COUPORATION REFORM.

HC Deb 05 June 1835 vol 28 cc541-76

Lord John Russell

I now rise to perform the very important duty of asking, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, leave of the House to bring in a Bill, to provide for the regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales. It was not till very lately that I expected such a task would have fallen to ray lot. In the course of last autumn, it was my hope and expectation, that the consideration of this important subject would have been in the hands of an individual, who I think will be admitted, on all sides of the House, to be eminently qualified for the task—of one who, in introducing it to the notice of Parliament, would have brought to it a degree of mature reflection, on account of legal knowledge and an intimate acquaintance with the constitution of the country, that would have recommended the measure to the country with a force and an effect which cannot belong to my arguments. I would say more, Mr. Speaker, were it not that I am now alluding to yourself, and that, therefore, it would not be proper for me to go farther. But since, by circumstances of comparatively recent occurrence, the duty of bringing forward the measure belongs to the station I now hold, I shall only beg that the House will give me that indulgence of which I stand so greatly in need, and make allowance for that inadequacy and those deficiencies which I am sure it will discover. I ask for that indulgence, because the question is one of the highest importance—one of considerable intricacy and detail—one which relates to ancient practices and privileges—and one which, by its right solution, must have a considerable effect on the body I have the honour to address. The number of persons under the government of Municipal Corporations to be touched by this Bill, amounts to about two millions: I state it in round numbers, that the persons who will come within the provisions of the Measure I propose to introduce, are not less in number than two millions. It cannot be said that this subject has been undertaken without consideration adequate to its extent and importance. It might have been allowable, and I think it would have been allowable, on the first meeting of a Reformed Parliament, to have taken a theoretical view of the subject—to have laid down certain rules and regulations which in the opinion of the House of Commons ought to govern Municipal Corporations and to make those rules and regulations, which, in the opinion of the House of Commons, ought to govern Municipal Corporations, and to make those rules and regulations the standards by which those Corporations should thenceforward be governed but by the advice of the Committee of which you, Mr. Speaker, were the chairman, another course was adopted. A Commission was appointed by the Crown to inquire into the state of Municipal Corporations, and after a year and a half of laborious and minute investigation, the Commissioners presented a Report to his Majesty, in which they stated that they had inquired into the condition of two hundred Corporations, and, after detailing the general nature of these Corporations they made the following remarks:—"In conclusion, we report to your Majesty, that there prevails amongst the inhabitants of a great majority of the incorporated towns, a general, and in our opinion a just dissatisfaction with their Municipal Institutions; a distrust of the self-elected Municipal Councils, whose powers are subject to no popular control, and whose acts and proceedings being secret, are unchecked by the influence of public opinion; a distrust of the Municipal Magistracy, tainting with suspicion the local administration of justice, and often accompanied with contempt of the persons by whom the law is administered; a discontent under the burdens of local taxation, while revenues that ought to be applied for the public advantage, are diverted from their legitimate use, and are sometimes wastefully bestowed for the benefit of individuals, sometimes squandered for purposes injurious to the character and morals of the people. We therefore feel it to be our duty to represent to your Majesty, that the existing Municipal Corporations of England and Wales neither possess nor deserve the confidence or respect of your Majesty's subjects, and that a thorough reform must be effected before they can become, what we humbly submit to your Majesty they ought to be, useful and efficient instruments of local government."

This Report was agreed to by far the greater number of Commissioners. One of them, a man of considerable talents and attainments, wrote and printed an elaborate protest against parts of it; and another, Mr. Hogg, I think, signified his dissent from the whole, but with these exceptions, it was the Report of the entire body. They were men eminently qualified for the task: they were selected by the Crown for the purpose, and after their appointment they bestowed the utmost pains and diligence upon it. I might undertake the duty of proving that the abuses which they declare to exist, are to be ascertained from the separate reports contained in the various volumes of Appendix presented to his Majesty, and subsequently laid upon the Table of this House; but as it is my purpose to propose a practical Measure, and a practical Measure of the highest importance, and as going into separate details of all the different abuses would render my speech much longer than the House, I apprehend, would like to listen to from me, it will be better to touch on only two or three heads, in order to show that the present bodies are unfit for the purpose for which they were appointed, and that they are not good depositaries of Local Government, and to leave the rest to the statements of the Commissioners which may be discussed on future occasions, during the various stages of the Bill, and either agreed to or refused as hon. Members may think the truth requires. There are two or three points, which appear to me so striking as facts, that I cannot altogether refrain from bringing them before the House. A great number of these Corporations govern populous towns, but there are others, where the Municipal body is so small that they are, in fact, not Corporations in the ordinary sense of the word. I will speak, in the first instance, of places which are considerable Boroughs, where a Municipal Council is required, but where it does not properly represent the property, the intelligence, or the population of the town.—One of these instances is contained in a Report which I believe is not yet before the House. I allude to Bedford, where the Corporate body is only one-seventeenth of the population, and one-fourth of the property of the place. In Oxford there are 1,400 electors, but a great many of these are not rated inhabitants; and generally there has been so much treating and so many corrupt practises at elections that seldom more than 500 can be said to be free from them. In the city the noble Lord opposite represents, Norwich, there are 2.221 resident freemen, but of these 1,123 are not rated at all; and out of the 1,123, there are 315 paupers. As to the amount of property rated in Norwich, it is stated that out of 25,541l. thus raised no less than 18,224l. is upon the property of persons who do not in any way belong to the Corporation. I might produce many other facts of a similar kind. At Lincoln three-fourths of the Corporate body are not rated, and nearly four-fifths of the population are excluded from it.—At Ipswich there are 2,000 rate-payers, but only 187 of them belong to the Corporation. I find that of 1,685 persons who are rated by a local act, which taxes all persons whose rent exceeds 4l. a-year, only 111 are freemen, although the number of freemen who voted in 1831 was 795. Thus fourteen-fifteenths are excluded from the Corporation. At Cambridge, the population is about 20,000, and there are 1,434 ten-pound houses; but there are only 118 freemen. The property produces in rates 25,499l. of which not more than 2,111l. is paid by freemen. These are facts that belong to one of the most important heads of the inquiry. It is, or should be, the objects of these Corporations, and one of the first objects, to represent the town over which they are placed—to represent its property, to share in its general feelings, and to take care of its interests, as having that due connexion which the governing body ought to maintain with those who are liable to the burdens. There are two modes of excluding this wholesome sympathy between the governors and the governed,—the one the more obvious and common mode where the Corporation is an entirely select body, where there is no appearance of a popular election, and where the Government is carried on in total defiance of, and in entire separation from, the general body of the inhabitants. This may be admitted to be a great and glaring abuse; but great and glaring as that abuse is, it is not, in my mind, so gross and so vicious an abuse as that which connects a few persons carrying on the Government for their own benefit with a portion of the lower class of the people belonging to the town, whose votes they buy, and whose habits they demoralize, and which, while it makes them the slaves and tools of political influence, at the same time disseminates among men under the semblance of free election practices the most corrupt and debasing. And yet I should not be surprised if we were to hear—indeed we have heard it already—that in some of these towns, in the city of Norwich for example, although the great majority of persons paying rates is excluded; although the great bulk of property is excluded; and although the major part of the minor rate-payers is excluded; that because some of these are members, and the constituency is numerous, the constitution of the borough is popular and democratic, and that for the interests of the people it ought to be continued. I protest against all such arguments, and against all such principles. What I wish to see is, certainly, a great degree of popular control, but I wish to see that popular control equally, regularly, and beneficially exercised. I wish to see persons who may be called from the lower ranks of the town to assist in elections, supported by the esteem and confidence of their fellow citizens, and not brought there by means of bribery, and sometimes where candidates are pitted against each other, handed up to the poll in a state of intoxication.

