BRIBERY AT ELECTIONS. (Hansard, 7 August 1834)

§ Lord John Russell
rose, and said, that the Amendments which had been made by the Lords in this Bill were of so wide and extensive a character as almost to render it entirely a new measure. At the same time, he begged the House to consider the very inconvenient situation in which matters of this kind now stood: whether it was the fault of the House of Commons or Lords he would not pretend to say, but certainly the result was, that, after a very long, expensive, and vexatious inquiry with respect to the boroughs immediately in question, there seemed 1020 hardly any chance of arriving at any conclusion in which the two Houses of Parliament would agree. This inconvenience was not new, because he remembered when, some years ago, he carried up a Bill, agreed to by the Commons, to the House of Lords, with respect to Penryn, after a very long examination: their Lordships, taking a different view of the matter from that House, threw out the Bill. Feeling that inconvenience, he was disposed to concur in any proposal by which it was possible to secure an impartial tribunal, by which neither House objecting, cases of that nature could adequately be tried. The manner in which they (the Commons) proposed to effect this was by the appointment of a Select Committee of impartial men, the evidence before them being taken upon oath, and afterwards sent up to the Lords. That proposal, however, was not assented to by their Lordships; and they had proposed instead of it, a tribunal totally new in its character, consisting of a certain number (five) of their Lordships, and seven members of the House of Commons, who, together, were to form a court to try such matters. When he stated that such a tribunal was altogether new, it was necessary to observe, that a Court of the same character was provided for in an Act of Parliament respecting East-India judicature; but it had neither been constituted nor acted upon. But, although this proposal was so totally new, he did not think there were sufficient objections to the proposal in itself to prevent the House agreeing to make an experiment of such a tribunal. He observed with satisfaction, that the Lords' Amendment in this respect proposed that the Commission constituting the Court should only issue in cases where the House of Commons thought fit to address his Majesty to that effect; so that if it were found, on experiment, that the tribunal was totally unsatisfactory, the House would still maintain its perfect and undiminished right, without addressing his Majesty, to proceed, as formerly, by bill, which might afterwards be sent up to the other House. But while he did not think that a Court constituted as he had described, of seven members of that House and five of the Lords would form a bad or unfair tribunal for the trial of bribery cases, there was another change which had been proposed in the Bill, namely,—that one of the Judges should 1021 preside in that Court. Now, he owned that, even admitting some persons of legal knowledge ought to assist the deliberations of such a Court, he should have greatly wished the House of Lords had not chosen one of the Judges of the land for that purpose. So far, however, he thought they might agree to the Amendments of the House of Lords. But there were some proposals contained in the Bill to which he proposed the House should not agree. It was proposed, that the Judge should have the sole power of admitting or rejecting evidence,—a proposal which he thought must have the effect of restricting the inquiries of Parliament within improper limits, and subjecting them to rules to which they had never submitted, and which might prove extremely injurious as far as the prevention of bribery and corruption was concerned; he, therefore, proposed, that they should disagree from that Amendment; and he proposed, instead, that the Court of twelve members should decide on any question as to whether evidence should be received or rejected, and that only in cases of an equality of votes the Judge should have the power of determining. There was another proposal with respect to the Judge which he thought highly objectionable, namely,—that the Court of twelve members having come to a species of finding, the Judge should declare whether or not he was satisfied with it. He did not think that members of the highest judicial tribunals in the kingdom should be subjected to the remarks of the Judge, provided he were not satisfied with their finding. But he had a still stronger objection to that proposal. With respect to themselves, whether members of that or the other House of Parliament, acting with respect to political affairs, it was to be expected that they must submit to whatever censures or imputations might be thrown upon them by public opinion or the Press for the course of conduct which they might pursue; and it was quite fair that they should be subject to that censure; but he should very much dread the case of a Judge, who usually kept himself free from such imputations, being placed in such a situation, where public opinion should be disposed to impute political bias or partiality of conduct with respect to any of those boroughs which might come under the jurisdiction of the Court. There were some other respects in which the Lords' 1022 Amendments ought, as he considered, to be altered. Some of these were merely formal, with respect to the time of sitting and excuses to be allowed by either House of Parliament; but others were more material. The House of Lords had left out, as he conceived purposely, the clause respecting costs, which were to be paid by the Treasury. Now, he thought, if a Select Committee were appointed, the House finding that there was ground for the allegations, and the parties having gone to the expense of inquiry, there being a sufficient case for proceeding against a borough, it would not be right that those who made the complaint should be subject to the further expense of inquiry; and therefore, whenever the Commission should be issued, the expense of prosecuting a petition should be defrayed by the Treasury, in the same manner as the Bill originally proposed with respect to the Committee. There was another Amendment with respect to a clause which, although it had not been altogether introduced, was very much added to—he alluded to the inquiries now going on before Parliament with regard to Carrickfergus, Liverpool, and Stafford. The clause to which he alluded only mentioned inquiries with respect to bribery at the last election. Now he thought that there should be no inquiry, unless a ground for it were made with reference to the last election; but an inquiry having been granted, it should, he thought, be allowed to extend further back. The House would clearly understand the ground upon which he put this, when he referred to the gross, notorious, and scandalous corruption which had taken place at former elections in Liverpool, and which they would agree with him in thinking should be comprised within the jurisdiction of the Court. He had therefore to propose, that instead of limiting the inquiry to the last election, it should be extended to the last and previous elections. He certainly felt the difficulty that there was in proposing that the House should agree to such extensive alterations; but at the same time he felt seriously the evils and inconvenience of the present state of things with respect to inquiries as to boroughs charged with bribery and corruption; and the public either did now, or very soon would, feel, how unjust it was to impose on men the burthen of extensive inquiries without leading to any 1023 useful or good result; it was for that reason that he wished the House to try the experiment of this Court; it being still within the power of the House of Commons, by refraining from addressing the Crown, and leaving the whole commission aside, either to proceed in the former method, or propose some new Bill for the purpose of trying any particular case. He really believed, however, that those Amendments had been made in a spirit of fairness, with the view, if possible, of obtaining some tribunal in which all parties should agree, and avoiding that conflict which manifestly subsisted between the manner of receiving evidence in the two Houses of Parliament; that which obtained in the House of Commons being by some considered too slight and hasty, and their Lordships' practice in that respect being thought by them (the Commons) a great deal too restricted and uselessly protracted. He regretted much that the House should be called upon at that late period of the Session to deal with so important a subject, but upon the whole he thought it as well that they should proceed to the further consideration of the Lords' Amendments to this Bill. The noble Lord concluded by moving that the Amendments be read a first time.

