SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 06 March 1839 vol 45 cc1325-78

Mr. Bernal

read the first vote, for 34,165 men for the service of the ensuing year.

Sir G. Clerk

wished to make some observations on the speech of the hon. Gentleman (the Secretary to the Admiralty) on Monday evening. He had listened to that speech with all the attention in his power, but he must say, that though there were many parts of it in which he entirely concurred, and which he had heard with great satisfaction, the hon. Gentleman had not succeeded in removing from his mind the conviction which it had previously received, that the state of the navy was not such as could be considered satisfactory to the country. The whole substance of the hon. Gentleman's defence of the Admiralty consisted in proving that the estimate was larger in the present year than it had been some time since, and that the vote now proposed would exceed any granted by Parliament during the last ten years. The hon. Gentleman's whole argument was pervaded by the fallacy of assuming the amount of force required in one particular year to be the test of the amount proper to be maintained in any other year. Therefore the hon. Gentleman had exultingly said, although blameable reductions have been made in our naval establishments, they have not been made by the present Government, and if the country be now complaining of the inefficient state of our marine force, that must be ascribed to the ill-judged parsimony of Tory administrations. Now, though it had often been his lot in former years to bring forward the navy estimates, he certainly had never heard in that House any complaints that the economy of the Government was too pinching. The hon. Member for Kilkenny had, on such occasions been always consistent in objecting to the amount required, both for the pay of the seamen and the purchase of stores, as quite disproportioned to the wants of the country, and had more than once taken the sense of the House on motions for reduction. In 1835, although the vote was but for 25,000 men, and was now declared to have been much too small, the hon. Member had proposed to reduce it by 5,000. The amount of naval force required in any particular year must be judged of by the exigencies of the public service at that season, and that vote might be very insufficient in 1839 which would have been very extravagant in 1835. The hon. Gentleman opposite, therefore, had quite failed in vindicating Ministers from the charges of neglecting and injudiciously reducing the navy, by finding fault with the lowness of the vote taken for the stores and men by the administration of the right hon. Member for Tamworth. The question of the expediency of that reduction must be decided by considering the circumstances in which the country was at that time placed. His noble Friend who brought forward the naval estimates in that year, Lord Ashley, and who was now present, would be better able than he himself was to state the reasons which had induced Government to propose the vote, if indeed it were necessary to argue the point at all, since in the succeeding year, when the estimate was very much increased, the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for the Home Department had admitted that the vote of 1835 was not unsuited to the then existing condition of affairs. The Board of Admiralty, over which Earl De Grey presided, had taken a vote only for the precise number of men actually employed at the period of his accession to office, so that the total number serving had not really been diminished. It appeared, from a return of the number of ships employed on the 1st of December, 1834 and 1836, respectively, that at the former date, when the Conservative Administration had come into office, there were 15,500 seamen serving in 160 vessels of various denominations; at the latter date, under the present Government, the same number of seamen employed by Earl De Grey's hoard was continued in 167 ships of various rates. The hon. Gentleman opposite, in bringing forward the estimates for 1837, took great credit to the Government for not having increased the number of men employed before. The number then serving was 15,502, exceeding only by two the number of men employed under Earl De Grey's administration of the navy. The ground they should take in increasing or reducing the navy, was the relative position of the great Powers to each other, and the actual circumstances of the country. With respect to the objections that were urged at present, he did not think the Board of Admiralty was responsible for the distribution of the naval force now adopted. That must be determined by the Cabinet on broader grounds than the pleasure of the department, and on this head no charge could justly be brought against the Admiralty. The burden of their delinquency must consist in the mismanagement of the subordinate details, and the weight of this accusation would fall with especial force on the First Lord. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was the Member of the Cabinet principally concerned in and responsible for the distribution of the naval force, because that Minister must always have the best knowledge of what is required by the state of our foreign relations and the condition of the navies of other Powers, these being the considerations which must regulate the proportions of force assigned to the different stations. In 1836 the hon. Gentleman opposite, although thinking that there existed grave reasons for the increase of our navy, which he did not then wish to specify, had given the House to understand that it was chiefly necessary for the purpose of giving increased protection to our commerce with South America and the West Indies. It was much to be regretted, that the state of our foreign relations was such as to require the presence of so large a squadron in the Mediterranean. When the hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir E. Codrington) commanded on that station, although affairs were then in a most critical and delicate position, the whole force permanently attached to the station did not exceed three sail of the line. If the result of all the diplomacy of the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been such as to excite the jealousy of the nations bordering on the Mediterranean, and to require the augmentation of our squadron there, then it was not the Board of Admiralty that was to be held responsible for that distribution of our naval force which had deprived our increasing commerce of that protection so much required on other stations. If the portfolio of the noble Lord inspired nothing but distrust and hostility in other nations, certainly that Minister must be considered to have incurred great blame in consequence of the very great additional expense which his measures had rendered unavoidable. Very inadequate provision, it could not be denied, had been made by the Government for the defence of our own shores and harbours. He hoped the hon. Member for Kilkenny would not suppose he wished to urge the Government to ask for an extravagant vote, but he must say, if that proposition was borne out by facts, no one was more to blame than that hon. Member. Not only had that hon. Member insisted on a most unwise parsimony in this branch of the public service, but he had never, on any occasion within the last four years, when his (Sir G. Clerk's) Friends had attempted to draw the attention of the House and the country to the unfavourable aspect of foreign affairs, given them the least support. He had uniformly supported the present Government, who, by mismanagement and incapacity, had reduced our foreign affairs to their present melancholy state, and rendered necessary a greatly augmented expenditure. So little attention, in fact, had the foreign relations of the country excited within the time he had mentioned, that the noble Secretary for that department had found his duty in that House a mere sinecure. They had very seldom the pleasure of seeing the noble Lord among them; and on this occasion especially, when a subject was under discussion that involved the consideration of the state of all our foreign affairs, he very much regretted that the noble Lord should not think it worth while to be present. The present question was not brought forward at the instance of any individual Member on a day when it might be inconvenient fur the noble Lord to attend, but was fixed for this evening by the Government themselves. The noble Lord's absence was the more extraordinary, since he was undoubtedly the person to whom the House must look for information as to the necessity of maintaining in the Mediterranean the present large amount of force kept there. With regard to the total amount of force to be voted, the grant or refusal of the demand must depend on the degree of confidence placed by the House in the Administration. For his part, he had never felt so great a distrust of any Administration as to refuse his assent to the particular vote, for which they judged it necessary to apply to the House. But if the presence in the Mediterranean of so large a portion of the force voted was indispensable, could Government suppose that the people of this country were blind to the paramount necessity of well-guarding our own coasts? Did they forget that those nations whose jealousy we had provoked in the Mediterranean, had fleets elsewhere? Did they think, that the people of this country never inquired what amount of force those powers might have cruising within a short distance of our own harbours, in the Baltic and North Sea? Did Ministers not participate in the alarm expressed the other evening by the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. T. Attwood), at our own defenceless state, in case of the appearance of a hostile fleet in the British Channel or the Mouth of the Thames? What was our actual state of preparation at this moment? From a return of the number of ships in commission, 1st of December, 1838, on the home station, it appeared, that in the harbours of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, there were to be found three first-rate ships. But by the next page of the return it appeared that the united crews of all three would be required to enable any one of them to put to sea. Of second-rates on the home station, there was to be found not one; of third-rates, none; of fourth-rates, none; of fifth-rates, none; of sixth-rates, none; of sloops-of-war, none; of steam-vessels-of-war none; but there were—what? Six gun brigs at Portsmouth, and two at Sheerness, and, therefore, those small brigs constituted the whole force that this country could at present oppose to a hostile fleet of any foreign nation appearing on her shores. [Lord J. Russell—On the first of December last.] He admitted, that was in December, and it might have been supposed, that the absence of force at that period was accidental; but on looking back to December, 1837, he was very sorry to find, that the state of things was exactly the same, with this difference, that then there were but five gun brigs, and now there was six. The whole addition to our force on the home station, between the end of 1837 and the end of 1838, consisted of but one gun brig. He asked the hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Admiralty what means existed of suddenly fitting out a squadron? Formerly there used to be at each of the ports be had mentioned guard ships with crews equal to half their full complements, and all their stores and guns on board, ready to put to sea at a moment's notice; and from the facility afforded by the dépôt of men then maintained in the coast blockade, they actually were sent to sea at a moment's notice. The hon. Gentleman had observed the other evening, that he considered it unnecessary to keep guardships lying in our harbours; that it was sufficient to have one or two fast sailing steamboats at command to send to the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and South America, for recalling ships and assembling a squadron. The House was told, that we had nine ships of war disposable for borne service. Where were they to be found, unless we sent these quick sailing steamships all over the world to bring them to the Channel? But suppose a quarrel were to break out in the mean time between us and any of the maritime powers, how were our coasts to be guarded from invasion? What was to become of our immense and richly laden fleets of homeward-bound merchantment? Why, they would be swept into enemies' ports, while our expected reinforcement was yet hundreds of miles distant. As they had been told by the Secretary to the Admiralty, that it was not necessary or expedient to have a large force on the home station, he would beg leave to quote as an authority that might have some weight, the words of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department in a speech respecting the navy delivered by him in 1836. The noble Lord, it would be observed, was stating reasons which rendered it impossible to withdraw any of the ships stationed abroad for the sake of reducing the expenditure. The noble Lord said, It came to be a great consideration that when multiplied demands were made from various parts of the world for the protection of our commerce, which could not be neglected, it was impossible to diminish the force necessary to guard it, and it was requisite to keep a large force constantly in a body ready to act on any point where it might be needed. It was necessary to keep such forces in various parts of the world. And the noble Lord went on to say, "In our opinion" (that was to say, the opinion of the Cabinet of which the noble Lord was a Member) "the past experience of the world shows, that it is essential that we should have a sufficient force in the neighbourhood of our own shores." These were the sentiments of the noble Lord as printed in his speech of March 4, 1836; and he could not help calling the attention of the House to them at the present moment; for when he saw that those who out of doors as well as some hon. Members within that House, who came forward under a sense of duty to call the attention of the House and the country to the state of the navy, were attacked in unmeasured and even violent language for the opinions they expressed, he must say, that he thought the sentiments of those gentlemen were fully borne out by the expressions made use of by the noble Lord on the occasion to which he had referred. With respect to the merits of the question itself he pretended to give no opinion; that would be better left to those who, from experience and education, had a right to be looked upon as authorities on naval topics. What then were the opinions of a very distinguished naval officer, Sir G. Cockburn, as contained in the evidence given by him before the select Committee on public income and expenditure of 1828? First, with respect to manning the guardships. The gallant Admiral being asked, "Do you think it possible, that they might be kept with a lower amount of permanent men on board them, considering you have the advantage of the blockade service?" answered, They might, but at very considerable inconvenience; I tried that in 1822; I think that was our lowest vote of seamen; I struck the masts of the guardships, and put them into what I call a sufficient state of security, but being in a state to be very soon made efficient; and I reduced their complements to the boats' crews, and the number of men necessary to keep the ships clean, it produced a very considerable degree of dissatisfaction, and after a short time circumstances obliged us to give them again their half complements, but certainly they might be reduced again, though in such a case we should be obliged, perhaps, to take the whole of the coast blockade if we wanted our ships in a hurry, instead of leaving a certain number to carry on the duty as at present; the ships would be as good ships, and they would be ready soon; they are now kept with their masts up, and ready in every respect as ships of war; their masts were struck in 1822, and they had nothing but the boats' crews on hoard of them. Now, did the hon. Secretary to the Admiralty think, that having reduced as we had these guardships, it would be possible, if a sudden demand for ships arose, that they could be got ready in a short period? Would it not require at least six months? The whole of the ordinaries at their disposal in each port would not furnish together more men than were sufficient to man a single first rate, or to complete the complements of the first-rates now in commission. But it ought to be considered, that the expense of fitting out a naval force was very considerably increased when that force had to be raised on a sudden. What was Sir G. Cockburn's evidence on this point? Being asked, In case of any sudden emergency calling for a naval force, would not the expense of raising that force, and preparing it for service, be in a very considerable proportion increased upon the whole being to be brought forward on a sudden momentary call? Sir G. Cockburn answers— No doubt of that; because we