The consequences of these vicious modes, whether by self-elected bodies totally separated from the town, or by those where there is a semblance of popular franchise, but where the burgesses are, in fact, divided from the householders and inhabitants of the borough, have been the greatest abuses of various kinds detailed and explained in the Report of the Commissioners. I have already said, that I will not. trouble the House by going through the documents; but I wish hon. Gentlemen to refer to such places as Coventry, Northampton, Leicester, and others, where they will find that the grossest and most notorious abuses have prevailed. In the distribution of charitable funds, they will see that two-thirds, three-fourths, and sometimes a larger proportion, have been delivered to persons who belong to the Blue party, or to any other colour that is the favourite symbol of the local government. By tracing the history as it is minutely given in some of those reports of charitable estates, it will be found that the property, instead of being employed for the general benefit of the town, has been consumed for the partial benefit of a few individuals, and not unfrequently in the feastings and entertainments in which the mayor and other corporators have been in the habit of indulging. In some no very large boroughs, these expenses have amounted to 500l. or 600l. a-year; and the enjoyment has been confined to the freemen of only one side of the question, as some inducement to stand by that side, and not to desert the Corporation in any political emergency. These facts are so fully established in the Reports of the Commissioners, that I do not propose to enter into them; yet I think I may venture to state one or two instances, which are particularly striking proofs of the way in which, in some of the smaller places, corporate funds have fallen into the hands of persons who have assumed the duties of corporators, but who have totally neglected them. One of these is Aldborough, where the corporators who are capital burgesses have been continually changed. It appears that they used to ask a regular sum, and that the price of "an honest burgess" (such are the terms of the charter) was 35l.; and one of the most "respectable, honest, and discreet burgesses," (still following the terms of the charter,) asked for, and was rewarded with, influence to obtain a Lord-Chancellor's living for a clergyman worth 100l. a-year. Whenever a transfer was made, that is, whenever the patron of the borough was changed, all considered themselves bound in honour to resign. The nominal heads of the borough are the collector of the customs and a resident surgeon; and the members of the council are the Marquess of Hertford, two members of his family, his solicitor, the superintendent of his estates there, his steward, the right hon. John Wilson Croker, a captain in the army or navy, and the chamberlain of the Corporation. The details respecting Orford are nearly similar. The Marquess of Hertford is one of the honest men of Orford, and the others consist of four or five members of his family, his present steward, his former steward, the superintendent of his estates, and the right hon. John Wilson Croker, while the collector of the customs at Aldborough, and an inhabitant there, is also an honest man of Orford, and the list of corporators is terminated with the town-clerk. To some future antiquary, who should not carry his researches completely into the history of the present age, it might seem, that to find a noble Lord and the right hon. John Wilson Croker devoting their talents and attention to the business of two such boroughs, was a proof of most extraordinary and exemplary kindness. Their becoming "honest and discreet burgesses" of Aldborough and Orford would seem to show how generously and disinterestedly they devoted themselves to the welfare of those towns, and endeavoured to promote interests they were so well able to serve.

I mention these cases, because the main facts apply to a hundred boroughs that I could name, which formerly returned Members to Parliament. But when the future antiquary shall go a little farther in his inquiries, and discover that both those boroughs were subsequently introduced into schedule A of the Reform Act, it would account for the singular regard paid by the noble Marquess and the right hon. Gentleman to the welfare of Aldborough and Orford. It has been proved by all the investigations of the Commissioners, that in large towns and in small, the practice has been for Municipal Corporations not to employ the powers with which they are invested for the purpose for which they were intended; they employed them in no manner for the good government and well-being of the boroughs—not that they might be "well and quietly governed," to use the words of some of the charters, but for the sole object of establishing an influence for the election of Members of this House. I now proceed to the method I propose to adopt, not for continuing these sinister and indirect practices, but for establishing really good government in corporate towns—that the people may exercise a vigilant control over the offices they have appointed, and that the funds may be administered honestly and fairly, and not diverted to favour the interests of individuals or to promote parliamentary speculations.

We intend to include 183 boroughs in the Bill I shall conclude by moving for leave to bring in, containing, as I have already stated, a population of about two millions. The number of inhabitants may be rather less at present, owing to the defectiveness of some of the boundaries—a point upon which I shall afterwards touch—but I may fairly state that two millions of persons will be affected by the Bill—a word I must be excused for using, as the measure is not yet before the House. By establishing not an extinction, but a reform of these Corporations, we do not propose that they should be deprived of their charters, but, in the first enacting clause, we declare that all powers in those charters, and all practices under them, inconsistent with the provisions of the Bill, are null and void, and shall totally cease and have no operation.—[Sir Robert Peel: Will this apply to the whole number?]—To the whole of the 183 boroughs; but there are 99 which have been visited by the Commissioners which we do not intend to insert in the Bill. There are some other places which have not been visited, or which have given no account of themselves, which, I believe, are not included in the 99. A few of these Corporations do not serve any Municipal purpose, others are Corporations only for particular purposes, with which it has not been thought necessary to interfere; they will remain as at present, as far as the provisions of this Bill are concerned. With regard to the 183 boroughs, we propose that there should be one uniform government instituted applicable to all; one uniform franchise for the purpose of election, and a like description of officers in each, with the exception of some of the larger places, in which there will be a recorder, or some other such, magistrate; but, generally speaking, the form of government will in all be the same.

I come now to the franchise. It must have occurred to every one who wishes that there should be a uniform franchise in Corporations, that the present parliamentary franchise of ten-pound householders, or, as they are familiarly called, ten-pounders, might, perhaps, be taken as the constituency in Corporations; but, upon considering what would be the best course, several reasons presented themselves which seemed conclusive against adopting that franchise. In the first place, I think it would be exposing that franchise to danger. I look upon it as most valuable, and it has worked as beneficially as the authors of the Reform Bill anticipated. It has produced a class of constituency which, from property and intelligence, is fit to be intrusted with the responsible duty of electing Members of Parliament; and I think if we were to say that no others but those who possess that franchise shall have a vote with respect to the Corporation, we should be raising a feeling of enmity and jealousy against these persons, on the ground that they monopolised all rights and powers to the exclusion of others that were as well entitled as themselves. In the next place, I think we should consider those whom I may call the permanent rate-payers, the inhabitants of the town, as perfectly fit and qualified to choose persons to represent them in its Common Council and government.

It may often happen, and I think it does often happen, that the lower class of ratepayers, however well known and long established in the town, do not take such a just interest in the election of Members of Parliament as not to be open to the various modes of seduction, and to those corrupt arts which have been ordinarily resorted to to procure votes. I do not think that the same thing can be said when you place before them the propriety of choosing their own neighbours, perhaps their next-door neighbours, as persons fit to have a voice in the Government of their own town. But there is another reason, as it seems to me more conclusive than all, which is, that these rate-payers do contribute, and directly contribute, to the expenses of the town. By this Bill they will be obliged to pay the borough-rate which may be required, and it is absolutely essential that they should not be exempt from it. According to the established principle—to the known and recognised principle of the constitution—it is right and proper that those who contribute their money should have a voice in the election of persons by whom the money is expended.

