HC Deb 08 May 1827 vol 17 cc675-82
Lord Althorp

said, it would be recollected that, in the beginning of this session, he had given notice of three different motions which he intended to bring forward; one of them he had framed upon the suggestion of a noble friend of his; the other two he had some time since originated. The object of these motions, generally, was to diminish the expense of elections. In the first instance, he had moved for a Committee to inquire into the modes to be adopted for diminishing the expenses of County Elections. The House was kind enough to grant that committee, which had now been sitting for a considerable period, and would, he believed, soon report. The other proposition, and which, up to this time, he had been unavoidably prevented from bringing forward in a more complete shape, was one for diminishing the expenses of all elections generally, but principally those of elections for boroughs. He did not mean to say that the bill he now intended to bring in went to more than one class of the evils which it was his object to remedy; but it seemed to him better that the House should apply themselves to the redress of those evils after this manner, one by one, and step by step; for that mode of proceeding would enable them to understand the position in which they were placed with respect to these objects. As he did not apprehend that any objection would be made to the bill he would now move for leave to bring in, he would not trouble the House with any arguments in support of it. But it might be necessary for him to explain what the grievances were to which the bill was meant to apply, and by what means those grievances were to be remedied. Hon. gentlemen were aware, that many acts of parliament had passed for the prevention of direct bribery at elections; but the effect of those acts was evaded in very many different ways. One of these methods was, by candidates employing a large number of voters in different places, and paying them for pretended services, in order to secure their votes. And, so completely was this the fact, that different prices were paid to those who gave the candidate, in whose interest they were, plumpers, from those who gave him half, or split, votes. The plumpers were paid for at a double rate, as compared with the half votes. In desiring to relieve elections from this sort of charges, he was not applying himself to the case of those who were called "election agents" only; for, to do so, would be to push the principle he was desirous of carrying into execution to a very small extent. He meant to extend it to a great number of other individuals, being voters, who were very commonly employed on such occasions, under a variety of denominations, as messengers, flagmen, runners, and musicians; musicians, by-the-bye, who had never played upon any musical instrument in the whole course of their lives. It was with a view to prevent this species of general bribery as effectually as possible, that he now called upon the House for leave to introduce the bill he spoke of. By that bill he did not propose to inflict positive penalties upon any parties. Such penalties, under such circumstances, he thought it was not desirable to create; nor was it any more his wish to punish the persons so ostensibly employed in such capacities, than it was to punish those who might pretend thus to employ them. But he wanted to take away the temptation from the candidate to offer such inducements to the voter, and from the voter to accept them, by rendering the vote of any elector so employed useless and invalid, at the election of the candidate employing him. He might mention many instances in which the effect of such employment was equivalent to the most direct bribery; as in cases where a candidate, pending the election, had paid the barber who shaved him one or two guineas for his trouble, the barber being one of his constituents. The means by which he proposed to prevent these practices for the future, were—to enact, that any person so employed, or paid, by a candidate, or others in his behalf (adopting, in this respect, the very words of the act against bribery), should not be allowed to vote at the election of the candidate, by, or for whom, he may have been, at such times, employed. From the nature of this proposition, it would be seen, that he did not wish to disfranchise the parties. But its effect would be, not to prevent candidates from employing any description of persons whose services, in their respective capacities, might be really of use to them; but, to prevent them from availing themselves of their purchased votes, under the mere pretence of employing them. In conclusion, he moved for leave "to bring in a Bill to prevent corrupt practices at Elections of Members to serve in Parliament, and for diminishing the expense of such Elections."

Mr. Wynn

observed, that the case mentioned by the noble lord, of the pretended musician-voters, as well as that of the person so exorbitantly paid for shaving the candidate's chin, came clearly within the rule and scope of the old Bribery acts. Still, there were so many considerations attaching to this subject, which might be gone into with advantage, on the introduction of the bill proposed, that he would certainly support the motion.

Sir C. Burrell

hoped, that the operation of the bill was not meant to exclude all persons employed and paid by candidates for their services at elections. It would be hard, indeed, if its effect should be to disfranchise so generally respectable a body of men, for instance, as election agents; whose services were usually very valuable to the candidate, and many other meritorious persons, whose exertions might be perfectly unimpeachable, though paid for.

