COUNTY COURTS FURTHER EXTENSION BILL. (Hansard, 16 July 1851)

§ MR. CROWDER
proposed to insert the following Clause:— And whereas it is expedient to render appeals from the County Courts more efficient; be it enacted, That so much of 13th and 14th Victoria, c. 81, sec. 14, as limits the Court of Appeal to the Puine Judges of the superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster, and the sitting of the said Court of Appeal to a time out of term, is hereby repealed, and that all appeals now depending or hereafter to be brought before the said superior Courts, shall be heard and determined in term by the Judges thereof as part of the ordinary business of such Courts, or out of term by any two or more of the Judges of the said superior Courts sitting as a Court of Appeal for that purpose.

§ MR. J. EVANS
believed that the present system of appeal gave satisfaction, and had never been complained of.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL
supported the clause, which would considerably tend to expedite cases of appeal.

§ SIR JAMES GRAHAM
wished to appeal to the hon. and learned Attorney General, and to Her Majesty's Government, to let the matter stand as it now was. He agreed with those who thought that we should have, in the cheapest and most expeditious form, the best mode of appeal that could be established. Now, as he uuderstood the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Crowder), objection was taken to the existing tribunals for appeals. He was certainly not disposed to overlook the importance of the superior Courts in Westminster-hall, and of the Bar there; for he believed that it was for the public interest that the Bar should be upheld in its independence and high position, but at the same he did not think that any sacrifice of the public interest should be made even for so great an object. He could well see that it would be for the advantage of the Bar in the present case that the appeal should he to the superior Court, not to a portion of the superior Court, but to the Court itself, with all the advantage of the Bar. But the question which the House had to consider was, whether that would be for 853 the convenience and interest of the public? Even though the appeal might be better heard by the Supreme Court with the assistance of the Bar, yet the question was, would it, on the whole, he for the advantage of the public? He put it to the hon. and learned Attorney General, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board, whether there was on the whole such an imperfection in the existing appellate jurisdiction, that, taking all the circumstances into consideration, it was desirable to effect this change. Her Majesty's Government were the guardians of the public in that House, and he held that they should make themselves parties to no change, unless such as would clearly be for the benefit of the public generally.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, he really did not see the necessity for the appeal that had been made to him by the right hon. Gentleman. It was the simplest thing in the world, and he did not think the right hon. Gentleman apprehended the nature of the proposed change. At the present moment an appeal lay from the inferior Court, presided over by the County Court Judge, to one of the superior Courts in Westminster, and was disposed of by the Puisne Judges sitting out of term; and the proposal now made was to enable appeals to be heard and determined in term by the Judges in the superior Courts. It would make no difference to the Bar whether the appeal was heard before the Puisne Judges or the supreme Court, nor would it make any difference to the suitors in point of expense. The only difference was this, that if the appeal happened to arise when the Court was sitting in banco, and if the Court was not so oppressed with business but that it might attend to it, then power should be given to dispose of the appeal at once. There was a difference in point of time—for by the present mode it might so happen that if the hearing of the appeal was postponed till after term, much time might be lost.

§ MR. CROWDER
thought the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) had mistaken the nature of the Clause which he (Mr. Crowder) had proposed. It might happen that an appeal was made just at the commencement of the term; and, according to the present system, that appeal must necessarily stand over, though the Judges might be in a condition to dispose of it. His clause would obviate that evil.

VISCOUNT DUNCAN
understood the 854 right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) to have asked whether the practice at present followed had not been satisfactory to the country, and whether any necessity existed for the proposed change. He thought they should let well alone.

§ MR. CROWDER
said, a case of inconvenience had occurred last term in the Common Pleas, in consequence of the Chief Justice being debarred, by the provision which had been referred to, from taking an appeal, except with the consent of both parties.

