HC Deb 10 March 1834 vol 21 cc1390-400

On the Motion of Lord John Russell, the Order of the Day was read for the second leading of the Bribery at Elections Bill.

On the Question, that the Bill be read a second time,

Sir Robert Peel

said, that the Bill proposed by the noble Lord was intended as a remedy to enable the House to escape the difficulties by which it had felt itself encumbered the other evening, when the questions relating to the boroughs of Carrickfergus, Stafford, and Liverpool were under consideration. The object of the Bill was to enable them to provide a tribunal more satisfactorily constituted than any tribunal at present existing, for the purpose of inquiring into allegations of bribery and corruption. In the general object of the Bill he concurred. It seemed to be extremely desirable that the House should have the means of making an example of those boroughs in which, it could be proved that general and systematic bribery had prevailed; and, with the exception of the House itself, there was not at present any satisfactory tribunal before which allegations of bribery and corruption could be properly investigated. Agreeing, therefore, in the general principle of the Bill, he begged to call the attention of the House to its enactments. It provided that, in case there should be an Election Committee appointed in the course of its inquiry, an allegation of general bribery and corruption in the borough should be made, in that case, the allegation against the return of the Member, and the allegation against the general purity of the borough, should both he inquired into by the same Committee. The Bill also enabled parties, within three months after bribery and corruption should have prevailed at the election for any place, to send a petition complaining of such offences; and it then provided, that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the allegations of such a petition, in the same manner as Election Committees are now appointed. In the first place, he very much doubted whether it would not be better to keep distinct, as far as possible, any inquiry into the existence of general bribery and corruption in a borough, from the inquiry into the return of a Member of Parliament. He did not mean to say, that he would not, as at present, allow an Election Committee to make a Special Report, alleging bribery and corruption against the borough generally; but he would appoint a separate and distinct tribunal for the trial of the allegation against the borough, that tribunal being constituted in such a manner as to attract the general confidence of this House, of the other House of Parliament, and of the country generally. Unless that were done—unless the decision of the Committee carried with it the confidence of that House, and of the House of Lords,—they would not, in point of fact, be relieved from their present difficulty. There would be the Report of a Committee as at present laid on the Table;—there would be long and tedious discussions upon it; the matter might be carried before the Lords when the Session was well nigh worn away;—the Lords not having implicit confidence in the tribunal which the Commons had appointed, would direct an inquiry of their own;—Parliament would be prorogued before the inquiry was terminated; and thus Session after Session would pass away without any decision, and of course without the infliction of any punishment whatever. He wished to aid the noble Lord in his object, which he apprehended was, first to have satisfactory evidence as to the existence of general and systematic bribery in any place, and then, with all possible despatch, to make an example of that place. He would, therefore, suggest to the noble Lord, who had paid much attention to the subject, that it would be infinitely better to keep the two inquiries as distinct as possible,—allowing the Election Committee as at present, if it have strong evidence of the prevalence of general bribery and corruption,—to make a Special Report, allowing also parties, even in cases where there was no petition against the return of a particular Member, to present a petition alleging general bribery and corruption against the borough; but establishing a distinct and separate Committee to try the latter allegation. Then came the question—how should this Committee be appointed? In the first place, he thought it should have all the sanctions and authorities with which a Committee of this House could be vested. It should have the power of examining witnesses upon oath; and, above all, no Member of it should be allowed to pronounce an opinion upon the subject of inquiry who had not heard the whole of the evidence. There should be an obligation upon every Member to attend personally during the whole course of the inquiry. At present that was not the case: when an Election Committee reported that general bribery and corruption prevailed in a borough, the subsequent Committee appointed to prosecute the inquiry into the alleged delinquency of the borough, was a more incomplete tribunal than the first, because it did not examine witnesses upon oath, and because it was not compulsory upon every Member to attend. The main reason why, in cases of this kind, he should prefer sending the matter to a Committee properly constituted, to an inquiry at the Bar of the House was, not only on account of the time and trouble that would be saved, but because it was known, that when the inquiry was gone into in the House, many Members who had not heard the whole of the evidence, and some who had not heard a particle of it, frequently pronounced their judgment, or at least gave their vote—for judgment they could not form. In what way, then, ought they to constitute the Committee before which was to be tried the important question—whether a borough should, or should not, continue to send Representatives to Parliament? He thought that the constitution of such a Committee should not be left to chance: such a course might, perhaps, answer tolerably well when only the right of an individual Member was concerned,—when the validity, or the invalidity, of an individual return was to be tried. Members then felt themselves bound by obli- gations of honour—by a sense of justice—which had a much less binding force—when the question at issue was, whether a certain borough should or should not retain its franchise—questions of general policy mixed themselves in that case with the