TURKEY AND EGYPT. (Hansard, 1 June 1840)

§ Mr. Hume

said, that as that bill imposed a taxation of more than 2,000,000l. upon the already impoverished people of this country, he would avail himself of the present opportunity to state his objections to the foreign policy of the Government, which was alleged as the cause for the necessity of that increased taxation. The people of England were going to be punished to support the policy which the British Government was erroneously pursuing with regard both to Turkey and to Egypt. If the policy of the British Government were erroneous, as he sincerely believed it to be, the House of Commons ought to withhold the supplies from that Government until it saw clearly what that policy was, and what object it was intended to attain. In the most gracious Speech which was delivered from the Throne at the commencement of the Session, Ministers claimed credit for the peace which had been maintained in the East, owing to the union of the Five Powers. The collective note of the Five Powers, delivered on the 27th of July, had prevented the Divan from concluding peace without their concurrence. He had, on a former occasion, made such comments as he thought fit upon that note; and the noble Lord had not felt himself in a situation to deny any of the positions which he had then laid down. All that the noble Lord had then said was, that he had been completely misinformed on all the points which he had noticed, and that he was consequently totally unacquainted with the policy pursued by the Five Powers. Since that time an important event had occurred. The French ministry had been changed. The French Chamber, before they would consent to vote the money which the new minister, M. Thiers, had called for, required him to declare explicitly the policy on which France was acting towards Turkey and Egypt. M. Thiers then stated what his policy was, observing that he had made it known to the British Government and to others, 782 and added that France was strong enough to maintain it, whether the other Powers concurred with France or not. He would read to the House one or two sentences from the speech of M. Thiers, as reported in the Moniteur, to show how different was the policy professed by that statesman from that followed by the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He was sorry to say that we had estranged ourselves from France, that we had allied ourselves with the great enemy of Turkey, that we had joined in supporting the policy of Russia, and that in so doing we had promoted and forwarded the ambitious projects of that Power. For those projects we were now maintaining a fleet in the Mediterranean at the expense of half a million sterling a-year, and, instead of forwarding, we were positively preventing peace between Turkey and Egypt—which was essentially a Russian object. Now, if it were true that France had offered to withdraw ten sail of the line from the Mediterranean if we would do the same, it was quite clear that France had no idea of war or of the necessity of war. He, therefore, thought, that as the French Chambers had called upon M. Thiers, so the British House of Commons ought to call upon the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for a declaration of his policy before it voted the taxation requisite to support it. M. Thiers, in his address to the Chamber of Peers, on the 14th April, 1840, said— The opinion of France is, that the independence of Turkey should be maintained; but by the word independence, we do not mean an impossibility. France believes, at least her cabinets have believed, that to maintain the Turkish empire, could not mean the restoration to the Turkish empire of all the provinces which have been successively detached from it; but we have thought, that to maintain the Turkish empire was to prevent any new dismemberment; and, if by the side of the Turkish empire a new empire had risen up which consented to the bond of vassalage which consented, as in other times, to be the faithful vassal of the Turkish empire—that if Egypt had succeeded better than Constantinople in arranging her finances and in creating an army which, though they do not resemble our finances nor our army, are yet superior to, those of Constantinople, it would be a real service to the Turkish empire to give to it the Pacha of Egypt as an ally, for besides the Turkish empire, which might defend itself, you would have the rear guard of a powerful vassal, useful and able to support the Sultan in moments of difficulty. 783 The dispute between France and England upon this question seemed to be this: that the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, insisted that the Divan should not make peace with Mehemet Ali, by yielding up to him Egypt and Syria. The noble Lord was willing to let the Divan yield up Egypt. France, however, was desirous that Syria, as well as Egypt, should be yielded up to Mehemet Ali, and that for Syria he should pay tribute, own his vassalage to the Porte, and consent to assist the Sultan, whenever he was required to do so. M. Thiers further said, that if the Powers should attempt to take Syria from Mehemet Ali, he would interfere on his behalf, and would prevent it from being taken from him. Such being the case, he thought that our Government was the cause of the present state not of peace but of suspended hostilities, and of the large naval and military establishments now kept up in the Mediterranean and along its coasts. He called upon the House, as it valued the interests of England, and those of free and liberal Governments, to act in concert with France, and to cease from being the ally of Russia. Why was there this difference of policy between England and France, the two countries, of all others, which ought to be united? He complained that the present policy of the British Government was hostile not only to a strict alliance with France, but also to the interest of Egypt, which we of all others ought to maintain. He maintained that, in the year 1833, the Sultan had given Mehemet Alia Syria as a Pashalic, and had afterwards given him Adana and other places as an appendage to it. He likewise maintained, that it was in consequence of the Sultan's having attempted to take back those provinces from Mehemet Ali, and of his having landed troops in Asia Minor to enforce his attempt, that Mehemet Ali had been compelled to put his own forces in motion, and that in the progress of events the Turkish fleet had deserted to him from the Sultan. What he further complained of was, that the policy of the British Government had not only stopped the negotiations for peace, but that when Mehemet Ali had offered to give back the Turkish fleet on certain terms, to be guaranteed by France and England, England had refused to guarantee those terms. The hon. Member read an extract from the speech of M. Thiers on the 14th of April 784 last, but we could not collect even the substance of it. It was his opinion that it would not be in the power of France and England united to take Syria from Mehemet Ali, and as the sentiments of M. Thiers were in direct opposition to those of Lord Palmerston, it became a question of great importance whether we should persevere in our present erroneous course at so heavy an expense to the British people, and whether we ought not to promote an union between Turkey and Egypt, and allow the heavy armaments to be put down which were now kept up at an immense expense to every country. He understood that within the last six months Redschid Pasha had made a proposition for peace to Mehemet Ali, which would have been accepted, had not the British Government interfered to prevent it. These were points into which it was necessary that the House should inquire, before it gave the means of supporting so large a naval force as was deemed necessary to support our negotiations with Turkey and Egypt. He wished that the noble Lord would satisfy him and the country that he was proceeding in the right course. He would, in conclusion, ask the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether any proposition had been made to him from the government of France for the purpose of promoting peace and withdrawing the heavy armaments now in the Mediterranean?