But while we think that it is but proper to have the permanent rate-payers of the town as the persons to elect the council which is to have the Government of the town, yet, at the same time, it seems to be as necessary to take some precaution that they are neither persons who are occasionally suffering under that pressure of distress which obliges them to receive parochial relief, nor persons unable, regularly, and for a length of time, to pay their rates. We think they ought to be the permanently settled and fixed inhabitants of the town alone, and those who regularly contribute to its rates; and we propose, as a test of this, that they should be persons who shall have been rated to the relief of the poor for three years, and who shall have regularly paid their rates for that term. There will be provisions introduced for taking care that the having received relief, or the not having paid rates for a short time, shall not exclude persons who have previously acquired the right of voting for a longer period than their inability to pay up their rates. We propose, then, that the right of voting should be in the occupiers of houses, warehouses, and shops, paying rates, using similar words to those adopted in the Reform Bill. We propose, likewise, that they should reside within seven miles of the place.

The next question is, as to whom these persons are to elect as the Government of the town. We propose that there should be one body only, consisting of the Mayor and Common Council, to consist of various numbers; not in an arithmetical proportion, but in such a manner as is best suited to the population of each particular case, varying from fifteen in the smallest of such places—the inhabitants of which are about 2,000—to 90 in the largest towns. The largest of these towns (of which there are only about twenty in number, and each of which have more than 25,000 inhabitants) we propose should be divided into wards, and a certain number of Common Councilmen (to be named according to a schedule to be annexed to the Bill) to be chosen in each ward; but with regard to the rest of the towns, it is proposed that the whole of the common Council shall be elected together.

Now, Sir, I will next state what is to be done with respect to those who at present have rights in these Corporations. We propose that all their pecuniary rights shall be entirely preserved. Exemption from toll, or rights of common, or any personal rights of that kind, shall be preserved, to all who now enjoy them, during their lives; but we propose that in future no person shall be admitted into these Corporations, nor be burgesses of them, except, according to the manner which I have just mentioned, by being permanent inhabitants, paying rates within the borough.

I know not what arguments may be used with respect to the various and ancient rights (and most various and widely different in their nature they are) which have hitherto existed in these ancient boroughs; but I do not believe that any sufficient case will be made out when we have established this franchise—large and extensive as we propose to make it—for admitting persons in future to become members of Corporations on any other grounds than those I have already stated. The first of those ancient rights is the right of birth. Undoubtedly this is one of those anoient rights which belonged, and most properly belonged, to Corporations. It was established when the inhabitants of these towns were free, and justly proud of their freedom, and when all the inhabitants of the country round about them were either villains or slaves. At that period of our history, a man had justly a right, if he left his town, of proving his freedom by birth—that he was a person born within the precincts of a town, and was neither the villain nor vassal of any neighbouring Lord. In the same way the rights acquired by serving an apprenticeship to certain trades appertained to these towns; and very properly so, when those trades that were rising and making their way against the barbarism that surrounded them, wanted exclusive advantages as an encouragement. But in these days, when we are all equal and free subjects, and when these trades are no longer matters of great craft and mystery, as they were called, and when, indeed, many of our modern trades are excluded from enjoying this right, there is no reason why distinctions of this kind should any longer be kept up, or why we should not abolish these kinds of right altogether.

We propose to abolish, likewise, all exclusive rights of trading, with a due regard, as I have already said, to the pecuniary rights of persons now living. For instance, I may mention the case of two persons in the city of Exeter; one of whom not belonging to the Corporation pays 100l. every year for certain tolls to which he is liable, while the other who lives next to him has no toll of that kind to pay, because he belongs to the Corporation. As far as the pecuniary advantage of the latter person is concerned, he will con- tinue to enjoy it during his life; but we propose that nothing in future shall exist in the nature of these exclusive rights and exemptions, which are undoubtly inconsistent with the good government of these towns.

Now with regard to the election of the Common Council; we propose that members of the council shall be elected for three years, but that one-third of them shall go out every year. For my own part, I must confess my belief is, that the inhabitants of the towns having once elected persons in whom they have confidence, whether they elect them for three years or one year, will generally elect the same persons. They will naturally elect those persons for whom they have a regard, and to whom they believe the disposal and management of their property may be safely intrusted, and whom they will not very likely think of changing. But providing that there shall be an annual election, of only one-third of the council, we shall secure at least two-thirds of the council, who will have had some experience of the management of the affairs of the town. With regard to the mode of elections, that in itself is not very important, but it is proposed to be effected by each voter making out a list of all those whom he wishes to elect and signing his name at the bottom. Although it is very easy to give a vote viva voce for one or two persons, yet it is evident that it would be very inconvenient to vote for fifteen, or thirty, or forty persons, unless the franchise were taken in the form proposed. We propose that the mayor shall be annually elected by the council, and that he shall be, during the time of his mayoralty, a justice of the peace for the borough and likewise for the county. We do not propose that there shall be any qualification either for the office of mayor or of Common Councilman. There is, I think but little to be gained by requiring a qualification. It very often excites ill-will and ill-blood, and in the old charters there is but little trace of that kind of qualification which it has been the fashion to introduce in more modern times. Then, Sir, with regard to the officers which the council are to appoint, we propose that, immediately on the council being elected, which will be on some certain day in October, they shall have the power of appointing a town-clerk and treasurer. Certainly we do not mean to oblige them; it would be totally inconsistent with the spirit of this measure were we to attempt to do so—to preserve the present town-clerks in the offices which they now hold. It would, I think, be utterly impossible to do so with any kind of consistency; because it appears to me quite obvious that, on a new body of men coming into power, and laying down rules of their own for their future Government, it is necessary that they should have the privilege of appointing persons in whom they have confidence, to assist in carrying out those rules, and that they should not be required to allow persons to remain in office who might thwart their purposes, and hold them at defiance. At the same time, wherever any case may occur, in which compensation can be fairly demanded, means are provided by which that compensation can be fixed and ascertained.

The most important part, no doubt of this Municipal Corporation Bill is that which relates to the management of the funds; the management of which certainly does not, at the present moment, show any great wisdom or economy on the part of these Corporations; for while the gross income of the Corporations amounts to 367,000l., the expenditure amounts to 377,000.; besides which there is a debt of 2,000,000l. owing by these bodies. When we come to look into particular cases, we shall find that some Corporations have been incurring debts year by year up to within two years ago, while they were actually dividing among themselves the proceeds of the loans they raised. It is proposed, therefore, that the council shall have the power of appointing a committee in order to manage their financial affairs, and that their accounts shall be regularly audited and brought before the public, and that there shall no longer be secret accounts. By adopting this system of publicity, even if no other guarantee be taken, it appears to me that we shall obtain a great security for the better management of corporate funds in future. There is another part of the duty of these Corporations which has been no less scandalously mismanaged, and to which I alluded in the earlier part of my address to the House, namely, the management of the charity estates, of which these Corporations have at different times been made trustees.

We propose that the Common Councils shall become the trustees of these charity funds, with power to appoint, if they think proper, a committee for their management; but at the same time requiring them imperatively to appoint a separate secretary, and treasurer, and to provide an audit of these funds in a different manner from the audit generally of the accounts of the town. It is likewise provided that the number of persons to be chosen for the management of these charity-estates shall not be less than fifteen, and that they shall be chosen, not from the council, but from among the general body of the burgesses of the towns; for it may often happen that persons may not like to have any thing to do with the Municipal Government of the town, who, from their habits of business, and their connexion with matters of this kind, may be regarded as very fit and proper persons to have the management of these charitable estates. Now, Sir, having mentioned the persons in whom the government of these Corporations is to be vested, who are to be the electors of these governing bodies, and what is to lake place both with respect to the general funds of the Corporations, and with respect to the charity-estates of which such Corporations have been appointed by the founders, or by acts of Parliament, the trustees, I come next to that very important part of the Bill, with regard to the administration of justice and of police within these towns.

