HER MAJESTY'S SPEECH—THE ADDRESS.

HC Deb 26 January 1841 vol 56 cc38-117

The Speaker

acquainted the House that he had that day attended her Majesty at the House of Peers, where her Majesty had made a most gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament, of which, for greater accuracy, he had procured a copy, which he would then read.

The Speaker

read her Majesty's Speech, for which, see ante p. 1.

Lord Brabazon

said, that, in rising to move that a humble Address be presented to her Majesty, in answer to her most gracious Speech, he felt the greatest possible pleasure—a pleasure unalloyed by any disagreeable feeling, except that occasioned by the sense of his own utter inability to do justice to the subject. In proposing that an Address be presented to her Majesty expressive of the grateful sense which the House entertained of the most gracious Speech which she had that day been pleased to deliver from the Throne, he felt happy that the subjects to which he should have to draw their attention were such as would confidently enable him to anticipate that hon. Members on both sides of the House would cordially agree with him in the Address which he was about to propose. Seldom had it fallen to the lot of any one standing in the situation in which he then stood to have to direct the attention of the House to topics of greater interest than those which had been put forward in the speech from the Throne, or to congratulate them upon a happier or more glorious state of things than was now before them. In entering on the various topics to which it was now his duty to refer, he could assure the House that he should endeavour, as far as possible, to acquit himself of his task without any manifestation of party feeling, it being his anxious desire to conciliate all parties in a cordial co-operation with him in the Address which he would shortly have the honour of moving. The first topic to which he would allude, was one which was not touched upon by her Majesty in her Speech, though it held a very prominent part in the Address which he was about t move, as he was sure it did also in the hearts and affections of all her Majesty's subjects. It was a subject upon which his feelings irresistibly carried him along; and he was glad to reflect, that it was a subject on which he could indulge to the full in the pride and satisfaction enjoyed by all loyal subjects—the birth of a Princess Royal On this point he felt that he did but justice to all the hon. Members whom he saw around him, in saying, that he expressed their feelings in common with his own, when he declared that this House hailed with unbounded delight and feelings of joy the auspicious event which had given the country a Princess Royal. When the House met last year to address the Throne on the declaration of her Majesty of an intention to contract marriage with his Royal Highness Prince Albert, they did so in fond anticipation that a step which met with such universal approbation would, through Divine Providence, be attended with all the blessings of domestic comfort and happiness, by which it was the ardent desire of all her subjects that her Majesty should be surrounded. If then they did, as undoubtedly they did, derive inexpressible joy from the anticipations and fond hopes they were led to entertain, how rejoiced should they now be to behold the accomplishment of all those fond wishes, and how gratefully should they thank the Almighty Giver of all Good that he had deigned to hearken to the nation's prayers and to protect her Majesty through all the perils of childbirth, and to give to the country a direct heir to the Throne, who, he sincerely trusted, would inherit all the virtues, and enlightened qualities of her Royal Mother. He now turned from the many pleasing reflections the subject he had adverted to produced, to a subject calculated to raise up feelings of honest pride and exultation in the heart of every Engglishman; he alluded to the glorious achievements which had been accomplished, not only at Acre, but on the banks of the Indus and at China. The latter triumph might not be so glorious as that of Acre or on the banks of the Indus, but it was still one likely to prove highly important in its results. It was a further matter of congratulation to consider that these achievements had not been undertaken for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement, but in the first instance, for the establishment of the independence of the Ottoman empire; in the second, for the better govern- ment of India; and in the third, to vindicate the national honour, and place the commerce of this country with China upon a surer and safer footing. It was pleasing to reflect that in all these undertakings her Majesty's efforts had been either crowned with success, or were upon the eve of being so. With respect to the political state of the country, he had no hesitation in asserting, that upon the success of the measures of her Majesty's present Ministers the interests of the country mainly depended. The course they had hitherto pursued had been attended with the most beneficial results. They had maintained the peace of Europe under circumstances unexampled in the history of any nation. Her Majesty in her Speech from the Throne had declared it to be her intention to use her best endeavours to establish and maintain the peace of Europe, and the guarantee of the other powers of Europe to aid and assist in that great work would allay those fears which had been excited in consequence of what had taken place in some parts of the continent. The settlement of the Eastern question had been rendered certain by the glorious success of the British arms at Acre; and by the arrangements that had taken place, the power of Mehemet Ali had been circumscribed within its proper limits. They had the strongest assurances from the Throne that the negotiations entered into by her Majesty with the great powers of Europe last year were on the eve of being brought to a successful termination. It was to be sincerely lamented that in the course of events France had thought it necessary to withdraw her assistance from the other great powers, which had confederated together solely for the purpose of maintaining the peace of Europe, and the safety of their respective political relations. It was, however, satisfactory to know, and it was matter of self-congratulation to this country, and to her Majesty's Ministers, that the righteous objects they had in view, and which it was their determination to secure, had been attained without the assistance of France, and even in spite of her opposition. To the former minister of that country another had succceeded, in whose abilities and moderation Europe had reason to repose every confidence. They might hope that France would yet see her error, and would enter again into friendly relations with this country, and renew her former friendly intercourse with us. The immense re- sources, and the many dependencies of this great empire, imposed a very serious responsibility on those who had to conduct its Government; and it was to him matter of rejoicing, to find in the measures and principles of our colonial policy, that love of justice, and those principles of liberty, on which a free country should ever act. It was matter of congratulation to look to the prosperous state of our colonial possessions, and especially of the Canadas, to see the rapid progress of internal improvement in those provinces, and the great advancement of their commerce. It was most gratifying to observe the temper with which the Canadians had received the measure for the union of the provinces which was passed by this Parliament in the last Session. Many who were hostile to that measure during its progress, were now doing all in their power to smooth difficulties and to give it a fair trial. For his own part, he felt quite assured, that at no distant period that country (Canada) would become a great and powerful nation. Amongst the intentions which her Majesty intimated to Parliament, none would be received with greater pleasure than her declaration of the necessity for maintaining economy in every department of the State, so far as was consistent with a due regard to the exigencies of the public service. A necessity had arisen for sending out two powerful fleets to carry on operations, one of them in a very distant part of the world. This necessity had naturally entailed a very great expense upon the country. But expensive as those armaments were, the expenditure was of small importance compared to the maintenance of this country's honour, and the protection of our fellow-subjects and allies in all parts of the world. In reference to that part of the Speech which alluded to the administration of justice, we understood the noble Lord to say, that the present state of the Court of Chancery was a crying evil, and complained of from one end of the country to the other. Of course, upon that subject, there would be great diversity of opinion, but he did trust, that Parliament, in whatever alteration it might make, would, as far as possible, remove the evils which were complained of. The powers of the commission relating to the poor, terminated at the end of the year. He felt satisfied, that the House and Parliament would admit, that these gentlemen had highly distinguished themselves, and that the country had reaped great benefits from their labours. They had all marked, in its working throughout the country, not only the improved social, but the improved moral condition of the peasantry. He was sure the House would, in the revision of the measure of the Poor-law, make the best provision for the continuance of such advantages. He was free to confess, that he believed her Majesty's Ministers were not insensible to the condition of the people of Ireland, for, indeed, their past acts proved, that they were men who had done much good for Ireland; and he hoped, that the same anxiety the Government had already evinced, would lead them to bring forward measures to improve the condition of the Irish people. These were matters to which he looked forward with deep satisfaction. They had that evening heard the notice given for leave to bring in a bill which was about to be laid on the table by the Irish Secretary, which he sincerely trusted, would, in its provisions, be equal to, and realise, the hopes of the people of Ireland. He sincerely hoped, that in legislating upon Ireland, that hon. House would not take into consideration the question of how little, but how much they could give to promote her interests. He implored the House to consider how they should pass such enactments as should secure this great object. He implored the House to consider how fair and how just the demands of Ireland were. She declared that she asked for nothing more than to be placed on an equal footing. The people of Ireland claimed nothing more than equal franchises, equal privileges, and similar institutions with those of the people of England. Let the Legislature but grant these and they would make Ireland a contented and happy country. He implored the House to do this act of common justice, and then they would be able to solve that mighty enigma which had puzzled that House so many years in legislating for that country. Let them but do this, and they would make Ireland contented, happy, and prosperous; not only a source of natural strength to the empire, but also of commercial wealth. He was happy to bear testimony to the fact, that Ireland was at present participating in a general prosperity which pervaded the United Kingdom. She was greatly improved in wealth and industry. And, indeed, the care which had been taken to disseminate the blessings of education (though party spirit and party rancour, he admitted, existed throughout the country) had had the effect of leading to a better system of order and law; and he believed that much was to be attributed to the friendly and benignant influence of the policy of her Majesty's Government. There certainly were matters which agitated and disturbed the public mind in Ireland, and there was one question that created great grief in his breast—he need hardly say, he alluded to the repeal of the union. To that measure he was most determinedly and decidedly opposed; and, therefore, he could not view it without fear and apprehension at any time; but that fear and apprehension was a hundredfold augmented when he saw the repeal of the union agitated at a moment when the greatest concord and union were required among all shades of Reformers to maintain that power and that position which they now had. He implored those who advocated that measure to pause ere some calamity befel the country, which they would be the first to regret. He felt he had trespassed on the House too long—he had touched upon more subjects than those which her Majesty had mentioned in her Speech, and he would conclude by thanking the House for the patient hearing they had afforded him, and calling upon them, with earnest confidence, to support the address which he had the honour to move. The noble Lord then read the Address, which was an echo of her Majesty's Speech.

Mr. Grantley Berkeley

said, in rising to second the Address to the Crown, which had been moved by his noble Friend, he was happy on this occasion to have the opportunity of being able to congratulate the House and the country on the successful issue of the foreign and domestic policy which had been pursued by her Majesty's Ministers. Attached as he was to a system of liberal policy, and a supporter of the present Government, as he had been on many important occasions, he nevertheless felt sure, that he should not offer to the ear of the House, one single source of congratulation, the satisfaction of which was not shared in by every party present. He would lain hope and believe, that there was not a man to be found in England, in Ireland, or in Scotland, who did not rejoice at the news brought by every Indian mail of the triumph of British arms throughout the length and breadth of the continent of Asia. He congratulated the country, he congratulated the Government upon the Chinese war. Yes, he congratulated the Government upon the Chinese war, which was likely to prove so advantageous to the most important interests of this country. And here, in passing, let him remind the House, that upon an angry discussion in the last Session of Parliament, the present Ministry had nearly lost the reins of Government, because they had not counselled submission to the indignities which had been heaped by Commissioner Lin upon the British flag, and the injuries inflicted upon English merchants. But though he remembered this, though he reminded the House of it, though the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Pembroke heard him and was intimately connected with the opposition to which he referred, nevertheless he was convinced, that that right hon. Baronet was too generous a foe, and by far too enlightened a statesman, not to rejoice with him, and with the House in congratulation to the Crown, in England's triumphant situation. When the operations against China were first discussed, the position of that empire—the remoteness of the scene of war—the novelty of the circumstances in which this country was placed, and the fact of the enormous bulk of the population of the empire to be humbled—all these subjects might reasonably engender a feeling of distrust in the minds of many as to the probable termination of events, but since that period they had seen, that the policy which gave instructions to the Admiral, the gallant, forbearing, and capable officer who commanded in those seas, was founded on the most just conclusions. It must be a proud reflection in the breast of every Englishman, that a handful of men, schooled in forbearance, but determined on success, should in so short a space of time have humbled the bloated pride of an enormous—of a self-styled Celestial empire, the largest on the earth, and have taught its emperor, and his boastful and false commissioners for the future, to honour and respect the humblest merchant of this country who might hereafter trade to their distant shores. Not only did he hail with satisfaction the policy of the noble Lord in a political and a commercial point of view, but religiously he was led to regard it as the dawning of a light which was about to break in upon the darkness of that idolatrous land. Interest in the breasts of myriads must have been raised as to the law and the religion which governed the British warrior when at home and at peace in his native land. The great mass of the Chinese people had been severely and justly taught, that they had to deal with an enlightened superior, instead of an inferior barbarian; and as religion and superiority were inseparable, not only respect for the flag of England had been taught by this successful policy, and her mercantile interests protected, but the seeds of a faith in God might have been sown, that should bring forth future harvests. Look at the conduct of this country in Syria—look at the glorious and brilliant career of the British force then employed, and the unprecedented bombardment and taking of St. Jean d'Acre, which was not more honourable to the gallant admiral who commanded, than to every captain of each individual ship, and to the efficiency of their crews. On this matter however, he might scarcely speak, because a relative of his own was in command. Let them look to the simple facts. The first lauding of the Turkish troops, and British and Austrian marines, was effected in Djourni Bay, on the 10th and 11th of September. The Turkish troops amounted to about 6,000, the British marines to about 1,500, and the Austrians to 250; the whole did not amount to 8,000 men. The troops of Ibrahim amounted to 60,000 men, in different parts of the country, but the people of the country were all against him, having been driven by cruelty and oppression to desperation. They, therefore, flocked to the sea beach for weapons, and from first to last received 30,000 stand of arms. A Turkish reinforcement followed the first expedition, and then from 12,000 to 14,000 Turkish troops were engaged. The Turks, always famed for their bravery, needed but a leader, and they found one in Commodore Napier, a man, he was proud to say, possessed of the most dauntless courage, of the most daring enterprise, and gifted with a genius available alike on sea and land. Fort after fort, and town after town surrendered to their joint attacks. The Egyptians fled before the bayonets of the victorious troops; but, whenever they could escape from their tyrant, they came to make their submission. In a few weeks only no less than 12,000 men came over to the allied troops. On the 4th November, the fortress of Acre, which had successively baffled the skill of Napoleon at the head of his best troops, and had for six months withstood every attack of Ibrahim himself in 1831 and 1832, surrendered to a British and Austrian squadron after an assault of less than four hours, and thus in eight weeks after their first landing in Djourni Bay, the fate of Syria was decided. Never had the skill and valour of the British navy displayed itself to greater advantage, or with less loss, their casualties having amounted to no more than 60 men. Compare this attack with that of Algiers, and look at the results. In the latter had been lost 800 men, killed and wounded, yet this affair of Algiers was considered as one of the greatest exploits of the British navy. What, then, remained to them, but congratulation? By sea and land their arms were successful. Congratulation everywhere waited on the thunder of the British broadside, and seemed to attach itself to the triumphant policy of his noble Friend, which had placed this country in a situation so superior among the arbitrators of the laws of nations. In spite of the threatening attitude assumed by France—in spite of the clamour raised at homo—fearless and free, the Government had done their duty, and were the policy of the Syrian war, the last act of his noble Friend, he might well lay down the reins of office, and say— To-morrow do thy worst, for I have liv'd my day; Be fair, or foul, or rain, or shine, The joys I have possessed, in spite of fate are mine; Not heaven itself, upon the past has pow'r— What has been, has been—and I have had my hour. Whilst on the subject of the foreign policy of her Majesty's Government he would beg to refer to the state of our colonial possessions in Canada; and he could not do better on this occasion, by their permission, than quote a few brief sentences from the speech or message of the President of the United States to the House of Congress, which was to the following effect:— With all the powers of the world, our relations are those of honourable peace. The excitement which grew out of the territorial controversy between the United States and Great Britain, having subsided, it is to be hoped, that a favourable period is approaching for its final settlement. From the nature of the points in debate, and the undoubted disposition of both parties to bring the mutter to a conclusion, I look with confidence for a prompt and satisfactory termination of the negotiations. The spirit of that passage proved that the Government of England had done their duty in relation to that question. In passing, he could not refrain from quoting one more remark in the same speech, in which touching the slave-trade, the President observed:— The efforts of the several Governments, who are anxiously seeking to suppress the slave-traffic must, however, be directed against the facilities afforded by what are now recognised as legitimate commercial pursuits, before that object can be fully accomplished. Supplies of provisions, water-casks, merchandise, and articles connected with the prosecution of the slave-trade, are, it is understood, freely carried, by vessels of different nations, to the slave factories; and the effects of the factors are transported openly from one slave station to another, without interruption or punishment by either of the nations to which they belong, engaged in the commerce of that region. Now, he would have this recommendation taken up by the loud voice of England, wheresoever her dominion extended over the wide waters of the world, and echoed back from shore to shore, on that he would urge that England having abolished slavery in her own dominions, in justice to the West-India planters, whose fortunes had suffered by it, she should not cease in her exertions to eradicate the frightful evil wherever it was to be found; stamped as it was by injury to the honest conformer to the law, with a blacker shade than ever. Wherever that trade prevailed it should be abolished by this country with even-handed justice. Let him therefore express an individual hope in passing, which might perhaps be echoed by others, that the time was not far distant when her Majesty's Ministers halting not in their liberal intentions, unbiassed by any faction, restrained by nothing but the interests of wide-spreading justice, the law of heaven, and the rights of man, would bring forward a generous, well-considered, thoroughly-provided-for, and effective measure, unrestricted to any particular region, for the importation of free labourers not only to the Mauritius, but to the whole of the West-Indian colonies. So that the inhabitant of any clime or country might attain the best market for his hire, and through general competition be enabled to make those terms best suited to his interests, and by free labour assist in driving an ill-gotten gain of the slaver from the market of the universe. But to return to subjects of congratulation. With the full flush of important victories upon their minds, grateful to the Crown, grateful to the Government, and glorious to the country, let them, with a calmer but not less sincere pleasure, glance for a moment at some circumstances in our domestic policy. He would touch first upon the New Poor-law; it was another instance among the many where the first bias of public estimation had been in error. That wild hawk, popular opinion, which so often skims the political field of imaginary blessings, and stops to plume on surface legislation, was here again false in her pitch of judgment. At first the law, among those for whom it was made, was decidedly unpopular; and as if to render it more so, in many instances rude, and unintelligent, and unfit men were often the leading instruments in carrying forth its provisions. He would here quote an instance which came under his notice, in a parish in or near which he was at that time resident. An old man and woman, who, if his memory served him, were between seventy and eighty years of age, and who were merely in want, on account of the debts of those who in rank were their superiors, were refused relief unless they would enter the poor-house: out-door relief was denied them, fit as they were to receive it. They had, in the whole course of their honest lives, never been in a poor-house, and they would have starved rather than have submitted to what they had in the first instance been taught, and in the last clamoured to regard, as a degradation. The law began by being unpopular. It was such acts as these that continued to engender dislike to it, but now that its provisions had been fairly tried, let them look at the result. The poor, in well managed counties, now began to feel the advantages of the law; he spoke from a direct knowledge of his own county, as well as on information from others; and in place of regarding its provisions with horror—instead of shunning the poor-house, they presented themselves willingly to seek its shelter and protection. There existed not a doubt, that the Poor-law Amendment Act was progressing most satisfactorily. In his own county, and, locally speaking even, where the poor were always well managed, the act was of infinite service. The rates there had been reduced on an average of twenty per cent., from the average taken of the three years preceding the formation of the union. By this, he meant the amount paid for relief. At the formation of that union in 1836, the number of ablebodied paupers receiving relief were 847, and on the 15th of January, 1841, that number was reduced to twenty-six. But he would not tire the House with notes he had made from facts undoubted, but this New Poor-law was a subject that would carry congratulation with it, and as such he freely offered it to the House. Again, let them look at the peaceable state of the great manufacturing districts, and of the agricultural population and the masses of the people. In spite of letters from "the Felon Cell," calling for, praying for, and endeavouring to stir up insubordinate assemblages, cloaked as such addresses usually were with a flimsy garb of a recommendation to abstain from "drunkenness and riot"—a mere subterfuge against personal responsibility—we find that "Manchester and every town in Lancashire and Yorkshire" have scarce been moved; and that generally throughout the kingdom the great masses of the people have begun to show an apter disposition to reflect upon the consequence of things, and to blush at the absurdity of the Chartist cry. He might fairly say, that the deceptive snow-ball of the Chartists, rolled in the first instance by a disaffected few, who, like thieves in the crowd, had little to lose by riot, but everything to gain by general confusion, had been, and was melting away before the measures of her Majesty's Ministers and the re-awakened sense of the majority of the people. The blessings of the agriculturist throve upon his farm; his home was beyond the reach of want; the incendiary was forgotten; and the day-labourer returned in comfort to his cottage. He, perhaps, should ask pardon for having trespassed thus upon the House; but a sense of duty—a feeling of gratitude to the Government he had so often supported, and on certain occasions as freely opposed, had led him into some discussion. He would now hope, that as her Majesty's Ministers had proved that they had successfully cultivated and used the art of war, that they would in time to come as sedulously cherish the greater blessings of peace and the resources placed at their command, widely and generally extending such civil and religious benefits as might prove treasures to mankind, whatever were their station, state, their creed, or colour. Impressed with the propriety of the Address his noble Friend had moved, elated as the House should be with glorious reasons for congratulation of the most domestic as well as of the most national description, let him beseech them to join with him in the declaration, that under such circumstances as their foreign and domestic policy offered, and at such a thrice-happy period as this, when, for reasons dear to the heart of the highest and lowest subject in the realm, all should be concord, sunshine, and uninterrupted harmony around the Throne, they could not but join unanimously in an address expressive of their loyalty and affection, and of their deep sense of gratitude that, under Divine Providence, the British policy had prospered.