§ Viscount Palmerston

said, that his hon. Friend had placed him in considerable difficulty, by endeavouring to draw him into what he regarded as a premature discussion of the details of a negotiation which had not been concluded, and it would be very prejudicial to the public interests if he were to discuss it in the manner in which his hon. Friend had invited him. It would not be consistent with the public interests, with those interests especially of which the department over which he presided was charged with the conduct, to state to his hon. Friend all the particulars which he wished to know; yet he did feel t his duty to assure the House that almost very assertion which his hon. Friend had made as to the folly of the course pursued by this country, as to the communications which had taken place between this country and other powers, as to the conduct of her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and as to the desires and wishes of 785 the Turkish government, were all founded on the most extraordinary misinformation, and he might really venture to say, that not one of them had the remotest resemblance to what had really taken place. The hon. Member had told the House, that the French government had notified to us, that they would have recourse to arms if we attempted to take Syria from Mehemet Ali. No such communication had ever been made to us by the French government. The hon. Member had also said, that the British Government had been informed, that if any attack were made by the British on the Egyptian fleet, it would be protected by the fleet of France. No such communication had ever been made. This method of denial came to almost the same result as that of assertion, and if he were to deny, and explain why he denied, all the information on which the hon. Member had proceeded, and which he was sure the hon. Member fully believed, he would be led very nearly to the point to which the hon. Member wished to bring him. He had denied the basis on which the hon. Member had founded his observations. The hon. Member said, the House had been called on to vote a very large amount of additional taxation, and that it was rendered necessary by the mistaken policy which he had endeavoured to pursue. Had the hon. Member forgotten that the great bulk of this increased taxation arose from measures which he himself had urged on the Government, and which he admitted were not founded on an erroneous policy? A great part of it arose from the reduction of the rates of postage; a great part of it also arose from the wants of the public service in Canada, and the question in which we had been involved with China; and a very small proportion of the whole amount now proposed to be raised was required, as the hon. Member wished to represent, for the service of the navy. But he would tell the hon. Member further, that the increased demand for the service of the navy did not arise, as he imagined, from the particular question now pending in the Mediterranean. The reasons which rendered it necessary were stated by Government when the condition of the navy was discussed. Larger supplies were required to place the navy on a footing more consistent with that which ought to be its standing with reference to the navies 786 of the other great powers of Europe. So far was it from having been stated by the French government, as the hon. Member supposed, that if this question were settled ten French sail of the line would be withdrawn from active service, that he was not aware that the settlement of this question would lead to any reduction whatever in the aggregate amount of the French navy. He believed the contrary to be true;—he believed that if France and Britain were entirely agreed upon every matter of detail that could arise in connexion with this question, there would not be, as the hon. Member seemed to suppose, any reduction whatever in the naval force of France, and he said that, independently of the Eastern question. When we looked at the various important questions now pending in every quarter of the globe, and considered the amount of the naval armaments of other powers, it must be seen that a very small portion only of the increase of taxation had been called for owing to the state of affairs in Egypt. He objected no less strongly to the other principle which seemed to have furnished the staple of the reasonings of his hon. Friend. The hon. Member seemed to suppose that if he could show to the House that the French government or any French minister entertained a particular opinion on any question, it became a duty and obligation on the British Government immediately to adopt and follow that opinion in all respects. Now, no man in the House attached greater value than he did to the intimate alliance of Britain and France. He believed it was not more advantageous to the interests of the two countries than beneficial to the security of the peace of Europe; and since he had had the honour of holding his present office he had zealously endeavoured to promote the continuance of that alliance. On more than one occasion he had had to defend himself in that House against a charge of doing the very thing which the hon. Member thought he should now have done—that was placing the British Government entirely at the beck of France, and serving the interest of France, whether or not it was consistent with our own. On those occasions he had always stated that he thought nothing was more to be wished for the interests of both countries, than that the alliance should continue as long as it was consistent with those interests; but he 787 had at the same time not concealed the consideration which must force itself upon every mind, that the two nations were too great, two powerful, and too high-spirited, and had too many important interests at stake, which each Government was bound in duty