We propose that the whole work and business of watching the town shall be placed completely under the control of the council, and that all powers given by the provisions of any local act, so far as they would militate against this power, shall not be continued to those now possessing them. This seems to me absolutely necessary in establishing a Municipal Government,—indeed the only notion I can form of a Municipal Government is, that the keeping of the peace, or to use the words of olden times, "the quieting of the town," should be immediately under the control of the persons who are deemed proper to have the government of the town: therefore any power inconsistent with the power of the general council, as far as the watching of the town is concerned, will be abolished. I will not enter into any provision at present as to paving and lighting. These powers are often exercised under local acts by Commissioners. It may be desirable hereafter that these powers should be consolidated; and I think this Bill will give the means of effecting that object; but we do not propose to interfere at present with these local acts, as far as these general purposes are concerned. Then with respect to another part of this measure, which refers to what I consider a part of the police of the town—and a part which has often led to very great abuses—I mean the power of granting alehouse licenses, it is proposed that this power shall not be vested in any of the magistracy. We think that it ought not to be mixed up or confounded with the duty of administering justice, but that it should be left to the council or to a committee of the council. I think that the council being elected by the rate payers—under the popular mode of election now proposed—although no doubt many of the members may have a desire to favour their friends or promote their own private views as a body—will always act under popular control—and be less likely to abuse the power of granting licenses than magistrates, in whose case the robe of justice is sometimes employed to cover a great enormity of abuses.

I come now to another part of the subject, which, I think, is totally separated and distinct from all the other parts of this measure—that is, the administration of what is properly called justice within these towns. We propose that there should be a division of these 183 towns into two schedules. The greater part of them are to be put into one schedule, to be called Schedule A. The House will observe that, unlike another schedule of that name which formerly attracted great attention in this House, Schedule A., in the present instance, will be one of privilege instead of disfranchisement. The number of the boroughs in Schedule A would be 129, and to these a Commission of the Peace would be granted. The remaining 54 might have, if they chose, a Commission of the Peace on application to the Crown. With respect to the 129 boroughs, the town councils are to have the power of recommending to the Crown certain persons whom they think proper to receive the Commission of the Peace within the borough; but they are not to have the power of electing magistrates in such sense as that the assent of the Crown shall not be necessary to perfect the election. I believe that at the present moment there are more than one thousand magistrates acting within these boroughs; but I do not think that any thing like that number is neces- sary. I am of opinion that the town-councils will take care not to recommend to the Crown any persons but such as the advisers of the Crown can with safety appoint to the magistracy. These magistrates will not have the power of sitting in quarter sessions, &c. as I have already stated, they will have nothing to do with the granting of ale-house licenses. But there is a considerable number of these boroughs of the largest size, in which it may be proper to have a court of quarter sessions, in which, indeed, there is a court of that kind already established, and in which there is a recorder perfectly fit for his situation.

The Bill, therefore, enacts, that on a town council applying to the Crown for the establishment of a court or quarter sessions, and on their stating that they are willing to continue the salary paid to the recorders, they shall be retained; but such recorder must in every instance be a barrister of five years' standing. Therefore in those towns where there is now a barrister of five years' standing, acting as recorder, and the town councils declare that they are satisfied with the administration of justice by these recorders, they may remain in office, and the quarter sessions be continued.

With respect to other towns desiring to have quarter sessions, but which either have no recorder, or where the recorder is not a barrister of five years' standing, it is intended that the Crown in future shall have the nomination of that officer. It will be necessary for the town to express its desire for the establishment or continuance of quarter sessions, and its readiness to provide for the salary of a recorder, and it will then become the business of the Crown to appoint that judge. It seems to me better that that power should be in the Crown, it being understood that the person appointed shall be a barrister of five years' standing at least, than that there should be any thing resembling the popular election of a judge. The recorder will be appointed during good behaviour, and will not be removable at the pleasure of the Crown; and it may therefore be expected that he will exercise his functions independently and fairly. There are some provisions in the Bill rendered necessary, in. consequence of those clauses relating to quarter sessions with respect to the county-rates. These provisions are of some complexity, and I will not enter minutely into their nature.

I have little more to address to the House. I must not, however, omit to state, that in cases where towns wish to have a stipendiary magistrate—and it is well known by several Members of this House, that in many towns their services have been found extremely useful—on their expression of that desire, they shall be at liberty to make certain rules and regulations for the appointment of that stipendiary magistrate, and shall be allowed by the Crown in their behalf. I have now gone through the principal provisions which it is proposed to insert in this Bill. I may have omitted some of them, and perhaps some points of considerable importance, but I think I have stated enough to give the House a general view of the nature of the measure. We find that of these Corporations many are in a state of insolvency, many in a state of internal dissension, and that the funds of many of them are misapplied. We are of opinion, that by the provisions I have now stated to the House, we shall be able in the first place to procure a council for the boroughs, which, by representing, shall possess the good-will of the inhabitants. We think that there will no longer exist the feeling that the Corporations have been created for the exclusive benefit and advantage of one party in the town, and that all those who happen to differ in opinion from that party, or who are not favored by it, are harshly and unjustly dealt with. We are of opinion, in the next place, that by these provisions we shall establish a due and regular police in towns in which that police is at present very defective. We conceive, in the last place, that by these, we shall provide for the pure and due administration of justice within these boroughs containing so large a mass of population.

The measure we propose, in my opinion, is in strict accordance with the spirit and intention of the Reform Act. It is a measure to reform one of our valuable institutions, and at the same time to preserve it; it is a measure to interfere, boldly, I confess, but to interfere after cautious inquiry, and after full proof of the necessity of that interference; it is a measure in strict conformity with the declarations of this House at the commencement of the present Session, that our Municipal Corporations ought to be subjected to vigilant popular control. It is a measure in perfect conformity with the wish expressed by his Majesty in answer to our Address on the subject, when his Majesty declared his hope that the dissolution of Parliament would not prevent any well-considered measures conducive to the general welfare. It is a measure upon which we, as a Government, are willing to stake what credit may belong to us for having formerly proposed Reform, being now, I may say, the leaders of a reforming majority in this House.

We have bestowed great attention upon the subject, though it is true that we have been deprived of the assistance of some persons whose aid we would gladly have received. At the commencement of my speech, I stated that we had been deprived of the assistance of two Gentlemen whom I alluded to, and now at the end of my speech I must also say, that we have also been without the assistance of my noble Friend, Lord Spencer, who, at the end of the last Session of Parliament, gave a notice in this House on the subject. I am sure that if that noble Lord had joined the Government, his assistance would have been most valuable, not only in framing the measure, but in explaining its details, in doing which he is unrivalled. I have attempted to explain to the House the general principle of the Bill; I will leave it to be divided upon with reference to its general merits; I will leave it to the judgment of the people of England to decide whether it is a safe, efficient, and wholesome measure of Corporation Reform. I now beg leave to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the better Regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales.

Sir Robert Peel.*

Although, Sir, I have resolved to avail myself of every advantage in the discussion of this most important question, which additional time and opportunities of reference, not only to documents already in the possession of the House, but to others which are not yet laid before it will afford me, and to decline entering, therefore, into any detailed discussion of the measure which the noble Lord has this night proposed: yet, Sir, on account of its vast importance, I should be unwilling to allow the Motion to be put from the Chair without a single observation having been offered on the subject except those contained in the speech of the noble Lord. I shall make no opposition whatever to that Motion; I shall throw not the slightest impediment in the * From a corrected Report, way of the introduction of this Bill—and, moreover, I am about to state opinions upon the subject of Municipal Reform generally—though not in immediate reference to this measure, the details of which are so important that each is entitled to separate discussion—which will prove that an opposition on my part, to the introduction of this measure would be quite inconsistent with the opinions which I entertain.

