PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.

HC Deb 09 March 1847 vol 90 cc1079-98

MR. EWART

presented petitions for the Repeal of the Punishment of Death from a numerous meeting, one of the largest ever held, at Exeter Hall; from Liverpool, signed by 13,000 persons; another from Liverpool, signed by the stipendiary magistrate, and several of the other magistrates of the town and county; also petitions from Birkenhead, Exeter, Norwich, Chichester, Dorchester, Bridgewater, and many other places, as well as from meetings, and from congregations in the metropolis and elsewhere.

MR. THORNELY

also presented a petition from the magistrates and a large number of the respectable inhabitants of Liverpool to the same effect.

MR. EWART

then rose to bring forward the Motion, of which he had given notice, for the Total Repeal of the Punishment of Death. Seven years had now elapsed since it had been his lot to bring this subject before the attention, or rather before the patience, of the House. At that time the subject excited a strong interest; but it now assumed a far deeper and more earnest character. This appeared partly from the number of the petitions just presented, and the numerous meetings held throughout the country, partly from the altered character of the petitioners. Seven years ago, few of the clergy of the Church of England had given in their adherence to the principle of total abolition; now, a considerable number had done so. Many were willing to append their names to petitions, and to support at public meetings the Christian principle of repeal. The further spread of these opinions was to be inferred from the increasing difficulty which he understood to prevail of obtaining from juries verdicts which involved the punishment of death. One particular instance had been cited to him in which the verdict was directly against the facts. If so, their instrument of justice failed them. It might ultimately fall, enfeebled and useless, from their hands. Proceeding into the subject, he should avoid two views of it—the religious view, although he entertained as strong a conviction of the essentially un-Christian spirit of capital punishment as any man, and the theoretical view of the question. He would endeavour to argue it on practical grounds: first, attempting to prove that death-punishment was no longer necessary; secondly, that it was positively injurious. The most eminent writers, philosophical as well as practical, fixed capital punishment on the basis of necessity. Filangieri argued that it was originally based on the necessity of self-defence. But if society could defend itself without capital punishment, this plea of necessity vanished. A more modern, and a royal writer—distinguished by the mingled benevolence and reason which add the highest lustre to a Crown—the King of Sweden, had also laid it down that capital punishment could be justified by necessity alone. That most enlightened monarch had appointed a commission to inquire into the criminal laws of Sweden. In his own work, he stated that— The Commission considers that capital punishment cannot be defended before the tribunal of reason and justice on any other grounds than its being found necessary for, and conducive to, the existence and objects of the State. But"—he significantly adds—"this necessity and applicability are doubtful. Was then the infliction of this punishment necessary—he (Mr. Ewart) would use a stronger term, indispensable—in our own existing state of society? Had it not safely been dispensed with in less advanced and more dangerous states of society? Had the familiar reference to the mild justice and sound policy of the code of Leopold of Tuscany, abolishing capital punishment, ever been disproved? or the successful experiment of Sir James Mackintosh in Bombay, as stated by himself? or the less known, but equally favourable result of the late Lord Metcalfe's merciful criminal code in Delhi, recorded in the annals of the East India Company? He (Mr. Ewart) understood also on good authority—which extended to the year 1845—that the reign of the present Emperor of Austria was distinguished by the absence of capital punishment; yet, that the crime of murder in Austria had diminished. But the advocates of the maintenance of capital punishment took their stand on the last step of the scaffold; and, granting much in favour of mitigation, insisted on the absolute necessity of this punishment in the single case of murder. But, had they not urged also this same plea of necessity through each succeeding step of those various acts of mitigation which they first opposed, and now, it seemed, approved of? When it was attempted to abolish capital punishment for the stealing of sheep, of cattle, and of horses, and even of 5l. in a dwelling-house, there were those in the House of Commons who asserted its peculiar necessity in such especial cases. When it was hinted that even forgery need not be capitally punished, how many insisted on the necessity of protecting the moneyed interest by sanguinary laws? In almost every successive stage of mitigation the plea of the necessity for maintaining the punishment of death was urged against it. And yet such necessity was no longer felt since the mitigation was achieved. Might not the plea then be equally futile that capital punishment was necessary for the crime of murder? Its remission extended to cases on the confines of that crime, so nearly, indeed, that the line of demarcation was scarcely to be distinguished. Was it not, therefore, possible or probable that it might as safely extend even to that crime? On what reasonable grounds had their opponents shown that it should not? The only plausible distinction which they drew was, that, in the case of murder, there was a sort of proportion between the crime and the punishment of death. For his part, he could not see why the principle of proportion was not similarly, if not equally, applicable to other cases in which the punishment of death had been abandoned. He could not understand that it was anything else than the primitive law of barbarous retaliation—the short, simple, and easy doctrine of the lex talionis, so long, but now no longer, the royal road to punishment. Lord Bacon had justly described revenge as a "kind of wild