Mr. More O'Fenall, in rising to move the navy estimates, begged the indulgence of the House in discharging a duty at all times difficult, but particularly so when undertaken for the first time, and under the necessity of asking for a considerable increase on the estimates of last year. The number of ships of all classes in commission on the 1st of January, 1839, was 224, and on the 1st of January, 1840, the number was 239, being an increase of 15 ships of all classes in commission. It was not necessary for him to refer to the circumstances which had rendered necessary that increase 455 of naval force, the committee being perfectly aware that the amount of force was arranged by the Government at large, the Board of Admiralty having no control over it whatever. The amount of excess this year on the gross estimates of last year was 395,477l.; but the credits in aid, which are variable every year, were large last, and unusually small this year; it was, therefore, necessary to vote 461,544l. in excess this year over the vote of last year. He thought he should best consult the wishes of the committee by proceeding at once to state under the different heads in the estimates, the amount of increase on each vote, and the grounds on which it was proposed. In No. 1, the vote for wages, it would be necessary to ask the committee for an increase of 1,000 men. On the 1st of January this year, the number of men borne on the books was 1,211 above the number borne on the 1st of January last year, and it would be necessary, therefore, to ask the committee to assent to that increase, and a sufficient sum to pay them. On No. 1, there would be an increase this year of 60,000/l., of which 36,700l. would be applied to the payment of 1,000 men, and the remainder for the increase of pay to petty officers, surgeons in small ships, engineers, and naval instructors in ships of the line. These heads of expences were explained to the House on a former occasion by his hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, as well as the grounds on which the alteration was made, and he believed the statement had given considerable satisfaction, not only to the committee, but to the naval profession in general. Under the second head, entitled "Provisions for men," the increase was 50,597l., arising partly from the increased number of men to the extent of 18,690l., and 23,000l, caused by a large increase in the price of the principal articles of provision. The demands from other departments will amount to 8,685l. On that point, the committee were aware that the Board of Admiralty had no control, and therefore were in no respect to be held responsible for the increase of the estimate. In No. 3 there was an increase on the vote, but not one which would fall on the country, by 6,000l. for postage. In Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, with a small decrease under some heads, there was still an increase of 2,881l. In No. 8, for the wages of artificers, labourers, and Others employed in her Majesty's establishments, at home, the increase amounted to 60,664l., of which 50,664l. would be ap- 456 plied to the payment of an increased number of artificers and labourers in the naval yards, and 10,000l. to the construction of steam-engines at the manufactory at Woolwich, and the repair of steam-engines. Since 1836 there had been a gradual increase of ships in commission every year. They had gone on building an increased number of steamers and small ships, of which the navy stood in great need; consequently the attention of the officers of the dock-yards, had been diverted from the building of large ships. From the peace establishment of 1819, and for a considerable period afterwards, it was not necessary to pay much attention to the construction of large ships. At the close of the war we had a great number of such ships lying in ordinary; and up to 1830, scarcely any progress was made by the foreign Powers in increasing their naval force. But since that time, great attention had been paid to the subject, not only by France, but by every other naval state in Europe, and it therefore became us, if we wished to maintain our maritime supremacy, to give attention to the subject in time, and by providing an additional number of large class ships, to take the best, the cheapest, most efficient, and most desirable means of preserving the peace of the world. It was with that view, therefore, that the Government, even in the midst of the present financial difficulties, looking to the great importance of preserving the naval supremacy of the country, had not hesitated in coming down to the House, and proposing what some would consider a large increase of the estimates. In No. 9, the foreign yards, the increase was small, being only 900l., which was caused by the sending to Jamaica and to Malta, engineers for the repair of steamers, and also by the payment of a naval builder sent to India, where it was proposed to construct ten large ships, and to convey home in them the frames of ten more, inquiries being now in progress by an officer resident at Trincomalee for that purpose. In No. 10, the increase was also large for naval stores. The increase proposed last year was considerable, and this year it amounted to 136,153l., of which a portion would be applied in providing the necessary stores under the head of standing contracts, and a still larger portion to increase the works in the dockyards and supply stores for the construction of large ships. It had been stated by his hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, that we 457 had last year in the yards a supply for five years, but as it was now intended to apply the strength of the yards to the construction of large ships, it was necessary to get an increased supply of timber. The committee was aware that, although there might be a large quantity in the yards, if they had not enough of a particular kind, the rest would be comparatively useless. An opportunity offered at the present time of getting a considerable quantity of that kind generally most difficult to procure, and most desirable to possess. A large portion of the vote would be applicable to that purpose. At no previous period were the stores of the navy more complete than at the time when his hon. Friend the Member for Halifax last brought forward the estimates, so they continued, and the vote of this year would place the whole of the dockyard stores in such a state of efficiency as to be equal to the demands of any sudden emergency. We should have within our yards, the means not only of equipping the number of ships in ordinary, but also the materials for carrying on extensive works, to effect, if necessary, a considerable increase in the number of our ships, without being obliged to go into the market under circumstances which might tend greatly to enhance the price of building materials. The next head of expenditure, the 11th, for new works and improvements, was one of considerable importance to the efficiency of the navy. The excess this year, under that head, was 33,132l. The Board of Admiralty had determined to ask the House to assent to that increase to be applied mainly to new works. Great improvements were made last year at Deptford, by the establishment of a rope manufactory; this year it was proposed to establish machinery there for the spinning of hemp. These improvements, when completed, would effect a saving to the public of 70 per cent, on the manufacture of rope. A great advantage would arise from the increased quantity supplied by the machinery, which would prevent the necessity of going into the market in time of emergency. At Woolwich the committee was aware that considerable works had been going on for a long period, docks and basins had been in course of construction. In adding the mast-pond to the basin, it had been necessary to remove the storehouse situated over the mast-pond, and it was now proposed to erect a large storehouse in place of it for machinery, which would cost 20,000l. It was also proposed 458 to construct a railway for the conveyance of heavy materials from the wharf. It had also been thought proper to erect a building with suitable machinery for making fuel for steam engines, on the plan of Mr. Grant, a gentleman who had been for some time in the public service, and who had contrived a composition of coal-dust and coal-tar, being about 40 per cent, cheaper than coal, one-half more efficient than Newcastle coal, and one-fifth better than Welch coal. It consequently, when used, kept a steamer much longer at sea. In former years, 3,000 l. had been expended in cleaning out the harbour at Chatham; this, by means of a new process which had been adopted, would in future he hoped, be wholly, or in great part, saved. At Portsmouth it was proposed to have additional saw machinery, and to extend the metal mills. At Pembroke it had been proposed to erect two new slips for the building of first-rates, and to construct timber-sheds, and roofs over slips, as also to establish sawmills. On No. 12 of the estimates there had been a small increase of 500l. On No. 13, the increase this year was considerable, in all amounting to 53,754l. But the expenditure on this head he considered to be of a character the most useful to the public service, because it was applied principally to encourage the furnishing of steam-ships by private contract. A large part of this sum would be applied to the contract for steam-packets, which had been entered into for conveying the mail between Halifax and Liverpool. On Nos. 14, 15, 16, comprising half-pay to officers of the navy and Royal Marines, military pensions and allowances, and civil pensions and allowances, there was a decrease this year, as compared with the last, of 34,712l. On No. 17 and 18 for freight, on account of the army and Ordnance departments, there was an increase of about 23,3267. He had now gone through the various heads on which there was an in crease, and endeavoured to explain to the committee the grounds of increase on each, head. The whole charge amounted to the sum of 5,659,051l. Of this sum there would be 3,372,039l. appropriated to the effective naval service, and 2,287,012l. to the non-effective service, and services not strictly naval, which were under the control of the Admiralty. He had not, in anything that he had said, referred to the estimates of former years, nor had he gone back to the acts of former Governments in order to justify the present scale of esti- 459 mates, he had not done so, because he thought that the vote of each year ought to stand on the particular circumstances of that year, and because he was unwilling to offer any observations which could have the effect of calling away the attention of the committee from the subject immediately before it. This he felt he should have been wrong in doing; he had always heard in that House, that the question of the navy estimates ought not to be made a party question, and thinking so, he would content himself by moving, without further remark, that 35,165 seamen be voted for the year ending 31st March, 1841, including 9,000 Royal Marines, and 2,000 boys.