Sir, when I look to the state of the population of the larger towns of this kingdom—when I contemplate the rapidity with which places, which at no remote period were inconsiderable villages, have through manufacturing industry, started into life and into great wealth and importance—when I look, too, to the imperfect provision which is now made for the preservation of order and the administration of justice in most of those towns—I cannot deny that the time has arrived when it is of the utmost importance to the well-being of society, to establish within societies so circumstanced a good system of Municipal government. In some of these towns no permanent and regular provision is, at present, made for the maintenance of public order, and the general purposes of good government; in others the provision which was originally intended to be made through the instrumentality of the Corporate system, has become utterly inefficient for the purpose; and I am bound to admit therefore, that on account of the change of circumstances, and on that account singly, there is ample ground for now considering whether such provision ought not to be made in towns not corporate; and whether in those towns which have Corporations, the provision at present in force be not inadequate! Sir, I am bound also to state that, on referring as fully as I have been able to do since they were presented, and amid the great pressure of other business, to the reports on the state of Corporations, the general impression left on my mind is, that, independently of the considerations abovementioned, the general purport of the evidence adduced before the commission, shows that the time is also arrived, when it is necessary for Parliament to interfere, for the purpose of providing some effectual checks against the abuses, which have been proved to prevail in some of the corporate bodies of this country. I therefore, Sir, without hesitation admit, that it is of the utmost importance to the well-being of society, that a good system of municipal government should be provided for the larger towns of this country, whether they be corporate or not, by the means of which the regular and pure administration of justice may be extended and secured, and the maintenance of public order promoted through the means of a well-regulated police. And, Sir, after having made that admission, I think it follows, almost as a matter of course, that corporations where they exist, ought to be made mainly instrumental in effecting those objects. To leave the corporations precisely on their present ground, and to establish new rates (where they may be necessary) for municipal purposes by new laws to be now passed, making no new provision for the application of these revenues, placing them under the sole control of corporate bodies existing on the old principle, would have a great tendency to defeat the object in view. If we admit the fact that the well-being of society requires the consideration of a good system of Municipal government, it is impossible to exclude from simultaneous consideration the existing state of the corporate bodies themselves. I think Parliament has a right to require, by laws to be now passed, that the revenues of these Corporations, excepting where they are applied under particular bequests to special purposes, shall be henceforth devoted to public purposes, connected with public municipal interests. I must say, that if I were a member of any corporation, so far from looking at this question in a mere narrow, party light, I should feel a much greater interest, a much stronger, direct, personal pecuniary interest, in seeing the corporate funds applied to public purposes, than in seeing them applied to any system of public feasting, or to any objects of mere electioneering and party interest. At the same time it is due to the existing corporations to admit at once, that while I have not the slightest objection to any new provision to be made by law which should impose some check on the appropriation of corporate revenues, such check will involve a new principle of law. The principle of the law heretofore has been, that these corporate bodies have had a legal right to apply their funds to other than public municipal purposes: they clearly had a right to apply their funds to corporate purposes as distinguished from municipal; and I apprehend that it has been ruled by the highest authorities, that ex- cepting so far as the restraining statutes interfered with the powers of ecclesiastical corporations, the corporations of this country had a right to regulate at their discretion, the application of their property, and even to alienate it, if they thought proper. The report made by the Commissioners has not sufficiently referred to the principles of law in conformity with which the corporations have hitherto acted. I think, also, there is ground for complaint that this report involves all the corporations in too indiscriminate a censure, that it does not sufficiently point out the many cases in which corporations have acted honestly in the performance of their trust, but that it has thrown a general reflection upon all corporations, in consequence of the abuse of their functions by a limited number. The noble Lord did wisely in laying down the principle that we had much better defer to a future opportunity any attempt to cite particular instances in which corporations may not have been justly dealt with. It is much more convenient on this occasion to refer to the general principle of the measure than to enter into the consideration of any special and individual cases. The noble Lord's precepts, however, were, as it often happens, much sounder than his practice. The noble Lord said, he would not refer to instances of particular corporations; but scarcely had the words escaped the noble Lord's lips, when he referred to some eight or ten corporations—not very impartially selected, I must say—and it is a little singular, that of those eight, or ten corporations, the noble Lord became acquainted with the circumstances of four-fifths of them by having access to documents which have not yet been laid before the House. We have had no report upon Norwich—we have had no report upon Bedford—we have had no report upon Oxford—we have had no report upon Cambridge—we have had no report upon Orford—we have had no report upon Aldborough—we have had no report upon Ipswich,—and yet these are the cases which the noble Lord has selected, and upon which he has mainly founded his argument. There is a double ground of complaint against the noble Lord. He first takes the unfair advantage of quoting from documents, to which he alone has had access, thus precluding all answer or explanation, which a reference to those documents might possibly afford; and secondly, he selects the cases of cor- porations in which a particular class of political opinions predominates, thus warranting the inference, that the party in the State holding those opinions, had been specially, if not exclusively, the encouragers of corporate abuse.

The noble Lord in the playfulness of his fancy, sent down an antiquarian on an excursion to the eastern coast of this country, to examine with particular and special care into the cases of Aldborough and Orford. Now, I hope the antiquarian will travel into the interior; I hope he will not select the smallest boroughs in which to indulge his antiquarian propensities. I hope he will go to Derby—yes, I hope he will go to Derby—and moreover I hope he will go to Portsmouth. I really wish the noble Lord had not taken this course; I wish he had adhered to the rule he himself laid down, because it would have been infinitely better to discuss general principles, without reference to particular cases; and above all, if there were to be references to particular cases, it should have been to cases to the reports on which all sides of the House had had access equally, and which were a fair and impartial selection. Why, see to what an objection the noble Lord lays himself fairly-open. If these unpublished reports be important as illustrations of his arguments, why did the noble Lord press forward this measure until those reports were completed? I seek no delay of this measure; but I must say, with reference to good Government and to the success of the Municipal system about to be established, that I do hope his Majesty's Government—if they should find on this side of the House that disposition which they seem not to have anticipated, to discuss this question fairly, without reference to its party bearings, but with a single view of providing a system of good Government—I say, I do hope his Majesty's Government will feel it to be important on a matter even more intimately connected with the peace and happiness of these towns than the Reform Bill itself, to afford most ample time for the mature deliberation of the details of this Bill. If the noble Lord deem those reports, which are not yet laid upon the Table, to be important as illustrations of his own arguments, he ought at least to enable us to refer to the whole of them before we are called upon to decide on the details of the measure. I again repeat, that I wish the noble Lord had not made a partial speeech. If the noble Lord looks to the facts of the case, he will find nothing in the corporations of Aid-borough or Orford, which will make them more open to his comments, than Corporations over which his own political friends have exercised an influence. I am quite aware of the observation in reply to which I expose myself, I am quite aware that if I show that no class of political opinions, whether professedly Liberal or Conservative, is a guarantee against the exercise of undue influence, that I am only fortifying the general argument in favour of a Reform. No doubt this is the case. The more general the perversion of Corporate privileges, the greater the necessity for correction; but let us have the case fairly stated—let us acknowledge the truth, that Tory Corporations are not the only ones to blame. The noble Lord forces me to offer him a specimen, and it shall be but a specimen, of Whig, pure Whig Corporations, I am sure it escaped his recollection, and I therefore invite him to refresh his memory by referring to the report on Derby. He will find it stated in the case of the Corporation of Derby, that whenever they thought the number of the freemen in their interest was "getting low," the Mayor, or some other influential Member of the Corporation, applied to the agents of the Cavendish family, and requested a list of the names of persons to be admitted as "honorary freemen." The Corporation took this course, because they wished to avail themselves of the interest of the Cavendish family over the freemen so admitted. On the last occasion when honorary freemen were made, almost all of them were tenants of his grace the Duke of Devonshire. The agent of his grace paid the fees on the admission of the honorary freemen. Without the creation of such freemen, it was said the Corporation "could not have kept the Tories quiet—they would have been restless." Now we are not so intolerant here, I am sure, as to presume that our own opinions, or our own acts, must be exactly right, and those of every one else wrong; but if this Corporation Report had stated that a Tory nobleman had nominated all the freemen, and had paid for their freedom, and that the excuse was, that without doing so, they could not have kept the Reformers quiet—the Reformers, ("who were very restless,") what a burst of vehement indignation would have been raised in this House against such an abuse of Corporate privileges. I have not the slightest intention of following the noble Lord's example in detail. As for myself and the Corporation of Tamworth, with which I have the honour to be connected, we have no reason to shrink from any inquiry. As far as that truly honourable Corporation is concerned, the report is most satisfactory. It gives to the Corporation, both in respect to the selection of Members and all its proceedings, unqualified praise.