§ SIR JAMES GRAHAM
said, he recollected that this very matter had been discussed in a former Session, and he certainly understood that, on the whole, the appeal clauses had given satisfaction to the country. He had yet to learn that they had not worked well; and he thought, before any change was made, that the inconvenience of the present system should be shown. There might be reasons as regarded the Courts for the change, but he could see none as regarded the public.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that with regard to public convenience, the object of all legal proceedings should be to do justice in the smallest possible period. Suppose a plaintiff got a verdict when the term was about taking place, and that the defendant wanted time, he brought his appeal, conscious that for three or four weeks he could interpose a delay; and there was an obvious inducement under the present system to bring an appeal for the purpose, under such circumstances, of gaining three or four weeks time. He could not see any substantial objection to the clause. If they could have an appeal disposed of at the commencement of a term, instead of waiting the whole term, and if that could be accomplished without one shilling additional expense to the suitor, he could not understand why that appeal might not be disposed of in term time. The only object of his hon. and learned Friend's clause was to expedite the appeal, and he (the Attorney General) thought that would be an undoubted benefit to the suitor.

§ SIR JAMES GRAHAM
said, the great object to be attained was, that there should be the most speedy justice at the least possible cost. If he rightly understood the hon. and learned Attorney General, that Gentleman said, the effect of this Clause would be to expedite the appeal, and that in deciding it the suitors would have the assistance of a Chief Justice, 855 without any increase of cost whatever. If the hon. and learned Gentleman told him that, he (Sir J. Graham) was bound to admit that this Clause was a desirable one, because it would give more speedy justice, and that without any additional cost to the parties—if it fulfilled all those conditions, he (Sir J. Graham) had not a word to say against it.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, he had no hesitation in repeating his previous statement, that the Clause would have the effect of expediting appeals, for two or three weeks at the least, and be attended with no possible disadvantage to any one.

§ SIR GEORGE PECHELL
said, that if this Clause had a tendency to expedite the suit, it ought to have been introduced by the Government.

§ MR. STUART WORTLEY
said, he would support the Clause, on the ground that it would secure two great objects, namely, greater despatch in disposing of the appeal, and greater weight and authority in the judgment of the court.

§ MR. CROWDER
then moved the addition of the following Clause:— And whereas doubts have arisen whether the appeal given by 13 and 14 Victoria, c. 61, s. 14, lies in cases tried by the County Court Judge without a jury; be it declared and enacted, That if cither party shall be dissatisfied with the determination of the County Court judge, in point of law, in any case tried with or without a jury, such party may appeal to the said superior Courts. He said, the appeal Clause in the 13th and 14th Victoria, c. 61, was thought to apply only to cases where there was a jury; so that if a cause was heard in the County Courts without a jury, however wrong the decision might be, there was no appeal whatever.

§ MR. CROWDER
then proposed to introduce the following Clause:— And whereas it is expedient to provide for the removal of claims arising under 9 and 10 Victoria, c. 95, s. 118; be it enacted, That any such claim, and any summons issued in respect thereof, and any order made thereon, may be removed into any of the said superior Courts by leave of any of the said superior Courts, or any Judge thereof, on such terms as to payment of costs or bringing money into Court as such Court or Judge shall direct; and when any such claim, summons, or order shall be removed, the said superior Court shall deal therewith in the same manner in all respects as with inter pleader cases arising in the said superior Court. He thought that a clause of considerable importance, because its object was to give 856 the right of appeal in cases where it did not exist at present. The clause which he wished to add had reference to the 118th section of the 9th and 10th Victoria, c. 95, which gave power to the County Court Judges to decide interpleader issues, without any appeal to any other tribunal. Even if it should be anxiously desired by both parties to an interpleader issue that it should be heard before a superior Court, it could not be done. It appeared to him very important that there should be an appeal in such cases.

§ MR. MULLINGS
said, the only objection he had to the clause was, that it would give facilities for appeals to the superior Courts. He did not know of any case in which inconvenience had arisen from the present practice; nor had the hon. and learned Member for Liskeard pointed out any such case. He (Mr. Mullings) did happen to know that there was a strong inclination in the superior Courts to get causes out of the County Courts; and he was not willing to get rid of the great advantages of the County Courts by affording facilities such as were contemplated in the clause which had been proposed.

§ MR. CROWDER
said, there might be inconveniences such as this clause was meant to remedy, without its being necessary to furnish given cases; but he was not at all aware that there was an anxiety on the part of the Judges of the superior Courts to take business from the County Courts.