§ Sir G. Clerksaid, it was not his purpose to object to the very distinct and intelligible manner in which the hon. Secretary of the Admiralty had gone through the various items of the estimates as compared with those of the last year. He had no objection whatever to offer to any part of the hon. Gentleman's statements. But, at the present moment, when the efficiency of the naval service had called forth so much attention in the country, he must say, he regretted that the hon. Gentleman had not gone more fully into the reasons which were considered to justify an increase of 1,000 men in this vote as compared with that of last year. Still he had not the slightest objection to that increase; on the contrary, having felt it his duty last year to object that the navy was not manned adequately, he should be guilty of inconsistency if he objected either to an increase of men, or of the stores placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, on this occasion. However, he thought the increase in the estimates was certainly very large, and he was sure that if the Admiralty applied due care and circumspection in the expenditure, he should feel no doubt about there being a proper amount of stores in the arsenals, nor any apprehension of the efficiency of the ships which would be fitted out. With such sums at their disposal he should feel that the Admiralty would incur a very heavy responsibility if we should suffer any injuries to be done to British property off our own coasts, or any insult to be offered to the British flag in any part of the world. These estimates, he repeated, were very great, and very much greater than the navy estimates of late years. Any person who heard that the House was voting 5,659,051l for the naval 460 service of the year, must think the vote adequate to the demands of a period of war. This was a larger vote than had been asked in 1830, when it was last his lot to propose the navy estimates to the House; and he found, on comparing the whole of the heads, that instead of any diminution, there was an increase on all he heads above the last vote taken by the Board of Admiralty, under the Government of the Duke of Wellington. It had been made a charge against that Board of Admiralty, that in 1829 and 1830 they had a greater number of ships in commission, and a greater number of men afloat than were voted in the estimates. That arose from a practice which had prevailed previous to the accession of his right hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke (Sir J. Graham) to the office of head of the Admiralty, of voting in the estimates the number of men who would be wanted to be retained on foreign stations, without including the reliefs. When, therefore, ships were sent out from home to relieve those on foreign stations, until the ships they were to relieve arrive at home, and were paid off, they were obliged to employ a considerable number of men more than were voted Owing to the peculiar circumstances of the east of Europe in the year 1830, representations were made to the Government, of such a nature that it was found impossible to send home any of the ships in the Mediterranean. In that year they had 33,000 men afloat; but while 5,594,000l. was all they asked of the House, 5,300,000l. was all that was expended; so much less was their estimate than the present. It was true that the Admiralty charges had since been burdened with the whole expense of the Post-office packets, which was stated last year at 105,000l.; but the committee would also remember, that the Admiralty of 1830 had to provide for the charge of protecting the revenue along the coasts of Kent Sussex, and that they had also several cruisers in the Channel for the protection of the revenue. He had been more particular in calling the attention of the House to the subject of the excess of men in 1830, because it had formed a charge of irregularity against the Admiralty of that period, that they had taken the surplus of what was voted for one head of service to supply deficiencies in another. His right hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke 461 had consequently proposed that a balance-sheet should every year be laid on the table, which would enable the committee to detect any irregularity of this kind; and he was now bound to say, that though he then thought that it was not practicable to calculate the estimates so accurately as this plan supposed, yet when his right hon. Friend's plan was put in execution, he was surprised at the extraordinary accuracy of his balance-sheets and the coincidence between the sums expended and the sums voted, as displayed in the balance-sheets. But still he was clearly of opinion that whenever any emergency arose, such accuracy could not be looked for, and was impracticable. Accordingly, in 1839 as great irregularities had occurred as any the House had ever seen in the years with which he was connected and sums had been taken from one piece of service and applied to make up a deficiency in another, just as before. The charge made against the Admiralty of which he had formed a part was, that they had made up the deficiency of the vote for wages, by applying to that purpose part of the money voted for the purchase of stores. This they were able to do, without detriment to the public service, for though they had allowed the stores of hemp to run extremely low, because the hemp was very bad in that year, yet he believed that the right hon. Baronet, when he came into office, found that all the stores, excepting hemp, were ample. Now, he found that in the last year there was 100,000l. voted for wages and victuals, which was not expended on those heads of service, and 100,000l. expended on stores more than voted, exactly balancing the deficiency upon the number of men voted. But the number of men actually voted ought to have been employed during the year. If any one would compare the number of men voted with the full peace complements of the ships in commission last year, he would find that those complements were 2,000 men short; he would find that the Admiralty at the present moment were liable to the same charge as to the number of men voted. The House had been told that the ships in the Mediterranean were on peace establishments. Now, he (Sir George Clerk) said, that considering that other nations always kept their ships there fully manned, it was not good policy to keep our ships below their full complements, as appointed 462 by the order in council for the time of war. On this head he would request the attention of hon. Members to paper A, which lay on the table, and was explanatory of these points, respecting the number of men which they were about to vote. The hon. Secretary for the Admiralty had told them that it was necessary to maintain the whole number of men now afloat. Now, he (Sir G. Clerk) found that the number of men necessary to give full complements to the ships at present in commission was 26,524; but the number actually afloat was only 24,076; so that the complements in these ships were 2,448 short of what they ought be. But this was not all; for he believed that most ships that were on the Mediterranean left England with short complements. The Powerful, after remaining three months in order to complete her number, was still obliged to leave with a short complement. The same thing happened to the Benbow. Now, it was clear, that if ships had short complements when they were sent out, instead of carrying supernumeraries in order to make up for casualties in the crews of the ships now in the Mediterranean there must be considerable deficiencies even in the peace complements of those ships. After the answer of the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, respecting our negotiations with Turkey, he could assure the House that he was very unwilling to state anything that could bear on that point; but he must say that, whatever might be the circumstances which required 12 line of battle ships in the Mediterranean, nothing, in his opinion, could justify keeping up there so large a force, except the object were to exert a moral influence; and if this were the object, he said the force was not enough, because England ought to have not only as many ships there as any other power, but, above all, it ought to be carefully provided that the ships should have an efficient number of men aboard; for he believed that no naval officer would contradict him when he said that if a collision arose he had rather engage with five ships well manned than with eight, or even ten, imperfectly manned. What was the state of things in the Mediterranean? Last year England had nine sail of the line there; the French had eight sail of the line; now we had increased from nine to twelve, while the French had increased from eight to fifteen, 463 which was the number of ships they had in commission in the Mediterranean at present. Some of their ships were of the largest class. There were two of 120 guns, one of 100, two of 90, four of 86, and ten of 80. He could give the name of the ships, if necessary, from the French official lists. Another 90-gun ship had lately been commissioned at Rochfort. If, therefore, it was our object to enforce the policy of the noble Lord, we ought to have a larger fleet in the Mediterranean. The hon. Member for Halifax last year quoted an observation of the Duke de Choiseul, that if it was the object of France to embarrass this country without committing herself, no more effectual course could be adopted than by exciting the fears or the jealousy of England, to oblige her "to keep the fleet of this country on a war establishment. We were, therefore, falling into the trap of the Duke de Choiseul—that is, we were increasing our force in the Mediterranean, but not to sufficient extent to enable us, notwithstanding the expense, to hold this language to France, that she had a force there which ought to excite jealousy. He had been greatly disappointed, that in the statement of the Secretary of the Admiralty he had made no allusion to two important alterations which it was said were in contemplation when the navy estimates were under discussion last year. One was the increase of the crews of the ships.
§ Mr. O'FerrallThe complement was only 3 per cent below that of 1815.
§ Sir G. Clerksaid, that this was no criterion, because the size and scantling of the ships were different in 1815. It was the duty of the Admiralty to keep up the armaments to their full complement. They would see the great difficulty they would have to contend with when they increased the number of ships. When a ship was paid off, it was not difficult to get the men to enter a new ship; but if they wanted an additional 1,000 or 2,000 men from the merchant service, they would find extreme difficulty in getting them; so that every expedient should be resorted to for keeping men in our navy. One resource formerly was the coast blockade; but that was done away, and the coast guard substituted. It had been stated by the Secretary of the Admiralty, that the coast guard was not in so efficient a state as had been contemplated. He understood. 464 that a commission had issued to place the coast-guard in a more efficient state than it was at present; he wished the hon. Secretary had stated if any thing had been done on that subject. He concurred with him in thinking that the subject of the navy ought not to be made a party question; and that every means should be resorted to to put the navy in an efficient state. He was afraid that little advantage could be derived from the men in ordinary; the whole number—the greatest number—taken in the year did not exceed 500 men. That was not a number adequate for the services of the country at this moment. He must again advert to what he had pressed upon the committee last year—the distribution of our naval force and the facilities of increasing it on a sudden emergency. He understood that there were twenty-one sail of the line in commission; of that number, twelve were in the Mediterranean; three first-rates were guardships at home, having only one-third of their complement; of the remaining six, three were destined for the Coast of China, and two were stationed in the Tagus; so that there was not one to have recourse to on any sudden emergency. If ships were necessary in the East Indies or the West Indies, South America or North America, for the protection of our commerce, there was not within reach a single line-of-battle ship for the purpose. Why, he would ask the noble Lord, should we keep three line-of-battle ships in the Tagus? One of them had been lying there for three years, without lifting an anchor. Why should the flag-ship of Admiral Gage, or that of Admiral Omanney, remain in the Tagus for months and years without moving? The House had heard the confession of the noble Lord, that he had no influence with the Portuguese Court. He should like to know what the answer of the Portuguese government would have been if the noble Lord had said, "I shall withdraw the British line-of-battle-ships from the Tagus." What was the object in keeping them there? Was it necessary, in order to keep Donna Maria on the throne of Portugal, that we should incur an expense of 100,000l. a-year, for three line-of-battle ships for five years, which cost the country half a million of money? If the noble Lord could show that the Portuguese government was exposed to difficulties and embarrassments on ac- 465 count of British interests, there might be some excuse; but after the statement of the noble Lord, that at Lisbon (and the same thing might be predicated of him at every capital in Europe) he had no influence whatever, why was the country put to this expense for no purpose? The Blenheim had been withdrawn to go to China, because we had no other ship to send. What had been the consequence of having no reserve at home? In July last year we had the first intelligence of the rupture with China. If we could have immediately despatched a sufficient force to Canton, an adjustment might have been brought about with much less difficulty than now. But we had no reserve; it was necessary to wait from July, 1839, to February, 1840, and then the Blenheim was despatched, and two frigates had only just sailed from Portsmouth. He doubted whether we had a sufficient force in the East Indies to spare a ship of the line; at all events, none had reached China. If it was necessary to have a force in the Mediterranean, we were obliged to leave the coasts of this country unprotected, and all our arrangements as to Turkey might be upset by a Russian fleet. He believed that Government were in possession of some information respecting the Russian fleet in the Baltic, and that no gallant admiral, at a dinner, or anywhere else, would now talk of the Russian fleet as a "pasteboard squadron." He wished the hon. Gentleman had given the committee some information respecting the state of ships in ordinary He had been happy to hear that it was intended to recommence building new line of battle ships, and that two new first class ships had been laid down at Pembroke. As to the ships in ordinary, many were fifteen and twenty years old, consequently in a decayed state. He feared that during the last year there had not been that minute visitation of ships in ordinary by personal examination, as was the practice a few years ago. He thought there would be gross neglect if the ships in ordinary were not now put in good condition. Last year the Secretary of the Admiralty had stated, that there had been a considerable addition to the number of artificers, which was increased to 7,591, and the number had been now further increased 800, making the total number 8,391—a number so near the greatest amount in time of war, that, he repeated, the Admiralty, with such means 466 at their disposal, would be guilty of the grossest neglect of duty, if they did not in a short time, remove from the minds of the people of this country the impression that our navy was in a weak and ineffective state. If Great Britain was to maintain the proud pre-eminence of a great naval and maritime power, it was necessary to build ships, however inconvenient the expense might be. He was happy to hear that it was the intention of the Board of Admiralty to lay down ships of large class, and new line of-battle ships. He regretted that the system had been dropped for some years, and he believed the consequence would be, that it would add very materially to the expense the country would incur. The policy of the Government had placed the nation in that state of feverish anxiety which the Duke de Choiseul said would be the most effectual means that could be adopted by those who wished the downfall of England—namely, that of being compelled to keep up a large establishment. Believing the country had the means, if required to exert them, of putting forth its full strength, and confident that the Government had means of information not within the power of persons on that (the Opposition) side of the House, of the circumstances connected with our foreign relations, which justified our keeping up so large a force, he was not disposed to offer any opposition to the vote of 35,000 men.
§ Mr. O'Ferrallsaid, the complements of ships had been increased, but not according to one uniform per centage. Thus the Pique, which had formerly 275 men, now had 306; the Blonde, which had 275, now had 280; the Andromache, which had formerly 175, had at present 185. With respect to the vessels sent to China, it would be better not to enter upon that question at present. He could assure the hon Baronet, that the state of the ships in ordinary had not been neglected; that they were regularly surveyed, and a report made of the state of each ship, and their condition was most satisfactory: we could send out a fleet much larger than any other country, he might say almost as large as any two countries.
