HC Deb 11 March 1850 vol 109 cc647-703

The House went into Committee of Supply.

On the first vote being read, namely, that 99,128 men should be voted for the ensuing year.


said, he was sorry that the vote now put into the Chairman's hand had not been agreed to on Friday night; for the consequence was, that he should have to make a more detailed statement than he would otherwise have inflicted on the Committee. He was sure, however, that his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose felt that, in opposing the vote on Friday, he had no other alternative but to adopt the course he had taken. He now begged to call the attention of the Committee not only to this vote, but also to the general state of the Army; and he asked their attention to that explanation, which it was usual for a person in his position to give them annually, with reference both to the strength of, and expenditure for, the Army. He had put into the Chairman's hands the vote with reference to the number of men, and it would be perceived from the Army Estimates that the number to be voted for the service of this year was 99,128; the number voted for the service of the current year was 103,154, showing a decrease in the ensuing year of 4,126 of all ranks, namely, of 128 officers, 303 non-commissioned officers, and the remaining number of privates. Out of that force of 99,128 which was proposed to be voted, 59,398 men were on home service, and 39,730 were upon colonial service. Of the troops on colonial service 9,688 belonged to colonial corps, and therefore there were 30,042 men of the line liable to be relieved periodically in different parts of the world. Let them, then, look to the 59,398 men they had at home, and after deducting from them the cavalry and household troops, to the extent of 6,000, and deducting also the numbers of the Guards, essentially a corps for home service, they would have, to relieve those 39,730 men serving in the colonies, 45,540 stationed at home; and he thought the Committee would admit, on viewing the matter in that point of view, that the vote called for was not excessive. With regard to this number they were told the other night that the number of men they maintained in the Army was more than was required, not only in point of number, but also in point of charge. The hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding said that he would propose to reduce the charge in the estimates to the extent of 5,823,000l Now, taking one-third of that to be effect-ed upon the Army—namely, a charge of 1,941,000l., he (Mr. F. Maule) presumed that his hon. Friend would not interfere in this reduction with the non-effective branch of the Army. That was a service which had been carefully investigated from time to time; it was one which appeared to him to be a necessary burden on the public, and which it would be impossible to reduce otherwise than by carefully watching and effecting reductions as vacancies occurred. Therefore, it appeared to him that the reduction could not apply to the non-effective branch of the service. Then let them see how the effective branch of the service stood. They proposed to have 99,128 men, at a charge of 3,936,582l. Let them take with that the sum which he calculated was proposed to be reduced by his hon. Friend—namely, a sum of 1,941,000l., and there would remain a sum for the effective service of the Army of 1,995,582l.; and he asked what force would that maintain? He would turn to the year 1835—the year to which his hon. Friend had so pointedly alluded. He (Mr. F. Maule) found, from the calculation made in 1835, that over the whole Army, taking in all the charges of the land force, and calculating that by the number of rank and file in the Army, the charge per man was 43l. 15s. 11d. Now, if they divided that 1,995,582l. by 40—taking the expense of each at 40l. per man—it would maintain an army for service in the colonies, and for reliefs for the colonies, and for the maintenance of the service at home, to say nothing of the dignity and honour of the country, of 50,000 men. That, he apprehended, was a number so infinitely below the standard of his hon. Friend in 1835, when they had 81,000 men, that he must at least have recourse to some other calculation before he could take from the effective branch of the army expenditure so largo a sum. His hon. Friend went on to say that the Army since 1835 had been increased from time to time, and that all those additions had been studiously maintained, and that they had never gone back in their steps. It was quite true that from 1835 there were repeated additions to the strength of their Army both at home and abroad. He found in 1835 the Army did not exceed 81,271 men; but in the year 1838 disturbances arose in Canada, an insurrection of a very formidable nature took place, and the Army was immediately increased to 89,305 men. It was increased in the following year to 93,000 men, and in the year 1840 certain colonial corps were raised, and not only with the sanction of the House, but on the urgent representation of Members of the House, that the service in the colonies would be performed far more economically by a certain force of colonial corps—the number then amounted to 95,628. In the year 1842 troops were required for emergencies that had arisen in India and China, and the Army was increased to 101,455. In the year 1846, the Government of the country came down to the House with a supplementary estimate, which was cordially approved of by the House, and the force was then augmented to 108,608 men. In 1849 the number was raised still further to 113,847, which was the highest number; and that occurred in this way—several regiments were sent home from the Indian establishment after the general actions on the Sutlej, under the opinion that India was to see no more war. The very next year a similar number of regiments was required for India; and had those to which he had just referred been dismissed immediately on their return, as the hon. Gentleman would have them do, the consequence would have been that the expense would have been doubled. That must show the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding, that it would not be the wisest or most economical course to adopt, at the moment they had some additional men to reduce them, without waiting for some time. Then they came to a turning point, and the amount was reduced last year from 113,847 to 103,254, and this year the number was to be reduced from 103,254 to 99,128. That, he admitted, was still an increase on the force of 1835, amounting to 17,857 men; but taking into consideration all the duties that had been added since 1835, he felt they were fully justified in keeping up the increased force they at present maintained. It had been said by the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding, that if their colonies were to have the power of self-control and government, it was but fair those colonies should maintain the force they sent out, as he said, in the form of a military police; but as he (Mr. F. Maule) maintained, in the form of a military protection. That was a policy not entirely unknown to the Government. So far as barracks went, and finding lodgings for troops, the noble Earl the Colonial Secretary had called upon the local Government of Canada to find barrack accommodations at Montreal, and the noble Earl had also called upon the local Government of Australia to maintain barrack establishments and lodgings for the troops in that colony. That was one step in the direction which his hon. Friend referred to; and he was by no means prepared to say, that as the colonies increased in wealth and importance, and as they required a body of troops from this country to protect their interest, they should not contribute, as some did at present—the Ionian Isles—for the protection the mother country afforded to them. He was quite prepared to maintain that there was scarcely one of their colonies in that position that they could be thrown on their own military resources, and it was the bounden duty of the mother country to maintain troops in those colonies for their protection. It would appear that it was the opinion of the hon. Member for the West Riding that there were too many officers kept up in the Army. His (Mr. F. Maule's) experience lead him to a very different conclusion. His experience had always been that the officers of the British Army were the worst paid, and the hardest working class of public servants, he knew of. He asked them to look to the pay of the officers of a regiment, and, in the first place, to look to the pay of a lieutenant-colonel. He would treat it in a mercantile way, so that it might be perfectly plain to the understandings of mercantile men. The lieutenant-colonel, to arrive at that rank in the Army, paid 4,540l. for his commission, and his pay for commanding a regiment was 365l. If they deducted from the price of his commission the interest, at five per cent, which was but a fair deduction, amounting to 220l., and 20l. for regimental expenses, which he had no alternative but to incur, and deduct the income tax—11l.—on his pay, it would, in all, amount to 258l, leaving a sum of 107l. as the pay of a lieutenant-colonel for the duty he undertakes. A major, taking all similar deductions, received 93l. 15s.; a captain rather more—108l.: a lieutenant 85l.; and an ensign 73l,. 5s. 10d. per annum. Yet these were the men whose organisation was said to be so extravagant. Then, so far from the Army being kept up for the aristocracy in this country, the aristocracy held but a very small portion of the commissions. In all the increase that took place since 1835, under successive Governments, care had been taken to increase the officers in very small proportions indeed as compared with the men. The increase of officers as compared with the men gave one officer to 152 men. But the reduction of officers was quite another thing. When they reduced the men they reduced them generally, without any great burden being placed upon the public; but if they reduced officers to any extent, they would have to begin, in the first instance, by placing a permanent burden on the public. And in the next place, they would destroy the efficiency of the public service; for their object always should be to keep up such an establishment of officers as should enable them, at the shortest possible notice, to raise a largo number of men, and make them efficient for the public service. If they departed from that system, they would find it more costly than pursuing their present course. One more remark with regard to the cavalry regiments. He admitted that what had been said with regard to the cavalry regiments was perfectly correct. It was perfectly true that the cavalry regiments had more officers, in proportion to the men, than the service actually required; but those who knew anything of the cavalry service must recollect that some years ago they were reduced to nearly skeleton regiments, which were capable of being increased whenever an emergency required it. And if a cavalry regiment was called to the field, as was some time ago the case at the Cape of Good Hope, its numbers would be increased, but without any increase of officers; and all cavalry officers were clear upon the point that, to meet an emergency, they must have their officers well trained and disciplined. It was on that principle that cavalry regiments could alone be maintained; and he thought that the principle was very admissible. He had stated that we had but 45,000 men at home to supply reliefs to 39,000 serving in the colonies, and 30,000 serving in India—that is, they had but 45,000 to be ready at all times to supply reliefs for 69,000 men serving abroad, and his right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester had remarked that that Indian service had entailed an expense on the country beyond that stated in the Army estimates. He stated that the East India Company paid the troops of the line that were employed in India, yet that they threw back upon the pension-list and half-pay list a considerable burden. It was quite true that a burden of that description did arise for the number of men that served in the East Indies; but what was their per contra for that? The East India Company paid every year 60,000l. into the Treasury to meet that expenditure, and other expenditure for officers and men of the Queen's service employed in India. Another remark had been made with reference to the proportion of officers to men in the British service. On referring to that, he found that in the year 1835 the proportion of officers to men was 1 officer to 17 men; in the present year they had 1 officer to 20 men; but if his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding turned to the army of a country which found great favour with his hon. Friend, the standing army of North America, which they might be sure was not maintained for the sake of an aristocracy, they would find in the small army of 17,000 men in the United States 775 officers, making 1 officer to 21 men. That was the argument he had to adduce to the House for maintaining the proposition he had laid before it, that 99,128 should constitute the number of men to be employed during the ensuing year. The necessity for having at home a sufficient number of men to relieve those abroad, was a strong ground for maintaining the force he had asked for; and if any one would refer to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth in 1843, they would find that the right hon. Gentleman had stated in stronger and better language than he (Mr. F. Maule) could use, "that they should so organise their force at home as not to expatriate for want of relief their force abroad." They had now arrived at a routine of ten years of colonial service, and if the House meant to retain that routine, they should give to the Government the means of maintaining a force for the purpose. In addition to that consideration, attention should be given to the times in which they lived; and consideration should be given to the position which this country held amidst other nations of the world. They should have this country in such a position with regard to its military force that it could not be subjected to wanton insult from other countries taking advantage of its defenceless situation. What was the strength of the army in France? It consisted of 430 128 men, besides the Gendarmerie, 23,756, and almost innumerable hosts of National Guards. The Prussian army consisted of 325,300 men, besides the Landwehr of the first and second class, which amounted to 450,000 men. The Austrian army consisted of no less, at this moment, than 352 generals, 2,084 staff officers, 16,545 officers, 49,673 non-commissioned officers, and 539,880 privates, making a total of 608,534. He did not say that this country was to run a race with the military establishments of other countries; but he would say that, considering the position this country held amongst the other nations of Europe, which were almost armed cap-à-pie, it would ill befit this country to maintain itself merely in a situation to give relief to its troops required on colonial service, without retaining some margin for the defence of its interests at home, and the maintenance of its dignity amongst the nations of Europe. He thought on this ground, with regard to the number of men, he had shown sufficient reason why the Committee should accede to the proposition of the Government, and grant in the present year 99,128 men. And now he would come to the charge for the present year; and in discussing that he would also follow it by a cursory and rapid view of the other votes in the estimates; and his reason for not entering more fully into those votes was simply this, that those estimates were now lying before the Committee upstairs, and that Committee was carefully engaged in investigating every item, and would report upon them to the House. Therefore, all he would do was to give to the Committee a cursory knowledge of each vote. The charge for the land force was, during the present year, 3,562,430l.; and the charge in the last estimates was 3,655,588l; showing a decrease of 93,1582. upon this estimate. The cost for the staff in 1849, amounted to 173,3762., and this year it amounted to 164,9162., showing a reduction of 8,4602.; He would call the attention of his hon. Friend, who complained that officers were not reduced in proportion to the men, that in the home service there were reduced on the staff two general officers, two aides-decamp, five assistant-adjutants-general, two majors of brigade, and one fort-adjutant; and on foreign service one lieutenant-general and one major-general of a district. The charge for the public department was last year 94,199l, this year 92,6842.; showing a decrease of 1,5152. The decrease on salaries would have been greater, as the reduction in the civil department on salaries was 2,2172., and on account of postage 561l.; but in the military department there was an increase on salaries of 191l., and on postage of 1,072l., thus making the real saving 1,515l. The vote for the Military College was last year 17,408l., and for this year 16,895l., making a decrease of 513l. The vote for the Military Asylum and Hibernian School was last year 19,298l., and this year 18,657l., being a decrease of 641l. He should enter more fully into this vote by and by. He would only now observe that the decrease would have been greater but for some little additional expenses for building a house for the master of the Hibernian school. It was, however, a self-sustaining establishment. The next vote was for the volunteer corps of yeomanry cavalry, upon which there was an increase as compared with last year of 14,714l. This increase had been caused ill consequence of its having been determined last year that the yeomanry should not be called out for permanent duty. It was, however, absolutely necessary, in order to insure the proper discipline of the corps, that they should have the opportunity during the present year of assembling for the purpose of drill. These items constituted the whole of the effective service of the Army, and as compared with last year, this branch showed a decrease of 89,573l. The next aeries of votes would be those on account of the non-effective service. The first vote would be that for distinguished military services, amounting to 15,112l. The sum voted last year under this head was about the same, being 15,120l., a decrease of 8l. The old staff appointments were well considered some years ago, and certain of them were set apart as rewards for distinguished military services. The garrison appointments vacated during the last year were the surgeon of the Portsmouth garrison and the Governor of St. Mawe's. The next item was the pay of general officers, amounting for the year 1850–51 to 58,000l., the amount taken under the same vote in 1849–50 being 78,908l., showing a decrease of 20,908l. In the vote of last year, however, there was included a sum of 13,908l., for arrears of pay due to General Murray at the date of his death; the real decrease upon this head, therefore, for the year would be about 7,000l. The decrease in the number of officers on the list, as compared with 1849–50, was 17. As compared with 1835, there was a decrease upon the whole of this vote of 55,648l. The third vote was that of the retired full-pay, upon which, as compared with the vote of 1835, there was a decrease of 23,000l The amount required for the present year was 54,500l; in the year 1849–50 it was 56,000l, being a decrease of 1,500l. The half-pay list, which was always a very formidable item in the estimates, showed a very fair proportionate decrease as compared with former years. The amount required for this year was 386,000l.; in 1849–50 it was 400,000l; being a decrease of 14,000l. In the year 1835 the vote was 585,600l, showing a decrease of 199,500l since that year. The number of officers that had fallen off during the last year from this list was 234, the number placed on was 87. He might say that no one had been placed on the list who had not earned the reward by due length of service. The next vote to which he would call the attention of the Committee was one including the charge of half-pay and reduced allowances to officers of disbanded foreign corps, the amount required for the present year being 42,200l.., being a diminution in the estimate of 1,956l. as compared with 1849–50; and as compared with 1835–6, of not less than 35,880l. For widows' pensions, the amount required for the present year was 126,636l.; in the last year the same vote was 128,778l.; being a decrease of 2,242l. The number of widows who had been removed from the list during the year was 56; while two only had been placed upon it; showing a decrease of 54 as compared with 1849–50; and as compared with 1835, the reduction in the number had been to the extent of 692. The decrease from the year 1835 was 22,693l. For the Compassionate Fund, the sum required would be 91,000l; in 1849–50 the amount was 95,500l.; being a decrease of 4,500l. Since 1835, there had been a decrease upon this vote of 68,000l. The charges for the in-pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals showed an increase of 215l., the amount required being for the ensuing year 35,756l. whereas in the last year it was 35,541l. There was a decrease in the charge for hospital expenses, but it was expected that in all probability there would be an increase in the claim for prize money, and a sum of 2,000l. was included in the estimates to meet that contingency. The charge for the out-pensioners, which was always the largest in the non-effective service, amounted in the last year to 1,224,052l.; the charge for the present year would be 1,233,711l., showing an increase of 9,659l. This increase was not for any increase in the number of pensioners upon the list—on the contrary, the number was reduced; but for several years past it had been the custom to calculate for the casualties and deaths a sum of 39,000l. This sum not representing accurately the amount of the casualties, had occasioned for several years past an excess of expenditure over the amount usually voted. In the ensuing year credit had only been taken for 20,000l. on account of casualties, instead of 39,000l. which alteration made an apparent increase in the amount required, as it was considered preferable to take a sufficient amount upon vote, rather than to show upon the balance-sheet an excess of expenditure over the amount voted. The decrease under this head since 1835 was 68,119l. The last vote for the non-effective service was for superannuations. Last year the vote was 38,000l.; this year it "was 40,000l, being an increase of 2,000l. This occured by an increase to the Commander-in-chief's department of 400l.; to the War Office, 812l; to the Adjutant General's department, 43l.; and to Chelsea Hospital, 975l., making 2,230l., from which was to be deducted a decrease in other departments of 230l. By a recapitulation of the votes for the non-effective service, there was shown to be a saving on the estimates of this year as compared with the last of 33,241l.; and upon the whole of the estimates for effective and non-effective services there was a saving of 122,814l. During the last few years many whose valuable services were acknowledged by all, and for whom the greatest respect was entertained, had found themselves compelled to retire upon their hardly-earned retiring pensions, some of whom were so completely worn out in the public service that within a very short period of their retirement they had died.

