§ On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the debate was resumed upon the Amendment made, on the 3rd of June, to the motion, "That leave be given to bring in a Bill to restrain the negotiation within England of Promissory Notes and Inland Bills of Exchange, under a limited sum, issued by Bankers or others in Scotland or Ireland:"—which Amendment was to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words, "a Select Committee be appointed, to inquire into the State of the Circulation in Promissory Notes under the value of 5l. in England, and to report their observations and opinion thereupon to the House, with reference to the expediency of making any alteration in the Laws now in force relating thereto," instead thereof.
Mr. Davenportsaid, that the question, as stated, seemed simply to him—whether the public should or should not be compelled to pay their publick and private debts in a currency of higher value than that in which they had contracted them. It was a question between the payers of taxes and the receivers of them. He had himself no trading connexion with the issue of paper in question; but he thought its continuance essential to the well-being of the country. His hon. friend, (the member for Radnorshire) was a political economist. He should like to hear that hon. member explain how it was, that there were at the same time masses of capital lying idle in the country, and millions of people out of employment?—How was it that the labourer was in rags, or naked, and the loom silent, because no market for its products could be found? The solution was, that a link in the great chain of national prosperity was wanting—the link of credit. The country banker, who formed that link, was almost wholly driven out and destroyed. The currency in circulation, he maintained, was not sufficient for the purposes of trade; and he was sur- 1055 prised to hear the chancellor of the Exchequer state, that the money circulation amounted to 65,000,000l. It might be, that there were twenty-two millions of sovereigns coined; but it did not appear how many of these were melted down, how many exported, and how many of them had found their way, as he believed many of them had, to the bottom of strong boxes, awaiting an opportunity of being advantageously employed. An argument, ad captandum, had been made use of to depreciate the advantages of country banks; namely, the insecurity that arose from their failure; but their failure was not an event of every day occurrence: the panic of 1825 was not, it was to be hoped, to be expected frequently. Besides, he denied that the lower orders suffered severely from those failures. He knew an instance which proved this. In his own neighbourhood, a bank had failed for 40,000l,; he made inquiry as to the extent of suffering which that failure had brought upon his neighbourhood, and the result of the inquiry was, that the poorer classes had sustained no injury from the failure: the truth was, that this class had seldom 20s. to spare from their wants. This bank afterwards paid 18s. in the pound. The hon. gentleman next adverted to the act of 1819, usually called Mr. Peel's act; which, acquitting the right hon. gentleman, as he sincerely did, of evil intention, had had the effect of bringing more of suffering and misery upon the country than any acts that had been passed by any ten ministers who ever sat in that House. Whilst he acquitted the right hon. gentleman of any evil Intention, he regretted that, when he saw the evil consequences of his measure, he did not lend a hand to remedy them. The hon. member then adverted to the increase which had taken place in the salaries of ministers some years back, in consequence of the depreciation of the currency, and observed, that though that depreciation had ceased nine years ago, the increased salaries still remained. When he had mentioned this last year, the right hon. member for Liverpool, had asked, whether he thought ministers were too well paid? He had not meant to say they were, but he thought they ought to have put the increase on the right ground—that such increase was necessary, not merely in consequence of an alleged depreciation in the currency. It had been urged as an objection to the proposed inquiry, that it would 1056 disturb the public mind; but what was this public mind which they should be so much afraid of disturbing, as to allow it to stand in the way of the public interest? Was it any thing connected with the price of stocks, or with stock-jobbing? But, whatever it was, he thought it ought not to stand in the way of an important inquiry. But the right hon. member who used this argument had said nothing about the contradictions in his own avowed opinions upon this subject at different intervals.—The chancellor of the Exchequer had argued the question on the ground of expediency. He (Mr. D.) would argue it on that of justice, and would contend, that the course about to be pursued by government, would be a direct infraction of the pledge given in 1822, that the public should be allowed the power of paying their taxes in a cheap currency, until the year 1833. He would not deny the right of government to oppose the circulation of a particular kind of currency; on the ground that it would be mischievous in its effects;—but, in the present case, to call for support to the course they took, they should establish two conditions: first, they should prove that the present paper, circulation was injurious, by positive evidence, not by the assertions of this or that member of the ministry. The second condition was, that they were bound to give an equivalent for the currency they proposed to subtract. Neither of these conditions did they offer. They only spoke of the impediments in the way of inquiry as far as it related to England. But those impediments were not heard of in I the case of Scotland, and for live and I forty substantial reasons. He did not blame the members of that country for attending to what they considered their own interests. In that respect they were certainly more united than the English members; but he warned the right hon. gentleman not to calculate upon the same support, in any measure opposed to those interests; for if he should venture to cross to the north bank of the Tweed, with such a measure as this in his hand, he would find the whole of those members opposed to him with fixed bayonets, and himself and his bill would soon be at the bottom of the river. If a committee were appointed, it would be found that the one-pound notes were not the cause of the late panic, but the ministers themselves, by their neglect of the state of the ex- 1057 changes. They had encouraged that spirit of speculation, of the effects of which they since complained. He contended, that ministers could not give a fair equivalent for the notes they withdrew from circulation; for a sovereign in gold was not a fair equivalent for the cheap and easily borrowed one-pound note; and also that it would be injustice to those who were burthened with 800,000,000l. of debt, contracted in a cheap currency, to say, that the taxes to pay the interest of that debt should not be in a similar currency. In conclusion, he expressed his satisfaction at finding that the extract from Mr. Locke, which his hon. friend had read the other evening, and which he himself had introduced last year, should have been received with so much satisfaction by the House. It would be his turn to read it next, and he hoped when it was read the third time, it would be with still greater effect.
Mr. Denisondeclared, that upon the best consideration he could give the subject, he felt himself bound to vote against the proposition of the hon. member for Carlisle. As the Bank restriction of 1797 had been alluded to, and as he was one of the few members then in the House who had participated in the discussions on that measure, he hoped he should be excused if be said something respecting it. When that measure was proposed, the objection that had been made to it was, that if an extensive issue of paper were carried into effect, it must necessarily depreciate the standard of our currency. That anticipation had been verified by the event. The standard had been silently and gradually depreciated. It had been in vain contended, that all bad governments, from the time of the French committee of Public Safety back to the reign of Louis the 14th, and up to the Roman republic after the first Punic war, had adopted similar expedients. The arguments which he and others had used against the measure were of no avail; for an immense majority were in favour of it. It was carried; and it led to results glorious, no doubt, to our arms, but ruinous to our finances. He regretted much, that when the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Peel) and others were endeavouring to find a remedy for the system in 1819, they had not resorted, when they found the currency so depreciated, to that of altering the standard. Such a measure would have prevented the ruin of the farmer, the tradesman, and the artisan; 1058 or at least it would have diminished the pressure upon them. The cause of all the evils we had endured, was the fatal policy of contracting a large debt in one description of currency, and trying to pay it in another. He might be asked why, if he felt this so strongly, if he was so convinced of the expediency of altering the standard—he had not himself brought forward such a proposition? The truth was, that the question was one of such difficulty, that he might well be pardoned for having shrunk from it. But it was well known to many hon. members, that his hon. friend, the late member for Coventry (Mr. Ellice) and himself had, in 1819, bestowed great attention on the subject, with a reference to bringing it under the consideration of the House; but they had found it a matter of such difficulty that they shrunk from it; and also that they could not agree with respect to the exact proposition which it would be expedient to make with reference to the change in the standard. He had been of opinion that 4l. 10s. or 4l. 15s. would be a fair standard to propose; while his hon. friend, the member for Coventry, thought, with a noble lord in the other House, that 5l. 5s. or 5l. 10s. would be preferable. The current however, appeared to run so strong, against either proposition, that it had been abandoned.—His reason for opposing the committee proposed by the hon. member for Carlisle was, that if such a committee were granted, it could come only to one of three determinations; first, that we should continue to go on as we were going on at present; secondly, that we should go back to a paper circulation; thirdly, that we should alter the standard. It was impossible now to think of altering the standard. To go back lo a paper circulation would be equally dangerous. We had struggled through our difficulties, and had almost got to the last of them. It was proved, that, at most, there were not three millions of small notes in circulation. Now really he could not think that the gradual withdrawing of those notes from circulation could be productive of any alarming consequences. If, however, a fresh paper currency were issued, what must be the inevitable consequence? To raise prices, and to drive all the gold out of the country. In that case, on the very first panic, arising either from civil commotion or from the apprehension of foreign war, recourse must be had to another Bank 1059 restriction; we should have a large paper circulation, not founded on a gold currency, and should have again to undergo the evils through which we had nearly struggled. The disposition of the country banks to issue small notes had been greatly exaggerated. He was acquainted with several country bankers in the north of England, and he knew that they considered it dangerous to issue one-pound notes to any great extent; because, in the event of a panic, such an issue compelled them to sell out of the funds at any sacrifice, to support their credit. In fact, some of them had, under such circumstances, sustained losses to an amount which he would not mention. He was persuaded that the only course which ought to be adopted was, to persevere in our present system. Any departure there from would involve the country in confusion. He was aware that there still existed considerable distress; but he was persuaded that the only way in which that distress could be alleviated was, to take every possible means of diminishing the public burthens.