§ Mr. Humedid not understand why this country should maintain a war establishment in time of peace, because France and Russia chose to increase their navies. If such a principle were adopted, it would be impossible for this country ever to 467 enjoy the benefits of peace. The House was called upon to increase the naval force of the country at a moment when the speech from the throne declared that the greatest concord subsisted among the five great powers. He, however, believed that any thing but concord prevailed among those powers. To our interference he attributed the state of hostility still existing between Turkey and Egypt, and he regretted to find, that the Government of this country was acting in harmony with that power which was the most anxious for war, and the greatest enemy of Turkey: he alluded to Russia. The desires and intentions of that power were completely advanced by the British Government, and this was the real reason why an increase of force was required, for peace was endangered by the policy we were pursuing. Russia and the noble Lord (Palmerston) had lately contributed to the maintenance of those differences between Turkey and Egypt, which were so fatal to the resources of the Porte. Mehemet Ali had agreed to pay the tribute, and to accede to a settlement of affairs, but England had stepped in and prevented him, for on the 28th of July a representation was made to the Divan, in the name of the five powers, forbidding that body to ratify the agreement previously entered into on the 26th of the same month. The statement had gone forth that the British minister had insisted on our fleet being sent to Alexandria, to attempt, in conjunction with the fleet of Mehemet Ali, the destruction of the Turkish fleet. The bad and mischievous policy pursued by this country had rendered an increase of force necessary. The idea prevailed abroad, that Russian counsels were more favourably listened to by the British Cabinet, than the counsels of France, and he feared it was the case. Yet this country was bound, by every feeling, to maintain terms of amity with France; for both countries had the same interest to preserve the peace of Europe, and both were engaged in the amelioration of their institutions. He therefore regarded any circumstance which tended to alienate France from this country as a most unfortunate occurrence. It was absurd to suppose that France had any designs on Egypt. She could never maintain a possession there but at an immense cost, and after a struggle she would eventually be compelled to 468 abandon it. He felt assured, that by our mistaken policy we were promoting the object we wished to prevent—the partition of Turkey; and he protested against the increase of force, which the people of England must be taxed to maintain, and which was rendered necessary purely by the false line of policy pursued by the British Government.
Lord Ingestriethought that the speech of the hon. Member who had just sat down advocated the interests of France rather than those of England. The Secretary of the Admiralty, in introducing the navy estimates to the notice of the Committee, with great good taste, had abstained entirely from allusions of a party character, in which he thought the hon. Secretary was deserving of great praise. He had always felt, that on subjects connected with the navy the interests concerned were of such an important character, that the House ought to lose sight of all party considerations, and unite in doing what was, on the whole, the best for the interests of the country. However much, in the present state of the finances of the country, they must regret any increase of the expenditure, he could not but rejoice that the Government had come down and asked for an increase of men, and also for a large vote for increasing the building and general resources of the navy. He would not enter into the grievances and wants both of the officers and men of the navy; he trusted that those grievances had been fully considered in the naval and military commission, whose report they were waiting for most anxiously, to see what was done to relieve the pressure on many officers in both services. When the navy estimates had been brought forward last year, an argument had been thrown in the teeth of Members on that (the Conservative) side of the House, that they had endeavoured to show the weakness and inefficiency of the navy, as opposed to the navies of other countries. He was free to confess, that it was a disagreeable thing for this maritime country to have its weaknesses exposed; but he thought it much more essential that we should know our weakness, than go on in fancied security, and expose ourselves to danger when least expected. He was led to make these statements from a comparison of the navy lists of France and England, and also of Russia. The House would 469 hardly credit the extent to which the French navy bad lately been increased. He would, with the permission of the House, read a statement of the extent of the French navy, as published in the official navy list in January of this year, and compare it with that of our own navy, as seen from the Navy List. The French had now in commission two ships of 120 guns, one of 100 guns, three of 90 guns, four of 86 guns, four of 80 guns, one frigate of 60 guns, one of 58 guns, five of 52 guns, and five of 46 guns, two armed en-flute to carry troops. Now, we had 22 line-of-battle ships in commission; out of these three three-deckers were lying in the ports. We had two ships of 120 guns, and one of 104 guns. These ships were manned at one-third of their complement of hands, and he was credibly informed, that such was the shortness of the manning in the Britannia in particular, that they were actually obliged to put petty officers to the oar on any state occasions which occurred, and the marines were employed in the boats of that ship. A great deal had been said with respect to the men in that ship, They had recently been very much increased in number, and that showed the propriety of discussing these matters, both in and out of the House. The Government, which had always said, that the ships were perfectly well manned before, had given a practical denial of their own statements, by adding to the complement of hands on board this ship. Now, to make a comparison of the state of the ships of the two services, the Committee must bear in mind, that the French had a very large proportion of frigates as compared with us. We had altogether, of all sorts, only eight or nine frigates in commission. Out of these we had only two of 50 guns, and those were of a moderate scantling in comparison with those more recently built. In the Baltic there were 28 sail of the line of Russian ships; in the Black Sea there were also 14 sail of the line of Russian ships—very large and efficient ships he could state as an eye-witness; Russia had also a great proportion of very large and heavy frigates. Now, what he contended was, with respect to the different armaments and our keeping an armament afloat, in comparison with other countries, that it was our duty so to conduct our negociations, that, if possible, we might prevent the necessity 470 of having such large armaments afloat, or that we should have our armaments fit to enter into collision with any country if it were required. He was also of opinion that we were much more likely to preserve the peace by showing the world at large that we were ready to meet an enemy whenever called on. He did not say this with the view of provoking any hostile feeling to any country whatever; out when we saw other countries increasing their fleets, we were perfectly warranted in putting our naval armament in the best possible condition. He must also observe, before he left this point, that the French had one ship of 120 guns, three of 80 guns, and one of 46 guns, all ready for sea; and they were building four of 120 guns, twelve of 100 guns, nine ships of 90 guns, and two of 80 guns; whilst we in England had building two ships of 120 guns, three of 110 guns, one of 90 guns, and six of 80 guns. In this calculation he had omitted taking any thing below frigates, because he took it for granted that these were pretty much the same in both countries, as he found no great difference in them. With respect to steam-boats, about which his hon. Friend, the Member for Halifax, had taken great credit for saying, that we were building our steamers in a very effective manner—the French had, at this moment, twenty-five steamers afloat and in commission; and we had only, besides packets running between Dublin and Liverpool, Holyhead and Dublin, and this country and Calais, only ten or twelve steamers, and only six of these were armed. He found, for the French service afloat, 23,173 men, and on shore 10,144 men, making a total of 33,317 men. We had 24,165 seamen, 2,000 boys, and 5,550 marines afloat, making a total of 31,715; and 3,500 marines to be employed on shore, making a grand total of 35,215, being only an increase above the French navy of less than 2,000 men. When he made a comparison between this number of men employed by England and France, he was bound to take into consideration the difference between this country and France. We were essentially a maritime nation; we had immense colonies to look after, and a trade going on with every part of the world. France had never yet assumed the character of a maritime nation, therefore he thought we had a right to make observations when 471 we saw her navy equalling in ships of a large scale, though not in number, the ships of this country, and almost equal, (he might say equal) to us in the number of men employed. The very great encouragement given by France to the navy was also worthy of the attention of the House. The King himself had made personal exertions in its behalf, and had put one of his sons, the Prince de Joinville, in command of a frigate. In Russia also, the Emperor every year made an inspection of the fleet, and went on board every ship himself. He would also remark, that there was a great facility of manning the ships of those countries which we did not possess. He understood it took four months to prepare the Powerful and the Impreguable for sea. He believed also that the Pique was short of her complement of hands when she sailed; and the Blonde also had sailed the other day short of her complement of hands. The Grecian, he also believed, was in the same predicament. Our sailors were flocking to the American service, because there they were better paid, and it was a fact that they always found the American ships half manned with English seamen. This had been stated, and his own observation convinced him of its correctness, in a work of Captain Marryat. It had been stated by the Secretary of the Admiralty that the ordinary seamen at Portsmouth assisted to man the ships in case of any emergency. He found that the total number of men entered on the books was 583; the total establishment should be 879; he found that about 200 were necessarily employed in cleaning the ships—a great many of these were warrant-officers—leaving only 383 men to man an armament. Would the gallant Admiral (Sir C. Adam) tell him that 380 men would man a snip for sea? He did not, therefore, think that the ordinary could be very much relied on as a source for manning their fleet. A scheme should be devised of a fresh scale of pay to encourage our seamen to remain in our service, and ships should be provided for young lads to enter the service, who should be entitled to increased pay, and have pensions after a certain time, to keep them attached to the service. He also thought it essential in a country where, he was glad to say, there had always been a great feeling for the navy, that they should now and then see a fleet at the ports to keep 472 that feeling alive; now our harbours were deserted by them. He hoped that the case of the men and midshipmen had been considered in the commission; they saw mates leaving the service every day—men who, after a hard service of six or seven years, passed their examination, and were then doomed to serve seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years more, and then get no rank and very small pay. They could not wonder at officers leaving the service; neither could they wonder if they found very great difficulty in getting youngsters to enter the service when they saw what they were likely to undergo. He understood that the Revenge had such difficulty in getting midshipmen that she had sailed with only ten on board. There were only 387 mates in the whole service, 428 midshipmen, and 430 volunteers. He found that the midshipmen were getting gradually disgusted with the service. When our foreign relations were in a state that required us to arm at all, he thought that we should arm in a way to show that we were determined not to suffer any aggression. He would ask the House to recollect whether in the last two or three years we had not had a few circumstances to make it quite necessary for us to have a proper armament. The insult to the Express packet he thought had been very lamely got out of, and the affair at the Mauritius had never been thoroughly sifted in the House. There were no vessels of war to protect our ships at Buenos Ayres in the blockade, and there was certainly a great want of vessels of war to protect our shipping in the blockade of Mexico. He thought also that the French, having made an asylum port of Port Mahon was very injurious to our interests in that quarter. He thought it would be very satisfactory to the country if the Channel fleet was to be manned and kept at sea, and kept in that state of discipline so necessary for the service, and to give the officers the opportunity of gaining experience in sailing ships of the line. He was very glad to hear that we were likely to go on building large ships; he must say that that had been very much neglected. His right hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke had established a rule, which had been departed from, of building three ships every year, and the sooner that plan was resumed the better. He could not sit down without saying a word as to the patronage of the navy, 473 however much he regretted to introduce a subject which might have the colour of party; but he was justified in doing so when he saw the party colour given to the appointments which had been made. The recent appointment to the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital had been a source of disgust to the navy in general; he would say no more than this, that in the official list of the navy he saw fifteen officers bearing the rank of Grand Cross of the Bath above the gallant officer who had received that appointment. He did not want to say anything against that officer, but it was an appointment which reflected anything but credit on the Admiralty. In a debate which had taken place elsewhere, the noble Lord at the head of the Administration had said that he did not consider it necessary to distribute honours amongst those who had distinguished themselves in action. The other evening the gallant admiral (Sir C. Adam) had said that Sir J. Gordon had come with tears in his eyes and regretted his removal from Chatham dockyard. Had that distinguished officer been nominated to the appointment in Greenwich Hospital, he being, as the gallant Admiral had stated, in distressed circumstances, the country would have been, he ventured to say, perfectly satisfied. He had made those few observations with a sincere wish to benefit the service to which he belonged, and which he hoped, and felt confident, would always be a credit to the nation. But it was necessary that it should be maintained in a proper manner, and if the Government would ask that House for such supplies as were necessary for maintaining an efficient and respectable fleet, both at home and abroad, certain he was that they would not be refused.
