of the colonies, amounted in 1851 to the following sums:—Central administration, or Admiralty, 868,500f. =34,340l.; scientific expenses to 404,100l.=to 16,164l.; colonial expenditure (not including Algiers) to 17,902,000f. =716,080l.; for extraordinary 677 constructions and other works, 3,955,000l. = 158,200l. The total expenditure amounted to 106,449,413f. =4,257,976l. 13s.; which sum includes the whole of the ordnance of the naval department of France. The interest of the debt of France is 391,154,760f. = 15,646,190l. 10s., and the total expenditure of France for 1851 amounted to 1,434,634,047f. = 57,385,361l. 18s. 44. This includes the expenses of collection and 80,000,000f. of drawbacks, reimbursements, and premiums, allowed for various exemptions, which reduces the amount by 3,200,000l., leaving a net expenditure of 54,185,361l. 18s. 4d. for 35,500,000 of a population. The whole of the expenditure of England for the year 1850 amounted to 55,480,785l., and the interest of the public debt to 28,323,961l., the same being derived from the produce of the industry of not more than 21,000,000 of the people; for, in fact, as Ireland pays neither an income tax nor any assessed taxes, the revenue of that country does not amount to its expenditure. They therefore find that while the public debt of France is a tax of 9s. 5d. per head upon the inhabitants, that of England amounts to 26s. 5d., being nearly three times the burden of the former country, or about 20s. per head, if Ireland paid the same proportion as Great Britain. Now, looking at the debts of France and England, and the naval expenditure of both, the folly of their persevering in building fleets during peace, to rot, without being necessary, is so manifest, that the common sense of every Englishman and every Frenchman should denounce the evil which burdens their industry and prosperity. The navy of Spain was—2 ships of the line of 74, 5 frigates (1 of 52, 1 of 44, 2 of 42, and 1 of 32 guns), 6 corvettes (2 of 30, 1 of 24, and 3 of 16 guns), 8 brigs (1 of 20, 1 of 18, 3 of 16, and 3 of 12 guns), 15 steamers from 40 to 350 horse-power, carrying 6 to 12 guns; 3 galleys, from 1 to 3 guns; 2 packet-boats of a gun each, 1 lugger, 1 felucca, 1 balancello, transport ships, 1 frigate, 4 brigs, 3 guardships, 7 steamships, 140 horse-power; 3 transport ships; and 3 brigs to carry 16 guns were ordered to be built in April, 1850. The navy of Portugal was—2 ships of 80 guns, 5 frigates of 50, 1 of 54, 8 corvettes, from 20 to 24; 11 brigs of 10 to 20, 7 schooners, and 2 steamships. The navy of Sardinia was—4 frigates, 4 corvettes, 3 brigantines, 1 brig, 6 steamers, 678 &c.—in all 60 ships and 900 guns; 1 commander-in-chief, 2 admiral, 7 captains of ships, 6 captions of frigates, and 2,860 seamen. The navy of the Two Sicilies was—1 ship of 80 guns, 5 frigates of 60 and 44, 1 corvette of 22, 2 bombships, 5 brigantines of 20, 2 galleys of 14—total, 484 guns; 6 steamships of 300 horsepower, 2 carrying mortars and 4 cannon; 1 steamer of 6 guns, 1 of 180 horse-power, 1 of 120, 2 of 50 horse-power, 1 of 40 horse-power, 2 of 300 horse-power (in building), 113 officers, 76 surgeons, 100 pilots, 12 shipbuilders—total, 301; 3,468 marine constables, 1,650 marines, 70 labourers, 24 mechanics, and 150 telegraphists. The navy of Greece was—2 corvettes of 26 guns, 2 steamers of from 1 to 6 guns, 1 packet-boat, 3 brigs of 12 guns, 10 of 2 guns, 7 schooners of from 2 to 10 guns, 2 of 6 guns, 1 of 2 guns, 5 cutters of from 2 to 4 guns, 1 yacht, 12 sloops, with a total of 22 guns, and 2 barques of 2 guns each. The Turkish navy was—2 ships of the line of 120 guns, 2 of 100 guns, 3 of 90 guns, 1 of 84 guns, 1 of 80 guns, 1 frigate of 56 guns, 1 of 44 guns, 3 or 4 sloops, and 4 or 5 steamers. The navy of Brazil was—2 frigates of 54 and 30 guns, 5 corvettes, in all 98 guns, 2 brigs of 18 guns, 10 brig schooners of 68 guns, 3 ketches of 13 guns, 2 schooners of 4 guns, 5 gunboats, and 6 steamers. Disarmed—1 frigate, 2 cutters, 1 barque, 2 steamers, and 6 transports. The United States of America did not pretend to maintain a great navy. A few ships were kept in commission, more for training officers and seamen, than for naval battles or aggression. He had not the latest return, but the previous lists gave 10 ships of the line of 74 guns, and one of 120 guns, 2 frigates of 36 guns, 14 frigates of 44 guns, and 1 of 54 guns; 18 sloops of war varying from 16 to 20 guns, 4 small brigs of 10 guns, 10 schooners, and 4 steamers. Of the larger vessels several were on the stocks. He had made these statements for no other purpose than to show that the British Navy, compared with other navies was in a powerful condition, and fully able to compete as a naval Power with all the other countries of the world. But such a contest could never occur. All the nations are not so mad as to combine for the destruction of England, to gratify not their interests but their passions. He believed that England would do wisely if they did not lay down any new keels in their dockyards for two or three 679 years, in order to be enabled to take advantage of the great improvements that were making every day in building and rigging, and in the steam machinery of vessels. The time had arrived when Members of that House would be compelled by, their constituents to insist on the Government to economise the naval expenditure, and reform the management of their docks. They ought not to keep up the useless and expensive establishment at Deptford, but dispose of it for the commercial purposes of the Thames. Woolwich could be altogether dispensed with as a shipbuilding establishment. He hoped the right hon. Baronet (Sir F. Baring), who had looked so carefully into the public expenditure, and particularly into the naval estimates, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, would see that not a penny was uselessly expended in stores and raw materials. In ease of necessity they could get better ships built in private dockyards with more rapidity than in the national dockyards; but if ever there was a period in the history of the world when there was a prospect of a long peace, it was the present time; and that university of nations, the Great Exhibition, would do more in cementing the different countries of the earth together than all their diplomatic exertions. International trade and navigation, mutual interests, were become the strongest bonds of peace. But there was another security against war —the empty treasuries and heavy debts of European States. With the exception of Prussia, there was not a Continental Power but was in a state of pecuniary embarrassment. Yet Prussia, had no Royal navy. There was no reason, then, for keeping up such an enormous force: much less for increasing the navy. He regretted that the Admiralty had lately been launching ships which would rot far more rapidly than on the stocks. He hoped his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty would not allow another ship to be launched, nor the keel of another ship to be laid on the slips for the next three years, for the time was soon coming when the House would have to account to the country for the way in which they had expended the money drawn from the industry of the people.