Mr. Grote

In offering to the House a few remarks on the Address which has been proposed for our adoption, I shall not think it necessary to examine in detail the Speech which has been read from the Throne, nor to touch upon all or even most of the topics which it brings before us. The Speech, taken as a whole, is not very rich in promises; it presents to us the Sketch of a Session as blank in prospect as the last Session was in reality. But there is, among the public matters adverted to in the Speech, one eminent above the rest in interest and importance, which has excited men's minds and stimulated discussion to an unprecedented extent within the last seven months—I mean the expedition sent against Mehemet Ali in Syria, together with its causes and its consequences. On that topic I beg to trouble the House with some remarks; and, in approaching the subject, it is my first duty to say, that I thoroughly agree with what has been stated by the noble Mover of the Address, as well as in the Speech itself, in commendation of the gallantry, the efficiency, the naval skill and precision of our armament in its operations on the Syrian coast. But though I perfectly concur with the noble Lord in applauding the military conduct and merits of our officers and seamen, I cannot equally concur with him in commending the spirit in which the expedition was conceived, or the purpose which it was intended to accomplish. I cannot forget, that we have been exerting our force against persons with whom we have not the slenderest ground of quarrel. Neither Mehemet Ali nor his supporters, nor any other person in Syria has done the least injury to English men or to English interests. We have no complaints to redress—no injuries to avenge—no cause for anger or displeasure against any one. Nay, in so far as we and the other Christian nations of Europe are concerned, it stands on record, that we have been unquestionable gainers by the government of the Pacha in Syria. Whether his government may have proved comparatively better or comparatively worse than the Turkish rule which preceded it, for the Mussulmen of Syria, there is indisputable evidence that the Christians of Syria have been much better dealt with under the Pacha's government than ever they were before. The trade of Europeans generally, and of the English especially, with Syria, has been largely augmented since the beginning of the Pacha's rule in 1833; the number of established English merchants has multiplied, and the Christian inhabitants of the Syrian towns enjoy juster dealing in respect to their property, more extended civil rights, and firmer protection against Mussulman fanatics, than the previous Turkish government afforded to them. If, then, we have attacked and expelled Mehemet Ali without any of the ordinary and universally recognised motives to war, on what ground is the expedition to be justified? We are told, that the expedition was undertaken for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the Ottoman empire, and of maintaining the independence and integrity of that empire under its present dynasty, a guarantee to such effect having been given to the Sultan by the five great Powers of Europe on the 27th of July, J839. The treaty of last July, and the execution of that treaty by the recent expedition, is set forth as a particular case coining under the general guarantee. To me, I confess, that this reason appears neither sufficient nor satisfactory. I dispute the wisdom and justice of the expedition: I dispute still more the wisdom and justice of the guarantee out of which the expedition is said to have grown. I will for the present put aside the proclaimed repugnance of the French to the treaty of the 15th of July, and the grave perils with which their repugnance has been accompanied. I will suppose France acquiescent, and I shall still contend, that our enterprise against Mehemet Ali is one which ought not to have been undertaken. There are two ways in which the note of the 27th July, 1839, pledging the five Powers to maintain the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire under its present dynasty, may be understood; there are two classes of dangers against which it may be supposed to guard. Either it may be considered as a covenant, on the part of the five Powers, each with the other, and all together with the Sultan, to abstain simply from any encroachment on the Porte, open or insidious, and to leave all the rights and territories of the Porte unimpaired, so far as foreigners are concerned; or it may be considered in a larger sense, as a bond on the part of the five Powers to secure absolutely to the Sultan and to his successors, the Turkish empire as it now stands, entire and undiminished—to guarantee him and his successors, not merely from external attack, but from all internal revolt or disruption of their empire—to guarantee them by armed interference on the part of foreigners, against all organised disobedience, and all attempt at self-emancipation on the part of any person in their dominions. The agreement of the 27th of July, 1839, I say, admits of being construed in either of these two senses. Construed in the first sense, I find nothing whatever to blame in it. It conveys a public pledge that none of the five Powers will take advantage of the distress of a neighbour; a pledge not altogether unreasonable, since some of them had been suspected of harbouring aggressive designs. But construed in the second or larger sense—and this larger sense has now been given to it by the treaty of last July and by our Syrian expedition—it seems to me to open a scheme of policy objectionable in every way—uncalled for, impolitic, indefinite in point of extent, and indefensible on any correct view of international obligation. I hope Gentlemen will not be displeased if I ask them, whether they have fully reviewed the extent of consequences implied in this obligation to guarantee the Turkish empire both against invasion from without, and also against all internal causes of revolt or dismemberment? Have they studied the past course of Turkish history, so as to understand the real character and working of that government to which they are thus lending forced and artificial perpetuity? Are they aware that the quarrels of Pachas one with another, and the disobedience of Pachas towards the Porte, are almost a part of the order of nature in the Ottoman empire; and are they still prepared to promise constant armed interfererence in support of the internal authority of the Sultan? But we often hear it maintained, that it is proper for us to act as armed protectors of the Turkish empire, in consequence of considerations connected with Russia. It is often contended that we ought to interfere—not on the ground of obligation towards the Sultan—still less on the ground of any expected benefit to ourselves—but in order to defeat the views of the Emperor Nicholas, who will interfere if we do not, and who will thereby be enabled to further his own ambitious designs upon Constantinople. This argument implies a tacit assumption, which, when openly announced, will appear both startling to the ear, and inadmissible to reason. It implies, that wishing to obstruct certain aggressive designs which Russia is insidiously pursuing against Turkey, you have no other preventive means to employ, except that of outbidding Russia in offers of service to the Sultan. It implies, that if Russia places a certain number of troops at the disposal of the Sultan, or proposes to execute for him any given business, you must make a similar tender: if she increases her bidding, you must increase yours also; above all things you must take care that she shall not get the benefit of the job. So that whatever service Russia may propose to render, having sinister motives to stimulate her in the duty, you, who have no sinister motives, must propose to do likewise, for the sole and exclusive purpose of disappointing her and shutting her out. I think the mere plain statement of this argument is enough to prove how little it ought to guide our conclusions. It is an argument which degrades our foreign policy into a blind sequacity and imitation of Russia—it is an argument which involves the most exaggerated apprehension of Russia, but which, nevertheless presents to you no securities against Russian ambition, except such as are both the most troublesome, the most costly, and the least effectual. Certainly, if the only method, which we possess of excluding the Emperor Nicholas from Constantinople, is to keep constantly a-head of him in devoted offers to the Sultan, our chance of success is but slender. He will be quite sure to tire us out in the competition. The eager appetite and never-ceasing importunity of an ambitious aggressor will infallibly triumph over the languor and slackness of mere disinterested precaution. If we are to assume, as a point conceded, that it is a vital and primary object with England to shut out Russia from Constantinople, it is fortunate that we possess rather more powerful machinery for doing so than the chance of outbidding the Emperor Nicholas in his offers of troops to the Divan. Depend upon it, the real security against the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia consists in the direct terror of your arms. Your fleets and your armies, ready to be employed in the way of direct prevention, form a guarantee both very notorious and very sufficient. So long as the Russian Emperor knows that he will not be permitted either by England or by France to hold Constantinople, so long will he abstain from attempting it. I contend, that this proposition of giving guarantees to the Sultan, not because such guarantees are proper in themselves, but because Russia will give them if we do not, is a proposition neither consistent with honour nor with policy. It carries us we know not whither, and after all it furnishes no effectual security against that which we desire to prevent. But in so far as concerns our Syrian expedition, it surely requires no very long-drawn deduction to prove that we have acquired thereby no increased securities against Russian ambition. Why, Russia is herself the grand projector of the enterprise. We are taking securities against Russian aggrandisement, at the instance and with the co-operation of Russia herself. We are consulting the very party whom we suspect of entertaining thievish designs, as to the best means of locking up and preserving our treasure. I have always understood that Count Brunow, the Russian negotiator, with whom this treaty originated, is a man of distinguished sagacity; at any rate, no one has ever imputed to him suicidal perverseness or stupidity; and unless you suppose, that he is thus ruining his own harvest, one of two things must be true—either Russia has no aggressive designs against Turkey, in which case precautions on our part are superfluous, and we have no motive for intermeddling, or else Russia has aggressive designs, but such as admit of being executed as well, or better, after the expulsion of the Pacha from Syria as before it. Choose which of these alternatives you will, the conduct of Russia herself is the best possible evidence that your Syrian proceedings are no way calculated to arrest the progress of Russian aggression, if any such aggression be really contemplated. We may escape, and I fervently trust that we shall escape, the present and terrible reality of a European war; but we have been hurried on to the verge of such a calamity, and even the premonitory symptoms and harbingers of war are full of serious and actual mischief. We hear of almost all Europe being placed upon an enlarged military establishment, and upon a footing of what has been called armed peace. This, of itself, is no light mischief; but the feelings in which it originates—the hostile tendencies which it foments and multiplies—the uncertainties of the future, which check all permanent outlay and long-sighted calculation—the transformation of friends and well-wishers into angry accusers and recriminants—the dreams of conquest which inflame men's minds in one quarter, and the anxious apprehensions which beset them in another—all these phenomena, overspreading and tainting the moral atmosphere of Europe, are mischiefs of a still more enduring character. I confess, that this contrast between the beginning and the end of 1840 smites me with the deepest sorrow. Entertaining as I do, a lofty opinion of the French nation collectively, as placed in the front rank, both of European civilization and constitutional government—profoundly admiring the glorious names which they have furnished in every department of human genius and excellence—I consider the rupture of the good understanding between England and France as a signal calamity for both. And I deplore it the more, when I recollect, that the initial cause of so fatal a change—the tropical point from which the sun of peace began to avert his cheering rays from the latitude of Europe, is to be found in the treaty signed by the noble Secretary last July, and in our Syrian expedition which has followed it. Now I would entreat the House calmly to consider what benefit we have acquired by our treaty, and by our Syrian expedition, such as are at all fit to counterbalance the manifold evils arising out of this revival of the feelings of 1815, and this disruption of the European brotherhood? The noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs professes to have settled the Eastern question. Grant him this. Does the House recollect what he has unsettled? Why, he has unsettled a thing of far more terrific import and magnitude—the relations of the great and powerful kingdom of France, numbering her 34,000,000 of compact and energetic population, big with exuberant force and dangerous recollections—he has unsettled all the relations of France with the remaining portions of Europe. He has cured, or he professes to have cured, a distemper in the extremities of our continent; but the very medicine which he has employed has driven the distemper violently into the heart and vitals. He has awakened a thousand slumbering elements of evil in the sensitive and tremulous regions of central Europe—elements which were before buried in the depth of men's bosoms, and overlaid by kindly sympathies as well as by enlightened calculation—elements which, when once aroused, are but too fearfully infectious, and traverse from land to land with the rapidity of an epidemic disorder. Against such risks and mischiefs is it a sufficient consolation to hear that what the Turks call order reigns in Syria, and that we have overreached Russia by executing a Russian plan of campaign? I deny, that there were any mischiefs so intolerable, or any dangers so imminent in the state of things as it existed at the beginning of last July, as to constitute a case of imperious necessity, and to call upon the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department, to force forward a new settlement at all or any hazard. And the House will recollect, that the state of the Ottoman empire, until the very moment when the noble Lord signed the Quadruple Treaty, was still conformable to a previous settlement which had been made in 1833—I mean the convention of Kutayah. Now to this settlement, made in 1833, the noble Lord was himself a consenting party. He officially announced to Parliament, in the Speech from the Throne, at the beginning of the Session of 1834, that a settlement had been made of the Ottoman empire, and that he hoped that that settlement would continue undisturbed. Nay more, the noble Lord, in a speech which he delivered in this House on the 17th of March, 1834, told the House. That the communications made by the British Government to the Pacha of Egypt, and to Ibrahim Pacha, did materially contribute to bring about that arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha by which the war was terminated. Here, then, was a settlement, the convention of Kutayah, which the noble Lord formally acknowledged, and which he had even in part contributed to bring about. How came it that this settlement did not stand, and by whom was it subverted? As far as Mehemet Ali is concerned, the settlement of Kutayah has never been violated: the Pacha held in 1840 the same territory which that convention had allotted to him, without any subsequent increase. The Sultan tried to violate the convention in 1839, but was defeated at the battle of Nezib. What the Sultan vainly tried to do with his own forces in 1839, the noble Lord has done for him in 1840. The Anglo-Syrian expedition was the first direct, avowed, effectual rupture of the settlement of Kutayah; and if the noble Lord has accomplished a new settlement of the Ottoman empire, he has, at the same time forcibly abrogated a preexisting settlement, to which he had himself assented. Will the new settlement be lasting? It may undoubtedly last while the noble Lord shall hold the irresistible force of Britain ready to prevent any violation of it, and so long as our ambassador at Constantinople shall be sincerely bent on upholding it. And give me leave to say that, under the same conditions, the convention of Kutayah would have been lasting and inviolate also, and our Syrian expedition would have been unnecessary. If, then, I could admit the premises which are commonly taken as the ground of reasoning upon this question—if I could admit, that the internal unity of the Ottoman empire was an object which England was bound to maintain by force of arms, I should still be compelled to deny, that the noble Lord had taken the easiest and the most unexceptionable means for such an object. Having once adopted the settlement of Kutayah, he was bound to assist in the maintenance of it, by all reasonable means in his power. If he had been only determined seriously to maintain it, we might have been spared both the costs and the hazards of our Syrian expedition, and the rupture of our alliance with France. But if the noble Lord chose to become himself the direct agent in subverting the settlement of Kutayah, and in imposing upon the Otto man world a new settlement conformable to his own ideas, I contend, that he was bound by every consideration to see that this new settlement should be such as not to raise any special ground of quarrel and disunion among the great powers of Europe. This was the cardinal point—the great and primary requisite—the absence of which no intrinsic merits in the plan of settlement itself could possibly redeem. How far the treaty of July has fulfilled this condition, let the events of the last six months testify. Such would be my reasoning in respect to the treaty of July, even if I acquiesced in the principle, that the internal arrangement and unity of the Ottoman empire was a matter which the English Government ought to maintain and guarantee by force. But in this I do not acquiesce. If the Turkish empire be disturbed by intestine dissensions, it may be right that we should interpose as far as we can by amicable mediation and good offices, and that we should try to reconcile and bring to harmony contending parties. But that we should go beyond this limit; that we should undertake to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire, both against foreign invaders and against itself and its own internal causes of disruption; that we should hold ourselves ready to crush any Pacha who may choose to resist the Sultan's orders, or who may appear likely to declare himself independent; that we should spend the blood and treasure of the English people, in providing factitious cement and cohesion for that disorderly mass which nature has in all ages denied to it—against this, I say, I record my deliberate protest, as well as against our recent expedition to subdue Mehemet Ali, which embodies this principle in conspicuous and formidable meaning. As I feel strongly on the subject of our Syrian expedition and its results, I have been tempted to trouble the House at greater length than I could have wished, and I have but one word more to add. If, in respect to our internal affairs, we are destined to obtain no farther progress or improvement—if the cold shadows of finality have at length closed in around us, and intercepted all visions of a brighter future—if the glowing hopes once associated with the Reform Ministry and the Reformed Parliament have perished like an exploded bubble, at least, in regard to our foreign affairs, let us preserve from shipwreck that which is the first of all blessings and necessities; that which was bequeathed to us by the anti-reform ministry and the unreformed Parliament—I mean peace and accord with the leading nations of Europe generally, but especially with our nearest, and greatest neighbour, France. The painful conviction forces itself upon me that this peace and accord have already been fearfully endangered by the treaty of July last, and that it must be altogether destroyed if the noble Secretary shall on future occasions take the same measure of our foreign relations and foreign obligations as he has clone during the last autumn, I see in the signature and execution of our treaty of July, interests the nearest, the most valuable, and the most comprehensive, gratuitously put to hazard for the sake of objects not only petty and remote, but lying out of the sphere of our legitimate action, and therefore, I cannot concur in any address which speaks of the policy of our Syrian expedition either in terms of praise or even in terms of acquiescence.