§ Sir C. Adamsaid that the noble Lord opposite had talked of the superiority of the French navy to ours. All he could say in answer to that was that, although many of our ships might be smaller, yet in point of numerical strength we had much the advantage. He admitted that the French had gained considerable expertness and experience in naval matters, and that their naval force was considerably increased, but he, nevertheless, contended that ours was more efficient. He was borne out in this opinion by that of Sir F. Maitland and Sir R. Stopford, both of whom considered, as appeared from their despatches (the gallant Admiral quoted) 474 that our ships were in all respects more efficient than those of America, France, or Russia. It was said, that we were not at present in a condition to go to war, and that the number of men was incomplete. On the other hand he asserted that it was quite impossible, without negociations or explanations, that we could be so suddenly plunged into a war as not to be able to supply the full war complement in sufficient time for any hostilities that we might have to encounter. We had 200,000 registered seamen, and much greater facilities of increasing our naval force in this respect than other countries. There could be no want of men. Numbers of young men, well calculated for the service, from being usually occupied in fishing, and who were to be found about our shores, could be had in a very short time. Our resources, therefore, for manning a fleet, in case of an anticipated war, were far greater than those of other naval countries. The noble Lord had also talked of the necessity of a fleet for the protection of our own shores. That also could be had, if the necessity existed. There had been in our own ports, during the past summer, no less than eight line-of-battle ships. With regard to ships in ordinary, there were many men available for that service, and most of them could be sent to sea in a few days. The noble Lord had not only asserted the superiority of the French navy generally to ours, but stated, that their ships were larger than ours. Now, although the English ships were inferior in point of size, he maintained that they were more handy, more active, and more effective in engagement with the enemy. In Lord Howe's action, the French ships were all second-rate, while of our force of twenty-five sail of the line there were but two second-rate. He conceived it, therefore, much better to use small active frigates than to follow the plan which the French had adopted of building large ships. It had been stated, that our ships in the Mediterranean were short of their complements. He could only say, that he knew not where the hon. Baronet, who made that assertion had gotten his information, because such was not the fact.
§ Captain A'Courtsaid, he had hoped that the gallant Admiral would have given some sort of answer to what had been stated on that (the Opposition) side of the House, respecting what be must call one of the most flagrant abuses that had ever 475 been committed—he meant the appointment of Admiral Fleming to Greenwich Hospital. What, he would ask, had been the naval services of that gallant officer to entitle him to that appointment? He distinctly replied, none. It was painful to him to make these observations, but in this case the necessity of doing so was forced upon him, and, however painful to his feelings, he would not shrink from avowing his real sentiments upon the subject. If the situation of Governor of Greenwich Hospital were, as it had hitherto been considered, an honourable retreat for the most distinguished of our wounded flag officers, then he would say that Admiral Fleming had no earthly claim. However long he might have served, he had never partaken in any of the gallant actions of the last war, and was, therefore, clearly ineligible while so many distinguished officers who had fought—and bravely fought in those actions stood senior to him. He would venture to say, that no act of the Government, since its accession to office, had given such dissatisfaction to the navy as that appointment. And how could it be otherwise when they saw one great object of their ambition, which they thought was only to be gained by the most gallant services, bestowed upon an officer, who, however excellent might be his private character, had never had the good fortune to distinguish himself in an engagement with the enemy? It had been said by the noble Lord at the head of her Majesty's Government, that that was only a consideration of a secondary nature. If by that the noble Lord meant that the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital was only to be made the reward of political services, the sooner the noble Lord abolished the useless sinecure the better, for the receipts of the office would go more than half way towards supporting 100 gallant veterans. And now with respect to the navy. That it was in a deficient state had been so ably pointed out already, that he felt it almost unnecessary to say a word in addition to the statements of his noble Friend and the right hon. Baronet near him, which clearly showed that our shores were totally unprotected, and that our ships were too few in number and too small in size. He would ask any Gentleman conversant with naval affairs how seventy-two gun ships with 500 or 600 men could compete with French ships of eighty or ninety guns and 700 or 800 men? It would be 476 unjustifiable and cruel to place British seamen in such a position; for, however gallant and zealous they might be, they would not have the physical force to uphold the honour and the glory of the country. He hoped the occurrences which took place during the American war would open the eyes of the Government to the impolicy and the injustice of exposing small vessels to those of greater force and power. As to what had been said of fitting out twenty or forty sail with the greatest expedition, it was his firm conviction that even the lesser number could not be fitted out under a space of twelve months, and what during all that time, was to become of our colonies and of our commerce? It was true that we could not have a larger fleet without a greater outlay, but how much better would money be employed for that purpose than was the useless expenditure on the coast of Spain? Useless he called it, for we obtained nothing by it. The French alone were the gainers, for they had obtained a footing in Minorca. How much better would the money which the Government had expended upon never-ending commissions have been employed in adding to the efficiency of our navy. Looking at the agitated state of the world, who could doubt that war might break out on a sudden; and if such should be the case, he earnestly prayed that the anticipated means of offensive and defensive operations would be amply realized.
§ Sir T. Cochranesaid, the question of our naval establishment divided itself into two parts. The first of these was its comparative strength, when contrasted with the naval armaments of other nations; next, whether it was sufficient to promote the extension of our commerce, and to afford it protection when extended. With respect to the first part—namely, the comparison of foreign naval armaments with ours—it had been said, that the number of effective seamen and boys amounted to 35,565, and that another 1,000 had been added to increase the force of our vessels in commission. Both these statements he denied. We had not that number of men and boys, and even the trifling addition of 1,000 had not been made. It was only of late that the packet service had been handed over to the superintendence of the Admiralty, and this service was as distinct from the navy as was the military service. Indeed, it was even more distinct. 477 The packet service was not likely on any occasion to be called to the aid of our naval force, whilst the aid of the troops had been frequently resorted to. The packet service, then, ought not to be mentioned as a part of our effective naval force. Then there was a consider able number of men engaged in the surveying department, who should also be deducted. After these deductions, the number of seamen would be reduced from 24,165 to 21,072, those engaged in the packet service being 2,379, and those in the surveying department 714; add then, to the 21,072 for marines afloat 5,503, and for those ashore 3,500, with 2,000 boys, and the whole amount, instead of 35,565, was reduced to 32,072. There was another reduction which also weakened our effective force very considerably, namely, the number of small craft which we had on the coast of Africa, and in the West Indies, for the purpose of preventing the trade in slaves. The propriety of this employment of our navy was not to be questioned; on the contrary, it redounded highly to the honour and reputation of this country, that they were so employed; but at the same time it was obvious that they could not be called into operation should any sudden emergency render their assistance necessary. But, in reality, the question was not so much the want of ships as the want of men. Look to the naval condition of other countries. See how that of France had increased: her naval force at present amounted to from 31,000 to 32,000 men. The French estimate for 1840 was 20,498; but there had been added since the budget was published—
The complements were not official, but they were calculated at the same rate as those given in the budget. What was the state of the Russian fleet? She had one ship of 120 guns, three of 100, seven of 84, nineteen of 74, making in all 30 sail Of the line; then there was one frigate of 478 56 guns, three of 52 guns, eighteen of 44, besides corvettes, and the whole manned by 33,000 men. Of these there were 16 sail of the line in the Black Sea. It was said last year that the Russian fleet was ineffective—indeed, that it was hardly seaworthy; but a different statement was made by an officer who had seen that fleet, and whose report to the Admiralty had produced a different impression there. He had not asked any questions on the subject of the gentleman himself, for he felt a delicacy in asking information which he might afterwards use in the House; but he acquired the information by conversing on the subject with naval men al their clubs. Now, with this comparative view of the state of the naval armaments of other countries, he would appeal to the House, and ask whether, looking at France, and putting Russia altogether out of the question, was this country in a position to red ace a single ship, if, which God forbid, circumstances should compel us to a war with France—if Russia were not in existence—if America remained yet undiscovered, could we reduce a single ship from our establishment? America, he knew, had no desire to go to war with this country; but, with the excitement which existed with respect to the boundary question, if a war should be forced on us, a twelvemonth must elapse before we could send out a fleet. He felt that even with respect to France, they were not superior in the strength of their fleets, and when they looked at Russia and the United States of America, the House must admit that the naval establishments of this country were not on an efficient footing. Let them now look to the state of our navy with regard to its capability to protect our commerce, and in doing so he would compare the state of our commerce now with what it had been at a former period. He would go back to a favourite period with that House; he meant to the period between the American war and the French war—to the period between the year 1783 and the year 1793. Let them then see what was the state of their commerce in the year 1790. At that period, it was to be remembered, our trade was confined to the East and West Indies and to the United States of America, for, from every other place, this country had then been excluded. In the year 1790 this country employed 15,015 vessels with a tonnage of 1,460,000. 479 The value of the exports amounted to 18,544,2052l. and the value of the imports was equal to 17,783,572l. What was the position of our commerce at the present time? In the first place, England had vast colonial possessions now, which she had not at the period to which he had referred. England had now possession of Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, the Island of Trinidad, Tobago, and St. Lucie. They were also in possession of a large portion of Guiana, while the whole coast of Spanish America was open to their commerce. At this moment, from east to west, from north to south, the sea was white with the sails of English vessels, and our exports and imports had increased in an enormous degree. On the 31st of December, 1837, this country employed 26,037 vessels, with a tonnage of 2,791,018, while their crews amounted to 173,506 men. The number of vessels employed in foreign trade, exclusive of those in ballast or engaged in the coasting trade, was, inwards, 12,252, with a tonnage of 2,346,300, and outwards, 10,614 vessels, with a tonnage of 1,861,121. The official value of the exports in 1838 amounted to 105,170,549l., and the imports to 61,268,320l. The number of vessels employed between Great Britain and Ireland was 16,347, with a tonnage of 1,585,624; and, in carrying on the rest of our coasting trade, 122,448 vessels were engaged, with a tonnage of 9,315,563. That was the state of our commerce now, as compared to what it was in the year 1790. Let them now consider what the state of the English navy was during the peace, or from 1783 to 1793. In the years 1785, 1786, 1787, and 1788 there were 18,000 men employed in the navy, and in the year 1789, 20,000 men. But, before he proceeded further, he wished to call attention to the mode in which the naval force of the country was at that time distributed. According to an account printed by order of the House of Commons on the 23rd of June, 1814, the following was the disposition of the navy in the year 1787. In the East Indies there was not a single ship. In Jamaica there was one fifty-gun ship, two frigates, and three smaller vessels. In the Leeward Islands there was one frigate and two smaller vessels; in Nova Scotia six small vessels; in the Mediterranean one fifty-gun ship and three frigates. But besides these they had, cruising about the British Islands, two 480 frigates and thirty-three smaller vessels; there were also at Portsmouth seven ships of the line, two fifty-gun ships, one frigate and three smaller vessels. At Plymouth there were five line-of-battle ships, one fifty-gun ship, one frigate, and three smaller vessels. In the Medway they had two line-of-battle ships and one small vessel. In the Downs they had one small vessel, and in the Thames they had one frigate and five smaller vessels. In short they had abroad nineteen vessels, and at home sixty-eight men of war, whereas now there was not a pennant to be seen on the whole coast. The statement he had made referred to a period of profound peace, and at the present