Before he quited this part of the subject he wished to answer the charge that when the Government had arrived at a large armament they were not disposed to go back again. In the 1848–49 the number of men voted for the effective service was 113,847, the gross charge was 4,356,750l.; in 1850–51 the number of men proposed to be voted was 99,128, and the gross charge wos 3,936,582l.; the decrease in the effective service was 14,719, and the charge was 420,168l. In 1848–49 the non-effective service was 73,340, and the charge 2,164,085l. In 1850–51, the men were 71,529, and the charge 2,082,815l. The total decrease on the two services since 1848–49 was, men, 16,530; charge, 501,438l. But let him compare the army establishments as they were at present with what they were in 1835. In 1835 the charge for the Army and the Militia was 6,126,643l.; in the year 1850–51 the charge for the Army and Militia was 6,129,247l., making an increase only on the army and militia services since 1835 of 2,604l. So that if 1835 were to be taken as a standard in point of charge, they were very much nearer to that estimate than the hon. Member for the West Riding appeared to be aware of. But although they so nearly approximated to the charge of that year, he did not mean to say that the Government were to remain stationary at that point, but would continue to make such further reductions as should be found consistent with the efficiency and dignity of the service, and would be prepared to carry out every reasonable and well-considered reform. There were one or two other points connected with the Army to which he should wish to call the attention of the Committee, as they tended greatly to the promotion of the discipline, the comfort, and the character of the Army. The first point to which he would allude was that of military imprisonment, which had placed upon the army establishments a considerable charge since 1835. The expenses of those committed to prison, he was, however, happy to state, had been more than covered by the sums deducted from their pay in the course of this year. He was also happy to state that a considerable improvement had taken place in the character and conduct of the Army, when measured by the numbers committed to military prisons. It was also satisfactory that the number of young men committed to military prisons from the ranks had been gradually decreasing for the last three years. In 1847, the number committed under 20 years of age was 1,126; in 1848, 981; and in 1849, 589. The number of men committed, of two years' service, was, in 1847, 1,656; in 1848, 1,590; and in 1849, 1,000. He felt confident that a continuance in the present mode of education would tend to produce a great decrease in the number of committals. There were many other items connected with this interesting subject, but he would allude only to one of them. But as the system of imprisonment now pursued by the Army had been much commented and animadverted upon, and misrepresented in many cases, he took this opportunity of stating that the alteration had been sanctioned by military persons of high authority, and, as far as he himself had observed it, he considered that the system had worked well, and had had a very salutary effect upon the Army. Formerly when soldiers were committed to prison they were allowed to go to bed at a certain hour at night and to rise at a certain hour in the morning, thus giving them a constant succession of good nights' rest. It was suggested by the Inspector General of Prisons that, without at all injuring the health of the men, or interfering with the practice of their previous life, it would be a proper regulation to make that every other night the men should sleep actually in the same way as if they were on duty or guard. That regulation had been adopted, and the men who had suffered under it had made a firm resolution never to go hack to prison again. Another point was with regard to the health of the Army. He held in his hand the latest return as to the mortality in the Army at home and abroad. The mortality at home was almost the same as in previous years, except the cases of cholera that occurred, and those he was happy to say were comparatively very few in the Army, as the epidemic did not fall upon the soldier with half the severity with which it visited the civilian. But, so far as the returns had been received from abroad, the improvement of the health of the Army, generally speaking, was very great. He found that the following was the ratio of mortality per 1,000 of the strength among the troops serving on foreign stations for the year ending March 31, 1849, compared with the average of the previous 10 years:—British Guiana, 1848–9,142, average of previous 10 years, 97.9; Trinidad, 33.0, average as above, 102.9; Tobago, 98.6, compared to 75.9; Grenada, 12.3, compared to 43.4; St. Vincent's, 6.0, compared to 66.1; Barbadoes, 128.8, compared to 42.9; St. Lucia, 17.4, compared to 67.6; Dominica, 40.4, compared to 132.3; Antigua, 10.9, compared to 63.2; St. Kitt's, 19.4, compared to 105.6; Windward and Leeward combined, 68.4, compared to 67.6; Jamaica, 48.3, compared to 66.9; Gibraltar, 8.4, compared to 11.1; Malta, 30.1, compared to 15.1; Ionian Islands, 23.1, compared to 15.5; Bermuda, 8.4, compared to 27.2; Newfoundland, 10.3, compared to 9.1; Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 19.7, compared to 13.0; Canada, 15.6, compared to 12.6; St. Helena, 8.4, compared to 15.4; Cape of Good Hope, 13.3, compared to 12.9; the Mauritius, 14.6, compared to 24.3; Ceylon, 21.5, compared to 41.4; Madras, 22.4, average of 20 years 76,1; Bengal (the return from this place is for the year ending March 31, 1848), 61.3, compared to 75.7; Bombay, 26.6, compared to 62.5; New South Wales and New Zealand, 8.3, average of 10 years 14.0; Van Diemen's Land, 9.6, compared to 14.0. The establishment of the regimental schools in the Army, which had been commenced in 1846, had been productive of a great amount of good. From the last quarterly returns which had been sent in, there were in 21 schools not less than 2,289 non-commissioned officers and men. He firmly believed that were these schools more generally established, a better educated body of men could not be collected together than the non-commissioned officers and men of the British Army. He was also happy to inform the House that the same plan of education had been adopted with respect to the upper ranks of the Army. There was no part in which a soldier more narrowly watched his commanding officer than in that of intelligence, and if a man once thought that he knew more than his officer, he would lose that feeling of respect which it was necessary that every soldier should feel towards his officer. His Grace the Commander-in-chief had recently insisted upon all officers undergoing an examination before they entered the service; and he hoped soon to see the time when no officer would be promoted to the rank of captain without undergoing an examination before he attained to that position. He would only add, that he had been assured upon the highest authority that both with respect to officers and men, the Army was in a state of which this country might well boast; that it was prepared at all points to meet the enemy in the field; that it had shown every disposition at all times and upon all occasions to live at peace, in harmony, and good-fellowship with its fellow citizens in every part, not only of this country, but of the whole extent of the British empire.