Mr. James

considered, that although the hon. Gentleman had spoken at great length against the policy of her Majesty's Government in foreign affairs, he had nevertheless failed to advance any solid arguments in support of his censure. The hon. Member had accused the noble Lord of breaking up the French alliance for inadequate reasons, but he could not concur in that view of the course pursued by the noble Lord. The foreign policy of the present Government had proved itself a sound policy by its results; indeed, no better course could have been pursued. The noble Lord enjoyed not only the approving testimony of his own conscience, but he believed of nearly every Member of that House, as well as of the great majority of the people of England, and, perhaps, of nine-tenths of the inhabitants of civilized Europe. He knew, that in some quarters it was said, that the present Administration were weak, inefficient, and incapable of conducting the affairs of the country, either domestic or foreign. He could net see the justice of that remark. If her Majesty's Ministers were to be considered as being correctly described in the terms he had just repeated, with respect to our foreign policy, they were, then, beyond all question and experience, the most lucky set of Ministers that England ever possessed; for their foreign policy had been most successful and brilliant in its results, and he very much doubled if ever any Ministry had in so short a space of time so ably vindicated our national honour and established our national interests. It was no business of his to support her Majesty's Government. But he had felt so strongly in favour of their foreign policy, that he was induced to trespass on the attention of the House to make these few remarks, and to say, that he acquiesced most cordially in the address, and that he congratulated her Majesty and the country, that the present Ministers were still in office, and he hoped they would long continue to be so. He thought it not at all improbable, that if the hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House had been in office, or if the hon. Member for London had been Foreign Secretary, instead of that little war to which some people objected, and the recent glorious events of 1840, we should have been involved in all the horrors and fury of a bloody, continental, large war.

