HC Deb 22 March 1827 vol 16 cc1313-40
Mr. Hume

said, that in rising to submit to the House the question of which he had so long given notice, he felt it necessary to state, that whatever he should now do upon this subject would be done by him with the greatest reluctance. He would not have submitted this matter to their consideration, if he had not been fully convinced of its great importance as relating to our government in India, and to all our connections with the affairs of that country. The occurrence to which he was about to call the attention of the House took place in the early part of the month of November, 1824. When he mentioned that date, a question might naturally arise, why so great a delay had occurred in laying a subject of so much importance before parliament. Upon that point he should only state, that in the middle of the month of July, 1825, in the course of the session of that year, he had requested to know from the President of the Board of Control, whether the government of this country had received any information of the transactions which had taken place in India in the November preceding? The right hon. gentleman answered then in the negative; and gave the same answer up to the last week in the session, when it was too late to take any step on the subject. In the last session he had given two notices upon this subject; but by some of those chances which frequently occurred, he was twice prevent- ed from making those notices the subjects of discussion; nor had he any opportunity whatever for so doing, until towards the close of the session, when the lateness of the period, together with the expected arrival of that officer, whose conduct was chiefly the subject of discussion, and whose presence in this country was desirable, that he might immediately meet the charge, had induced him to postpone his motion. When the present session arrived, he felt the most anxious wish to introduce the matter to the notice of the House; and he should certainly have done so before this time, but for the important subjects which had occupied so much of their attention. He felt that it was at any time a delicate matter to interfere on subjects relating to the army, perhaps more so on this than on many other occasions; but he felt it to be a positive duty for him now to take upon himself this task, and to bring under the notice of the House the proceedings of the executive in India, with regard to the management of the army. He acknowledged that he should not have been warranted in calling the attention of the House to the subject, but on account of its very great importance. He knew that, in all armies, as well at home as abroad, some instance of insubordination among some of the troops, might, at one time or other, be discovered. The degree of importance of any such instance of insubordination would vary according to time, place and circumstance; and some might be of a very trifling nature; but, in the East Indian army, where there were at least one hundred and twenty thousand native troops to twenty-five thousand British soldiers, any thing which affected it in such a manner, as to tend, in the slightest degree, to create a feeling of insubordination, must always be a matter of the highest importance. It should always be remembered that we held possession of India but by a very small numerical force, at least compared to the number of the natives employed in our service; and it should always be a matter to which our general officers and governors should devote their utmost care and attention, to uphold, as much as possible, the character of our officers and soldiers, not merely for their superiority of military skill, discipline, and courage, but for their moral conduct, in carrying on the government of that immense country.

Having made these general observations, he should now state the circumstances of that transaction on which he wished to take the opinion of the House. The governor-general of India had, in consequence of some manifestation of enmity on the part of a native prince, deemed it necessary to embark in hostilities against him. That resolution was taken in October, 1824, and in furtherance of it, some troops were sent towards the frontiers. Among these troops were the men composing a battalion of the 47th native regiment, who were marched from Futtaghur, which was about a thousand miles up the country, towards the eastern frontier. What he was now about to move, related to the order given them to march from Barrackpore, where they had assembled, towards the Burmese territory, and to their refusal to obey it; a refusal which, on account of the line of conduct that, he contended, had been improperly pursued by the commander-in-chief, led to the destruction of three or four hundred of their number in a very short space of time. There were two questions upon which he thought the House would require to be informed. In the first place, they would desire to obtain some knowledge as to what had been the causes, the existence of which had led to this insubordination and mutiny; and secondly, they would wish to know whether proper measures, such as were consistent with the maintenance of strict discipline, and at the same time with a spirit of humanity, had been employed to bring these mutineers back to their duty. When they were satisfied upon these two points they would be able to decide, whether the loss of life that had occurred had not been owing to the mischief of not properly carrying into effect those means that might have been resorted to for the purpose of restoring order without having recourse to bloodshed. There was no man who had been in India, that would not readily bear testimony to the general good conduct of the native troops—none that would not agree with him in saying, that whenever these native troops had been led into action by the side of our countrymen, they had manifested as much zeal and courage in the service as the British soldiers. He was positive that all who knew them would concur in the statement, that on all these occasions they had shewn the same zeal, alacrity, and bravery, and. had displayed the same gallantry, that had so honourably distinguished our countrymen in the service there. At the same time, he was bound to acknowledge, that they had occasionally displayed acts of insubordination. That, however, ought not to be resorted to as an argument against them, any more than against the European troops, for the same thing had occurred in the European corps.