justice." But this species of retaliatory justice was only a sort of deliberate and civilized revenge. He denied, therefore, that on the ground of "proportion," the retention of capital punishment was proved to be any longer necessary. But its necessity might possibly be proved from statistics. Reason not being strongly in its favour, refuge might be found in figures. Let them, therefore, meet the question on the debateable ground of statistics. Now, it was generally admitted that statistics might be found or fabricated on either side of an argument: they were, or they might be, two-sided instruments of Parliamentary warfare — like the oracles of old, they might utter, not the inspiration of the Deity, but the promptings of the priest. It was also admitted that statistical results often depended on the particular years included within a particular return. A year or two of distress, such as the years 1842 and 1843, might overthrow the entire basis of a calculation. Other causes, not permanent, but temporary, might sway the balance, and disturb the fair principle of calculation. But, he thought, the fairest principle to proceed on was, to take a certain number of years during which the capital punishment was inflicted, and a similar number of years during which it was dispensed with, and compare the results. He would first refer to a large class of crimes in general for which capital punishment had ceased; and next, to the crime of murder, for which alone, practically speaking, it was still retained. The first return, then, which he would cite, related to the first general class of crimes. Its date was May 22, 1846. It referred to seventeen species of crime punishable with death in 1830—the period whence the modern mitigation of our code might be deemed to date—it extended backwards to five years of capital punishment, forwards to five years of non-capital punishment, for those seventeen kinds of crime. The result was, that, during the five years of capital punishment, the total amount of crimes in those seventeen cases was 7,276; during the five years of non-capital punishment they fell to 7,120. This, too, notwithstanding the increase of the population. He thought this a fair comparison. In subsequent years, possibly, other causes might incline the balance one way or another. In one year it was better, in another worse. In the years 1842 and 1843, from distress, vast was the increase of crime. Last year, again, it had decreased, if he remembered right, eight per cent in general; and, in one particular case, in which it had before increased, and whence arguments against further mitigation had been drawn—the case of rape—it had decreased twenty-six per cent. So much for crimes generally. Now, for the crime of Murder. A return, moved for in 1841, giving executions and their results in successive periods of five years, showed that for the five years ending in 1825, 1830, 1835, and 1840, as the number of executions for murder diminished, the number of murders decreased. The number of executions fell from 76, in the five years ending in 1825, to 40, in the five years ending in 1840; while the number of committals for murder fell from 383, in the former five years, to 291, in the latter five years. In the same periods it would appear that the certainty of punishment increased; for the centesimal proportion of convictions to committals rose from 22.98 to 29.90. Another return, elucidating this subject—moved for, like almost all these returns, at the suggestion of a very highly valued friend of his (Mr. Wrightson), a gentleman who had written ably on the subject—was dated August 22, 1843. It comprehended periods of six years, from the year 1812 to 1843. As the capital punishments for murder decreased in the descending scale, the crime of murder appeared to decrease also. In the first period of six years, when the number of capital punishments was 122, the number of murders was 444. In the last of the periods of six years, when the capital punishments were only 50, the number of murders had fallen to 351. Another table in the same return showed another important result. It reviewed, first, those years in which all who were convicted of murder were executed, and an equal number of years in which the smallest number of those who were convicted were executed; thus comparing the effect of the most unsparing execution with that of the greatest amount of forbearance. What was the result? In each year following those years in which executions invariably took place, the number of murders increased. Combining them together, the increase was from 239 to 270. On the other hand, in the years following those years in which there had been the fewest executions, the number of murders had fallen from 268 to 222. He might adduce further statistics illustrative of this argument, especially those drawn from the results of commutations in different countries. But he fore-bore to overload the subject and fatigue the House. He likewise might refer to the results of mitigation in France, Prussia, and Belgium. But he would limit himself to those experienced in the last-named country; because Belgium was the only country in which capital punishment had been recently abolished. It was abolished there, or suspended, in the year 1830. But, in the year 1835, it appeared that certain individuals advised its reintroduction for the sake of setting an "example." Capital punishments were therefore revived: and what was the result? Condemnations, which from the year 1830 to 1834 had only amounted to sixty-four, rose in the interval between 1835 and 1839, to eighty; or about twenty-five per cent. Here he would close his argument from figures. Arguments from facts and circumstances led to the same conclusion. Our prison discipline was immensely improved; our police everywhere better regulated; education was yearly advancing. The additional safeguards which these improvements gave, while they rendered crime more unlikely or more controllable, rendered less necessary the usurpation of the disposal of human life by man. Finally, on this part of his argument, he would say, that, however he might have argued, ill or well, against the necessity of capital punishment, the real onus probandi did not lie on him to prove, or try to prove, the negative—that