§ Mr. Leslie Fosterasked, what it was they were called on to do? To find two millions and a half of gold circulation. He denied that they were called on to contract the currency. Whatever might be the present amount of our circulating medium, be it sixty-five millions or more, all that was requisite was, in particular districts, to find, for the small notes to be withdrawn, a compensating quantity of gold circulation, aided by notes of a higher value. We already possessed a gold circulation of two-and-twenty millions. Notwithstanding the mystery which had been thrown over the subject, there were data to prove that such was the fact. This mystery had originated only since February, 1826. Before that period, we knew accurately how much gold was coined in the country, and how much was exported. If the House would refer to the statements of lord Liverpool, and the then chancellor of the Exchequer, they would find that, up to the period he had mentioned, the new gold which had been coined and issued, amounted to twenty-five millions. Of that amount it was calculated that seven millions had been exported, leaving eighteen millions in the country. It appeared, however, by the Custom-house accounts, that one million of the gold so exported had return- 1060 ed, making the amount nineteen millions. From that sum the only deductions were, the money carried in the pockets of the persons who visited the continent, and the money employed in smuggling; which was estimated by some at two, and by others at three, millions. So that, according to one calculation, the gold circulation at that period was seventeen millions; according to the other, sixteen. Now, it was well known, that in consequence of the favourable rate of exchange, an immense importation of gold bullion had taken place in 1826. The Mint was occupied in coining throughout that year; and the amount thus coined he understood was five millions. Now, if that was true, we had the 22,000,000l. which the chancellor of the Exchequer had declared was the amount of our gold circulation.—He wished now to say a few words with respect to the sacrifices and trials which the country had already gone. They were of two descriptions, and ought not to be confounded. The first were the natural consequences of that contraction of our currency, which was the inevitable result of the first operation of changing a paper for a gold circulation. This was one of the severest trials which the public or which private individuals could possibly have had; and it was enhanced by the reluctance with which many persons surrendered their gold after having received it. They hoarded it for some time in their coffers; and thus the slowness of the circulation rendered it inadequate to the wants of the community; for the efficiency of a circulation consisted not in its numerical amount, but in the velocity with which it moved. This, then, he repeated, was the severest of all the trials which the country had gone through, but it was unavoidable, if we meant to retain our high rank among the nations of Europe. That trial was, however, past, not to return; for no one could suppose that the substitution of between two and three millions of gold for so much paper could be productive of any extensively disastrous results.—But there was another difficulty in the substitution of a gold for a paper circulation, which, he admitted, was in kind common to the year 1819 and to the present time; with this difference, that it was at present only nine-tenths in degree. That difficulty was the expense of finding the gold circulation. When we returned from a paper to a gold circulation, we must necessarily 1061 be at the expense of again purchasing the gold of which we had got rid in the first instance. Whatever temporary benefit was obtained by the cheapness of the paper circulation, was, of course, lost, on returning to a gold coinage. For every pound of such coinage so repossessed, we must actually part with an equivalent amount of exports, without any return. It was the price which we were compelled to pay for the privilege of employing gold in our circulation instead of paper. He contemplated not only the convertibility, but the actual conversion, of the paper into a metallic currency. This would not depend so much upon any amount of treasure as upon the habitual consumption of the country. It would not depend upon any magic of the banking system, nor upon the hoarding up of gold. Such a notion was analogous to the old idea of providing food for the nation in distressed times, by establishing granaries and stores of provisions; but it was found that the best provision was in the habitual consumption of the country. The effect would be the same with respect to gold; for which they must not depend so much upon the Bank keeping stores of it in their coffers, as upon the habitual and extensive consumption or use of it throughout the nation. This would not only supply the gold wanted, but would also necessarily diminish the paper, and thereby have a double operation. When hon. gentlemen talked of this one-pound note circulation being a stimulus and facility to commerce, they should recollect how small a portion of those engaged in commerce or manufacturing pursuits had had recourse to it. This small paper was not found in London, Liverpool, Manchester, nor in any part of Lancashire; and therefore the aid which it afforded to manufactures and commerce could be but inconsiderable. He was sensible that, of the circulating medium of 65,000,000l., 34,000,000l. was in paper; but if the proportion was to be destroyed, where was the line of safety to be drawn? They could not have a paper and a gold circulation at the same place. Lancashire must either give a lesson to Northumberland, or follow her example of having a paper currency. But there was no general safety but in the total extirpation of the first, which might otherwise take possession of the soil which was at present free from its encroachment. If they would complete the great national work 1062 which they had undertaken, they should show to the enemies abroad, and to the enemies within their own bosom, that England was able to resume the circulation of gold for every purpose she ever contemplated. He did not think, because this circulation was stopped in England, it followed that it ought to be stopped either in Ireland or Scotland. He would deny that any such analogy existed between the three countries. England was rich, and the small part of her circulation which consisted of this species of currency rendered her a proper country for the trial of the experiment.—Scotland was less wealthy.—Ireland was poor; and almost the whole of her circulation was in small notes. He did not know the exact amount of the one-pound notes in circulation in Ireland; but this he knew, that the proportion was prodigiously greater than in England. It was not proper to call upon Ireland to make so much greater a sacrifice than England. This observation also applied to Scotland. This latter country had gone on for a longtime under the one-pound note system, without any risk. It was impossible, however, for Scotland or Ireland not to see the necessity of ultimately resorting to a permanent system, which would exclude the circulation of the small notes; and he hoped that that period would soon arrive with respect to Ireland. If the abolition of small notes succeeded in England, it would be time enough to try the measure in Ireland. It was not required to make a new law by the present measure; but only to give full operation to a system which had already been adopted.
§ Sir J. Wrottesleysaid, he was at a loss to know on what grounds the hon. member could pronounce a measure to be so beneficial to England, and then argue that it ought not to be extended to Ireland and Scotland. He might be a good authority upon the affairs of Ireland, but he took too much upon himself when he pretended to pronounce the time at which the notes might, with propriety, be withdrawn from Scotland. He should give his vote under the impression for the continuance of the one-pound notes in circulation. Were a committee granted, the question of depreciation should not be discussed. Had he been in the House in 1819, he should certainly have wished for a higher standard than was at that time adopted, and by which a great deal of inconvenience would 1063 have been saved to the country; but he would not depart from the pledge then given to the country, unless some extraordinary circumstances of distress should render it expedient to do so. He could state on the part of the Bank, that nothing would give them greater pain than a recurrence to a circulation of one-pound notes; more especially now that the public securities were at so low a price. The same feeling existed in four-fifths of the English counties; and so far from having any wish to issue one-pound notes, at the two meetings held upon the subject, the point was not even allowed to be discussed. The Master of the Mint would do him the justice to say, that, as the organ of those meetings, he was adverse to the circulation of such notes, and he had only felt himself bound in duty, as the representative of a manufacturing interest, to advocate in parliament a contrary measure. If the one-pound notes were to be withdrawn from circulation, a time never did exist at which it could be done with so much propriety as the present. He thought that, if the country bankers were to be restrained from circulating- notes under five pounds in value, the Bank of England ought to be prevented circulating any smaller than ten pounds. Although he would allow that the amount of one-pound notes in circulation was not very large in comparison with the general circulation of the kingdom, yet he was convinced that they were extensively diffused amongst the manufacturing part of the population; and the withdrawing of them would, in some districts, be attended with considerable inconvenience. The chancellor of the Exchequer had stated, that the total circulating medium of the kingdom amounted to sixty-five millions; but in making this estimate he had omitted the circulation of all bills of exchange, and promissory notes of every description. These bills of exchange and country bank notes could not amount to less than twelve millions. To this must be added all bills in the possession of the Bank of England, of bankers, and of bill-holders. He was almost afraid to estimate the amount; but he would state it at twenty-three millions. This would make the whole circulating medium of the kingdom amount to one hundred millions. Taking this as the fact, at what had the chancellor of the Exchequer estimated the amount of the one-pound notes? He had taken the gross amount at two millions 1064 and a half in England; and had asked, what inconvenience the country would feel in withdrawing so small a sum from the general circulation? With deference to the right hon. gentleman, he thought the argument lay the other way, and would ask, what inconvenience could possibly arise from allowing so small a sum as two millions and a half to remain in a general circulating medium amounting to one hundred millions? The proportion was so small, that he did not see the necessity of injuring, alarming, or disturbing, any district, interest, or class of men, by agitating the question. He was sorry that the right hon. member for Liverpool was not in his place, upon a question on which he was so intimately acquainted. He totally denied that if the present measure were not carried, unlimited issues of paper in small notes would take place. He thought that a rise of prices or an increase of the business of the country would require an additional quantity of notes. If the ports of the world should again be thrown open to our trade, the present circulation of the country would not be sufficient for its business, and such an occasion alone would justify the circumstance of an increase of the circulation by the means of an issue of notes. The security to be afforded by the bankers, in the event of such an issue, was a matter of importance. Some years ago, when the Bank of England was not able to pay its notes in specie, the country bankers had been asked to give security for their issues, and they had refused to do so, observing, that they would furnish security when the Bank was prepared to pay in specie. Their situation was different now; and if notes should again come into circulation they would be prepared to afford the best security. Let them, however, do what they might, it would be but an act of justice to allow the country bankers to state the circumstances to which they had been reduced, in consequence of the withdrawing of the one-pound notes. He would, upon that point, state one or two facts, with regard to the state of those large districts where the working of iron and coal mines kept an immense body of men in employment. In those places scarcely any labourer received his wages in money. They were paid in goods; and so rigidly was that system pursued, that if a man wanted money for any particular purpose—such, for instance, as that of paying his rent—he was obliged 1065 to take his wages in goods, and to dispose of the goods before he could touch one particle of the metallic currency. He had also inquired into the state of these matters in the large manufacturing towns, and he found that among them an immense quantity of copper was in circulation both genuine and spurious, and the retail dealer was so anxious to get rid of that copper, which he was obliged to take in payment for his articles, that he would dispose of it for bills at seventy-five days after date, in order to procure money for the purposes of his business. Another evil of the present state of the currency was, that in those parts ten sovereigns out of every hundred were of light weight; and those who had no scales to weigh the money presented to them in payment, suffered a great inconvenience. These were facts that could be brought in answer to the fanciful and nonsensical theories of modern times. There was a small quantity of silver, but it was of little value in remedying the inconveniences he had referred to, for if paper would not circulate with gold, still less would silver circulate with base copper. In voting as he should do for the committee, he was certain there were many objects, into which it could inquire, that were well worthy the serious attention of the House.