moment there was a prospect of war from almost every quarter. It might be said that many of the vessels he had enumerated were only guard ships; but even if they were to be so considered, still they could have been sent out on an emergency, and their places would have been supplied by others. In the year 1790, in consequence of a dispute with Spain, about a miserable plot of ground, and, in consequence of the capture of a small vessel, this country called upon Spain for redress. Spain declined to comply with the demands of this country, and in consequence, this country armed itself, and prepared for war, and so far from sending out guard-ships, and nothing more, he found that Upwards of 3,000,000l. had been expended in preparations. There was one material fact to which he was most anxious to call the attention of the House, and it was the difference in the state of public opinion now, in regard to impressment to what it was at the period he had been considering. At the time to which he had alluded, impressment was resorted to as a matter of course, but now it was happily different. Impressment was now viewed with horror, and it could not be resorted to without exciting the strongest feelings against such a course of proceeding. Yet, if any sudden emergency called upon them to arm, nothing was left to them but to resort to impressment for manning the fleet. That was a state of things which was to be deplored, for impressment ought only to be had recourse to in cases of absolute necessity, and it was the duty of that House to take steps to guard against such a necessity arising. What, then, was to be done to prevent the necessity of resorting to impressment? It was his opinion, and the opinion of 481 other officers of high authority, that they ought to keep up a permanent home establishment, sufficient to command the fear of some nations and the respect of all. [Hear, hear!] At present they had no guard-ships, nor any vessels ready to send out to any point on which this country might be threatened, and he thought no one would say, looking at the state of our foreign relations, that it was wise or politic for a great commercial country like England, to be so destitute of the means of defence. He might be told, that to increase our naval force would be to create a great additional expense to the country; but, if that increase was made, England would be in a situation to command the respect of other nations, and even to force them to disarm. The expense, therefore, would not be greater than at present; for, if they were in a position to enforce their rights, their fleets might be called home as soon as their disputes were settled, and such reductions might then be made as might be deemed necessary. If there was a strong permanent establishment kept up, then, if it was necessary on any emergency to arm, they might at once despatch the vessels at home to the point where their services were wanted, and replace those sent out by others. That was the principle upon which the country had formerly acted, and he had no hesitation in saying, that it was the principle upon which they ought to act at present. The time had been, when other nations looked on the decisions of that House with respect; and the respect of other nations for this country was mainly to be attributed to the powerful peace establishment which had formerly been maintained. He trusted the House, therefore, would follow the example which had been set in former times, and that they would do everything in their power to put the naval establishment on a footing of the most perfect efficiency. He hoped the House would permit him to call attention to the great interest which was felt in the state of the navy in former times. In the first place, he would call attention to a period, 200 years ago, when the Protector Cromwell was at the head of the Government of this country. In 1664—
Men. 9 sail of the line 7,821 8 corvettes, less 3 corvettes avisos 1,270 3 brigs, 226; 7 brigs avisos, 644 870 4 brigs, canonniers 208 18 brigs, and 3 small vessels 1,098 5 steamers 360 11,627 Add amount of estimate 20,498 Total 32,125 The Protector was so sensible of the respect paid by foreign States to the naval power of England, when kept in a respectable condition, that instead of reducing his navy 482 at the conclusion of the war in 1654, he ordered all the ships to be repaired and put into good condition; he also ordered new ones to be built, and filled the storehouses and magazines with all necessaries for the fleet, as if it had been a time of greatest danger.In 1695 Parliament had addressed the Crown on this subject. The House of Lords sent up an address, in which they stated—That having spent some time upon consideration of the fleet, both at home and abroad, and of the great increase of the naval force and strength of our neighbours, we conceive it to be our duly to your Majesty and the kingdom, humbly to represent that the honour and safety of this nation, under the Providence of God, chiefly depend upon your strength at sea; and whereas, by the long continuance of this war, the number of your ships must have been diminished, and those remaining greatly impaired, we think it of the highest importance to your Majesty's service, and the security and interest of your people, that you would be pleased to give speedy and effectual directions for the repairs and increase of your Royal Navy.In 1697 the King acquainted Parliament, after the peace of Ryswick—That the naval fleet of the kingdom was increased nearly double what it was at his accession, and that the charge of maintaining it would be proportionably increased, as it is certainly necessary for the interest and reputation of England to have always a great strength at sea.In 1707 there was another address to the Crown on this subject, in which it was stated that—It is a most undoubted maxim, that the honour, security, and wealth of this kingdom does depend upon the protection and encouragement of trade, and the improving and right managing its naval strength. Other nations, who were formerly great and powerful at sea, have by negligence and mismanagement lost their trade, and have seen their maritime power entirely ruined; therefore, we do in the most earnest manner beseech your Majesty that the sea affairs may always be your first and most peculiar care.The documents to which he had quoted related to times of peace, when war had been terminated, and he trusted the House would not now neglect the precautions which had then been taken, and which had secured for this country the respect of other nations. He hoped the House would adopt such measures as would secure for this country in times of emergency such a fleet as would be able to 483 protect their interest and command the respect of surrounding nations. He had to apologize to the House for having trespassed so long upon their time, but he felt strongly upon this subject, and he was convinced that the welfare and prosperity of the country mainly depended upon the efficiency of their naval establishments, and he could not, therefore, allow himself to sit silent when a question of such importance, and in which he felt so deep an interest, was under consideration.
§ Viscount Palmerstonwas anxious to say a few words before the House came to a vote on this question, because objections had been made in the course of the debate to that part of the policy of the Government with which he was more immediately connected. On the subject itself which was now under discussion, it was unnecessary for him to say anything, for all parties bad concurred in the propriety of the vote which was proposed for their naval establishments. The hon. Baronet, the Member for Stamford, had given his testimony in favour of the judicious arrangements which were adopted with regard to stores. He had said, that the amount of stores were satisfactory, and that the number of men to be employed, and the way in which they were to be employed, was perfectly judicious. The hon. Baronet had said, that the amount of stores, and the number of men to be employed were sufficient, and he had only to appeal to the statements of the hon. and gallant Officer who had last spoken, to prove, that the Government had not proposed too large a vote upon the present occasion. The considerations which arose on the discuss on of a subject of this nature were twofold. In the first place it was to be considered, what the number of ships ought to be, and that ought to depend on a view of the foreign relations of the country, and of the state of the naval power of other countries. Another consideration was, how the naval force ought to be distributed, and that, again, must depend on circumstances of a fluctuating and temporary character. Now the opinions which they had that night heard expressed, were favourable to the course which had been adopted by the Government. The discussion showed, that the Government had taken effectual steps to place their naval establishments on an efficient footing. With the exception of 484 the hon. Member for Kilkenny, the general opinion of the House was, that the amount of force asked for was not too large. The Government had been accused of carrying on war with a peace establishment, while the hon. Member for Kilkenny blamed them for keeping up a war establishment in time of peace. The Government was, therefore, willing to put the one opinion against the other, and he thought they might fairly draw the conclusion, that the present naval force was equal to the wants of the country. The right hon. Baronet opposite had said, that the increase in the naval force had been rendered necessary by the course of foreign policy which had been pursued by the Government. He had said, that the Ministers had kept up abroad a continued system of agitation, and that the necessity for increasing the naval establishment of the nation had only been created in consequence of their mismanagement of their foreign relations. In reply to that charge he could only say, that they had, at all events, been tolerably successful. Whatever objections the hon. Baronet might make to the conduct of the Government with respect to foreign affairs, they had, however, generally carried their objects, and if they had done that, and if they had conducted the whole of their proceedings with only a peace establishment, he thought those who approved of their general policy would agree with him, that they had not only been successful, but that they had also shown judgment in the course of policy which they had pursued. The hon. Baronet had said, that the Ministers were the dupes of France. He had said, that the nation wished to pursue, with regard to this country, the policy which had been followed by the Duke de Choiseul, and to compel England to make great efforts in order to exhaust her resources. The answer to that charge, however, was to be found in the statements of hon. Gentlemen opposite, who made it a matter of complaint, that France maintained a larger naval force than England. The fact, however, was, that no such views were entertained by France, and there was no hostility displayed by that country towards England. France had no hostile views on this country, and even the present amount of her naval force was in some degree temporary, for of the number of ships now at Toulon, not a few were only fitted out in order to take the place 485 of others whose periods of service had expired. The hon. Baronet had also complained of the present distribution of the navy. He had said, that they ought not to keep so many ships in the ports of Lisbon, where the hon. Baronet argued they were not so available as if they were stationed as home. He must, however, contend, that those ships were as available in the port of Lisbon as if they were in the harbours of this country. Nay, he would say, that they were even more available, because, if, at any time, they wanted to send out a fleet without making the intentions of the Government known to other nations, they could send them with more secrecy from Lisbon than from this country. Lisbon was a centrical position, and he must contend, that those vessels were as well situated at that port as if they were home. The hon. Baronet had said, that if they wished to force the Portuguese Government to attend to their remonstrances, they ought to withdraw those ships from Lisbon instead of retaining them. Now, if the argument were a good one, it would fairly lead to the inference, that it would be better for them to have no fleet at all. It was obvious, therefore, that they were rather chargeable with having too many, rather than too few ships. With regard to the distribution of the fleet, this was a matter which must be regulated by the circumstances of the case. It was quite clear, that they should have a considerable force in the Mediterranean, and the main bulk of the fleet was there. But then it was said, that their own shores were not sufficiently protected. Undoubtedly, if there were any reasonable expectation of an attack being made on the English coast, the force Was not sufficient. But he was happy to say, that there was no ground for apprehending any such necessity. With regard to the Russian fleet (and the state of our relations with Russia had been made a matter of reproach), if the statements which had reached him were well founded, it would be perfectly preposterous to ask the country to expedite a fleet against a power to which no inimical intentions could be imputed. He would say only one word more with respect to what had fallen from his hon. Friend as to the present system of policy pursued by the Government with reference to affairs in the Levant. He thought that his hon. Friend was not very consistent with himself. He had laid down princi- 486 ples, and meant to act on them in a way which would lead to consequences wholly at variance with those principles. He said, that his object was to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, and he proposed to re-establish peace between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. And how? Why, by the concession on the part of the Sultan to Mehemet Ali of the whole of his demands—by the virtual, nay, the actual, transfer of a large portion of the dominions of the Porte. When they came to argue that question, he should be prepared to prove satisfactorily to the House the justice and expediency of the policy which Ministers had pursued, and which had for its object the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, founded on a just regard to the best interests of this country as connected with that part of the world. And so far from tending to war, this was the only course which they could pursue, if they were desirous to prevent the events which were taking place in that quarter from necessarily leading to an European war upon a considerable scale. This was not the time for going at large into that question, and it was only his wish at present to protest against the doctrine laid down by his hon. Friend.