capital punishment was not necessary—but upon those who opposed him to prove the affirmative issue of its necessity. Here he left this part of his argument, and proceeded with the next, to show that the punishment of death was not only not necessary, but that it was positively injurious in its results. Injurious to whom? To the criminal who suffered, to the jury who tried him, and to the public for whose sake the suffering was supposed to be permitted. First, with respect to the criminal. It had been admitted ever since the days of Beccaria, that the main element of a well-chosen punishment was its certainty of infliction. But, he would ask, "Can you unvaryingly, or with any due degree of certainty, inflict the punishment of death even for the crime of murder? If you cannot do so, the general effect on the criminal's mind must be an uncertain one." In such a case the disposition of man inclines towards the chances in his own favour: a species of moral gambling is engendered, and he boldly stakes the uncertainty of his own life against the general uncertainty of the law. But, besides the final uncertainty of the punishment, there were many intermediate causes of uncertainty. There was an uncertainty which had not been sufficiently dwelt on—that of the English legal definition of murder! "Malice prepense" must be an essential ingredient in the crime. Now it appeared to him that "malice prepense" might bear a different definition in the minds of different judges; for the proof of it depended on the circumstances of the case; and that which might appear to amount to a deliberate purpose in one man's mind, might not appear so in the mind of another. He thought the uncertainty of this definition was traceable in the constructions which it had undergone by different tribunals. He forbore to dwell on the various stages, before, during, and after, the trial, all so many different degrees, or professions, of uncertainty. Before the final consummation of the sentence, both local interest and public feeling interposed to stay the uplifted arm of justice. What was worse, a morbid sympathy was engendered—engendered he (Mr. Ewart) maintained by capital punishment alone—which threw a false splendour around the criminal, and raised him into a sort of felonious hero. This false splendour was flung over one, who would otherwise be unnoticed, by the magnitude of his punishment, and what might be called the dignity of death. That it was the punishment, not the crime, which produced this false sympathy, he (Mr. Ewart) was convinced, for this reason: formerly the same sympathy existed for criminals who were capitally sentenced for forgery, for robbery, or for sheepstealing. But, now that the capital punishment was abolished in those cases, the false sentiment in their favour existed no longer. Surely the same result must follow if the capital penalty were repealed in the case of murder. The last bad effect on the criminal, too obvious and too often urged for him to dwell upon, was, that serious, but unanswerable objection in the eyes of reason and religion, the withdrawal, or rather extinction, of the criminal without the chance of reform. By capital punishment he was dismissed— Unhousell'd, disappointed, unaneal'd, No reckoning made, but sent to his account With all his imperfections on his head! Thus justice precipitately closed the career of crime! He (Mr. Ewart) turned next from the prisoner to the adjudicating body—the jury. He maintained that the continuance of capital punishment was positively injurious also in its influence on the jury. It dazzled, or dimmed, the vision of justice, which should be strong and clear. The magnitude of the punishment threw the crime into the shade. The jury were taught to shrink from a responsibility, when they ought simply to discharge a duty; and their decisions were overshadowed by the magnitude of the penalty imposed by the law. This feeling had evidently increased in modern times. In his opinion it would continue to increase. As men advanced in civilization they must more acutely feel their own responsibilities; above all, they must feel that awful responsibility, the infliction of a punishment, final and fatal, by a fallible tribunal. In modern times, too, men were prone to draw refined distinctions on the ground of insanity in criminal cases. Perhaps it might be even said, that the more horrible and stronger the murder, the more inclined might some men be to ascribe it to the wanderings of reason. Here then was another opening for the escape of the responsibility of a jury. The continuance, therefore, of capital punishment enfeebled the administration of justice, and shook our jury system to its foundation: it was injurious to the tribunal which administered, as well as to the criminal who suffered from, the law. But was it not, also, fatally injurious to the public?—the public whom they ought, first of all, to regard—the public, for whose sake it was said that capital punishments were maintained as an example. As an example to whom? What thoughtful father would admonish his children by means of such an exhibition? What pious tutor would initiate his pupils in such a lesson? Was it then for the more laborious classes that they maintained this public ceremony; those classes whom they ought to elevate and refine, not demoralize and debase? To which portion of those who beheld it could it do good? To the virtuous? They shunned it entirely, or retired from it with abhorrence; or, if they endured to witness it, they became one step the further removed from virtue. To the vicious? It had been proved by repeated evidence that criminals were not only the unreformed witnesses of executions; but that they were, in some cases, incited to crime by witnessing them. Was it then the uncertain mass who fluctuate between good and evil, the indifferent, on whom they were to produce an effect? If for such as these executions were to be maintained as an incentive to virtue, why not make a great moral lesson of them? Why not invest them with the serious dignity of a solemn ceremony? Instead of that, they were hurried through, often suddenly, in the doubtful twilight of the morning—as if the State were ashamed of this great moral lesson; and, still more, as if it were ashamed of the minister