Mr. Secretary Peelsaid, he cordially concurred in the observation of an hon. member, that it would ill become them to speak too dogmatically upon matters of such great moment as those which the House was now engaged in considering. The facts to be collected were so numerous, so widely spread, affected the interests of so many, and were composed of such various elements, that that man must indeed entertain great confidence in his own judgment, who could make up his mind conclusively, on the whole bearing of the question. The hon. gentleman had alluded to the resolutions which parliament had come to, as a proof that they should abate their confidence; and in that also he agreed with the hon. gentleman. But while he admitted those positions, he must say that nothing could give rise to more serious evils, than keeping the public mind in a perpetual state of uncertainty, as to the intentions of the legislature. If they resolved at one time that the issue of small notes should cease, and at another time that they should continue,—if they went on vacillating between one course and another, and finally gave up the principle 1066 to which they had repeatedly pledged themselves, the country would not place any reliance on their decisions. He concurred with the hon. baronet in thinking, that the question before the House ought not to be decided upon the ground of consistency: it was their duty to regard it on the higher ground of expediency; but the evidence of expediency should be very clear, that could warrant them in retracing their steps, and undoing what they had done, with respect to the issue of small notes. He would argue the question in that calm and dispassionate manner which became the discussion of such subjects, while he endeavoured to show, that there was no such evidence of expediency as ought to induce them to retract the decision they had come to in 1826. He would address himself to the arguments adduced by many for whose opinions he entertained the highest respect, though he could not agree with them in thinking that we should retrace our steps, or, what was still worse, enter into an inquiry, the effect of which would be, to throw every thing into a state of uncertainty and confusion.
The first argument to which he would advert, it was, perhaps, hardly fair in him to refer to, as it had been urged on a former evening, by the hon. member for Callington (Mr. Attwood) on presenting a petition. That hon. member had stated, that the country was reduced to such a state of distress, that she could not maintain her dignity in relation to foreign countries; that her resources were impaired, her productive energies suspended, that she was in a state of dissolution, and that her restoration to prosperity must be despaired of. There was nothing more unwise than to indulge in such gloomy descriptions of the country. He admitted, however, that gentlemen ought to be cautious how they prophesied future wealth and prosperity; and he remembered that, on former occasions, some persons, sitting where he then was, had been blamed for having indulged in too dazzling descriptions of our prosperity; but the other extreme was also to be carefully avoided, and the state of the country was not to be described under the influence of hypochondriacal feelings. He admitted that there might be some local distress, some districts in which trade was not flourishing; but he hoped to convince the House, that the country was not in the desperate condition represented. He could not admit that the industry of the country 1067 was paralysed by the withdrawal of the one-pound notes; for he saw no signs of it in our manufactures or in the state of the revenue. He believed, if any necessity were to arise for war, that the House need not despair of the country, that she would not be able to maintain that high character she had long enjoyed. He would decide the question by general facts; for he would not deny that there were districts in which the demand for labour was less than in others, and in which distress might be felt. If there were that general distress and impaired energies, there would be a falling off in consumption, a reduction of work, and a general diminution in the demand for those articles which supplied the wants of the people. Since the 1st of February, 1826, not one single country bank note bad been stamped at the Stamp-office. Since 1826, then, they had been gradually reduced; and, if the ultimate reduction of them were to produce such evils as had been predicted by the hon. member, it was only reasonable to suppose, that the partial reduction which had already taken place, since 1825, should be attended with a diminution of production and consumption. A part of the evils pointed out by the hon. member ought now to be
| 1825. | 1828. | ||
| Strong Beer | 6,500,000 | 6,542,000 | barrels |
| Table Beer | 1,480,000 | 1,539,000 | barrels |
| Tallow Candles | 104,980,000 | 110,718,000 | lb. |
| Wax Candles | 959,240 | 923,000 | lb. |
§ In the last article, there was a falling off, but the consumption of the intermediate year, the year 1826, was 916,0001b. So that during the year 1827, there was an increase upon that of 1826, although the consumption was less than that of 1825.
| 1825. | 1827. | ||
| Cider and Perry | 22,000 hhds. | 51,000 hhds. | |
| Plate Glass Total Glass | 14 096 cwts | 16,613 cwts. | |
| Crown Plate, | 516,000 cwts | 594,000 cwts. | |
| Broad Green, | |||
| Malt | 27,906,000 bush, | 28,742,000 do. | 25,340,000 (1827) |
| Paper | 51,345,000 lbs. | 52,304,000 do. | |
| Printed goods | 116,000.000 yds. | 122,000,000 do. | 88,000,000 (1827) |
| Soap | 93,000,000'lbs. | 97,000 000 do. | |
| April 5, 1825. | April 5, 1828. | Aver. of last 3 yrs. | |
| British Spirits | 3,913,000 gals. | 7,330,000 gals. | 5,000,000 gals. |
| Starch | 4,961,000 lbs | 6,945,000 lbs | |
| Tea | 23,940,000 lbs | 26 900,000 lbs | |
| Vinegar | 2,357,365 | 2,800,000 |
§ From this statement it would appear, that a considerable increase had taken place in every article, with the exception of wax candles; and the inference from these facts was, that the industry of the country in producing, and the comfort of the people in consuming, those articles, had increased in proportion. He would now pass to other
1068§ felt. But, what was the fact? Had that diminution been felt in the revenue? He would not refer to that, however, because members might say, that its amount was only a proof of the great pressure the country was labouring under. He would refer to articles of general consumption; and he would shew that no diminution whatever had taken place. He would compare the year ending the 5th April, 1825, with the year ending the 5th April, 1827. This was favourable to his view; for half of the year 1825 was a time of excitement, when the country was in a state of what the hon. member would, probably, call great prosperity. He proposed to take for the illustration such articles as strong beer, table beer, tallow-candles, wax candles, cider, perry, malt, paper, glass, British spirits, and tea. He meant to compare the account of these articles consumed in the year ending April 1825, with the amount consumed in they ear ending April 1827; and the result would show the House, that they were not justified in taking that gloomy view which the hon. gentleman had thought himself justified in taking. The following were the returns of the consumption in those years respectively:—
1069§ topics which would illustrate his observations, and submit the following list to the House:—
| Ships entering Inwards from all Parts—British and Irish. | |||
| Tons. | Men. | ||
| Jan. 3, | 1826.—21786 | 162,614. | 162,000 |
| 1827.—18,960 | 151,327 | 151,000 | |
| 1828.—20,457 | 165,548 | 165,000 |
§ Looking, then, at all these general facts, he came to the conclusion, that there had been no falling off in British industry, and that therefore there was no reason for the gloomy anticipations of the hon. member for Callington. He came, then, to the questions involved in the motion, or rather in the amendment, of the hon. baronet. Was it desirable, or was it necessary, at this time, to lower the standard of value? As he understood the hon. baronet, his speech consisted of two distinct propositions: the first was, that the landed interest could not go on, unless the standard of value was lowered, because it was not possible to pay in a currency regulated on a metallic standard, a debt contracted in a paper currency. The second proposition of the hon. baronet was, that it was possible to maintain a paper currency, convertible into gold, when there was no gold as the basis of the currency. The first proposition was, to lower the standard; the second was, not to lower the standard, but to maintain a paper currency in circulation, when there was no gold, and both these propositions he should contest. If things were now in the state they were in 1819, it might be a question of depreciating the standard of value; but, after the act of 1819 had been ten years in existence, the question became a very different one. Whatever opinions he might have been disposed to entertain in 1819, he could not, for one moment, suppose, after the 1070 present standard had been so long established, that it was now advisable to have recourse to the hon. baronet's proposition for lowering the standard of value. He had heard complaints against the proceedings of the committee of 1819: its report had been stigmatised with great severity; and he, as the author of it, had been charged with having done more mischief than any ten ministers that ever sat in parliament. Adopting the slander to the extent that distress had been occasioned, and sincerely deploring that degree of suffering, he still thought that such enormous difficulties would have been found in lowering the standard, that the alternative would, at last, have been the resumption of a paper system, or a return to a circulation of gold. We were told that we had a debt of eight hundred millions contracted in inconvertible paper, and that, therefore, it ought not to be repaid in gold. That was a very easy way to settle the matter; but we were to recollect, that, whatever was the case with some of the original lenders, the whole debt was not contracted in inconvertible paper; comparatively speaking, only a small portion of it was contracted when paper was inconvertible into gold, and the original creditors of the state having parted with it, it had, at subsequent periods, been transferred to hands who had given for it the full value. What satisfaction would it be to the landholder, 1071 who, on the depreciation of land, had converted his property into stock, to say "You are a public creditor; but you received too much when you obtained 50,000l. for your land, and we are about to act on a new standard, according to which we shall pay you off at a lower rate than that at which you made the exchange." The state ought to have taken that into consideration, at the time it created the original obligation: at that time the return to cash payments was only suspended, and it was determined that they should be resumed. From 1815, cash payments were only suspended; and all parties making contracts were aware that the country was about to make a great exertion, and the state ought at least to have said to its creditors—"We reserve to ourselves the power of repaying you in a currency not nominally the same in amount, but which shall be regulated by the existing depreciation." If the state did not reserve to itself that power; he believed that the departure from national faith would, in future times, have involved this country in great difficulties; and that if the time should ever arrive, when the public necessities might require something more than the supplies of the year, and the example had been set of repaying the public creditor in a depreciated currency, the character of the country would have received a taint, which would have greatly increased the difficulty of raising money on temporary emergencies. He had never disguised from himself the pressure that would be occasioned by repaying the amount of a debt contracted while money was depreciated, in an improved currency; and if we refused to restore the original standard, we should find great difficulty in adopting any other, upon any principle either just or satisfactory. The general assumption was, that, for a long period antecedent to 1819, there had been an immense depreciation of the paper currency; that was not the fact. It was, he admitted, very difficult to determine what should be the principle by which the amount of depreciation should be ascertained. Suppose he took the test of the hon. baronet, (sir J. Graham)—the difference between the market and the mint price of gold. That was the test which he selected; for in comparing the amount of taxation in 1813, and 1827, he urged that taxation in 1827 was heavier than in 1813, although in the first instance, the taxation was 1072 nominally eighty-four millions, and in the last instance, only fifty-two millions. He said, that a deduction ought to be made from the pressure of taxation to the extent of 36 per cent. He would, therefore, take the hon. baronet's test, and he found, that from 1803 to 1810 the market-price of gold was 4l. per oz., and the depreciation was only 2l. 13s. 2d. per cent. From 1810 to 1816 there was a great depreciation; it amounted in 1814 to 25 percent; but, in 1817 and 1818—two years before the committee of 1819—gold was only 4l. per oz. All this was laid upon the committee of 1819: but, in consequence of the terrible revulsions to which the paper system had been subject two years preceding, paper had righted itself by a violent struggle, and the currency was again practically restored to within 2½ per cent of its original value. What had we done in 1819? We decided to revert to the ancient currency, and it was not fair to lay upon the committee of 1819, and not upon the paper system itself, a great part of the pressure which had since resulted from the attempt to restore the standard. But all this was beside the present question. The question now before us was, whether, having acted for ten years upon the ancient standard, we were now prepared to unsettle all the various transactions in that improved currency, and to apply to the liquidation of every debt some new standard? To that he never could consent. Great as the suffering had been, he had doubts whether any other system could have been safely followed, but that which was adopted; but of this he was quite certain, that if we attempted to unsettle the system now, the confusion and uncertainty in all money transactions would be such as to compel us hereafter, heartily to repent our rashness. As the hon. baronet had disclaimed the charge that this was one of the eight important subjects to be devolved upon the committee; he should not further advert to the point; but too much was due to the argument itself, and to the ability with, which it had been supported, for him to neglect it.