discussion. Take, for instance, the case of a borough in which the chief part of the constituency consisted of freemen,—suppose, in the appointment of a Committee to inquire into allegations against that borough, the chance should fall upon Members who are mainly returned by freemen,—it would be found that those Members would have a leaning towards the freemen. It was not, therefore, too much to say, that, in many instances, a Committee of this description, appointed merely by chance, would not carry with it the confidence of either House of Parliament. Supposing, then, that there were insuperable objections to the constitution of these tribunals by chance, with whom should rest the power of nomination? To vest it in the Government might be open to objection,—to vest it in the individual Member who might complain, would be equally open to objection. But there appeared to be one authority in the House upon whom the power might very properly devolve, and in whose exercise of that power implicit confidence would be placed. He thought it probable that a Committee nominated by the Chair would consist of persons who, by their freedom from party prejudice, and from all personal interest in the question at issue,—by their ability, and by their general integrity, would be most likely to command the confidence of both Houses of Parliament, and of the country in general. He should, however, propose to reserve to the House the power of controlling the power of nomination by the Chair in cases where it should think proper. He would constitute such Committee by Act of Parliament, requiring the attendance of every Member throughout the whole of the investigation, and giving them the power to examine witnesses upon oath; and he was satisfied, that a Committee so constituted, under the sanction of the House, would have more confidence reposed in its decisions, than if it were nominated by the party interested, or by the Government, or if it were selected by chance. The appointment of almost all other Select Committees was left to the Member who brought the sub- ject forward. The selection by chance applied only to Election Committees, and, for the reason he had stated, worked well enough upon the whole, in determining the right to a return. But when such important functions were to be intrusted to a Committee, as that its Report should declare whether a whole borough, or a particular class of the constituents of a borough, should or should not cease to exercise the elective franchise, it appeared to him that, if the judgment of a tribunal were to carry with them the confidence and approbation of the public, it was of the utmost importance that that tribunal should be constituted with the utmost care and discrimination. The noble Lord proposed, that the Report of the Committee should be laid before the House of Lords, and that if the two Houses should unite in an Address to the Crown, praying his Majesty to suspend the franchise of the delinquent borough; in that case, the franchise should be suspended. Now, if the House of Lords were to be expected to take the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons as the warrant for its proceedings, of what immense importance was it that that Committee should be constituted in a manner calculated to inspire confidence in its decisions. But he would advise the noble Lord to re-consider this part of his plan. The noble Lord proposed, that the Committee should report as to the prevalence of general bribery and corruption. This was extremely vague; and he would strongly urge upon the noble Lord the necessity of requiring from the Committee a minute and detailed report of all the facts that had appeared in evidence before it,—specifying, as accurately as possible, the extent to which bribery prevailed; then let the House of Commons express their opinion upon the subject, and if they affirmed this Report of the Committee, let them then send the Report of the Committee, with the sanction of their approbation in their collective capacity to the House of Lords. The House of Commons, upon questions of this kind, should originate its own course of proceeding. Whether by Bill or not, he did not pretend to say; though he certainly thought, that the House of Lords was as likely to concur in a Bill as in an Address to the Crown. The noble Lord, by his proposed plan of proceeding, required the consent of the three branches of the Legislature. Then, why not have it by a Bill, instead of introducing this novel proceeding of a joint Address to the Crown from the two Houses of Parliament. Nothing was gained by the innovation. The noble Lord contemplated no other case, than that of suspension and extinction of the franchise. But it was quite clear, that there might be instances in which a mitigated punishment would be desirable,—such as the disfranchisement of a portion of the electors, or the extension of the franchise over some adjoining district or town. This might be provided for by Bill. These details, involving so much of local detail and so little of principle, might be arranged by the enactments of a Bill; but how could they even be satisfactorily settled through the medium of Addresses to the Crown. His purpose, however, in calling the attention of the House to the measure in this stage, was to point out the necessity of having Committees appointed to investigate the allegations made against the purity of boroughs, constituted in such a manner, and named by such an authority, as should ensure to those Committees the confidence of the Legislature and of the country. He must observe, however, before he sat down, that the noble Lord admitted of an appeal. He thought appeals were generally taken advantage of by those who had a weak case. In every instance, either as related to election law, criminal law, or any other system or form of jurisprudence, the best plan was to institute, in the first instance, an effective tribunal without an appeal, rather than an inefficient tribunal with an appeal. All the money thrown into the pockets of country attorneys, connected with election matters, was worse than lost. He would advise the noble Lord, therefore, in the case of Election Committees, and in the case of complaints against the general conduct of particular boroughs, to constitute one tribunal as perfect as possible, and not to have two Committees, the one with an original jurisdiction, and the other to act as a court of review.