He should now proceed to consider the circumstances to which the mutiny of the native troops was to be attributed, repeating what he had before said, that their insubordination was no more a reproach to them than to our own troops, and that the corps of British and of native troops ought both to be placed on the same footing in that respect. If, as he had already asserted, the native troops were distinguished by general good conduct, and those who had served with them were prepared to bear testimony to their merit, he thought they would concur with him in saying, that the circumstances which had led to the mutiny of these troops must have been of a most extraordinary nature. The battalion of the 47th native regiment had but a short time before been brought down from the upper provinces, from Futtaghur, which was about a thousand miles up the country, and up to the time of their being assembled with the other troops at Barrackpore, he believed that no troops had shewn greater readiness or good will in the service. The service to which they were destined was certainly not one that was likely to create much enthusiasm. Some alarm had arisen throughout the country, not only from the proceedings that had taken place on the eastern frontier, but also from the fear that the native troops of Bengal had acquired religious prejudices that would prevent them from acting with their usual zeal and alacrity; and, indeed, that they would manifest a greater degree of unwillingness than on any other occasion to quit their own territory. That unwillingness might not only have been expected, but could have been easily accounted for, by a variety of circumstances. First of all, it was known that the troops which had preceded them had suffered great privations, that many had been disabled by sickness, and they naturally feared that they should suffer in the same manner; the more especially as they were in a state of destitution, as to many things that were absolutely necessary. In speaking thus of these troops, he could not avoid drawing a contrast between the troops sent from the Bengal, and those sent from the Madras, establishment. The Madras troops were in a much better condition as to all necessary equipments. He, therefore, distinguished between these troops, as the two governments under which they acted had so differently provided for their wants. The Madras regiment came down to the military station fully equipped, and in a short time received directions to proceed, together with the Bengal troops, towards the eastern frontier, in order to enter upon the Burmese war. A short time previously to their being assembled for that purpose, about three hundred men had deserted from one corps, on account of their unwillingness to go upon such an expedition. Towards the latter part of the month of October, these troops received orders to march from Barrackpore. On the 22nd of that month a report was presented to colonel Cartwright, stating the impossibility of their moving forward, unless cattle, carriages, and other conveniences were afforded them for the conveyance of their baggage. He believed it would be found that this report had ultimately been forwarded by colonel Cartwright to the Presidency. The conveniences they required were such as the experience of former services had proved to be necessary; and the demand of the troops was not, therefore, to be wondered at. Whether that document had found its way to the commander-in-chief, and from him to the government, he was not able to say; and it was his wish, and indeed his object in the present motion, to ascertain that fact. All he knew was, that every day the anxiety of those native troops to obtain the necessary carriages became more earnest, and they urged that their demands should be granted without further delay. Their request was, in some measure no doubt, strengthened by the superior attention which they saw had been paid to the comfort of the Madras troops. These troops having been landed on the Bengal territory, had daily rations distributed to them, while the Bengal troops had none. The former, too, had great coats given them to protect them from the excessive rains, while none were allowed to the latter, who had to bear the same inclemencies of the weather; and this difference existed between the troops of the two Presidencies, although both were acting in the same service. Sir Thomas Monro, the president of the Madras establishment, had so well provided for the troops sent from his Presidency, that they formed a most striking contrast to the miserable condition of the Bengal troops. On no former occasion had men turned out in such numbers or in better condition. The Madras troops amounted to ten thousand, all of whom were volunteers; and the zeal, alacrity, and readiness they had manifested, were admirably supported by the very excellent arrangements of sir Thomas Monro. The battalion of native Bengal troops required additional batta, which, undoubtedly, would have created an additional expense to the government; but if that expense was necessary, the troops were justified in demanding it. They were told, however, that they could not have the cattle, nor the carriages they required. When that answer was given to the Hindoo troops, the reply they made was that which might naturally have been expected. They said, "if we are made coolies (that is beasts of burden), how can we fight? How can we be both coolies and soldiers. It has always been our pride to be soldiers, and we are willing to do our duty as soldiers, but we cannot use our arms, and carry burthens at the same time." Now, he could hardly think that the commander-in-chief was ignorant of these circumstances, as colonel Cartwright and general Dalzel had made the requisite statements to the Presidency. On the 30th of October, these native