§ Mr. Warburton
agreed with the noble Lord in thinking that the Amendments made in this Bill were perfectly new, and it was perfectly necessary that they should have an opportunity of solemnly and deliberately considering them. It was clear, that if any justice was to be done to the public, if an opportunity was to be afforded of disfranchising a borough in which bribery prevailed, some new mode of conducting the process had become absolutely necessary. He considered, however, if those Amendments were agreed to, they must abandon not only all hope, but the very possibility of succeeding in such an attempt. He hoped, therefore, the noble Lord would not press the Motion at the present period of the Session. They could not consider deliberately the propositions which had been brought forward without going into Committee, and going through all the stages of a new measure. He would, therefore, with the noble Lord's leave, move that the Amendments be taken into further consideration that day six months.

Mr. O'Connell
seconded the Amendment. At so late a period of the Session it was utterly impossible duly to consider so extensive a change in one of the most important constitutional tribunals of the country. It appeared to him to be extremely objectionable to allow the House of Lords to have anything to do in the first instance with the determination of what cases of alleged bribery in the election of Members of the House of Commons should be proceeded with. That decision should be exclusively retained by the House of Commons, and no communication upon the subject ought to be made to the other House until that House had arrived at a judgment upon the point. They ought no more to allow the House of Lords to have anything to do with originating a measure referring to the election of a member of the House of Commons, than they would allow the House of Lords to have anything to do with originating a pecuniary measure. He did not think that the tribunal proposed by the House of Lords was a good one. The proposition went to suppose that seven Members of the House of Commons, and five Members of the Lords could act together cordially on such a subject. Now, recollecting the proceedings on the Reform Bill, and recollecting the efforts which were then made, and made ineffectually, to get rid of the intermeddling of Peers at the elections of members of the House of Commons, he was at a loss to understand the kind of logic which would admit Peers to be members of a Court in the first instance to sit upon such subjects. At any rate it was a point of great importance, and ought to stand over until it could be deliberately considered. To the appointment of the judge of one of the Courts of Record to preside over the proposed tribunal, he had a great objection. He did not wish to see a Judge mingling legislative with his judicial functions. And with respect to evidence, a Judge would have his legal notions constantly outraged by having that kind of evidence brought before him to prove cases of bribery at elections which he would not listen to in one of the Courts of Westminster Hall. When it was also considered that a Judge so placed would have to enter into all the bustle and turbulence of a Committee-room, and would be subjected to the influence of all the bad passions of a 1025 contested election, he put it to the House whether it would be right to drag the pure ermine of the judicial robe through so much filth? They were now in the mouth of August; it would be much better to wait till February; and the noble Lord might then come forward with some matured proposition on the subject. If such a tribunal as that proposed by the House of Lords were established, it might prove wholly inoperative. By Mr. Pitt's India Bill a similar tribunal was instituted for the trial of offenders in India. That tribunal had existed for above forty years, during which time there had certainly been many offenders, but not a single trial by that tribunal had taken place. He hoped, therefore, the noble Lord would relinquish all further proceedings this Session.

§ Mr. Hardy
thought it would really be a matter of much importance to get rid of the long, tedious, and expensive investigations before the other House of Parliament antecedently to the disfranchisement of any borough. In his opinion, the suggestion which had been made, that so far as evidence was concerned, the decisions of the Legislature ought to be founded upon the Report of a Jury composed of five Peers and seven Commoners assisted by a Judge, was a suggestion well worthy the serious consideration of the House. After the best reflection which he could bestow upon the subject, he felt disposed to support the Amendment, and hoped that the noble Lord opposite would not press the Bill.

§ Lord John Russell
did not conceive that the objection to the Bill founded upon the length and general character of the investigations before the Lords was at all conclusive against the measure. Hon. Members must be aware that no Bill could be passed without an inquiry if the Lords insisted upon it, and he did not see how that practice could be done away with. However, he believed the feeling then prevailing in that House was adverse to such a measure, that they were not prepared for so great a change, whatever might be its merits or demerits; for the present, therefore, he would not press forward the Bill.