said, that he most heartily concurred in the concluding portion of the speech of his right hon. Friend, He was happy to find that so much had been done to promote the discipline, the health, and education of the Army. He had heard from the present distinguished Commander-in-chief that the number of lashes given at one time should now be limited to 50, and it was a great satisfaction to have heard him say that even that number might in time be reduced. He never said that the pay of the men or officers of the Army was too high. The only difference that existed between him and his right hon. Friend was as to the numbers of that Army. He believed that the manner in which the accounts were kept in his right hon. Friend's office might be a pattern to every office; and he was glad to hear the results which, from those accounts, his right hon. Friend had been able to lay before that House respecting the present state of the Army; and he said so because he had been told in former years, on both sides of the House, by officers of the highest rank, that British soldiers were not to be treated like other men, and that only the lash could keep them in order. Year after year that doctrine was supported, and he was regarded as a theorist for opposing it. It was true that care had been paid to the localities of the barracks, and that had tended to reduce the mortality amongst the troops. He was bound also to admit that great attention had been shown to the accommodation of the men in barracks. But still let the House consider the situation in which the country was placed in a financial point of view. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth would remember that in 1828, in consequence of the public outcry against the expenditure, he was obliged to nominate a Committee of Finance to consider our establishments, and effect a reduction in the various departments; but the searching inquiries they made were considered too great, and they were not allowed in the following year to finish the work they had begun. In that year the expenditure was 50,000,000l; but he was sorry to say that since that time they had increased the expenditure, except during the last two years. He maintained, however, that there was no necessity for the increase during the intervening years. They had not yet heard the financial statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but he thought he might take the expenditure for the present year, allowing for reductions, at between 50,000,000l. and 51,000,000l. If the House should decide that the number of men at present composing the Army should be continued, then they could not turn round and refuse to pass the Estimates. He held in his hand the report of the Committee, of which the late Sir Henry Parnell was chairman, in reference to the Army and Navy question, and which report stated that— the Army and Nary were a great source of expenditure, and it was only by keeping them within a proper limit that a saving could be established. During a period of peace, the Committee should advert to the necessity of turning a time of tranquillity to the improvement of the revenue, to retrenchment, and economy; and they bogged to impress such on the serious attention of the House. That Committee sat in 1819. Now, on former occasions he used to refer to the period of 1792; and he was then in a position to show that every Finance Committee that sat up to the period of 1828 had directed the attention of the House to the necessity of keeping a low establishment in view, in order to strengthen the credit of the country by improving its finances, and by being prepared, in case of necessity, with a full exchequer to supply the sinews of war; while, under the present system, they had been expending not only the amount of their revenue, but beyond the amount of their revenue. Within the last twelve years, they had added nearly 40,000,000l. to their debt. Here they were at present in a condition to benefit themselves, if they would only take a lesson from the Finance Committees that sat at various periods up to the present. The question he wished to ask was, did they require the number of men they were then about to take a vote for? He asserted they did not; and the right hon. Gentleman who preceded him had given no reason whatever to show that such a number should be voted. In 1835 and 1836, the number of men in the Army amounted to 80,000; but owing, as was said, to the rebellion in Canada, they increased in 1837 to 89,000; in 1838 they increased to 93,000; so that, owing to the rebellion in Canada, which was temporary, the Army was increased 13,000 men up to 1838. No man would say that at present Canada, with its state of government, required an increase of soldiery. His right hon. Friend the Secretary at War had stated that in 1840 colonial corps were raised, and he (Mr. Hume) was one of those who approved of such corps, because he saw in them the saving of transit of troops backwards and forwards. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared before a Committee that "two-thirds of the troops of Great Britain were retained for the purpose of relieving those abroad;" and therefore it was only reasonable to approve of colonial corps, as they undoubtedly decreased the public expenditure. Now, he thought, by the showing of his right hon. Friend, that they were entitled to a reduction of the troops at home by reason of the colonial corps. But the case was far different; for in 1846, instead of a reduction, they had the troops increased to 108,000, instead of 80,000, in 1835; and what reason was adduced? Why, the state of the country. In the following year, 1847, the troops numbered 113,000; and in that year he took the sense of the House as to whether retrogression would not be the better policy; but the Government met him with the statement that "they wanted troops for India,": where at the time he believed there was war. Well, at present there was peace in India, and why were not these men reduced? He wished to know why recruiting-should not be stopped for twelve months? He did not wish that efficient men should be discharged or disbanded; but, if they wished to make a reduction, they should discontinue recruiting. He wished next to come to the present period, and to ask why we should require an estimate for upwards of 99,000 men? He considered that his right hon. Friend had failed to make out a case in support of the estimates, and the House should, therefore, without hesitation, adopt the recommendations of all Finance Committees from 1828 upwards, and reduce the number of men. The question might be asked, would you reduce them altogether, or at various times? His answer was this:—Instead of 99,128, now sought to be voted, he would take 89,000; and the year following he would reduce the number to 80,000, which should be regarded as a fair and gradual reduction. In reference to the system of purchase which prevailed amongst the officers, he would wish to see that system done away with altogether. He was in favour of the system that promoted men from the ranks for merit and service, instead of making promotion a mercantile principle. A good deal had been said about "reliefs to India." He would be sorry to see any regiment stationed more than ten years in India, though he had known regiments to be eighteen years in India; but he condemned that principle, as, in his opinion, it amounted to a banishment for life of their best officers. He thought he had shown that the revenues exacted from the people now were as heavy as in 1828, and also that the expenditure, which had been reduced to 44,000,000l., at present rose as high as 50,000,000l., showing within the period an excess of some 6,000,000l. He would now come to the number of men. In 1834 they had 80,000 men, which number continued up to the Canadian rebellion, when they increased to 89,000 men, and in the next year to 93,000 men, and so on until they numbered 113,000. He contended there had been no circumstance to warrant such an increase in the country's expenditure, and that at present they were in a position to commence a reduction. If he spoke of economy, he was told that it was the old argument of pounds, shillings, and pence; but, after all, that was the real argument. The establishment which the Finance Committee of 1792 recommended was 45,242 for Great Britain, Ireland, and the colonies. He was not prepared to return to that number at present, but possibly they might come by and by to it, when the colonies were their own managers, and took upon themselves their own police. 30,000 men, or a large portion at least, might then be withdrawn from the colonies; and the time might come, though he might not be in that House to hear it, when they would be able to return to the old establishment of 1792, or very near it. They had heard no reason for maintaining a large army, except that France and Prussia were doing so; but when the First Commissioner of the Admiralty proposed to keep up a large fleet, because France was extending hers, he protested against that doctrine—and he did so now. We had paid a severe penalty in the shape of 600,000,000l. of debt for fighting the battles of the Continent; and if war should again arise, it might not be in the power of any House of Commons to adopt such a course again. And, on the other hand, instead of trusting to the maintenance of a large army to keep the peace of the country, let Parliament grant to the people the reforms he considered to be their right, and let the policy of this country rest on the contentment of the people, and not on force. But the right hon. Gentlemen who now sat on the Treasury benches seemed to have become Tories. There must be something infectious in the seats, for he could bring before the House speeches of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, telling the Tories in times past, year after year, not to trust to bayonets or large military establishments, but to depend on the fidelity of the people, and their interest to maintain peace; but the noble Lord was now equally ready to maintain the contrary doctrine, and that large establishments must be kept up. He would advise hon. Gentlemen not to take the opinion of any Secretary at War or Prime Minister, but to judge for themselves of the circumstances of the country. In 1835 the cavalry was 10,880; in 1850 it is 12,850; of foot guards there were, in 1835, 4,782, in 1850 the number is 5,206; of infantry the number was 72,722, it is now 102,312, including those in India; and the colonial corps, which were in 1835, 5,590, are now 9,998—making an aggregate, therefore, of 100,990 in 1835, against 129,625 in 1850. He would contrast the amount of the Army in 1835 with that of the present time, by showing the manner in which it was distributed. The force for Great Britain in 1835 was 23,013, now it was 33,972; for Ireland, in 1835, it was 21,300; now it was 29,400; in the colonies, in 1835, it was 36,941; it was now 39,730; the total amount of our force for Great Britain, Ireland, and the colonies, in 1835, was 81,271, and at present it was 99,128, being an increase of 17,857. The force in India in 1835 was 14,720, and now it, was 30,497, making the aggregate number of the Army 129,625. However, as India defrayed the expense of the troops stationed there, he would say nothing about them, but confine himself to the force maintained for Great Britain, Ireland, and the colonies, which, as he had showed, exceeded that which was sufficient for the same purpose in 1835 by no less than 17,857. This, however, was not the only increase to our armed force since 1835. In addition, there were 10,000 pensioners, and 10,000 labourers in the dockyards enrolled, whilst the English and Irish police had been augmented by about 10,000; in all, 30,000. To return to the increase of 17,857 men over the estimate of 1835, he proposed to reduce it this year by 10,000 men, and to reduce the remaining 7,857 next year. That would effect a saving of expenditure equal in amount to the malt tax and hop duty; and, as there was a surplus of 3,000,000l., the House might repeal, in addition to those taxes, the taxes on windows and on "knowledge." Savings might also be made by consolidating regiments. The three regiments of horse guards, which numbered only 1,300 men, might very well be thrown into one, and the seventeen other cavalry regiments might be reduced to seven or eight. By such an amalgamation a con- siderable saving would be made as regarded officers, barracks, clothing, and other matters. The infantry of the line, numbering 75,178 men, composed no fewer than 100 regiments; but if 1,000 men were apportioned to each regiment, as ought to be the case, an important saving would result. The Secretary at War had not clearly distinguished, in the statement which he had made, between the charges for the effective and non-effective service. In 1835, the charge for the non-effective service was 2,499,000l; now it was 2,082,000l., being a reduction of 417,000l. The right hon. Secretary ingeniously availed himself of this reduction to say that the gross charge for the Army and Militia was only 2,604l more at present than it was in 1835. But it was the effective force with which the Committee had to deal, and that was augmented from 3,294,000l. in 1835, to 3,936,000l. now—an increase amounting to nearly twice as much as the saving made in the noneffective branch. It was of the unnecessarily large charge for the effective service that he and his friends complained, and called upon the Government to reduce it. He did not wish that one single soldier should be discharged; but that the reduction should be effected by a cessation of recruiting, by which means the saving was effected in the four years preceding 1835. Let not the Government think that they would cease to be pressed. The country Gentlemen would be down upon them harder next year than they were then, and it was impossible to afford all the relief required by the nation without a reduction of at least 10,000,000l. The force had been kept up at its present amount in order to keep down the people, and to deprive them of their rights. How heavily the burden pressed upon the community was illustrated by the fact, which he had recently ascertained by inquiry, that in the parish of Marylebone 600 distress warrants were out for the non-payment of rates, to say nothing of distresses for assessed taxes, of which he intended to move for a return embracing the whole of the country. Through the pressure of the rates, and of taxation, numbers of contributors to the support of the State had been converted into burdens on its resources. Were the reduction which he proposed effected, the force would still amount to more than it was in 1835, including the dock battalions, the pensioners, and the additional police. Let those who complained of the income tax bear in mind that, if the Army and Navy had not been increased, that tax would never have been imposed. He pledged himself to struggle for a reduction of 10,000,000l., as necessary both to prevent pauperism and crime, and to afford the people proper relief and enjoyment, and for each specific diminution he undertook to make out a sufficient case. The English people were an economical people. [Laughter.] He repeated that statement. That they were economical was proved by the fact that they had amassed so much capital; but at present the taxation pressed so heavily on them that they were deprived of the benefit of their economy, and it was on that ground that he asked for reduction. A gentleman named Norman, in the City, had published a pamphlet, the object of which was to show that the people of England were not heavily taxed as compared with those of other countries; but his object in referring to the work was not to combat its doctrine on this occasion, but only to point out an extraordinary misrepresentation that occurred in its second page. It was there stated that his (Mr. Hume's) friend, Mr. John Stuart Mill, maintained that taxation amounted only to this: that Government spent the money, which the people would have to spend if they had not paid the taxes. That was a misrepresentation of Mr. Mill's opinions. ["No!"] Yes, it was. Mr. Mill entertained an opinion the very reverse of that attributed to him. If the noble Lord at the head of the Government would consent to the Amendment, it would relieve him from some of the applications with which he was bothered at present. The Prime Minister must be wretched whilst in office, and he often wondered how any man would accept it. The more he had to give away the more he was pestered by applications, and therefore the noble Lord would get rid of some of his tormentors by assenting to the Amendment.

Motion made, and Question put— That a number of land forces, not exceeding 89,128 men (exclusive of the men employed in the territorial possessions of the East India Company), commissioned and non-commissioned officers included, be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, from the 1st day of April, 1850, to the 31st day of March, 1851, inclusive.


said, he could assure the hon. Gentleman that it was not because of his having been connected with the service that he should oppose the Amendment. Having listened attentively to his address, he was of opinion that he had not made out his case. Was there any one of the colonies in which the number of reliefs could be reduced? He had taken the trouble of ascertaining what number of troops of the line were quartered in the different colonies. He found that in the whole of the American colonies there were but eleven regiments of the line. As each regiment had a depot of about 200 men at home, the effective force was only 5,500 men; and, looking at the extent of country to be garrisoned, he thought it could hardly be said that that force was too large. In the West Indies there were seven regiments, or 3,500 men, scattered over the various islands. At the Cape of Good Hope there were five regiments, or 2,500 men. Considering the nature and extent of the frontier to be guarded, and remembering what had occurred within the last few years, he should like to know whether any hon. Member would propose to make a reduction. Were any troops withdrawn, he believed the colonists would soon call out for protection. In Ceylon there were two regiments of the line, or 1,000 men: at Mauritius the same number. In the whole of Australia, including New Zealand and Van Diemen's Land, there were only five regiments of the line, or 2,500 men. At Gibraltar, also, there were five regiments, or 2,500 men; a number which had always been considered requisite to hold it as a military post. At Malta there were two regiments, or 1,000 men; and the same number in China. Such was the disposition of the troops in the colonies; and after this enumeration, he must repeat his belief that the hon. Gentleman had made out no case for the reductions which had been proposed by him. The hon. Gentleman had made a charge against the Army which was hardly fair, namely, that it had been maintained in order to keep down a class. The conduct of the Army afforded a contradiction to that statement; and he must add, that whenever there had been an apprehension of danger in the manufacturing districts, the manufacturers had been the first to demand the aid of the military, and to grumble at their removal.