I now approach that which has a more immediate bearing on the question; namely, whether it is safe to maintain throughout the whole of the united kingdoms a I paper circulation, with power to issue notes below 5l. without having any gold currency as the basis of that paper cur- 1073 rency? Notwithstanding all I have heard, I entertain doubts whether the system can be safely adopted. And here let me tell the hon. baronet (sir H. Parnell), that his proposal of an improved mode of banking is quite distinct from this point. Perhaps it might be materially improved, if the charter of the Bank of England did not stand in the way of that improvement. I am not prepared to say that an arrangement might not be made with the consent of the Bank previous to its expiration; but that is a consideration with which I will not now encumber myself. Still, with this improvement, I entertain serious doubts whether it would be safe to introduce a general paper circulation, to the exclusion of a gold currency. In this argument, I think it ought to be conceded to me, that a limited paper circulation below five pounds cannot co-exist with a gold currency. The experience of all countries—of Scotland, of Ireland, and of the United States, shows that notes for 5s. and 2s. 6d. exclude silver currency. In Ireland, the existence of fractional notes for 15s. and 25s. has had the same tendency; and the same effect will be produced upon gold, if notes below the value of 5l. are in circulation. The argument of the hon. baronet (sir J. Graham) is, that a paper circulation, if it be convertible into gold, is sufficient for every purpose; and I will examine some of the illustrations by which he supported it. First, he mainly relies on the example of Scotland: he says, "you find there a paper circulation which has excluded gold, but by which the affairs of that country are prudently and securely conducted, with few failures, and panics of rare occurrence." My answer is, that nothing is more fallacious than to draw inferences from the case of Scotland. What I believe is, that the security of Scotland, in this respect, depends upon the metallic circulation of England, that you maintain the value of the paper circulation of Scotland by means of the exchange, and that the alteration of the system here is the safety of the Scotch circulation. The hon. baronet tells us, that there is some inconsistency in the report of 1819, and in me as having drawn it, in permitting Scotland to have a paper circulation; and that the same advantage ought not to be refused to England. But the hon. baronet upon this occasion made a quotation which presents an imperfect view of the 1074 meaning of the writer. The hon. baronet omitted to state, that the opinion there mentioned was given as the opinion of the witnesses from Scotland, and not as the decision of the committee; and the quotation he made is introduced by the words, "the grounds relied upon by the witnesses from Scotland are these." My opinion follows, where it is said that, although it is recommended that the system of currency in Scotland should not be disturbed, yet the committee regret, that they could not themselves express a clear, decisive, and unqualified, opinion upon the subject. But I am ready to admit, that I am not satisfied that the circulation of Scotland has not a tendency to add to our insecurity. I certainly think that the paper circulation of Scotland relies on the Bank of England. Though I think the case of Scotland different from that of England, I believe uniformity of system would be greatly preferable to the maintenance of a paper circulation. Let the hon. baronet advert to this fact,—that in 1826 we had determined that within three years we would make a vigorous and decided effort to restore a metallic currency, and that it might be very desirable to restore it by gradual and secure steps. If we had determined at once to restore a metallic currency in England, and in Scotland which never had a metallic currency, the effect must have been much more violent; and we might have greatly aggravated the distress of Scotland, had she been called upon to join in the exertion, at the time when England threw twenty-two millions of gold into circulation. The time may, nevertheless, arrive, when uniformity may be adopted.
The hon. baronet contends, that the bill of my right hon. friend is wholly unnecessary, because the report shows that the paper circulation of Scotland co-existed with the metallic circulation of England; but, a very few sentences afterwards, the hon. baronet offered his own contradiction of his position; because he said, that on his own estates in Cumberland the rents for seventy years had been paid in Scotch notes. This, therefore, is a complete proof, that the Scotch notes have for many years circulated across the border; and, unless you put a stop to it, you will do manifest injustice to the English banker, by giving a privilege to the Scotch banker, of which the former is deprived I believe that, very recently, a branch bank from 1075 Scotland has been established at Carlisle; and it may be a question, whether this is consistent with the law, as it now stands; but, if we permit the Scotch banker to issue notes without control, they will soon find their way beyond the border into the interior of the country. Hence it is evident that, injustice to the English banker, we have no alternative but to prohibit the issue of Scotch notes; and if by this bill we cannot prevent it, I apprehend we must resort to the other course, by introducing a gold currency into Scotland. But what may be true and safe with regard to Scotland, may be neither safe nor true with regard to the rest of the united kingdom. Such are my reasons for thinking, that it is impossible to trust to a paper circulation without a foundation of gold: paper may be convertible into gold nominally, and while people have confidence in it, well and good; but there will be a manifest tendency in every banker to do two things, to issue as much paper, and to deposit as little gold, as he can: the whole supply of gold on which we can depend is that which is retained to meet the demand; all beyond that will be so much loss; the whole country will be saturated with small notes, and bankers will become dependent upon each other. It will then be impossible to take an adequate security against an excessive issue of paper; one failure will create a panic, and that panic, arising from a comparatively trifling cause, may be destructive to the whole; for we are to recollect, that the small notes will be in the hands of the mass of the population, upon whom panic will have the greatest effect, and argument the least force. If the parties themselves are not to retain gold as a deposit, the whole mass of the circulation will depend upon the Bank of England, without the smallest control on its part over distant establishments. There seems to me to be an inevitable tendency to an over-issue of paper, without a constant sentinel keeping watch upon it; and that sentinel is the metallic sovereign in constant circulation. If it be true of this country, it is true of every country.
The hon. baronet has endeavoured to support his position by reference to authorities of the highest rank. I trust that my inquiries upon this subject have made me familiar with their writings; and if he really could support his proposition, as to lowering the standard, and introducing a paper currency, not convertible into gold, 1076 by such great authorities as Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith, I should, of course, be led to attach far more weight to his arguments. But, if there were any three names I should have quoted for a directly opposite purpose, they would have been precisely those upon which the hon. baronet relied. For a gentleman arguing in favour of lowering the standard to refer to such a man as Locke, as an authority in his favour, I own did surprise me. I was well acquainted with Locke's beautiful Essay, in answer to Mr. Lowndes, the Secretary for the Treasury, in which he contended against every argument for reducing the standard; and I beg the House to observe what was the proposal of Mr. Lowndes, and the reply of Mr. Locke. Mr. Lowndes proposed that money should be raised one-fifth, or, in other words, that it should have one-fifth less silver in it. That, be it observed, is exactly the present proposal with regard to gold. What was Locke's answer—the writer who is now quoted as an advocate for altering the standard? "Altering the standard by raising the value of money will weaken, if not totally destroy, public faith, when all who trusted the public, and assisted our present necessities, under acts of parliament, the million lottery, the Bank act, and other loans, will be defrauded of twenty per cent." The quotation made by the hon. baronet I well recollect. It was from a singular paper, directed with great force of argument against the Usury-laws; for the landed interest at that time wished to limit the interest of money to four per cent. Locke never referred to an increase of money such as the hon. baronet contemplates, and Locke's opinion seems to be an erroneous one, however highly I may think of his Essay: at that time there was a great balance of trade against this country; and gold was sent out in great quantities, and Locke goes on to state the consequences of distressing the landed interest. But what was Locke's remedy? Was it a depression of the currency, or an issue of paper? He never thought of a paper circulation, nor of depreciating the standard of money.—The authority of Hume is even still less in favour of the hon. baronet. He cannot think more highly than I do of the philosophic writings of that great man; his acuteness, sagacity, and anticipations of the future, seem at times almost miraculous; and I apprehend that he deserve 1077 at least as high a reputation for his Essays as for his History. The hon. baronet referred to Hume, to shew that the only wise course for a country is, to have a constantly increasing circulation; and no doubt, if the wit of man could devise a constantly increasing circulation, which never could come to a stand, it would, much increase the active industry of the country; but the force of every stimulant must cease at some period, and be followed by a proportionate depression. Mr. Hume is speaking of the circulation of specie, and not of paper money. So far from thinking with the hon. baronet, that it is wise to increase the circulation of paper, Hume says, in one of his notes—"We observed in Discourse III. that money, when increasing, gives encouragement to industry during the interval betwixt the increase of money and rise of prices. A good effect of this nature may follow, too, from paper credit; but it is dangerous to precipitate matters at the risk of losing all by the failing of that credit, as must happen upon any violent shock on public affairs." In the text he tells us—"'Tis only in our negotiations and transactions with foreigners, that a greater stock of money is advantageous; and, as our paper then is absolutely insignificant, we feel by its means all the ill effects arising from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages." Hume's argument relates to the effects upon industry by the increase of the precious metals; but it is quite different from the position of the hon. baronet, who quoted him in favour of an increase of paper circulation.—Then, as to Dr. Adam Smith, I well recollect the beautiful and most happily illustrative metaphor applied by him to the subject: he tells us, that gold and silver may be compared to roads, which are productive of no profit, but circulate all the products of industry; the roads, not being cultivated, are sources of positive loss, but they are the means by which all property is transferred; and, with respect to paper circulation, he says it is like a wagon-road, if he might use so violent a figure, in the air, which enabled the owner of the soil to cultivate and convert into a source of profit even the otherwise barren roads. It is clear, however, that he was well aware of the evils of a paper currency; for he makes use, in one place, of this apposite expression; "It were better, perhaps, that 1078 no bank-notes should be issued, in any part of the kingdom, of a smaller amount than 5l.;" and he goes on with a train of reasoning to show the dangers of a paper currency. In short, it is utterly impossible to quote Adam Smith as an authority for an unlimited issue of paper, without a basis in gold.