should be forced to give greater pay for exertion to bring forward that which would otherwise be ready; there is no doubt, at least I am strongly impressed with an idea, that there would be great difficulties in doing it at all, if our seamen are intercepted in their way home, and we have no nucleus to form upon. Supposing our ships to be all laid up in ordinary, and that we have no men but what can be entered at the moment or pressed, we should be six or eight months, or more, getting the fleet in that view into the state in which it is now, during which time our enemy would be taking all our merchantmen, and our seamen, to French prisons. He believed, that the gallant Admiral opposite (Admiral Adam) felt as much as himself, that the ports of the country were in a most unprotected state; but perhaps he might find, upon making application for an increased vote to enable him to remedy this, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer might say, "Wait a little; I am in such a situation just now that I can give you no relief. You must wait till next Session, and in the mean time run the risk, or send for as many ships from foreign stations as you can." Such might be the answer of the right hon. Gentleman; but was this a safe policy? That was the question? The hon. Secretary for the Admiralty had admitted, that foreign nations had the most accurate information on other points regarding the navy of Great Britain; did he not imagine they were as fully acquainted with the difficulties of manning our ships, or with the places where they were stationed? The points to which he had alluded appeared to him of the very greatest importance; and inadequate as he felt to do it justice, he was very anxious to impress the importance of the subject of the navy on the House. The hon. Secretary for the Admiralty told them, and told them, he believed, truly, that they had made very great exertions to place the dockyards la a better condition than formerly; but he must say, he did hope the Admiralty would take still further measures to place the dockyards of the country in a still better condition. But he did think, that some blame rested with the Admiralty, for not doing all they might have done. He contended, they might have effected more with the votes they had got from that House. The vote proposed by the Government of 1834 was only for 15,500 men, while the House had voted 23,165 men for the last two years. When the Admiralty employed this vote fully, and manned a sufficient number of vessels with it, then he thought, and not till then, would they remove from their shoulders the obloquy which had covered them for the last ten months. The hon. Secretary of the Admiralty had stated the difficulty of manning a large squadron in the time of peace. He (Sir G. Clerk) admitted the difficulty to the full, and therefore he declared, that the Admiralty was the more to blame, that they kept their ships laid up in ordinary, and had no nucleus on which they might form the necessary amount of men. He was perfectly well aware, that persons brought up to any trade or calling were never found in greater numbers than just so many as were actually wanted to supply the trade with the requisite supply of hands. So in the case of the naval service of this country, whether national or commercial; there would only be found, at any given time, just so many persons qualified for the duties of seamen as were just enough for the exigencies of the King's service and the mercantile at that time. On a sudden emergency, therefore, the difficulty of finding able seamen would he found to be enormous. The only way was to keep up a considerable force afloat; at least this would be a much better course than to be obliged, on occasion of any pressing emergency, to raise entirely new crews, and that too by resorting to violent means, for it could not be done without sweeping the ports of all the seamen who could be found there. He had no wish to insinuate, that the maritime resources of this country were failing, there was no reason to think any such thing; the maritime resources must always flourish while the commercial marine continued on the increase; and he must say, that it was therefore with great pleasure, that he heard of the great increase that had taken place within the last year in our commercial marine. He also heard with much pleasure the statement made by the hon. Member for Kendal on the first night of the Session, in proof of the commercial prosperity of the country, which he might observe had been most satisfactorily corroborated by the hon. Member for Halifax on Monday last. But if 200,000 seamen were, as was stated, employed in vessels mostly now abroad, the inference was, that there remained but a very small number of seamen in our harbours; and let it be remarked, that to render any number of these men available for manning the navy, on any occasion when they were speedily wanted, the Admiralty must resort to the employment of press-warrants. This would be absolutely necessary, if we meant to provide for the safety of the homeward-bound fleet; because, if we were not able to send out vessels immediately on the emergency of any sudden declaration of hostilities into the Channel, it would swarm with privateers and cruisers, who might inflict the severest injuries on our trade. Therefore it would be necessary to resort to the measure he mentioned, or, in order to avoid it—for press warrants would perhaps now find less favour in that House and with the country than they had at former periods—they must adopt the alternative of keeping a large body of men afloat. For his part, he should ever maintain the necessity and policy of the Admiralty's keeping possession of the power of issuing press-warrants on particular emergencies; because he thought that the existence of Great Britain as a nation might come to depend on the exertion of that power to the fullest extent. With respect to the demonstration-ships, of which so much had been said, would the House believe that they—not one of them—had a mast in them, nor any stores aboard, and that it would take a considerable time to equip them for sea? This was the case of those demonstration-ships, which ought to have been ready for sea at a moment's notice. The Ganges had required much to be done to her before she was fit for sea: she had to be caulked, and in part newly-coppered, before the men could be put aboard her. The Powerful had not yet been able to sail. The hon. and gallant Admiral seemed to dispute this, but he spoke with the full knowledge that the Powerful had sailed from Sheerness; it was quite true she had sailed from Sheerness, but it was only to Portsmouth, and for what purpose he begged to ask? Why, to get men to complete her complement. He thought, if he required a complete proof of what he had been stating, this case furnished it—furnished a complete proof that if nine, or ten, or twelve, line of battle ships were wanted on a sudden, instead of being able to fit them out in three days, as Sir G. Cockburn had done in 1827, when it was determined to send a force to Portugal, the present Board of Admiralty could not have them ready in three months. For it was quite certain, that though the Powerful might take only six weeks to fit for sea, yet if seven or eight second-rates had to be got ready at one time, they would find that each of them would take nearer three months than six weeks to equip. In his opinion, and he believed others who knew more of the subject thought with him, the demonstration-ships ought to have all their masts up, and all their yards and stores on board, so as to be ready to put to sea at a very short notice. This, he thought, ought to be done, and when the Admiralty defended themselves for not doing it, by referring to the order of his right hon. friend (Sir J. Graham) who introduced those ships, they must be sensible that they had quite departed from the principles of that order, and had reverted to a system which rendered those ships more like ships in ordinary. He would again entreat the attention of hon. Members to the effects of this, and of a contrary system, as contrasted in the evidence he had already quoted. Sir G. Cockburn said, "in the years 1787 and 1790 we had to make large naval armaments in consequence of our force being kept down for peace, as it was. Whenever we had any dispute with any foreign nation we were obliged immediately to make an armament to get thirty or forty sail of the line ready, though we did not know we should go to war, on purpose to avoid the evils I have mentioned; whereas the other day, when the difficulties with Spain and Portugal arrived, I was sent for by Mr. Canning to be consulted as to what preparations might be necessary, and my answer was, Nothing; we need not do anything, for we have our ships ready; we have got the men on the coast blockade, and whenever you tell me it is necessary to make a movement, I will answer for having twelve sail-of-the-line at sea in three days; and so it took place, for, though nothing was said to anybody, and it remained a perfect secret with the Cabinet and myself till the message went down to the House, in three days afterwards twelve sail-of-the-line were ready to proceed.'" Was it possible that expedition like this could be made now! If the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs were to notify to the Admiralty that it was necessary to send a squadron of even three or four sail-of-the-line to the West Indies or the Gulf of Mexico, what would be the answer? Would they be ready in three days, as the twelve sail-of-the-line were in 1827? He would venture to say, they would not be ready in three months—nay, that it would be six months before they were ready. The gallant Admiral appeared to deny this; he should like, therefore, to know whether the gallant Admiral would consent to the appointment of a committee of that House to inquire into the state of preparation in which the Admiralty would be able, if called upon, to produce eight or nine ships of the line, in a few days. He should like to know whether the Admiralty would consent to such a committee, and would lay before them such information as would enable them to judge for themselves. Still, as he said before, he believed that great exertions had been made of late; that there had been a considerable conversion of stores, manufacture of sails, and manufacture of masts; but he must object to the hon. Secretary of the Admiralty stating that when they came into office they found many difficulties to contend with, all of which were owing to the ill-judged parsimony of the Tory Government. This formed the exordium, the middle, and the end of the hon. Gentleman's speech. It was true that there was a reduction of expenditure under the Government of the right hon. Baronet in 1834, but then it must be remembered that the money vote was always proportioned to the number of men that were voted, and that the number of men in that year was greatly reduced below the tale of former, as well as of subsequent years. But the hon. Member seemed to state also that the state of the stores in 1830 was deficient. At this distance of time, not having the advantage of any official documents to which to refer, he could not be quite accurate; but he thought on that subject he might appeal to the hon. Member for Kilkenny, whose complaint at that time was, that they were always accumulating stores. If they had erred then, they had erred on the safe side. The hon. Member seemed to say, that a new system had been introduced, and found great fault with the stores being appropriated to particular vessels. He would ask had not all the ships' stores been so appropriated? The only question that could be raised was as to the number of ships as to which those stores could be appropriated. But he understood, that if a ship of the same class were to be put into rigging, the same stores would be given to that ship. That seemed to be a system which was found fault with. He apprehended, that that must be the system which was still pursued by the present Admiralty, and the only question as to the appropriation of stores would be the number of ships to which they could be appropriated. The hon. Member had made some observations upon a speech said to have been delivered by the Earl of Hardwicke, with regard to the efficiency of the navy. He understood his argument to be this—the First Lord of the Admiralty asserted, that he had thirty sail-of-the-line in ordinary, with full complements of masts, sails, rigging, and stores, and of those thirty ships, there were thirteen demonstration-ships, peculiarly fitted for sea. Was the Revenge one of those ships? She was one of the thirteen fitted for sea. If the masts and sails were not complete, they could have put masts and sails into her; but that would, in the same way, have made one of their other thirteen ships want masts and sails. [Sir C. Adam: No.] He believed the Government had lately caused great exertions to be used in making masts; he believed they had a greater stock now than last year. Since the time of the observations made by the Duke of Wellington last Session, on the state of the navy, greater exertions had been made; and he thought that those persons who had joined in that debate, were as deserving of praise for causing those increased exertions, as the hon. Member for Bristol, the other night, had said Captain Berkeley was, in stating that the increased complement of ships had been so speedily determined on by the Admiralty, since he had put forward his pamphlet on the subject. The same observations, with regard to the stores at Portsmouth, would apply to the establishment at Plymouth. It had been stated, that ten sail-of-the-line were to be provided out of Plymouth harbour, and he found that they had not topsails for that number of ships at Plymouth. [Mr. Wood: No, no.] What had been the statement of the Admiralty the other night?—that, instead of complete sets of sails for ten sail-of-the-line, they had complete sets for seven sail only, and these would not make out their complete thirteen sail of-the-line. He thought the noble Lord had been perfectly justified in saying, that the statement of the Admiralty was an incorrect one, that they had provision and stores and masts and sails for thirty sail-of-the-line. He must call the attention of the House, in the next place, to the reduced complements of the Cornwallis, the Wellesley, and the Ganges. He altogether denied the power that the Admiralty had assumed of altering the rating of any particular ships. He saw that these three ships were 74-gun ships, third-rates, and they were rated as fourth-rates. Now, he contended, that that was using a power which the Admiralty did not possess. Her Majesty, by an Order in Council, declared and made public to all the world, the rating of the ships in her navy according to the number of men belonging to them on their war complement, and the pay of the different officers depended upon the rating of the ships. It would, therefore, be a most injurious power to grant to the Admiralty that they were at their discretion to reduce the rating of the ships, and call a third-rate a fourth-rate, and deprive not only the captain, but the whole of the petty officers, of a portion of their pay. This was what a number of the petty officers could not be aware of. The number of men might, in this way, be varied from third-rate to fourth-rate. What was the rating of the Cornwallis? She had the same complement as the other 74-gun ships. Was she still a third-rate? She was reduced to a fourth-rate. The power of altering the rating of ships was never claimed by the Admiralty before. He was aware, that it had frequently happened that vessels of that size had been employed as troop ships, armed en flute; but this was the first time it had ever been attempted to give a troop-ship carrying an admiral's flag a lower rate. They had decreased the complements of the Wellesley and the Cornwallis, and the rate of the petty officers had been decreased accordingly. He much doubted, whether these petty officers might not bring an action to recover the amount of their pay. He thought it his duty to call the attention of the Committee to this point, because it was an usurped power. He felt that he had troubled the Committee at great length, but certainly after the speech of the hon. Gentleman, he could not be content to say less than he had said. He certainly did hope, that an alteration would be made in the number of men in the service. He believed it had been stated that it was not necessary to have ten sail-of-the-line in the Mediterranean. If it was not, why keep them there? Would it not be better to keep one or two of them cruising in the Channel? The crews would be quite as well disciplined. He thought it highly improper, that there had been no force at Mexico to protect the merchantmen. The coasts of the St. Lawrence and Newfoundland were also unprotected. There were many points of detail in the speech of the hon. Member, the Secretary of the Admiralty, to which he should like to have alluded, but he would not longer detain the Committee.