troops were told, that they could not have the cattle, and that march they must. Now he must observe, that this refusal did not at all accord with what had generally been the practice in that country, where it had always been the custom to obtain in such circumstances the assistance of the civil magistrate. These orders and that answer drove the men to insubordination, and the blame of creating that insubordination seemed to him not to rest with the men who committed it, so much as with the officers, who were, or ought to be, answerable for the complaints. The want of cattle at that time was so great, that from within fifty miles round, all the cattle had been pressed into the service of the government; and, at the very time that cattle were refused to the troops, there were no less than ten or fifteen thousand head of cattle at a place a short distance from Fort Wil- liam, which was only twelve miles from the spot where they were required, and where they might have been applied to the necessary purposes of the government. Indeed, the government ultimately appeared to be satisfied that the demand which the men had made was reasonable, since they actually issued money to enable them to purchase or to hire cattle for their service. The manner in which that issue was made, or rather a statement which accompanied it, seemed to him to prove, in the clearest manure, that the Commander-in-chief, sir Edward Paget, could not have informed the general government of the necessity of furnishing the troops with cattle, since their own order for the issue of money, which was dated on the 4th of November, distinctly stated, that as soon as they were informed of the necessity of furnishing cattle to the troops, they had issued money to the men for the purpose of procuring them. The issue of money, however, under the circumstances to which he had already alluded, was not the best course that could have been pursued; since, even if the sum issued had been four times as great as it was, the troops could not, without the assistance of the government, have procured the cattle they required. The issue of money, therefore, was but adding insult to the previous denial. On the Monday morning the troops declared, that unless the grievances of which they complained were redressed, they must decline to march, and they expected that justice would be done them. They demanded either to have the cattle furnished to them, or to have inquiry to ascertain how far their complaints were well grounded. He contended that troops had never before been ordered to march under such circumstances.

On the 1st of November, sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-chief, thinking it necessary to put down at once any symptoms of insubordination, went down to Barrackpore, having previously ordered thither a large body of English and native troops, and several pieces of artillery. Now, he admitted, that whenever a corps was in a state of insubordination, their mutiny ought to be put down; and he did not quarrel with the measures that had been adopted for that purpose, but with the mode which had been pursued. The hon. member here produced a plan of the place, where the forty-seventh Native regiment had been assembled at Barrack- pore, and by its aid described the manner in which they had been surrounded by the Body Guards, the Royals, and by his majesty's forty-seventh regiment, and entered into a detail of the circumstances under which the massacre took place. He then contended that, if sir Edward Paget had informed the mutinous troops of his determination to enforce obedience, and of the means he possessed to do so, they would instantly have obeyed him, and this dreadful destruction of life might have been avoided. These troops had only ten minutes given them to decide whether they would march or not; and then, without being informed of the force that could instantly be employed against them—without having shown the slightest disposition to resist—without having loaded one musket, they were treated in the severest manner, and were, at the end of the assigned time, shot down by a fire opened by the artillery, and supported by the Royals; and, when their battalion broke, they were charged by the cavalry. None of those means which common humanity would have dictated were employed. The men were kept in ignorance of the force under the command of sir Edward Paget. The troops under his orders and the artillery were kept in ambuscade, until the work of destruction began, when these unhappy persons were hunted down in such a manner, that not one of them was afterwards to be found. The loss on this occasion had been computed at four or five hundred men—some said six hundred; but he should be content to put it at the moderate estimate of three hundred men. There was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the details of this unhappy affair, because the press of India was shackled, and the only information that could be obtained was through the statements of private persons. The press of India, besides its general restraint, was in this instance put under a special interdiction. A circular was sent from the government to the papers, forbidding the mention of this circumstance until the official statement of it should have appeared. All the details, therefore, were suppressed; for no persons would dare to publish them, since they knew that such a publication would have been attended with the same punishment and the same ruin that had before been inflicted on others who had ventured to disobey such commands. From private information, however, there was sufficient evidence to shew the real nature of the transaction.