§ Sir Robert Peelsaid, that it was his intention to give his vote without the least hesitation or reluctance in favour of the full amount proposed for the navy estimates of the present year. He could not concur in the view which had been taken by the hon. Gentleman who was the great and consistent advocate of economy in that House, and by which he had proposed to maintain the establishments of this country without any reference in time of peace to the establishments of other countries. He conceived it to be quite impossible to disregard the efforts made by other countries to maintain a great naval establishment. A profound peace might prevail, but the gradual progressive increase of the naval power of a neighbouring country might be indicative of hostility to us. The very efforts made by a country without any apparent necessity to lay the foundation of a great maritime power, might when its exertions were completed, if our inferiority were satisfactorily estatlished, enable that country to choose a moment for the commencement of offensive operations. And in the 487 relations of any two great European countries, the increase of the establishments of either should never be neglected by the other. It was, therefore, of great importance that they should not so conduct their affairs as to be entirely irrespective of other countries. If they permitted other countries to increase their naval establishments, while at the same time they diminished their own, so far from promoting the ends of true economy, they might be undermining their security on the one hand, and on the other entailing a great additional expense upon the country. It was with the utmost surprise that he had heard the hon. Gentleman attribute to her Majesty's Government, and particularly to the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the whole responsibility of the progressive increase in our establishments, and impute the decrease of our financial prosperity to the gross impolicy with which our foreign affairs had been managed. He was surprised at this attack, when he considered the apparent cordiality with which the hon. Gentleman a few nights since, had voted his entire confidence in that policy. And if the hon. Gentleman had made upon that occasion the speech which they had heard to night, he thought that his modesty must have prevented him from recording that vote. The noble Lord opposite had congratulated himself upon maintaining a happy medium, because come persons complained that the naval establishment of this country was not sufficient, while others averred that it was maintaining a war establishment in time of peace. The noble Lord had said, that these two observations were contradictory, and afforded a strong proof that her Majesty's Government had adopted a happy medium. Now, so far from these propositions being contradictory, they might with perfect ease be reconciled. It might be true that Europe might be, to all appearance, in a state of peace—that assurances might be conveyed to her Majesty from all quarters, that foreign powers were desirous of maintaining with her Government the most amicable terms; and it might be, too, that they had a war establishment, and an inadequate one, and yet he did not see how these two propositions were contradictory: neither could he see that her Majesty's Government had preserved the happy medium. He believed that it was in a great measure from the 488 policy which had been pursued by her Majesty's Government, that the country was in this condition. But the noble Lord said—"Whatever complaints you may prefer in particular instances, at all events, you must admit that my foreign policy has been successful." Now, this was a very happy assumption, but this they entirely disputed. Twenty-five years had now elapsed since the establishment of a general peace throughout Europe. What progress had they made since that period towards a diminution of the national burdens? The indications of success would have been, that so great was the confidence which they had established amongst foreign powers, so prevalent was the influence of their mediation and example, that the powers of Europe generally were discontinuing or greatly diminishing their armaments, and that now, after the lapse of a quarter of a century," they were enjoying the beneficial fruits of internal tranquillity, and reaping a rich harvest of commercial industry. Had the noble Lord given proof of the success of his foreign policy by diminishing their military establishment? Was it not, on the contrary, the fact, that there was an increase in the army? But, at the same time, the noble Lord said, that his policy had been successful. At the end of twenty-five years, they could surely demonstrate the success of their policy by pointing to the reduction which they had effected in this important branch of expenditure. But, instead of retrenchment, had they not been making preparation for war during a time of peace? Was the state of their finances such as they could congratulate themselves upon? Did the noble Lord bear in mind, that for the last four years there had been a regular deficiency? In 1837 there had been a deficiency—in 1838 a deficiency—in 1839 a deficiency—in 1840 an increased deficiency—mainly on account of the increase in their military establishment. So far, therefore, as the state of the finances, and the indications of general tranquillity were to be considered as enabling them to effect a reduction in their establishments, he did not think that the noble Lord had much to congratulate himself upon. He would abide by the test which the noble Lord himself had proposed as to the merits of his foreign policy—the list of that eminent success of which he had boasted. Let them examine that policy in detail. The point, he presumed, upon which the noble 489 Lord chiefly rested to maintain the allegation of success was the quadruple alliance—the treaty which was to have formed a lasting bond of amity between the four western powers of Europe, as a counterpoise to the diplomatic influence of the northern and eastern powers. The noble Lord had prophesied, that between these four powers—England, France, Spain, and Portugal—bound by the common sympathies of a liberal and constitutional form of government, nothing could put a period to the harmony which would prevail; that the influence of England in the Peninsula would be established on a permanent basis; and that permanent relations of the most desirable description would be established amongst these four powers. He would begin with Portugal. The noble Lord had said that his policy had been, at all events, successful, and, if such were the case, it would undoubtedly be primâ facie affording a presumption that the policy which led to those successful results was correct in principle. But what was the noble Lord's influence in Portugal? They kept three sail of the line on the Portuguese coast. His hon. Friend the Member for Kilkenny had said, "Remove them, and you will have more influence with the Portuguese Government;" upon the supposition that they kept these three sail there to protect the Government, which they (her Majesty's Ministers) had established, and that, relying on their protection, Portugal was enabled to defy their power and disregard their representations, because she was safe in the protection of their three sail of the line. On this ground the hon. Member asked them to try the effect of removing the fleet. "This," said the noble Lord, "proves that, in accordance with your opinion, if England had no fleet at all, her influence would be increased throughout Europe." Now, what account had the noble Lord given of his influence with Portugal? The business of that evening had commenced with the presentation of a petition by his noble Friend the Member for Liverpool complaining that Portugal had treated with the greatest injustice, and with utter disregard and contumely, the just claims of British subjects, and accompanied this injustice with every species of insult. Did the noble Lord deny the allegation?—not at all. He said, that he agreed with almost every word in the petition; that the conduct of 490 Portugal had been well described—of that government which they themselves had established; and in that act of establishment departed from their ordinary rule, not to interfere in the domestic concerns of foreign countries. The noble Lord said, that his influence with that government was so small for the last five years, that, notwithstanding every successive change in the constitution of that government, and in the individual members of whom it was composed be had not been enabled 10 procure for England that satisfaction, that bare justice, which it appeared Belgium had obtained for her subjects in Portugal.
I admit (said the noble Lord in substance) all your allegations; but so small is my influence with that government which I established, that, although for five years I have been repeating my entreaties and remonstrances, they have not been attended to; and I am now about to form a committee in London, if possible, with the concurrence of Portugal, if not, without it, and whatever may be the report of that committee, I will exact those terms from that Government with which I have been so successful.So much for a matter of private claim. What had the noble Lord told them during the last Session of the conduct with respect to the slave-trade of this their ancient ally, that used to be connected with England by ties of the closest attachment, and which owed its existence to a suspension of those principles of non-intervention in the domestic concerns of other nations? The noble Lord said, in substance, last year,If ever there was a flagrant violation of national faith, it was that which had been committed by Portugal. It was not merely that they had turned a deaf ear to the interests of humanity—that Portugal had disregarded every appeal which had been made to her—that she had positively violated her compact with this country, for Portugal had received a pecuniary equivalent from England, about half a million sterling having been paid to her to relinquish her slaves—it was not merely that she had utterly disregarded the claims of humanity, and disregarded, too, the solemn compact into which she had entered with us; but although we had a pecuniary claim on Portugal, and had made her an advance beforehand, upon a specified condition, yet Portugal swindled us out of our money; and I ask of you, the Parliament of England, to pass a bill to prop up my defective influence, and force from Portugal that justice which she will not render to my remonstrance.Here was the success with which the noble Lord's policy had been attended in 491 the case of one power which was a party to the quadruple alliance. He would next come to Spain. He saw a correspondence in the papers, from which it appeared that the British merchants resident at the Havannah, having subscribed a considerable sum to provide a religious service there in accordance with the rites of the Church of England, applied to the noble Lord to use his influence with the Spanish Government to obtain the desired permission. The noble Lord having been presented with a military star by the government of Spain, in consideration of all the important services which he had rendered to that country, could surely not have the smallest difficulty in obtaining so slight a favour. And this appeared to have been the noble Lord's opinion at the time, for he stated at once that he would make the desired application to the Spanish government. And the noble Lord did make the application, but no answer was for some time returned. At last he acquainted the merchants that, having made his application to the Spanish government, backed by all the influence of the British Crown, which was upon so friendly a footing with Spain, he found it impossible to procure from the Spanish government the small permission to the British subjects resident at the Havannah to celebrate divine service according to the ritual of the Protestant religion. He (Sir R. Peel) thought that one great object of the treaty of quadruple alliance was to introduce toleration into the international dealings of the Peninsular powers; that the progress of civilization and refinement which a liberal form of government would introduce was one of the grounds upon which the treaty of quadruple alliance was proposed. The interference had taken place, the money had been advanced, the blood of British soldiers had been spilt, and to what point did the influence of her Majesty's Ministers with the government of Constitutional Spain extend? The noble Lord had not been able to procure this small favour from this government, which again he had established, three months after the success of his interference in its behalf. He was not able to secure to the British residents at the Havannah this little privilege. But, on the other hand, how stood the French influence with Spain? He did not think that the interference of France in arranging the domestic affairs of Spain had been carried 492 to a greater extent than that of England. He thought that one of the great recommendations urged, when the project of the quadruple alliance was introduced into Parliament, was, that British influence would become paramount in the Peninsula. Now, how had the French succeeded when they applied to Spain for the possession of an island at Port Mahon? It was promised to them by the Spanish government. It was protested against by a committee of the Cortes; it was protested against by the noble Lord, who professed himself to entertain a strong feeling against it. But the promise was carried into effect notwithstanding; and the island was now in the possession of the French. How much more important was this concession made to the French than the favour which had been asked for the British residents at the Havannah! So much for Spain, the second party to the quadruple alliance. And now for France. Again he repeated, that he most deeply lamented the manifestation of a growing jealousy between this country and France. What were the happy consequences which the noble Lord could have predicted as resulting from the quadruple alliance, except the reduction of the national establishments, the increase of mutual confidence, but above all a forbearance on the part of each of the four powers to increase their naval force—particularly during a time of peace; and, in short, the removal of everything calculated to disturb the most cordial relations between England and France? Could they deny that the French had fifteen sail of the line in the Mediterranean? Why we ourselves had twelve sail there? We had only twenty-one sail of the line altogether, and out of these there were fifteen situated in the Mediterranean, or its immediate neighbourhood. Was that for the purpose of interfering between the Porte and Egypt? Was it not undeniably on account of the predominant influence of France, which made them unwilling to leave the Mediterranean without three-fifths of their naval force either there or in its vicinity? The demands of this country on France for compensation for the grievances and wrongs sustained by our merchants on the coast of Africa, were they adjusted? Had those grievances, brought forward as they were by one of the keenest supporters of the present Government, the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets— 493 had those grievances, he would ask, been redressed? If the influence of the noble Lord with foreign powers were so great as he had that night boasted that it was—and he was now speaking of those powers only who were parties to the quadruple alliance—if the policy of the noble Lord had been so successful as he had vaunted it to be, and if the noble Lord admitted, as he had done, that the claims of our merchants on the French Government were just, how came it to pass that up to the present hour, he had not obtained any the slightest reparation for them? He had said in the first place, that the noble Lord could not give the House any indications of that complete success in his foreign policy, which would have been best shown by retrenchment in his estimates, and by reduction in his military establishments, and he had now proved that the noble Lord could not give the House any indications of it in the compliance of foreign powers with the just and equitable demands of his Government. It was possible that the noble Lord might boast of the complete success of his policy in settling the boundary question on the north-east frontier of the United States. That question of boundary had been long pending between the two Governments of Great Britain and the United States, and the indications which he saw in the papers before the House were not such as to induce him to place any confidence in the boasts of complete success which the noble Lord had uttered upon this portion of his policy. Travelling to the east of Europe, he thought that he recollected a boast, or rather a pledge given by the noble Lord in his place in Parliament, that three months should not elapse without England's having a representative at Cracow. If the noble Lord bad not made a boast on that subject, no one would have had a right to quarrel with the noble Lord. It might be, that difficulties had occurred which it was not possible for the noble Lord to encounter; bat then the noble Lord, knowing, as he must have done, the jealousies which he would have to encounter in any negociations relative to Cracow, ought not, as a Member of the British Parliament, and still more as the foreign Minister of the British Cabinet, to have given a pledge in public that such and such an event should take place within a given time. He did not mean to say, that under peculiar 494 circumstances it might not be right to give such a pledge; but this he did mean to assert, that such a pledge should not be given unless it were intended to redeem it, and that at any rate, he who gave it, and did not redeem it, should abstain from boasting of the complete and uniform success of his foreign policy. Into the seat questions connected with the present state of affairs in the Levant, he would not enter at present. He had asked he noble Lord on that subject a question, which the noble Lord had desired him not to press, as a sense of public duty would forbid him from answering. He would, therefore, forbear from entering into that part of the noble Lord's foreign policy; but if he were to enter into it, he thought that there again he should find room for arguing that the noble Lord could produce no proof that the success of his foreign policy was complete and triumphant. He had not intended to have taken any share in the present debate; but he could not hear the noble Lord's boast that his foreign policy had been so triumphant, without entering his decided protest against its correctness.