Admiral Sir C. Adam

rose to address the Committee with great reluctance and diffidence, for he was aware, that he was by no means competent to follow so practised a debater as the hon. Baronet. The statements of the hon. Gentleman as to matters of fact were such as he could answer, and he was much mistaken if he could not answer them to the satisfaction of the hon. Gentleman, who sat behind him, and of the public at large. The hon. Baronet had commenced his speech with a reference to the question of foreign politics, into which he did not propose to enter, as there were other Gentlemen who were not only more competent than he, but whose peculiar province it was to discuss that question. The hon. Baronet had then proceeded to the subject of having guard ships in our ports, and maintained that we now pursued a bad mode of keeping up a force fur defending our shores. Now, eleven half-manned guard-ships were certainly better than nothing at all. He remembered when the necessity occurred for sending a force to Portugal. These ships were brought forward in a most effective manner, and did their duty well; but then they only went armed en flute to convey troops; and at all events their complements were not full, or they could not have carried troops on board. When it became necessary to send troops to North America he would maintain that it was done with no less alacrity and promptitude, and in a manner which did infinite credit to the officers and men who had to undertake that arduous duty in the middle of winter. The light ships, which were commissioned in April 1836, were made ready for sea in three or four months, and put in such a state that they were sent to join the Mediterranean fleet and were ready to perform the same services which any other ship of the squadron could perform. As to the allegation that the shores of the country were undefended, he was prepared to deny the fact, and to disprove it. In the course of last summer there were three line-of-battle-ships in the three ports which had been referred to, and which could readily be made effective in a very short space of time. Besides these three ships, which were constantly here, there were in the Tagus, within a few days' sail of our shores, and constantly sailing backwards and forwards, the Hercules, the Edinburgh, the Minden and the Hastings, the two large frigates Pique and Inconstant, and some sloops and other vessels. At the same time there were in the St. Lawrence, under Sir C. Paget's command two line-of-battle-ships, independent of those going and coming—the Cornwallis and the Malabar. These were two of the ships which at the time the right hon. Baronet came into office were called demonstration-ships, and the right hon. Baronet proceeded to put them in a state ready for commission, by putting masts up, water tanks in, rigging them, and in the summer they appeared ready for sea, and this was the state in which they were when he was called to the Board of Admiralty. Shortly after he came into office, it was thought necessary to commission the Hercules; and so far from that vessel being in a better state of preparation, in consequence of the manner in which she was previously rigged, the fact was quite the reverse. He did not mean to blame the right hon. Baronet, who put this and the other ship in that state, nor did he mean to say, that there had been any neglect on the part of the proper officers in not reporting them to be in the state in which they were afterwards found. Every sailor knew that when a ship was to go to sea, everything about her was examined with great care, and defects were seen which would not appear on a cursory examination. In this way the state of the Hercules had been discovered, and she had to be completely unrigged and re-rigged; so that instead of being in a greater state of preparation from what had been previously done, time was absolutely lost in the unrigging and re-rigging. It was found, too, that the lower masts from having been two or three years longer exposed to the weather, were so much the worse that it was necessary to change them also. The Admiralty, consequently, instituted a close and minute inspection of the masts and gear of the different vessels, and ultimately came to a resolution to remove all the masts and everything connected with these ships into stores appropriated to them, where they were kept regularly tallied, and ready for use. The effect of this was, that masts instead of being exposed to all weathers, were now kept under cover, and instead of being bleached by the frosts of winter, and dried by the suns of summer were kept perfectly ready to be put on board ship the moment they were required. He (Admiral Adam) maintained, from the experience he had had, that this was a much better system than that adopted by the right hon. Baronet—not that he thought any blame attached to the right hon. Baronet or the Board of Admiralty, of which he was the head. On the contrary, the system adopted by them might have answered very well if all the stores and sails had been new and perfect. But unfortunately a large part of the supply of stores had been left at the end of a long war, when the six hundred pennants were flying which the hon. Baronet had talked of. When so large a portion of these were broken up, the stores which accumulated could not be got rid of; it was necessary to use them as they were wanted. With respect to the deficiency and unserviceable state of the stores, his hon. Friend, the Secretary for the Admiralty, had not attributed blame to the right hon. Baronet opposite. A large portion had, indeed, been found so much deteriorated that it was absolutely necessary to get rid of them. But it would have been foolish and absurd to get rid of them so long as there was a chance of their being of use. But when he (Admiral Adam) came to the Admiralty Board, his noble friend now at the head of it did find the stores in such a situation as to make it it necessary to provide immediately an addition, nay considerable additions to them. In January 1836, they began to supply the deficiencies which they found, and it was not after or in consequence of the Duke of Wellington's speech on the subject. He maintained, that the Duke of Wellington's speech had no effect whatever on the system adopted in supplying the arsenal. That speech had indeed the effect of producing a pamphlet from a flag officer, full of innumerable misstatements and wilful misrepresentations, which had been so ably exposed by his hon. Friend near him (Mr. C. Wood) last night. He would not say anything with respect to those stores of rigging that had remained in the arsenal, and to which the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Clerk) had alluded as not attached to any ship. According to the former system stores had remained for twelve months in some cases, labelled with the name of a particular ship, after she had been condemned. It was found extremely inconvenient to have stores appropriated to particular ships, because an officer would often hesitate to take what he wanted from one of these complete sets, however great might be his need. It was, therefore, determined to have no stores kept ready for particular ships, except for those which were called demonstration-ships. A general store was kept for general purposes besides. Now, with respect to the flag-ships of Sir Frederick Maitland, Sir Charles Paget, and Admiral Elliot, stationed at the East Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the West Indies, the facts were these:—The predecessors of these gallant officers had hoisted their flags in a large class of frigates; but it was suggested, and Sir George Cockburn approved of the system, that it would be for the convenience of the admirals, and also for the advantage of the service, to employ, instead of these large frigates, small seventy-fours, of which there were unfortunately so many in the service. That there were so many of these vessels was neither the fault of the right hon. Baronet nor of the present Board; but being in existence they could not be burned, consequently they must be used as long as they were fit to go to sea, and as long as the necessary repairs were not too great. Nor was it to be supposed, that these seventy-fours were perfectly useless; for it happened, that by far the largest portion of the Baltic fleet consisted of seventy-four gun ships precisely of this size, which had been so much complained of. But he was referring to the employment of seventy-fours as flag ships, instead of large frigates. There had been several reasons for it—the first he had mentioned, the advantage of using these seventy-fours. The next was the accommodation which such vessels afforded to the admirals and the various persons employed about a flag-ship. On the West-India station the convenience was particularly great, where whole battalions might be conveyed from one island to another with the greatest ease, in consequence of the facilities which the clearance of the lower deck afforded. But the hon. Baronet (Sir G. Clerk) had brought a heavy charge against the department to which he had the honour to belong. It was no less than that they had acted in contravention of the King's Order in Council; that they had made ships of one rating which were properly of another, as in the case of the flagship so often referred to, by removing the lower deck guns, and reducing their complement to the amount of frigates. But the hon. Baronet did not seem to recollect, that the King's Order in Council merely prescribed, that the complements should not exceed a certain number. Certainly, the hon. Baronet's construction did appear to him to be an overstraining of the meaning of the Order in Council. Another advantage of these seventy-fours was, that they were stronger ships and carried a heavier burden than the frigates. But, after all, how did it come about, that these ships were employed? One would suppose, that the present Board of Admiralty were entirely to blame, if the matter of blame properly attached anywhere. But what would the House think when he told them, that this arrangement had in fact been determined on when Earl de Grey was at the head of the Admiralty. When a gallant Friend of his (Sir Peter Halket) was appointed to succeed Sir George Cockburn on the West-India station, upon the appointment of Sir George Cockburn to the Board of Admiralty, he was promised to have a seventy-four as a flag-ship without its lower-deck guns. He made the request, and proposed to the Board to be allowed to hoist his flag in a seventy-four, as not being attended with more expense or difficulty than the use of a frigate. The hon. Baronet had also complained, that there were too small a number of ships on the coast of Mexico when the French first went to blockade it. An order had been sent from the Admiralty to the commander on the nearest station to pay particular attention to that coast, and to station ships there. It had happened from the admiral being in the St. Lawrence, and from some other untoward circumstances, that the whole number of ships intended had not been placed there. His noble Friend at the Head of the Foreign Department, when he found that so large and important a squadron was proceeding under the command of Admiral Baudin to the Gulf of Mexico, immediately determined to send a squadron there also, for purposes, which, as it was not necessary now to explain, he would not enter upon. That squadron was composed of line-of-battle ships and large frigates, which were at that time in this country, and as there did not appear any reasonable cause of alarm from the Russian fleet, it was not thought necessary to keep them for the defence of our unprotected coast, but rather to employ them where it was considered their services might be useful. The consequence was, that Sir Charles Paget was directed to proceed himself with the Cornwallis, the Edinburgh, the Malabar ships-of-the-line, the Madagascar, and the Seringapatam, the Inconstant, and Pique frigates of the largest size, and six or eight corvettes and sloops. But the business of this squadron was not to prevent a blockade. The French had a perfect right to blockade the coast of Mexico, or any port of a country with which they were at war—quite as good a right as this country had to blockade the port of Carthagena. But it was said, that the French had been left unwatched. It was true the English squadron did not arrive in time for the taking of St. Jean d'Ulloa; but that was of little consequence. They would have had no right to interfere with what the French were doing on that occasion. When a squadron was wanted in the Gulf of Mexico, a squadron proceeded to that service. [An hon. Member: "Too late."] By no means too late for the object intended. The object had never been to prevent the French from blockading the coast of Mexico, or taking the castle of St. Jean d'Ulloa. He denied, that it was too late, although it had not arrived so early as had been intended, owing to circumstances to which all maritime operations were liable. Amongst these was the unprecedented long passage of the ship that carried out both the original and the duplicate despatches. He was not aware of any other point necessary to touch upon. If he had neglected anything, he was persuaded, that there were several hon. Friends behind him who would supply his deficiencies. He could not sit down without alluding to the case of the Revenge. The Revenge was one of those ships intended to be demonstration-ships. The Revenge had lately come from the Mediterranean, and paid off, so lately, that the repairs were not ordered till a few months ago. The repairs were not completed yet, and were reported not to be ready till April. It was no extraordinary thing, that the main mast of a ship requiring some repairs should not be finished at the time spoken of. There was one subject to which the hon. Baronet had alluded which he approached with great reluctance, and that was the peace complements. After all that had been said about them, he maintained now, as he had said last night, that the extreme complements necessary for war ought not to be put on ship board in the middle of peace. In time of war, a much greater force was required for managing the sails, anchors, and cables. In peace time it was perfectly well known, that without the war complements, line-of-battle ships could not be manœuvred with all the exactness, adroitness, and celerity that could possibly be required. And he maintained, that it was better to keep eleven line-of-battle ships in commission, with reduced complements, than ten perfectly efficient and ready for war, because it was affording opportunities to a great number of officers for learning their duty, and fitting themselves to take their part hereafter in protecting the trade and commerce of the country. With regard to the reduced complements of the seventy-fours, which had been cut down to frigates, he could see no reason why they should not be reduced. The masts, yards, and sails in a frigate were really larger, and she was in some respects more difficult to manage, from the upper deck being cut off, and from dropping in her courses more. Whether the new complements might not be somewhat increased, he could not now discuss; but his opinion certainly was, that they were at present too small. But with respect to the statements which had been made on a former evening of a gallant Officer who thought it necessary to unbend his sails, and make an excuse to avoid being beaten, in furling and loosening them by the ship of a foreign squadron, he confessed, that it did surprise him. He would say, that if that officer would, like Hercules, put his shoulder to the wheel to teach his men and officers better, such things would not happen. With respect to Captain Berkeley's pamphlet, he had denied, and denied again, that there had been any difference between the Admiralty and Captain Berkeley, excepting upon certain points connected with the peace complements, in which Captain Berkeley was opposed by every member of the Board. He was sorry, that Captain Berkeley had so far forgotten himself as to take a step unjustifiable in any member of a Board—to appeal to the public in a printed pamphlet—especially at a time when he knew that the very subject upon which he differed with his colleagues was under their consideration. The scheme now proposed was to fix proper complements, still preserving the peace establishments. If it were not carried to the full extent, it would still go far to remove the evils complained of, and it would be carried to an extent that would give satisfaction to the country. He was sorry to be obliged to speak on this subject. He regretted, that Captain Berkeley had put forth his pamphlet in the manner he had done—having but one feeling towards him as an individual—an officer, and a member of the Board of Admiralty. He maintained again, that it was not Captain Berkeley's pamphlet that caused the increased complement to be adopted; and he, therefore, denied the inferences that had been drawn by the hon. Baronet opposite.