The hon. and gallant Gentleman has declared that my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose has not made out a case for the reduction which he proposes; and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of War stated that the expense of the Army and the Militia at the present moment is very nearly the same as it was in 1835. Now there are two kinds of military expenditure—namely, effective and non-effective. The effective military expenditure is for services actually performing; the non-effective for services performed. The former is under the immediate and direct control of Parliament, and is in proportion to the force maintained, and increases or decreases with the number of men voted. The non-effective expenditure depends upon the number of men which have been employed in previous years, and therefore is removed from the direct and immediate control of Parliament. To judge, therefore, of the increase or retrenchment which has been made in the Army expenditure, the effective expenditure should be alone considered. In 1835 the number of men voted was 81,000, and the estimate for effective services was 3,334,000l; in 1848, the number of men was 114,000, and the estimate 4,356,000l. This year the number of men is proposed to be 89,000, and the estimate for them 3,936,000l.—a decrease therefore as compared to 1848, of 15,000 men, and 420,000l—an increase, as compared to 1835, of 18,000 men, and 592,000l Now, ought the force of the Army to be reduced to the standard of 1835l That force should be divided into two parts, each requiring separate consideration. One part is employed in the foreign possessions of the Crown, the other part at home. With regard to the force at home, I shall say nothing at present. I am not, for many reasons, inclined to strip the centre of the empire of military force; and if we maintain a considerable force in the colonies, we ought to have a considerable force at home to relieve the troops in the colonies. The question, therefore, to which I shall confine myself is, whether there can and ought to be made a considerable reduction in our military force in the colonies. I would call the attention of the Committee to a return printed last year of the expenditure of Great Britain, on account of the colonies, for the year 1846–7. This return gives the expenditure for that year at 3,500,000l But that sum did not include any indirect expenditure, nor the expenditure on account of the fleets maintained on the colonial stations, which last expenditure, I reckon at not less than 1,000,000l. a year. Therefore, in my opinion, the direct military, naval, and civil expenditure of Great Britain, on account of the colonies. did not amount, in the years 1846–7, to much less than 4,500,000l I will confine my observations to the military expenditure. According to this return the direct military expenditure of Great Britain on account of the colonies (including ordnance and commissariat expenditure) amounted to 3,000,000l. in 1846–7: all this expenditure was on account of the effective military force; and as in 1846–7 the whole expenditure of the empire on account of effective military force amounted to 6,600,000l., it follows that 5–11ths of our effective military expenditure is on account of the colonies; and as in the long run the expenditure on account of noneffective must be in proportion to the effective force which had been previously employed, I am entitled to assert that 8–11ths of our whole military expenditure is on account of the colonies. Now, in the years 1846–7, the whole military expenditure, including ordnance and commissariat, amounted to 9,000,000l, of which 4,000,000l. was required in consequence of the force we were maintaining, or had maintained, in the colonies. Therefore the question of the amount of military force to be kept in the colonies is a question with regard to 4,000,000l. of annual expenditure, consisting directly of. 3,000,000l. expenditure for effective service, and indirectly of 1,000,000l. expenditure for non-effective services. It is evident, however, that it is only in the effective expenditure that any immediate reduction can be made. The question therefore is, do we want 41,000 troops in the colonies? If we do, we must pay for them, and we ought to keep an ample force at home to relieve them. We may make some economies here and there, save a few thousands; but I am inclined to think that the Army has been well managed, economically speaking; and I feel persuaded that we cannot reduce the cost of these troops under 4,000,000l. a year for effective and noneffective expenditure. To ascertain whether the military force in the colonies can be reduced, it is necessary to consider how it is distributed. I have only its distribution in 1848–9, which I will take in connexion with the expenditure for 1846–7. I am sorry that there is no return of the distribution and expenditure of our military force for the same year. Our troops are distributed through three different classes of colonies, namely, military stations, plantations or subjugated territories, and colonies, properly so called. With regard to military stations, if the people of England pride themselves on such fortresses as Malta and Gibraltar; if they choose to have the Ionian Islands, and will display their wisdom by laying claim to Sapienza; if they have a mind for St. Helena, Hong-Kong, Labuan, and the Falkland Islands; if they will dot the world over with their troops—why, they must pay for so doing; they must not grudge 500,000l. a year for effective military expenditure in these places; for the follies of mankind are always the most expensive of their amusements. But I do grudge the expense of 2,500 troops in the Ionian Islands. Our military expenditure on account of these islands has amounted, on an average, to about 130,000l. a year, or about 4,500,000l. since the peace. Of that sum we have expended 456,000l. on military works. We commenced fortifications at Corfu, which were estimated to cost 152,000l.; they have cost already 356,000l.; they cannot be completed at less than 90,000l. more; and when completed at a cost of 450,000l., they will be so extensive that, in the event of a war, it would not be expedient to keep a sufficient garrison to man them; therefore, in such an event, the wisest plan would be to withdraw our troops, and blow up the fortifications, and we could always reconquer them if there were no fortifications for less than the interest of the capital we have expended upon them since the peace. As military stations they are useless, and their government has not added to our fame in Europe. The hon. and gallant officer the Member for Longford stated that there were only 1,000 troops in Malta; the number was 2,891, including the Maltese for whom this country paid. Next, with regard to our military expenditure in our plantations and subjugated territories. In the West Indies the military force amounts to about 6,500 men, with an effective expenditure of 500,000l. a year. Is this expenditure necessary? In the Mauritius we keep 1,73l men, at a cost of about 90,000l. a year. Since 1828 we have expended 200,000l. on military works at the Mauritius, and lately we have commenced other new works, part of which is to cost another 200,000l. These works and troops are said to be required, because the Mauritius is an important military station, and the inhabitants hostile to our dominion, partly from their French origin, partly from Colonial Office misgovernment. There to defend us from foreign and from domestic foes from without and from within, sea defences, and land defences, and garrisons are required. In Ceylon, there were not 1,500 men, as had been stated, but nearly 4,000 by the latest return. The hon. and gallant Officer argued that the number of troops had not been increased in those colonies. [Major BLACKALL: I said troops of the line.] There were 1,800 European troops in Ceylon. Ceylon affords a capital instance of the mismanagement, ignorance, and bigotry of the Colonial Office. Mismanagement and ignorance led to injudicious taxes, which occasioned fiscal riots, at the same time Colonial Office bigotry wounded the religious feelings of the natives. Superstition, and hatred of races, slmost produced a revolution, which was suppressed, whether with excessive rigour or not I cannot pretend to say, as I am not a member of the Ceylon Committee. But this I am prepared to say, that the increased military expenditure of that colony has been caused by the misconduct of the Colonial Office. Lastly, with regard to our military expenditure on account of our colonies, properly so called, this is a question of principle. That with regard to our military stations and plantations was a question of expediency. I maintain on principle that our colonies, properly so called, in so far as they are integral portions of the empire, but do not contribute towards the general revenue of the empire, ought in ordinary times to defray all their own expenses; and if they want troops for local purposes, they ought to pay for them. At the same time, they are entitled to claim the complete management of their local affairs. I, therefore, maintain we ought only to keep troops in our real colonies for imperial purposes. I ask why we should keep nearly 9,000 troops in North America, at an expense of 650,000l. a year? If that force be intended to prevent annexation to the United States, it is ridiculously small. If we wish to prevent annexation we must give that colony the complete control over all its own affairs, and deprive the Colonial Office of its power of interfering in the local concerns of that colony, and if by those means we cannot succeed in retaining the affections of the colonists, and attaching them to the empire, be assured that results cannot be obtained by 9,000 armed men, even were we inclined to enforce a reluctant obedience at the point of the bayonet. A few troops for show more than use at Quebec and Halifax, would be all that would be required for imperial purposes. Next, at the Cape of Good Hope the number of troops in 1848 was 5,000, and the expenditure in 1846–7 685,000l. This was the commencement of the Kafir war. Now I contend that wars with natives are local wars, which the colonies ought to pay for, and which then they would take good care not to get into. I do not quite agree with the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that because we have expended some millions on those local wars, we are entitled to send convicts to the Cape. But I argue, from the vigour and energy with which the colonists have resisted and defeated the noble Earl, that they are more than a match for a Kafir. Therefore I should propose to withdraw most of our troops from South Africa, and keep only for imperial purposes a few troops at Cape Town. Lastly, in the Australian colonies and New Zealand, the number of troops in 1848 was 4,500, costing in 1846–7 about 270,000; about 2,000 of those troops are distributed between Van Diemen's Land and New South Wales. In the former colony they are required on account of the convicts—therefore for imperial purposes. In New South Wales there ought to be no troops whatever, as I cannot conceive to what purposes they can be applied except for police, and the colonists ought with free institutions to pay for their own police. In New Zealand, according to the last account from Governor Grey, the military force in the northern island amounted to 2,948 men, nearly equal to the number (3,157) of adult male Europeans not military in that island. In fact, according to that authority, the number of military (1,798) in New Ulster exceeded by 298 men, the number (1,500) of adult male Europeans not military in that province. I believe, however, of this military force about 400 are pensioners; the remaining 2,500 are troops which must cost this country not less than 150,000 a year. When it is remembered that in addition to this sum a sum has been generally voted of from 20,000l to 30,000l. a year for the civil government of that colony, it must be acknowledged to be a most costly gem of the British empire. I believe it has been made so costly by the mismanagement of the Colonial Office; and in consequence of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, having broken his pledge of giving free institutions to New Zealand. I speak not of Auckland and New Ulster at present. I confine my remarks to Wel- lington and New Munster. I knew the leading men who emigrated there. A body better qualified for self-government never left these shores; if you give them self-government they will take care of themselves. They are on the best terms with the natives; and from New Munster alone you may withdraw 1,000 troops, and effect a saving of 60,000l. a year. If the troops in Canada were diminished by 5,000 men, at the Cape by 2,000, and in New Zealand by 1,000, a reduction would be effected to the extent of 8,000 men altogether. For these reasons, omitting the question of the amount of force to be kept at home or in our plantations, I contend that I am entitled to vote for a reduction in the vote of men, because I am convinced that a great reduction ought to be made in the military force in our colonies properly so called, and that such a reduction would be in accordance with the true principles of colonial policy and the great interests of our colonial empire.


said, that he understood the hon. Baronet who had just sat down to have said that as long as they held their colonies, they ought to maintain the troops there. [Sir W. MOLESWORTH: No, no!] He understood the hon. Baronet to have said so. At all events, he could not understand how he could vote with the hon. Member for Montrose for a reduction of 11,000 of their troops, when his own opinion was that they could not safely make a greater reduction than 8,000 men. The hon. Member for Montrose complained that they now had 4,000 men in the colonies more than they had in the year 1835; but he should recollect that the colonies of Hong Kong and New Zealand, which they held only since that favourite year of comparison, absorbed those 4,000 men. What was the use of those colonies, some of which they took by stealth, others by purchase? He could not see of what use they were except to afford advantage to the mercantile interests of this country. No one could presume to doubt that they were of great advantage in that way. As for New Zealand, in that colony there could be no manufactures introduced except from this country. They should not now come forward to ask for a reduction in the amount of troops necessary to protect those colonies which formed the chief market for their manufactures. He would ask the House were they in such a safe position as to admit of their withdrawing any of the troops? Would the House consent to withdraw any of the troops from Ireland? If the Government felt that they could with confidence withdraw 9,000 or 10,000 of the troops from Ireland, they would gladly do so; but such confidence should not be placed in the peace and tranquillity of that country as some hon. Gentlemen would appear to suppose. He looked on Ireland as the most populous and the most helpless country on the face of earth, and could not admit of the withdrawal of such a number of troops. There was not at present a country in Europe that was not kept down by the force of bayonets; and there was not a crowned head that did not depend on such a force for its existence. It was said that the existence of railways did away with the necessity of having large numbers of troops in any one portion of their dominions. No doubt as a means of transit they were extremely advantageous, and would be of great use in case of a foreign invasion; but in case of an internal commotion they would be of no such advantage. Now, for instance, he would suppose that a row took place in Liverpool, and the troops were sent to check it, and succeeded in doing so, and then the disaffected made their way by rail to Manchester, and did the same there. Suppose there were no troops in Manchester, and the troops had to be sent from Liverpool to check the disturbance; what then would the Manchester gentlemen say? They would exclaim, "We pay taxes, and we have as good a right to keep troops in Manchester as you in Liverpool have." He would remind the House that the whole of this force was kept up to protect their interests and their property. It was the fashion to talk about the Army as being kept up for the purpose of providing for the younger members of the aristocracy. Such a clap-trap as that was a mere attempt to bring the Army into contempt. The aristocracy were not a bit more provided in the Army than any other body in the community. There was a fair sprinkling of gentlemen whose fathers belonged to the mercantile body in the Household Brigade and the Guards; and he should say that in the heavy cavalry more than half the officers were sons of mercantile and commercial men. As for the line, he declared to the House that every interest was fairly represented. Those who spoke about the Army should be more careful; and when they made statements they should take care they should not be the very re- verse of the truth, as such statements were likely to do incalculable mischief. It was stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding, that there were more officers in the Army than was necessary, and added that there was an officer to every twelve men. How could the House accept such a statement as that, when they would find, by comparing the numbers, that there was only one working officer to every thirty men. If they took all the officers as they now stood, working and non-working, including even the veterinary surgeons, they would find that instead of one officer to every twelve men, there was only one to every eighteen. If, however, as he said before, they only took the working officers, they would find that there was only one officer to every thirty men. He would observe that instead of having too many officers, there was reason to believe they had not enough of them to enable them, whenever they sent a detachment of men, to supply an officer to accompany them. The newspapers every day contained complaints of their not having enough officers in India. He would recommend those who argued on these matters without any personal knowledge, to ask any military man, and then they would receive full and fair explanations. The hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding said that he had consulted a military man, either a Hanoverian or an Australian. [Laughter.] Well, Austrian; but he might just as well have consulted one as the other. He thought that when advice was asked on these matters, it should not be sought from a foreigner. They were proved to be an overmatch for the foreigners as far as military matters went: and if the hon. Gentleman preferred the position of the foreigners he wished him joy, but the English were as far superior to them as one thing could be to another. Hon. Gentlemen said that they were anxious to keep faith with their creditors; but they should also keep faith with their soldiers, and allow the reliefs to proceed; and all he could say was, that if the Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose was carried, they would give strength to the disaffected and discontented in every part of Her Majesty's dominions.