§ ADMIRAL BOWLESsaid: The lion. Gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. MacGregor) has certainly given us a most elaborate account of the strength of foreign navies, although if it is as inaccurate as that which he has favoured us with of our own, 680 it is of very little value in a discussion of this nature. He ought, however, to have recollected that we have within our memories seen all these Powers coalesced in hostility against us; and let me rather, therefore, endeavour on the present occasion to prevail on the Committee to consider this great question as becomes men who are charged with a most important duty, and the decision of questions on which our national honour and our national safety equally depend. The subject was argued the other night under two different suppositions. The first, that as war was in future not only highly improbable, but almost impossible, all our preparations against such a contingency were so many absurd and unjustifiable expenses —while another party, not venturing to go quite this length, only contend that our establishments are needlessly largo and extravagant, and entirely disproportioned to any danger we can reasonably apprehend. It would be a waste of time to argue against the first class of objectors. I wish I could call them harmless and amiable visionaries; but I grieve to say that the public peace is more likely to be endangered by their mischievous disposition to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries, and to make common cause with a revolutionary party, wherever it is to be found, than by any other peril now discernible in the political horizon. But I will now, Sir, endeavour to deal with more tangible realities; and in reply to the objectors against the magnitude of our preparations, I must ask whether they have ever read or heard of the commencement of the war with France, in, 1793, when, after having in the preceding year reduced all our establishments to the lowest scale, under the mistaken impression that war with that country was impossible, from their internal distractions and embarrassed finances, we suddenly found ourselves engaged in hostilities with an enemy much better prepared than ourselves; and it was not until after a year's exertion, and an enormous loss of merchant ships and men (the French prisons being full of our best seamen), that with seventy-eight sail of the line in commission we were able to protect tolerably our coasts, Colonies, and commerce. Sir, it is only by reviewing past events and past dangers that we can form any safe and rational conjectures with respect to the future; and although I have seen too much of the miseries and calamities of 681 war not to deprecate its recurrence from the very bottom of my heart, I cannot persuade myself that the present moment is one in which we should be justified in relaxing our preparations, or abandoning our defensive position. Let the Committee only cast its eyes at the events now occurring at the Cape, from whence in a fit of parsimonious economy we withdrew last year too large a proportion of its garrison, informing the inhabitants at the same time that they must in future he prepared to defend themselves; and having thus tempted the Kaffirs to attempt another invasion, we are now hurrying out with breathless haste reinforcements—which must, after all, arrive too late to prevent dreadful losses and heavy expenses—and this we call economy Let us, therefore, Sir, examine calmly and carefully what our establishments really are, and what proportion they bear to those of other maritime Powers. France may be considered as possessing about 50 ships of the line, 57 frigates, and 114 steamers. Russia has about an equal number of ships of the line, but is inferior to Prance in frigates and steamers; while the United States have 11 ships of the line, 15 frigates, and an increasing number of armed steamers, forming an aggregate force of above 100 sail of the line, with a full proportion of smaller vessels of every description. I am very far from wishing to exaggerate, or anticipate danger unnecessarily; but we cannot conceal from ourselves that there exists, both in Europe and America, a strong party, envious of our prosperity, jealous of our naval strength, and but too ready to avail themselves of any favourable opportunity to injure the one, or impair the other. It is, therefore, the duty of this House to maintain in their full and undiminished efficiency those defensive preparations which in all former times have been found not more than sufficient for our protection. To weigh well the possibility of future coalitions against us; to reflect that our actual amount of force is very much below our former establishments; and that in real truth France was stimulated to the extraordinary exertions made during King-Louis Philippe's reign, not by any preparations of ours, but by the parsimony and apathy observable in our naval administrations, from the effects of which we have even now scarcely recovered. We were informed officially the other night that our whole strength of ships of the line 682 had diminished to 60; and although the hon. Member for the West Hiding imagines that no fleet of thirty sail of the line will ever be again assembled, I can tell him that three fleets of this force will be necessary to oppose any such coalition as that which may very possibly be formed against us. Our whole force in activity is barely sufficient for the various services on which it is employed abroad; and the reduction of 3,000 seamen two years ago has, as I then predicted, broken up our home squadron, and deprived us almost entirely of those means of instruction and exercise, as well as of defence on any sudden emergency, which Sir Robert Peel had most wisely provided. If the