HC Deb 16 August 1831 vol 6 cc101-10
Colonel Evans

said, that he had at all times experienced the indulgence of the House when he felt it necessary to deliver his sentiments, and he trusted that the same kindness would be extended to him now, when he was about to bring under its consideration, a Motion relative to neutral Powers, in so far as their conduct affected Poland. Since the Session of 1830, war had been raging in Poland, but not one word had been said on the subject in Parliament from that time to the present. He knew perfectly well, that there were many individuals in that House who were capable of introducing this question in a much more able manner than he could: but as no person had stood forward to bring it under the consideration of Parliament, he felt himself, weak as his abilities might be, justified in taking it up. He was the more especially induced to do so, because this was not a party question, but one on which he believed all persons in that House very nearly coincided in opinion. Every one must see the great importance of this question, which concerned the neutrality of those States that were on the borders of Poland. It appeared to him, from the information which he had received, that the passports granted in this country to individuals wishing to proceed to Poland, had not been treated by Prussia with that respect which they ought to command. Merchandize sent out from England had been stopped by the Prussians in transitu. He collected from a public paper an answer of a most extraordinary nature, which had been given by Prussia to a strong representation made to that government on the subject of its conduct towards Poland. The authorities said, that Prussia was not in a state of neutrality with Poland, but merely in a state of inactivity, and they wished that their good Ally, the Emperor of Russia might triumph over the Poles. They declared, that the principles on which the Polish Revolution was founded, were exceedingly dangerous; and they expressed their fears, that unless the Emperor of Russia, triumphed in this cause, Prussia would lose Posen, and her other Polish provinces. What he was about to state, would not, he believed, afford much information to many Gentlemen in that House; but he had reason to suppose, that the right of Poland to claim at least neutrality from the neighbouring Powers was not generally understood on the Continent of Europe. The rights of the Poles were not only rights to neutrality but rights of the most sacred and special character. Without going into the nature of those original rights which might be made out in favour of Poland, he would proceed at once to those immediate rights which were secured to the Poles by Treaties entered into at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In 1815, the Minister of England mentioned at that Congress the necessity and propriety of reconstructing the Polish kingdom—that kingdom which had been dismembered, first in 1772, and subsequently in 1795. The grounds on which this doctrine was initiated, and enforced, by the English Minister, were—first, claims and considerations of justice on the part of the Poles, and, secondly, the necessity of interposing a barrier between Russia and the Western States of Europe. It was greatly to the honour and credit of the Minister of England, that he strenuously and perseveringly urged this doctrine at the Congress of Vienna, demanding, on behalf of England, that Poland should be re-established, with all that had belonged to her, under a distinct dynasty of her own, as indispensably necessary for the safety of Europe, in erecting a barrier against Russia, and in maintaining the balance of power, and the principles of public law. And let him observe, that the "balance of power," or the "political equilibrium," of Europe, did not mean any equality of power or of territory—did not mean a balance of the numerical strength and resources of the different States, but an equality of rights and station in the political society of Europe. The object of the doctrine of the balance of power was, to secure the weaker against the more powerful States, in the peaceable enjoyment of all that the weaker States held by a just title; it was purely a defensive, a preservative system; it did not affect to put an end to all wars, but was directed against the usurpation of conquerors and the encroaching ambition of powerful States; holding it as a principle, that no one State should obtain a preponderance which might be dangerous to the liberties of others, and bid defiance to the united efforts of others. This doctrine, as he had already observed, partially influenced Lord Castlereagh in the arrangements which he advocated in favour of Poland at the Congress of Vienna. The views of Lord Castlereagh with respect to Poland were supported in the Congress by Austria and by Prussia. The Emperor of Austria even declared, that far from consenting to the union of the Duchy of Warsaw with Russia, he was disposed to make some sacrifice of his own possessions, for the sake of the entire re-establishment of Poland as an independent kingdom. Prince Talleyrand, too, on the part of France, expressed himself thus, in a note to Prince Metternich, dated Dec. 19th, 1814:—"Of all the questions to be discussed at this Congress, the King would undoubtedly consider the affair of Poland as incomparably the most important to