Lord John Russell

said: After the objections that have been made by the hon. Member for London to the course of foreign policy that has been pursued by her Majesty's Government, I think it necessary to state my views of that policy, and to explain the grounds upon which I approve of that policy. I feel confident with regard to any and every objection, that may be further urged against the foreign policy of the Ministers, from whatever quarter it may come, my noble Friend, the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department is, and will be, now, and at any future period, perfectly ready to give the fullest explanation to Parliament, of the grounds upon which the Government are ready to defend their conduct with regard to that policy. Her Majesty, at the commencement of last Session, informed this House that the great powers of Europe had been unanimous in arresting the hostilities which had taken place in the Levant, and expressed a hope, that the same unanimity would continue, and would lead to a final settlement in such a manner as would maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, and give additional security to the peace of Europe. With regard to the object which her Majesty declared we had in view—to the great object, I say, in which this House declared their concurrence in their address, namely, to uphold the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, and, by the settlement of the affairs of the Levant, to give fresh security for the peace of Europe; to these views the policy of her Majesty's Government has been directed; from that object they have never swerved; and I trust I shall be able to show, that the course they have pursued was the best course, and perhaps, I may add, the only course conducive to that end. Sir, I am relieved from the necessity of argument as to the great importance of the object in view, both by the general concurrence of this House not only in the Address of last year, but in the course of many years past. I am relieved likewise from the necessity of so arguing by the admission of the hon. Member for London, who, although he has said he would have attained the object by different means, yet conceives the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire to be a measure of the highest importance. The hon. Member for London says he would have taken different means. I, perhaps, may make one general remark before I enter upon the discussion of this topic, because I believe it goes to the bottom of the difference between the hon. Member and myself—a difference which he has stated with his usual perspicuity, while informing the House in what manner he thought a pacific policy ought to be pursued. It seems to be the opinion of the hon. Member that the peace of Europe would be best attained by interfering as little as possible with the general affairs of the continent, but using, when necessary, the terror of the fleets and armies of the empire. I differ from the hon. Gentleman. I say that by alliance with those powers of Europe, so much interested in the preservation of the balance of power by continual and vigilant attention to the events which from time to time arise affecting that balance—you only can succeed in maintaining that peace and preserving that balance. I conceive this to be the case, so far as regards the general reasoning upon the matter. If you look to the course of perhaps the most pacific Minister that ever guided the destinies of this empire—I mean Sir Robert Walpole—you will observe that, so far from being inactive, so far from being inattentive to the course of events, he was ever vigilant and watchful, ever taking part in treaties, and throwing the balance of power from one state to another, as the case might be, and in one year alone he fitted out a fleet of twenty-five sail-of-the-line. So much, then, for the general course which the Government of this country has pursued. I will now proceed to consider the particular case in question, although I may perhaps have to argue it again. I will take the case as put by the hon. Member for London, and then I will ask, whether his policy would tend most to the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the balance of power. The hon. Member would not have interfered in Syria, he would not have given an opinion with respect to Mehemet Ali; but in case of the Pacha attempting to obtain preponderance in Turkey, and to obtain influence at Constantinople, then, as I understand the hon. Member, he would have used the terror of our fleets and armies to deter the Pacha from the continuance of such attempts. Let me suppose a case conformable to this policy of the hon. Member for London. Suppose, then, when called upon for aid by Turkey, we said, "We mean to give you no assistance;" suppose we had said, with respect to this question, "We think that it is not one upon which it is incumbent on England to express an opinion," and then, driven back by our resolution not to assist him, the Sultan had looked to Russia alone for succour. Suppose, then, that Russia, yielding to temptation, had taken the measures which, with the large fleets and armies at her disposal, she was able to take—suppose her ambition had increased with our inertness—her projects of dominion had risen with our want of energy—is it to be said that the terror of our fleets and armies alone would have been able to arrest her progress? I will ask whether a peremptory summons on the part of England would then have been of great avail? If, then, you had taken the course of amicable discussion, and had thus attempted to ward off a war, as suggested by the hon. Gentleman, would the attempt have succeeded? I say the policy of the hon. Gentleman would have been almost certain to produce the war which he has deprecated. I will admit to the hon. Member, that we are not, when the Pacha of Albania, or of any other province of the Turkish empire, may become disobedient and rebellious to the Sultan, or that when the Sultan may say to us; that he finds his authority in Syria resisted by tribes of mountaineers—in such a case, I say, we are not to resort to arms as the means by which the inconvenience is to be remedied. I admit that to the hon. Member; but the fault of the hon. Member's argument is, that he supposes all cases to be alike—he makes no distinction between them, but says you are to lay down a mathematical rule generally applicable to all, and from which you are not to deviate under any circumstances. The hon. Member says, that because the course adopted in the present case has been taken, we are consequently to support the Sultan against every rebellious Pacha in his dominions. But is it to be said, that when an empire is in convulsion—a powerful and triumphant pacha shaking off the authority of his sovereign, and even aiming at the mastery—at a time when war is hover- ing over Europe—with such indications as these, is it to be said that we are to look calmly on, and not interfere. The hon. Member for London says there must be an undeviating rule applicable to all these cases. I deny it. It is not in the nature of human affairs, that there should be such an universal, unalterable rule. You must take cases as they rise; you must view circumstances as they are in existence, and upon those circumstances you must judge what course is best for the preservation of the peace of Europe, and the honour and dignity of the Crown. Then, what has been the case in the present instance? The war which ended with the treaty of Adrianople had greatly weakened the power of the Turkish empire. The Sultan, whom we had always expressed ourselves ready to befriend, continually urged upon the British ambassador, that the danger to him did not only arise from European powers—he said it was necessary for him to have protection against his own vassal—from England if she would grant it, or from Russia if she would afford it to him—but protection he must have against a vassal of his own who was growing too strong for him, and whose means and resources were increasing every day. A contest took place, in which that Pacha still increased his power, and threatened more nearly and more deeply the stability of the Turkish empire. On one of those occasions the forces of the Sultan were defeated at the battle of Nezib. The Sultan asked for the assistance of this country. Russia granted him that assistance, and Russia, as I think, most imprudently for her own interest, but not unnaturally as regarded her position, obtained peculiar advantages for herself by the treaty of Unkiar 'Skelessi. True, this did not substantially increase the power of Russia, yet it was a general warning to Europe, that if that treaty was to be followed up by acts—if it was to be followed up by other treaties, and other supports—it would establish an exclusive protectorate on the part of Russia over Turkey. Such was the view taken by the king's government, and that government did not hesitate to say to the government of Russia, that that was a treaty which England could not consider as forming a part of the law of Europe, and that England would in future consider herself at liberty to act as if that treaty was not in existence. The same course was followed with France. I forget at this moment what was the course taken with the go- vernment of Austria. This, Sir, was not a safe condition for Europe to be in. There were no Russian troops in the capital of Turkey; but such dangers might at any time have arisen as to all for their presence there; and it could not be said that the peace of Europe was safe so long as affairs were in that state as related to powers like Russia and Turkey on the one part, and Russia and England on the other. The Sultan died, and there were no hands which could assume with the same vigour the reins of government. Mehemet Ali was then in the position which my noble Friend so clearly describes in his note of the 31st August. Hon. Members will see in that note the opinion held by her Majesty's Government on the position of Mehemet Ali, possessed of Egypt and Syria, with both military and naval forces disproportionate to his station, and beyond that point which this Government considered it natural he should support—with a position threatening Bagdad, on the one hand, and the Sultan on the other. In that note also was mentioned the intention of Mehemet Ali to render himself independent of the Sultan. I will ask, did not this position threaten the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire? But there is still more. I will take the statement I am about to make, not from the note of my noble Friend, but from a French minister, one of the ministry called the ministry of the 12th of May, which was in power at the time when these events took place. Propositions had been made to Mehemet Ali by the Sultan, but they were such propositions as might have been expected to be made by a young sovereign, whose power had been weakened. M. Passy said, that those propositions were rejected. Mehemet Ali demanded possession of all he occupied. But he did not stop there; he demanded the dismissal of the Grand Vizier, whom he considered his personal enemy. He addressed letters to the other pachas of the empire, inviting them to join him, and to proclaim, like him, their independence. I ask, was not this threatening the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire? M. Passy also said, that he had intelligence that Mehemet Ali endeavoured to promote tumults and insurrections in Constantinople, and among those facts there were some others which his present position prevented M. Passy from revealing. This, Sir, is the statement of a French Minister—one favourable to Mehemet Ali; this is his account of the position of the Pacha. That, not being satisfied with the great power he possessed in Egypt and Syria, he invited the neighbouring pachas to rebel against the Sultan—that he was carrying on these dangerous projects—that what he wished to establish was not only influence, but power in the heart of the Turkish empire. We might, indeed, say, that this is a matter remote from our interests—that Mehemet Ali might be as good a sovereign as the Sultan. But there is one little circumstance which I beg the hon. Member to consider. It is this: that the Emperor of Russia might take no such view. That sovereign might say, I have a treaty with the lawful Sultan of Turkey; or the Emperor of Austria might say the same; and that the maintenance of those treaties was their interest as well as duty. Foreign troops, Russian or Austrian, would then have occupied Constantinople, and, in point of fact, there must have been war raging in the east, such a contest as might be expected to be carried on between two such powers as Russia on the one hand, and the Sultan on the other—such a contest as it would have been impossible for Great Britain to look on, forgetful of all her treaties, all her alliances, all her declarations in favour of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire. If, indeed, she could have been so neglectful, so unmindful of her duties, she would have been obliged at last to interfere, and would ultimately have been brought into a war, amid all those evils which it is the pacific policy of the hon. Member for London to avoid. The ambassadors of the great powers declared at Constantinople, that it was the wish of the sovereigns they represented, that the Sultan should not conclude a separate settlement with Mehemet Ali, but should wait the result of their views, after they had consulted as to the best course to be pursued. As I have stated what I think was the interest of England, and as I have stated the views of a French minister with regard to the projects of Mehemet Ali, I will now quote the opinion of the Government of France of that day, and I think the letter will show that the Government of France took the same view as the Government of England did—namely, that the first object was the general preservation of the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. The noble Lord read the following extract from a letter addressed by the French Minister of Fo- reign Affairs, M. Passy, to the government of Austria. In a communication made on the 25th of September to the Cabinet of Vienna, of a plan of arrangement; the Cabinet of May 12th said, that it was thus necessary to protect Mehemet Ali. No peculiar predilection animates us in favour of the Egyptian power. We certainly should not see without some regret the extraordinary work of Mehemet Ali overturned, and which, in the midst of numerous imperfections, contains undoubtedly, the germs of numerous improvements; but our faith in the duration of this work is not stable enough to induce us to think of causing it to form the base of a political system. We much rather believe, that at an epoch more or less distant, the vast provinces now under the power of the Viceroy, are destined to return under the immediate rule of the Sultan, and that the Ottoman Empire, notwithstanding its present fallen state of power, is still destined to outlive the establishment of Mehemet Ali, to absorb it, even, some day—because bound up with that fallen state, there remains, in its antiquity, in that religious character peculiarly attached to the Ottoman dynasty, in the resemblance of ideas, and of oriental institutions, a moral force which belongs only to itself. In thus looking forward to an occurrence which we do not fear or desire, but in respect to which it appears to us wise to regulate our policy, because it is probable, we think certainly that we should take into very serious consideration, the means of giving as much stability as possible to an empire, destined according to appearance, to remain for a long time one of the principal elements of a political equilibrium. This was the view of the government then existing in France, and it certainly shows an approximation to the views at that time entertained by the other great powers of Europe. [Mr. D'Israeli: In what year was this view expressed?] It was in the year 1839. I believe it is unnecessary that I should now state what took place with regard to the collective note signed by the representatives of the great European powers at Constantinople. After the signing of that note, it became necessary, that the great powers should come to some immediate understanding as to what should be done in consequence of it, and to that end it was not only desirable, but imperative, that a conference should be held. The communication I have just read was a communication which was stated in the French Chamber of Deputies to have been made by the French government to the government of Austria. About the time that this communication was made by France to Austria, the pre- sent Russian ambassador, M. Brunow, arrived in this country with propositions upon the same subject. Those propositions were stated by him to my noble Friend, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. My noble Friend, so far from desiring to make any separate agreement—so far from desiring to disunite this country from the alliance with France, which we have always endeavoured to maintain as one of the securities for the peace of Europe—so far from wishing to make any such arrangement, the first thing that my noble Friend did was to communicate the propositions in the same terms as those in which he had received them, without stating his own decision, much less the decision of her Majesty's Government, upon them, to the French ambassador, by whom they were immediately transmitted to the French government. The answer made by the French government has already been quoted in the course of the discussion of this evening. It appears from what has since been stated, that the French government at that time supposed, that the Government of this country were disposed to agree with the propositions made to them, and that they had submitted an alternative, which had not before occurred to them, with regard to the entrance of the combined fleets into the Dardanelles. That, however, is an error in the statement of the French minister, for, whilst such was the opinion of the French government, the opinion of the Government of England was always formed—that if these operations were to take place—if Mehemet Ali was to be confined within certain defined limits—if one of the powers of Europe should attempt to take possession of Constantinople, then an English and French fleet should enter the Dardanelles. That was the opinion of the English Government, and had the overture been at once rejected by Russia, there would have been an end to all negotiation with that power upon the subject. The Emperor of Russia, however, most wisely for the interests of his own empire, most fortunately for the peace of Europe, was disposed not to continue in that separate course of policy out of which much of the danger that threatened the integrity of the Turkish empire, and the peace of Europe had arisen, but was ready to co-operate with the other powers of Europe, with-England, with France, with Austria, and with Prussia, for the purpose of making a final arrangement of the Eastern ques- tion. And I must say, that whatever the former projects of Russia may have been, or whatever, at some future time, may be the intentions of so great a military power, the conduct of the Emperor throughout the whole of the negotiations upon this subject had been marked by the most perfect good faith, and by a sincere and earnest desire to co-operate with the other powers of Europe in such a way as to make the events in the east an occasion for settling on a firm and secure basis the peace of the Levant. There was no reason that I know of to suppose that the government of France would refuse to be a party to such arrangement. When I say there was no reason, I mean that there was no reason that I know of, either in the interests of France, in the general language which the government of France had held with respect to the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, nor in the public declarations which France had made upon the subject, that could induce us to suppose that she would refuse to become a party to the arrangement. There was, therefore, reason to hope that, in the course of the negotiations which would necessarily take place prior to a final settlement of the question, any difference of opinion that France might entertain as to the portions of Syria which should be left to the Egyptian would have yielded to the general opinion, whatever that opinion might be, of the other opinions of Europe. If that opinion had been less favourable to the views of my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs than it turned out to be—if Russia, Austria, and Prussia had been inclined to give a greater portion of Syria to Mehemet Ali than my noble Friend was disposed to give, I do not believe that we should have dissented from that opinion. But What I am quite sure of is, that if we had found it necessary to dissent from the decision of the other powers—if we thought that the arrangement was not sufficiently secure, not sufficiently advantageous to the Sultan, we should never have thought that that difference of opinion with the great powers of Europe would at all have justified us in complaining of insult and injury; and still less have justified us in demanding of this House and advising our Sovereign to increase to an enormous extent the armaments of the kingdom. Therefore, when the hon. Member for London says, that it is a misfortune that there is an estrangement between France and this country, I entirely agree with, him in lamenting that occurrence; when he says that every effort ought to have been made to induce France to combine in the general arrangement proposed by the other powers of Europe, I entirely concur with him; but I cannot agree with him when he says, that the blame of producing the estrangement ought to be visited upon the Government of this country. So far from that being the case, I maintain that the blame properly and justly belongs to that Government which not only differed in opinion from all the other powers, but endeavoured to make the difference national, by appealing to the passions of the people, and threatened the peace of Europe by the preparation of vast armaments. I should rather say, that the blame of the estrangement belonged to France for the course of policy she adopted at the time that the treaty of July took place. I shall not think it necessary to quote more than a very few words of what occurred whilst the negotiations were going on; and those few words will be taken from a despatch and a letter which had been given to the world in the discussions in the French Chambers, and which were addressed by M. Guizot, the French ambassador in this country, to the government of France. It appears, that whilst the negotiations were going on from October, 1839, to July, 1840, every effort was made by my noble Friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in concert with the government of Austria, which was most earnest upon the subject, to devise some arrangement, which, securing the integrity and independence of Turkey, should still be of such a nature as to admit of the concurrence of France. It appears, also, from the papers to which I am now about to refer, that, whilst all this was going on, the French ambassador in this country foresaw that if no approximation were made by the French government to the views of the rest of the powers, it was likely that the negotiations would end in the separation of France. It appears, that on the 17th of March. M. Guizot wrote to the Foreign Minister of France as follows:— But it may likewise happen, that matters may be hastened, and that we may soon find ourselves obliged to take a decision. If that happens, the alternative in which we shall be placed, will be this,—Either to agree with England, acting with her in the question of Constantinople, and obtaining from her in the question of Syria concessions for Mehemet Ali—or, to withdraw from the business; allowing it to be concluded between the Four Powers, and keeping ourselves aloof, waiting for events. I do not affirm, that in this case the conclusion between the Four Powers is certain. New difficulties may arise. I only say, that this conclusion appears to me probable, and that if we do not make the attempt to bring about between us and England, upon the question of Syria, a compromise with which the Pacha may be contented, we may expect the other issue, the arrangement between four, and hold ourselves prepared. It is important that you should know the state of things and, not make for yourselves any illusion upon the probable chances. There is here, in the Cabinet, a sincere desire to maintain and to draw closer the French alliance, but, that this desire, and the prospective difficulties of execution, should outweigh the motives which drive England to seize the occasion of settling according to her own political views the questions of Constantinople and Syria, that I cannot affirm. On the day before (the 16th of March), M. Guizot wrote in a despatch:— By a singular concurrence of circumstances, Russia shows herself disposed to abandon, to adjourn, at least, not only her projects of aggrandisement, but her pretensions of an exclusive protectorate over the Ottoman Empire, and to second England in her design of weakening the Pacha of Egypt. Now, I say, that this passage proves that in the course of the negotiations there had been a manifestation of readiness on the part of Russia to abandon designs which, in this country, and in other countries of Europe, had been thought of extreme danger to the stability of peace. I maintain that that one sentence proves the advantage which had been so far gained by the negotiations which were then going on. But with regard to the position of France, M. Guizot, after saying, that he thinks time may perhaps be gained, proceeds to observe— It may also happen that events may receive a new impetus, and that we shall soon be obliged to take a decided part. If this should happen, the alternative in which we shall be placed will be this: either to act in concert with England on the question of Constantinople, and in obtaining from her, in that of Syria, some concessions for Mehemet Ali or to withdraw from the negotiation, leaving it to be conducted amongst the four powers, and holding ourselves apart to await the course of events, I do not affirm that in this case a conclusion by the four powers is certain; new difficulties may arise. I only say, that in my view such a conclusion appears probable, and that if we do not make an endeavour to bring about, between us and England, an arrangement on the Syrian question with which the Pacha ought to be satisfied, we should be prepared for the other issue, the settlement by the four powers. It is important that you should perfectly understand the state of things, and not make any false calculations on the probable chances. There is in the cabinet here a sincere desire to maintain and strengthen the alliances with France. But that, this desire, and the prospect of the difficulties in carrying it out, will outweigh the motives which urge England to seize an opportunity of settling, according to its own views of policy, the questions of Constantinople and Syria, is what I will not venture to affirm. That was the letter, written, according to his own account of it by the French ambassador, on the 16th of March, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France. From that time we never had a proposition which it seemed to us would combine these advantages. On the 17th of July my noble Friend informed the French ambassador of the conclusion of the convention; and yet the Government of France of that day assumed, that it was taken unawares—that it was taken by surprise—that England had acted injuriously to France in concluding the convention, and that no notice had been given of a disposition on the part of the Powers to determine the question independently of France. I cannot say, that I think there was any justice in this complaint. I lament the estrangement and the irritation which thereupon arose in France, because of the people of France, of a people so enlightened, of a people so gallant, of a people who have done so much service to the civilisation of Europe and of the world—of such a people, of such a nation—I cannot speak except with feelings of sincere esteem. Nor can I wonder, that when the government of France, having the direction of affairs, and knowing what had taken place, gave it to be understood that France had been insulted, that France had been injured, that France had been wounded in her honour and her interests; when such representations were made to the sensitive people of France, I cannot wonder that a great feeling of estrangement and of irritation towards this country should have taken place. This was the natural and necessary consequence of the course pursued by the French Government. Seeing how impossible it is for the general mass of a population to follow the train of negotiations, which probably extend over a considerable period of time, it is not to be wondered at that the feelings of the French people should have been aroused and inflamed when they were told by those in whom the trust of government was reposed, that the honour, the dignity, and the interest of their country had been wounded; but I do wonder—I do indeed wonder, that the government of France should have been so reckless as thus to endanger the peace of the two countries, thus wanting to increase the feeling of alienation and insecurity that had unfortunately already begun to spring up, and to give it to be understood, that there were in England feelings of hostility and estrangement towards France which never existed. In stating such observations to the House, in answer to the hon. Member for Kilkenny (Mr. Hume) at the end of the last Session of Parliament, my noble Friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, observed as strongly as it was possible for him to do, that this treaty was in no way intended against France—that no interest of France, no engagement of France, was at all affected by it—that he lamented that France was not a party to it—that the interests of this country, and he believed of Europe, required that he should take a course opposed to the views of the government of France; but, that the feelings of the English Government, and, he was persuaded, of the English people, also would continue to be as friendly towards France as ever. That was the feeling upon which this arrangement was entered upon. Why, then, was it not possible to agree with France? My opinion is, that it was impossible to agree with France, because she laid down for herself as a rule, (I cannot conceive upon what ground of French policy or French interest) that whatever Mehemet Ali positively refused to do, no menace or coercion on the part of the European powers should compel him to do. Austria having devised a plan which she thought would be acceptable to France, the French Ministry did not say, that it was a proposition injurious to France and dangerous to the peace of Europe, but took means to ascertain whether it would be acceptable to the Pacha: and when the Pacha said, that he would not agree to it, the French ministry refused to be a party to it. It appears to me, that far from attending to the honour and interests of France, the interests and dignity of that country were lowered by this kind of proceeding. When the Pacha understood, as he would be sure to understand if the policy of France were adopted, that no actual force was to be employed against him, was it not certain that he would say, in the language of the ambitious and fortunate soldier, "I will not render up an inch of my possessions, I will not yield one of the advantages I have gained by my sword—I will retain all that I have—and if the opportunity occurs I will add to my dominions as much more as I can." What other answer would be natural to the Pacha? But the part of France, as I conceive, was to look to what arrangements would be conducive to the peace of Europe—what arrangement could be adopted consistently with the views of all the great Powers—what arrangement would afford to those powers a common ground upon which all could meet, and when such an arrangement had been devised, then to say to the Pacha, "This is the arrangement that has been made by the powers, and this is the arrangement which you must accept. Therefore, in the course of these transactions I maintain that it was not the conduct of England, not the view which England took of the necessity of supporting the Sultan against the aggressions of the Pacha, which led to the estrangement and separation which I lament; but the unfortunate conduct pursued by the French government in transferring to Mehemet Ali the attachment which they had always expressed towards the Sultan and the Ottoman empire, and which induced them, in regard to every proposition, and to every arrangement proposed by the rest of Europe, to look always to what would be pleasing and acceptable at Alexandria, rather than to what would be secure and honourable at Constantinople. With respect to what took place after the signing of the treaty, I know it has been said, that propositions should again have been made to the government of France. But with what prospects of success could any propositions have been offered? From October 1829, to July 1840, we had negotiated in vain. During the whole of that long period, we had earnestly but vainly endeavoured to bring France to concur with us. The moment for carrying out the views of the powers who were parties to the treaty, appeared to be favourable. The people of Syria had risen against Mehemet Ali, and were making an effort to throw off his yoke, which they regarded as intolerable. We knew that the opinions of the French government were decidedly adverse to ours. Under these circumstances, if we had asked the French Government to sign the treaty, I think it would have produced one of two consequences: either a declaration more hostile than that made when the treaty was actually signed, or, on the other hand, a proposal to negociate—a proposal to go over the whole of the question again, and thus to have lost the whole of the year 1840, and to have obliged the powers in 1841 to come to some new arrangement upon the subject. When I read the directions given by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French ambassador in London during the time that the negociations were going on, urging him by all the means in his power to obtain time, to promote delay, to make no propositions, but to raise objections to every suggestion of the other powers, I cannot doubt, that if the consent of the French government had been asked to the treaty, there would have been some cavil about the execution of it, some difference of opinion about the precise terms which admitted of the entrance of an English fleet into the Dardanelles—some difficulty that would have exposed the peace of Europe to still further danger, and have left the settlement of the Eastern question as far off as it was in October of the year preceding. I have not made any remark as to what has happened since the conclusion of the treaty. My noble Friend (Lord Brabazon) and my hon. Friend (Mr. Grantley Berkeley), who moved and seconded the Address, have expressed their sense—a sense in which I am sure the whole of the House will participate—of the gallant conduct of the naval force of this country employed in the Levant. All the persons in the naval and military service employed in the expedition, and especially those who assisted at the siege and capture of Acre, have behaved according to the ancient reputation, and with the accustomed gallantry of Englishmen. I shall be glad if the enterprise, which was undertaken for the sake of restoring Syria to the Sultan, should have the additional effect of putting an end to the unfounded remarks and unjust imputations which of late years it has been the fashion to make, with respect to the strength and efficiency of the British navy. I ventured last year, when these objections were repeated, when the inefficiency of the navy was again and again insisted upon, I then ventured to say, that it was very difficult, when anything was in a state of profound peace, when ships of war had only to sail from one port to another, to prove that they were worthy of the ancient reputation of the British navy; but I added, that if any occasion arose, I was sure they would confound by their deeds all those who ventured to doubt their efficiency, and that they would continue, as heretofore, to maintain the glory of their country. I rejoice that that has been the case, and that the speedy success of their operations has brought us to the eve of the accomplishment of all the objects contemplated by the treaty of July. No doubt the course pursued has been attended with danger. No doubt the estrangement of France, and the view taken by the French government of the position of Mehemet Ali led to considerable panic; but in going over these affairs again, and considering the difficult courses that might have been adopted, I own I can see no course that could have been taken with less immediate danger, and certainly none that would have been more likely to lead to so satisfactory and permanent a result. We may now hope to free the Sultan from the continual dread of a vassal who for a long time has threatened him with an overgrown and formidable power. We may hope to preserve the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire with a great degree of stability, and with revived and improved intelligence. We may hope that the danger which, a few years ago, appeared to be threatening Constantinople from a foreign source will for a long period be averted. If these be the results of the policy proposed by my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston), and adopted by her Majesty's Government, I think this country will have no reason to complain of the persons in whose hands these affairs have been placed. I think the country will see that the great interests of the peace of Europe, that the great interests connected with the stability of one of the elements of the balance of power, have not been neglected, and that no consideration of ourselves has prevented us from pursuing a course, which, if attended with danger, has likewise been attended with great and important results. Before I conclude my remarks upon the subject of foreign affairs, I may, perhaps, be permitted to say, that I very much lament, that in the course of the discussions in the French Chambers, the name of a most honored friend of mine, lately deceased, has been not un-frequently referred to for the purpose of showing that there was disunion in the Cabinet of this country, as to the mode of carrying out the treaty of July. I must say, that I think the use which has been made of my noble Friend's name was a most unwarrantable liberty. I am entirely precluded from stating what were the sentiments—what the views of my noble Friend, so lately one of the Colleagues of the present Ministry; but this, at least, I may say, that all his motives were motives connected with the general peace of the world—with that kindness and benevolence which actuated his nature, and which never departed from him in any transaction in which he was engaged; that actuated by these motives, whatever views he urged—whatever policy he supported, he did so with that high sense of honour, with that unflinching integrity and independence which became a man who for a long course of years, had taken a prominent part in the political concerns of his country—who inherited, with the name, the opinions, and much of the character of Mr. Fox—who, as he was the friend of most of the distinguished men of the present day who have followed Mr. Fox, so likewise was he the representative of those great principles which were maintained by Mr. Fox, which, I think, are intimately connected with the peace, the freedom, and the welfare of mankind. Having stated thus much in vindication of the foreign policy that we have pursued, I shall not, at this moment, trespass upon the House by entering at all upon matters of domestic policy, unless it be to state generally to the hon. Member for London (Mr. Grote) that he is completely mistaken in saying that we are in every sense enemies to improvement. I assert that a continual progress in improvement with regard to all our institutions—with regard to our commercial affairs—with regard to our judicial tribunals—with regard to all matters of domestic concern, is the great principle by which we wish to abide. But, whilst I will not mistake abuses for institutions and give to the former the defence which I should give to the latter, so, on the other hand, I will not mistake institutions for abuses, and attack them as if they were nothing more than vices in our political system. I wish to maintain the institutions of this country, and I wish not to undertake any reform—improvement though it be called—which is incompatible with those institutions. I wish to maintain an Established Church—I wish to see an hereditary House of Peers—I wish to maintain an hereditary monarchy. If there be any plans proposed which I think hostile to those institutions, they shall have my decided opposition. I do not wish in the least to disguise my views. If there be any plans proposed which, as I think, would tend to a republic—to overturn the Church, or to the destruction of the hereditary peerage, I shall, as I have always done, state my sentiments to the House and explain the grounds of my opposition. But it is not just to confound the resistance to innovations of this kind—resistance to dangerous changes of this nature, with resistance to improvement. I think that in the present state of this country the safest improvements will be those which can be gradually carried without offering disturbance to our political system. More rapid attempts, whilst they might themselves become the cause of disturbance, would, I think, have the effect of postponing, if not of destroying altogether, the very improvements sought to be obtained. But it is not my purpose to dwell upon this point. In reference to the observation of the hon. Member for London (Mr. Grote) I wish only to say this, that although he may not entertain the same views that I do with respect to the measures to be brought forward for effecting internal improvements, I shall be happy to co-operate with him in introducing many changes that I think would be beneficial. There are many improvements in the administration of justice—many improvements with regard to matters of trade and other affairs, which would lead to no party conflict or excitement, and which would be attended with no great political innovation, which I shall always be happy to lend my humble aid in proposing and carrying. I have now stated what I conceive necessary with regard to the general views of the foreign policy of the Govern- ment. With regard to their domestic policy; many occasions will, no doubt, occur upon which the opinions of the House may be taken upon it. We are ready to bear our responsibility upon all these matters; and while we do continue the Ministers of the Crown, we will serve the Crown faithfully, and to the best of our ability promote the welfare and happiness of the empire.