disposition of the French Government had been at all doubtful or suspicious when they brought a strong squadron to Cherbourg last year, we had no equal force at hand for our defence or protection, and it very rarely occurs that we have even a single ship at home fully manned and disciplined. I hope, Sir, that I may have shown that our force afloat is not too large; and it therefore only remains for me to offer a few observations on our dockyards, on which it has of late become the fashion to lavish every opprobrious and disparaging epithet, without the slightest proof of misconduct or mismanagement. I heard an hon. Member the other day speaking of "the scandalous malversation in our arsenals," as a fact universally admitted; and if I had asked him for an explanation, he would probably have referred me to those newspapers which almost daily teem with unjust and injurious accusations against a class of meritorious and hardworking public servants, whose zeal and exertions deserve better treatment at the hands of their countrymen. If anything to their disadvantage could have been elicited, it would have been infallibly discovered by the Committee on the Navy Estimates in 1848, who were sufficiently inclined to look with suspicion, at least, if not with disfavour, on our naval establishments, and readily received all accusations against them. But, Sir, it must be recollected that our dockyards are under the immediate supervision of the Admiralty, acting in all cases on their express directions; and therefore if mistakes are made, or unnecessary expense incurred, it would I think be only fair to consider whether the blame may not rest elsewhere. Now, I am very far from saying that no mistakes have been made, or no expenses unnecessarily in- 683 curred; but I am inclined to impute them rather to the too political character of our naval administration than to any other cause. We all know that our Admiralty changes with every Government, and frequently oftener—to take the last ten years for an example. We have had five different First Lords during that period, and the entire Board has been changed three times, besides many partial removals; and giving, as I sincerely do, full credit to all these individuals for the most anxious desire to fulfil faithfully a laborious and difficult duty, it is impossible not to see that these too frequent changes inevitably lead to much diversity of system, many expensive alterations, much doubt and hesitation in the prosecution of important works, and many other minor inconveniences which may be easily understood, but which I will not weary the House by recapitulating. It is to our system, therefore, and not to individuals, that blame is to be imputed; and I have not the least doubt that if a certain proportion of the members of the Board of Admiralty held their places during pleasure, and were ineligible for seats in Parliament, the evils which are now felt from these too frequent changes would be very materially diminished; and I take this opportunity of repeating a suggestion which I offered two years ago, with respect to the Surveyor of the Navy, whose duties are of the highest importance, and who, instead of being placed, as at present, under the direction of one of the Junior Lords of the Admiralty, and therefore liable (at least occasionally) to be thwarted and obstructed in the execution of his office, should, in my opinion, have a seat himself at the Board, and form a part of that permanent establishment which I am now recommending. It was to remedy similar evils arising from the same cause that Sir Robert Peel wisely determined to appoint a naval officer (Sir T. Hastings), carefully selected for the purpose, as a permanent member of the Ordnance Board; and the success of the experiment fully justifies my recommendation for its extension. Our heaviest expenses are incurred in the construction and repairs of our Navy; and it is therefore of the highest importance to guard against those hasty or injudicious alterations which too often mark the commencement of a now Naval Administration, by providing a certain proportion of experienced and well-informed persons, who may be able to explain to their new (and perhaps too eager) col- 684 leagues the actual state of affairs, before any important change is commenced, or some plausible projectors are allowed to try their experiments at the public expense. It is impossible, in discussing this important subject, not to contrast our Military with our Naval Administration, and to inquire why these two great services should be conducted on such totally different principles. The one wholly irrespective (as an armed force should always be) of party or politics, and directed by the ablest professional men; while the other is exposed to every political vicissitude, liable to all those variations of opinion and conduct inseparable from frequent changes in its administrators, and presided Over by any nobleman or gentleman who may happen to draw this prize in the lottery of politics, without the least previous knowledge or experience of naval affairs. I confess, Sir, my wonder has always been, not that mistakes are frequently made, and dissatisfaction excited, but that a great department administered on such principles should have been so satisfactorily conducted as it has generally been; but this is no argument against improving our system, and guarding against those evils which have hitherto existed. Sir, I dare say that we shall hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, or some of those Gentlemen who think with him on these matters, a severe attack on the vast accumulation of stores in our arsenals, and recommendations to purchase these articles when they are wanted, instead of providing them beforehand. But the House will recollect that timber, hemp, and canvas cannot be obtained at a moment's warning. That oak, in particular, requires at least three years' seasoning before it can be used without great danger of that rapid decay of which during the late war we had such lamentable proofs. That ships must have sails prepared for immediate use, as well as other parts of their equipment; and with respect to hemp, as none is grown in this country, and our whole supply is derived from the Baltic, it may be sufficient to mention what actually occurred only last year, when all the contractors for this article (of whom there were several) having failed in their supplies, only 200 tons out of 1,000 could be procured in the whole London market to make up