the interests of Europe,"—adding, "the partition which destroyed its existence as a nation was the prelude, in some measure the cause, perhaps—even to a certain degree an apology—for the subsequent commotions to which Europe was exposed." The Emperor Alexander, however, opposed the re-establishment of Poland as a nation under a dynasty of its own, and would consent to no arrangements in regard to Poland, of which the annexation of it to Russia did not form a part. As the troops of Russia were at this period in possession of Poland, the three Powers who were anxious for the re-establishment of Poland as an independent nation, did not consider it safe to urge their proposition beyond a certain point. In consequence, however, of the pressing instances of the three Powers, a free Constitution and the Nationality of Poland were conceded by Russia, but only upon condition, that Poland should be annexed to the Russian dominions. The 1st article of the Treaty of Vienna was this:—"The Duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of those provinces and districts which are otherwise disposed of by the following articles, is united to Russia. It shall be irrevocably bound to the Russian empire by its Constitution." He entreated the House to observe the expression—"shall be irrevocably bound to the Russian empire by its constitution." This condition was reiterated in various treaties, official documents, and diplomatic notes, from one of which the following passage, which alluded to that constitution, was extracted:—"His royal highness the Prince Regent would then no longer have fear that any danger to the liberty of Europe should result from the union of Poland with the Russian empire, already so powerful—a danger which would not be imaginary if the military force of the two countries should ever be united under the command of an ambitious and warlike monarch." The constitution, then, of Poland was to be its bond of union with the Russian empire; and let him now, therefore, read to the House one or two of the articles of the charter which gave that constitution. The second article was this,—"The civil and political relations in which we place it (Poland), and the bond by which this union is to be secured, are determined by the charter which we now grant." The ninth article was this—"In every instance in which Russian troops may be introduced into Poland, or Polish troops into Russia, or in the event of the passage of these troops through any province of either of these kingdoms, the support of such troops, and the expenses attendant upon their journey, shall rest entirely with the nation to which they belong. The Polish army shall never be employed out of Europe." This, as well as many other articles of the charter, proved clearly, that there existed no ground for maintaining that the annexation of Poland to Russia was an incorporation of Poland with the Russian empire. Other articles of the charter provided for the liberty of the press—gave publicity to the proceedings of the diet—declared that no person should be arrested, except according to the forms of and in the cases determined by the laws; and farther, that no taxes should be levied except by the authority of the Diet. Now this charter was guaranteed by all the Powers who constituted the Congress of Vienna. All the stipulations of it were expressly declared to be obligatory upon Russia, not only so far as they regarded the Poles, but with reference also to the other contracting Powers, who had desisted from the re-establishment of Poland upon these conditions. Such was the charter, and such the guarantee for the fulfilment of the conditions of the charter. He need hardly, perhaps, state, what was so universally known, that these conditions had been most flagitiously violated in every respect. They had been observed only for the first two or three years which immediately succeeded the Congress of Vienna. The freedom of the press was at an end; for the fifteen years during which the kingdom had subsisted, not a single budget had been submitted to the Diet; but every thing relative to the subject of taxation had been done arbitrarily, and by royal decrees; and, in a word, the charter was no more regarded than if it had been a piece of waste paper. Personal liberty, under such a condition of circumstances, was, of course, quite out of the question. The gaols had been filled with Poles who had been arrested, almost without pretext, and certainly without the shadow of law. The consequence of these arbitrary proceedings on the part of the Russian autocrat had been the appeal to arms, which the Poles were now so gloriously maintaining against their oppressors. He would not detain the House by detailing the particular circumstances which had provoked and led to this open revolt on the part of the Poles against the tyrannical dominion of Russia. He thought he had slated sufficient to demonstrate to the House, that the Poles had sacred and unalienable rights which demanded the protection of the public law of Europe. Before he concluded, he could not help adverting to the general conduct of the Russian government. There had doubtless been many exaggerations as to the views and the capabilities of this formidable and half-civilized Power; but it was impossible for any observing man, who considered the history of Russia for the last century, not to be struck with the fact