I have thus shown, I think, that the main supports of the hon. baronet, as far as regards the opinions of the illustrious men I have named, fail under him; and, if it were possible for them to go into this committee with me, I am sure I should have their votes for resisting the proposition they are supposed, by the hon. baronet, to advocate, and would refuse their sanction to the system he maintains. I must say, therefore, that neither on the score of experience, nor of authority, do I think the hon. member for Callington, or the hon. baronet, has established such a case as ought to induce the House to recede from the position it took in 1826. I entreat the House to consider what we were told at that period—that if that act were passed (and it was passed by a majority, I think, of ten to one, for only eight ultimately divided against it), the mischief resulting from it would be immediate—that the country banks would reduce their circulation, and that the evil would not be deferred to 1829. Then let me ask, after we have undergone that suffering, which was inevitable, from the attempt to restore a metallic circulation—after having since 1822, issued from the Bank twenty-eight millions of gold, of which it is calculated twenty-two millions remain, with eight millions of silver—after having reduced the circulation of country bank notes to two millions and a half, would it be wise to retrace our steps, and, by the commencement of a new inquiry, imply a doubt as to the soundness of our policy? If we do retrace our steps, do not let us suppose that the injury will be confined to two millions and a half of Bank notes: we shall never have an opportunity of considering the question under the same advantages as at present and no confidence will hereafter be placed in your decisions, if we now attempt to unsettle a question which has been so long concluded. The country is now within sight of the goal, which, in 1826, it was so anxious to reach: a little firmness, and another spring, will enable it to reach it; and I believe it can be attained, in the present state of 1079 the country, without any material addition to the existing pressure.
Mr. Attwoodsaid:—It is not now, Sir, for the first time, the right hon. gentleman, will allow me to remind him, that propositions for inquiry into the character of our own measures, and into questions of essential interest, have been met by statements from the Treasury-bench, such as he now makes, and by attempts to show, from official returns and tables of comparative consumption, how great was the general prosperity of the people, and how great the danger of interfering with so much happiness. But, I remind him also, that since the mistaken and unfortunate measure of 1819, those statements have, in every instance, proved either to have been fallacious when made, or have been instantly followed by reverses all but fatal to the country. I place, therefore, no reliance on the result the right hon. gentleman would draw from his tables, nor do I think he is himself satisfied of the accuracy of that result. He purposed to contradict, by these tables, the view I had taken, on a former occasion, of the existing distress of the country; but I said nothing of the consumption of candles, whether of wax or tallow, or of starch or vinegar, or any commodities of that nature. I spoke of agriculture: I told him of the condition of the farmer, of the poverty of the trader, of finances embarrassed, of sufferings pressing on the labourer, of gaols bursting with criminals. The right hon. gentleman must feel, that if he had given to my opinions a direct contradiction, instead of a constructive denial: if he had at once boldly affirmed, that the farmer was prosperous, the trader content, the finances flourishing, and the labourer employed, he would feel that such assurance would be opposed to the experience of every member who heard him.
On the subject of the one-pound note circulation, the right hon. gentleman has misapprehended my observations. I did not state, as he represents, that our present difficulties have been occasioned by the reduction of that circulation; nor do I think that it has, in fact, been yet reduced in the degree he calculates. I ascribe our existing difficulties to the false standard introduced by the act of 1819—that act, the true character of which he is now almost the only individual who still persists to misunderstand,—and I maintain, that amidst the calamities thus 1080 entailed on the country, we could not encounter with safety the further pressure which the suppression of the small-note circulation must produce. Of the degree of that additional pressure I give no confident opinion; nor do I rely on any opinion that is with confidence given on this head. That, in some degree, the operations of productive industry will, by this measure, be generally oppressed and crippled, I hold to be perfectly certain. That the distress thus occasioned will be extreme or ruinous I assert not; nor do I value the opinion of any man, who shall assert, with confidence, the reverse of this; or shall say that he regards the further progress of this measure, if it be persisted in, without anxiety and alarm. The right hon. gentleman assures the House, that the resources of the country at this time are entirely equal, to maintain, in foreign wars, its character and interests, if either should be assailed. He would have rendered his assurance more complete, if he had coupled it with a reference to the act of 1819. If what the right hon. gentleman means to affirm is, that considerable additional burthens could be imposed on the country; that large supplies could be raised at home, and spent abroad, and this without any Bank restriction, and with an adherence to the act of 1819; I answer, in the words used by my hon. friend, the member for Shaftesbury, to-night—he believes it, but I do not;—nor do I think that the present burthens of the country can be permanently sustained.
It is not, Sir, my intention to enter generally into the wider field of argument connected with this debate; but to confine my observations to the narrow question more immediately before us—the propriety of reconsidering at this time the act of 1826. The operation of our monetary system on the various interests of the community, and on their condition; the manner in which the changes we have made in this system have affected, and continue to affect, all interests and classes; these have been developed in the speech of the hon. baronet, the member for Carlisle, in so comprehensive, masterly, and able a manner, that I refrain from repeating his unanswered arguments; but in so acting, I desire to guard myself against the belief, that I agree in anything with those, who deprecate discussion, examination, and inquiry, into every part of this important 1081 Subject.—I agree as little with the right hon. member for Liverpool (Mr. Huskisson), who endeavoured to deter the House from appointing the proposed committee, by exaggerated statements of imaginary dangers, arising—from what? from an inquiry into the character of its own acts; from alarm thus to be spread in the public mind; speculations to be set afloat; a second panic produced; and I know not what, of visionary evils, having no existence whatever but in the mind of the right hon. member himself. It is time to abandon this petty policy. A short time since we heard similar apprehensions expressed on another subject—the import of wool. There was danger in that inquiry: alarm would be excited—speculations fostered or suppressed, for I know not which, and care not, if the House should inquire into the necessity of imposing a duty on foreign wool. But, in the other House of Parliament, a committee of Enquiry has been appointed, and none of these mischiefs have followed. The noble duke, now, most fortunately for the honour of the country, and its safety and best interests, at the head of his majesty's government, is not of that class of minds prone to believe that the people of this country will ruin themselves by groundless alarms. He appears rather to apprehend ruin to the people, from precipitate, incapable, and blundering legislation. "Your interests are involved in this matter," would appear to have been his language; "inquire, examine, and discuss, all its bearings. The interests of the country are involved in it: let these be also examined." Enough has there been already, he appears to have thought, of blind and false legislation, and enough has the country suffered from it.
Sir, I can readily perceive why there should exist, with those who were parties to the act of 1819, a great reluctance to examine into its real character. But, when my hon. friend and colleague (Mr. Baring), no party to that measure, who saw its danger, and whose view of its character has been confirmed by subsequent experience, join those who condemn further discussion; there is a manifest inconsistency in his argument. My hon. friend said, on a late occasion, that some particular alteration of the standard, which he supposed me to advocate, would now effect a great fraud. He acquitted me from intending any such object; and did me no more than justice in so doing. I will not 1082 now discuss with him whether this or that alteration of the standard might not at present be effected without injustice. There would be no difference between us on that point. But I will point out to his indignation a measure which, to use his own expression, did effect a great fraud; a greater fraud, indeed, than has been ever worked by any other single measure. It is the act of 1819, as he himself describes it. That act altered, he says, the value of money twenty-five, or thirty-three, or on some articles, fifty per cent. Take the lowest of these estimates and trace the consequences. Into every merchant's account existing, a fraud was secretly introduced of twenty-five per cent. On every rent, every tax, and every debt, was secretly twenty-five per cent falsely imposed. Calculate all this and say if any single measure ever effected an extent of robbery so great as this act. I can conceive in the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Peel) to the integrity of whose intentions, both now and in 1819, I do full justice, an almost invincible repugnance to admit a conviction of the true character of this measure. But it is inconsistent in my hon. friend (Mr. Baring) admitting the character of this measure, not to admit also the necessity of proceeding to a full examination into all its consequences—whether, and in what degree, we have yet the power to redress any and what part of the wrong it has effected, and to protect any of the victims of that enormous injustice. Would it be nothing, after a measure of this character has spread disorder and ruin through all the relations of society, and shaken the security of all property, that the House and the country should come to a full knowledge of its extent and effects; and should understand clearly the cause of our past embarrassment, and the nature of the future difficulties we have yet to encounter? Would it be nothing to clear away those absurd theories of over-production, over-population, and overtrading—each in its turn, or, at times, altogether, supposed to have plunged the country into ruin; of too much fertility, too much industry, too many people; and all those schemes and projects founded on such theories; schemes of emigration, projects to correct over-trading—this House teaching the traders how to trade, has ruined the traders by its blunders—schemes of Scotch banks and branch 1083 banks, alike abortive—and even this present project for suppressing small notes, on the ground that it is necessary for the safety of the public finances? Have we not a committee now sitting to inquire into the embarrassments of the finances; whether and in what manner our encumbrances can be met? And is it nothing that this committee, sitting for this object, after the operation of a measure such as my hon. friend has described the act of 1819 to be—shall be guilty of the incredible absurdity of leaving out of view, altogether, the manner in which the public burthens have been increased fraudulently by this act—shall avoid scrupulously even the most remote inquiry into the question how far, and to what extent, it is, by indispensable justice, required; even if no pressure of necessity existed, to cut clown these burthens to the level of the act of 1819? Proceeding on this capital error, the labours of the committee will be useless, and will do less towards relieving the difficulties of the revenue, than will be effected by the unanswerable exposure of the cause of its embarrassments, in the speech of the hon. baronet beside me—though they sit till the day of final doom.