Mr. Milnes

said, that the noble Lord who had just sat down had, he thought, satisfactorily answered the hon. Member for the city of London with respect to the guarantee of the five powers regarding the separation of the Turkish Empire; but he wished to impress upon the House that the intervention of this country which had taken place was wholly different from that moral intervention and support given to the Ottoman empire by the guarantee of the five powers, and in this he thought the noble Lord would find, lay the whole secret of the difference between the policy of England and the policy of France. In the case of the quadruple treaty, while this country actively interfered with Spain by sending the Spanish Legion into that country. France refused to interfere, except by the influence of her moral weight. So in this instance France had been ready to give all possible moral weight to an arrangement of the affairs of the Turkish empire, but said she would not consent to use force, or to fire a single gun, because she did not know where its echo would end. Keeping this important declaration in sight, he could not but shortly advert to what he thought a most painful omission in the Speech from the Throne. He was of opinion, that the peculiar situation in which the foreign relations of this country at present stood, not only authorized, but demanded, some expression of regret at the rupture which had occurred between this country and France. Allowing her Majesty's Ministers to have been as right and successful as the hon. Member for Cumberland seemed to believe, he was sure such an expression of regret would have been cordially responded to by the House, and received with delight by the whole of this nation. In the absence of any expression of regret, he felt bound to protest against the assumption in the Speech from the Throne, already protested against by the hon. Member for the city of London, and not contradicted by the noble Lord, that the objects of the treaty of July—namely, the integrity and inde- pendence of the Ottoman empire, had been secured. He had waited with anxiety, but had waited in vain, to hear from the noble Lord how the integrity of the Ottoman empire was in a better and more secure position now, than it was a year ago. What were they to understand by the word "integrity?" Was it not a mere diplomatic fallacy? For himself he would say, that the integrity of the Ottoman empire, as the phrase had been used, could mean nothing more than the addition to the dominions of the Sultan of those petty districts of Syria which had been withdrawn from him. The independence, however, of no empire could be secured by foreign interference. At present the Ottoman empire was placed under the protectorate of England and Russia, but was the Sultan in a more favourable position now to oppose the encroachments of Russia or of any other power than he was before? England and Russia were in fact face to face in the East. If Mehemet Ali was strong enough to be dangerous to the peace of Europe, then, by their recent proceedings, the Government of England had destroyed the only barrier between Russia and the Ottoman empire, and the only party sufficiently powerful to prevent any farther dismemberment. No person could see in the recent transaction relative to the East any thing else or more than a transfer of the Ottoman empire from the protectorate of the five great powers of Europe to the protectorate of Russia and England alone. It was Stated in that House last year, that no one of the powers was to gain anything from the treaty which had been agreed on; but he would recall to the recollection of the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the same stipulations had, he believed, word for word, been made in the fifth article of the treaty of the 5th of July, 1828; but, although the same stipulations had been made in that treaty, the House would do well to remember that it was followed by the war of the Balkan, by Russia taking possession of the mouths of the Danube, by the treaty of Adrianople and the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. No dependence could, in fact, be placed upon such stipulations when the passions of men were once aroused, and when success attended their operations. He believed sincerely that the noble Lord opposite never contemplated any accession of territory or any exclusive advantage for England, and that all that France had said and thought of the interested motives of this country was false and without foundation, and he should be glad to hear from the noble Lord again, that such was the real state of the facts, and that he had never contemplated any aggrandizement of English interests. But, although he was convinced that England contemplated no exclusive advantage, yet, at the same time, he, and those who acted with him, and who were opposed to the general policy of the Government, might for that very reason object to the course which had been pursued, and which had been productive of great expense and risk to the nation, while no professed advantage was sought to be obtained. He should, however, bring no such charge against the Government, at this moment, but he did accuse them of short-sightedness, of ignorance of the French people, and of a disregard of French history, and of the events which were passing amongst the French people. It was no excuse for the present state of affairs betwixt England and France to blame the conduct of M. Thiers, or of any other French Minister. Whatever might be said on that subject, the fact remained the same—that the Government had broken up the system of European policy which had existed since 1815, and returned to the system which had been acted upon before that period. France had always hitherto been either in a state of hostility to the rest of Europe, or in connexion or alliance with the other powers, and, when therefore, she found herself excluded from the recent treaty, she had been led to the conclusion, not unnaturally, that the coalition which had been formed was a coalition hostile to her interests and her honour. The French people could not forget the coalitions which had been formed against Louis 14th, and against Napoleon, and it was not surprising that they should consider a separation from the other powers as an act of hostility to France. He was not there to apologise for the conduct of the French people, but when those susceptibilities to which he had alluded, and which no statesmen ought to neglect, actuated them, then he must say that, unless for the attainment of some most important object, a disruption of the French alliance could only be considered as a most dangerous and terrible experiment. For himself, he would follow the course which had been pursued by the hon. Member for London, and would implore the House to look at their present situation and compare it with what it was last year, in order that they might see what they had gained by the separation of France from England. What had they gained by the destruction of that alliance of which M. Thiers was the chief cornerstone, and which that minister, who had been that night so severely attacked, had declared to be the best for securing the peace of Europe? It had availed them nothing, but it had given rise to the most angry and ferocious declamation on the part of the French people against England, and brought them to the verge of an European war. These were facts which ought and must be considered in the discussion of this question. He believed, indeed, that if the policy of the present Government had been pursued by a government composed of Members from his side of the House, the effect on the French people would not have been half so disastrous, as they would have considered it but a remnant of the old hostility which they imagined Conservative statesmen entertained towards their country. But the disruption of the alliance had been brought about by those who had always expressed themselves favourable to an union of the two countries, and it was not, therefore, unnatural for the French people to suppose that their exclusion was an act of hostility. The noble Lord, the Secretary for the Colonies, had asked whether any one could believe, that if the people of England had been placed in the position of the people of France, they would have followed the same course of exaggeration which had been pursued by the French people. He knew well the apathy of the people of England in regard to Foreign affairs, and that with their ocean fortifications and wooden walls they were inclined to meddle little with the proceedings of the continental powers of Europe. The people of England required much to arouse them; yet he would say, that if France and Russia had combined to the exclusion of England, as England and Russia had combined to the exclusion of France, he firmly believed the people of this country would have risen as one man, and that no Minister who had ventured to submit to such a combination would have met with their support. What, however, was the state of things to which they had arrived? They were in the state of an armed peace, and in his opinion they ought to ask Ministers night after night how they were to supply the means for the maintenance of such a position? An armed peace was a peace without its profits; it was war without its stimulants, and with out any of those circumstances which could make war tolerable. In other days, even when England could boldly look Europe in the face, and was able to subsidize the other powers, an armed peace was looked upon with terror, and Ministers might depend that there was nothing more trying to a country. Yet it would continue. He would say, that all attempts at disarming on the part of France would be found impracticable. France was blessed with a wise Sovereign and with a prudent Minister; but that would avail nothing, for that Minister would not be able to hold office an hour, if he were to bring down to the Chambers, a proposal for disarming. France then would go on arming, and England, in consequence, would be obliged to arm, and that, too, with all the embarrassments arising from the present state of their finances, with all the disadvantages of a disunited people, and with all the dissatisfaction resulting from the repeal agitation in Ireland. And what would be the end, peace or war? If peace, then, for what object, he would ask, had their treasures been lavished? and if war, then let them consider what war was in these days. Everything which had contributed to the civilization of the world, and the extension of intelligence, every additional shilling of capital invested, every additional child supplied with the elements of education, had made the effects of war more disastrous, and the risk of it more criminal. For his part, he would never consent to England engaging in any war, in which success should not be advantageous to the general interests of humanity and in which defeat itself should not be dishonour. He had now fulfilled what he had considered his duty, in calling upon Ministers for some expression of regret, in regard to the present position of England and France. He called upon the Government to heal, if it were possible, the wound which had been inflicted, and by every means in their power, to endeavour to calm the effervescence in France, so as to prepare the way for the admittance of that nation into the coalition of Europe, for till that was effected there could be no certainty of peace, and no security for England. At present they were living in apparent security, but they were on the brink of a precipice. What had become of the treaty of commerce betwixt this country and France, of which they had heard so much last Session? The hope of it was gone, and it was impossible in the present state of feeling in France, that it could be renewed. He should conclude, as he had begun, with stating his disappointment, that there was no expression of regret in the Speech from the Throne relative to the present position of England and France, and by calling on Ministers to do all in their power to allay the irritation which existed amongst the French people, and to reflect on the terrible consequences of unnecessary war. If for a phantom of a Turkish united empire, or a possible Arab empire, or for any other speculative cause, England was placed in peril of war with France, he did not believe that the people of England would support the Ministers who brought them into such a position. There was in this country no settled animosity to France, and he was, therefore, anxious that every Gentleman, at least, who took part in that discussion should as far as possible, make up for the deficiency in the Speech from the Throne, by expressing individually his regret for the circumstances which had occurred, and his hopes of a speedy adjustment of the points in dispute betwixt this country and France.