Lord John Russell

was very happy to hear the suggestions of the right hon. Baronet, and he certainly would give them his best consideration. He was very glad that the Right hon. Baronet had turned his attention to the subject; and he was sure that not only the right hon. Baronet, but the House in general, would see how very necessary it was to have a better plan than at present, for conducting proceedings with respect to boroughs charged with general bribery and corruption. When he stated that he would attend to the suggestions of the right hon. Baronet, he did not know that he was, at that moment, prepared to agree with him. The Committees were now appointed to try a very important right,—namely, the right of Members to sit in the House; it was one in which it was of the highest importance that the utmost impartiality should be exhibited. The right hon. Baronet said, that, in his opinion, the Committee which he had proposed would not be a fit one to investigate questions of this nature. In this respect he must be allowed to differ from the right hon. Baronet; nor could he acquiesce in the suggestions, to intrust the nomination of this Committee to the Speaker, because he could not help thinking, that the effect of so doing would be to place the Speaker in a very invidious situation. In questions of this description, it appeared to him that a degree of heat was excited, as great, if not greater, than arose on questions of general policy; in such cases, two parties were very warmly and violently engaged in contesting the right of a particular county, or a particular borough; and, therefore, they would be the more disposed to view with jealousy the nomination of a Committee by the Speaker, party feeling and irritation hurried men a long way; and it was exceedingly probable that it might be said, that the nomination by the Speaker was not altogether a fair or impartial one, and that there was a little too much leaning on one side or on the other. The dignity and station of the Chair depended, in a great degree, on the reputation in which it was held; and it would be exceedingly dangerous to suffer its character to be called into question for a single moment. The right hon. Baronet would see, that this was not an objection to the particular Committee which he proposed, but a general objection to the consequences which might ensue from the adoption of his suggestion as to the mode of its nomination. With regard to the powers of the Committee generally, he had in the Bill, adopted the provisions of the Act of 7 George 4th, relative to Election Committees, on the ground that the powers of that Act were known. The power to examine witnesses on oath, and various other powers were given under that Act; and he deemed it advisable to adopt them because they increased the security of the proceeding, although, at the same time, he need hardly say, that the Committees, as at present formed, were very imperfect. A few years ago, the right hon. Baronet, impelled, he believed, by the general sense of the House, introduced a measure, founded on very correct principles, for the purpose of putting an end to the appointment of nominees, by which one great advantage was obtained. It appeared to him, however, that the effect of adopting this suggestion would be to leave Election Committees in a very uncertain and loose state for persons who had no experience in these matters. However well disposed and honest they might be, and however impartially they might form their opinions, they might, in the end, come to a conclusion different from that at which men of longer experience, and more mature judgment, would be disposed to arrive. Certainly, great improvements might be made in the constitution of Election Committees; and he had no doubt that the suggestions of the right hon. Baronet would be of great importance towards attaining so desirable an end. He might, perhaps, mention, that the idea had struck him, whether it might not be expedient to appoint an assessor to the Chairman, who would be enabled to pronounce an opinion on all points of practice—who would possess a knowledge of the different precedents—and by whose assistance the Committees would be made much better guides to the opinion of the House than at present. The right hon. Baronet wished to give the House the power of confirming the decision of the Committee. That point was set at rest by a provision in the Bill which gave the House the power of addressing the Crown. He could not say, that he was prepared to accede to the right hon. Baronet's suggestions relative to the nomination of the Committee; at the same time, he was prepared to say, that he would consider them, and that he would endeavour to render the Bill as practically beneficial in operation as possible; always having in view a still further amendment of the Grenville Acts, by which the tribunal might become such a tribunal as the right hon. Baronet had described,—a tribunal, which would inspire the House of Lords with the confident assurance, that the subject had been fully and carefully investigated.