of public instruction by whom this moral lesson was practically imparted. But, it might be said, "Execute in private;" and some persons were in favour of such a proposition. If so, what became of the argument of example? It must, in that case, be abandoned as untenable. But there was another point of view, which more especially disclosed the inefficiency of capital punishments in free countries like our own. In such countries efficient punishment might be said to consist of two combined forces: the one derived from the sentence of the law; the other from the weight which public opinion superadded to that sentence. In such cases, the effect of law was enforced by the coincident pressure of public approbation. But if the law were at variance with public opinion, public opinion exercised, not a coincident, but a perpetually counteracting, effect to the pressure of the law. But what if that counteracting effect went on constantly increasing? From the petitions on their Table, from the well-known sentiments of the people, it appeared that it did so. In the case of capital punishments, therefore, they had not only an established resistance to the pressure of the law, but a resistance which was constantly increasing. Every year, therefore, must add to the difficulty, if the present system were continued. But, if it were discontinued, he might be justly asked, what punishment would he substitute for the punishment of death? To that question he would answer, that, with all the appliances and means, and all the skilful refinements of our present system of imprisonment, he would substitute imprisonment for life. This had been done in other countries possessing less advantages. Why should it not be tried in this? Such a punishment was not, like the punishment of death, barbarous, yet evanescent; it was ever-present and effective. It was no transient and futile horror, like the spectacle of a sudden and sanguinary death, but, while life lasted, an ever-living lesson. Nor would it be wanting in severity; since what more formidable sentinels for the portals of a prison, than the dread phantoms of solitude and sin? Thus, in the course of time, the prisoner might be brought under the control of religious influences; reformation would take the place of execution:— Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe Concretam exemit labem purumque reliquit Æthereum sensum:"— and he might be softened and moulded into a new creature. But what was the operation of the present system? Time was, in many cases, denied for the operation of repentance. If the distinguishing doctrine of Islamism was resignation, surely one at least of the vital characteristics of Christianity was repentance. Yet by the infliction of capital punishment they closed the gates of repentance on mankind. Nay, some of the strongest opponents of abolition admitted this objection; for they proposed that the execution of a capital sentence should be suspended for a year, in order to give time for repentance. But if for one year, why not for two—for three—for four—five, or ten? Who shall prescribe within what time a sinner shall repent? The principle of opposition on this ground was, then, virtually abandoned; and what more momentous ground could be submitted to their contemplation? This only passing glance at one religious aspect of the question, which forced itself on his attention, would he (Mr. Ewart) allow himself. But, ere he closed, he must turn to another view of the question. It was not by sanguinary punishments, or punishments of any description, that they could overcome the tendency to crime. The remedy was a more searching one. To extirpate the evil, they must strike deeper; they must give the people, not a horror of the punishment, but a horror of the crime. They must educate the people. But there were two modes of educating them; one acting by internal means, the other by the external influence of outward objects. Among the external influences, one was, the withholding from the view of the public, sights which could only tend to harden and degrade it. All experience showed that such scenes debased and barbarized the people. The King of Sweden, to whose work he had already referred, showed this result, he thought conclusively. He gave a catalogue of countries in which capital punishments were most common, yet in which savage and sanguinary crimes appeared most prevalent. Thus Spain, which exhibited the most numerous executions (1 in 122,000 inhabitants) was the most fertile in atrocity of crime. But Norway, in which country no execution had occurred from the year 1835 to the year 1837, showed only one execution to every 720,000 of its inhabitants. Yet the conterminous country of Sweden, in which crimes were far more common, exhibited one execution for every 172,000 inhabitants. The same inferences might be drawn by comparing Ireland, and even England and France, with Pennsylvania, Prussia, or Bavaria—States in which executions were most rare. History told the same tale. In the best times capital punishments were the most uncommon, or the most at variance with the feelings of the people. Thus, in the high and palmy days of Rome, they found capital punishments generally abolished. Even on occasion of the treason of Catiline, an argument was raised against the infliction of the punishment of death. It was argued, says Cicero— Mortem à diis immortalibus non esse supplicii causâ, constitutam. …. Itaque eam sapientes nunquam inviti, fortes etiam sæpe libenter oppetiverunt. In the earlier and purer era of primitive Christianity, the same reluctance had been manifested. High reason, and deep religion combined and coincided on this good principle. The time was come when, in this country, the experiment might be fairly tried. Commercial freedom was opening trade and labour to the people. Education was following in the track of commercial freedom. The people even now were scarcely patient of these pomps of death and spectacles of blood, the attributes of an age more barbarous than our own. He asked the Legislature to listen to their aspirations; to achieve a great social, moral, and religious victory; and to offer up this last sacrifice, expiatory of the sanguinary legislation of the past, on the united altars of civilization and Christianity.

