WAR IN THE PUNJAUB. (Hansard, 26 February 1849)

§ Mr. G. THOMPSON

said, he rose to solicit the indulgence of the House, to whose impartiality and courtesy he appealed, while for a few moments he spoke in explanation of a matter personal to himself, touching the correctness of a statement he had made in his place in Parliament a few evenings since upon an important subject, and the answer given to that statement by a Minister of the Crown. It would be in the recollection of the House that on Friday last he put a question to the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. C. Hob-house), the President of the Board of Control, relative to the papers connected with the war in the Punjaub. The question was asked in the precise words of which notice had been given the day before, and was founded upon two facts referred to in the terms of the question—namely, that the war in the Punjaub had been going on since April, 1848, and that it had occasioned the calling into the field of 120,000 men, including camp followers. The right hon. Baronet, in replying to the question—and upon the style and manner of that reply he (Mr. Thompson) would make no comment—thought it his duty to give a flat contradiction to both the facts 1206 referred to. "It was not the fact," he said, "that the war in the Punjaub dated as far back as April, 1848; the original of the war was of a much later date. He also denied that the army in the field amounted to 120,000 men. He did not know whether camp followers meant camels and things of that sort. The fact was that the forces did not amount to half that number, nor anything like as many." It was in vindication of the accuracy of the statement so denied, that he ventured to claim permission of the House to occupy a very small portion of its time—a favour which he trusted would not he denied, as it was of the utmost importance to the character of every Member that he should prove the accuracy of the assertions he made in that House. In the absence of those official papers which it was his most anxious wish to see laid upon the table, he had had recourse to the ordinary channels of information—the newspapers published in India. Those journals had informed him that on the 5th of April, 1848, Mr. Vans Agnew, of the Bengal civil service, in the capacity of an assistant political agent, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the Bombay Fusiliers, in command of a small force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were despatched from Lahore to remove the Dewan Moolraj from the government of Mooltan, and to instal the Sirdar Khan Singh in his place; that they arrived at Mooltan on the 16th of April; that on the 17th they were set upon by some rebel soldiers belonging to Mooltan; that they defended themselves in a small fort on the outside of the town; but that on the 20th the principal part of their escort deserted to the insurgents, and the two gentlemen named perished. This he (Mr. Thompson) had thought it right to regard as the origin and commencement of the war in the Punjaub. From the same journals he learnt that on the first intelligence of the disturbance at Mooltan, the chief of Bhawulpore despatched forces to the relief of the British officers, which arrived too late to render any service; that on the news reaching Lahore Major Edwardes was ordered to march on Mooltan, with the Sikh troops under his command; that some regiments of the Lahore service, under two distinguished Sikh chiefs, were directed to march towards Mooltan, and that two moveable brigades, one from Ferozepore and one from Lahore, consisting of 3,000 men each, were directed to march on the 27th; and to unite on the banks of the Ravee on 1207 their way to Mooltan. Below Mooltan, on the Indus, a steamer was despatched up the river by Colonel Shaw, with a company of native infantry and two guns; and Major Jacob, with a squadron of the Scinde horse, was sent to watch the frontier. It was quite true, that when all doubt had ceased at Lahore respecting the death of Messrs. Anderson and Agnew, it was resolved to suspend decisive operations, pending a reference to the Governor General and the Commander in Chief; but it was not less true, according to every statement in the Indian papers, that prior to the 2nd day of May a small force of irregular cavalry and artillery was despatched from Loodianah to the aid of Bhawulpore; that another of irregular cavalry and artillery was sent from Lahore to Govindghur; that a detachment of Sikh troops were ordered towards Mooltan; that the defences of Lahore were strengthened; that the political agents at the out-stations were called in; that all officers absent on leave were ordered to join their regiments; and that the troops along the whole of the right bank of the Sutlej were required to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice. At the same time, Major Edwarde?, Colonel Cortlandt, and the Nawaub of Bhawulpore, were taking measures to unite their forces, and bring them into the field against the Dewan of Mooltan. Such were the notorious facts upon which he had founded his statement on Friday last, that the origin and commencement of the war in the Punjaub dated from the month of April, 1848. If anything else were needed to prove this, there was the proclamation of the Lahore Government, dated the 18th of May, which was a formal declaration of war against Moolraj, and contained the threat to "root him out from the face of the earth, and bring him to entire destruction and everlasting perdition." He would now say a word upon the denial of the right hon. Baronet, that the army in the field in the Punjaub amounted to 120,000, including camp followers. He held in his hand a return of all the troops now in the field in the Punjaub and at Mooltan, including the reserve at Sirhind. The following was an abstract:—The grand army under Lord Gough amounted to 21,020; the Lahore force under General Wheeler to 5,510; Brigadier Wheeler's own force to 2,360; the reserved force under General Hill to 5,800; the Mooltan force under General Whish to 7,580; and the Bombay Mooltan 1208 force under Brigadier Dundas to 6,750: making a grand total of 49,020 men, exclusive of from 15,000 to 20,000 native auxiliaries. So much for fighting men. Some days previously to the question put to the President of the Board of Control, a pamphlet had been published in the form of a letter from General Sir Charles James Napier, late Governor of Scinde, to the Right Hon. Sir John Cam Hobhouse. In that letter, the gallant General informed Sir John Cam Hobhouse that— The usual calculation is, that for every fighting man in the high-caste Bengal army, there are five servants, or 'camp followers'—non-combatants. In the Bombay army, where the caste is generally lower, there are about three camp followers for every fighting man. That an army in march, consisting of 10,000 fighting men, amounts in the mass from 40,000 to 65,000 men; that the general must feed this crowd of non-combatants, and their animals. The statement of General Napier was fully confirmed by a military writer in the Delhi Gazette of October the 25th, who, speaking of the preparations for the war in the Punjaub, says— The number of men to be assembled at Ferozepore amounts, more or less, to 20,000 men. Their camp followers will exceed 100,000; but we will take them at that figure. Now, assuming the correctness of General Napier and the writer in the Delhi Gazette, whose statements confirm each other, and taking the Bombay troops in the Punjaub at 10,000, and the Bengal at 39,000, there were 30,000 camp followers attached to the former, and 195,000 to the latter, making 225,000 in all; which, added to the 49,000 fighting men, gave a grand total of no less than 274,000 men in the field. In the statement made on Friday, he (Mr. Thompson) had set down the fighting men at 40,000, and the camp followers (two to each soldier) at 80,000, making, together, the number 120,000. He had now demonstrated how greatly below the actual amount were the numbers he had stated. With this explanation, he was content to leave the matter with the House, and also the question of expense, which would be determined when the accounts were produced.