Sir James Graham

said, that many years had now elapsed since his official connexion with naval affairs had terminated. During that interval, his attention had been directed to other subjects. Whatever he might think of the measures adopted by his successors, with respect to those in which he himself bore a part he had been content, and was still content to leave them to the unerring test of experience. In the large changes which it was his lot to introduce in the most important branches of naval administration, he had had the good fortune to be assisted by naval officers of the highest reputation, amongst others by an hon. Friend, who was at that period his colleague, but who, much to his honour, still thought the post of difficulty the post of honour. Satisfied, as he was, that the measures then adopted would bear the test of discussion, if he was entitled to any share of the credit which might attach to them, he would not shrink from the responsibility of defending them. He referred with pleasure to the opening statement of his hon. Friend, the Secretary of the Admiralty, made the other evening. He was convinced that the great ability, clearness, and knowledge of the subject evinced in that statement must have been felt by the whole House. If he might express regret without offence, he certainly was rather sorry that the hon. Secretary had given to the subject somewhat of a party tone. He should be extremely sorry to twit the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Adam) with the difficulties he might have in this House. His character was not formed there as a debater; it was formed in a very different scene. In his profession, he was universally known and acknowledged as a brave, gallant, and distinguished Officer, who had won the respect and affection of those under his command. But he regretted that he had been led to speak in a somewhat dictatorial tone on this subject. Something had been said by the hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for the Admiralty, of paragraphs in Tory newspapers. Why, he might as well have complained of paragraphs in the Radical newspapers. It had been made matter of congratulation, that his connexion with the Admiralty had ceased, and the efficiency of the service raised by the termination of that connexion. He would not be led by such comments in anything he might offer to the House on the present occasion, or induced to adopt a party tone. He thought the question for them to decide was one of paramount and national importance, namely, whether the British navy was in a state on the first emergency to maintain the honour of the British flag, to secure the protection of this country, and to preserve peace amongst the nations of the world. All the other questions, whether one was a little more to blame, or another a little less to blame, he would altogether surrender. No one would contend, that in so difficult and arduous an administration, and amongst the shifting and varying circumstances in which it was carried on, there might not be some errors committed. The great question was, taking a general view of the subject, were we well prepared or ill prepared for any emergency that might arise. Something had been said with regard to a gallant Friend of his, who was also a Colleague—he meant the brother of the hon. Gentleman whom he saw opposite (Mr. F. H. Berkeley). He regretted, that that gallant Officer had been led so far astray by the example of the Secretary of the Board—that, being a Member of the Board, he should have appealed from decisions not yet concluded by the Board, to the profession generally, and to the public at large. He thought it an error of judgment on the part of that gallant Officer. He did not see how it was possible, that an Administration upon such a publication could take any other course than to declare the connexion terminated. On the other hand, in the opinions expressed in the letter of Captain Berkeley he entirely agreed. He regretted very much the reduction of the peace complements in 1834. He was bound to say—with all respect for the naval officers who concurred in the opinion, that that reduction should be made—that it was not a judicious reduction; and he especially admitted it with regard to the razée frigates, as they were called—to those of the fourth class—and to the new frigates of the fifth and eighth classes. Captain Berkeley said—and it was strictly true—that the size of the masts and yards in those ships made the labour of working them excessive; and on almost all occasions, even in smooth water, to put the ship about, all hands were called up, thus interrupting the comfort of the men, and interfering in every way with what rendered the being on board a man-of-war desirable. This was the result of their ships being under manned. It operated seriously against voluntary enlistment. But why discuss this matter further? A fresh armament had been decided on, and he thought wisely decided on by the Board of Admiralty. New complements were to be given to the ships, and he thought this most desirable, however it had been effected. He had nothing to regret in connexion with this matter, except that Captain Berkeley had lost his place at the Board; but even here there was some consolation, for if Captain Berkeley was lost, Sir John Pechell was restored to the Board of Admiralty; and he believed, that in her Majesty's service, there was no Officer more efficient in his peculiar branch. An hon. Gentleman had given him (Sir J. Graham) the other night more credit than he deserved for the introduction of a system of naval gunnery into her Majesty's service, to which he attached the greatest importance. He was bound to say, that the first suggestion of it he had found in the department left by Lord Melville and sanctioned by Sir George Cockburn. The first recommendation of it had been by an officer in the navy, Capt. Smith, he believed; and his attention had been further called to it by a pamphlet of Sir H. Douglas, who pointed out the great deficiency in naval gunnery; acid the melancholy experience of the American war had tended to confirm the same impression. He had also thought, that the time had arrived when it was prudent to diminish the expense of the marine artillery, and it had been reduced from eight companies to two, leaving a nucleus for forming a force in case of war approaching. But while he thought it of importance to reduce the expense of the marine artillery, he found, that with very little additional cost, improvements might be made in naval gunnery. In this, however, he could not have succeeded to his own satisfaction, or the satisfaction of the country, without the assistance of Sir John Pechell, who gave his undivided attention to the subject, and who, being trusted by his present colleagues as he well deserved to be, would continue his services with equal efficiency. He was sorry that the hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for the Admiralty, was pleased last night to taunt the Administration that immediately preceded the present. He thought, that justice ought to have restrained him from doing so. Earl de Grey had a very short opportunity of presiding over the Admiralty. He did not think, that Earl de Grey's Board, considering the circumstances under which they undertook the management of public affairs, and the short time during which they directed them, could be held strictly responsible for deficiencies found in 1836 in the stores or general arrangements. If there were deficiencies in 1835—if there were any deep-seated neglect on which the hon. Gentleman opposite could put his finger, he was the real person responsible—he, and the Administration of which he was a member. With regard to the stores, he had come prepared with documents that would terrify them. If he were to go into them, the House would never wake again. The decision as to the coast-guard was also sustained by official documents. So would his defence he for reducing the marine artillery, and for introducing the system of naval gunnery. There was also that most entertaining subject, the substituting day pay for task and job work in the dockyards. He really believed they would consider him the most unreasonable man, and also the most tiresome man in the Committee, if he were to enter on such subjects at that moment. With reference to the great subject now before the House, it was better not to embarrass it with such things. But there was one matter of great importance, because it touched the permanent efficiency of the service, and that was, the state of the stores. On that point a debt of justice was due to Lord Melville, his immediate predecessor. He should consider it inexpedient, even if he had the materials, to state the present amount of the stores. He had not the official information necessary to do it. If he had, he would not use it; and not thinking it right to use it, he would not ask for it. But there was no objection to mentioning the state of the stores as he found them at the end of 1830, and as he left them in 1833. He would state to the Committee, the principal naval stores in which the maintenance of the efficiency of the navy depended. He would vindicate himself from reproach, and show that, notwithstanding the economy—the rigid economy he had endeavoured to introduce, no branch of the public service had been left unprovided with those essential necessaries, without which it could not be safely or efficiently conducted. On the other hand, it was only justice to his predecessor, who left these stores, to state that against him he had no right to complain. His hon. Friend, the Member for Stamford (Sir G. Clerk), had said to the hon. Gentleman opposite with the utmost fairness, that if he had any complaint to make against the amount of stores left by Lord Melville, he challenged comparison with the present amount of stores, and was ready to go into the examination with him upon any one head. He (Sir James Graham), was ready to go into a similar comparison; but, for the present, would content himself with submitting to the House, a statement of the amount of stores left by him in 1834 as compared with those left by Lord Melville in 1830. And if they were not in all cases quite so great, he was satisfied that they were in every respect sufficient for the wants of the service. He would not weary the House with details, but state the gross amount of the principal articles. On the 31st of December, 1830, he found 56,633 loads of timber—he left 59,671. He found 3,932 tons of hemp—he left 7,221. He found 4,154 tons of yarn—he left 4,188. Of cable and cordage, he found 3,500 tons. He left 3,038. He found 33,600 bolts of canvass—he left 30,000. He found 2,569 anchors—he left 2,441. He found 725 chain cables—he left 858. He found 10,529 iron tanks—he left 9,453. Of lower masts for ships of the line, he found 170—he left 151; of lower masts for frigates, he found 167—he left 191. He found 371 top-masts—he left 394. He found 895 spars for top-masts—he left 995. He found 452 spars for lower yards—he left 422. There was a combination in the market to keep up the price of hemp. What was the course, then, that he pursued, when he found that there was a deficiency in the stores, and that there was no preparation made for having a proper supply of steam-engines for vessels of war?—he came down with a special estimate to the House of Commons, and without any difficulty he obtained what was necessary. Such, then, was the state of this department in the important article of stores; but that was of secondary importance compared to the state of the ships themselves. It was a matter of the very highest importance, that the ships themselves should be in a state of prompt preparation. He agreed with what the present head of the Government had said elsewhere, and what had been repeated here to-night, that the number of ships that were and ought to be in commission was not an Admiralty question, but a Cabinet question; and it was one, too, which must vary according to the state of affairs, and according to the views of the Government generally, as to whether there should be any want for a naval force in a given time, and whether a demonstration of the naval power of this country should be made in any part of the world at a given period. It did not then follow because his noble Friend (Lord de Grey) had in 1835 only asked for 15,000 seamen instead of 20,000, that he acted improperly. The question to be asked and the question to be considered was, was he not justified in so acting in reference to the foreign relations of the country at the time? The force that a Government ought to ask for ought to be the smallest that would be sufficient for the purposes of the country. He did not think, that any fanciful apprehension nor any vain desire to make a useless demonstration of the force of this country could justify a Government in asking for a single man beyond what the actual necessity of the case required. This was his opinion, and he might illustrate it by his own conduct, which had met with the approval and concurrence of his hon. colleagues whom he saw opposite. In the year 1831 he came down to Parliament, and asked for an increase of 4,000 seamen and 1,000 marines. He had raised the number of seamen from 18,000 to 22,000, and the number of marines from 9,000 to 10,000; and during the years 1831–32 his colleagues had conducted the Dutch blockade, and had also a fleet on the coast of Portugal, which was the means of placing her present Majesty on the throne of that country. Before he left office, however, he had reduced the sailors by 4,000, and the marines by 1,000. The present state of circumstances, he was sure, would be found to justify the present Government in making an augmentation. The hon. and gallant Admiral had referred to the demonstration-ships, and the Secretary to the Admiralty, who was a very severe critic, had declared, that the name of "demonstration-ships" was a very absurd one. This he believed was declared by the writing, not the speaking secretary. He was not there to defend the particular nomenclature, but he was there prepared to defend the principle upon which such a measure had been founded. He did contend, that demonstration-ships on the principle that he had laid down might be made immediately available not only in Europe, but to the utmost extent of the civilized world, and at their most distant possessions, and this, too, with a due regard to the safety of the shores of England. Upon this point he must say, that he differed with his hon. Friend as to the guard-ships; for he said, that whether they looked to the discipline of those ships, or to the state of the men, he could not believe, that they constituted a reserve on which reliance could be placed in time of danger. He hoped the House would pardon him if he read for them his opinions on the subject. He had obtained an official copy from the Board of Admiralty, stating at the same time, that it was his intention to use it in the House: it was given, too, with this understanding. It was a minute left by him at the Board of Admiralty the day he left office, and in which he laid down opinions that, as they were written, were more distinctly expressed than he could speak them; and they referred to the principles that ought to be acted on with respect to demonstration-ships. The minute was as follows:— Admiralty, June 14, 1834. As my last act before leaving this Board, I consider it my duty, in the most earnest manner, to impress upon my successor the paramount importance of keeping at all times ready to receive men, twelve sail of the line, and six large frigates, in addition to the ships which may be in commission. When I say, ready to receive men, I mean their standing rigging over the mast head, their topmast pointed, their lower yards across, all their internal fittings complete, and their ground tier of tanks on board. On a sudden emergency it is impossible to calculate the advantage which this state of preparation affords; and I speak from experience when I declare, that if reliance be placed on a state of ordinary to meet the exigencies of a sudden armament, with efficient dispatch, disappointment will ensue, and national danger may be the consequence. France, Russia, all the naval powers, keep constantly a large portion of their fleet in this advanced state of preparation; but when I compare the number of their ships, and the limited sphere within which they move, with our reduced peace establishment, and our ships of war in commission, scattered throughout the world for the protection of our commerce, I am convinced, that prudence and policy dictate the necessity of having a force concentrated and ready in our harbours, at once to proceed to sea, at soon as men can be obtained. This force should be equally divided between Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the Medway, to prevent confusion, and to insure celerity when an armament takes place; and the admirals and captains superintendents, at those ports should be held strictly responsible for the constant state of perfect efficiency in which these ships should be kept without fail. Their rigging must be removed from time to time, and their masts and spars overhauled; but the cost is insignificant compared with the national advantage of having this force instantly available, without the risk of disappointment. To insure these ships being constantly ready, I would recommend, that as ships of these classes are brought forward for commission, they should be taken from the number thus prepared. I have mentioned the raising of men as the necessary limit to dispatch in preparing for sea. I may be allowed to observe, that the coast guard, as now constituted, is