I will not follow the noble Lord, by detailing many cases of Whig abuse; but there is one other Corporation of which I must remind the noble Lord. The antiquarian must not omit in the course of his excursion to pay a friendly visit to Portsmouth. [Mr. Bonham Carter bowed, which occasioned much Laughter.] "In Portsmouth," say the Commissioners, "it can hardly be necessary to point out the complete closeness of the system. For a long series of years, it has been exercised with the undisguised purpose of confining the whole municipal and political power to a particular party, and almost to a particular family, and, (as the report justly observes), it has been found perfectly efficacious in its operation." "That no instances can be traced of municipal corruption, seems attributable, not to any correcting principle in the system, but merely to the absence of evil intentions in those who have accidentally been placed at its head." Now, if I were to choose a Corporation in the neighbourhood of which I, as an individual not interested in the honest application of Corporate property, and fond of good living, should like to reside, the Corporation of Portsmouth is the one, of all others, on which, without a moment's hesitation, my choice would fall. [Mr. Bonham Carter expressed his dissent.] The hon. Gentleman shakes his head; let me beg his attention to the facts stated by the Commissioners, with reference to that Corporation. Their revenues are, I think, 600l. or 700l. a-year, of which about 450l. is annually expended in feasts. Here is the account:—"The feasts," say the Commissioners, "are rather more expensive this year than in ordinary years." Now, here let me ask? the House in what year they suppose it was that the expense of feasting was particularly heavy? Why, no less than the great era of Reform. "On the occasion of the accession of his present Majesty, 41l. 9s. was spent in refreshment for the party attending the proclamation, and in the year 1830 the sum of 108l. 10s. was expended on a dinner given on the election of the representatives—which expense, says the report, was defrayed on former occasions by the Members themselves. The annual average expense of feasts from 1824 to 1831, inclusively, was 447l. An account was given to us, showing that the average income during that time, accruing from dividends and rents, was 600l." Now I have proved, I think, beyond a doubt, that in the whole kingdom there is not a more hospitable Corporation than this, at least in proportion to their means; for out of an income not exceeding 600l. the annual average expenditure on the rites of hospitality is no less than 447l. But mark the attachment of the Members of this Corporation to the great principles upon which the Reform Act was founded. Nothing can more clearly show their devotion to Reform, than the special exception which they make in 1830 from their former usages, and the increased hospitality in which they indulged at the era of Reform. Then it is that they add a new item to their expenditure, and pay 108l. 10s. for an election dinner, the charge for which has been heretofore defrayed by the Members themselves.

Mr. Francis Baring

said, as we understood, that he had paid his share of the expense.

Sir Robert Peel

Here is the report in which the whole matter is set down.

Mr. Bonham Carter:

It is a very faithful report.

Sir Robert Peel

continaed—41l. 9s. was sufficient for a feast on the occasion of his Majesty's accession, but no less a sum than 108l. was expended on a dinner to the representatives on their election. The hon. Gentleman says, that this report is a faithful report, and he, no doubt, has repaid to the Corporation his share of the money. I shall say nothing in regard to the Corporation of Nottingham, or any other Corporation; nor, indeed, should I have alluded to that of Portsmouth, but for the purpose of showing that neither the noble Lord, nor any other person, ought to attempt to visit upon any one party exclusively, the abuses which have existed in Corporations.

But the better course is to look to the future; and I, as one of the Conservative party, strongly advise all Members of Corporations readily and willingly to concur in an Amendment of the existing system—to relinquish the influence that they may have derived from the control over corporate funds and charitable trusts—but upon this express condition—that the Reform be a sincere, bonâ fide Reform—that it be not a mere pretext for transferring power from one party in the state to another; that the object aimed at shall be—a good system of Municipal Government—taking security, as far as security upon such a subject can be taken, that the really intelligent and respectable portion of the community of each town be called to the Administration of Municipal affairs; and guarding against the future application of the charitable or corporate funds to any other than charitable or public purposes. If this be the avowed and the real object of the new measure, I for one shall be disposed to give a favourable consideration to its general principles, and will co-operate cheerfully in the Amendment of its details; but if, under the specious pretext of Amendment, it shall be merely calculated not to extirpate, but to transfer the abuse of power—to extinguish one political party and elevate another—then I shall consider the Bill a great public evil, aggravating and confirming and perpetuating every existing abuse. I do not object to the principle, that corporate revenues shall be applied strictly to public municipal purposes—I do not object to the principle, that those who administer those revenues, and exercise corporate authority, shall execute their trust under the control of popular opinion. If, after admitting the leading principles, I suggest delay in the further consideration of this subject, I make the suggestion with no sinister view, and from no motive but a desire for the successful working of the new system. A great question of this kind, so complex in its details, and so very important in its principle, should not be hastily discussed. It requires long and deliberate investigation; and a little delay would not be misplaced in such a case. Great questions are never fully or successfully matured by a hurried process; their perfection is only the Work of caution, time, and care.

I beg to advert briefly to one or two points in the noble Lord's Measure. He says the right of suffrage is to be invested in the rate-payers. ["No", from the Ministerial side.] Well, in the rate-payers being householders, and subject to certain conditions of residence and payment of rates. He does not invest it exclusively in the 10l. householders. He would allow every one, no matter what the amount of his qualification be, a vote in the election of the governing body of the town, provided he be a resident rate-payer. The qualification of the constituent body is of course a most important element in the Question. So is the frequency of elections. How often are they to take place? Every one who had respect for the good order of society, and was anxious to prevent personal collisions and animosities, which were unhappily consequent on elections, should be anxious to avoid too frequent occasions for these popular ferments. Corporate Reform may be a very desirable and beneficial measure; but I trust we can procure the advantage of it at a cheaper rate than the sacrifice of the harmony, and good will, and social concord of the societies to which it is to be applied. If there is to be a perpetual conflict of political principle in every town—a constant revival of bitter animosities, with all the concomitant evils of popular elections—the result may be—the exclusion of men of intelligence and respectability from corporate functions—a bad administration of corporate authority—and destruction to all friendly intercourse and social happiness among men of different parties in the same town.