§ Viscount Palmerstonhad listened to the speech of the right hon. Member for Tamworth with a mixed sensation of pain and of pleasure—with pain to think that an individual standing in the right hon. Baronet's eminent position, and filling so ample a space in the eyes of Europe, should, in discussing the important interests of this country and the tendency of its foreign policy, have taken so narrow and so limited a view of it as to put the great issue, whether the foreign policy of the Government was wise or not on such petty matters as those which the right hon. Baronet had mentioned, totally forgetting all those great considerations, which ought to have presented themselves to his mind, and the absence of which was to him a source of pleasure, because he well knew that the right hon. Gentleman had too statesman-like a mind not to have adverted to them, if those considerations would hare served his purpose. He was therefore almost ashamed to follow the right hon. Gentleman, through the miserable paltry details on which he had rested the whole strength of his case. Out of deference, however, to the House, he would pursue the right hon. Gentleman through the different subjects which he had made the theme of his vituperations against the Go- 495 vernment. And first with respect to Portugal, which was now, as always, a sore point with the right hon. Baronet, because it was the first point on which the policy of the Liberal Government came into collision with that of the right hon. Baronet. It was in Portugal that we found the right hon. Baronet the defender and protector of Don Miguel. It was in Portugal that we found him on the very point of acknowledging that usurper, merely because he had overthrown a constitution. It was in Portugal that the first attacks were made by the right hon. Baronet and his supporters on the foreign policy of the Liberal Government, and it was because that Government supported the cause of Donna Maria and of the constitution in Portugal, that every term of contumely and reproach had been heaped upon himself personally as the organ of it, and that every prophecy of disgrace and discomfiture was hurled against him from the other side of the House. Ministers said, that they were convinced that the cause would succeed; and succeeded it had, in spite of all that the right hon. Baronet had said to the contrary. Nay, the right hon. Baronet himself had admitted, that it had succeeded, for he had talked of the form of Government which he had established, and by so doing had established the very doctrine which he had attempted to refute. Perhaps it was not to be expected that the right hon. Baronet would concur in the feelings of those who thought that they had done a service to the cause of good government in rescuing Portugal from the tender mercies of an usurper like Don Miguel. But, said the right hon. Baronet, "We have no influence now in Portugal, because Portugal refuses to admit our claims." Now, he would ask the right hon. Baronet, whether Don Miguel admitted the claims of the British Government when the right hon. Baronet was the Minister who advocated them? Was the right hon. Baronet more successful than the present Government in getting satisfaction for British claimants? Were the former Governments of Portugal—those Governments in which the will of one man was the law of all—more disposed to put down the slave trade than the present constitutional Government? If the right hon. Baronet would only look back to what had occurred in Portugal under his protegé Don Miguel, he would pot find that the spirit of the Portuguese 496 Government to support the slave trade was more intense now than it was formerly. The present Ministers, had however, done that which the right hon. Baronet did not even attempt to do. They had taken vigorous measures to compel Portugal to put down the slave trade, and had not been afraid to incur the displeasure of the present Government of that country, whatever might have been the ceremony which the right hon. Baronet used to the protected Administration of Don Miguel. Now, with respect to Spain, a country in which a severer struggle had recently been carried on between a despotic and a popular form of government than any which had been witnessed in modern history—looking at Spain, and judging of the policy of the British Cabinet, its mo-lives, its objects, and its success. The right hon. Baronet could find no spot in it on which to place the finger of his scorn, except the refusal of the Governor of Havannah to allow a Protestant chapel to be established in that port. Would the right hon. Baronet permit him to ask one question in return for the many which the right hon. Baronet had put to him? Did the right hon. Baronet think, that if Don Carlos and the Inquisition had been established at Madrid, there would have been a stronger disposition in the Court of Spain than there was at present to allow the legalized introduction of Protestant worship into the dominions of that country? Was it possible, that the right hon. Baronet could look with indifference on the success of the Spanish people in shaking off the yoke of a despotism which was calculated to cramp all their energies, and to wither in the bad every hope of prosperity? Could not the right hon. Baronet enter into the feelings of those who, forgetful of every term of insult and contumely by which they had been assailed, and forgetful of every prophecy of discomfiture and disgrace by which it had been attemped to dishearten them, now felt some triumph—and surely it was a justifiable triumph, in the complete success of the policy they had pursued? He said, complete success; for whatever any man might anticipate as to the precise period when the embers of the civil war still smouldering in Spain might die out, one thing was quite certain, that the flame of liberty would not be extinguished, but that it would continue to burn on with a clear and steady lustre in that country, for the 497 constitution was established, and by that very circumstance Spain was rescued from the debased situation in which she had so long been sunk, and was qualified to become, as she soon would become, an important element in the balance of power in Europe. Could the right hon. Baronet, who aspired to be the first Minister of this great country, who thought himself qualified, and whom so many persons thought so well qualified, to guide the destinies of England, and to direct its foreign as well as its domestic policy—could the right hon. Baronet close his eyes and blind his mind to the various important bearings which would arise from re-establishing Spain as an element in the balance of power in Europe? Could the right hon. Baronet see no other advantage which would result to this country from such a consummation than obtaining permission to build a Protestant chapel at the Havannah? But then the right hon. Baronet said, that he would try the present Government, not only by the failure of their influence, but by the test of the success of French influence. And what were the mighty objects of which the right hon. Baronet had spoken in order to prove the success of France? Why, he could hardly believe his own ears when he heard the right hon. Baronet particularize the instance which he considered as a triumph of influence dangerous to this country, and showing the utter failure of all the exertions which the present Government had made. Why, it was, that the French had obtained a lease for a year of a small island off Port Mahon, for which they paid a rent of sixteen dollars a-month—a lease, too, which they had bought of the Americans, as anybody would buy a lease of a house, and of which they had got a renewal for two years. But he would tell the right hon. Baronet, if he asked what Ministers had done to rescue Spain from any foreign influence whatever, be it France or any other country, that by establishing a constitutional Government, by introducing popular control over the executive, they had done more to secure the independence of Spain than they could have done by getting the Spaniards to concede the lease of a paltry islet. Then the right hon. Baronet turned to France, and said, that Ministers had boasted of having framed that noble alliance, and of having cemented a good understanding between the two countries, The 498 right hon. Baronet had asked, what had it all come to? and had tauntingly remarked, that France had fifteen sail of the line in the Mediterranean. The right hon. Baronet complained too, that a spirit of hostility towards us was growing up in France. Why, if he were to be asked what was the cause of that spirit of hostility, what at least was the probable cause of it, he should say, it was the language held during the last four or five years, not by the right hon. Baronet, because he knew too well the consequences of indulging in that strain, but by all the Gentlemen who surrounded him, and by all the party in another place, who seizing on every little incident which they thought might be made a handle for creating ill-will between the two nations, endeavoured by every means to excite the jealousy of England, and revive her ancient animosity against France, and by so doing to provoke of necessity corresponding feelings on the part of France towards us. That part of the public press, too, which might be supposed to speak the opinions of the other side, had been perpetually, for a great length of time, holding the same irritating language, and exciting a return of it from the French newspapers. He declared that if there was, which he did not believe to exist, a growing spirit of jealousy and unfriendliness towards England in any considerable party in France, he could not be surprised at it, from the tone and manner in which everything connected with France had for a longtime past been treated by Gentlemen on the other side of the House. But he said that it was not so; he said that there were obvious bonds of union, deeply rooted, and firmly founded on the most vital interests of the two nations, existing between Great Britain and France, and he could relieve the mind of the right hon. Baronet, who had said, that in the present month there were probably fifteen sail-of-the-line in commission, by assuring him that he had the firmest conviction that the Government of France, and all those statesmen who had the greatest influence on the policy of that country, were as strongly convinced as her Majesty's Ministers, were that the friendly union now happily subsisting between the two countries was as essential to the interests of both nations as it was to the general peace and happiness of Europe. He had not thought it worth while to dwell on instances of our success which might be an excellent set 499 off against the cession of the lease of an island off Port Mahon, and the existence of fifteen French sail-of-the-line in the Mediterranean. He had not thought it worth while to mention that from Spain, a Government with which we had no influence, according to the right hon. Baronet, we had obtained a treaty for the suppression of the slave-trade, which no administration had ever obtained before; that from France we had obtained a treaty of the same kind, giving a mutual right of search, a right which it was obvious that there must be many reasons to prevent the French from conceding, except with great difficulty. He would not dwell on these things, though he thought them no bad set off against some, on which the right hon. Baronet had laid great stress, but he asserted that if it had been a main object of the policy of Ministers, as it undoubtedly had been, to cement a good understanding between England and France, in that object they had entirely succeeded. But then the right hon. Baronet ventured on another topic of accusation, and charged him with having on a former occasion boasted that in three weeks he would send a consul to Cracow. He had boasted of no such thing. A right hon. Friend of his had made a motion for an address to the Crown, among other matters to appoint a consul at Cracow. He then stated that it was the intention of Government to appoint a consul at that place, and thereupon the motion was withdrawn. That was their intention without doubt, but afterwards they were led to alter that intention. Ministers had then made no pledge, circumstances had arisen which had induced them to alter their intention, and they had not appointed the consul because they found it would give umbrage. In the first place, it would have given infinite umbrage to the powers which had the chief command over Cracow, and in point of fact, if those powers had chosen to make the Cracovian authorities refuse to receive our consul, they would have refused to receive him, and we should have had no power to compel them to accept him. Taking all circumstances into consideration, it did not appear to Ministers that there was a sufficient motive for sending a consul thither. Some of his hon. Friends, he knew, had a strong feeling on this point, and if they chose to argue the matter, he would be ready to 500 meet his hon. Friends. He repeated, that Government had not thought it worth their while to send any representative to Cracow. These, he thought, were all the topics on which the right hon. Baronet had touched, if he excepted the accusation that the present Government had not succeeded in composing differences. Why, he maintained, that in that object they had been most successful, they had composed differences, and those of a very embarrassing and delicate kind. A great difference had been growing up between two powerful countries, with each of which it was of the greatest importance that the British empire should maintain peaceful relations—France and the United States. Those countries were quarrelling on a point of honour, they could not come to an accommodation without the intervention of a common friend. "We," said the noble Lord, "stood forward, we settled, we composed that difference, we prevented a war which would have been most calamitous to both parties, and which might have involved this