to a certain extent a reserve of prime seamen; but whatever measures may be adopted, founded on registration, to regulate compulsory service, it never should be forgotten, that in moments of real danger impress alone is the sure and rapid means of obtaining the necessary supply, and the surrender of this prerogative of the Crown will, in my judgment, be the death-blow to the naval supremacy of this country. This was the opinion which on this subject he had placed upon record. There was one point to which he wished more especially to refer, viz., the coast-guard forming a reserve in time of imminent danger. The coast blockade consisted of 2,500 men, and cost the country 150,000l. They were only a guard for the coasts of Kent and Sussex, and it was a civil and not a naval force. His noble Friend, who was at the head of the Government when he was in office, surrendered the patronage of the coast-guard, that which was the most useful patronage which a first Lord of the Treasury could command. The situations were given to the supporters of the Government, amd no patronage could be more useful to any Administration. Now, the noble Earl, when he was satisfied that a naval object could be attained by the surrender of the patronage, did not hesitate a moment in surrendering it; but, in doing so, he said that he should have security that it could not be jobbed afterwards, and that all the situations should be applied to naval and not civil purposes. The Admiralty had now only a control over the appointments which were given to officers, who, on paying off ships, recommended men after three years' service, and who, with such a recommendation, had a right to the appointment of boatmen. What then was the advantage of this arrangement? That the whole of the coast of Great Britain and Ireland was surrounded by a force under the command of naval officers composed of seamen, and those the best seamen. And, with relation to the pensions which they were permitted to receive—for what purpose were they permitted to have them? As a retaining fee, in order that the Admiralty might be able to call on them to go on board ship, with the intimation, that if they refused, they would lose their pensions, as if the necessity arose, they should be compelled to go. The coast blockade consisted of 2,700 men, while the new force, under new discipline and naval control, consisted of upwards of 5,000 men. He had the authority of a very able and distinguished officer, Captain Bowles, that in substituting the coastguard for the coast blockade there was a saving of from 50,000l. to 60,000l. a year. That was the direct saving; but the fiscal saving was incalculable; as smuggling had never before been effectually suppressed, and now it was suppressed completely. He had been led further into this subject than he had intended to go; but he was very glad to hear that Government had appointed a commission to enquire into the subject. He was not prepared to say that a coast guard might not be maintained at a less cost; but then he hoped that the Government would think twice before it put down the system of coast-guard and recommenced the system of the coast blockade. He had, he owned, entertained an apprehension that there was about to be a departure, by the present Government, from the rule laid down by him with respect to the demonstration-ships. Before, however, he ventured to express an opinion upon this subject, he had consulted Sir Thomas Hardy. He had reminded the gallant Admiral, that the plan was adopted in strict accordance with his opinions, and those of the late Admiral Dundas,—a man whom he could not name without declaring his affection and respect for his memory, and saying that he was, without exception, one of the most upright, disinterested public servants that had ever entered into the service of her Majesty. The question he had put to Sir Thomas Hardy was, whether he thought the rule that he had laid down with respect to the demonstration-ships was advisable, and he thought that in candour he was bound to read the answer he received. It was this:—The admiral stated, that 'it certainly was his opinion, as well as that of Admiral Dundas and the other Members of the Board of Admiralty, that with a view to the necessity of any sudden armament, it would be of advantage to have four ships-of-the-line in Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the Medway, with their several stores prepared, and in such a state that they could be got into readiness with the least possible loss of time. Experience, however, had shown that continuing ships in that advanced state of preparation was not advisable, because the rigging required to be refitted, and the mast repaired." He added, that "he thought it would be of more advantage to the service to have the rigging and masts prepared and marked for each ship, but kept in the dockyards until the time when the vessels were required for service" He had entertained, he said, a different opinion, and believing it to be a point on which some of the public anxiety had been excited, he thought he was right in stating this to the House. Everything depended under this arrangement to the preparation of the most minute particulars, and these being ready at once to be put on board. He had discovered before he left office that there was a deterioration in the lower masts, owing to their being exposed, and he had mast-houses erected for the purpose of masting and unmasting vessels. There was one point to which he felt bound to allude, and he did it in no angry spirit—he made it in passing, and it had reference to the case of a sudden armament being called for. It could not now take place, in case of a sudden emergency, supposing in the course of the next summer. The first men that were put on board were the marines. Supposing, then, they were to put in commission twelve sail-of-the-line and six frigates, 2,500 marines would be required. At this moment they had not more than 1,100, or 1,200 marines in England; and he must say, that if the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, instead of trying to settle the affairs of Spain, by the attacking of windmills, and of determining the succession in Spain by 1,200 marines—if the noble Lord would recal the force that was in Spain, this country would be in a condition to supply twelve sail-of-the-line in commission and six frigates with marines. Now they could only put six sail in commission. The force that was now in Spain could make no impression there, and it was required here. He assured the noble Lord he did not make these observations in an angry spirit. He thought that the experiment in Spain had failed, and the seen-ray of this country would be greatly increased, if the 1,000 marines now in Spain were here, and ready to be put on board ship. But he came back to a matter of primary importance, and even the presence of the hon. Member for Kilkenny would not induce him to qualify his opinion; for with that hon. Member he had before now fought many a battle upon the estimates. That hon. Gentleman would, be was sure, feel horrified, when he said that it was his opinion that, upon different essential points, a larger expenditure, and of a permanent kind, was essentially necessary. It was upon these points he was anxious to carry the committee along with him. So far was he from being hostile to the present Government, that he said of whomsoever the Administration was composed, they should always take care of that which was indispensable for the safety of the country, and that that ought always to be a point of paramount consideration. He had often told the hon. Member for Kilkenny that ships, like men, were perishable—that ships ought to be renewed, and that there ought to be a regular annual supply of new ships. He held this to be indispensable. The gallant Admiral had referred to the class of ships designated "the forty thieves," and Lord Melville, conscious of the defect in this respect, had sought a remedy for it. He wished now to refer to Sir John Barrow's published table of the navy, and he desired to call the attention of the committee to the relative force of Great Britain, as contrasted with the naval force of France, Russia, and the United States. What was the state of the three countries as to their line-of-battle ships? England had twenty-one ships of the line, France had ten, Russia forty, and the United States two; that is, England had in commission twenty-one line-of-battle ships, against the fifty-two of these three Powers. Of frigates of fifty guns and upwards England had two, France ten, Russia four, and America six. Then as to ships in ordinary, England had fifty-seven sail of the line, France ten, Russia three, and America five; of frigates of fifty guns and upwards, England had seventeen, France fifteen, and America nine. Of ships of the line building, England had twelve, France twenty-nine, Russia seven, and America, according to the statement of Sir John Barrow, twenty-six. He was aware that upon this last item the Secretary of the Admiralty in the House demurred to the Secretary of the Admiralty out of doors, and maintained that the number of ships of the line building by America was smaller than that stated. He would now endeavour to explain the nature of this disagreement, in doing which he must say that he rather leaned to the statement out of doors. Although America had not twenty-six sail of the line actually building, she had the slips and frames laid down for that number, which were to be delivered in 1841; so that in the year 1842 at latest the American government would be able to complete that number of ships of the line; and he very much doubted whether the same could reasonably be expected as to our twelve sail of the line now in building. Now, taking the ships building and in ordinary together, it appeared that England had only sixty-nine, whilst France had thirty-nine, Russia ten, and America, at the end of the year 1841, would have thirty-one. Of frigates, England had nineteen, France thirty-two, and America twenty-seven. Of steamers of war England had five, France twenty-two, Russia eight, and America one; and, in ordinary and building, England had seven, France fifteen, and America none. He thought that these facts were worthy of the serious attention of the committee. He had given credit for the ships in ordinary being of a good sailable and serviceable description, although many of them were of a class described by the gallant Officer opposite as the "forty thieves," being built by contract during the war, and proved to be ships of a very inferior kind. The hon. and gallant Gentleman appeared to demur to this statement; but he (Sir J. Graham) could undertake to prove to the hon. and gallant Gentleman that what he said was correct. Every one knew that the duration and worthiness of ships were estimated upon similar principles, and with the same precision, as human lives; and that the assurances of the one and the other were effected upon like considerations. At Lloyd's, ships were assured in three classes, A. B. and C., to which they were respectively allotted, upon view of their age and their state of repair. Now, from his (Sir J. Graham's) recollection of the state of the ships in ordinary in 1834, combined with what he knew of the repairs which had since been done to them, he was enabled to form a pretty accurate opinion, though he did not think it prudent to state it, of what the value of our fifty-seven sail of the line, in ordinary, would be, tested by the rule of Lloyd's. But he would beg the gallant Officer tomorrow carefully to make inquiries on this subject; and if he was very much at ease upon this score to-night, he did not think he would be quite so well satisfied to-morrow, after he had gone into that investigation. He had the satisfaction of recollecting that during the four years that he was in the Admiralty he had launched seven new ships of the line. In 1831, the Calcutta of eighty-four guns, and the Thunderer of eighty-four guns; in 1832, the Neptune, 120 guns; and the Monarch eighty-four guns; in 1833, the Royal William, 120 guns, and the Waterloo, 120 guns; and in 1834, the Rodney, 92 guns. Besides these, when he left office, he left on the stocks, and nearly ready for launching, three ships of the line—the London, ninety-two, the Nile, ninety-two, and the Industry, eighty-four guns; and eight sail of the line laid down; three of the first class, namely, the Frederick, the Sovereign, and the Victoria; three of the second rate vessels—the Collingwood, the Goliah, and the Vanguard, which was the only vessel which had been launched during the last five years; and two of the third-rate—the Algiers and the Cumberland. Did he take credit to himself for what he had done? Not the least; on the contrary, it was due in a great measure to the arrangements of the noble Lord whom he succeeded in office. When he came into the Admiralty he found these vessels in a very advanced state towards launching, and he had only acted upon the principle adopted by Lord Melville of launching a certain number of ships every year, and unless this principle were still acted upon, he very much feared, that our fleet would dwindle away every year, and at last require a great effort to restore it at all; when, if time should press upon us, national dissatisfaction must ensue, and national disgrace probably follow. With the advice and concurrence of Sir Thomas Hardy and Admiral Dundas, the number of vessels which he proposed launching was three new vessels of the line, and three new frigates, with three old ships, worth the trouble and expense, which were every year to be repaired. Lord Auckland had also adopted a similar view of the subject, and with his late Majesty it was a constant subject of interest and inquiry. Whilst in office he had had the honour of laying before his Majesty the above scheme as a fixed principle of action, and he had every reason to believe it had been adopted by Lord Auckland, in this manner of proceeding it would take fourteen years to renew our line-of-battle ships, taking the number at eighty-four. A less force than this he did not think it would be safe to be restricted to. There was nothing magical about the number three; but what he meant to say was, that a certain number of new vessels, upon a fixed and determined calculation of durability, should be launched, and a certain number of old ships repaired. Now, that the present Board of Admiralty had not acted upon this principle, he did not think was entirely attributable to themselves; there were circumstances which, in his mind, accounted to a great extent for their not so doing. The Board of Admiralty had within the last two years taken upon itself the packet service, and in obedience to the urgent demand of the public for more expeditious modes of conveyance, the ten-gun brigs, used as sailing packets, had been condemned, and new vessels substituted in their stead. Coincident with these circumstances, there were political reasons why the number of ships in commission could not be increased, and the consequence was, that a decay of lower masts took place in the ships in ordinary, for which the Admiralty was not to be held responsible. He thought, however, that with a very moderate increase of hands in the dock-yards, the increased work thrown upon them by reason of the necessities of the packets department, might be disposed of, conjointly with what was required for the naval defence of the country. It was estimated, that it took 120 shipwrights to build a ship in a twelvemonth; so if 500 hands were added, this, at the rate of 5s. a-day, would amount to 225l. a-week, or 65,000l. a-year. As to materials, the average being double of the wages, the sum would be 130,000l. a-year, making a total of 195,000l., which sum he (Sir J. Graham) really thought would be the full amount required satisfactorily to dispose of the question between safety and danger, by accomplishing the complete efficiency of the service. He really believed, that if her Majesty's Government were to propose this increase in the estimates, they would meet with the general support and concurrence of the House. Let them reduce the matter in dispute within those narrow bounds, and instead of indulging in crimination and recrimination, and invidious comparisons between Tory Governments and Whig Governments, let them put the case in a right point of view before the world, and show that they were all united in the determination to do all that the case required. He was sure that if the House were satisfied, that this increase was required for the efficiency of the public service, the hon. Member for Kikenny might perhaps be found to object to it; but he was confident the House generally would be found to concur in all which proper prudence dictated. It was with sorrow deeper than he could express, that he had seen it lately stated at a public meeting at Birmingham, and stated amidst the plaudits of the auditory, that Burke was a "political scoundrel," He, on the other hand, considered him to be one of the first political philosophers; and Burke had said, that "there was a sort of bastard economy which produced inexpressible injury to the public service; and, that in naval matters the estimates for the year were never to be taken as the real standard of expenditure." He begged the committee to consider these matters, which, in defiance of the taunts which had been thrown out against him in various quarters, he had thought it right to lay before them, and happy should he be if any thing which he had stated should have the effect of persuading the committee to agree with him in a matter which he could not but consider to be of the greatest public importance.