Mr. Brougham

felt himself under obligation to his noble friend, for this endeavour to put a stop to the great, and, as his late election experience proved beyond all doubt, the growing evil of election expenses. Well, however, as he wished the measure, if he thought it was fairly open to those objections which had been stated to it by an hon. baronet, or that it would at all abridge the elective franchise, he should be the last man to support it. But he could not regard it in the same light as the hon. baronet viewed it. If he was to rule, that any person exercising any certain trade, profession, or employment, was not to be allowed to vote at any election, which certain trade or occupation such person used generally, habitually, and independently of the election, and that such person might have voted if he had not been so employed, that would be undoubtedly a disfranchisement. But what his noble friend's bill said was this—to the barber, suppose, who had been alluded to— "if you exercise the trade of a barber generally, habitually, and independently of this election, such employment shall be no bar to your voting; but if, on the morning of the election, you shall shave the candidate's chin, and receive fifty guineas for it, then do I hold you guilty, not of shaving, but of bribery." But, bad and imperfect as the present law was, it did not, in his opinion, require a declaratory clause to explain that such a case as this came within its operation. Nor did he believe, notwithstanding all that he had seen and heard of committees lately—and he had heard accounts of these committees which he should have had great difficulty in believing, if he had not had them from undoubted authority—that any committee appointed under the Grenville act, could entertain a doubt as to such cases. It was very true, therefore, that the law as to such cases was sufficiently explicit; but others had been stated by his noble friend, in principle the same, though perhaps not so obviously so; and, as it might be doubtful whether they were reachable by the present law, it was, at the least, safer to adopt this more comprehensive bill, by which all persons employed at elections, such as musicians, bearers of flags, and all persons who filled such like important and respon- sible offices, and whose services every one knew were overpaid, should be disqualified from voting at that election. Every gentleman knew the heavy expenses which candidates were subjected to, in paying agents, not only for their professional assistance, but by way of enlisting in their cause the electioneering influence of those persons, and of securing their votes. He had no objection to candidates employing such agents at elections: they might give them ten guineas a-day if they were foolish enough to do so, but let it be to them as canvassers, and much good might their services do these gentlemen; but let them not, under such a colour, buy up an elector's vote. By law, and by the spirit of the constitution, every elector ought to tender his vote for the candidate whom he thought the most fit to represent the particular county or borough in parliament; but, in consequence of this influence, he tendered it as the hired and paid agent of the candidate. Could it, then, be called disfranchisement, when agents were told, that, because of the retainer which they had received from any particular candidate, they were placed under a temporary restraint as to voting? For they were supposed to be incapable of disinterestedly discharging the duty of a judge—as an elector ought to be—of the merits of the party soliciting their suffrages. For these reasons he wished success to this measure; but he wished it had been carried further. His noble friend had addressed his attention to the defects of the law, as it affected the proceedings in elections out of doors; but he would recommend his noble friend to extend his measure to that acknowledged evil—the growing misdirection of Election Committees in that House. He had heard so much of the abuses to which he had referred, that he was greatly disposed to move for the minutes of some of the committees which had sat on the late elections. This was the first occasion that had presented itself for the expression of his sentiments on those crying outrages, not only on all legal principles, and on all justice, but on all common honesty and common sense, which he had heard of with astonishment, and at first with great incredulity. He alluded to the conduct of the committees up stairs. One suggestion he would throw out for the amendment of the Election laws. According to the present practice, two nominees were appointed; wherein, he thought, lay much of the evil. One committee, thus constituted, had recently decided in this way:—they would not allow that A had treated B, though it was offered to be proved that A had given a commission to another to bribe B. There were other instances equally scandalous: and sure he was, it was high time to revise this constitutional tribunal for trying contested elections. One case he would also mention, in which a committee had decided, that one borough could not have another borough contained within it, because there was a right of common over it. There were no two lawyers in Westminster-hall who would have hesitated one moment in coming to a decision; but which the committee did not, until after they had entailed grievous expenses on the parties, and after seven or eight days discussion. He wished success to every measure which tended to purify elections of the enormous expense attending them; both as regarded candidates at the poll, and those whose election was questioned after their return. This could be accomplished only by a tribunal in the nature of a court of justice. He was a moderate reformer—one of those who, on account of their moderation, had been called mock reformers. His object was practical reform; and, so cautious was he in the advances he made, that he would not lift one foot from the ground, until he found that the other was firmly planted. He knew that in advancing, he had to walk beside a precipice; and, therefore, he would move with care along the devious path. When daylight broke upon him, he might proceed more boldly; but he found himself, at the beginning of his journey, surrounded with darkness and danger. He might again be charged with being a mock reformer; but he would adhere to these principles, and support his noble friend in his partial and moderate, but at the same time, real, substantial, and useful, reform of the law of election. There were two measures which he should like to have ingrafted on this bill. One was the abolition of the nominees. These appointments were, in every case, a deep mockery of justice, and serious injury to the parties, and he might add, to the nominees themselves—for no situation could be more painful, perplexing, and anomalous than theirs. They were sworn to do justice equally, yet called at the will of the parties to be their representatives. On the one hand, they were bound by their oath to act impartially; on the other, they were under the not less solemn obligation of honour to maintain and defend the interests of their friends. The consequence was, that the nominees always went into the committee greatly to their own discontent, if they were conscientious persons; and greatly to that of the opposite party, if they were of a different character. On one side, they were perhaps charged with not having done enough for their friend; and on the other, they were accused of having violated their duty, which was, to judge with perfect impartiality between the parties. He recommended that, instead of appointing these nominees, both parties should unite in naming a chairman to the committee, who would act as referee on all disputed points. By this course, most probably, an experienced, steady, and just man, would be appointed chairman, and the same justice would be done in these cases as between parties who submitted to the award of an arbitrator. A change also, he thought, should take place in striking the list of the committee. Instead of taking, in the first instance, forty-eight names to be reduced by the parties to thirteen, he would rather they should take the first twelve that were drawn, without any striking at all; or they might draw out eighteen, and strike out only two or three each; as, by possibility, a relative or friend having the same interest might be among the original number. Even if one objectionable name remained, after the peremptory challenge, it would, upon the whole, be better than pursuing the practice which was expressively termed striking out the brains of the committee. Under the existing system, the parties sought for a chance of honesty, by abandoning all chance of ability. The hon. and learned gentleman concluded with repeating his conviction, that the expenses of elections ought to be reduced to the lowest practicable amount.