Mr. Hume

said, if he had not paid particular attention to this question, yet still he should have found sufficient grounds for his resistance to the policy of the Government in the Speech of the hon. Member for London. Having endeavoured, perhaps too pertinaciously, in the course of last Session, to bring the state of the negotiations on this question under the consideration of the House, he could not allow the present discussion to go on, without pointing out what, indeed, was but a realization of his fears—the dangerous condition in which the Government had placed this country. It would be recollected that so early as the 27th of March of last year, he had moved that the papers explanatory of the negotiations which had taken place between France and England should be laid on the Table. A long discussion ensued, in which the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs managed adroitly to evade the motion, and to allege as Ministers commonly did when they found it inconvenient to produce papers, that it would be injurious to the public service to do so. Yet he was satisfied that he had made the motion which he had done, for it had at least prevented the commencement of hostilities at the time. He had learned when in France that considerable uneasiness existed in that country as to the results of the policy pursued by the British Government, and that many well-informed persons apprehended danger from what was considered to be the wild course pursued by the British ambassador at Constantinople, actuated, as they believed him to be, by personal motives against Mehemet Ali. He was fearful that the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would be weak enough to support and carry out the mad proceedings of that nobleman. He wished the House of Commons to have before them the facts, in order to do away with the fears which were then entertained as to the consequences of such proceedings. It was perfectly well known to every one who had been at Constantinople, or who had taken a part in this question, what the conduct of the representative of England had been. That nobleman had totally misrepresented the spirit and the feeling of this country, and it was to prevent the further progress of the evil that he, on the first of June last, when it was proposed to add two millions to the expenditure, protested against it as a violation of those principles which a Liberal Government had ever professed. He then pointed out that the money was not wanted, and that the increased expenditure arose from the mistaken policy of England. However, not content with what he then did, he again, on the 24th July, specially brought the subject before the House, and challenged the noble Lord with having agreed to a treaty ten days before, and asked for information, that they might know how far the objects proposed to be attained in Syria were worth the risk of breaking our alliance with France. He recollected that the noble Lord declined giving any decided answer, and that one part of his statement was a denial of the existence of any such treaty. He found that a mere technical error justified the noble Lord in such a statement, because what he had called a treaty, was in her Majesty's Speech styled a convention. True it was, that in that day's Morning Post, notice was given that such a treaty had been agreed to, but the noble Lord said that he had not seen the Morning Post, and this was the way in which the House had been treated. All information was withheld, and yet within a month afterwards they found that such a treaty had been concluded. He should be glad to know wherein would have been the danger of granting the information he required? Had the papers been laid on the Table, they would have seen what the noble Viscount was about. If the whole correspondence that had taken place between France and England had been then laid before the House, he believed that the noble Viscount would not have succeeded in obtaining a majority of the cabinet in support of his policy. He blamed the noble Viscount for persevering in measures in which he stood alone. It was well known that a majority of the cabinet were opposed to him. Every body knew it, even through the organs of the Ministers; or, if the Whig newspapers did not reveal it, at least the Tory journals did. The noble Lord, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had not met the able statement of the hon. Member for London in one of its most important points. He had not answered the question put to him as to the why and the wherefore, and the cause of our aggressions on the Syrian provinces. He avoided that altogether. It was a new Whig doctrine that England had a right to interfere between a vassal and his Government; but suppose the House of Commons said to the noble Lord, "You have interfered to put down Mehemet Ali, would you also interfere to put down the pacha of any other province?" But, said the noble Lord, there might be exceptions, and since the present question might fall within the exception, he thought that the noble Lord ought to have directed his attention to it, and shown the ground on which he was warranted to interfere. Had they one interest connected with hostility towards Mehemet Ali? Was one advantage for England endangered by his rule in Syria? He hoped the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs would explain the necessity that there was for our breaking our alliance with France, or for our proceedings against Mehemet Ali. If the noble Viscount could satisfy him on this point, he should be ready to withdraw many of the objections which he entertained to the policy of the Government. At present that policy appeared to him not only to be bad, but wicked, for it carried desolation and ruin into the Syrian provinces, and for no purpose that he knew of connected with the interest of England. He asked the noble viscount the simple question, why has he interfered? Because the noble Viscount would say, it was necessary to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman empire: but who was going to disturb it? Mehemet Ali, it was said. He denied it. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) said, that Mehemet Ali intended to assert his independence of the Sultan; but did the noble Lord recollect the character which the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, gave Mehemet Ali at the time that this was said of him? They had been told by the organ of the Government that it was necessary to put down the grinding tyranny of Mehemet Ali, and therefore the English Government proceeded against him. Was that any excuse for interference, or was it worse than the tyranny exercised by the Emperor of Russia in Poland? He believed the latter to be ten times more oppressive than the former. He would not, however, apologise for Mehemet Ali's deeds; he was obliged to resort to the conscription in order to maintain his troops against the bad faith of the Sultan and the European governments, who, after having guaranteed to him possession of the provinces which he held, allowed them to be attacked, and his authority over them to be destroyed. By whom was the integrity of the Ottoman empire threatened? By Mehemet Ali? No; and he would prove it. What took place after the battle of Nezib? Lord Ponsonby, instead of proceeding to Constantinople, spent six mouths at Naples, while Mr. Maudeville was left to act on behalf of the British Government. Ibrahim Pacha had been in full march for Constantinople, and might have reached that capital, but the French and English Governments interposed to stop his progress. The noble Viscount took credit for having stopped his progress by the offer of the Pachalic of Egypt, Syria, and Adana. A treaty to this effect was framed and executed, and from that hour to the present Mehemet Ali had never infringed it. After that event, all intercourse respecting those countries and their commerce, instead of being carried on with the Sultan, should have been carried on with Mehemet Ali, who never showed the smallest intention to take any step hostile to the Sultan. The real fact was this, that although the Sultan was on terms with Mehemet Ali, yet in 1839, contrary to the acknowledged pledge of the British Government by a treaty to which it had given its assent, an armed force entered Syria, arms were distributed to the mountaineers, but Ibrahim Pacha attacked his enemy and annihilated him. It ought to be borne in mind, that at this time the Turkish fleet was completely deserted, and when the accounts of the battle of Nezib and of the death of the Sultan, Mahmoud reached it, the senior officers held a consultation as to the course they should pursue. They knew that Great Britain had been made the dupe, and had lent herself to the baneful influence which had crippled if not destroyed the Turkish empire. If flushed with success, Mehemet Ali had then intended to attack Turkey, why did he refrain and withdraw within his own boundary? He might have been rendered a powerful ally of the Sultan, and showed no symptom of hostility. He defied Ministers to produce a single document to prove, that there was any disposition on the part of Mehemet Ali to move against Constantinople. It was said, to be sure, that if Great Britain had not interfered, Russia would have interposed; but the principle on which Great Britain had interfered was most mischievous, and had been productive of the most lamentable consequences. The noble Lord, therefore, had failed to make out his case, and had given no answer to the hon. Member for London. It was contended that Russia had been a most active partisan, in conjunction with the other allies; but was it possible to believe, that the experience of the last fifty years had not convinced the Cabinet of England, that the invariable policy of Russia had been to cripple and enfeeble the Ottoman empire? Could any man seriously believe, that the Emperor Nicholas had any sincere disposition to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman empire? On the other hand, the French government was anxious to maintain the integrity of Turkey, by not carrying fire and sword into Syria. It said "Let England and France combine, and let the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi be maintained;" and if England had been desirous of securing peace, and to avoid the evils which had followed upon war, all she had to do was, to remain quiet, and to allow Mehemet Ali and the Porte to make their own terms, and settle their own differences. On the 25th and 26th July, a treaty was agreed upon; the terms had been actually settled by the Divan, and they would have been accepted with pleasure by Mehemet Ali. He had alleged that on a former occasion and he had since seen the document itself. He wished the noble Lord to attend to this question: whether the letter purporting to have been delivered on the 27th July, 1839, had not been drawn up and agreed to at Vienna, and intended to have been delivered before the battle of Nezib? It was delayed until the evil had taken place, and all that was asked in the letter was, that the Sultan would not conclude any treaty without the concurrence of the allies. If it had been presented before the battle of Nezib, that evil might have been prevented. The noble Lord might contradict this statement if he could—that the dying words of the Sultan Mahmoud were to enjoin that peace should be made with Mehemet Ali. Could the noble Lord deny that? In fact, all the mischiefs he lamented had been produced by the abandonment of the principle of non-interference, and after what had passed this country could never recover the reputation she had lost. He had now proved, that Mehemet Ali had not shown any symptoms of a desire to subjugate Turkey, and he would take the liberty of referring the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) to the character he had himself given of Mehemet Ali. He did not refer to the Morning Chronicle, but to one of the noble Lord's despatches, though it was very well known that the columns of the Morning Chronicle had been open to the noble Lord, at least the public said that that paper had been open to receive all the trash the noble Lord chose to send, and certainly plenty of it came. It was a curious circumstance that the grinding tyranny and cruelty of Mehemet Ali, about which much had been said, was intended by Ministers to be inflicted upon one-half of Syria. The course of policy on the part of this Government had been most vacillating and inconsistent, and this was one proof of it. Had it been otherwise, the condition of affairs would have been widely different from their present, state. He called upon the noble Lord to show him, if he could that he had not been one of the most inconsistent men that had ever presided over the foreign department of the country. As to the oppression of Mehemet Ali, he (Mr. Hume) believed it had been grinding, especially as regarded conscription; but had there been no oppression on the part of the Ottoman empire? The noble Lord's inconsistency was, that while he complained so loudly of that grinding tyranny, he was willing at one time to leave all Egypt and half Syria subject to it. A Minister who had promoted all the horrors of civil war on the shores of Syria, was little entitled to complain of Mehemet Ali, or of his tyranny. Mr. Wood, the agent of Lord Ponsonby, had carried money and arms to Syria and had done his utmost to promote disorder and revolution. Another reason which the noble Lord had given for British interference was, that Mehemet Ali had wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Ottoman empire. Now he would refer to a correspondence which had taken place on that subject. But first he should observe, that much as had been said against Mehemet Ali, the noble Lord himself had described his character as being that of a person who was anxious in his administration of the power vested in him, to secure, with the most impartial justice, the possessions of all his subjects. When the announcement of the Pacha's intention to throw off the Turkish allegiance had been made, in July 1838, the British and French consuls had strongly recommended him to be satisfied with things as they then stood, and they had persuaded him to lay that intention aside. It was hard, then, to bring against the Pacha now what had occurred in 1838. As an instance of the excellent manner in which Mehemet Ali governed the countries under him, he could only point to the safety which all travellers enjoyed when his authority was paramount. Why, then one could travel all through Syria with less liability to the loss of a trunk than one could by going from London to Brentford. Nothing could exceed the perfect safety with which the goods and property of travellers might be carried through that country some years ago, when he (Mr. Hume) was there. A circumstance lately happened which he would mention to the House. The camel of a traveller going to Suez having fallen down was obliged to be abandoned, but the goods with which it was laden had remained for three days, on the way unprotected, yet they had remained perfectly safe, and had been recovered. So much could not be said of the country now. Such was the present state of that unfortunate province that Mehemet Ali had been written to from Jerusalem to resume the authority of the place. Little did the hon. Gentlemen who moved and seconded the address know of the disastrous results of the policy which our Cabinet had pursued. As to Mehemet Ali, he had only been anxious to secure himself from aggression. After all, too, had the noble Lord attained what he intended? Had he secured the integrity of the Turkish empire? He would venture to say that, 50,000 stand of arms having been placed in the hand of the Druses, and other tribes of Syria, no man alive could say, when and for how long the orders of the Sultan would be obeyed by them. The hon. Member for London had shown the enormous increase in the population and commerce of Beyrout. What a change had been wrought there ! No pacha from Constantinople could ever restore its trade and prosperity. What was to be done for the future? Was it meant that a British army should be kept there, supported by a fleet of twenty two sail of the line? The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) had not told the House what was to be the result: the Speech from the Throne stated that the objects were on the eve of being accomplished; but would the noble Lord say whether it were intended to withdraw the British fleet? The Speech held out little hope of anything but additional taxation, and all for what? to maintain this expensive and wicked scheme of the British Government. As to the supposed attainment of objects, had we added to the strength of the Ottoman empire? Let the noble Lord take the evidence of naval officers on the coast, and of those who were at Acre, as to the condition of the country, and by that let him judge whether a more wicked or fatal course of policy could have been adopted. The real secret was, that Russia wished to cripple and weaken Turkey, and no means more effectual could be found than promoting civil war. But the noble Lord, the Secretary for the Colonies, who did not seem very well acquainted with the facts of the case, contended that no other course was open to this country in order to secure the integrity of the Turkish Empire; but might not this Government have interfered, as had often been requested by Mehemet Ali, in order to compel the Sultan to act up to his agreement and to do justice? By this means, Mehemet Ali would have been left ready at any time to march 50,000 or 60,000 men to the defence of Turkey, should she be assailed by Russia. Would not this have been a proper course before the British Cabinet chose to risk the peace of Europe by estranging France? Yet, with its eyes open, the British Cabinet disregarded the peace of Europe, and placed the whole continent in a state of jeopardy causing the most expensive preparations for war. Not less than fifty millions of money had been expended by different countries of the continent upon preparations. Of this burden Great Britain would have to sustain her share, and that with a revenue three millions deficient within three years, of which not less than a million and a half had been deficient in the last year. This country was not in a condition to bear additional taxation; the productive powers, being incapable of supporting the pressure, could not add to the decreasing revenue. Was he not justified then in saying that Ministers had incurred a heavy responsibility? It appeared that estimates were to be laid on the Table for providing for the public exigencies such as the occasion might require, but no information had been given what those exigencies were. As long as the union between England and France was sincere and cordial, it was a security for the maintenance of peace in Europe. That union was at an end, and the responsibility of those who had terminated it was heavy indeed. Instead of mutual confidence, the two powers were almost in a state of actual hostility. Such a course of policy was both dangerous and wicked, and condemning it as strongly as he did, he felt called upon to record his opinion, even though it might only be that of an individual Member. In his view, the House ought to have been called together long ago, in order that its sense might be taken upon the great questions to which he had adverted. Now it had met it ought to lose no time in recording its judgment in favour of maintaining the firmest alliance between England and France. He distrusted Russia, when she who had been so long its enemy, came forward under the pretence of protecting the integrity of Turkey. Whether the House did or did not support him in it, he felt it an imperious duty to place his opinion upon the journals. Was it not known that we were excluded from Persia by the wiles and intrigues of Russia? By whom was the war in Affghanistan fomented against us. Were not these things enough to make as alarmed, and to prevent us from entering foolishly into the late arrangements. Then there were many omissions in the speech: there was no mention of the state of the negotiations with respect to the Maine boundary:—how should there be? for the noble Lord's time had been wholly taken up with the arrangements regarding Syria. Allusion had been made to the speech of Mr. Van Buren to show how the matter stood; but Mr. Van Buren declared that the happiness which his country enjoyed was mainly attributable to its not having entered into a treaty that would interfere with other states. He wished, therefore, that the hon. Member who had quoted one passage from that speech, had gone a little farther, and had quoted the important passage to which he had now referred. The president said further, that the plan of an arrangement had been sent to this country, and that it was waiting for the approval of the noble Lord. And he would tell the noble Lord that he would not be able to obtain the same terms from the next government as he could from the present. He was sorry also to observe, that no notice was taken in the Speech of the state of our finances. There was a demand for money, but no notice of the state of the revenue. He had heard it stated in speeches from the Throne in other times, that there was an improvement or a deficiency, but now not a word. Then there was no notice of education, there was no intimation of any intention to follow out that education of the people which was so much required, and for which the noble Lord had received so much credit last year. Then he saw no notice taken of the present state of our commercial relations. The noble Lord said, "You must not believe that I intend to act on finality principles," yet the result was, when any reference was made to a really important improvement, that the noble Lord turned round and said, "Oh stop a little, you are going a great deal too fast and too far," and consequently there was no notice of any commercial improvement. In short, there was the greatest indifference to the state of the country. There was no reference to the condition of the working classes, which, though admitted to be a case of destitution, was said not to be a state of despair. He thought, that the Speech, so far as it went, was objectionable, because it took credit for an act which was a disgrace to any government, the adoption of the treaty ending in a convention, the only result of which was a sacrifice of 15,000 or 16,000 Syrians, leaving this country in great embarrassment; but he protested more against it for not stating what it ought to have done, the real condition of the country. It had slurred over matters that were of real importance to the country, and had put prominently forward the foreign policy, which seemed to have occupied the whole attention of the Government. He did not speak of this as a party matter—it was a material object to bring it forward at the earliest moment. The Speech presented to us a state of meddling with the affairs of every nation except our own; but our own condition was not so much as mentioned. He would therefore read to the House an amendment, embodying his own opinions, which he was desirous of placing upon record. Whether he would divide the House or not, would depend upon the sentiments of those who should come after him. The hon. Member concluded by moving the following amendment to leave out from the words "Royal Consort," to the end of the question, in order to add the words, To thank her Majesty for having called us together in Parliament at a period when the finances of the country, the condition of the working classes, and the state of our foreign relations in every quarter of the world, alike require grave and mature consideration; That regarding war as the greatest calamity which can afflict a civilized community, and specially destructive of commerce and manufactures, which so largely contribute to the wealth and greatness of this country, we cannot but view with intense apprehension and regret any interruption of the peace which we have now for so many years happily enjoyed: That we view with especial uneasiness the state of our relations with France, as we consider the cordial alliance of Great Britain with that power essential to the permanent peace of Europe, and to the spread of freedom and civilization throughout the world: That we regard with distrust the Convention formed by her Majesty's Ministers with the military governments of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, under the pretext of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which has been more injured by the encroachments of Russia than by any other power: Humbly to state to her Majesty, that whilst admitting the undoubted prerogative of her Majesty to declare war and conclude peace, we consider it no less our undoubted right and duty to inquire into and examine the exercise of that prerogative: That, therefore, we humbly beseech her Majesty to direct her Ministers to lay before this House the grounds on which they have advised the employment of her Majesty's forces in Syria, as full information concerning them is necessary to enable us to judge of the wisdom and policy of the measures pursued by her Majesty's Ministers, and which her Majesty informs us has been attended with signal success, and that the objects which the contracting parties had in view are on the eve of being completely accomplished; To express to her Majesty our surprise that her Majesty's advisers have recommended increased establishments, attended necessarily with increased taxation to her Majesty's already heavily burthened people, and regret that her Majesty has not directed our attention more particularly to the increase of expenditure beyond the revenue, and to the distress and discontent which prevail to an alarming degree among the labouring classes throughout the kingdom, to the causes thereof, and to the best means of relieving her Majesty's faithful and suffering people.