MR. CLAY
believed that cases such as had been suggested by the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Crowder) were not cases where there was any difficulty in point of law. The difficulty was one of fact, and not of law, and a difficulty of fact was as well, if not better, ascertained by the mode of proceeding in the County Courts than by that in the superior Courts.

§ MR. W. WILLIAMS
wished to know if there had been any complaints from the public, or from the Judges of the County Courts, who had constant opportunities of seeing the defects, if defects there were, ic the existing law? In the absence of such complaints, he was opposed to the addition of the clause.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL
would suggest to his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Crowder) that he had better withdraw the clause. Such a clause was not absolutely necessary, and he did not think it was desirable to overlay the simplicity of the existing system.

§ MR. CROWDER
consented to withdraw the clause.

§ MR. CROWDER
then moved the addition of the following Clause:— And for preventing vexatious expenses and delay in prosecuting the said appeals; be it enacted, That the Judges of the said superior Courts, or any five of them, of whom a chief of one of the said superior Courts shall be one, may from time to time, if they shall think fit, make general orders for regulating the proceedings on appeals and the costs thereof; which orders shall be as valid and effectual as if included in this Act; provided always, that such orders shall not be in force until the end of the Session of Parliament next after the promulgation thereof. He said his object in moving such a clause was to prevent vexatious expense and delays in prosecuting appeals before the superior Courts.

VISCOUNT DUNCAN
would suggest to the Committee that they had better let well alone, taking warning from an epitaph he had seen on a tombstone the other day—"I was well, and, wishing to be better, here I am."

§ MR. J. EVANS
said, he must oppose the clause. There was no complaint made of the law itself, as it at present stood; why, therefore, should all those cobwebs he spread around it merely for the purpose of catching victims?

The ATTORNEY GENERAL
would support the clause, on the ground that it was desirable to have a uniformity of system with regard to appeals from the County Courts, in the three superior Courts of Common Law, instead of leaving each individual Court to make its own regulations. If they granted the power of appeal, it was desirable that it should he accompanied by certain well-defined regulations. The clause did not extend the power of appeal one tittle beyond what was given by the existing law.

VISCOUNT DUNCAN
did not believe the costs of the superior Courts were at present so popular as to make the people wish that they should be extended to the County Courts.

§ SIR GEORGE PECHELL
said, that a Committee was sitting upon this subject, and he should wish to know whether they had made any report as to the necessity of these alterations?

§ MR. BOUVERIE
was not aware that the question had come before the Committee alluded to by the hon. and gallant Member; but he thought it very desirable that the Judges of the superior Courts should establish some uniform system with 858 regard to the mode of proceeding in appeals, and also with respect to the costs thereof.

§ SIR JAMES GRAHAM
said, if he were forced to a division, as at present advised, he thought he must support the clause. If the clause had tended to multiply appeals, he might have hesitated; but there already existed the right of appeal to the superior Courts. It happened, however, that there was not any uniformity either in the mode of proceeding with those appeals, or as to the costs. The clause now proposed would give the Judges of the superior Courts the power of establishing that uniformity. If the Judges of the land were to be trusted with anything, they certainly were fit to be trusted with such a power as that which this clause gave to them. There was one point, however, which he thought required explanation. The clause sought not only to regulate the proceedings on appeals, but "the costs thereof." He should like to know why it was necessary to refer to the Judges of the superior Courts the regulation of the costs? With that single observation he was prepared to support the clause.

VISCOUNT DUNCAN
said, that although he at first intended to divide, the Committee on the clause, and although he was still opposed to it, still he should not trouble the Committee to divide.

§ MR. CROWDER
begged to explain, that each of the superior Courts already possessed the power of regulating the proceedings in their own courts on matters of appeal, and also with regard to costs; but the object of this clause was that the Judges of the three superior Courts should unite and form one set of rules with respect to such appeals and costs in all the Courts.

§ SIR JAMES GRAHAM
wished to know whether, at the present moment, the costs in the three Courts varied from one another?

§ MR. CROWDER
was not aware of the fact, but it had occurred that the costs were differently taxed in the different Courts. He, however, believed that there was now one uniform mode of taxing costs in all the three superior Courts. He had no objection to strike out the words "and the costs thereof."