, in order to justify the vote he should give, would offer a few observations to the Committee. He believed that the Government were anxious to go on reducing the military establishments as much as possible; and he must say most sincerely, from his own personal knowledge of what his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been doing, that he was as anxious to reduce the expenditure, and to economise the finances of the country, as any man could be. In 1848 he (Mr. M'Gregor) had himself proposed a reduction in the expense of these establishments from 18,512,147l to 14,250,000l.; and he found, that since that period the Government had themselves made a reduction of 2,686,711l., bringing the total cost at present of Army, Navy, and Ordnance to 16,825,436l. He agreed with the hon. Member for Southwark that they should reduce the military expenditure in the colonies, and he hoped that, as Ireland was in a tranquil state, there would be no necessity of maintaining more than the ordinary garrisons in that country. He did not agree with the hon. Member for Montrose that they had no source of alarm in the large military establishments on the Continent; for he thought that when such large standing armies were kept up in France, Austria, and Prussia, it behoved us to see that we were in a safe position. The Prussian army, on the 1st of April last, amounted to 325,300 men under arms, of between 22 and 32 years of age, exclusive of the Landwehr, 151,500, of 32 years and upwards, and 36,000 Gendarmerie, being a total army of 512,800 men. The Austrian army, in the end of June, 1848, amounted to 706,708 men; and in France the actual standing army was 453,884 men, for the year 1849, exclusive of the National Guard; and he found the cost of maintenance of the French army was exactly double the cost for the maintenance of our own army, being 13,850,000l. sterling. He could not, under these circumstances, vote for any immediate reduction in the Army; and although he hoped, by reducing the expenditure of the country to reduce the taxes (especially the window tax), which pressed so heavily on many interests, he would never consent to reduce any taxes at the expense of public credit. He was anxious to see reductions made in the Army and Navy, whenever they were practicable and compatible with safety; but he thought that hon. Gentlemen who wished to make a sweeping reduction of 11,000 men could not do so without inflicting injustice on most of those 11,000 men. If they brought home troops from the colonies, this would take some time, and they must, as a matter of justice, give them pensions. He did not, under all the circumstances, expect any great reduction to be effected in the Army and Navy for some years; though he believed the expense might be reduced by economy.


bore testimony to the forbearance and good conduct of the troops whenever he had seen them called out on particular occasions. The question, however, was, whether it was convenient or not to reduce the number of the Army, and he had been surprised to observe the same Gentlemen speak and vote for a reduction of taxation, who spoke and voted against a reduction of expenditure. How was it possible consistently to talk about a reduction of taxation, and at the same time to vote for the full expenditure of the country? The window tax, for example, produced a good round sum. As a landed proprietor, he should be glad of the reduction of much taxation; as a metropolitan representative, he should feel it his duty to vote for the repeal of that tax; but he could not pursue that course if the full expenditure was maintained. The hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham had advised the hon. Member for the West Riding, if he wanted to reduce the British Army, not to consult an Austrian officer but an English military man. But whether the Army was to be reduced or not, he (Sir B. Hall) told the hon. and gallant Member, without wishing to say one word in derogation of himself or of any other officer of the British Army, that upon such a question as that of reduction, their opinions would not be those he should most rely upon. If, for example, he wished to reduce the number of bishops, he should not go to the bishops for advice; and so, if he desired to reduce the Army, he should not consult the officers. The two cases were in the same category. In a matter so connected with their interests, it would be impossible for the officers to give an unbiassed opinion. Scarcely a man connected with the Army would be found voting with the minority on this proposal. The hon. and gallant Member had referred to the state of Europe; but this country did not stand in the same position. We were at peace with all the world, and could afford to reduce our Army, and yet keep the crown upon the head of our Sovereign, which was not the case in some other countries, where armies were kept on foot only to preserve crowns on heads, some of whom, perhaps, did not deserve to wear them. The hon. Member for Glasgow referred to the number of the French army, but could he be surprised when he considered the condition of all France? So in Russia, there was no Government, and the army was required to maintain the power of the Crown. The same reason applied to Austria; and in Prussia there would soon be three Parliaments sitting in different places, and yet Germany was called by some persons a united empire. He admitted that those countries must keep up their military force, and that there was good reason for not reducing their armies. But this country had enjoyed many years of peace; and it appeared to him that the time had come for reduction, and that it was useless going on from year to year saying that there could be no diminution in the number of the Army. He thought the proposal of the hon. Member for Montrose was one that could be fairly met. The earnest wish of the country was for a reduction of expenditure in order to obtain a reduction of taxation, and he did not think that those who opposed such a reduction of expenditure had a right to demand remission of taxation. He had before voted for reductions, and should do so now with a great deal of pleasure.


explained that he had not asked the hon. Member for the West Riding to appeal to the officers of the Army for advice; but had merely alluded to his avowal that he had consulted an Austrian officer, who stated that the system on which we conducted our Army was a very erroneous one.


, as a civilian, expressed his admiration of the manner in which the estimates were framed, particularly as discredit had been attempted to be thrown upon that noble service—the Army. Unfounded imputations had been cast upon it. ["No, no!"] Why, during the recess, he had seen pamphlets, numerous enough, in which it was asserted that the Army was a cradle for the aristocracy, and that regiments were commercial speculations for the profit of the colonels, and not for the maintenance of peace, law, and order. No man, however, could take up the estimates without seeing how every shilling of the public money was spent; and, he repeated that, whether any item was capable of reduction or not, this was a circumstance creditable to the manner in which they were framed. The point at issue then was, were Her Majesty's Government seeking for the maintenance of a larger force than was necessary to maintain peace at home, the dignity of the empire abroad, and retain possession of our colonies? With regard to the maintenance of peace at home, it was clear there must he a sufficient force to hack the law. The sentences pronounced by the Judges could not be put into execution merely by a small police force; and when hon. Members alleged that the "people" were calling for reductions in our military establishments, he asked them what they meant by "the people?" Did they mean to include, under that term, pickpockets, thieves, and that large body, estimated at 70,000 in the metropolis alone, who were properly distinguished as the "dangerous classes?" If so, he could easily account for the demand; for in addition to the metropolis he contended that the great towns, such as Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, and others, required garrisons, but not to tyrannise over the people, or to deprive them of their political rights. The people certainly asked for a reduction of taxation, and he was ready to have it reduced; but he was not willing to reduce the Army, which would prevent adequate protection being afforded to the community. With regard to the colonies, he contended that the military force necessary for their retention could not safely be less than it was at present. He was prepared to show this to be the conviction of every colonial governor; and he preferred their opinions upon such a subject to those of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding, who, he regretted to say, had, on more than one occasion, indulged in a depreciatory tone with regard to the Army and Navy. He was glad to hear the noble Lord at the head of the Government, upon a late occasion, say that her Majesty's Ministers were determined not to allow one of our colonies to be taken from us. But, to enforce this determination a sufficient military power must be maintained. He did not think it was doing justice to the Government, who had made already such reductions as they could consistently with the safety of the country, for hon. Gentlemen not to take the slightest notice of those reductions, and call for a still further reduction of 10,000 men. Those hon. Gentlemen ought rather to acknowledge the reductions already made, and bow to the opinions of her Majesty's Government as to any further step in the same direction. With respect to our colonies, he maintained that so far from the military force there being too large, it was the reverse, as the governors, military men, and other compe- tent authorities, had often shown. He considered these better authorities on such a subject than the hon. Member for the West Riding. After the imputations which that hon. Member had cast upon the noble and distinguished man who was the glory of our country and our age, he thought he had a right to doubt anything which came from such a source. 'That hon. Member spoke both of the military and naval services in the spirit of an alien. For himself, he (Mr. Stanford) desired to see this country great and glorious as it ever had been; and he therefore thanked the Government for manfully coming forward, and, instead of pandering to a base desire for popularity, asking for such a force as they considered right for the maintenance of the glory of Old England.


said, that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Reading appeared to look upon the Army as kept up only to give force to the sentences of the Judges. The hon. Gentleman, in fact, seemed to gather the idea from the select vestry, of which he (Mr. Osborne) believed he was, or had been, a member. The British Army he regarded in the light of the new police, and when the hon. Gentleman asked whether the cry for the reduction of the Army came from the people, he (Mr. Osborne) would ask him whether select vestries had made no call of the same nature? Had not one select vestry, which might be named, made immense complaints of an extra rate of sixpence in the pound for the new police, which the hon. Member knew very well amounted to a large sum?


observed, that he was not a member of Marylebone vestry, to which the hon. Gentleman appeared to be referring; but the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose was.