The late Vice-president of the Board of Trade, who spoke in reply to the hon. baronet, said, that his speech went mainly to recommend a depreciation of money; and, as a matter of course, the speech of the right hon. gentleman himself went mainly to describe the mischievous character of such depreciation. The right hon. gentleman will allow me to say, that his information on this subject does not warrant the degree of confidence which he reposed in it. He said, depreciation of money had been, whenever effected, the work of the worst tyrants of the worst times. But my hon. colleague (Mr. Baring) has pointed out, that the depreciation of the late war was the work of the House of Commons. It was—which the right hon. gentleman will think somewhat more—the work of Mr. Pitt. The depreciation of 1797 was his measure, whatever may be the terms in which that measure or its author, must be characterized. The choice was presented to Mr. Pitt, of abandoning the antient standard or of abandoning that war, which, in his view, was necessary for the safety of the constitution and the laws. He chose the first alternative; he preferred, where one must be sacrificed, the country to the standard. I do not characterize that 1084 measure; I describe the circumstances under which it was adopted. My hon. friend the member for Surrey (Mr. Denison) tells us this night, that he voted against the act of 1797, and disapproved also of the act of 1819. His conduct was consistent throughout. He did not consider the war of Mr. Pitt necessary? but he is mistaken in believing that none but arbitrary governments have depreciated money. The United States of America, in their struggle for independence, adopted that step. I advocate neither America nor her measures; but the member for Radnor will scarcely class Washington and Franklin among his worst tyrants of the worst times. And, with regard to those examples of depreciation furnished by our own history, which the hon. member probably meant to refer to, he is mistaken in his views of those measures. In this country there was no depreciation of money by the government, from the reign of Elizabeth to the time of Mr. Pitt. Previously, great depreciation had been, at different times, effected. The same weight of silver which was coined originally into 20s., came, by these depreciations, at length to be coined into 62s. 6d. But, excepting Henry 8th—who depreciated money and raised it, alternately and successively, and in a manner analogous to our own operations on the currency within the last thirteen years—with that exception, the successive depreciations which our money underwent, were not the work of the worst tyrants in the worst times, but mainly of our greatest monarchs, and in our best era. These depreciations went not to effect injustice or fraud, but to prevent both. They did not go to raise prices, and to lower the value of money; their effect was, to prevent prices from falling, and to maintain the value of money at an equal rate. They were adjustments of the standard, rather than depreciations, in the sense commonly used—adjustments of the coin to the changing value of the materials composing it, to the necessities of the people, and to the faith and spirit of pecuniary contracts. These measures were, in fact, similar in. principle to the measure which this House ought to have adopted in 1819—to the measure then recommended by my hon. friend, the member for Surrey. The course then adopted ought not to have been one either of depreciation or appreciation—not a measure to raise or lower prices, but to maintain those which existed—a men- 1085 sure which would have adjusted the metal standard about to be introduced, to the value of the paper standard it superseded, maintaining the same value as that standard, and supporting the same prices. On this subject, the right hon. Secretary has entirely misapprehended the argument of Mr. Locke. He will find, on further examination into Mr. Locke's paper, that the money then to be dealt with was not, and had not been, the legal money of the country. It was clipped, debased, illegal; no man was obliged to receive it at all, nor was it practically current at its nominal amount. The money the right hon. Secretary had to deal with, in 1819, was different in these essential particulars: it was legally and practically the standard money of the country, current at its nominal amount; and neither the authority of Mr. Locke nor his arguments therefore have the bearing he supposes on the act of 1819.
The hon. member for Radnor has, in answer to the hon. baronet, explained the ruinous effects of a depreciation of money on one great class of society—the annuitants and the holders of fixed incomes. His view has been but partial; and, to explain it more fully, and as an answer to his arguments, I will read the opinion of the right hon. member for Liverpool, below him, as I find it set forth in an extract from a speech of that right hon. member, which, as it has been published as his, and not contradicted, I presume to be authentic. "When prices were continually rising, all the active classes were benefited, and annuitants alone were placed in a worse situation. But it was better any loss should fall on them than on the productive classes. The effect of a rise in price on them would, perhaps, force them to greater economy, and at most, abridge their comforts; but, while they were reduced to this, the other classes were benefited. But the effect of a falling market, on the industry of the country, was very different. If the value of a man's stock were only reduced one-tenth in value, perhaps that one-tenth might amount to almost the whole of his own capital—the nine-tenths might be borrowed. The fall naturally alarms! the creditor, who, by urging his demands, forced sales, by which the difficulty was increased: in such a state of things it was impossible that the revenue, depending, as it did, so much on the active classes, should not fail. The only articles 1086 above value were money for production, and bread for the active part of the population; and nothing could be so distressing to a country as a scarcity in these, and a glut in all other articles."
Now, Sir, in what I have thus said on the depreciation of money, it has not been my intention to discuss that subject generally, but to set, in their just light, before the House, those mis-stated facts, misapprehended authorities, and fallacious inferences, which have been introduced on this subject, into this debate. But the narrower question more immediately before the House, is the propriety of reconsidering the act of 1826. The right hon. the chancellor of the Exchequer concluded the speech which prefaced his motion by urging the necessity of consistency, though at some sacrifice. But it could scarcely have escaped him that, whilst his motion went solely to the suppression of Scotch notes in England, his speech was entirely directed to show the necessity of suppressing English notes in England. His arguments and his motion had no connexion with each other. And, as regards consistency, the question is this; not whether Scotch notes shall be suppressed in England, nor even whether English notes shall be suppressed in England,—but whether we will abolish English notes in England, whilst we permit Scotch notes to circulate in Scotland and Irish notes to circulate in Ireland? It behoved the chancellor of the Exchequer to show what ground of necessity or expediency exists for abolishing that description of circulation throughout one half of the empire, which he thinks it expedient to continue in the other half. The House, when it adopted the act of 1826, for suppressing one-pound notes in England, proceeded on principles applicable as much to Scotland and Ireland, as to England and to Wales. I state that in the most distinct terms. The chancellor of the Exchequer of that time stated, that there was no substantial ground why all parts of the united empire should not be put on the same footing. It was described to be a question of time and not of principle. It was intended, said lord Liverpool, that the one-pound notes of Scotland should be suppressed from 1829, and of Ireland in a year or two later; and the chancellor of the Exchequer said, that he would, in a few days produce his plan for abolishing the small-note circulation 1087 of Scotland. We have since discovered that we were proceeding on principles altogether erroneous, as far as related to Scotland and to Ireland. And how has that discovery been made? By examination and inquiry,—the usual process by which error is detected and truth discovered. We first condemn this circulation, then we proceed to inquire, and then discover that our judgment is false. But, does this lead to no reason for distrusting the principles on which we have proceeded with regard to England? If the Scotch committee had confirmed the opinions we were proceeding on, respecting Scotland; that would have been a ground for confidence in those we adopted with regard to England. But with what plea of consistency can those same individuals, who first told the House that it was a measure of absolute necessity to suppress the one-pound note circulation, both of England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland; and who now tell us, that they find, on inquiry, all their information to have been false, as it regarded half the empire;—still urge us to deal with the circulation of the other half on the same information, without examination and without inquiry? Can this course of proceeding be considered in any other light, than as arising from a determination on the part of ministers to conceal, as far as possible, their own errors, regardless of the consistency and character of the House, and of the effects which their measures are calculated to produce?
If we examine the information the Scotch committee has given, we shall find none warranting any change of opinion with respect to Scotland, which is not equally applicable to this English circulation. All that the committee has explained of the stability of the Scotch banks, the number of their partners, and the infrequency of failure among these banks, was as well known before the committees as since. Before the committee sat, a bill was introduced into the House founded on this supposed knowledge, for the purpose of giving England the advantage of Scotch banks; and for the other information which the committee has given, important, though some of it is, it is as true, in all its essential parts, of the banking system of England, as of the banking system of Scotland. The committee has described the system of what are called cash credits in Scot- 1088 land; and the right hon. Secretary seems to attach great importance to that system. It consists mainly in this; the Scotch banks lend money with great readiness, on easy terms, to traders of all classes—the smaller as well as the more important. So great an advantage is found in this, that the traders of Scotland very generally avail themselves of these loans. I do not undervalue these banking operations. They produce an extensive effect on the whole productive industry of Scotland. But the transactions of the country banks of England are essentially of the same character. They differ in nothing but the name. The Scotch banker advances on a cash credit—the English on an open account. One requires the security of a bond, the other of a bill: one takes a signature under a seal on the face of the instrument—the other an indorsement on the back. But with respect to the essential assistance given to the trader, the English system is as extensive to the full, and as effective, as that of Scotland. The committee has examined into another branch of the operations of the Scotch banks—their system of deposits. This system has been explained, as far as I know, for the first time, in this report and evidence. Hitherto the source which supplied the Scotch cash credits has been described as arising from the circulation of notes. It appears that the Scotch notes form but a small part of that supply. The Scotch bankers are great borrowers of money, as well as great lenders. They are ready to borrow at all times, from all persons, any amount of money, small or large: they repay these loans at short notice, and interest accrues while the money remains. The convenience thus afforded, is found to be so great that the system has become universal, and the whole trading community of Scotland, either as borrowers or lenders of money is brought into connexion with the banks. I acknowledge the effects of these operations on productive industry. Their deposit system, perhaps, forms the most important means by which the banks of Scotland promote a general prosperity. Increase of wealth, individually or nationally, proceeds mainly from accumulation and saving. But accumulation tends to check its own increase. It is commonly capital withdrawn from active use and ceasing to become the source of future production. To such a state of things, these banking operations 1089 —peculiar, I believe, to this empire—apply with great effect. They take the inactive capital of one man, and give it to him whose enterprise is cramped for want of resources. They open a connexion between the dead capital of the community on the one hand, and its languid industry on the other. Extending themselves to smaller towns, and drawing within the circle of their operations the inhabitants of the remotest hamlets; those banks collect from the whole surface of the country the scattered elements of dormant enterprise; they give them at once a shape the most effective and the most powerful; and at once apply them to those divisions of the great machine of commerce, where they are calculated the most to stimulate, to invigorate, and excite. The opinion given by the Scotch bankers, to the committee, of the importance of their operations on the general interest, has been held by the ablest writers, and the acutest politicians of Scotland. These date from the establishment of its banks, that great impulse to improvement which Scotland received in the earlier part of the last century. They ascribe that improvement, its progress, and the present condition, of Scotland, as being connected greatly with the operations of the banks. But nothing of this is peculiar to Scotland. The country banks of England carry on the system of deposits, as well as of advances, to as great an extent as the branch banks of Scotland. In England, as well as in Scotland, that rapid career of internal improvement in agriculture and manufactures, that great increase in wealth and population, which were unknown in former times, take their date from the general establishment of its banks. The first impulse was by them given to that career of improvement; and if there is any man who now thinks that our agriculture, our commercial and manufacturing industry, are not intimately connected with our system of banking—that they are not mainly dependent one on the other, and must recede or advance together—he knows but little of the internal condition of the country.