DR. BOWRING

seconded the proposition. Every discussion that took place in that House and out of doors on this question brought the period nearer to them, at which the total abolition of the punishment of death would become inevitable. It could not be denied that every experiment that had been made had been successful, and that with the diminution of punishments there had been a corresponding diminution in crime. If anything characterized an advancing and progressive age, it was respect for life. Disregard of that highest and greatest of treasures, was always associated with backwardness and barbarism. Reverence for life, and a disposition to recognise its sacredness, and an unwillingness to throw it away, was what distinguished the best understanding of the principles of Christianity, and the first advance of civilization and philosophy. In a state of society in which life was wantonly wasted, be assured they would find all the elements of crime; but the indisposition to crime, as far as their experience went, should always be associated with that hesitation with which legislators consent to destroy life, and in which public opinion comes to confirm the decision of legislators. It appeared to him, that if they desired to inspire in the minds of every one a respect and a reverence for that possession which they called life, they ought themselves on no occasion to throw it away. On what principle, he asked, did society take altogether from the criminal the hope of reformation. His hon. Friend had quoted statistics of several countries which fully bore out his statement; but he had not referred to those of Prussia, which were peculiarly illustrative of the subject. Again, let them look to the number of homicides and other aggravated crimes committed in the Roman States as compared with Tuscany. These were adjoining States, and the people much resembled each other; and he imputed the small comparative number of homicides and other crimes in Tuscany to the humanity of the legislation, which was in his mind the philosophy of legislation. He did not think that the House could be better employed than in diminishing the number of crimes for which the perpetrators were now executed; and as experience had hitherto been successful in all proceedings in that direction, he trusted that the House would assent to the Motion of his hon. Friend.