the deficiency. Perhaps the House may not be aware that France grows a sufficient quantity of hemp for all naval purposes, and is, therefore, no longer dependent on a foreign supply. There is 685 another missatement which has been very generally circulated, but which I should hardly have thought worth noticing if I had not observed that it has produced some impression on persons unacquainted with naval affairs. I allude to an inquiry as to what has become of all the ships in our possession in 1815, and why any new ones are now necessary? To this question the short answer is, that the average duration of a ship (even with a repair equal to half its value) does not much exceed twenty-five years; and, besides this, the changes which have been introduced, both in the size and armaments of ships of war since that period, would have rendered our Navy very inferior to those of all other nations, if, from a mistaken economy, we had endeavoured to patch up our old ships instead of building new ones. Sir, I have detained the Committee longer than I intended; but I was anxious, while I endeavoured to contradict statements calculated to excite unfounded discontent and uneasiness, to offer some suggestions, which I think, if attended to, might place our Naval Administration on a more satisfactory footing. It has been the evident object of many newspaper articles to represent our Navy as in the worst possible state; and if these assertions are allowed to remain uncontradicted, there is very great danger of their obtaining at least a partial belief, and that the nation, formerly so proud of its fleets, and so jealous of their honour and superiority, may become disgusted and impatient of an expense which, it is led to believe, produces such unsatisfactory results. It is, therefore, with very sincere pleasure, I state my opinion that the British Navy, speaking of it as a whole, was never in a better state of efficiency and preparation, and, with respect to that part of it which is kept in commission and activity, especially our two squadrons in the Mediterranean and at Lisbon, all accounts concur in representing them in the highest state of order and discipline, and that they only require more frequent and careful exercise at sea. The superiority of our new ships is becoming every year more apparent; and I cannot here avoid expressing the gratitude so justly due to Sir W. Symonds, from his country as well as his profession, for the great improvements he was the first to introduce into our naval architecture, amidst a storm of obloquy and opposition rarely equalled in our naval annals. Sir, I will conclude by expressing my 686 earnest hope that we may consider this important subject calmly and carefully, and that we may not, on this occasion, exhibit to the country a scene too often witnessed in private life, namely, that of a testy old gentleman, very rich, and very proud of an establishment which he expects to have kept up in the most perfect state of order and efficiency, but unfortunately afflicted with chronic fits of imaginary poverty; and when his wife, or his housekeeper, or his steward, comes to him for money to pay his weekly or monthly bills, he breaks out into the most absurd invectives against the waste and extravagance of his servants, and the carelessness or dishonesty of those who manage his affairs, and by thus disgusting or discouraging persons who are serving him faithfully and honestly, runs a very great risk of falling into the hands of rogues, whose first object will naturally be to deceive and plunder him.
§ SIR GEORGE PECHELLwas quite willing to admit the efficiency of the British Navy, but he must complain of the vexatious waste and mismanagement with which it was conducted. He believed that we wore most thoroughly prepared for any conflict with the navy of France. The pamphlet of the Prince de Joinville had demonstrated the weakness of the French fleet as compared with ours. Their three-decked ships had half their guns paralysed occasionally, and nothing could be worse than their sailing properties. In 1838 and 1839 it had been said in that House that there was nothing to prevent the Russians from coming over to England and burning our ships at the outports, and our Pavilion at Brighton. It was even said at that time that the Cossacks were actually coming. Why had not the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Bowles) then dispelled such strange notions—notions entertained by the party to which he belonged? The impression of the country was, that much economy might be practised in the dockyards. He proposed that we should get rid of all the vessels ranging from thirty-eight guns down to twenty-four, by bringing them to book and selling them; for they would never be of any service in a serious encounter. He also thought that some economy might be practised with regard to the masts of vessels. It was said that sixteen masts out of twenty at Chatham and Sheerness had been found to be inefficient. The pay, food, and clothing of our sailors were admirable, and they 687 consequently manifested no desire to quit our service. Something' must be done to economise the expenditure. Reduction might be made under the heads of stores and dockyards. The people were determined that some reduction should take place.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, that we had 155 sailing vessels and 12 steamers in 1835, and that we had, in 1848, 160 sailing vessels, and 96 steamers. Therefore there had been all that addition of steamers without any reduction of sailing vessels. The question for the Committee now to consider was, whether there were not more stores than were wanted or required for the exigencies of the country. He was glad to find the Navy in an improved condition. He recollected the time when the men were ill-used and ill-fed, but now that they were better provisioned and better paid, why should not the naval business of the Government be executed for less money than heretofore? The hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Bowles) had said that we ought not to rest satisfied with old ships; but since 1828 we had built 264 ships of war, and could these be called old? He (Mr. Hume) protested against waste, while at the same time he was for sustaining the superiority of the Navy. We had 250 vessels now in commission, and, instead of 26,000 men, we had at present 39,000 men. It was for the Committee to declare by their vote whether they would sanction the waste going on in the dockyards.