The member for Edinburgh said, "Leave Scotland and her banks to prosper together." I agree with him; but I put in the same claim for England, and I claim the same consideration for the English country banks, as he claims for the branch banks of Scotland. Has the prosperity of England been less than that of Scotland? No 1090 —nor its commercial reverses more frequent or more severe. The prosperity of both has arisen together, proceeded from the same causes, and each has derived an equal assistance from its banking systems. But the English banks are subject, it is said, to failures; and the labourer, not a judge of commercial credit, suffers occasionally by the loss of a bad note. These sufferings are not to be undervalued; but when a banker fails, the loss of the labourer by his notes is the smallest part of the injury he sustains. There is a destruction of credit in that district, of resources, a reduction of the means of employment; and the labourer who loses a few weeks' employment, suffers more than he who holds a bad note. The labouring classes have been subjected of late years, to appalling sufferings—but the bad paper which they have held is not to be charged with those sufferings. These have sprung from a deficient market for labour; that market is connected essentially with the banking system, and, whilst you are proceeding, out of regard for the interests of the labourer, to contract that system, the slightest motion of your machine of reduction, insignificant as it appears to you, is calculated to inflict upon millions of labourers, reduced in wages, or destitute of employment, a greater extent of suffering than the labourers have experienced from, all the bad paper of insolvent banks, which they have held since banking has been known.
But the report of the committee throws some new light upon the question of the difference of stability between the Scotch and the English banks. We have proceeded on the opinion that the Scotch banks were banks formed on what is called the Scotch system, joint-stock banks, secure, because they embraced a large number of responsible proprietors. But the committee has shown us, that a great proportion of the banking system of Scotland, is conducted by private establishments, differing in nothing from the private banks of England. There are in Scotland, says the report, thirty-three banks; and the evidence shows, that of these, thirteen are private establishments, varying in their number of partners from eight to one. The joint-stock banks have formed branches. The private banks have branched out also: one hundred and thirty-three is the number of the whole, banks and branches, of which between thirty and 1091 forty appear to be private establishments, issuing notes, one class as well as the other. Now these private banks of Scotland in no way differ, in the security which they offer, from an equal number of English country banks. No man will deny this, and on what ground, then, is the House proceeding? We find the same description of persons issuing the same description of paper, the same security, the same limitation, and we proceed to abolish this paper in one district, on the ground of its being destructive and ruinous, while we deal with it in another, as wholesome and advantageous. Can it be possible that this House will proceed to legislate on such a basis? If we maintain that the small-note circulation has in it somewhat of peculiar danger, and is therefore only to be intrusted to a certain description of banks, offering, by the number of their partners, superior security for their issues, that is intelligible and consistent. But if we proceed on the principle that it is necessary, for the very same individual banker, to be prevented from doing, in one district, that which we allow him to effect in another; that what is safe in Dundee, or in Glasgow, is dangerous in Norwich or in Newcastle; that, in reducing the circulation of one-pound notes, we are to follow the course of a river, and to suppress all that we find on one side of the stream, as dangerous, while those on the other side are secure; I would recommend the House to guide their measures by the cast of the dice, rather than proceed in a course so full of utter absurdity as this is, under the pretence that they are gravely consulting the interests of the people.
I state, that, at least, the private bankers of Scotland, of whom I wish to speak with all respect, cannot be assumed to offer greater security than the private bankers of England. There have, indeed, been no panics amongst the Scotch banks. The proceedings of the committees have, however, thrown light on this branch of the subject. There was no panic, says the report, in Scotland, in 1715. There was but one bank. There was no panic either, in 1745, thirty years nearer our own time. I am not disposed, as the committee was, to draw any inference regarding the present circulation of Scotland from either of these circumstances. Their insertion may prove, perhaps, the partial temper of the committee, but nothing else. Another circumstance is reported, of more import- 1092 ance. "The Scotch bankers supported themselves," (the passage is in the Lords' Report) "from 1797 to 1812, without any protection from the restriction by which the Bank of England, and that of Ireland, was relieved from cash payments." If any thing is to be inferred from this passage, it is, that the paper of the Scotch banks possesses a stability greater than that, not only of the English country banks, but of the Bank of England, and of the Bank of Ireland. Now we happen to know that, during the whole of the year 1811, a guinea was worth 25s. or 26s. in all parts of this empire. The Scotch paper, therefore, stood its ground, not only against all discredit, but against the manifest interest of the people, who might have profited twenty-five per cent by exchanging it for gold. The taste of the people of Scotland is, we are informed, to prefer paper to gold. But that alone will not explain the fact here stated; for a Scotchman, in possession of four notes, might have changed his notes for four guineas, and have sold his guineas for five notes; so that what we are required to believe is, not merely that a Scotchman prefers paper to gold, but that he prefers a smaller quantity of paper to a greater, four notes to five. We must be convinced that, behind this state of things, exists something that the committee has failed to explain. The evidence will lead us to this explanation. It exhibits strong presumption, at least, that the Scotch paper has been at no time practically convertible into gold. Either by combinations amongst the bankers, or by some condition on the notes, or by both, this paper has been, at no time, subjected to the test of payment to which English paper has been, at all times, liable. The evidence of Mr. Thompson states—"That there is no other person than Mr. Maberly, that he has ever known, ask for gold in Scotland." Mr. Thompson is an experienced banker—has been cashier successively to the two principal banks of Scotland, and he never knew any other person than Mr. Maberly ask for gold in Scotland. Now, we have also the evidence of Mr. Maberly, and have the means, therefore, of ascertaining how this demand was met. Mr. Maberly says—"I demanded payment; leaving the Scotch bankers their option of paying me in gold, in Bank of England notes, or in bills at sight on London." Mr. Maberly seems to have been ready to be content 1093 with any payment they would give him. He had their notes, and desired some other description of money. He would willingly have got Bank of England notes, or bills on London, or any description of payment. But, observe how his demand is received. "They made (says he), in many instances, an attempt to detain my people all day by giving them silver; that I rejected in the first instance, because I had no right to take more than 40s.; they then set up a right of holding every single note as a separate demand, and, therefore, that they had a right to pay each in silver, because each note was a separate demand; however they shortly waived that, and paid in gold. The whole of this, before the new sovereigns came out, had to be weighed, and my people were kept whole days in some of their shops, from the quantity of light gold offered them." This was the proceeding of, it would appear, the principal bank in Scotland when payment was demanded of its notes, and that not on any extraordinary occasion. And it is plain that if the banks of Scotland, generally, were to support each other in such a system as this, a restriction on cash payments, too strong for the people to break through, might, without the aid of any law, be practically established. The evidence tends to show that this is their aim. Mr. Thompson says, "that if an individual were offered a 20s. note of any bank in Scotland or a sovereign, I do not know a person who would, not prefer a note to a sovereign. Such is the taste of the people." But then he says afterwards—"I think, if you multiply the circulation of sovereigns you would make it more probable that those panics would ensue, that the taste for gold would follow." Another evidence says, that by introducing gold into the circulation, the habit of panic and of runs on the banks would be produced. The Scotch paper is further guarded. It is not payable, either the small notes or the large, in the places where it is issued. How is a Scotch labourer at Glasgow, in possession of a Glasgow one-pound note, and desirous to obtain a sovereign for it, to proceed? He must carry his note to Edinburgh; he may, indeed, send it through another banker, but suppose he prefers a piece of gold to the credit of any banker? Here is a perfect restriction established. No panic can take place under such circumstances, nor a Scotch bank be subjected to the test of gold payments.
1094 But the making cash notes not payable where they are issued, has been uniformly treated as a vicious practice in this House. A bill is now going through the House to compel the banks of Ireland to pay their notes where they are issued: an act has already passed, imposing a like condition on English bankers, though no English banker attempted, as far as I know, to free himself from the liability of paying his smaller notes at home, or ever thought of reserving the right of imposing on a labourer, who might hold one of his notes, the penalty of taking that note to London, if he should desire payment. What pretence, then, is there, for giving to the Scotch bankers, public and private, a preference over the English banks, on the ground of the superior stability of their paper, and their freedom from panic? There was no panic in Scotland, says the committee, in 1825, nor any stoppage of payment among the Scotch banks. There could be none: no payment in gold could be obtained. That there would have been no panics or failures amongst the country bankers in England, if they had adopted a similar course, is evident: the panic in the country ceased as soon as the sovereigns were exhausted, and one-pound notes were substituted in their place. An hon. friend of mine, a member of this House, described, in December, 1825, the panic in his town in these words:—"The fury of the people for gold increased with the quantity paid; but, about one o'clock on Friday, arrived our first supply of Bank of England one-pound notes. The amount was not large; but we divided them amongst all our neighbours. The effect was like throwing a wet blanket on a flame, and in an hour the town was perfectly quiet." The panic was a desire to obtain gold. When nothing better could be obtained from the country bankers than one piece of paper for another, the panic was at an end.