SIR GEORGE GREY

regretted that he could not assent to the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries. On the present occasion his hon. Friend had avoided an objection which was made to another Motion he brought forward in 1841 on this subject, the last time, he believed, that it had been brought before the House. That Motion stated distinctly that capital punishment should cease; and the effect of the adoption of such a resolution would have been the involving those charged with the execution of the law in great embarrassment. His hon. Friend now moved for the abolition of the punishment of death in another manner; but, looking at the arguments adduced in support of the Motion, and also to the effect which he believed that the adoption of a Motion for the total abolition of the punishment of death would have, he felt it to be his duty to resist the introduction of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman very properly discarded the urging any theological ground for his Motion, but rested it on the state of society, and on the diminution of crime which it would lead to. The hon. Gentleman did not call upon them to diminish the number of offences for which the punishment of death now appeared in the Statute-book, because there were peculiar grounds for such diminution; but invited them to agree that in all cases, and even cases of the most aggravated murder, and cases of high treason, which might involve the greatest danger to the nation, and be attended with the most serious loss of life, they should dispense with the punishment of death. He could not agree in such a large and sweeping proposition. His hon. Friend said, that he founded his case on statistical returns; and his hon. Friend who seconded the Motion also quoted further statistical returns, and said that they showed that in proportion as they had repealed the punishment of death for crimes, so in the same or a greater proportion had crime diminished. He agreed with his hon. Friend that statistics were the elements of Parliamentary warfare; but if they took other quinquennial periods, instead of those quoted by his hon. Friend, it would be found that they would give directly opposite results. If they took only one period, particular circumstances might have existed to lead to a diminution of crime; but if they took an equal period at another time, an increase would appear. In stating this, however, he admitted that the effects to the contrary were not of a very serious nature; and he believed that no one in that House would say that he wished the Legislature to retrace its steps, and go back to the punishment of death in cases where it had been abolished. The principle was an important one as related to the interests of society, and as regarded the prevention of crime. His hon. Friend said, that the infliction of the punishment of death in cases of murder did not answer the object in view; and he founded this opinion not on statistics as to the crime of murder, but on statistics having reference to other crimes for which the punishment of death had been removed. With respect to the results obtained respecting the latter class of crimes, it must be admitted that public opinion did not go with the infliction of the severer punishment. They were a class of crimes, the commission of which did not so deeply involve the interests of society. It was therefore impossible for the Government to inflict the capital punishment against the operation of public opinion. As long as the severer punishment existed, it held out an inducement to the commission of the crime, as criminals believed that they might to a certain degree commit them with impunity, from the unwillingness of parties to prosecute and of juries to convict. Persons, in many of these cases, would not come forward to prosecute, as these crimes involved only a pecuniary loss; and they therefore would not prosecute when the result probably might lead to the shedding of blood. Juries also were unwilling to convict in such cases, even on the strongest evidence. The hope of impunity was thus excited, and a premium was thus held out for the commission of this class of crimes. It was certainly true that no threat of capital punishment would deter from the commission of crime, when it was known that the punishment would not be inflicted. In fact, no Act of Parliament could answer the object in view if it imposed punishments and penalties which ran counter to the current of public opinion, and such a law must soon be repealed by the successful influence of public opinion. What was, however, now the state of the law with respect to capital punishments? Since 1841, when the last amendment of the law in this respect was made, certain cases were reserved in which capital punishment should be inflicted; but not a single execution had taken place since that time, but in cases of murder. He would now show the House that, instead of there having been an increase of the crime of murder in this country, there had, on the contrary, been a gradual decrease in the commitments for murder. On the average, during the periods of 1813–15, there had been but one commitment to every 133,000 souls; during the years 1823–25 but one commitment to every 157,000; during the years 1833–35 but one commitment to every 193,000; and during the years 1844–46 there had been but one commitment to every 240,000 souls, showing a great and progressive decrease in the commitments for murder; while in the same period the commitments for crime generally, to which the punishment of death is not attached, increased 276 per cent. He did not say that the abolition of the capital punishment was the cause of the increase of other crimes, for they must take into consideration the increase in the population since that time, and, above all, the improvement which had taken place in the police, which had increased its efficacy, and led to a greater number of criminals being detected and brought to trial. The almost certainty of execution following in clear cases of murder had not tended to increase that crime, but had had the practical effect of diminishing it. He believed that criminals looked forward with a degree of horror at the infliction of the punishment of death, which they would not feel at any other punishment. The certainty of its following in cases of murder, rendered it different from its being attached to other crimes, where it was not inflicted. He did not believe that public opinion was in favour of the abolition of this punishment, although a large number of conscientious persons, for whom he entertained the greatest respect, were in favour of it; but still he believed that the great majority of the people would be shocked, and public feeling would be outraged, if it was at once abolished. His hon. Friend had stated that life was the highest and greatest treasure of man, and that it should not be sacrificed wantonly. He not only agreed in this, but he would observe that it would be disgraceful in any Government wantonly to inflict any punishment. It was the first duty of Government to look to the protection of life; and he believed that it was by the continuance of the punishment of death in cases of murder that this object would be obtained. In cases of murder, there was no unwillingness to come forward. On the contrary, in such cases there was every desire, on the part of both prosecutor and witnesses, to convict the criminal; and it was very rarely in England that juries hesitated to discharge their duty in such cases. Therefore, he said that no man who committed murder could reasonably expect that the punishment of death would not follow. His hon. Friend had spoken of executions, and had asked what was the use of them. Did he suppose that it was to operate as an example only on those who saw them with their own eyes? He believed that the effect was not produced only on the spectators, but was widely influential when the result became known. When persons read accounts of the execution and the trial, and were struck with the solemn mode in which sentence was passed, the effect was produced on the rest of the community, and was not merely confined to the crowd which had assembled to witness the dying struggles of the criminal. He would not say whether executions produced crimes to the extent stated by his hon. Friend; but he believed that persons who went to executions were generally deeply imbued with crime. With reference to juries having been said to acquit improperly persons charged with murder, on the ground of insanity, he could say, from his experience in the office which he had the honour to fill, that the cases were not nearly so general as stated; and although there were cases of this serious nature, where juries had given such verdicts on comparatively slight indications of insanity, yet there were many more where juries had given such verdicts in simple cases of larceny, from some mistaken feelings of humanity. In the latter cases, the parties would certainly have a much longer imprisonment inflicted on them. As to that part of his hon. Friend's speech in which he stated that if the capital punishment was abolished in cases of murder, the juries would be unwilling to give credit to the plea of insanity, he did not think that his hon. Friend had adduced any argument which would justify the support of the Motion on that ground. He did not think it was necessary for him then to go further into the subject. As to the abolition of the punishment of death for the other crimes on which it was now imposed, he would only observe that, although for the last five years no case had occurred in which it was necessary to inflict it, yet cases might arise, such as treason, in which it would be necessary, although this was a crime of such unfrequent occurrence; but because the crime was not common was no answer to the necessity for the severest punishment for it.