believed, then, that the hon. Gentleman had accepted the Chiltern Hundreds as far as concerned select vestries. But if the reasons of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Reading for supporting the Motion were extraordinary, those advanced by the hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham were still more extraordinary. The hon. Member for Reading represented the civilian reasoning, and the hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham the military reasoning, in support of the Motion. And what were those reasons? The question of the number of the Army had been truly put by the hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark. It depended upon our colonial empire. Of course, if we chose to have an empire upon which the sun never sets, we must have troops to maintain it; but the hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham said, "We must keep up a large force in the colonies, because they are discontented with our mode of government." Indeed, he went further, for he contended it was necessary to keep up an enormous force in Ireland, because the people there were impoverished and starving. This was the military part of the reasoning. The hon. and gallant Member would probably consider the condition of the union of Kilrush an additional argument for a large force in that country. He rested the case, too, upon the opinions of military officers. He (Mr. Osborne) believed British officers to be honourable men; there were none more honourable in the world, for they were British gentlemen; but he should not go exactly to an officer in the Army to consult upon the propriety of a reduction in the numbers of his profession. His judgment was as liable to be warped as that of other persons; and when the hon. and gallant Member talked of the opinions of officers, he would ask him if the abolition of flogging in the Army proceeded from them or from the Horse Guards? Was it not resisted year after in that House by Members connected with the military profession? Had it not been for a civilian, his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose—and this was among the thousand and one good things he had done—that system of punishment would have been existing in the Army at this moment. There could not be the slightest doubt that flogging would have been continued. The hon. and gallant Member then referred to the number of officers in the Army; and in the very next sentence misrepresented his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding, with regard to the views expressed to him by an officer in the Austrian service. He said his hon. Friend had compared the Austrian and the British Army—and then he turned round and said, he would compare the British Army either with that of Austria or Prussia. Very well; but let the hon. and gallant Member recollect that nearly the whole system adopted in the British Army had been stolen from the Prussian service. The whole of the infantry manœuvre had been taken from the Prussian system. The hon. and gallant Gentleman should have taken pains to acquaint himself with this fact, and not misrepresented his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding under the plea of being a true friend to the British Army. To return, however, to the hon. and gallant Member's argument as to the number of officers. Most undoubtedly he had made an unintentional misrepresentation on this subject. The Army, he said, was under-officered. But he forgot to tell the House that the troops which he alleged to be under-officered were not the Queen's, but the East India Company's. The complaint was made, not as to the Queen's, but as to the Company's troops; and the hon. and gallant Gentleman knew it well. The troops in the Company's service were certainly disgracefully managed, because they were under-officered; and he thought he was justified in this assertion after the recent general order of Sir Charles Napier, in which he exposed the way in which some regiments had been handled. He (Mr. Osborne) was not content to rest this question entirely upon the colonial part of the argument. It had been said by his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose that there was something in the Ministerial benches which seemed to contaminate those who sat upon them. He did not hold that to be the case; but he believed there was a power independent of them, which hindered any set of men, be they Whig or Tory, from carrying out the principles they were accustomed to hold on the other side of the House. That power he believed to be what was called the "Horse Guards." The noble Lord the First Minister, with the best intentions, and the Secretary at War, with the best knowledge, as to the plans which would effect a remedy, would never be allowed to carry them out whilst the Army was governed upon the system that prevailed at the Horse Guards. It was perfectly possible to have increased efficiency with diminished expenditure. In the year 1837 a commission sat upon this subject; and he would now venture to ask why the recommendations contained in the report of that commission had not been carried out? There was no use nibbling at regiments, or reducing 3,000 men here, and 4,000 there. They must begin at the fountain-head; for, until the whole system was altered, it was idle to think of economy. How was the Army managed? It was managed by three different departments. There was the Horse Guards for the infantry and the cavalry; the Ordnance; and the Commissariat, which was under the Treasury-Now, he wanted to know why these departments could not be consolidated, put under one head, and carried on by a Minister of War having a seat in the Cabinet, and in that House? This very system had been recommended by the Commission which sat in 1837; and the noble Lord the First Lord of the Treasury, the late Earl Grey, Sir James Graham, and other distinguished individuals, urged its appointment immediately. It was evident that it would produce great economy; and why it had not been adopted he could not tell, except that the Horse Guards stood in the way. The Secretary at War, whose statement he was glad to hear, for its clearness, was only financial secretary at the Horse Guards, and he had no power to carry out anything but what he was told; therefore it would be unfair to fall upon him for any shortcomings. The fault was not in him but in the system; and so long as the present system was kept up, he held that, with all deference to the hon. Member for Reading, who was so enamoured with the novel manner in which the estimates were drawn up—though it was precisely the same as had been in use for 30 or 40 years past—so long would there be profuse expenditure. At the same time, he (Mr. Osborne) must find fault with two assertions of his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding. One of them, indeed, had no foundation in fact, though he believed his hon. Friend had no motive in making it but that of a sincere desire for the public good. The Army, said his hon. Friend, was kept up for the benefit of the scions of the aristocracy. He differed with his hon Friend. [Mr. COBDEN said, he had never said so; it was the Liverpool Financial Reform Association.] The Liverpool Financial Reform Association had published several interesting tracts, which he had read; and he could assure them that, having taken great pains to inquire into this subject, they were completely mistaken. He had even gone into the pedigree of the officers of regiments, and he had found, upon careful investigation, that the great proportion of officers in one branch of the service—namely, the heavy dragoons—were generally the sons of capitalists and gentlemen who had made their money fairly and honestly in their different occupations. He found, also, that the great proportion of infantry officers were the sons of very poor men, who entered the Army as a profession; and it was only in two exceptional regiments, which were not the working branch of the service, that it was otherwise. It might be, therefore, that, in some cases, the working of the system was as had been described, but in the great majority of cases it had been misrepresented. But his hon. Friend was perfectly justified in the second assertion be had made, namely, that there was a great disproportion of officers to men. Then the Secretary at War pointed to America, and the proportion of officers to men there. He (Mr. Osborne) wondered nobody had got up and expressed their astonishment at this reference; for, if a real comparison was wanted, the right hon. Gentleman should not have gone to America, but to the continental nations. For an army of 100,000 men, we had no less than 9 field-marshals, 58 full generals, 57 lieutenant-generals, and 174 major-generals—a staff much greater than was maintained for an army of 450,000 Frenchmen; and let it be remembered that the French were obliged, out of theirs, to supply a staff for 500,000 National Guards. But here the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow came in his new character of Chancellor of the Exchequer, and would not allow the House to make any reduction, because, he said, the French army cost double the amount of ours. This was said amidst loud cries of "Hear, hear!" from the opposite side. But the hon. Gentleman omitted to state a material point, namely, that the French army was quadruple ours, and that in the French estimates the whole of the Ordnance was included. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had only casually alluded to the clothing establishment of the Army. He (Mr. Osborne) was not going to enter into any diatribes about the clothing; but he thought that, before the hon. Member for Reading felt satisfied with the estimates, it would be well if he bad inquired whether a saving could not be made by putting this establishment upon a different footing. 147 colonels, who had regiments, bad 90,000l. for clothing; and the sum allowed each general officer for an infantry regiment was 1,840l., whilst his annual expenditure for clothing was 1,066l What became of the odd 800l? It went into the general's pocket. He had no objection to that; but he maintained it Would be much better to give an annual payment to deserving men who had got regiments, than to place their emoluments upon such a footing, for they would be better satisfied on the one hand, whilst 40,000l. a year would be saved by the clothing being taken out of their hands. A private of the line, he found, cost in clothing 2l. 6s. per annum; a foot guard, 3l. 15s.; a private in the cavalry of the line, 4l.; in the Blues, 8l. 4s.; and in the Life Guards, 8l. 13s. 3d. Thus the cost of the Life Guards was more than double that of a private in the cavalry of the line. This was enormous. He trusted, then, that they would not much longer be encumbered with the cuirass into which they were put, and in which, if they were called out, they would never be able to strike a blow, nor with those enormous boots in which, large as the men were, they seemed to be lost. What was the cost of clothing for the French and Prussian armies? In 1847, the cost of 370,125 French troops, including tent equipments, was 464,000l., being 1l. 13s. 2d. per man; in Prussia it was 1l. 15s. 10d. per man. But in this country the cost was 3l. per man, just double those of Prussia or Prance. Something must be wrong in our system; and he was sure that so long as the clothing of regiments was in the hands of colonels, so long would this evil prevail, and so long would they be exposed to detraction for what they could not help. If, then, the Secretary at War had any influence at the Horse Guards (which he did not believe), he entreated him to put the clothing establishment of the Army upon a different footing. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Chippenham had referred, as he bad already said, to the proportion of officers in the British Army; but his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding had not made the statement imputed to him. His hon. Friend said he had spoken to a distingushed Austrian cavalry officer—that he had gone over the different regiments, and found the proportion of officers to men double in the cavalry regiments to the infantry, and double what they were in the Austrian service. It was new to him (Mr. Osborne) to hear the Austrian and Prussian cavalry underrated; and if the hon. and gallant Gentleman had had an opportunity of seeing them, he would have seen that we took pattern by them every day. But what was the system as to our cavalry? Exclusive of the Household Brigade we had 23 regiments of cavalry. The first Dragoon Guards had two extra troops, and it consisted of 361 horses, and 511 men of all ranks; the 22 other regiments had 271 horses and 387 men each. There were 33 commissioned officers in the 1st Dragoon Guards, and 27 in the others; and the non-commissioned officers were 40 in the first, and 32 in the remainder. There was one officer to seven on dis- mounted parade, and one to six on mounted parade. The Prussian regiments numbered 1,400 men, and one officer was sufficient for 40 men. Now, he wanted to know whether we could not put our cavalry upon an efficient footing without so enormous a staff? Why, instead of having those skeleton regiments, should they not get rid of the staff, and make the regiments real and effective? He came now to the question of agency. Why should it be continued at an expense of 30,000l a year? There was no such thing in India; and he could sec no benefit in it here. He suggested that saving might be made by employing half-pay officers as quartermasters and adjutants. By a return he moved for the other day, he found that one man, a clerk, after forty years' service, had retired upon a pension of 700l. a year; but many officers of high rank, after having seen hard service for forty years, and spending 7,000l. in the profession, would only get 400l. This he submitted was not right, whilst by placing the establishment upon a different footing, economy would be promoted. It had been said that the commercial principle did not apply in the Army. His right hon. Friend forgot that no officer obtained any step in rank for the regulation price; that he was frequently charged 2,000l. or 3,000l. above it for his commission. No officer (and the Horse Guards winked at it, and his right hon. Friend winked at it too) could hope to obtain a step in the service without paying heavily through the nose for it. Some allusion had been made to education in the Army He rejoiced that some steps had been taken upon that subject; but he thought it would hereafter become a grave question for that House, when they had got a highly educated body of men, whether their eyes would not be open to the impolitic way in which commissions were given or purchased. It was all very well to talk about education; but in proportion as the Army was educated, they would begin to reason, that there was no reason why a greater proportion should not be eligible for commissions, or any why the bad system of purchase should not be continued. It might be said, "Let well alone." That was said by all Governments; but with respect to the Army he maintained that by cutting down the Ordnance and putting the whole Army under one responsible Minister, a saving of 500,000l. might be effected. Certainly he never expected it to be done; but, as it might be effected. he should give his support to his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose.


, in explanation, said, his argument with regard to the estimates was that they were so intelligible that any person who read them might know how every shilling was expended. The hon. Gentleman had been pleased to indulge in insinuations that there was some particular reason for his (Mr. Stanford's) having left the parochial vestry alluded to. The hon. Gentleman was mistaken.


assured the hon. Gentleman that he was not aware of the fact that he had been a vestryman until he was about to address the House.


said: I think, Sir, we are all under very great obligations to our right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, for the clear, admirable, and lucid manner in which he has not only explained, but drawn up those estimates. The only fault I find with them is the fact of their being formed on a plan far too economical, nay, almost parsimonious; and I hope my right hon. Friend will excuse me, when I express my surprise that he could come down to this House and ask for the reduction of a single man, if he had the well-being and interest of that most deserving arm of the British Army, the infantry, at heart. Hon. Members of this House little know the hardships and endurances of these men; they are, I may say, almost expatriated. A regiment returns from foreign service, and when again recruited, I will not say thoroughly disciplined, they are, at the interval of four years, again ordered for foreign service, and this is all owing to the paucity of the establishment of our Army for the different reliefs for foreign service. I greatly regretted to see a diminution of 1,000l. in that part of the estimate which regards gratuities and medals to soldiers for long and meritorious services. That system of reward has been found most efficacious, and should be largely encouraged. I also regretted to see so small a sum demanded for rewards and medals to deserving and meritorious soldiers while serving. From the parsimony of this grant, commanding officers are often placed in much embarrassment, as I was upon one occasion myself, when in command of the Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, from having two most meritorious and excellent men to discharge, and could only award one medal. I trust my right hon. Friend will excuse my calling his attention to those points, as well as to the great and manifest injustice of taking away the good-conduct pay from sergeants when they are promoted to that rank, after having so well earned these distinctions while serving in the lower grades. I assure my right hon. Friend, the soldiers of the Army are justly proud of the distinctions bestowed upon them by their Sovereign, when they have with them the conscious feeling of having deserved them. It gratified me to hear that the attention of my right hon. Friend had been called to the military prisons. I have long thought the comforts of those confined were far too much attended to, in fact they were far better off as to lodging and food than good soldiers in barracks; and I quite approve of the system of altering night-sleeping on guard-beds, which my right hon. Friend tells the House he has introduced. I am glad to express a similar gratification with the hon. Member for Montrose, that that debasing and cruel punishment, flogging, is fast falling into disuse in the Army; but I cannot agree with him that purchase should be discontinued in the Army, for I would ask him how could a man, however deserving, but who had risen from the ranks, be able to bear the expense of horses and equipments in the cavalry service, unless the hon. Gentleman will allow them to come down to this House for a supply? I shall conclude with one remark, and that a regret that I cannot compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesex upon the knowledge he has shown of cavalry tactics; but I could not expect much, as I dare imagine he has obtained his diploma from that gay military school where he was performing the important duty of aide-decamp to his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.


said, that he felt the same difficulty with respect to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Montrose that he did on a previous evening with respect to the Amendment of the hon. Member for the West Riding. Both were abstract questions, and he did not see how they were to be carried out; but, in the meantime, he felt that he might be giving a vote which would imprudently reduce the military power of the country. He agreed with the hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark in regarding the question as a colonial one, because one half of the men required were needed for the colonial service. The question then was—is the House prepared to give up the colonies? ["No, no!"] His opinion was that the wisest course would be to give up the colonies altogether, looking at the present state of the commercial interest. He knew of no advantage which the colonies conferred which would not be derived if they were left to themselves; and therefore he would say, that the honest, the wise, the expedient plan would be to say to the colonies, "If you wish to leave us, we shall be extremely obliged to you. We are not at liberty to discharge you because we encouraged emigration; we are bound in consequence to support you; but so soon as you feel that you are able to do for yourselves, we shall be glad to relinquish our control." If this step be taken, Canada and some of the other colonies, which were able to stand on their own bottom, might avail themselves of the offer, and thus relieve the mother country of the expense which she had now to bear in protecting those who were perfectly able and willing to protect themselves. As matters stood, he did not like to vote for an abstract proposition, and he should, therefore, vote for the Ministerial proposal.


said, he certainly should support the Government; and if the Government had found it necessary to ask for an augmentation of the Army, he should have supported it; Cavendo tutus was his motto.


observed, that the Secretary at War had announced that in the course of a short time officers would be subjected to an examination previous to promotion. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to state what that examination was, for if it were in any degree similar to that lately adopted before the admission of officers into the service, he should oppose it in every way. If officers who had served their country, and perhaps been before the enemy, were to be subjected to a sort of schoolmaster's examination, and their title to promotion to be determined by the extent of their knowledge in Cocker and Bonnycastle, he begged to say that he believed great disgust would be occasioned. For his own part, rather than be subjected to an examination in algebra, logarithms, and other such merely scholastic matters, he would throw up his commission. If the Government were to introduce a system of purely voluntary examination in engineering, military history, and other professional knowledge, this might operate as a beneficial incentive to military students. The hon. Member for Dumfries had said on a former occasion, that the British Army was notoriously the most unintellectual army in Europe. [Mr. EWART: No, no!] He believed those were the very words the hon. Gentleman used; but he (Colonel Reid) did not know what means the hon. Member had of forming an opinion on the subject, for the Commander-in-chief himself had no means of ascertaining the intellectual qualifications of the men engaged in the service. He (Colonel Reid) believed, however, that if some incentives in the way of promotion were held out, officers would feel that their success depended in some measure upon their own exertions, and would apply themselves to professional studies.