Mr. Spring Rice

recommended the insertion of a clause, to declare giving cockades and ribbons an act of bribery. These favours, as they were called, formed a large item in the candidates expenses, and answered no other purpose than that of giving greater vigour to the display of party opposition. The practice had been proscribed by the law of Ireland since 1796, and it would be a commendable alteration in the election law of this country.

Lord Althorp,

in reply, said, he had no objection to introduce any clauses which would lessen the expenses of elections; but he was afraid of hazarding the success of the bill itself, by tacking upon it suggestions which might not be generally approved of.

Mr. Wynn

said, he had, in the early part of the session, given notice of a bill for next session, which would consolidate all the election law. That bill was postponed, only because he wished to let the committees dispose of the cases arising out of the general election; as by these results many useful hints might be furnished. He was willing either to go on with the bill, if such was the pleasure of the House, or to hand it over to his hon. and learned friend. If he was to give an opinion, he should say that this question would be better discussed by being treated extensively, than by piecemeal.

Mr. Alderman Wood

said, he had been present at almost every ballot that had taken place this session, yet he had not been elected a nominee upon any committee, with the exception of one; and that he had not known the gentleman who had asked him to be his nominee upon that occasion. However, he had succeeded in securing that gentleman's return to parliament. He approved of retaining nominees, as without them he did not think the interests of petitioning parties would be protected.

Mr. H. Twiss

said, that as committees were at present constituted, they acted like juries, without the superintendence of juidicial authority; and perhaps such an authority could not be introduced without introducing also a power that might interfere with the power of that House, which would, perhaps, be productive of greater inconvenience than even the present system. He thought that considerable improvement would be effected, by establishing some mode of determining the validity of questionable votes on the spot on which they were taken, and not of having recourse to the scrutiny before the committee, as at present, where much greater difficulty lay in the way of duly ascertaining and determining them.

Leave was given to bring in the bill.