Sir Edward Codrington

rose under a great disadvantage after the right hon. Baronet, but he hoped the House would allow him to make a few observations. He agreed with the right hon. Baronet in the principles he had laid down with respect to demonstration-ships. Whatever might be the strength of the fleet in commission it became the country to have a certain number of ships ready in case of emergency. Without that additional naval force, in no period of history had we been able to carry our intentions into execution. There ought to be ships always ready to be brought forward at a moment's notice. The only difference of opinion was, as to whether this should be brought forward that way, or in another. It had been found that those demonstration-ships were not in a state of readiness as they would have been if the stores had been prepared in the dock-yard. He had known many instances where ships had been supposed to be ready, where the rigging had been supposed to be in good order, but when they came to be examined it was found the rigging would not bear the strain of sea service, and, in short, it was found there was more to undo than there was to do. It might be easy to get stores upon an emergency, but it was not so easy to get men. The obtaining of stores was of secondary importance. He knew it took a great deal of time to make a real seaman. He was sorry that the House did not seem to be aware of the real value of good seamen. There was no class of men under the sun who were worse treated than British seamen. Seamen were not paid at their value, and this led into a point that had been gently touched upon, viz., the subject of impressment. He was ready to admit the right of impressment, but then when they had done with the men they ought to give them the best rewards they could. When an increase in the army was wanted, they coaxed and wheedled a man, and induced him to become a volunteer; but how did they act with respect to the navy? Why if they saw a man was worth his weight in gold they stole him. He knew he had been reproached by many naval officers for giving an opinion against impressment, but he did not deny the propriety of the practice when it was absolutely necessary. At one time a ship he commanded was paid off, and he was waited upon by one of the best men he had had under his command. The man asked him if it was true that he was going to retire for a time, and being answered in the affirmative, he said he did not want to be made a warrant officer—he wanted him (Sir E. Codrington) to procure his discharge, because his father, a waterman in London, was eighty years of age, and his mother seventy-eight, and he wanted to procure his discharge, in order that he might work as a waterman, and that he might be enabled to do something for them. That man was a pressed man—he never received the bounty—he preserved to himself the right to desert—he received no bounty—he refused it, but he went further, and said he was ready to pay eighty guineas for two substitutes. He had that excuse for deserting, but he did not; he served under him for nine years with a good character, and had served as long before with a good character; and yet he had no encouragement to remain in the navy. That was not proper encouragement for such an important service. He spoke of only the case of one than, with which he was well acquainted; there might be hundreds more. He objected to impressment as the usual mode of filling up the ranks in the navy, not to use in a great emergency. Was it right that a man who was impressed should be liable to all the caprices of any officer who might choose to act the part of a despot? His opinion was, that if the country was unfortunately obliged to go to war, she was also bound to go to the expense of getting and keeping good men. He had not had a very short experience on board ship, and the result of that experience was, that he would much rather go to sea with a good, well-disciplined, and contented ship's complement in not so good a ship, as go to sea in one of these fine ships only half manned, and those discontented. He spoke only in his character of an officer in the service, and one who had seen some little service, and not from any party feeling. The men serving in the navy were not party men—they served without any party feeling—the moment they got afloat they had only an anxiety to do their duty—he had scarcely ever seen an instance in which an officer had carded party feelings into the naval service. There certainly had been a party attack, and therefore he had not interrupted the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) in what he considered a party speech. The question, however, was not a party one, and ought not to be discussed upon such grounds. He was old enough to remember three armaments—the Dutch, the Spanish, and the Russian armaments, when thirty-six sail of the line were moored at Spithead in a very short time. He fully believed that the best means of preventing a war was the exhibition of a strong naval force. There was a want, in his opinion, upon the part of every Administration he had ever seen with respect to the navy. The pensions of the men had been most ignorantly tampered with and reduced. One instance he would mention to the House, in order to show that there was great injustice done to the navy. When he arrived from the Mediterranean be went to the Admiralty and represented the case of a man who had received eight wounds, one of them a very bad one, being caused by splinters, from which he lost the use of one eye. The Admiralty asked what had become of the man. He answered that he had been made a signal-man, and made to use the other eye. Oh, then, said the Admiralty, they could do nothing for him, as he was not disabled—his case did not, therefore, come under their consideration. The man was again in action, and the other eye damaged. He (Sir E. Codrington, represented his case to the commissioners, and the man had been allotted 6d. a day. When he made the report his word was doubted; for, said they, such things are not done in the army. "No," said he, "that was what he complained of, it was always so in the navy." He wrote to a surgeon on the subject, who in answer stated that the man's eye was uninjured until a musket ball had passed over it, which had caused cataract. Why, he would ask, should doubt have been thrown upon a matter of that sort? Because, supposing cataract had not come from the wound, there was a man who had done his duty in battle, who had been cut to pieces and disabled from providing for himself, and he received the paltry pittance of 6d. a-day. Was that, he would ask any encouragement for a man to join the Navy? He would now mention a case, which he trusted would be put to rights by the present Commissioners; he believed it was the wish of the Government to do all they could for the good of the Navy. He would mention the case of a man being wounded—a Midshipman; if he was wounded and granted a pension, upon promotion he lost that pension.—These things wanted alteration. He had no doubt the Admiralty had a desire to look into the matters that had been complained of, but then they should look into them properly. They should come forward boldly to the House, and say that they had a demand which the House must grant. Talk of economy—economy was not to be considered where justice was on the way. The reason the Navy of England was in the state it was at present was because a superior class of men were not encouraged. He could not close the observations he had made without referring to another branch of the service—the shipwrights. Great injustice had been done to them. Whenever a man entered into that yard, whatever value he was of at that time ought to be kept up; but what was the case? Why, when a man went into the Dock-yard, instead of carrying his servitude with him, he was only considered entitled to a pension for the service he had performed there. Why, he would ask, was not his previous services to be taken into consideration? When a man had served twenty-one years he was entitled to a pension, and why was not that to be taken into consideration when he went into the Dock-yard? That was what he complained of, he did not complain of people having too much, but he did complain of those who had served their country not being put upon the same footing as those who did not go through half the danger. Many of these things being heavy upon his mind, there was one case that was before him of a distinguished officer who had been sent out on a survey, Captain Fitzroy; that gallant individual had found himself totally unable to accomplish the object he was sent upon without an expenditure from his own small property of nearly 7,000l.; did it not, therefore become the country to pay him for what he had done. If he had spent the money improperly, give him only one half of it back—if he had spent it properly, let him have the whole. He had been in Parliament now for near seven years, and it was painful for him to think during that time how little attention had been paid to the Naval Service. Let Parliament take the subject seriously into consideration at once, and do not let them wait till young officers wrote pamphlets calling their attention to the subject. He knew that these things were not agreeable to men in office. He cared not for Whig or Tory, when he was speaking of the Navy, because he looked upon the Navy as the brightest jewel in the Crown of their young Queen—and he felt convinced that there was not a seaman in the country who was not ready to give up his life in protecting that bright jewel. He hoped the House would look with great strictness into the present estimates, in order to effect the better condition of the Navy. He could not conclude without mentioning to the House a circumstance that took place between the Emperor of Russia and a naval officer of this country. On one occasion, when the Emperor and the officer were together, the top sail of a ship was shifted in fifteen minutes, one of the most difficult feats of a seaman. He doubted very much whether that could be done now, considering the state of the Navy at the present time. The great difficulty was in procuring real skilful seamen, and good experienced workmen in the Dock-yards—both which points were under the present system rendered very difficult of attainment, by the bad encouragement which was held out to sailors and to workmen.