§ ADMIRAL BOWLESwas of opinion that the naval expenditure of this country in 1792 was upwards of 5,400,000l.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, the hon. and gallant Admiral had made a gross mistake. The whole of the estimates for 1792—naval, military, and civil—amounted only to the sum he (Admiral Bowles) had stated. The whole taxation of the country at that period was only 16,000,000l., whereof 1,000,000l. was devoted to the sinking fund, 9,500,000l. to paying the interest of the debt, and the remainder to the estimates.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that as compared with the years 1848 and 1849, the reduction on this vote was 340,000l. The hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) had observed that we were going on building sailing vessels and steamers; but since 1849 the Admiralty had not ordered to be laid down 688 one single sailing ship. All their orders had been for screw steamers. He was glad to hear all sides of the House acknowledge that the Navy was in an efficient condition, and he called upon them not to impair that efficiency. Let them remember that great reductions had taken place in the dockyards, and that additional reductions in these yards had been effected even since the Estimates wore laid on the table.
§ MR. HENLEYcould not support the Amendment, although he had voted with the hon. Member for Montrose to reduce the amount of wages in the dockyards. The stores were much less now than they had been in the five years from 1840 to 1845; but the wages were higher now than then, and therefore he was willing to reduce the wages. He thought the dockyards were maintained at too high a cost; still he could not consent to sweep away one-third of the present vote.
§ MR. COBDENsaid, that if there was one subject more than another of an important character it was the consumption and expenditure in our dockyards. There was a general impression that we were building ships only to rot, that our fleet already in existence was sufficient, and that we might go on with it without any danger or insecurity to the country. If they could not do that, they could not make any sensible reduction in their expenditure. Let them not go whining about the country and talking about the excessive burdens of taxation; let them, if that was their intention, bear it like men, and tell the country at once that there was to be no reduction. Now, there was one subject, in relation to the great expenditure for stores, not touched upon hitherto. Had hon. Members seen the great quantity of stores we had sold during the last few months? We had sold nearly 1,500,000l.; and a large proportion of those had consisted of naval stores. Now, in that 1,500,000l. of stores for which we had taken credit, there had been a loss of 2,000,000l. at least; and this was a very moderate estimate of the loss. Was there not an obvious mode of economy in this view of the case? They accumulated a vast stock of these stores, and then, they sold them off for a mere fraction of what they cost. Could they not trust more to private enterprise than they had done for the supply of these articles? He would assume that all that 689 the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Bowles) had said was true. He would assume they might be involved in a war; but did they not think that economy might be practised if they purchased commodities 20 or 30 per cent below the former market value of them, rather than by keeping a large stock on hands, and selling a portion of it afterwards at a considerable loss? Some allusion had been made in the course of the debate to the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park, and it had been referred to as a guarantee against future wars. They might see a proof in this great building that they went to an unnecessary outlay of stores for the purposes of the Navy. They had seen fifteen acres of ground covered with a magnificent erection in about six months, and by one firm. He put it to hon. Gentlemen if we were suddenly threatened with war, and the national spirit were roused by some unjust aggression, and the Government invited the co-operation and the competition of our innumerable private dockyards, foundries, sail-works, and hemp-works, in order to produce the necessary materiel for the war, whether we would not immediately be put in possession, to any conceivable limit, of all the articles we might require? With the facilities which we possessed in capital, and in railway communication, and with the aid which a Government could at any moment obtain from private enterprise, the vast accumulation of stores which took place under our present system, involved needless waste and cost. But he did not think that there was any danger of our finding ourselves in hostilities in any given week. Surely every country had something to dread from a war with England. Look at our actual force. We had seventy line-of-battle ships, with twenty more building. Besides these we had 140 steam ships of all kinds on our list, to say nothing of the prodigious and splendid fleet subsidised for the Post Office service. As regarded the latter, he believed, on the authority of professional men, that the steam ships belonging to various' great companies, and employed in the conveyance of the mails over every ocean, would together be found more than a match for the united steam fleets of all the foreign Powers put together. With all these resources available, there ought to be some confidence. Then they had to consider that their surplus next year would go to the Kaffir war—that there would be a very general desire out of doors for a reduction of expen- 690 diture—that they had come to this point at last, that it was a question who was to pay the taxes; for if they got rid of the income tax the working classes would ask why were they to be burdened?—and, looking at all these things, lie thought it would be flying in the face of the good sense of the country to go on voting a sum like this every year for the mere purpose of wasteful accumulation. He hoped his hon. Friend (Mr. Hume) would take the sense of the Committee on the subject.
MR. CORRYsaid, that as the hon. Member for Montrose had disputed the accuracy of the statement of his hon. and gallant Friend (Admiral Bowles), respecting the Navy Estimates of 1792, he (Mr. Corry) had turned up the Report of the Committee on Finance Accounts, issued in 1828, in which he found it stated that in 1792 the naval expenditure for 16,000 men was 5,000,000l. odd.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, the hon. Member was quite mistaken, 5,000,000l. was the whole amount of the civil, military, and naval estimates.