MR. HUME

observed that the right hon. Gentleman had admitted the diminution of some crimes by the abolition of the punishment of death. Was not that the strongest argument for going on in the same course? The speech of the right hon. Baronet involved an argument against the abolition ef the punishment of death in all cases. He said life was valuable and sacred; and, therefore, they should protect it by such a punishment as was best calculated for the purpose of deterring criminals from taking away life. This was the old argument against the abolition of the punishment in all cases of stealing, on the principle that property was sacred, and should be protected in every possible way. The right hon. Gentleman said that he was not prepared to take a further view of the question—that he was not prepared to go back—but all his arguments told against him on this point. It was notorious that persons who went to executions became indifferent to the shedding of blood, and very often ultimately became murderers themselves. The result of every proceeding on the subject in that House for the last twenty-five years, showed the propriety of diminishing the severity of punishments. The right hon. Gentleman said that public opinion was not favourable to the removal of capital punishments in cases of murder. But there were four or five other crimes for which this punishment was now retained, but never executed. Surely it could be abolished with respect to them. Juries formerly hesitated to convict in the clearest cases where property was concerned, because they objected to the infliction of capital punishment, and so it would be in cases of murder. The question was, whether the taking the life of a murderer deterred another from the commission of that crime? Such had been the effect of abolishing this punishment, that he called upon the House to go on in the same course. He trusted that at any rate the Government would allow the Bill to be brought in.

MR. AGLIONBY

was anxious, as a supporter of the Motion, to say a few words on one point which had been alluded to. The right hon. Baronet had said that the feeling of the country was against the Motion. Now as far as his observation extended, the right hon. Baronet was mistaken, for he believed that it was almost entirely in favour of the Motion. He knew this to be the case with respect to his constituents, who, if they did not entertain an unanimous feeling on the subject, yet a very large majority of them were decidedly of opinion that this punishment should cease.

SIR R. H. INGLIS

said, that if his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Home Department had not thrown the shield of his character over part of the speech of the hon. Member for Dumfries, which he thought was open to exception, he should not have risen to address the House on that occasion. As far as he could understand, his right hon. Friend had praised the hon. Member for having avoided all the theological part of the question. Now, if he (Sir R. H. Inglis) rightly comprehended that question, it was not left to them to decide as a matter of expediency whether or not they should inflict the punishment of death in cases of murder, whatever they might do in any other cases. His hon. Friend had stated that the punishment of death under the Levitical law, had been abolished by the more humanising spirit of the Christian dispensation. But that was not the point at issue; the punishment of death did not rest on the Levitical law. It was a law given by God himself when the world had been newly replenished. The law given by the Almighty was, that "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." He did not think, therefore, that human legislators were at liberty to dispense with the punishment of death for wilful murder. He had always avowed that opinion in private, and he would never shrink from avowing it in public. The House, however, would show itself prepared to blot out that universal command of God, as he believed it to be, if it were to accede to the Motion of the hon. Member for Dumfries. But, even on lower grounds, he should deprecate the adoption of that Motion; for it was clear that if the same punishment were enacted for murder and for burglary, the man who committed burglary would also commit murder, because he would by that means take away a witness of his crime, and would incur no greater degree of punishment. He should not trespass any longer on the time of the House, as he had frequently on former occasions expressed to them his views upon the subject. He felt it his duty to give his decided opposition to the Motion of his hon. Friend, believing, as he did, that the measure would not be productive of good, but would loosen the ties of society. Let them remember that all their sympathies should not be in favour of the criminal, but that they should also be extended to the victims of his crime.