I give no opinion at present upon the nature of the qualification which the noble Lord proposes for the constituent body. If he had taken the 10l. franchise as the qualification, he would have had the same means of ascertaining the actual right to vote, which exists in the case of elections for Members of Parliament, namely, registration of the voter. If he takes a different franchise, there must still be some check upon the exercise of it—some means of proving that the right claimed is really possessed by the party claiming it. If the noble Lord's plan be adopted, there will be in each borough town three different popular bodies entitled to vote in public matters. The vestry, controlling the expenditure of the poorrates—the 10l. householders, electing the Members of Parliament—and the body of householders who will be entitled to vote for the Common Council, and Corporate officers. This seems, at first sight at least a complicated and not very satisfactory arrangement.

Another important point, and one which will require very deliberate attention is, the fixing of the limits of the new Corporate jurisdiction, in all cases wherein the limits of the existing Corporate authority are unsuitable. By whom are the new limits to be determined on? Are they to be co-extensive in all cases with the limits of the borough under the Reform Bill? And if not, what authority shall decide on the exceptions to be made—and on the precise degree to which the old limits shall be extended? If the new Common Council is to have the authority of imposing additional rates for municipal purposes, this question of limits will be a most important one, and one of very difficult settlement. It will occasionally be embarrassed by the existence of local acts, extending over districts, the limits of which are different both from those of the old corporation, and of the new borough, and which districts may have separate debts, and separate engagements. It may be very fit to abolish all these distinctions, and incorporate the whole into one district, subject to one general superintending authority; but it will be no easy matter, I fear, to provide by one general law, for the mode of doing this consistently with justice, and the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

Some express provision ought to be made with regard to the existing obligations of corporate bodies. Many of them have contracted debts and engagements, in some cases, perhaps, improvidently; but still, if those debts and engagements were contracted under the authority of the law, the creditors ought to have a full assurance that the nature of their security shall not be affected by any change in the corporate authorities. In some Corporations, the members of which are trustees of charitable estates, the estates have been alienated, and a compensation has been made by the charitable trust, not very regularly, perhaps, in some instances, out of the Corporate revenues. Here, again, there ought to be a restraint upon the power which any new body may acquire over those revenues, and provision should be made, that the first lien upon the Corporate property shall be, the re-payment of the sum due to the charity, on account of the alienation of the trust estates.

Then again, with respect to Ecclesiastical patronage. Many Corporations are possessed of valuable livings, and extensive patronage connected with the Church. Surely the right of appointing to livings ought not to be exerised by those who are not members of the Church—who cannot be fit judges of the qualifications requisite in a minister of another religious profession, and have no direct interest in making fit appointments. A Corporation possessed of Ecclesiastical patronage, might, under the new system, be composed entirely of Dissenters, or might be under the control, at least, of a predominant dissenting interest. Would it be fitting that Ecclesiastical patronage connected with the Church of England should be exercised by a dissenting body? Would not Dissenters themselves be the first to protest against any legislative enactment, which should by possibility place the nomination to their spiritual charges, whether Roman Catholic, or Methodist, or Presbyterian, in the hands, or under the direct influence, of members of the Church of England.

With regard to the future management of charitable trusts, such as have been hitherto under the superintendence of corporate authorities, some special provision will be, in my opinion, necessary, for the purpose of strictly confining the application of the charitable funds to the purposes for which they were intended. If they are to be placed under a political body, what security will there be that the political interest will not, as it has heretofore done, sway the distribution of the charitable revenues? There must be a selection of objects, and a large discretion as to that selection, capable of being very easily perverted to the promotion of party objects. Popular elections will give no security on this head; the body which owes its authority to the popular voice will have just as great temptation to the undue exercise of power in the management of a charitable trust, and as great opportunity for exercising it improperly, as a self-elected oligarchy. The only effectual precaution will be the separation, if possible, of the charitable from the municipal trust, and the selection of some independent, and impartial authority, subject to proper control, for the management of the charitable estates, and the appropriation of the charitable revenues.

The noble Lord has touched very imperfectly upon the local administration of justice under the new system which he proposes to establish. He has not adverted to the contemplated establishment of Local Courts, exercising jurisdiction in certain civil causes, and especially in regard to the recovery of debts below a certain amount. It will deserve serious consideration, whether, in the event of the establishment of such a local jurisdiction, the necessity for maintaining any separate borough jurisdiction will not, in most of the Corporate towns, be superseded. In some of the larger ones, it may be fit to have a separate jurisdiction, but in the small boroughs, the continuance or establishment of a separate jurisdiction, would interfere with the satisfactory and succesful operation of any measure for the local administration of justice, founded upon general principles.

There is one point on which the noble Lord has expressed an opinion, from which I see strong ground to dissent, namely the proposal to devolve upon the Common Council—upon a body owing its authority to popular election merely, the exclusive power of licensing public-houses within the Corporate jurisdiction. I think this is a power, which a body so constituted, is not likely to exercise wisely or impartially—that it is a power which may be grossly abused for party purposes, and also with a view to selfish considerations of personal interest. Here again I see no additional security against such abuse in popular election.

The noble Lord proposes to confine the division of boroughs into wards, to twenty boroughs. I am very much inclined to think that the principle of such division may, with advantage, be extended much further—and that you may thereby ensure a much fairer representation of property, and of the varied interests in a borough, I than if you were to make each borough a single district, without subdivision, so far as the right of election to Corporate office is concerned.

Upon many of the points adverted to by the noble Lord, the qualification of the constituent body, the number of the governing body, the frequency of elections, and other important matters of this kind, I shall reserve my opinion, feeling it quite unsuitable to the importance of the subject to pronounce a decided one at present. Of this I am satisfied, that no system of Municipal Government, however specious in its theory, will promote the object for which alone it ought to be designed, will ensure the maintenance of public order, the pure administration of justice, or the harmony and happiness of the societies to which it is to be applied, unless its direct tendency be to commit the management of Municipal affairs to the hands of those who from the possession of property have the strongest interest in good government, and, from the qualifications of high character and intelligence, are most likely to conciliate the respect and confidence of their fellow citizens.

Mr. Strutt

said, that the Corporation of Derby which he had the honour to represent, having been alluded to, he could, upon the part of the members of that Corporation, state that none would more sincerely coincide with him in thanking the noble Lord for having introduced this measure than they would.

Mr. Hume

hoped that all parties would co-operate in making this measure as perfect as possible. He wished to ask the noble Lord whether his Bill was intended to apply to any other Corporations, but the 183 mentioned by him.

Lord John Russell

was understood to say, that a separate measure would be introduced in regard to London, with regard to some of the other Corporations mentioned in the Report, they were so small that he had not determined whether they should be included or not. The right hon. Baronet had complained of his having gone into details of the abuses of some particular boroughs, but that was not the case, as he had only stated of whom the Corporation consisted in those boroughs.

Sir Robert Peel

observed, that there were some small Corporations which had ceased to return Members to Parliament: he would, therefore, suggest, that if they wished to resign their Corporate privileges they might be at liberty to do so. He thought that there could be no objection to this, provided it was done with the consent of all the parties interested.

Lord John Russell

was aware that there were some small Corporations which did not possess sufficient means of paying their expenses: it might, therefore, be desirable to get rid rid of them. He saw no objection to the suggestion of the right hon. Baronet.