country, too, in the blaze." Again, there had arisen a difference between France and Mexico, which might not have had consequences so serious to the contending parties, but which would have caused great injury to England in its commercial relations. Well, the present Government composed that difference too. "Oh, but," said the right hon. Baronet, "you have not composed the difference respecting the north-eastern boundary of the American provinces." They had not yet done that, certainly, but he begged leave to ask the right hon. Baronet, whether former Governments had been more successful—whether the right hon. Baronet himself had been more successful? Had he found it so easy a question, or was it more near to a settlement in the right hon. Baronet's day than at present? If the right hon. Baronet had endeavoured to pick out the narrowest and smallest topics to which to draw the attention of the House, he could not have succeeded better. That was the policy of the right hon. Baronet; but Ministers had taken higher views and a larger range. Their great object had been to preserve peace. They were told by an hon. Member opposite, on succeeding to power, that they could not preserve peace for three months; they had preserved it for ten years. Their policy had not been, as the right hon. 501 Baronet said, to intermeddle in the affairs of other countries, but by the legitimate exertion of the influence of Great Britain to support other nations in their struggles to obtain for themselves institutions similar to those which had been described as forming the boast of this country. In that object they had succeeded; for in no equal period of time, he would venture to assert, had civil liberty made such progress as in those years during which, according to the right hon. Baronet, the policy of Ministers had been singularly unfortunate. They had been successful in so many things, that he had almost forgotten to recall to the recollection of the House the successful close of the negotiations relating to Belgium. That, he supposed it would be admitted, was an arrangement of no small difficulty, of no inconsiderable importance to Europe, of no small moment especially to England, and yet in that they had been successful, without drawing on that war so often predicted as the inevitable result of all their efforts. But while they had protected the friends of civil liberty in Europe, had they thereby forfeited the friendship and goodwill of those powers whose Governments were constructed on a different principle? He answered confidently and boldly, No. In the first place, although reproached with having alienated for ever our ancient allies, the Dutch, they had obtained from them a treaty of commerce abolishing those differential duties, which had been vainly solicited by former Administrations, disposed to be most friendly to Holland. They had concluded with the Governments of Turkey and Austria treaties of the utmost importance, which, when fully in operation, would confer extensive benefits on our trade. He asked again, if in pursuing that course which their own feelings as British Ministers had led them to consider to be, not only best adapted to secure the interests and welfare of the empire, but most congenial to the wishes of the nation, they had lost the friendship or forfeited the goodwill of other states? No, he repeated, for if any period could be pointed out at which more than at another time the Governments to which he alluded—those of Austria, Russia, and Prussia—were disposed to place confidence in that of England, it was the present moment. Therefore, he said, that the right hon. Baronet had utterly failed to establish the positions with which he set out, and he 502 fearlessly asserted that in everything of importance which the present Government had attempted to accomplish they had hitherto succeeded. He knew that many of those objects were distasteful to Gentlemen opposite, but he nevertheless thought them calculated to promote and secure the best interests of England. So far, then, from the right hon. Baronet having proved, that Ministers had been uniformly unsuccessful, it had been shown that there was not one important object they had tried to secure in the attainment of which they had failed.
§ Sir R. Peelsaid, that there were two or three points in the speech of the noble Lord which he would very briefly notice. In the first place, he would advert to the subject of the general tenour of his own observations. They were made in answer to a boast by the noble Lord, that tinder his administration of the foreign policy of this country, the influence of England had a predominating weight. He had selected, therefore, one point which showed what was the extent of our influence with the three powers. He had also taken the case of Portugal, and referred to our negotiations on the subject of the slave trade with that power, by whom, upon the admission of the noble Lord himself, every engagement which she made with us had been violated, notwithstanding our advance of half a million to enable her to carry out the objects of those negotiations. He had noticed also the claims of the British subjects, which had that night been brought forward by his noble Friend, which claims, by the noble Lord's admission, had not been satisfactorily adjusted, and he did infer from these circumstances, that the policy of the noble Lord had not been so successful as he had represented it to be. The noble Lord had said, that Don Miguel would not have given this country more than the present Queen of Portugal. That was the whole amount of the difference. "It is true," said the noble Lord, "that I got nothing for you, but you would not have got more from Don Miguel." The noble Lord said, that the Members of former administrations would have been guilty of the enormity of recognizing Don Miguel. Why, supposing they had been guilty of such an enormity, they would only have done what Lord Althorp told them to do. That noble Lord, whom hon. Members opposite had, selected to become the leader of the party 503 in the House of Commons, called the Administration to which he (Sir R. Peel) had belonged, to an account for not recognizing Don Miguel, and said, that whatever Don Miguel's character might be, in his opinion, the time was come, when, in conformity with the ancient policy of England, the then Government ought to recognize Don Miguel as the de facto, if not the de jure, Sovereign of Portugal. The noble Lord said, that the objects which he had failed to accomplish, were, in themselves trifling and of no importance. He said, that the question of building a chapel at the Havannah was not an object of any great importance. But he had brought these instances forward for the very reason that the objects which the noble Lord had failed to accomplish, were trifling and unimportant. Just as they were unimportant, exactly in the proportion of their triviality, was his proof conclusive, that the influence of England was not predominant, and that the policy of the noble Lord had not been successful. The noble Lord said, he had maintained peace; but had he reaped the advantages of peace? Had he been able to make the reductions which ought to be made in time of peace? If the peace which was now maintained was of so feverish a nature, that it was necessary to increase the establishments of the country, the noble Lord had very little reason to boast of the maintenance of peace. He would now refer to the case of Cracow. The noble Lord said, he had made no boast of what he would do in that instance. That was undoubtedly true. The noble Lord had made no boast, but when a motion with reference to Poland was brought forward, he had made a public declaration, which led to the abandonment of the motion, that three months should not pass before he sent a consul to Cracow. And yet the noble Lord said, he made no boast of what he would do The noble Lord said, he was deterred from sending a consul to Cracow by the apprehension of giving umbrage to the other powers. That was a very good reason, perhaps, for abandoning his intention, but it was no reason why, after stating that he would act upon that declaration, he should boast of the influence of England and the success of his policy. Now with respect to our relations with France. The noble Lord said, that the language of the party with which be was connected, and the 504 language of their press, endangered the stability of our alliance with that country. Now, he would tell the noble Lord, that his alarm arose from the language of the noble Lord's press. He must tell the noble Lord, that it was perfectly well known, that the language of that portion of the press which was supposed to speak the sentiments of her Majesty's Government had done more to create irritation in France than all the speeches made in either House of Parliament by individuals, and all the language used by the press which it was supposed represented the opinions of the Conservative party. He would not at that late hour of the night refer further to the speech of the noble Lord, having already spoken upon the question, but he had thought it proper to remark upon the cases of the chapel at the Havannah, and the conduct of the French Government at Portendic as affording an argument to show, that the influence of England did not enjoy that predominance which the noble Lord asserted her to possess, and that his own policy had not been advantageous to the interests of this country.
§ Viscount Sandonconfessed his surprise that the noble Lord, after the utter inutility of his efforts had been exposed, should yet take credit to himself for the protection and encouragement which he had given to our commerce. The noble Lord ought not to look to the establishment of abstract principles in other countries, but to the substantial interests of his own. He professed, indeed, to be a follower of the principles of Mr. Canning, who said, that while he was a Minister of England, he would look like a Minister of England to the interests of England, and not to the foundation of abstract principles abroad. After the statement of facts which had been made, surely the noble Lord had no right to say, that the influence of England was predominant, or that his own policy had succeeded? Surely, when he said so, he had forgotten how France laughed to scorn our interference when her own aggrandizement was in question? Surely, he must have forgotten how long the interests of England had suffered from neglect in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Rio de la Plata. Surely, he must have forgotten the establishment of new principles of blockade, which were denounced-by the judge of the Admiralty, the noble Lord's supporter in 505 that House? He recollected the noble Lord boasting, that no Minister had ever done so much for commerce as he had. It was always the noble Lord's way to meet charges of the kind which had been brought forward to-night with so many strong assumptions. But if the case were as the noble Lord represented it, certainly there never was so ungrateful a body of men as the merchants of this country. He had not intended to have entered into this debate, but having been frequently made the channel of complaints that our commercial interests had been neglected, he could not listen in silence to the boast of the noble Lord of the attention paid to our commerce in all quarters of the globe, and the success with which his efforts had been followed.
§ Captain Pechellrose for the purpose of protesting against the language which had been used in that House and elsewhere with respect to the appointment of Admiral Fleming. He had seen Admiral Fleming in command more than thirty years. He was a good officer, and a most diligent cruiser. He considered that the gallant Admiral was quite able to conduct the duties of the office to which he had been appointed. Would they have an old man appointed, whose infirmities would prevent him from doing the duties of the office? Why did hon. Gentlemen cavil at the appointment of Admiral Fleming? No one found fault with that of Sir Thomas Hardy. When he heard it advanced, that good officers would not be got to serve in the navy if a war should break out, because they had no affection for Ministers, he could not but protest against such language. He did not believe, that the officers of the French navy would stand up and speak disrespectfully of their colleagues and superiors. He had not met with that dissatisfaction out of doors on this subject which was represented to be in existence, and he would add, that he did not believe the officers of the Royal Navy generally did concur in the observations which had been made in another place.
Viscount Ingestrie, in explanation, begged distinctly to discharge himself of having intended to say anything personal against Admiral Fleming. He spoke of him only in reference to his political appointment.
§ Sir E. Filmersaid, the gallant Captain had put himself up as the champion of 506 Admiral Fleming, but he had forgotten to state how many times the admiral had been in collision with an enemy. He now asked the gallant Captain that question.
§ Captain Pechelldenied, that he had started up as the champion of Admiral Fleming. He rose to defend the navy generally, and to protest against the language that was used about the navy as well as Admiral Fleming, who had distinguished himself in various ways.
Captain A' Courtwished to say nothing against Admiral Fleming, but he believed him to be ineligible for the office he now held, and that he ought not to be appointed when there were so many officers above him, and below him too, who had fought and bled for their country, and acquired distinction by their gallant services, and who ought to have been considered before Admiral Fleming. On the part of the service to which he had the honour to belong, he entered his protest against that most unjustifiable appointment—an appointment which he was sure the country at large reprobated and condemned.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ The House resumed.