Sir R. Peel

said, that there was one subject of such surpassing interest connected with the peace of Europe and with the general interests of humanity which so completely cast into the shade all other topics, however important those topics might be in themselves, that it was hardly necessary upon that occasion to notice the omissions that were made in the Speech, or to criticise the language in which the various topics were mentioned. If he were inclined to criticise the Speech, he could not say that he ever recollected a speech which was more successful than this in that merit which was generally conceded to documents of this description, the merit of saying as little as possible. On that point, he could not deem it a complete failure. The Speech must be considered as the speech of her Majesty's Ministers, and it possessed the advantage which had been ascribed by a great diplomatist to all language, that it was given to man for the purpose of concealing his thoughts. It was a careful Speech, for the hon. Gentlemen, the Mover and Seconder of the Address, found it so utterly impossible to eke out their own speeches with becoming decency to the ordinary length, if they had confined themselves to the topics mentioned in the speech itself, that they felt it absolutely incumbent on them, even at the risk of offending her Majesty's Government, to introduce many matters which they thought ought to have been introduced into the Speech itself. The state of Canada and the intentions of the Crown with respect to the union of the provinces was one instance. It was omitted in the Speech; it was touched upon by the hon. Mover. The boundary question, again, was touched upon by the hon. Seconder. The state of Ireland and the progress of the repeal agitation touched upon by the Mover. The state of the war in India, and the progress of our arms in Affghanistan, again touched upon by the Mover and the Seconder. They gave a tacit acknowledgement, from which it was clear what were the topics that they would have introduced, if they had prepared the Speech for the Throne. Nay, it was clear that they were in possession of information which did not appear to have reached her Majesty's Government; for, talking of China, one of the hon. Gentlemen exulted in a tone which those who had prepared the present Speech could hardly have entertained. It seemed, then, that the document which had been supposed to be an edict of the Emperor of China was not authentic, because the hon. Gentleman had talked of the "humble tone assumed by the Emperor," and the hon. Gentleman was fully aware of an arrangement that was to give indemnity for the losses suffered by her Majesty's subjects. He hoped that the hon. Gentleman's information would prove to be correct, but all the Speech asked the House to do was to concur in a mere statement of a matter of fact. The Speech said only— Having deemed it necessary to send to the coast of China a naval and military force, to demand reparation and redress for injuries inflicted upon some of my subjects by the officers of the Emperor of China, and for indignities offered to an agent of my Crown, I, at the same time, appointed plenipotentiaries to treat upon these matters with the Chinese government. These plenipotentiaries were, by the last accounts in negotiation with the government of China; and it will be a source of much gratification to me, if that government shall be induced by its own sense of justice to bring those matters to a speedy settlement by an amicable arrangement. This was certainly a very moderate, and no doubt a very justifiable hope, but it was at variance with the assurance, on the faith of which the hon. Gentleman had made his comments. He thought, however, that those who had framed the Address in such cautious terms, had done quite right, for he held that unless notice were given, the Address should always be so framed as not to demand any opposition, considering especially the disadvantages under which hon. Gentlemen making any opposition necessarily laboured. There was, however, one topic, of paramount importance—the present state of Europe, and the foreign relations of this country. On the very threshold of the discussion, he could not but express his deep regret and despondency, when he contemplated the present state of our relations with Prance, and when he heard on every side the din of military preparation. He did hope that, after the lapse of twenty-five years of profound peace—with a new generation arrived at maturity, who had not taken an active part in the exploits of the last war—he had hoped that all fear had been dissipated, that there had been new guarantees for a prolonged peace, and that mankind generally had been convinced, not only of the inestimable advantage, but of the great moral obligation to maintain peace, unless for the security of the nation, or for the vindication of the national honour; and he did hope that new material interests had arisen which would effectually keep down any fresh demonstration of a warlike feeling. With respect to France, whether in power or in opposition, he had never held but one language, or one opinion, that a cordial and good understanding between France and England was essential to the peace and the welfare of Europe. He did not mean to say he was convinced that an intimate alliance of an exclusive nature between this country and France, giving offence to what the hon. Gentleman called the great despotic and military powers of Europe—he was not prepared to say that he saw so fully the advantage of such an alliance as others; but no one felt more strongly than he did, that the best interests of humanity were involved in the maintenance of cordial good will and amicable relations between us and France. The French nation, or at least a part of it, entertained a false conception of the opinion of the people of England. It was not true that we felt—the man would be base and ungenerous indeed, who could feel—any triumph in the supposed humiliation of France. He did not believe that there was any wish on the part of this great community, though it had been called her natural enemy, and which had certainly been long and warmly engaged in conflict with her: he did not believe that there was the slightest wish that the power or authority of France should be curtailed, or that there would be the least rejoicing at any reverses befalling France, or subjecting that country to humiliation. At the same time, with that feeling strongly rooted in his mind, he was not prepared at once to say, that the policy which had been pursued of attempting the settlement of the Eastern question was not necessary. He could conceive a case of complication arising from the Syrian question, if no vigorous attempt had been made at an adjustment which would have involved this country in the very war which he was so much inclined to deprecate. It was no doubt true that the Turkish empire had been long exhibiting symptoms of decadence and weakness. Still it existed in a state of decadence, and weakness was widely different from the approach of the actual dissolution of that empire; for in that event new interests would arise in Europe, and every effort should, in his opinion, be made to prevent that conflict, of interests, and that actual collision which would arise on the dissolution of the Turkish empire. It was quite clear that the position which the Pacha of Egypt had maintained had become inconsistent with the independence of the Porte, and the interests of this country with Turkey. Well, then, it was said by some hon. Gentlemen, "England shall have nothing to do with this; the events apprehended are merely a contingent possibility; they will take place at a remote part of the Mediterranean; and the true policy of England is, therefore, to refuse to take any part in the adjustment of these matters, for fear of the risk which we run." Now, let him take the opinion of the hon. Member for Kilkenny with respect to Russia as correct—and mind, he did not assent to it—it was impossible to disguise from ourselves the relative position of the Russian empire and of Constantinople. The peculiar nature of the Russian position, and the force of circumstances, must naturally subject her to jealousy and suspicion; but the course which Russia had pursued ought to have exempted her from some of the aspersions that had been cast upon her. But suppose those suspicions should be well founded, what was the security if we refused to interfere, and Russia were actuated by such ambitious designs as the hon. Gentlemen attributed to her, would she not take upon herself the part or exclusive protection which we refused to take upon ourselves? The hon. Gentleman thought that the troubles which had taken place on the north-western fronters of our Indian possessions were attributable to Russia. Suppose Russia should gain possession of Constantinople in consequence of the growing weakness of the Turkish empire, would the hon. Gentleman view that event with complacency? The hon. Gentleman (the Member for the city of London) clearly would not, because he stated that in such an event he would resort to the physical and material power of England to dispossess her of Constantinople. If that were a sound policy, and if it would be an object for England to dispossess Russia of Constantinople when once she had gained possession, those who were of opinion that we ought to be prepared so to act in such an extremity, could not object on general grounds to that line of policy which would prevent Russia from getting there—which would prevent, by the exercise of our moral influence, the occurrence of that great calamity which would compel us to go to war with Russia on ground where Russia, by her contiguity, must have a great advantage over us. It might be no easy matter, considering the position of Russia with Constantinople, and our own distance from the scene of action—it might be no easy matter to make the evacuation of Constantinople by Russia one condition of peace with us. The co-operation of France in effecting a settlement of the Eastern question would unquestionably have been of inestimable value. Of that there was no doubt, and when we were obliged to relinquish the hope that France would cordially unite with us in effecting that settlement; first, by the means of advice, and, secondly, by the aid of a demonstration, the question assumed a new shape, it was to be viewed under a new aspect, the chance of success was much less, the risk of evil was much more; but he thought that it would be difficult to say that if four great powers of Europe, acting as he assumed for the sake of argument, they did with perfect integrity, really believing that the advance of a rebellious vassal upon Constantinople would be the signal for the dissolution of the Turkish empire, that great evil would arise from the necessary partition of the Turkish dominions, and if they were convinced that the general interests and welfare of Europe required an active intervention, he was not prepared to say, that when one of those powers refused to take part in that mediation, the other four powers should of necessity desist, because he was afraid that the consequence of such an example would not be limited to the single case, but that if the one power could exercise such an authority in the affairs of Europe, it would be tempted to extend its influence beyond that range. He would therefore, suspend his opinion with respect to the convention till he should have received that further information from her Majesty's Government, which he presumed they were prepared to give. They might be prepared to show that the consequence of a refusal, on the part of England, would have been the immediate interference with Russia. They might remind us that the event which occurred in 1833 would have occurred in 1840. The Porte applied to us in 1833 for protection against this very vassal, Mehemet Ali; we refused; what was the consequence. The Porte applied for assistance to Russia; Russia did step in and interfere, and she received, as her reward, for that assistance, the treaty against which we were the first to protest, and which we were obliged to tell her we could not recognise as part of the law of Europe: we were almost driven to war the very act which might be assumed to be again possible. It was possible that Russia might see her neighbour about to be spoiled without justice by one of her subjects usurping the power and authority delegated to him for the purpose of overthrowing his Lord. He did believe that in such an event Russia or Austria would feel the necessity for an interference; he believed also that there would be a recurrence to the course taken in 1833; and depend upon it Russia would not twice thus protect Turkey, and twice save her from annihilation, within a space of seven years, without these powers being placed in the relative position of master and slave. He therefore suspended his judgment upon the propriety of the treaty until he should have received the fullest information; but he should not be acting with justice, if in the absence of that information, he were to agree to any amendment which would be a censure upon the parties to that treaty. He was prepared then to admit, first, that intervention might have been necessary—advisable, perhaps, if we could obtain the cooperation of France—that it might have been necessary even if the co-operation of France were wholly refused; but he must say that, in proportion as the assistance of France was withdrawn, in proportion as we lost the chance of that cordial co-operation and assistance, which was so essential to us, because the absence greatly diminished the chances of our success—so ought we to have shown, and he trusted that we had shown, throughout the whole of the proceedings the utmost consideration for the not unnatural feeling with which France would view a revival of the alliance of 1814. It was impossible to admit that there was any analogy in principle between the two treaties; but unfortunately with a sensitive and susceptible people sometimes the coincidence of facts and circumstances stood in the place of a principle. Yet nothing was more dissimilar than the principle of the quadruple treaty and that of the treaty which led to the occupation of Paris in 1814. He could make allowance, however, for the feeling of that country, which was among the most distinguished—he could not say more distinguished than our own—for having always set, and justly set, the highest value on its military character. He should be, indeed, sorry, if the French viewed the transactions of 1814 as any humiliation; they must naturally view with regret the reverses to which they were subject, but he was sure that no impartial man, reading the history of that campaign, unfortunate as the termination might be for France, could feel any other than the highest admiration for the skill of her general and the bravery of her soldiers. But the event was too recent, and the reverses were too great, not to render France exceedingly jealous of any new alliance. He agreed that the evil of excitement by hon. Members, aggravating that jealousy was very great. He attached great importance to this point, and he hoped that the noble Lord would not say that he had agreed in the propriety of the higher portion of the subject, and that he had censured only the minor part—that he admitted the great part to be good, and had I carped at the small. If it had become necessary to act without France, he would have exhausted every means to convince France of the propriety of our course, he should have come to the resolution to act without her with the greatest regret and reluctance, and he would have left—as he hoped the noble Lord had left—distinctly recorded the grounds for what, he trusted, was only the temporary secession of France; he would have exhausted everything to show deference to the wounded feelings of France. Now, he told the noble Lord that there was one point which, on reading the French debates, had given him the utmost concern. He would quote exactly what passed in the Chamber of Deputies, and the report carried with it internal evidence that both parties concerned in the discussion were acting with perfect honesty, and were only describing their own feelings. M. Guizot was making a speech on the Address, and stating the general warning which be had given to the French government, that the proceedings might possibly lead to a negotiation between the other powers, when he was interrupted by M. Thiers, who said:— I will prove with the documents in my hands, since it appears that I am placed in a position of being compelled to justify myself in the presence of an Ambassador who received his orders from me, I will prove, I say, to M. Guizot, that he told me on the 14th of July, that we had still plenty of time before us, and that there was nothing to render urgency necessary. To which M. Guizot replied:— That is true. I foresaw what was probable, but I was sure of nothing. Whereupon M. Guizot proceeded to read further extracts from his despatch, when M. Thiers said:— This is all very true, but you quote only a portion of the letter. You will permit me lo quote the other portion. M. Guizot—Certainly. M. Thiers—I will prove that you wrote to me on the 6th, 9th, and 14th of July, as follows:—'The English Cabinet is in deliberation—there is great agitation—there is a crisis; but nothing is yet decided. Two plans have been prepared—one for five Powers, for which propositions have been made to France, and the other for four Powers, in the event of France refusing the propositions that will be made to her.' This is what you wrote to me. All your letters contain the supposition that before signing any treaty a proposition would be made to France. M. Guizot—That is true; I believed that such would be the case. All the world knows, that during the last days of the negotiation, France was kept in ignorance of what was going on. I was not exactly informed of the proceedings. What I told you, was what I believed. The treaty was concealed from us. This was wrong. It was not delicate conduct, and it was a proceeding against which I loudly protested. I was myself ignorant of the treaty, and therefore could not inform you of it. The fact of the treaty having been signed was, not communicated to me until the 17th of July, two days after it took place. He had read that passage with great concern. The noble Lord might say, that from the month of October, to the month of July, intimation was given to France, that negotiations were pending, and that France ought to have conceived that the treaty would have been signed. He did not deny that this was not different from the general tone of the language held by M. Guizot. But, considering the character of the man, and especially considering the friendly feeling of M. Guizot towards England, he could not but say, that after the signing of the treaty of the 15th of July, between the powers who were severally parties to the treaties of 1814 and 1815, having such a man as M. Guizot resident amongst us, and leaving him ignorant of the fact, he was not surprised that there should be some ground for indignation. He did not assert that the parties to the treaty might not have signed it without the concurrence or knowledge of France; but he thought, that they would not have been going out of the way to have dealt with the prejudice, and he thought that there would have been an advantage, if in the most temperate and considerate way we had apprised M. Guizot that the object must be attained, and saying to him, "If you do not immediately determine to join with us, we must proceed without you; and in strict candour we must tell you that the affair must be settled." He had carefully read all the letters, and though M. Guizot evidently saw in a dark vista the possibility of a treaty, yet, on the 6th, 9th, and 14th of July, he believed it was distant, and he was in the humiliating situation of not being aware that on the very next day to the 14th, the treaty would be signed. He did regret that proceeding. The noble Lord said that it was better to communicate the treaty itself. If the noble Lord had said to France, "We are going to war with Syria, and are indifferent whether you join us or not," he believed that it might have been offensive; but if he had gone and said, in a perfectly conciliatory spirit, "This is about to be done; will you co-operate with us, or will you decline to aid or countenance us in out proceedings?" he could not help thinking that much of that interuption of the friendly intercourse which had formerly prevailed, which had taken place, might have been prevented, and he certainty could not help thinking that such a course would have given much less offence than that which had been adopted of signing the treaty, and then communicating the fact. In private life it must be felt that such would have been the fitter mode of proceeding, and it would have been certainly the more friendly course to communicate the positive intention to do an act, than to adopt the act and then to make it known. Let them recollect what had happened at Verona. In the year 1825 France was about to march an army into Spain, and the circumstances which then existed were not dissimilar to those of the present case. At Verona, France communicated to the allies her intention to invade Spain. The three other powers, Russia Prussia, and Austria countenanced the proceedings, but the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Canning decidedly objected to it. But there was, up to the last moment, the most unrestrained communication between the four powers who were parties to the in tended invasion and England, and he could not help thinking, that if the army had been marched without a previous communication being made to England, feelings would have been expressed of regret and disappointment at that course being taken. The noble Lord would find, that communications had passed between M. Chateaubriand and Mr. Canning, and that, in consequence of the remonstrance of England, M. Villèle sent to keep back the army which France was about to send, facts which proved at least that England was admitted to the conference. All that he contended for was, that this was the more friendly course, and although they might fail in convincing the party of the necessity of the course which they were about to pursue, much of that jealousy might have been prevented which was the result of deciding on and adopting an act one day, and communicating that fact the next, and then saying it was too late to interfere. There was another point upon which he felt bound to say a few words. He must enter his protest against Parliament having been allowed to separate last year without a knowledge of the events then in progress having been communicated to it. We were on the point of a rupture affecting the interests of Europe, and the maintenance of our communication with a powerful empire, when the Parliament was permitted to separate. Parliament was sitting on the 15th of July, when the noble Lord said, that he still hoped for the cordial co-operation of France; that France had expressed a favourable opinion with respect to the independence of the Ottoman empire, and the general tenour of the speech of the noble Lord was, that France was favourable to his views. The noble Lord had then the letter of M. Guizot in his possession, containing a strong remonstrance upon the subject of the treaty, and considering the manner of that letter, and that the British Parliament was then sitting, he did say, that whatever the technicalities might be attending the ratification of a treaty, it was not fit that Parliament should have been dismissed at a moment when such important matters, requiring such mature deliberation, were pending. He must say, if such conduct were to be acted on as a precedent, it would undermine the authority of Parliament. But the peculiar conduct of the noble Lord with regard to the treaty should be remembered. So anxious was he for its immediate execution that the parties to it consented that it should be put in operation without waiting for its ratification. Their orders were given to their naval and military commanders to convey fire and sword into the heart of Syria. They knew the ratification of the treaty was not necessary in order to carry its provisions into effect; they knew that its practical execution must endanger our connexion with France; and yet, notwithstanding the insufficiency of its completion, they proceeded on it. As there were many points in connexion with this subject, upon which, before he could form a correct judgment, he must see the official information of the progress of the treaty; and as, before he could judge of the foundation of the opinions which had been expressed with regard to the possible designs of Russia and other powers, we must also be put in possession of similar correct details; he should say nothing now on the subject of the progress of the negotiation, of the objects which were sought to be attained, or of the mode in which that negotiation was carried on. Considering the position of M. Guizot, he was perfectly convinced, that nothing could be further from the intention of the noble Lord than to act unfairly towards him; but he could not help thinking, that the letter of November 2nd, from M. Guizot to M. Thiers, in which he said, that he thought, that there was something to find fault with in what was being done was not a communication which could be considered useful. He could not help saying, that he shared in the feelings of regret which were expressed that the name of France was omitted in the Speech from the Throne. It was difficult to over-estimate the force and effect of that omission upon the minds of the French people. Could there have been any difficulty in taking the words of the noble Lord himself, and expressing regret at the occurrence, maintaining at the same time their own ground, making no concession in point of argument, but expressing merely their regret at the termination of the alliance? In a former Speech from the Throne they had mentioned the alliance as a security and guarantee for peace. Admitting, if they would, that France was to blame, would there have been anything conceded in the expression of regret, that from some cause that alliance was at any end? The expression of regret could not be attributed to any but that which was the real cause. It could not be ascribed to weakness, because they took credit for signal success, and could there have been a more becoming addition to such a portion of the Address, than that regret was experienced at the interruption of those friendly relations which had so long subsisted? If such a thing had been done, it would have been an argument immediately directed against those who took every opportunity of inflaming the minds of the French public against this country; her Majesty said, I have the satisfaction to receive from foreign powers assurances of their friendly disposition, and of their earnest desire to maintain peace. The position of affairs in the Levant had long been a cause of uneasiness, and a source of danger to the general tranquillity. With a view to avert the evils which a continuance of that state of things was calculated to occasion, I concluded with the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Russia, and the Sultan, a convention intended to effect a pacification of the Levant; to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, and thereby to afford additional security to the peace of Europe. If France had conveyed to this country an intimation of her friendly disposition, and that it earnestly desired to maintain peace, what would there have been derogatory to the dignity of this country in expressing a similar feeling? Again, if the speech were true, and he must take it to be true, her Majesty said— I rejoice to be able to inform you that the measures which have been adopted in execution of these engagements have been attended with signal success; and I trust that the objects which the contracting parties had in view are on the eve of being completely accomplished. In the course of these transactions my naval forces have co-operated with those of the Emperor of Austria, and with the land and sea forces of the Sultan, and have displayed upon all occasions their accustomed gallantry and skill. What were the objects which the contracting parties had in view? Not the destruction of the army of Ibrahim Pacha; no, the great object was the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire; and by that means the additional security of the peace of Europe. If they were on the eve of attaining that great object—if they were going to take a new guarantee for the peace of Europe, what objection could they have to the insertion of that expression of regret, which he believed would have been suitable to the case? He fully and sincerely hoped that the clouds which now overhung the subject would gradually disperse, and that Europe would not be visited by those troubles which were threatened. He conceived that there could be nothing more mischievous than the renewal of war. What the consequences might be no man could foresee. What the amount of capital, of time, wasted on preparations we all are witnesses. If that capital and that skill which are expended on these preparations were sunk in the sea, though that would be useless, it would not be injurious: as they are at present exercised they are worse than useless, they are deeply injurious. The subject could not be thought upon without calling to their recollection those events which paralysed Europe from the years 1793 to 1815, and without reinspiring all those bad passions which should be extinguished. Additional taxation, both upon France and England, must take place—the effect would be a withdrawal of so much capital as was expended from both those countries—a loss which would be attended with the most disastrous consequences. He hoped that when that which had passed had been duly considered in France, it would not be supposed that we were influenced by any feelings of jealousy or animosity towards that country. It was suggested that the Syrian question was settled. They might have determined that the powers of the Pacha should be confined to Egypt, but did that constitute the settlement of the question? He conceived that it could not; and it must be remembered that France, standing in its present isolated position, must be called upon to co-operate with England in the settlement of a thousand questions which might arise and produce difficulties. The relation to be maintained between the Pacha and the Porte must be considered. They might give him the hereditary pachalic of Egypt, but conditions might be imposed so stringent and onerous, as to render him entirely dependant upon the Ottoman empire. The peculiar relations of Turkey with respect to the Mediterranean must be considered. Could it be denied that France was the most important power, whose dominions joined that sea? How important then must it be for the very objects of the country, that in any amicable arrangement which might be made, France should join; not with a view to extract from England any concessions that she was wrong; but in order simply that she might be made a party to any arrangement which might be made of this most important question. He repeated that no settlement could be efficacious unless they could still prevail upon France to become a party to it. No man could be more convinced than he, that the object which had been had in view was the security of peace, and in her Majesty's Speech it was declared that their endeavours had been attended with signal success. What was there, then, to prevent their taking fresh steps, and inviting the interference of France? It appeared to him that there was an opportunity in which, without making any unreasonable concession, it might be called upon to interfere. They had been successful, and they had shown that twenty-five years of peace had pot abated the gallant spirit of the navy said the army of England, and now was the time when they could afford to say to France—"We are conjoined with the great powers of Europe for the sake of procuring peace. We can make no concession, but we are actuated by an earnest desire to admit you among our number, that your interests may be consulted, because we entertain no wish to endanger or to curtail your power. We entreat you now to enter into our plans, and to concur with us in considering what would be most advantageous for the interests of France, for the interests of the Porte, and of the peace of Europe." He found now an opinion upon the subject of the importance of the maintenance of peace has been expressed by the gallant General, now a minister of that country. On the 17th July, 1839, Marshal Soult thus Wrote to the Baron de Bourquency:— In the important crisis into which the death of Sultan Mahmoud has precipitated the Ottoman empire, arising out of the events which marked the last month of his reign, the union of the great European powers can alone offer a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of peace. The communications exchanged during the last few weeks have fortunately proved that this agreement is as perfect as possible. All the cabinets desire the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire under the present reigning dynasty. They were all disposed to employ their means of action and influence to secure the maintenance of this element, so essential to the balance of power, and they would unhesitatingly declare themselves against any combination which would affect that balance. Such an agreement in opinion and resolution will be enough (no one can doubt) to prevent any attempt being made against those high interests, as well as to remove every feeling of anxiety, the very existence of which already produces real danger, in consequence of the irritation it causes in the public mind. The King's government believes that the cabinets would be adopting a measure essential for the consolidation of peace were they to declare in written documents, to be mutually interchanged, and, in case of need, published more or less fully, that they were actuated by such intentions. On our part, we formally declare, that these are our invariable intentions, and I authorise you to transmit to Lord Palmerston a copy of the present despatch, after communicating it to him orally. He was confident that there was not one of the four powers which would not express itself to the same effect upon the importance of the maintenance of peace, and it must be admitted, that in the exertions which had been made on behalf of the Ottoman empire, no peculiar advantage, commercial or otherwise had actuated those by whom these steps had been taken, but that they had proceeded upon the belief, that the support of the Ottoman empire was one of the great elements of the peace of Europe. These were some of the grounds upon which he said it was possible to return to peace. He might be doing little good to those of whom he was speaking in saying that which he did say; but he was convinced that they were doing all that they could do in the present crisis for the maintenance of peace. If any man could afford to give good counsel with respect to the maintenance of peace, it was Marshal Soult. If any map, by the opinions which he had expressed, was deeply concerned for the maintenance of peace, it was M. Guizot. If there were any two men who would shun a conflict with England in an unnecessary war, he should say it was these two men. It would be a sacrifice of truth, if he did not express his opinion. His belief was, that they were honest men, actuated by a sincere desire to accomplish the objects which they professed. He believed it firmly of Marshal Soult, because he admired the manly, honest boldness, with which the old soldier came forward, and when France was agitated from one end to another, declared that he bore a grateful recollection of the reception that he had met with in this country—a declaration, not the result of any personal vanity, but which he made, because he felt that in the pomp and magnificence of his reception, feelings of personal admiration of the man were not exhibited, but that they indicated that the old, ungenerous animosity which was entertained in this country towards France was gone, and that we took that opportunity of showing the different feelings which now prevailed in the country. He believed, that it was this which had passed in his mind, and he ran the risk of injuring him, by the compliment which he paid him, when in the British House of Commons he expressed a hope, that he and. M. Guizot might be success- ful in maintaining peace, and that, aided by the returning good sense of France, they might, rescue both France and England from the mischievous calamity of renewed hostilities.