Sir Robert Inglis

merely wished to express a hope, that the decision of the Committees to be appointed under the Bill should be made decisive of the several matters referred to them, as he quite agreed with the right hon. Baronet in opinion with regard to the evil effects attendant upon the power of appeal. If they appointed any tribunal, it ought to be a competent one, intrusted with absolute power of decision. Of course, when he spoke in opposition to a tribunal of appeal, he did not mean to exclude the House of Commons from exercising its control over the Reports of its Committees.

Lord Althorp

thought it would be quite enough to call upon a Committtee to report the facts proved in evidence before them, as well as their opinions upon those facts, without requiring them to pronounce a binding decision. The suggestions of the right hon. member for Tamworth were, he was free to admit, worthy of consideration, and, as far as he was concerned, he promised they should receive it. He did not agree in the form of nomination recommended by the right hon. Baronet; but, at the same time, he thought it might be possible, by taking that recommendation into consideration, so to nominate the Committees that, while the evil effects of selecting them by ballot were removed, the Speaker might not be placed in the invidious situation of having the entire nomination of them intrusted to his discretion.

Mr. Tooke,

in rising to express his entire concurrence in the principle of the Bill, and his opinion that its machinery, subject to some modifications in detail, was well calculated to carry that principle into effect, begged he might be permitted, as germane to the matter, to save the time of a more formal application, to ask the noble Paymaster of the Forces whether it was his intention to bring in a Bill for amending the English Reform Act, in consequence of his pledge to that effect of last Session, and of Reports since received from the Revising Barristers? or whether he would appoint a Select Committee to consider those Reports?

Lord Althorp

replied, that a measure of the description alluded to was under the consideration of Government, but, until it was ascertained how far the Reports of the defective working of the Bill were correct—and those Reports were in a train of investigation—he could not take upon himself to say, whether or not any measure on the subject would be introduced to Parliament during the present Session.

Mr. Warburton

hoped, the noble Lord meant to lay before the House the result of the investigation to which he alluded, in order that they might be in a situation to judge how far and in what respects the Reform Bill had worked well, and in what instance it was defective.

Lord Althorp

said, he could not undertake to do so, as the inquiry was not strictly of an official character. It was solely instituted for the satisfaction of the Government, with whom would, of course, be the responsibility of introducing the measure to which the question of the hon. Member referred.

Mr. Baines

availed himself of the opportunity to state, that much difference of opinion prevailed as to whether one of the questions put to the voter applied to qualification of amount or residence. He also begged to suggest, that the practice of taking the list of the Revising Barrister as the standard by which the voters might regulate their qualification was attended with considerable difficulty and inconvenience.

Sir Robert Peel

was anxious, once more, to impress upon the attention of the noble Lord the immense importance of having the Committees, by whose decisions, not merely the return of particular elections, but the general right of voting was to be affected, selected on some more fixed principle than that of a chance ballot. With regard to the noble Lord's apprehensions of placing the Speaker in an invidious position, by calling upon him to nominate the Committees, he must say, that he thought them altogether unfounded. He put it to the noble Lord, whether any man, a Member of that House, having a Committee to appoint, and meaning to act fairly, ever found a difficulty in select- ing a competent and efficient Committee. In fact, he could not imagine any circumstances in which the nomination of the Speaker was likely to be questioned. The noble Lord had alluded to party feelings as likely to render the power he proposed intrusting to the Speaker unpleasant in its exercise to him; but, he put it to the noble Lord to say, whether it would not be better to run even that risk, than to leave the individuals who were ranged on each side the selection of the Committee by whom the question respecting which such party feeling was excited, should be decided?

The Bill was read a second time.