to protect, to allow of their being coupled in any such indissoluble bond as would induce them to follow each other's policy invariably. The Government of Britain should neither follow the policy of France, as contradistinguished from that of Britain, nor that of Prussia, nor that of Austria, but they ought to look to the interests of Britain, without paying any regard to the opinions that might be entertained by any foreign government or minister. The point was to show that any proposed policy was consistent with the interests of Great Britain, and if that could be made out, the denegation of it would become a matter of charge against a government. But the mere fact of a foreign minister holding a particular opinion on any point was no argument, and proved nothing as to the soundness of its policy. He utterly denied, and so far the House would believe him, that the French government had at any time intimated any intention of taking up arms against the other four Powers on this question. He was assuming the statement made by his hon. Friend to be correct, that France differed on some points from the other four Powers but he assured the hon. Member that he was mistaken if he thought that difference if difference existed, likely to lead to a war between Britain and France. He thought that was very improbable, independent of the other relations existing between Britain and France, which would be sufficiently strong to prevent the French government from breaking them, and rushing into the other extreme of hostility. Looking at the other great interests of France, and the questions she now had on her hands, it was not to be supposed that France would enter into a chivalrous crusade in defence of interests not her own, which she could not reconcile with the national faith and honour, and with the obligations she had entered into with the other Powers. The hon. Member had done him the honour of supposing that the collective note presented in July last to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople was entirely the work of his (Lord Palmerston's) own hand. The hon. Member said 788 it was by that note that he had prevented an amicable arrangement being concluded between Mehemet Ali and the Porte. If the hon. Member supposed that we had such an entire influence and control over the other four great Powers, as to be able to persude them all, France included, to sign and deliver that note, he must admit that the hon. Member paid a compliment to the influence of the British Government. It was not for him to explain from what quarter the note arose. All he would say was, that the British Ambassador immediately and most cordially joined in it; but the suggestion did not come originally from him. The French government had never retracted or disowned that note, and when the hon. Member asked him to state to the House what had been the policy of Britain on this question he could only refer him to the speech from the Throne at the beginning of the Session, in which it was said that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was an object which it was thought deserving of every endeavour on our part to defend. That opinion he still held, and the more he thought of it, the more satisfied he was that it was sound doctrine. He was fully persuaded that the interests of this country required the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, and that those interests would be sacrificed if the policy which the hon. Member wished for were to be adopted. The integrity of the Ottoman empire would at once be destroyed by the dismemberment of some of its most fertile and rich provinces, and consequently its independence would be reduced to the mere shadow of a shade. He was convinced that even taking that view, which was so much a favourite of the hon. Member, bearing on the naval expenses of the country, if what the hon. Member called peace, which was a mere surrender to Mehemet Ali, had taken place at the time mentioned by him, this country would have been compelled in order to prevent the consequences that would have ensued, to keep up a large naval force in the Mediterranean. Thus, as far as we were concerned, peace would have taken place without any of the advantages which peace ought to bring with it. He could not conclude without expressing a hope that we should be able to make some arrangement, in conjunction with the other powers of Europe, which would restore amicable 789 arrangements between Turkey and Egypt, and prevent the recurrence of that unfortunate policy which once brought the Russian army to Constantinople, and if it were resumed, would in a short time bring another to the shores of the Bosphorus. He could only say, that when negotiations of this importance, complicated from their very nature, from the number of interests concerned and the distance which separated the Powers who were acting in them, were made the subject of discussion before they were finished, and when hon. Members, acting, like his hon. Friend on misinformation made statements which were entirely unfounded, and incorrect regarding those transactions, persons holding the situation he filled were placed in great difficulty. He might, perhaps, not have answered the expectations of his hon. Friend, and he was afraid he should not be able to do so until matters came to something more like a termination; but till that time he should be compelled to refuse to go into the points on which explanation was sought by his hon. Friend, and confine himself to setting him right as to the misinformation he had received. He trusted, however, that the House would not take for granted that the facts were as his hon. Friend had stated, for he could assure them that his hon. Friend had received the most extraordinary misinformation on all the material points to which in the course of his speech he adverted.