that Russia, during that period, had never concluded a single war without acquiring an accession of empire. Each of these successive aggrandizements became more marked than the preceding ones; but when they arrived at the conclusion of the war in 1814, and 1815, they saw, in the conduct of Russia, indications of the most ambitious appetite, and a successful exercise of the most arbitrary power, that ever threatened other states. At that time the Russian autocrat did not hesitate to declare, that he had 480,000 men ready to move, and that he would not give up the hold he had upon the Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon, in the zenith of his success, had never pursued a more daring or a more unjust course. Again, when Austria evinced a disposition to accede to the wishes of the Italian States, who was it that induced Austria to have recourse to the force of arms instead of to just and conciliatory measures? It was the emperor of Russia: and it was he also who had compelled the French King to send an army into Spain to put down the liberal party in that country. And thus it was, that a semi-barbarous despot had been allowed to influence the affairs of civilized States. He observed, that the present Prime Minister of France, in his published speech, was made to profess a peaceful system of policy, and to say, that the French Government would do all in their power to preserve the peace of Europe undisturbed. This, however, was the language of fallacy. The French Minister could not preserve that which did not exist. The French Minister could not preserve that entire which was already broken. Europe was not in a state of peace, and could not be in a state of peace while the war in Poland continued,—while the Powers of Europe allowed the continuance of that war, which was an outrage and an insult upon all the great potentates who, by their representatives at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, guaranteed the national independence of Poland, upon certain and defined conditions, each of which had been violated. If Russia were successful in the struggle, and Poland were subdued, that country would be garrisoned, not as heretofore, by Polish troops, but by a Russian army. This work effected, it would not be difficult to foretel whither Russia would next direct her encroaching steps. The doctrine of the French Prime Minister, therefore, was a fallacious one, and the fallacy of the French policy must continue while the war between Poland and Russia was suffered to continue. While he was on this subject, he might be allowed, perhaps, to make an observation upon the speech of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. That Minister was reported to have said,—"Look at the map, and see if it be possible that we can assist Poland." Now this appeared to him to be bad in argument, and to betray a sad want of recollection. The French Minister might have remembered that, be the distance between France and Poland what it might, the armies of France and of Russia had traversed it two or three times within the last twenty years. He would say further, that this speech of the French Minister, if correctly reported in the newspapers, (and it was there that he had read it), was not justifiable—that it contained an important disclosure of the policy of France, which might be highly detrimental to the interests of Europe, and which, although it might furnish a temporary defence for the French Administration, furnished that defence at the expense of their country. He trusted, however, that the French people would recollect, that the same sword which was now reeking with Polish blood, would have been brandished by the despotic barbarians of Russia upon the frontiers of France, for the purpose of putting down the revolution of July, if it had not been for the energy and promptitude which characterized the revolt of the French people against their domestic tyranny. He had now but to add a few words with regard to the conduct of Prussia in this struggle between Poland and Russia. He had not rested his views of this subject upon the statements which had appeared in the newspapers, many of which, however, seemed to be well authenticated, but, as a military man he had been convinced, for the last two months, that the resources of the Russian army must have been derived from some neutral Power. The Russian army had crossed the Vistula; their rear was on Prussia; and for some time their communication with Russia had been cut off. No army, so situated, could have maintained the position which the Russian army had so long maintained, without having derived resources from the neutral power. The hon. and gallant Member concluded by moving, as an amendment upon the motion before the House, "That an humble Address be presented to his Majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before the House as early as pending negotiations would admit, information showing how far neutrality may have been observed or violated in the present war by the States bordering on Poland, particularly Prussia, whether in reference to those bodies of troops, that may have taken refuge or passed within neutral frontiers, to supplies of provisions of arms, of munitions, or aid of any kind, or in respect to the free passage of, or obstructions to the passage of merchandize, to and from the territories of the kingdom of Poland."