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 38; Noes 106: Majority 68.
| List of the AYES. | |
| Alcock, T. | King, hon. P. J. L. |
| Barrow, W. H. | Lushington, C. |
| Bell, J. | Meagher, T. |
| Bennet, P. | Mangles, R. D. |
| Bright, J. | Milner, W. M. E. |
| Brocklehurst, J. | Molesworth, Sir W. |
| Child, S. | Pechell, Sir G. B. |
| Clay, J. | Peto, S. M. |
| Clifford, H. M. | Pigott, F. |
| Duncan, G. | Salwey, Col. |
| Dundas, G. | Scholefield, W. |
| Ellis, J. | Smith, J. B. |
| Fox, W. J. | Smythe, hon. G. |
| Geach, C. | Stanford, J. F. |
| Greene, J. | Trelawny, J. S. |
| Gwyn, H. | Wawn, J. T. |
| Hardcastle, J. A. | Williams, W. |
| Hastie, A. | |
| Heyworth, L. | TELLERS. |
| Hutchins, E. J. | Hume J. |
| Jackson, W. | Cobden, R. |
| List of the NOES. | |
| Anson, hon. Col. | Bowles, Adm. |
| Arkwright, G. | Boyle, hon. Col. |
| Armstrong, R. B. | Brisco, M. |
| Bagshaw, J. | Brooke, Sir A. B. |
| Baines, rt. hon. M. T. | Bunbury, E. H. |
| Baring, rt. hn. Sir F. T. | Cabbell, B. B. |
| Bateson, T. | Carter, J. B. |
| Bellew, R. M. | Cavendish, hon. C. C. |
| Beresford, W. | Chaplin, W. J. |
| Berkeley, Adm. | Clements, hon. C. S. |
| Berkeley, hon. H. F. | Cockburn, Sir A. J. E. |
| Berkeley, C. L. G. | Coles, H. B. |
| Bouverie, hon. E. P. | Corry, rt. hon. H. L. |
| Cowan, C. | Norreys, Sir D. J. |
| Cowper, hon. W. F. | O'Connoll, M. J. |
| Craig, Sir W. G. | Ogle, S. C. H. |
| Crowder, R. B. | Ord, W. |
| Dawes, E. | Paget, Lord A. |
| Deedes, W. | Palmer, R. |
| Dod, J. W. | Palmerston, Visct. |
| Douglas, Sir C. E. | Parker, J. |
| Dundas, Adm. | Patten, J. W. |
| Dundas, rt. hon. Sir D. | Power, Dr. |
| Edwards, H. | Price, Sir R. |
| Ellice, E. | Reid, Col. |
| Elliot, hon. J. E. | Repton, G. W. J. |
| Evans, J. | Ricardo, O. |
| Fergus, J. | Rich, H. |
| Ferguson, Sir R. A. | Romilly, Sir J. |
| Freestun, Col. | Seymour, Lord |
| Gallwey, Sir W. P. | Shafto, R. D. |
| Gordon, Adm. | Shelburne, Earl of |
| Grey, rt. hon. Sir G. | Somers, J. P. |
| Grosvenor, Lord R. | Somerset, Capt. |
| Hamilton, G. A. | Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W. |
| Hatchell, rt. hon. J. | Stanton, W. H. |
| Hawes, B. | Thompson, Col. |
| Henley, J. W. | Thompson, Ald, |
| Herbert, H. A. | Towneley, J. |
| Hollond, R. | Townshend, Capt. |
| Hope, Sir J. | Trevor, hon. T. |
| Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H. | Tyler, Sir G. |
| Knox, hon. W. S. | Wall, C. B. |
| Labouchere, rt. hon. H. | Wellesley, Lord C. |
| Lewis, G. C. | Williamson, Sir H. |
| Mackie, J. | Wilson, J. |
| M'Taggart, Sir J. | Wilson, M. |
| Matheson, Col. | Wood, rt. hon. Sir C. |
| Melgund, Visct. | Wood, Sir W. P. |
| Morgan, H. K. G. | Wrightson, W. B. |
| Mostyn, hon. E. M. L. | Wynn, H. W. W. |
| Mulgrave, Earl of | |
| Mundy, W. | TELLERS. |
| Murphy, F. S. | Hayter, W. G. |
| Naas, Lord | Hill, Lord M. |
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§ (3.) 298,389l. New Works, Improvements, and Repairs in the Naval Establishments.
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he should like to know what had become of the 9,500,000l. which had been expended on the new works and improvements in the yards since the termination of the last war?
§ ADMIRAL BOWLESsaid, the expenditure had partly been rendered necessary in consequence of the Admiralty now building larger ships than they did before the close of the war, which made it incumbent on them to purchase land from time to time for increasing the size of the dockyards; and partly by the requirements for building and repairing the steam navy, which involved a separate staff of engineers and conveniences not necessary in building and repairing ordinary naval vessels.