Mr. Grote

rose to explain. The right hon. Baronet, who had just sat down, and the noble Lord, the Secretary of the Colonies, appeared to have understood him to say, that it was his opinion that the design to occupy Constantinople by Russia was a sufficient cause for going to war to prevent that being done. He had, however, expressed no opinion pro or con; but he assumed only that it was the opinion of many of those who were near him.

Viscount Palmerston

I certainly am not going to extend my remarks upon the speech of the right hon. Baronet to any very great length; but I trust that I shall be able to show the right hon. Baronet that the objections which he has made do not rest on any solid foundation. I am happy to say, that in much that has fallen from the right hon. Baronet I entirely concur, and especially in that which fell from him at the conclusion of his speech, I do most sincerely and entirely agree. I concur with him in lamenting that the course which this transaction has taken for a time, and I trust only for a short time interfered with and interrupted those good and friendly feelings, which so long, at least during ten years, have subsisted between England and France. I agree with the right hon. Baronet in thinking that it is of the utmost importance, not merely for the welfare and prosperity of the two countries, but that the peace and tranquillity of Europe require that there should be a good understanding between England and France. I have gone further than the right hon. Baronet on this question, for I have attached greater value than he has to the close connection between the two countries. It has often been my lot to stand in my place here, and justify myself against the charge of attaching too much importance to that connection, but I have always said when the topic has been brought up, that the alliance between France and England rests upon the interests of these two countries, and I cannot help thinking that the real interests of the former with regard to Turkey are identical with those of the latter, and that we have not been pursuing our own line of conduct in reference to Syria, in such a manner as to justify any resentment or hostility on her part to- wards us. There has been great misapprehension in the public mind in France as to the spirit of the proceeding, and the tendency of the steps which have been taken. I am persuaded that when the French nation come to cool their temper, and reflect more deliberately upon the principle upon which we have acted, and know and understand that we have not acted unfairly towards France, we shall find the temper of the French nation, as regards England, return to that frame which we most anxiously desire, and from which we regret that it should have departed. I feel glad, therefore, that the speech of the right hon. Baronet should have shown, first, that in the great interests of England both parties in this House concur, and that, whatever party rival-ship may exist as to competition for power, on this point they do not stand in the way of unity of opinion when it is shown that the great interests of England are at stake; and also that, whatever may have fallen from individuals formerly among the leading men on both sides of the House, there is a settled conviction and an earnest desire that the best and most friendly feelings should exist between this country and France. I can assure the House and the right hon. Baronet that, as on the one hand, we should be able to show that no efforts on our part were omitted in the course of these transactions to obtain the co-operation of France, so, on the other hand, no proper exertions will be left untried to secure the future goodwill of that country; and I am ready to admit, and to declare that, possessed as France is, of vast naval and military power,—placed as she is geographically in the centre of Europe, she cannot be excluded from the great affairs of Europe, and that no transaction of Europe can be completely or securely settled unless she be in one way or another a party to it. The right hon. Baronet thinks that we did not show sufficient court to France, or place sufficient confidence in her by not making her acquainted with the intention of the four powers to conclude the treaty of July 15. I have on former occasions discussed that point in this House, because it is so entirely a mistake to say that we allowed Parliament to separate last year without informing it of the nature of the proceedings with reference to this treaty, that upon two occasions it fell to my lot to enter into an explanation in this House as to the course of proceeding with regard to the conclusion and signature of the treaty. Twelve months passed, during which we endeavoured to bring France to an understanding with us, upon the course of proceeding, and for the particular arrangement which the four powers desired to make. We failed in so doing. We made several propositions to France, which contained concessions on our part, and we stated that these were a sacrifice which we thought it expedient to make, in order to obtain its co-operation. The object was to carry the particular arrangement into effect, and that, by coercive measures, and after the repeated refusals of France to be a party to that arrangement, would it have been anything but a mere mockery to have gone to her, and said "You have declined to give your consent to these measures; we told you before that we should act, and that if you did not agree to our proposal, we should act without you; will you now revoke your refusal, and be a party to this coercive measure, which you before told us you would under no considerations allow?" So far from such a step being really one of conciliation towards France, I have no doubt that although the French government and the French ambassador here might not have made it a ground of quarrel, they would have been entitled to say that it was not a step of conciliation, but that it implied that our former answer had been insincere, and that we were endeavouring to gain an advantage; in fact, that such a course would have been an act of incivility instead of a measure of conciliation. And as regards the question of expediency, it must be clear to every man, especially to those who have read the debates in the French chambers, that if we had taken that course, the treaty could never have been carried into effect. The French government had openly avowed, that delay was their only object; that they wished to gain time, so as to prevent us from doing any thing by those methods of negotiation, which are the legitimate means for governments to employ when they wish to prevent other governments from acting in a way which they do not like. This being so, and if we had acted thus, considering the time and season, when our operations on the coast of Syria must have ceased: and bearing in mind that any such communication between the two governments, would not have been a mere matter of simple "aye!" on the one side, and "no!" on the other, and that, there- fore, it must have led to much loss of time; I say that it would have been an act of the greatest imbecility on the part of the four powers to have taken a course which, if they had taken it, would have answered the object of the French government, by producing delay, and for that year utterly prevented any effectual operations. Then, Sir, again, I am not aware that such a course would have been consistent with usage: because I do not know that the plenipotentiaries of those powers, which had Ministers at the court of England, would have been justified in submitting for the consent of the French government, a treaty which they were about to conclude, until they knew whether their own governments would ratify and approve it.

Sir R. Peel

But you had time to communicate it to the French government. Indeed you did communicate it.

Viscount Palmerston

To whom?

Sir R. Peel

To the French Ambassador.

Viscount Palmerston

No doubt, on the second day after the signing of the treaty, we did communicate to the French ambassador, not only the fact of such a treaty having been signed, but also the substance of that treaty. But that was not a communication on which the French Government could pronounce an opinion whether they would sign the treaty or not. The French Government would have said, "Show us the letter of the treaty—make us acquainted with its details—let us see it in extenso. We have told you already that we cannot agree to the substance of it as already communicated to us, and, therefore, in order to show us why we should agree to the treaty as it is, you must let us see whether there is anything in the details that can make amends for the objectionable principle." Now, with regard to the question of communicating the treaty to Parliament, the right hon. Baronet says, that it was not fitting for the Government to allow Parliament to separate last Session, without making them aware of the nature of the engagements in which this country was about to involve herself. With regard to laying the treaty itself before Parliament, to that there is an insurmountable objection, because we could not lay before Parliament a treaty which had not been ratified by the other contracting parties. But the fact that such a treaty had been signed was made matter of discussion in this House. I cannot charge my memory as to the period when the treaty itself was published in the newspapers—most probably not until after Parliament had risen; but I believe it was either a day or two before, or a day or two after. [Sir R. Peel: No: it sat a few weeks after.] I do not remember; but I do not lay any stress upon it. The point I wished to refer to was, the fact, of the treaty having been concluded, and the general nature of it had both become matter of public notoriety, and had, on two occasions been made the subject of discussion in this House, on the motion of my hon. Friend, the Member for Kilkenny, and that therefore it is impossible to say, that Parliament had been kept in ignorance of the general nature and bearing of our engagements. It would have been competent, in fact, for the House to have passed any opinion upon those engagements, either of approval or of censure, of any Member or Members, if this House had thought fit to have afforded the opportunity. But the right hon. Baronet says, that although the treaty could not have been laid before Parliament until ratified by the other contracting powers, yet that there was a protocol accompanying it, which announced a determination that some measure of exclusion should be acted upon, even before the treaty was ratified. That is perfectly true; but, in the first place, that protocol was founded on the treaty, and could not be laid before Parliament, except with the treaty out of which it arose; and, in the second place, it should be borne in mind, that although the plenipotentiaries of the four powers had determined that those measures should be acted upon, yet that protocol was to go to their courts with the treaty, and if they objected to ratify, then there would still have been time to notify that fact before the orders which had been given, could have been acted upon: and, therefore, that although the protocol in question was in terms precise and decided, yet it, like the treaty, was subject to the approval or the disapproval of the other courts, who were parties to the transactions. Now, Sir, with regard to the despatch which I wrote on the 2nd of November, I should have wished to have communicated that despatch to the French Government before the change of ministry took place; in point of fact, it was communicated a few days afterwards All I can say is, that circumstances prevented me from writing that answer sooner; and it did not appear to me that the fact of a change of Government in France was any reason for preventing me from putting an answer on record to arguments which I could not admit, and to which it was extremely important that there should be a recorded reply. Sir, on the general question of our policy, and the grounds on which it rests, it will be the duty of Ministers to lay before Parliament such facts as will place the House in the position of having better grounds than they now have for forming a conclusion on these matters: and my noble Friend, who spoke in the early part of the evening, has stated in so able and impressive a manner, a general outline of the ground on which our policy has rested, that it is almost unnecessary for me to do more than refer to his speech for a full and complete justification. Though, indeed, it is but fair to ourselves to say, that with the exception of the hon. Member for London, and the hon. Member for Kilkenny, there is not, I think, a man in the House, who, on general grounds, and in the present state of the information possessed by the House on the subject, would be disposed to raise any objection to the course pursued by the Government. The state of affairs in the Levant for some years past has been pregnant with immense danger to the peace of the world. The Sultan had for a long time been constantly menaced and attacked by a subject who had already grown too powerful to be put down by any means which his sovereign could command; nay, who who was in a position which rendered it impossible to expect, that he would longer forbear to act, after open declarations which showed not only that he was determined to cast off his allegiance, but also greatly to increase the range of his aggressions. The Sultan having shown himself unable to resist in, the Held the attacks of the Pacha, it became necessary for him to throw himself upon some other power; and the only choice we and the other powers had, was to give by common consent to the Sultan the general protection of the powers of Europe, or to allow him, as in 1832, to resort to the support of one power, which, by affording him assistance under such circumstances, would afterwards require an undue preponderance in its future relations with Turkey. Such being the position of the Sultan, I say, that the subject is one in which the interests of this country are deeply concerned, and not less the interests of the whole of Europe, and that the object of the policy pursued was to avert events which must inevitably have involved the great powers in very serious difficulties. But then it is said, "You ought, not, however important you might think the subject to be, to have engaged in this course of policy under the objection of France, because you were incurring the very danger of war, which you say it was your object to prevent." Now, in the first place, I say, that in all our previous diplomatic transactions with France, the principles and opinions which she had placed on record, entitled us to assume that France could not, without a dereliction of her own principles, and a departure from her own professions, take up arms in support of the Pacha and against the Sultan; and if she did not do so, then I conceive that no further question could arise, than that some would think, that the enterprise was a more difficult one than we had calculated on, and that our available means of coercion were not sufficient to accomplish the purpose we had in view. Sir, the result has proved that our information and opinions on the subject were better founded, because we not only succeeded to an extent beyond all the expectations of those who underrated those opinions, but I may fairly also say, that our success was more rapid than any persons, even those who were the best informed upon the subject could have been justified in expecting. But why has it been so? For the very reason which ought to recommend the course of policy to my hon. Friend, the Member for Kilkenny, because we were assisting a willing people in relieving them from a slavery which they found to be intolerable, and in aiding them to return to their allegiance. For if the people of Syria had not to a man been anxious to return under the Sultan, and get rid of the rule of the Egyptians, the squadron and the marines which we had on the coast would not have been sufficient to accomplish that result which it has been our good fortune to realise. Therefore it is, I say, that we take credit on good grounds; first, in thinking, that what we were about would not disturb the peace of Europe; and secondly, that we were not undertaking an object which we had not the means to accomplish. Now, Sir, although undoubtedly great irritation has been created in France by the course which the four powers have felt themselves bound to take, yet I feel bound to say, that if the same pains had been taken to enlighten and inform the public opinion of France as to the nature of the recent transactions, and the spirit in which they have been conceived, as have been taken to mislead them, and excite unfounded jealousy and groundless animosity. I am convinced, that the interruption which has unfortunately for the moment taken place in the good understanding between the two countries, either would not have existed at all, or if it did exist, it would have been infinitely less, and in a much more mitigated degree. Sir, I shall not on the present occasion go into those details and minor points in the arrangement to which my hon. Friend, the Member for Kilkenny, has referred, or I might advert to many points which he will find explained, when the papers are laid before him. I shall then be ready, when the House are in possession of full information, to go into a more detailed explanation, which will then be more easily understood by the House. I will only add, that it affords me great satisfaction to think, that if my hon. Friend does put to the vote the amendment which he has read to the House, he is not likely to have a very large or numerous party to support it. If I were inclined to criticise his address on the same principles as those on which he has criticised ours, I think I might point out almost as many matters that ought to be touched on as he has alleged against our Speech and Address. Sir, I shall not further detain the House. I can only again repeat, that if we did not advise the Crown to include in the Speech from the Throne, any expression of regret that France was not a party to the treaty, it was not because we did not feel that regret, or that we thought the House would not respond to it, but because, as I apprehend, it would have been unusual, and inconsistent with the ordinary principles on which Speeches from the Throne are usually framed, to have expressed regret at an interruption of a good understanding, which had not been marked by any diplomatic event. If either country had withdrawn its minister, and had thus interrupted the diplomatic relations of the two countries, then it would have been a public act, of which the Crown might have taken notice in the Speech from the Throne. But for the Crown merely to have taken notice of the irritation which has been manifested in various ways would not have been consistent with the ordinary course of proceeding, in framing a document of that kind. If the right hon. Ba- ronet thinks the omission to which he alluded implies any want of regret on the part of her Majesty's advisers, I can assure him for myself, and equally for all my colleagues, that the regret which he has expressed is sincerely shared by us, and that we confidently hope, that before any length of time elapses, we shall find the present irritation of feeling in France had subsided, and that France has returned to her natural and proper position in Europe, and that the good understanding which has arisen out of the common fundamental interests of the two countries, will be found to have returned to its former condition.

Amendment negatived.

Address agreed to, and referred to a Committee.