I have entered into these details, because I consider them essential for bringing this question fully before the view of the House. It is not a question of the insignificant interests of the bankers in any part of the kingdom, but of the general interest of the community, concerned in this question, generally, to an uncertain, and probably to a serious extent. We are about to give to different parts of this kingdom a different legislation. For the last thirty years, at least, the same cur- 1095 rency, founded on the same laws, has existed in Scotland and in England. We have no ground before us to justify the change now proposed; nor can this House, with any regard to its own character, its consistency, or the interests it has to deal with, refuse to appoint the proposed committee.
Sir F. Burdettsaid, that at that late hour he should not think himself excusable in trespassing longer upon the time of the House, than was necessary for him briefly to express his sentiments in support of the amendment of the hon. baronet, confining himself simply to the expression of those sentiments, without-entering on the details, which were certainly important, but to which at that time of the night, and after a debate so protracted, he could not venture to trust himself. He could not avoid saying, however, that he considered the hon. baronet to have done a service to his country by the statement he had made on a subject of such importance to its vital interests: and he was surprised, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, and the protracted debate, when he considered the ability that had been displayed by the hon. baronet, and the information that had been brought to the discussion of the question by every hon. gentleman that had spoken upon it, and especially by the hon. member who had just sat down, who had presented for their consideration subjects well worthy of their best attention, and which few were capable of so well laying before them, that the House should not have displayed more patience in listening to the debate. Confident he was, that, if the House did its duty by attending to the statements of those hon. members, they would hesitate before they opposed the attempt to procure an inquiry, which was proved, more than ever, to be now necessary to the well-being of the country. There were two things in which he considered the right hon. Secretary for the Home Department to have been peculiarly infelicitous. He was unfortunate in having his name originally connected with this measure, which had been productive of more positive suffering, more unmixed misery, more breaking-up of the sources of wealth throughout the country, than any other that had ever been devised. It was true that this bill had not been adopted: but, whenever there had been an approach to its completion, whenever they 1096 had reached a point of approximation, which they had once, twice, or three times done, it was always sure to produce distress, and they were compelled on each occasion to arrest in its progress that blind design which the ministers had made up their minds to carry into effect. He thought, too, that the right hon. gentleman had been most infelicitous in his reply to the hon. baronet. The facts of the hon. baronet had not been touched upon at all by the right hon. gentleman, and his reasonings had received no answer which could be considered, in any degree, satisfactory. The right hon. gentleman had, it was true, fixed upon two or three instances of what he called inaccuracy of statement, or misapprehension of authorities, in the speech of the hon. baronet; but he apprehended that the right hon. gentleman would be found to have been infelicitous in his observations even upon these. Since the time of Adam Smith, the public mind had greatly advanced in knowledge upon these subjects. The acuteness of Hume had, as it were, thrown forth the first spark which enlightened us upon these difficult and delicate subjects. The right hon. gentleman had, however, quoted Locke upon this question, and had expressed his wonder that the hon. baronet could so much misapprehend the meaning of that author, in the quotation introduced into his speech to support the inquiry. Now, it appeared to him that the hon. baronet's quotation of Locke was strictly in point, and the quotation of the right hon. gentleman calculated to support the very opposite side of the question which he wished to maintain. The right hon. gentleman had observed, that Mr. Locke was contending against Mr. Lowndes upon the injustice of altering the standard of value, because the debt was contracted in a legal and proper standard. Mr. Locke, like an honest man, maintained that it would be unjust to contract the debt in one standard, and pay it in a lower, but he would ask, was that at all applicable to our case? Were we not paying a debt contracted in a debased currency?—a debt which no man could give any sufficient reason for the country, being thus depressed, to pay up; and in paying which in the present currency, we were not only doing a lasting injury to the country, but committing an act of injustice to three fourths of the nation, The right hon. member for Liver- 1097 pool was so inconsistent with himself upon this subject, that his opinions were scarcely to be guessed at. When, however, he maintained the doctrine of high prices, he had taken the sound and rational view of the question. It was impossible, however, that the interests of all those whose capital was fluctuating could, under this state of things, be reconciled with the interest of annuitants, whose property was fixed and nominal. It was undoubtedly hard upon them; but when it was understood how small a portion they formed of the nation, and when it was considered how much all the agricultural classes, and the trading classes and shopkeepers, and every other class, had suffered from the change of a depreciated currency to a higher, and when it was recollected in how short a time that change had taken place, he believed that if hon. gentlemen had understood as much when they consented to that change as they do now, and had it to do over again, they would no more have consented to it, than to the wildest project which the imagination of man can conceive.—The right hon. Secretary had also found fault with the hon. baronet's quotation from Hume; and in that he was equally infelicitous, because, according to the right, hon. gentleman, Hume advocated a constantly increasing circulating medium. Mr. Hume, in that point, fell into an error; and the right hon. gentleman closed in with the error, and adopted it for the support of his argument. It was now, however, he believed, well understood, that nothing could possibly be more injurious to a country, than a currency either increasing or decreasing, although the right hon. gentleman did not seem to understand any thing about it. The policy of a government was, to guard against these alterations. Their object was, if possible, to keep prices always the same; and by that means only could they hope to do justice between man and man.—The hon. baronet then proceeded to argue that the chancellor of the Exchequer had proceeded upon loose and insufficient data in his calculations with respect to the number of small notes in circulation, which he believed to be nearer six millions than two, as the right hon. gentleman asserted. The data of the calculations were so loose, that they ought not to legislate upon them; and that was another reason why there ought to be an inquiry. After observing upon the great 1098 injury inflicted upon the country by the withdrawal of any part of the circulating medium—an injury which had caused a loss to the country of late years to an amount almost equal to the whole national debt—the hon. baronet declared, that the landowners were not opposed to the interests of the public creditor; on the contrary, he had heard many of them declare that they were willing to make any sacrifice to satisfy the just claims of the national creditor. Government were not, perhaps, aware of the consequences of what they were about to do. He could not, however, avoid suspecting that the right hon. gentleman felt some misgivings upon the subject, and that he regretted the course he had taken upon this subject. He must feel that he cannot, by a vote of the House, set the question at rest, and that it will press upon him again and again until he grants an inquiry. It was an easy thing to talk of decision, and to recommend it, but decision was not at all times commendable. It was well calculated to win campaigns and to win cabinets, but in such a question as that now under discussion, caution, deliberation, and inquiry, were more desirable qualities. A mere vote of that House would not satisfy the country—it would not meet the expectations of the country—it would not allay alarm; there would be more wisdom in delay and deliberation, than in rash and summary proceedings. He thought that the currency of the country—in England, Scotland, and Ireland—should be equal and uniform. It might be said, that a small-note circulation might be suited to Ireland and Scotland, but not to England. Ireland, on account of her negligence; and Scotland, on account of her prudence, might be permitted to have those notes, though they were declared to be unfit for England. But he would say, as Voltaire was stated to have said to a physician, respecting a regimen—he requested him "to wait until he had more strength." So he would say to the political physicians of the State—do not establish a system of currency which will place this country in a disadvantageous situation with respect to Scotland or Ireland, or if you are determined to impose it, "wait until she has more strength to bear it than she has at present." The hon. baronet concluded by expressing his determination to support the amendment.
§ Mr. Huskissonrose to explain. He 1099 said, he could not now enter into a refutation of the inconsistencies in the speech of the hon. baronet who had just sat down, or of the hon. member for Callington who preceded him. He would only explain so far as to vindicate himself from the charge of inconsistency on this question. What he had said was borne out by far higher authorities than himself. He had said, that it was a proof of the happy state of a country when there was a gradual and steady tendency towards high prices, from sound, natural, and permanent causes, but that high prices proceeding from artificial causes—from rash and dangerous speculation, or from any other temporary and unsatisfactory source, so far from being a proof of national prosperity, was the reverse. That was what he had said, and by which he abided; he wished, therefore, whatever other inconsistencies he might be charged with, that his name should not he connected with doctrines which were shameless and unprincipled, and calculated to promote fraud, and lead to national bankruptcy.
Mr. Attwoodcalled upon the right hon. gentleman to explain what he meant by imputing to him the promulgation of doctrines shameless and unprincipled.
§ Mr. Huskissonsaid, that the doctrines advocated by the hon. member were calculated to promote fraud, and lead to national bankruptcy.
Mr. Attwoodreplied, that the right hon. gentleman was the advocate of doctrines far more calculated to promote fraud, and lead to bankruptcy, than any which he supported.
§ The House divided:—for the amendment 45; against it 154; majority 109. The motion of the chancellor of the Exchequer was then agreed to.
| List of the Minority. | |
| Astley, sir J. | Euston, lord |
| Bell, M. | Ennismore, lord |
| Baring, sir T. | Guise, sir W. |
| Bright, H. | Heathcote, G. |
| Benett, J. | Hume, J. |
| Bankes, H. | Howard, H. |
| Buck, L. | Kemp, T. R. |
| Burdett, sir F. | Keck, L. |
| Calvert, N. | Kennedy, T. F. |
| Clive, lord | Liddel, H. T. |
| Corbett, P. | Lloyd, sir E. |
| Cholmeley, M. J. | Milbank, R. |
| Cotterell, sir J. | Maberly, J. |
| Dawson, A. | Marjoribanks, S. |
| Dickinson, W. | Martin, J. |
| Davenport. E. D. | Martin, J. C. |
| O'Brien, W. | Vyvyan, sir R. |
| Powlett, lord W. | Waithman, ald. |
| Palmer, C. F. | Wood, ald. |
| Pendarvis, E. W. | Williams, sir R. |
| Robarts, A. | Wodehouse, E |
| Smith, S. | Webb, col. |
| Smith, A. | Wrottesley, sir J. |
| Sibthorp, Col. | TELLERS. |
| Slaney, R. A. | |
| Tuite, H. M. | Attwood, M. |
| Thompson, ald. | Graham, sir J. |