§ MR. HUMEwished to know from the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the 692 Admiralty whether it was intended to build the Keyham dock on the original or the reduced plan; and whether the 97,627l. included the purchase of land, or merely the erection of the buildings necessary on changing the gunpowder magazine?
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, the Board of Admiralty had followed the recommendations of the Committee with respect to Keyham; and with regard to the vote for the powder magazine, that sum was for the actual carrying on of the building. The sum for the purchase of land had been voted on a former occasion.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, on constructing the dock, the entrance had been made so shallow as to preclude the admission of the vessels; and he wanted to know whether the expense of deepening the dock was in the estimate?
§ MR. COBDENsaid, a large steam basin had recently being constructed at Portsmouth, and it appeared desirable that some further experience should be gained as to the necessity of steam basins before another 1,250,000l. was expended in the construction of another basin of the same kind. It was instructive to see how this work was begun. It appeared from the report of the Committee that Parliament sanctioned the commencement of this undertaking without any knowledge of the total cost. In the estimates of 1844–45 there appears for new steam basin 30,0002., to he provided in future estimates 370,000l.; in the estimates of 1845–46 total estimate for now steam basin is 675,000l., and 1 00,000l. for the year; in the estimates of 1846–47 total estimate for new steam basin is 675,000l., and 133,0001 for the year; in the estimates of 1847–48 total estimate for new steam basin is 675,000l., and 120,000l. for the year. The total estimate now amounted to 1,225,000l. He asked whether it was intended to vote that 1.250,000l. without a fresh estimate?
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, the question was calmly discussed by the Committee, and the conclusion they came to was that it was desirable to go on with the works. The estimate was now fully before the House. He had every reason to believe that that estimate would fully cover the expenditure. The majority of the Committee were of opinion that the works ought to be proceeded with.
§ MR. COBDENsaid, they were of opin- 693 ion that they should be partially proceeded with. The Committee said—
Up to the 15th of April, 1848, about 400,000l. had been expended at Keyham, and contracts, involving a very large outlay, are still binding. Under these obligations, your Committee recommend to the House that the works immediately dependent upon the cofferdam should be continued; but they desire further to suggest, that no progress in the buildings and factories should be made until the estimate shall, in the navy estimates of 1849–50, or of some future Session, have been submitted to the House; and they recommend that in the preparation of this future estimate the details and proportionate expense of the work should be limited in amount, thereby lessening the charge on the revenue of the year, and postponing the completion of this new establishment to a more distant period. Arrangements for giving effect to these recommendations can only be made in accordance with the stipulations of contracts now in force, or with the consent of the contractors; but no new contract in reference to works at Keyham should be entered into until the Board of Admiralty shall have reconsidered their plans for this factory, and communicated their decision to the House.Now, this steam basin, as it was called, involved a great deal more than the cost of construction. If it was carried on in the way proposed, there was to be an outlay of 80,000l. per annum for wages. He objected to establish a large manufactory, and to keep up a great number of skilled workmen, at a large expense. They were laying out this large sum for docks and basins, forgetting that commercial men required no steam docks or basins. They brought their vessels to a river wall and put their machinery in. It appeared to him they were completely wasting the money, and, in fact, if they had a California without any trouble or expense in getting the gold, they could not act with greater prodigality.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, the hon. Gentleman knew as well as he did that the original intention was to create a largo factory at Keyham; but he stated last year that they had no intention to create a factory there.
§ SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTHThen why is it put in the estimate?
§ MR. COBDENMr. Ward distinctly stated that if a factory is not included, the whole sum will be wasted.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, the whole expenditure was before Parliament. He had followed entirely the recommendation of the Committee that they should go on with those works which were not completed at the time with regard to the basin, but they should leave the factory works.
§ ADMIRAL BOWLESsaid, that it was of the utmost importance that this addition of the now works at Keyham to the dockyard at Devonport should be completed with as little delay as possible. That, even with all the exertions which could be used, it would be at least two years before a single steam-vessel could be repaired at that yard; and when it was considered that this was the arsenal to which ships disabled in the Bay of Biscay, as well as on the coast of France and Ireland, would naturally resort for safety and repairs, it might easily be imagined what difficulties and delays would arise, if, at the commencement of war or armament, we found our frontier dockyard wholly unprovided with the means of speedily refitting a most important part of our Navy, and destitute of those preparations and appliances with which all the French arsenals on the opposite coast are now so amply furnished. It was therefore, in his opinion, the duty of Her Majesty's Government to proceed with these works with the least possible delay; and he had heard with much regret some expressions from the First Lord of the Admiralty which induced him to fear that that right hon. Gentleman was not sufficiently aware of the vital importance of this subject, or the fatal consequences which might arise from disregarding it. The Committee of 1848 was, in his opinion, deeply responsible to the nation for the erroneous opinions expressed in their report on this question—a report made in direct opposition to the whole of the evidence, and drawn up by Gentlemen whose strong preconceived prejudices, and previous sentiments, rendered them very incompetent judges of a great professional subject of this description.
MR. CORRYsaid, that the most judicious of the witnesses before the Committee were unanimously of opinion that a steam factory at Devonport would be a highly useful establishment.