Mr. Brotherton,

as a Member for one of the new boroughs alluded to by the noble Lord, rose to express his gratification with the measure now proposed. In the borough which he represented, the principle of the proposed Bill had been acted upon for sometime, and it had been found to be most beneficial. In the large town of Manchester there was a most numerous constituency; and in the first instance it was proposed that none should have a vote in connexion with the Municipal Government of the place who did not pay a certain sum in rates; in consequence, however, of the small number of voters that there would be under such an arrangement—he believed not more than fifty—it was determined to make the voting general to the rate-payers, and this had given universal satisfaction. He did not entirely concur with the noble Lord on one point; he did not see the expediency of making the payment of rates for three years a necessary qualification for a vote. This would unnecessarily limit the constituency. In Manchester the number of voters was several thousand, and it would be reduced by the Bill, if the payment of three years' rates was insisted on to constitute a qualification. He thought well, however, of the measure, taking it altogether, and he had no doubt that it would give general satisfaction to the country. He felt perfectly satisfied that the property intrusted to the control of the Corporate bodies to be appointed under the Bill would be managed to the satisfaction of the people.

Mr. Ewart

felt bound to observe that he, as the representative of an old Corporate town, was equally satisfied with the hon. Member who spoke last with the measure of the noble Lord. He was convinced, that the extent of suffrage, limited in the way proposed by the noble Lord, would not greatly reduce the number of voters. It was a curious circumstance that one of the first countries which adopted a sound system of Municipal Government to any extent, was strictly monarchical. He alluded to Prussia, where, in 1808, an extensive measure of Municipal Reform, corresponding, in many respects, with that of the Noble Lord, was proposed by one of the first Ministers of State that ever lived in that country—he meant Baron Von Stein. There were some principles connected with that plan which he thought might be taken up with ad- vantage by the noble Lord, and adopted in his measure. Among other things, he provided, that any householder should enjoy the privilege of voting, and that the suffrage should be taken by Ballot. Thus that mode of voting had been adopted in Prussia—a strict monarchy, and almost a military government; and although it had, in some respects been in operation for upwards of thirty years, no complaints had been made, and no evil had been found to result from it. Approving, as he did, of the Bill, still he claimed the right of making any objections that occurred to him, and above all, urging the adoption of Vote by Ballot. There was no doubt that the measure of the noble Lord would meet with the approval of the majority of the House, though it might not give satisfaction to all parties, and he was confident that this measure would, in future ages, be regarded as one of the greatest benefits ever conferred on the country.

Mr. O'Connell

was anxious to say one word before the question was put to the vote. He thought that there was an essential defect in the title of the Bill. There was a deficiency of one word which greatly diminished the value of the measure. It was entitled "A Bill for the Better Regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales." The word he wished to see annexed to it was Ireland. In other respects he did not think that it was possible to produce a measure which was more entitled than the present to universal approbation. From the omission of the word he had alluded to, it might appear that, since the Union, Ireland was only to be treated by measures of coercion; and while the House had been extending the franchise to other parts of the empire, it had been cutting Ireland short of her share. They had already experienced the evils of doing injustice to Ireland in many points. The Irish Reform Bill was distinguished by its injustice in this point, namely, doing so much less for Ireland than for England. He hoped that they would remedy the injustice they had done, and that they would give a measure equally extensive as the present to Ireland. They required no more; they would not be satisfied with less, nor ought they to be satisfied. The right hon. Member for Tamworth had thrown out an observation respecting leaving livings in the hands of Corporations, the greater portion of the members of which were Dissenters. He belonged to a sect in Ireland which preponderated in some towns, and he should not object to an arrangement which, he believed, would be satisfactory. At present Roman Catholic laymen, although possessed of livings, could not institute to them, which had never been complained of. Now he would suggest, that in case the greater number of the members of a Corporation were Roman Catholics, that the right of bestowing the Church patronage belonging to it should be given to the Bishop, as the proper guardian of the Church. On this principle he should not hesitate to recommend this alteration, but he hoped that Ireland would have all the other parts of the Bill conceded to her. He was sure that this measure would give the greatest satisfaction to all persons not connected with monopolies. The right hon. Gentleman had taunted the noble Lord with selecting the boroughs he had alluded to only from one side, but it could not be said, with respect to Ireland, that partiality could be resorted to in the selection of boroughs, for it so happened that the Corporations in Ireland were all on one side. It was perfectly clear that Catholics were entitled to admission into the Corporations by birth or servitude, and yet, by a bye-law, they had been constantly excluded. One of the judges, now on the bench, Chief Baron Joy, had endeavoured to confirm this regulation of the Corporation of Dublin. Ireland required Corporation Reform more than England; and he trusted that the noble Lord and his Colleagues would not give less to his countrymen than they had given to the people of England.

Lord John Russell

said, that, under this Bill, there would be a power of making new Corporations; but it was not intended to apply this principle to the new metropolitan boroughs.

In answer to a question of Lord Sandon,

Lord John Russell

stated, that all persons, having the right of voting under the Reform Bill, would have a vote in Corporations.

In answer to another question,

The Noble Lord

stated, that after the death of the present race, there would be no freemen to vote.

Mr. Baines

was sure that the Dissenters of England and Wales would not wish to interfere with the Church patronage belonging to Corporations, even though they should form a majority of their bodies. All that they sought for was, an equality of civil rights, and perfect freedom of religious opinion. He agreed fully with the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Tamworth, that it would be as improper to exclude Conservatives from their fair share in the honours and privileges of Corporations, as it was to exclude Liberals, and all that was sought for was an equal participation in those immunities. He sincerely hoped that, in future, there would be no exclusion on account of religion or politics on either side. The plan announced by the noble Lord seemed admirably calculated to guard against this evil—the source of so many complaints, and the foundation of so much party jealousy and discontent. It was a truly liberal and extensive plan, founded upon the ancient Constitutional Elective Municipal Franchise and it would, in his opinion, give very general satisfaction to the country.

Mr. Roebuck

remarked that, in many large towns, there were great numbers of persons who had holdings under 10l., and were not rated, consequently they would not be entitled to vote in Corporations.

Lord John Russell

replied, that rating usually depended on an arrangement between the landlord and tenant. A person could generally be rated on an application on his own part.

Mr. Finn

was most anxious that a measure of equal extent with the present should be granted to Ireland. In that country the Corporations were infinitely worse, and squandered the money of the people away in a manner which the people of England could form no conception of. He wished that the Government had some measure ready for Ireland.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

assured the hon. Gentleman that it was the intention of his Majesty's Government to bring forward a measure of Corporation Reform for Ireland, as extensive in its provisions as that introduced by his noble Friend. He could speak of the necessity of reforming the Corporations in Ireland; he had had experience of the conduct of one of those bodies, and he knew that the conduct pursued by that was not singular to it. There was a circumstance which prevented the present Bill being applied to Ireland—namely, the principle of giving votes to rate-payers. Every one connected with that country must be aware that such a principle was not applicable to Ireland. He was sure when the measure for that country was laid before the House, the hon. and learned Gentleman, as well as the hon. Member who spoke last, would do justice to the wishes of the Government. In the course of a few days the Report on Irish Corporations would be laid on the Table, a measure founded on it would be, shortly afterwards, produced, and he trusted that it would give as much satisfaction as the Bill now proposed to be introduced.

The Attorney General

wished to remind hon. Members, that England was not the first country that had had a measure of Corporate Reform conceded to her by the present Government. They had conceded such a measure to Scotland three years ago, and it had been found to operate most beneficially. The people of England had waited patiently until the inquiry of the Commissioners had been completed, and a measure was now produced which appeared to give general satisfaction; and he trusted that in the course of a few days a Bill for Ireland would be introduced, and would meet with a similar reception. He could not sit down without referring to an observation—which appeared something like a slight slur—which had fallen from the right hon. Baronet. He was sure that when the right hon. Baronet had read the whole of the Report, he would feel that the Ministers had acted with the greatest impartiality. Indeed, the case of Derby, referred to by the right hon. Baronet, was a proof of this.

Motion agreed to.

The Bill was brought in and read a first time.