HC Deb 25 July 1848 vol 100 cc812-6
MR. GLADSTONE

rose to move an Address, setting forth— That by an Order in Council, which his late Majesty was pleased to approve on the 15th day of December, 1831, Sir John Thomas Claridge, then Recorder of Prince of Wales's Island, was removed from the said office on account of an 'irritation between the Local Government and himself' which, in the opinion of the Lords of the Committee of Council, acting judicially in the case, was 'principally to be attributed' to the conduct of the said Local Government and of the Home Authorities:—Also setting forth that it further appeared to their Lordships in their investigation of the case, 'that no imputation rested on the capacity or integrity of Sir J. T. Claridge in the exercise of his judicial functions, so as to preclude his Majesty from employing him in his service in some other judicial situation; 'and praying that Her Majesty, graciously taking into consideration the expectations which the terms of the said Order in Council were calculated to create, may be pleased to direct that Sir J. T. Claridge may receive an appointment in Her Majesty's service of such a class as to Her Majesty shall seem meet. He had moved for a copy of that Order in Council six days ago, but it had not yet been laid on the table of the House; however, it was accurately set forth in the terms of his Motion, and he might say that that Order in Council constituted his case. Sir John Thomas Claridge had, in the year 1825, been appointed to the recorder-ship of Prince of Wales's Island. Some years afterwards six charges had been made against him by the Court of Directors of the East India Company. Those charges had been referred to the Committee of the Privy Council, corresponding with what was now denominated the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and as only two of those charges had been persevered in, he should have only to deal with two of those charges. The first charge was, that Sir John Thomas Claridge had refused to execute the duties of his office until he should have obtained from the local government a guarantee for the payment of a certain amount of salary; and the other charge was that he had refused to proceed to Sincapore and Malacca for the trial of offenders unless the local government would pay his expenses. The Committee of Council decided that although Sir J. T. Claridge was not justified in the measures to which he had recourse to enforce the payment of his charges, or the expenses of his going his circuit, yet their Lordships were inclined to think that the local government was not justified in refusing to allow him his charges, and that it was the duty of the Court of Directors to provide for the payment of his expenses, and that Sir John Thomas Claridge had acted from a mistaken view of his duty. It appeared, therefore, that the local government were to blame as well as Sir J. T. Claridge. The Order in Council went on to state, that in consequence of the irritation which existed between the local government and Sir J. T. Claridge, it would be advisable that he should be removed, but that he had been guilty of no act which should incapacitate him from serving the Crown hereafter in a judicial capacity. Therefore he had been dismissed, not as a punishment, but on grounds of public policy and as a solution of a public dilemma. No imputation rested on his character; and from the wording of the Order in Council, an expectation had been raised in his mind that he should be employed again, which expectation had not been fulfilled. He did not bring forward this Motion as a party question, or as a charge against the right hon. Baronet opposite. There had been several Presidents of the Board of Control since these occurrences had taken place, all of whom had neglected the claims of Sir J. T. Claridge. He had brought forward this Motion entirely on public grounds. The independence of the Judges in England was secured by the fact of their holding their offices for life; but in the colonies they were liable to dismissal by the Government, and the only security they had for the independence of the colonial judges was the appeal to the Committee of the Privy Council, and the recommendation of that Committee should be always attended to. If they valued the independence of the colonial judges he besought them to agree to this address.

SIR J. C. HOBHOUSE

would not go further into the subject than the specific wording of the Motion required. He had no more to do with the case than the right hon. Gentleman himself. The appointment had taken place twenty years ago, and he had nothing to do with it, and had had nothing to do with the matter at all except having been so unfortunate as to have had a long and by no means agreeable correspondence with that gentleman. The whole accusation against him was, that he had not thought proper to recommend this gentleman for an Indian judgeship. [Mr. GLADSTONE: For any colonial judgeship.] He had no power to recommend him, except to an Indian judgeship. But he would ask the right hon. Gentleman how it happened that during the five years which the right hon. Gentleman had been in office, he had overlooked the claims and the merits of Sir J. T. Claridge? How came it that while the right hon. Gentleman held the office of Secretary for the Colonies he had never bestowed a judgeship on this gentleman? How came it that the injustice of this case had not burst upon the right hon. Gentleman until he (Sir John Hobhouse) had had the misfortune to become for the second time the correspondent of Sir J. T. Claridge? He considered that the proviso in the Order in Council on which the right hon. Gentleman had laid so much stress was somewhat extra-judicial. It, however, did not go the length of recommending him for employment, but it merely stated that he was not incapacitated from being employed. There was nothing whatever to impugn the character of Sir J. T. Claridge, who had been appointed by an able and excellent man, Mr. Charles Wynn; but neither was there anything that gave him any claim to any other appointment. He had nothing to say against the character of Sir J. T. Claridge, but he would rather not make him a judge. When the case was heard before the Privy Council, the Members of the Committee were Lord Brougham, Lord Goderich, and Mr. Charles Grant; and if they had entertained so decided an opinion as to the propriety of the reappointment of Sir J. T. Claridge, how came it that they had not reappointed him? Lord Brougham had conveyed extra-judicially to Sir J. T. Claridge that it had been the intention of the Committee in their decision to give a triumph to neither party. Shortly afterwards Sir J. T. Claridge had made a communication to Lord Brougham, to which he received no answer. He was not more fortunate in a second application; and the third time he received an answer that was by no means satisfactory. So little did Lord Brougham think himself called upon to do anything for the reinstatement of Sir J. T. Claridge, that when he applied for a silk gown, Lord Brougham thought it right to refuse even that small favour. Since the dismissal of Sir John Claridge, the office of President of the Board of Control had been held successively by Lord Glenelg, by himself (Sir J. C. Hobhouse), by Lord Ellenborough, by Lord Fitzgerald, by the Earl of Ripon (who had been a member of the Committee which had investigated the case); and then he again had the misfortune to be compelled to make the speech on this case which he was then addressing to the House. He could not see how the House of Commons could in anywise interfere in the case, and that seemed to be the real difficulty felt by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman wanted the House of Commons to ask the Crown to give an appointment to Sir J. T. Claridge; had the right hon. Gentleman any precedent to show for such a case? He rather thought the right hon. Gentleman had not; on the contrary, he could recollect when a Motion had been made in that House on a former occasion to address the Crown to grant a pension to a gentleman, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth strongly opposed it, on the ground that it would be an interference with the Royal prerogative, and that it should be left to the responsibility of the Government. But, supposing that the House of Commons addressed the Crown on the case of Sir J. T. Claridge, and that the Crown gave him an appointment, who would be responsible in that case? It would not be the President of the Board of Control, or the Secretary for the Colonies, or the Prime Minister; for one and all these might urge that they could not do so consistently with their views of the public service, or that they had no appointments of the nature required in their gift. In that case the consequence would be that there would be no redress for the House of Commons. The House of Commons occasionally interfered to remove a man from a situation—to remove a Judge or a Minister—but never to appoint him. It would be manifestly unconstitutional, and the greatest danger to the public service might ensue from its interference with the judicial office. He hoped, therefore, that the House would not agree to the Motion. He wished it was in his power to come to some other conclusion on the subject, and to be able to say that Sir J. T. Claridge was the fittest person to be appointed as judge in India or elsewhere; but he could not give such an answer. He trusted, therefore, as no good could come of it, either to the House or to Sir J. T. Claridge, that the right hon. Gentleman would not press his Motion to a division. Motion withdrawn.