Mr. Dominick Browne

seconded the amendment.

Viscount Palmerston

said, that he could not concur in the Motion, and did not intend to follow the hon. and gallant Member through the discussion into which he had entered, of the various transactions within the last few months connected with the unfortunate war between Russia and Poland. He was sure that the House would believe, that the Ministers of this country could not have witnessed that contest without the deepest regret, and that it would be most satisfactory to them to see it terminated. At the same time he was convinced the House would feel that, if he entered into a discussion of the merits of the cause of the two parties—of the circumstances out of which the war had arisen—of the conduct of other nations in reference to that contest—he should be widely departing from that line which it was his duty as a Minister of the Crown to observe. The Motion in its present form did not require the production of papers: the fitness of laying them before Parliament was made to depend upon a contingency, and he suggested to the hon. and gallant Member, that he might wait until the period arrived when the documents could be produced without injury to pending negotiations. He trusted, that the House and the hon. and gallant Member would not think, that he was wanting in respect to either, if, without going into details, he simply entreated that the Motion should be negatived, without requiring him to enter at all into the question.

Mr. Hume

was unwilling to prolong the discussion unnecessarily, but he trusted that the noble Lord would not refuse to satisfy the just expectations of those who took a strong interest in the war between Poland and Russia. The noble Lord would not deny, that the five great Powers at the Congress of Vienna (always ready enough to maintain other engagements) bound themselves by treaty to maintain the rights and privileges of the Poles. The Poles were placed under the protection of the States of Europe, and on that ground the British Government ought to show that they had a disposition at least to consider their claims. He (Mr. Hume) was sorry that this country had been a party to the stipulations at the Congress of Vienna; but as Ministers had taken such a Strong interest in the affairs of Holland and Belgium, it became them to take care that the liberty of the Poles was equally secured. He did not require the noble Lord to disclose anything that would interfere with the success of measures in progress, and he was willing to believe the British Cabinet had adopted such as were consistent with the dignity of this country; but he hoped that the noble Lord would declare his intention to maintain the treaties negociated by Lord Castlereagh in 1815. The proceedings of that noble Lord on that occasion did him more honour than perhaps any other act of his life. To him the Poles were mainly indebted for the stipulations to secure them a constitution distinct from that of Russia. He had expected, that the noble Lord would have admitted the rights of the Poles, and that they were entitled at our hands to as much justice as we had endeavoured to secure for Belgium or Holland. He had, therefore, heard with great regret the meagre, or rather the no answer of the noble Lord. He was sorry that more had not been said; and he was sure that what had fallen from the noble Lord did not shew, that the honour and character of England in respect of Poland were unsullied. He thought we were at least bound to insist on the execution of the Treaty of Vienna. He begged to enter his protest against such partiality as the British Government seemed disposed to show in protecting Belgium and resigning Poland to its fate. A nation nobly struggling for its liberties was entitled to all the benefit which latitude of construction could give, and the weight and influence of Great Britain ought to have been thrown into the scale of suffering Poland. As far as had come to his knowledge, not one of the great Powers had shown the least sympathy, or had taken any measures for maintaining good faith towards Poland. No person could be less anxious than he was to drive Ministers into a war, but they ought to interfere for the Poles as well as for the Dutch and Belgians.

Viscount Palmerston

hoped that nothing he had said, and nothing he had omitted to say, would lead any man to suppose that the British Government had forgotten any obligations imposed upon it by treaties, or that it was not prepared to fulfil those treaties.

Mr. Dominick Browne

said, that he had fell the utmost indignation at the apathy with which the House had listened to the statement and motion of the hon. and gallant Member. He had hoped to have witnessed more sympathy in favour of the Poles than the House had displayed, and he must say, that he felt grieved for the honour of his country. He was not accustomed to act in concert with the hon. and gallant Member, and he should not have seconded the proposition had any other Member come forward. He had full confidence in the Administration of Earl Grey, the friend and disciple of Charles James Fox, the champion of liberty all over the world; and he hoped that justice would be done to the unhappy and oppressed Poles. He had seconded the Motion, because he wished the subject should be noticed, and he might, therefore, perhaps be allowed to express a wish, that the hon. and gallant Member would withdraw his motion and not press it to a division.

Colonel Evans

was proceeding to remark that he had done his duty, however the House might think fit to neglect its duty, when he was called to order by

The Speaker,

who remarked, that the hon. and gallant Member was doubly out of order—first, because he had not confined himself to explanation; and secondly, because he had no right to say that the rest of the House did not do its duty.

Mr. O'Connell

was of opinion, that this was not the precise moment when a question of such a kind could be properly introduced. He believed, however, that the sentiment in favour of a gallant and struggling people was warm and general: it was the anxious desire of all, that they should be able to destroy the foul and grinding despotism to which they had been too long subject. For his part, he devoutly hoped, that the Poles would triumph over their enemies.

Colonel Evans

was only about to say, when he was interrupted, that the apathy of the House might possibly arise from the cold and feeble manner in which he had brought forward the subject.

Amendment negatived.