§ MR. HENLEYsaid, that the only answer the right hon. Baronet had given was that the Government were not going to build a factory now; but the way the Estimates were framed led to the inference that the Committee pledged itself to the application of this large vote to a particular purpose, and it might be concluded that the Government were going to build it next year or the year after. He saw also that there was a foundation laid down for an establishment, and that workshops and a smithy had been erected.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that this Estimate had been framed to meet the objection taken before the Committee as to the mode of drawing up the Estimates. He had proposed the whole of the original vote as it might be required, and if he had followed the old practice, the effect would have been that he should have concealed from the Committee a large sum of money. He thought he had stated as plainly as man could state a fact, that he had not the slightest intention of setting up the factory; but occasions might arise—a time of war, for instance—which might render the building necessary, and he could not bind the Government against doing that which might be essential in times of emergency.
§ MR. HENLEYobjected that the Government might say to that House, whenever it was convenient to carry out this project, that they had had the Estimate before them year by year, and therefore it was impossible to see what objection could be made to it.
§ MR. GEACHwished for some explanation of a sum of 4,000l. which he saw in the vote, that was to be applied towards the building of a church at Keyham.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that in order to compare the votes for the years it was necessary to put in the sum voted in the last year, and last year there had been a discussion on this vote. Many of these items had been put in in contemplation of the proposed establishment at Keyham.
The MASTER OF THE ROLLSsaid, there was a very large population there, and the church was of great use.
§ MR. GEACHsaid, as a new Member, he must express his opinion that the Committee was going on a wrong system, which must lead to inextricable confusion. 697,000l. had been spent on this place at Keyham, and now it seemed the works were to be given up. If they acted thus in their private concerns, they would soon, as traders, get into another place; and he feared the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, if he appeared there, would not get his certificate. It would be better to make the 697,000l. a bad debt at once than go on increasing it by further expenditure.
§ Vote agreed to; as were the following Votes: —
§ (4.) 26,000l., Medicines, &c.
§ (5.) 62,949l., Miscellaneous Services.
§ MR. PETOsaid, he was anxious to 696 take this opportunity of impressing upon the First Lord of the Admiralty the necessity of giving to all officers of Her Majesty's Navy ample opportunities of becoming practically acquainted with the machinery connected with the steam engines now employed so largely in the service. Not long ago, the commander of the squadron off Lisbon ordered the captain of a steamer to unship the tubes of the boiler. This was done despite the remonstrance of the captain, who had not sufficient artificers on board; and on returning to Portsmouth they were found to be replaced in a very unworkmanlike manner, and thus the ignorance of the commander cost the country several thousand pounds.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that every facility was afforded to the officers of the Navy for the acquisition of such knowledge.
§ MR. HUMEwished to draw attention to the fact, that if any of Her Majesty's ships assisted a merchantman in distress in never so small a degree, the owner immediately had a bill sent in for the service rendered. This was a foul disgrace upon the Navy of this country; and he had been at the trouble of ascertaining that both the navies of France and of the United States were expressly ordered to render every assistance to merchantmen, and to make no charge; at some future opportunity he should move for inquiry on the subject.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGsaid, that as the hon. Member had expressed his intention of calling attention to this question on a future occasion, he would reserve for that opportunity any explanations he might have to offer with respect to it; meantime he would inquire into the matter.
§ MR. HUMEsaid, he wished also to call the attention of the Committee to the fact, that although some years had elapsed since the Pasha of Egypt made a present to England of one of Cleopatra's Needles, no steps had yet been taken to have that curious gift conveyed to this country. There were two pillars of granite in Egypt called Cleopatra's Needles. Of these, one had been presented by the Pasha to England, and the other to France. A month did not elapse before the pillar was conveyed to France, but the pillar that belonged to England still remained in Egypt. During the Premiership of Sir Robert Peel, Captain Donnelly offered to convey it to London for 7,000l., but the offer was refused, on the ground that the money could not be spared. And there the needle still re- 697 mained, an insult to the man who presented it to us, and no badge of honour to ourselves. He was grieved to find so much extravagance in some respects, and so much parsimony in others.
§ Vote agreed to, as were also—
§ (6.) 488,452l., Military Pensions.
§ (7.) 159,589l., Civil Pensions.
§ (8.) 143,200l., Freight of Ships, &c.
§ On the Motion that the sum of 889,496l. be granted to defray the charges of the Post Office Packets,
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSobjected to proceeding with so important a vote at one o'clock in the morning. The Committee had sat considerably beyond their usual time, and it was only fair now to report progress,
§ MR. HUMEquite agreed in the suggestion of his hon. Friend. The vote was one which would elicit considerable discussion, and could not be disposed of at that hour in the morning. He saw no reason why letters should not be sent to the colonies at a penny each as well as to the Channel Islands. In his opinion everything ought to be done to increase the means of communication between our colonial dependencies and the mother country.
SIR FRANCIS BARINGhoped the Committee would consent to go into the consideration of the vote at once, as the greater portion of it was under contract, and the details were very small.
§ MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, he would divide the Committee as long as he could get a single Member to go into the lobby with him, rather than proceed at that hour. He moved that the Chairman report progress.
§ Motion agreed to.
§ House resumed. Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
§ The House adjourned at One o'clock.