begged to ask the hon. and learned Attorney General whether, in the Bill about to be brought in by the Government for the reform of the Courts of Equity in England, it was intended to introduce a clause to prevent a practice which was not consistent with the due administration of justice—namely, that of a Judge hearing an appeal from his own decision in the Court below?
The Attorney General
conceived that, even if he were aware of the enactments to be brought forward elsewhere on the subject referred to by his hon. and learned Friend, he doubted, before the measures were brought forward, whether he should be at liberty to disclose them. Although he disapproved as much as his hon. and learned Friend could do of the practice of appealing from a decision of the Lord Chancellor sitting in the Court of Chancery to the Lord Chancellor sitting in the House of Lords, he thought it would be very inexpedient to say, that no Judge who had determined a case should sit as a Judge in the Court of Appeal. He was of opinion, that as a member of that Court he would be very useful.
said, that the answer of his hon. and learned Friend did not apply to the question he had put. No doubt the assistance of the Judge who decided the case might be very useful in affording information to the Court, as was the case at Nisi Prius on applications for new trials. His question was, whether a Judge should be allowed to sit to determine a case on appeal which he had himself decided in the Court below;—whether he should be allowed to volunteer to do so, as had in some instances been the case?
§ Subject dropped.