Lord Ashley

, at that late hour would not detain the House at any length, but he felt it his duty to make a few remarks in reply to what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman, the Secretary to the Admiralty, the other night. He understood, that the hon. Gentleman had regretted his absence, had he been aware that the hon. Gentleman intended to make any remarks upon him that night he certainly should have been in his place. He saw the hon. Gentleman in the lobby some time pre- viously, and as the hon. Gentleman gave him no reason to suppose, that any remarks would be made that night he went away. The hon. Gentleman, however, was in error in that part of his statement which referred to the Government of 1835, and he (Lord Ashley) was not a little astonished when he learned that, after an interval of four years, he was called on to defend estimates which at the time he moved them, were received without objection, though the hon. Gentlemen who preceded them, and were opposed to them in that House were present and heard the proposition which he made. He recollected perfectly well, that his right hon. Friend, the Member for Taunton, had not disapproved of those estimates. It was true, that the Government of 1835 called for a dimished vote by 232,000l., although in point of fact the vote which they took was less by 282,000l. than the vote of the previous year. He took no credit to himself for this reduction, but the very reverse, for he gave all the credit that was due to the Government that preceded them, and said, that had they remained in office they would have done precisely the same. What he insisted on was simply this—that whereas it had been put abroad industriously, that the Tory Government, for the sake of popularity, would increase the estimates, he thought it fair to show that such a representation was false; that greater expenditure was not a necessary result of a Tory Administration; and with this view he said, that instead of being increased, the estimates were, as he shewed, less than those of the preceding year. He took no credit for what had been done, but, on the contrary, declared that the former Government would have just done the same had they continued in office. When, therefore, the hon. Gentleman left it to be implied, that this reduction was made for the purpose of acquiring a little popularity at the risk of impairing the navy, he did so in total forgetfulness not only of the statement which he made at the time, but of the answer which he gave to his right hon. Friend, the Member for Taunton, in still more emphatic language, on a subsequent night. It was true, that the estimates were reduced to the extent of 2,000 men, but, on the other hand, they added 1,000 boys, the numerical whole was thus reduced by 1,000, but the expence by 1,500, as 1,000 boys were estimated in wages as 500 men. But, why was it that these 2,000 men were reduced? When they came into office, ships had been ordered home by the preceding Board, which had 2,000 men on board, and these men were to be paid off on their arrival. No record was left on the part of the former Government at the Admiralty of their intention to re-employ those men, and, therefore, how could the then Government do otherwise than pay off these men? They had taken their seats at the Admiralty Board late in December, and after the bustle of the elections; and how was it possible to go into all the multifarious details of these estimates? In February the estimates were laid on the Table of the House, and he would put it to hon. Members whether, in the course of so short a period, they could have entered into all the considerations connected with so complicated and difficult a subject? They had no time to look into reports, or examine the position of foreign affairs; and therefore it was impossible that they could undertake to say, that those 2,000 men ought not to be paid off, especially as any other course would have rendered them responsible for saying, that the preceding Government were wrong. But if the estimates were improper, why had they not been opposed at the time? No such opposition had been given, and, on turning to the speech of his right hon. Friend, the Member for Taunton, he found him concurring in the estimates. What did his right hon. Friend say on that occasion? Why, he said, "that the amount of men resulted from the political position of our foreign relations, and that the present state of foreign affairs rendered the vote specified in the estimate quite sufficient." He went on to say, that it could not be expected that a Government who had been in office only five or six weeks could alter the estimates which they found ready to their hand, and therefore said, that he for one concurred in the reduction. On proposing the estimates, he had stated to the House how far the Government, with which he was connected were responsible for them. He said that they found the estimates three-fourths prepared when they went to the Board, and that it would have been rank madness on their part if they had by remodelling them taken upon them to declare that their predecessors had been in error. Without experience how could they undertake to say whether the reduction was proper or not? It was impossible, after the lapse of four years, that he could recollect all that had taken place; but this he would say, that had they adopted any other course they would have left themselves open to an attack of a very different character from that which the hon. Gentleman had made on them. As hon. Gentlemen must know, the estimates were prepared by the heads of departments; and they had not abated one iota in the estimates which had been offered to them by those whose duty it was to make them up. They took the estimates submitted to them precisely as the preceding Government, had they remained in office, would have done, and submitted them to the House. Now, when such were the facts, was it possible not to feel surprise at the statement which had been made by the hon. Gentleman, the Secretary for the Admiralty, on a previous evening? In regard to the amount of stores in 1835, what were the words of the hon. Gentleman? The hon. Gentleman said, "The lowest vote for stores the right hon. Baronet ever took had been reduced by the Tory Government 82,000l.; in short, the lowest vote ever taken for stores had been taken by the Government of the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Tamworth. These most inadequate means were called for in 1835." He had retained some papers, and now let them see what the actual facts of the case were. The vote for naval stores in 1834 was 499,190l., and the vote he took in 1835 was 421,958l. That was certainly a reduction. But why was it? His hon. Friend would perfectly understand him when he used the expression "full establishment." By an order of the Admiralty, a certain amount was fixed on for the whole establishment, and a special establishment for each store. In the year preceding, that in which he was in office, the sum wanted to complete what was called the full establishment was 583,360l.; the sum inserted in the estimates was 450,090l.; therefore, it was 133,270l. less than the sum required to complete the whole establishment. The sum wanted in the next year was for the full establishment, 428,550l., and the sum inserted in the estimates was 363,130l. What was the result? In the sum of money then taken for stores, they only had a deficiency of 65,420l. to make up the amount of the foil establishment. But as in the estimates of the preceding year 133,270l. would have been necessary to make up the full establishment of stores, and as in the year of the Administration to which he belonged, the deficiency in the estimates was only 65,420l., it showed that they had bettered the dockyard stores to the amount of 67,850l. They left the stores that sum better than they found them. The amount of stores in timber was eight per cent. beyond the full establishment; the cordage was fifty-three per cent. beyond it: hemp was on the scale of the full establishment; and spar was 133 per cent. beyond it. The average annual expenditure of stores gave the following results:—The amount of the stores was—Timber, 8 per cent. beyond the full establishment; cordage 53 per cent. beyond the full establishment; hemp, on the scale of the full establishment; spars, 133 per cent. beyond the establishment. The average annual expenditure of stores, gave the following results: Timber had decreased in five years from 42 per cent. to 17 per cent.; cordage decreased in five years from 34 to 28 per cent.; spars decreased from 12 to 4 per cent.; canvas from 61 to 50 per cent., and they had likewise a large supply of ready made sails. The estimates which he had brought forward were estimates which had been furnished by the officers in the various departments, and they felt bound to adopt them in the first instance as the most to be relied upon, having been furnished by persons best acquainted with the amount of the supplies necessary. The only change they made was in the steam-engines for vessels which was increased by the administration to which he belonged, from 40,000l. to 50,000l. The hon. Gentleman in speaking of the estimate of coals as 16,000l. for one year and 15,000l. for another year, should not have argued that there had been an insufficient supply in the year in which the estimate was smallest. In fact the quantity of coals in both estimates was the same 20,000 tons. The real cause of difference was a difference in the price of the coals During the time of their predecessors, coals were 15s. 5d., and during their period of administration they were only 15s. Would the hon. Gentleman be able to show that there had been any deficiency in the supply of coals? for without that there would be no use in the argument. Did he mean to say that the stores were found deficient? If he did not, where, then, was the force of his observations? If he did not say that, his argument went for nothing. He believed it could not be denied that the stores of coals had been found adequate for their purposes. They had taken generally the esti- mates of their predecessors, and they could not have done otherwise, as they felt it best to adopt the estimates of the several officers, who were supposed to be the best judges of the amount of expenditure which was necessary. What other course could they have adopted? Could they have said "We shall not rely upon the results of your experience; we shall increase the amount of expenditure over what you tell us is necessary?" They could not have done that, and the hon. Secretary for the Admiralty would admit that they had not left insufficient stores, and that the comparison between their predecessors and them was in their favour.