said, he found that of the proposed reduction of 4,426 men, 2,230 had been transferred to India, leaving only an actual reduction of 1,896. But what he rose to call attention to particularly was that of the 128 officers charged less to us, 96 had been sent to India, leaving only a decrease of officers to our charge of 32; and, that even that decrease consisted entirely of adjutants, quarter-masters, and surgeons. Looking down the lists for 1849 and 1850, of officers of all ranks, they would find that of all ranks, down to that of lieutenant and ensign, there was last year, 5,103, and this year, 5,105, proving the fact he had just stated. They drafted off the rank and file, but did not reduce the officers. A great deal had been said respecting the necessity of keeping up a military force for the colonies. He considered that all depended on the course we intended to take respecting the colonies; and if ever there was a time when that question ought to be decided, it was the present. The hon. Member for Birmingham found a difficulty in supporting the Motion of his hon. Friend, because that question was unsettled. But how were they to settle it, unless by a vote such as they were now asked to give? They had nothing to do with the framing of the estimates, and had no knowledge of, or power over them, until presented in that House. If they did not deal with them now, they could not do so hereafter. No other opportunity could offer itself for reducing the 6,000,000l. demanded for the support of the Army. If they voted the number of men demanded, they would in effect be voting the amount of money demanded; therefore, when hon. Gentlemen voted for the proposed number of men, they voted against any reduction of expenditure. The hon. Member for West Surrey was to make a Motion to-morrow evening for a reduction of expenditure; but if the present vote was agreed to, it would be useless as regarded the Army, as the question would have been decided. He considered that we ought at once to determine our colonial policy. We were going to give to our Australian colonies and New Zealand absolute power and control over all those vast and fertile lands which we called ours, and would it not be well to insert a clause in the Act to the effect that we should call upon those colonies to pay the expense of their own police and other establishments? He maintained that the House was not in a position to pass this vote, and that if they did they could not carry out those principles of retrenchment for which the hon. Member for West Surrey was about to contend.


did not agree with the hon. Member for the West Riding that the speech of the hon. Member for Southwark justified his vote for the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose. The hon. Member for Southwark had said that they might reduce the force by striking off 1,000 men here, and 1,000 men there, and by diminishing by one-half the force maintained in New Zealand; but he did not give any proof that such a course was practical or prudent. That hon. Gentleman came to the conclusion that 7,500 men might be safely subtracted from the vote proposed by the Government. The hon. Member for Montrose, however, proposed to strike off, not 7,500, but 10,000 men; and therefore he (Lord J. Manners) considered that the speech of the hon. Member for Soutbwark did not justify the conclusions of the hon. Member for the West Riding. He (Lord J. Manners) would not enter into the various matters which had been discussed; but as the hon. Member for Middlesex had cursorily referred to the subject of army clothing, he would express his earnest hope that care would be taken in future by those whose duty it was to provide clothing for the troops to prevent the recurrence of those disgraceful proceedings, the disclosure of which had startled the country last autumn. He hoped that in future the Army would be clothed upon principles of something like common justice and humanity, and that, whatever system might be adopted, they would not have it on their Parliamentary conscience that the unfortunate men had been reduced by a pitiful economy to the degrading position in which they had been placed.


wished to explain, as he appeared to have been misunderstood, that he had said that they could not reduce the force at home without first reducing the force in the colonies, but he had confined his remarks to the reduction which he thought could be made in the colonies.


considered it necessary, although the cavalry regiments were numerically weak, to keep up a large proportion of officers to form a nucleus for establishing an efficient cavalry force in case of necessity. Cavalry officers required much more experience than infantry officers, and ought to be brought up to the service from their earliest youth. He believed that the Austrian cavalry was under-officered, and that this had been found in late wars; and, in his opinion, the British Army was not over-officered if they wished to have the means of increasing their force on any emergency. It had been stated that the British forces in the colonies were more than sufficient for their defence, but from his own experience on foreign service, he could contradict that assertion. At Gibraltar and Malta, for instance, the troops were frequently much harassed by their duties, especially when sickness prevailed. In the Ionian Islands, also, our forces were perfectly insufficient for the proper performance of the necessary duties. With regard to the system of education proposed to be established, he believed there was a strong feeling in the Army that it would be most beneficial. He could assure the gallant Officer the Member for Windsor, that the professional education, even of cavalry officers, was insufficient, and that, if they wished to increase the efficiency of the Army, it was absolutely necessary that that education should be still further extended.


agreed with the hon. Members for Southwark and the West Riding on the necessity of reducing the military force in the colonies; but he was not prepared to support the Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose, because there were no moans upon the estimates of putting a veto on the number of troops sent to the colonies, and therefore the object of his vote might be misunderstood. He had been glad to hoar the Secretary at War say that he was prepared to reduce the number of troops in the colonies. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had made a similar declaration; and the noble Earl the Secretary for the Colonies had stated before the Ordnance Committee last year that he had written to one colony—the Cape of Good Hope—to say that the colonists must in future depend entirely upon themselves for their defence: and he (Mr. V. Smith) understood the noble Earl to say that he was prepared to pursue the same course in other cases. He (Mr. V. Smith) was of opinion that our troops ought to be entirely withdrawn from some of the colonies, and that the colonists should be left to provide for their own defence. The Kafir war had been terminated at much less cost than would otherwise have been the case, because when that war broke out there was but a small British force in the colony, and the colonists readily came forward and enrolled themselves as volunteers, which they would not have done if they had had a large body of the Queen's troops to depend upon. He agreed that the present was as suitable an opportunity as was likely to occur for reducing the colonial expenditure of this country, for when they were giving self-government to the colonies they might tell them that with the art of self-government they must also learn the art of self-defence. He hoped the noble Lord at the head of the Government would be prepared to carry out the policy intimated by Earl Grey before the Committee last year, and that he would reduce considerably the forces employed in the colonies, if he did not entirely withdraw them. He (Mr. V. Smith) would ask the Committee to look at the danger incurred from maintaining a British army in Canada. His noble Friend at the head of the Government had said a short time ago that he was not prepared to consent to the annexation of Canada to the United States; but suppose a strong desire to exist on the part of the Canadian people to annex themselves to the United States, the moment such a notion was expressed, the British forces in Canada would act, and this country would be involved in a war from which extrication might be most difficult. Although he considered it desirable that what the Legislature of this kingdom intended to do with regard to colonial expenditure should be clearly known, he did not think the present occasion was well chosen for eliciting their opinion on that subject. He regarded it rather as a question of policy than as one of economy in the estimates. Whatever might be the effect of free trade and the repeal of the naviga- tion laws in this country, it had no doubt produced a great change in our colonial policy, and had completely altered our relations with our colonies; and he thought that now, in entering upon a new line of policy with regard to the colonies, that policy ought to be certain, clear, and definite, that we might know what to expect from the colonies, and that they might know what to expect from us, that when separated—if hereafter we were to be separated—we might separate upon amicable terms.


regretted, that though he was friendly to every practical effort for the reduction of the public expenditure, he could not support the Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose. The hon. and military Member for Chippenham had said they ought to maintain the army in Ireland from compassion to the impoverished people. That certainly seemed to be a new doctrine for the maintenance of a military force. The hon. Member for Birmingham had said this was a colonial question. It might be so in distant colonies, but in Ireland it appeared to him to be a Church question—an ecclesiastical question; and it was quite clear that the "church militant" in that country was supported by that establishment from which it took the designation. It struck him that they might trace in Ireland some connexion between the tent and the tabernacle. They had in that country 22,000 regular troops, 10,000 enrolled pensioners, and 12,000 constabulary, making a total force of 44,000 men. These troops were in Ireland for the purpose of forcing upon the people institutions to which they were adverse. He would wish to see the whole of the British army, if possible, quartered in Ireland, because the expenditure would benefit the country. He was the more anxious that this should take place, because his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose was determined to add a last blow, by abolishing the Irish Viceroyalty, in order to effect a saving of some 60,000l. a year, which was not more than a farthing a piece for the whole population of the united kingdom. If, instead of this Amendment, there had been a Motion made to abolish the temporalities of the Church in Ireland—["Question!"]—and thereupon to reduce the military there by 10,000 men, it would have been a more practical proposition, and more likely to receive support out of doors. But be was compelled, with deep regret, to vote against this Amendment. He believed, if the nuisance of the Irish Church were abated, the troops might be withdrawn; and, at the risk of exciting a laugh, he would state that as he had sworn as a Roman Catholic not to employ his power to weaken the Protestant Church in Ireland, he could not vote for this Motion.


thought it right, as other hon. Members had done, to give a reason for his vote on this occasion. He was a decided friend to retrenchment and economy, and he did not know how it was possible for the Government to retrench, unless the House was prepared to support retrenchment. He had heard no answer given to that part of the speech of the hon. Member for Montrose, wherein he stated that in the years 1833, 1834, 1835, and 1836, we had only 80,000 troops for England and Ireland; and he was at a loss to know why it was considered necessary that there should be 20,000 more now. He wished to be consistent in that House. It was his intention to vote to-morrow night for the Motion of the hon. Member for West Surrey; and he did so, because he believed that the course of legislation for several years had been to diminish the cost of articles of consumption, and that the power of paying taxes had been materially diminished by free trade. He did not agree with the hon. Member for Reading, when he said that a military force was wanted to keep down a vagrant and discontented population. He thought it was an insult to them, as citizens, to say that they required any military force whatever to keep down the population either in the metropolis or in great provincial towns—such as Manchester, Birmingham, and Leeds. In 1848, what was the feeling of the metropolis? When there was danger, all classes enrolled themselves on the side of peace and order. There was one fallacy which he had heard stated by the hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham, that the forces required for the colonies were required mainly for the manufactures and commerce of the country. Now, so far as he was able to gather the sentiments of the manufacturing and commercial interests, he believed that manufacturing and commercial men were of opinion that the Legislature would promote the interests of commerce and manufacture much more by wise and economic measures than by keeping up the present amount of taxation, and that the safety of the country might be securely left to the loyalty of the people.


Sir, I shall not at present enter on the question whether there should be a reduction of 10,000 men beyond the reduction of 4,000 proposed by Her Majesty's Government, but there is one part of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Northampton which seems to me to require some notice. As I understand my right hon. Friend, he is disposed to lay down the principle, that as the colonies are to have representative or self-government, and as we have adopted the policy of free trade, that, therefore, the colonies are to be told that they are to rely totally on their own resources for self-defence. Now if my right hon. Friend asks me to give my assent to that doctrine as a general principle, I must say that I am totally opposed to it. I am entirely against any excessive or unnecessary force being kept up in any of our colonies, as I would be against any unnecessary and superfluous force being kept up in the united kingdom; but, at the same time, I do not think the colonists should be told that, under all circumstances, they are to rely in future entirely on their own resources. Now I think the principle ought to be to suit your force for each colony according to the circumstances of the times in which that force is to be employed. With regard to our military fortresses, it has been stated, and I think hardly denied by anybody, that the forces at Gibraltar and Malta are hardly sufficient for the garrison duties in those places. Then, with regard to some of our colonies, we have made very considerable reductions in the forces kept up. In Jamaica and the West Indies generally the force is now upwards of 4,500 men Jess than in 1835. In Australia we have lately made a very considerable reduction, as the force, which was 4,000 men, is now reduced to 2,629, making a reduction of 1,380 men. I think, when circumstances show that such reduction can be made, it is wise and proper to make it: but in other cases there is often a necessity of sending additional forces, and in such cases it is perfectly obvious that we ought to be ready to send them, and not to desert the colonists, and leave them to rely solely on their own resources. With regard to such fortified places as may be in the colonies, I should be also sorry to leave them to the forces that might be raised by the colony. With regard to Quebec, for instance, I should be sorry to see all the regular forces taken altogether away from it, and the Legislative Council left to provide entirely for its defence. Without entering into the other questions that have been mooted to-night, I must therefore decline to agree to the general principle of my right hon. Friend. At the same time, if a good cause he shown for reduction in any particular colony, I am ready to agree in such reduction, though I cannot agree to the general principle that under no circumstances are the colonists to have any assistance from us.


explained. He had alluded to the adoption of free trade merely incidentally, and in support of his view with regard to leaving the colonies to maintain their own forces. He should beg to refer to a despatch of Earl Grey to Sir Harry Smith, in which he told him to tell the colonists that in case of any future war with the natives, like the last Kafir war, the colonists should have to depend on themselves.