MR. BROTHERTON

said, that punishment could only be justified on the ground that, by its infliction, it would either reform the offender, make reparation to society for the injury done, or deter others from the commission of crime by the example it afforded. It could easily be shown that capital punishment did not produce any such effects. It was impossible to reform a man after you had hanged him. As long as a man lived, he might make some reparation to society for the injury he had done; but he who was hanged could no longer be useful to society: and there was a growing conviction in the public mind, that the punishment of death did not prevent crime. In his opinion, it was of the greatest importance that the laws and institutions of the country should cherish in the minds of the people a feeling of the sacredness of human life. The punishment of death was either right or wrong. If it were wrong, it could not, under any circumstances, become right. He who gave life, had alone the right to take it way. The infliction of capital punishment was a violation of the principles of humanity, justice, and mercy. With regard to the text, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," he believed it was no more a precept than the declaration that "they that take the sword, will perish by the sword," was a precept. Both were intended to teach men that they must expect just retribution for the committal of injustice. That the quotation was not a law, was proved by the fact that it was forbidden to slay the first murderer on record. If the text mentioned by the hon. Baronet were to be taken in the sense in which he wished it to be, one murder would lead directly to another, and, in that case, where was bloodshedding to end? Would that text justify murder for the purpose of retaliation? He maintained that capital punishment was wrong in principle, and that the law sanctioning it, should no longer remain on the Statute-book. There were many ways of punishing crime—from the tread-mill, the silent or separate system of imprisonment, to transportation—without putting men to death. The State had power over the civil, but it had no right to take the natural life of man. There was a growing public opinion that crime diminished in proportion to the mildness of the laws. The improvement in public opinion on this subject was illustrated by a case that had occurred in the year 1814, when a man was executed at Chelmsford, in Essex, for cutting down a cherry tree. It was reported that the judge on the trial observed, that "a man who would cut down a tree maliciously, would kill a man." No judge at the present day would utter such a sentiment. He trusted that public opinion would improve still further, until the punishment of death was finally abolished.

House divided:—Ayes, 41; Noes, 81: Majority, 40.

List of the AYES.
Aglionby, H. A.	Mackinnon, W. A.
Baine, W.	M'Carthy, A.
Barclay, D.	Milnes, R. M.
Barnard, E. G.	Morrison, Gen.
Bowring, Dr.	Muntz, G. F.
Brotherton, J.	O'Brien, C.
Browne, W.	O'Connell, J.
Castlereagh, Visct.	Pattison, J.
Christie, W. D.	Pechell, Capt.
Crawford, W. S.	Strickland, Sir G.
Currie, R.	Tancred, H. W.
Dennistoun, J.	Thornely, T.
D'Eyncourt, rt. hon. C.	Trelawny, J. S.
Duncan, G.	Turner, E.
Ellis, W.	Walker, R.
Escott, B.	Warburton, H.
Fielden, J.	Williams, W.
Hanmer, Sir J.	Yorke, H. R.
Hindley, C.
Hutt, W.	TELLERS.
Kelly, Sir F.	Ewart, W.
Lawless, hon. C.	Hume, J.

List of the NOES.
Acland, Sir T. D.	Clay, Sir W.
Adderley, C. B.	Clerk, rt. hon. Sir G.
Aldam, W.	Clive, Visct.
Arundel and Surrey, Earl of	Douglas, Sir H.
	Duncombe, hon. O.
Bailey, H. J.	Dundas, Sir D.
Baring, H. B.	Entwisle, W.
Baring, T.	Fellowes, E.
Barrington, Visct.	Ferguson, Sir R. A.
Bellew, R. M.	Frewen, C. H.
Bennet, P.	Gladstone, Capt.
Bentinck, Lord G.	Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.
Beresford, Maj.	Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Berkeley, hon. C.	Halford, Sir H.
Buller, Sir J. Y.	Hastie, A.
Carew, W. H. P.	Henley, J. W.
Chichester, Lord J. L.	Herbert, rt. hon. S.

Heron, Sir R.	Protheroe, E. D.
Hope, G. W.	Pulsford, K.
Howard, hon. C. W. G.	Pusey, P.
Ingestre, Visct.	Rashleigh, W.
Inglis, Sir R. H.	Reid, Col.
James, Sir W. C.	Round, C. G.
Jervis, Sir J.	Russell, Lord J.
Law, hon. C. E.	Scrope, G. P.
Lawson, A.	Seymour, Lord
Lefroy, A.	Shaw, rt. hon. F.
Lincoln, Earl of	Sheppard, T.
Lindsay, Col.	Sibthorp, Col.
Macaulay, rt. hon. T. B.	Smith, J. A.
Mackenzie, T.	Smythe, hon. G.
Manners, Lord J.	Somerville, Sir W. M.
Matheson, J.	Spooner, R.
Miles, W.	Stuart, W. V.
Monahan, J. H.	Strutt, rt. hon. E.
Morpeth, Visct.	Vesey, hon. T.
Newry, Visct.	Vyse, H.
Northland, Visct.	Wortley, hon. J. S.
Palmer, R.	Wrightson, W. B.
Palmer, G.
Parker, J.	TELLERS.
Patten, J. W.	Tufnell, H.
Peel, J.	Craig, G.