Mr. Henry Berkeley

would not detain the House for a moment. He wished only to reply to an expression which last night fell from the gallant Admiral, the first naval Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Charles Adam), an expression which, in justice to a near relative of his, he could not very well let pass. He understood (for he was not himself present at the moment) that the gallant Admiral, alluding to the publication of Captain Berkeley's pamphlet, said, that "Captain Berkeley had forgotten himself." Now, so far from thinking that his brother had forgotten himself, he (Mr. H. Berkeley) thought he had never better recollected what was due to himself and to the service to which he belonged. He would further say, that if the first naval Lord, and the noble civilian at the head of the Board of Admiralty equally recollected what was due to the service, they would not have put his brother to the trouble of pushing the measure which they had now carried. It was painful to him to recur to matters of a personal nature. He felt the other evening, that it was necessary for him to make an explanation touching his brother but he should avoid as much as possible, if other Gentlemen would do the same, any recurrence to that subject for the future. In addition to this he would simply add, that to the principle advocated by his brother he still adhered; and, although he was perfectly prepared to offer no opposition to the vote now brought forward, yet at a future time he should take an opportunity of placing upon the books of the House a motion to the effect, that there should be but one standing complement for the ships of her Majesty's navy.

Sir C. Adam

said, he should be sorry if the expression he had used, of Captain Berkeley having forgotten himself, should be taken as a personal offence, because he begged to remind the hon. and gallant Gentleman and the House, if that were necessary, that if any one man could have expressed himself in more handsome terms than another respecting Captain Berkeley, he was that man. He had said, that he valued Captain Berkeley as a man, an officer, and a gentleman.

Viscount Ingestrie

said, the hon. Gentleman, the Secretary to the Admiralty, the other night made a most luminous and perspicuous statement of the condition of the navy, but he began it with an assertion, that the Admiralty administration of the navy had been the subject of party attacks for the last six months. He regretted to say, that the hon. Gentleman seemed to wish to continue that party spirit in all the observations he made; for of his speech from beginning to end, he must say, that he never heard such antithesis of Tory and Whig in any speech he had listened to since he had had the honour of having a seat in Parliament. That was not a line of conduct which he would pursue; because he considered the navy of his country of paramount importance, and that all party feelings should be subordinate to that service. He was not disposed to quarrel with any particular party or Government; if he were to quarrel with any one, perhaps he should begin with her Majesty's cheeseparer general, the hon. Member for Kilkenny. The hon. Member had long stood before the public as the advocate of retrenchment, and no doubt thought he was doing the State some service in the course he pursued; but the result was the best proof of that. The hon. Gentleman, the Secretary to the Admiralty, had told the House, that there was a much greater number of ships in commission than at any period since the peace. He admitted that. But the hon. Gentleman forgot to mention at the same time the state of our relations abroad, and our position in comparison with foreign nations. We had had a great colony in a state of revolt. The navy of France and of Russia had been increased; and the state of things generally was such as required our navy to be placed on a very different footing. The hon. Gentleman had alluded to a pamphlet which had been published by "A Flag Officer." He did not profess to be acquainted with that "Flag officer," but he could not see why it should not be right, that an officer should give vent to his feelings and opinions, intending thereby, as it was fair to suppose, to promote the good of his country. In looking over some returns which were laid upon the table of the House a short time ago, he found, that as the number of the ships progressively increased, so the number of the men at home progressively decreased. He would mention a few years:—

	Number of men at home.
In 1823 the number of seamen and Marines voted was	25,000	8,000
In 1828	30,000	9,639
In 1833	27,000	9,303
In 1834	27,000	2,865
In 1835	25,500	2,539

The last year in the list was that which had been the subject of attack, having been the year in which his right hon. Friend (Lord Ashley) was of the Administration.

	Number of men at home.
In 1836 the number of seamen and Marines voted was	32,700	5,467
In 1838	33,000	5,254

In 1837 there was a small increase in both numbers. Of the 5,254 men at home there were 2,665 for the ordinary and packet service; and, substracting the numbers applied to other services, the remnant left was 861. The year 1792 was frequently referred to by way of illustrating this question. In that year we had 14,000 men and eleven guardships ready to proceed to sea. In 1835 we had 31,500 men and only three guardships, and only one ship about to be launched. As to the distribution of ships in commission, we had ten sail-of-the-line in the Mediterranean, one at Lisbon, two in the West Indies, two in the East Indies and Cadiz, three at home, and three disposable ships; making up twenty-one altogether. He was at a loss to conceive what had become of the nine disposable ships of which they had heard so much. He was very much disposed to think that they were made of pasteboard, as the Russian ships were said to be. He, however, did not think so lightly of the Russian ships. But he should like to know where those nine disposable ships were? Where were they when that business took place the other day at Vera Cruz, when our flag was insulted in a most unwarrantable manner? Why were they not there? Why was the English flag left unprotected, except by a packet, or perhaps by a brig, hardly within signal distance? He should like to have a good, right down, straight forward, answer to that question. With respect to the manning of ships, which was a point on which naval officers were perhaps better able to talk than on political questions, he was one of those who thought that every ship going to sea should be ready to go into action the very next moment she got out of harbour, should she meet an enemy. Every ship ought to have her guns properly manned. About two years ago he was in command of one of those delightful ships called "jackass frigates." They were supposed to be the best manned ships in the service; the complement was 160 men, but owing to an order made by Lord Auckland, he believed, that complement was materially changed in character. The 160 men included every creature on board; and, after allowing for midshipmen, schoolmasters, and others, all the hands he had for a watch was thirty-five or thirty-six. He would ask any officer if that was a sufficient number of able seamen to manage a ship of 600 tons, knocking about at sea, and taking into consideration the chances of sickness and accidents? As so much had been said respecting a gallant Officer who had vacated his seat at the Admiralty, he could not refrain from saying that he most cordially concurred in all his observations. He wished to refer to a few things that were felt to be grievances in the navy, and which he was sure, if the House understood them properly, it would be disposed to redress. He begged to refer to the question of pensions for petty officers serving in small ships, where they had more work, more wet, and more hardships to go through, than on board large ships. He understood that the pay of the seamen was to be made equal to the pay of those in large vessels. [Mr. C. Wood, not equal to the largest vessels.] He thought they ought all to be equally paid; a man did more work on board a small ship than a large one. The officers of other services were allowed their stationery and table money, besides having a great increase of pay. Let the House look at the scale of the pay of other nations. He had selected the pay of a Capitaine de Vaisseau of seven years standing in the French service, commanding a frigate of twenty- four guns, because that was a class of officers nearest to his own standing in the British service, and because he was an officer commanding something like a jackass frigate, such as he had already mentioned. A captain of that class in the French service had personal pay of 240l. and 1l. per diem table money at home, and 1l. 10s. per diem table-money abroad, making his pay 605l. per annum at home, and 785l. abroad. In the American service a Captain would have 732l. full-pay, and 500l. half-pay, while in England his full-pay was 390l., and his half-pay 190l. Again the captain of a frigate in the French service below twenty-four guns or equal to a commander in the British service had personal pay, 170l., with 10s. a-day table money at home, and 24s. abroad, being a total of 462l. at home, and 508l. abroad. The American officer of that class had 500l. full-pay, and 380l. half-pay, but the British officer of similar rank, had only 300l. full pay, and 155l. half - pay. In all other services the midshipmen had good pay and tolerably decent half-pay, but in the English navy the midshipmen had, as the saying was, three farthings a year paid quarterly, in fact they had no half pay In short, in other services all ranks of officers were allowed table money, but in the British service, if an officer on a foreign station entertained in a manner to do credit to the nation he served, he was put to very considerable personal expense; and if he was a man with a family, he could not go to sea without being subject to great pecuniary loss. He would not allude to the state of the stores in the dockyards, because that was not a matter within his province, but he would advert to the number of hands employed in the dockyards, and he must say there was no strength sufficient for the ships in ordinary, all hands being engrossed in working ships in preparation for commission. The present state of the artificers in the yards was a subject well worthy the attentive consideration of the Admiralty. Those men conceived, that their interests were not properly taken care of. They complained of the want of the superannuation allowances, and still more of the manner in which they were classed, from which great discontent had been created. He could not sit down without alluding also to the subject of naval architecture, and he must ask the hon. and gallant officer opposite (Sir C. Adam) when the returns he had moved for on this subject in June last would be laid on the table? Those returns he thought, might have been drawn up in two weeks, instead of taking eight months in their preparation. But with regard to naval architecture, he thought that was a subject which ought to be taken into their serious consideration. He believed, that the experiments on that head were going on in a spirit of partisanship, and upon false data. The House would be astonished to know the amount of money expended on ships built and now building by Captain Symonds. 1,500,000l. had been expended or would be expended before all those vessels would be fit for sea, and that too merely for an experiment, which in many instances had not succeeded.

Sir C. Adam

must beg to deny that fact; look at the Gorgon for instance.

Viscount Ingestrie

resumed. Why, the Gorgon had been obliged to be again caulked, and he thought he could safely contradict the hon. and gallant Admiral, and say, that the Gorgon was the worst ship that ever swam. There were many other minor points to which at that hour he would not allude. He must, however, mention that 15 per cent. was charged on slops furnished to the men by Government; that ought not to be. Plain tobacco was charged to the men at 1s. 7d. per pound, whereas it cost the Government not more than 6d. In conclusion, he would only repeat his wish to see the officers and men of the British Navy placed on the same footing as those of other nations.

Sir C. Adam

owed the noble Lord some apology for the returns to which he had alluded not being now on the Table, but he could assure the noble Lord, when he had come to look at them, he had found they required a great deal of preparation, and that it was necessary to send abroad for some of them which were required. He would, however, lay them on the Table to-morrow. With regard to the Gorgon, the noble Lord was entirely mistaken, for Lord John Hay had reported her to surpass any war steamer that was ever launched.

Captain Gordon

said, that there were so many hon. Members who wished to deliver their sentiments on this important subject, that he felt called upon to move, that the Chairman do now report progress and ask leave to sit again.

Mr. C. Wood

was anxious to answer many of the observations which had been made in the course of the debate, but as every vote in the estimates had been discussed, he hoped to be allowed to take the first vote now—that as to the number of men—and then that any hon. Member should state his views to the House on another vote being proposed, on a subsequent day.

Captain Gordon

objected to that course, for if the vote of the number of men was taken, there would be an end of the debate. He must, therefore, persist in his motion.

Mr. Hume

wished to say one word. A gallant officer had applied to him (Mr. Hume) the epithet that he was a skin-flint, and the cheese-parer to her Majesty. He begged to say, that he would rather have that epithet applied to him, than that he should deserve the name of a skinback, which was applied to many in the sea service.

Viscount Ingestrie

, in explanation, said he concluded the hon. Member alluded to what had fallen from him (Lord Ingestrie,) and he begged to state that he had no wish to say anything personally offensive to the hon. Member. He had not alluded to the hon. Member in private life, but only to the course pursued by the hon. Member in that House.

The House resumed, Committee to sit again.