said, that when his noble Friend wrote to the Cape that, in case of a future Kafir war, they must provide their own defence, he did not think his noble Friend meant to imply that the colonists were not to use Her Majesty's troops, but merely that they were not to rely on fresh expenses being paid for them. The matter, he thought, rather confirmed him in saying that each case must depend on its own merits. But taking the colony of New Zealand, which had not at present a constitutional government, and supposing that if within the next two years it received a representative constitution, he was not prepared to say that they ought immediately to withdraw their military forces from that colony. It was quite true that some of the North American States had risen without any assistance from British troops; but in the early history of these States did they not find instances where the whole population of the colony was four times swept away by tribes of Indians, before the final settlement of the colony took place? And seeing that in New Zealand there was a native population of 100,000 men of a very warlike character, he should certainly be afraid to see a few Englishmen left without protection among them, as they also might be massacred as the American colonists had been, and he did not think that, holding the position which he held, he would be doing his duty if he left them exposed to such a danger.


said, that England was the only country which paid the military, naval, and civil expenses of her colonies. It was an important question, what was the value of those colonies; for if they were not worth anything, why keep them? Canada had been referred to; and it was said there had been an increase of 14,000 in our military force on account of Canada; and we constantly kept there an amount of force nearly equal to the whole peace establishment of the United States. The naval and military expense of Canada was estimated at one million per annum; we also paid the Canadians about 15s. per load more for their timber than we paid to other countries, which amounted to 1,700,000l. a year; making a total of 2,700,000l. What did we get in exchange for this? According to the last returns, the exports to Canada in 1848 did not amount to 2,000,000l.; and for the last seven years the average had been less than 2,500,000l.; and for that we incurred an expense of 2,700,000l. per annum. Canada had self-government. We had given her possession of all her lands: we could not dispose of a yard of land in that colony. What, then, had we in Canada? No power whatever, except the luxury of putting a veto upon any act of the legislature; and for this we sacrificed the whole amount of our exports to Canada. It was utterly impossible this question could long remain in its present state. Canada must pay all her expenses, or she was a worthless possession. It was a great error to give away the Crown lands for nothing. He should move a clause in the Australian Colonies Government Bill, reserving all the Crown lands till the colony agreed to pay its own naval and military expenditure.


said, he concurred with the right hon. Member for Northampton that it was premature to consider the question in a colonial point of view, as our colonies were now under a totally different system, and it was yet doubtful what form our relations with the colonies could assume. The hon. Member for the West Riding had said that hon. Members who intended to vote with the hon. Member for West Surrey would act inconsistently if they voted against the Amendment of the hon. Member for Montrose. He denied that; for the protectionists had never been a popularity-hunting party; and while they were always anxious to support practical measures of retrenchment, they had a right to determine questions so vague and general as that of the hon. Gentleman's on its merits. What were they to think of a measure supported by the hon. Member for the West Riding, who at meetings out of doors had used language calculated to endanger the peace of Europe? There had been one expression attributed in the papers to the hon. Member, in respect to the authenticity of which he had ever since felt an intense curiosity. He wanted to know whether the hon. Member for the West Riding, who, when it suited his purpose, could coo in dove-like notes of peace, had used the pacific phrase that he would "crumple up" the empire of Russia. After using that and similar language, calculated to aggravate the most military State in Europe, and set it against England, what did the hon. Member mean by coming there and asking the House to reduce its armaments? The Emperor of Russia had certainly as much power to "crumple up" the hon. Member for the West Riding as he the Emperor of Russia. He did not deny that the hon. Member had power to crumple up the prosperity of a great empire. If the hon. Member would go to Russia and carry on such a political agitation there as he had inflicted upon this country, he might accomplish the crumpling up even of Russia. He should be very happy if the hon. Member would go and try the experiment. He hoped that, as far as practicable, the House would consent to economise the expenditure of the country; but as he believed the economy proposed by the hon. Member for Montrose would prove dangerous to our national safety and dignity, be should give his cordial support to the Government proposition.


begged to reply to the question asked by the hon. and gallant Member for Windsor, who had asked whether there was to be a second examination before an officer arrived at the rank of captain, that he hoped to see such an examination before long, although at present no such examination had been decided upon. He would repeat, that unless the officers of the Army kept pace with the men of the Army in increased intelligence, it would go far to shake the discipline which it was necessary to maintain. With respect to the remarks of the hon. Member for Middlesex upon clothing, the subject would be very fully examined by the Committee upstairs, and they would state in their report whether, in their opinion, the present system should be adhered to or altered.


said, the grounds for his Motion were few and simple. During the four years of 1833, 1834,1835, and 1836, the number of men was 81,000, while the estimates for the present year were 99,000. Besides the men voted in those years we had now in artillery, marines, dockyard battalions, and Chelsea pensioners, an addition of 40,000 bayonets to the military force of 18343–5. If a large reduction of taxation were made, it could only be done by reducing the expenditure in the military, naval, and ordnance estimates. He was sorry to find that so few hon. Gentlemen upon the opposite benches were likely to vote for his Motion. But he had done his duty, and if the House were satisfied in the present state of the country to have 40,000 men more than in 1835, he must leave them to say so on a division.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 50; Noes 223: Majority 173.

List of the AYES.
Alcock, T. Moffatt, G.
Blake, M. J. Morris, D.
Blewitt, R. J. Mowatt, F.
Brocklehurst, J. O'Connor, F.
Brotherton, J. Osborne, R.
Cavley, E. S. Pechell, Sir G. B.
Clay, J. Pelham, hon. D. A.
Cobden, R. Pilkington, J.
Devereux, J. T. Salwey, Col.
Duncan, G. Scully, F.
Ellis, J. Sidney, Ald.
Ewart, W. Smith, J. B.
Fagan, W. Strickland, Sir G.
Fordyce, A. D. Sullivan, M.
Fox, W. J. Tancred, H. W.
Gibson, rt. hon. T. M. Thicknesse, R. A.
Greene, J. Thompson, Col.
Hall, Sir B. Thompson, G.
Hastie, A. Thornely, T.
Henry, A. Walmsley, Sir J.
Keating, R. Wawn, J. T.
Kershaw, J. Williams, J.
King, hon. P. J. L. Wood, W. P.
Lushington, C.
Marshall, J. G. TELLERS.
Milton, Visct. Hume, J.
Mitchell, T. A. Molesworth, Sir W.
List of the NOES.
Abdy, Sir T. N. Bennet, P.
Acland, Sir T. D. Beresford, W.
Anson, hon. Col. Berkeley, Adm.
Archdall, Capt. M. Berkeley, hon. H. F.
Arkwright, G. Blackall, S. W.
Armstrong, Sir A. Boldero, H. G.
Armstrong, R. B. Bowles, Adm.
Arundel and Surrey, Earl of Boyle, hon. Col.
Bramston, T. W.
Bagshaw, J. Bremridge, R.
Baines, rt. hon. M. T. Brockman, E. D.
Bankes, G. Brooke, Lord
Baring, H. B. Browne, R. D.
Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T. Bunbury, E. H.
Baring, T. Burrell, Sir C. M.
Barnard, E. G. Busfeild, W.
Bellew, R. M. Cardwell, E.
Carew, W. H. P. Heathcoat, J.
Carter, J. B. Henley, J. W.
Chatterton, Col. Herbert, H. A.
Chichester, Lord J. L. Herbert, rt. hon. S.
Childers, J. W. Herries, rt. hon. J. C.
Christy, S. Heywood, J.
Clerk, rt. hon. Sir G. Hildyard, R. C.
Clive, hon. R. H. Hildyard, T. B. T.
Clive, H. B. Hobhouse, rt. hon. Sir J.
Cooks, T. S. Hobhouse, T. B.
Coke, hon. E. K. Hodges, T. L.
Cole, hon. H. A. Hodgson, W. L.
Compton, H. C. Hollond, R.
Corry, rt. hon. H. L. Hood, Sir A.
Cowper, hon W. F. Hotham, Lord
Crowder, R. B. Howard, Lord E.
Dawson, hon. T. V. Howard, hon. C. W. G.
Deedes, W. Howard, P. H.
Denison, E. Inglis, Sir R. H.
Denison, J. E. Jermyn, Earl
Dodd, G. Jervis, Sir J.
Douglas, Sir C. E. Jones, Capt.
Douro, Marq. of Kildare, Marq. of
Drummond, H. H. Labouchere, rt. hon. H.
Buncombe, hon. O. Lascelles, hon. W. S.
Duncuft, J. Legh, G. C.
Dundas, Adm. Lemon, Sir C.
Dundas, rt. hon. Sir D. Lennox, Lord A. G.
Dunne, Col. Lewis, G. C.
Ebrington, Visct. Lewisham, Visct.
Edwards, H. Lindsay, hon. Col.
Ellice, rt. hon. E. Loch, J.
Elliot, hon. J. E. Lockhart, W.
Enfield, Visct. Lowther, H.
Estcourt, J. B. Lygon, hon. Gen.
Evans, W. Mackie, J.
Farrer, J. Mackinnon, W. A.
Ferguson, Sir R. A. M'Gregor, J.
Filmer, Sir E. Mahon, Visct.
Fitzroy, hon. H. Manners, Lord J.
Foley, J. H. H. Marshall, W.
Forster, M. Maule, rt. hon. F.
Fortescue, hon. J. W. Maxwell, hon. J. P.
Fox, R. M. Melgund, Visct.
Freestun, Col. Monsell, W.
French, F. Moore, G. H.
Glyn, G. C. Mulgrave, Earl of
Goddard, A. L. Muntz, G. F.
Gooch, E. S. Newry & Morne, Visct.
Gordon, Adm. Norreys, Sir D. J.
Goulburn, rt. hon. H. O'Connell, M.
Grace, O. H. J. Ogle, S. C. U.
Greenall, G. Ord, W.
Greene, T. Owen, Sir J.
Grenfell, C. W. Paget, Lord C.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G. Paget, Lord G.
Grey, R. W. Palmer, R.
Grogan, E. Palmerston, Vist.
Grosvenor, Lord R. Parker, J.
Grosvenor, Earl Patten, J. W.
Guernsey, Lord Pinney, W.
Guest, Sir J. Plowden, W. H. C.
Gwyn, H. Plumptre, J. P.
Hall, Col. Power, Dr.
Hallyburton, Lord J. F. Power, N.
Halsey, T. P. Rawdon, Col.
Hamilton, G. A. Reid, Col.
Harris, hon. Capt. Ronton, J. C.
Hastie, A. Reynolds, J.
Hatchell, J. Ricardo, O.
Hawes, B. Rice, E. R.
Hayter, rt. hon. W. G. Rich, H.
Heald, J. Romilly, Sir J.
Rushout, Capt. Stephenson, R.
Russell, Lord J. Stuart, J.
Russell, F. C. H. Talbot, J. H.
Sadleir, J. Thompson, Ald.
Sandars, G. Townley, R. G.
Sandars, J. Townshend, Capt.
Scrope, G. P. Turner, G. J.
Seymer, H. K. Vane, Lord H.
Shafto, R. D. Verney, Sir H.
Shell, rt. hon. R. L. Vesey, hon. T.
Sibthorp, Col. Walpole, S. H.
Simeon, J. Walsh, Sir J. B.
Smith, rt. hon. R. V. Wellesley, Lord C.
Smith, J. A. Westhead, J. P. B.
Smythe, hon. G. Williamson, Sir H.
Smollett, A. Wilson, J.
Somers, J. P. Wilson, M.
Somerville, rt. hn. Sir W. Wrightson, W. B.
Spearman, H. J. Wyld, J.
Spooner, R. Wyvill, M.
Stanford, J. K.
Stanley, E. TELLERS.
Stanley, hon. E. H. Tufnell, H.
Stansfield, W. R. C. Hill, Lord M.

Original Question put, and agreed to.


said, that as a Committee were sitting upstairs on the Army Estimates, he would take a half vote on the next item. He therefore moved that a sum of 1,700,000l. on account be granted to Her Majesty to defray the charges and expenses of the land forces for the ensuing-year.


said, that after the vote which the Committee had just come to, and the large majority against his Motion, he should take up their time unnecessarily if he did more than recommend the Government to take the subject of his Motion into their serious consideration.


thought that this repetition of the course pursued last year in taking votes on account, was liable in many respects to grave constitutional objections, and was a very inconvenient mode of despatching the public business. The House had no opportunity of discussing the propriety of this expenditure, or any part of the vote, for the first vote on account was taken without objection, and the other half was proceeded with at the close of the Session, when the public attention was no longer given to their proceedings, and when Ministers had the greatest facility for passing the rest of the vote. He doubted whether the House were not by this course leaving too much to the Committee upstairs. Was there any probability that their investigations would lead to any material economising of the vote proposed?


quite agreed with the right hon. Member that if the course taken during this and the past year were adopted on every occasion, it would be very objectionable; but these Committees had reported from time to time, and it was considered desirable that the House should have these reports before them before voting the money. The Estimates for the Navy and Ordnance were considered by the Committee upstairs, and were then proceeded with in the ordinary manner; and with regard to the Army Estimates, the course taken last year upon the Navy and Ordnance votes would be adopted.


asked why an increase of 14,000l. in the vote for the removal of the land forces should appear on the present estimates?


said, that last year the removal of troops did not take place as usual, from motives of economy; but as it would be extremely inconvenient to postpone the usual general change of quarters for another year, that removal caused the increase alluded to.

Vote agreed to.