—The hon. member here referred to a letter which he stated to have been written by one field-officer to another. It was dated from Fort William, and spoke in strong terms of the melancholy occurrence which had then taken place. The writer, however, stated, that he was not present on the occasion of the firing on the native troops.—The men who fled to the river were sniped and shot in the water; and so indiscriminate was the slaughter, that he believed he was correct instating, that a number of country people, in no way connected with the disturbance, were destroyed in the fury of the pursuit. Such had been the progress and result of this unfortunate mutiny. Courts martial were held first upon forty, who were found guilty, and six of whom were executed. On the 8th of November, twenty more were tried and convicted, four of whom were hanged; and on a subsequent day, forty-two men of the forty-seventh Native regiment were brought to trial; the charge was proved against them, and they were sentenced; but he did not believe that, in the whole, more than twelve of the mutineers had been hanged. They were hanged on the parade; and, what he believed had never occurred before, one of the offenders long remained exposed in chains, to keep up the memory of this melancholy affair, which the House was now told ought to be allowed to sleep without further disturbance. He thought he was warranted in asserting—whether by order of the government, or by the instrumentality of sir Edward Paget, he knew not—that to this moment the country was in ignorance of the real causes which had occasioned such disastrous consequences, excepting by means of private information. On the 4th November, a general order had been issued from Fort William, which stated that the mutiny could not have occurred without the previous knowledge of the native officers; it therefore directed that the forty-seventh regiment, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers, should be disgraced, and the officers discharged, and declared unworthy of the confidence of government. In the issuing of such a hasty order, culpability rested somewhere, and it was for the House to ascertain whether any and what portion of it was attributable to sir Edward Paget. The fact was, that the officers having failed in persuading the mutineers to aban- don their design, had left them to their misguided judgments, and had notwithstanding been dismissed the service, and involved in indiscriminate disgrace.

Such had been the effect of this violent course upon the native army in India, that had not affairs taken a favourable turn both in the east and west of our possessions, the consequences might have been most fatal. If one point more than another demanded investigation, it was the reasons that could be assigned for this sweeping act of power, which confounded the innocent with the guilty. The loss of life, the squandering of human blood, was another question which he was satisfied the House would not be disposed to treat with indifference. He well knew that military law, to be efficient, must be arbitrary; but every man who wielded a power so enormous ought to be held responsible, and to be prepared with good reasons for its application on every occacasion. He thought he was in a situation to establish, that the proceedings of sir Edward Paget had not met with the approbation of individuals in authority. Many of the officers and Brahmins would infinitely rather have been shot than condemned to labour in chains like ordinary felons. He was not aware whether any orders had been sent out to India to liberate them, and discharge them from a punishment so onerous and degrading.—He now begged to state why he thought that the Commander-in-chief was principally answerable for what had occurred. At first it had been his opinion that lord Amherst had given the orders; but a letter from captain Amherst, of which he had received a copy from India, went far to satisfy him that the Governor-general was not implicated. It stated, that the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry had not been sent to England sooner, out of delicacy to sir Edward Paget. He (Mr. Hume) therefore concluded, that lord Amherst considered himself free from responsibility, and was unwilling to furnish evidence against the party who was really culpable. The Commission of Inquiry commenced its labours in November, and continued them until January; but the Report did not reach this country until the July following, seven or eight months after the period when information ought to have been obtained. In order to obtain the fullest and most accurate information regarding a transaction which had spread terror and dismay through all India, that commission had been very properly appointed, consisting of a colonel and two lieutenant-colonels. One of his objects was, that their Report should be laid upon the table, in order that the House might be able to judge how far the corps had been driven to these acts of desperation by inattention or mismanagement. He wished to discover whether the mutiny was a wanton violation of the respect the soldier ought to pay to his allegiance; whether it was a voluntary act on the part of the troops; or whether they were, in fact, driven to it by the conduct of their superiors. The Report would also shew whether those conciliatory measures had been adopted in the first instance, in this case, which in many others had succeeded in allaying a spirit of disobedience, and in saving an effusion of blood. Had the same course been taken which was pursued in 1807, when a native regiment had been disarmed and sent down into the country, which was afterwards restored by general St. Leger to the service, and an opportunity thus afforded of distinguishing itself, perhaps the evils now so deeply to be deplored might have been avoided. If the men loudly complained, in God's name let some symptom be shewn of a disposition to inquire and redress. At Bhurtpore, not long since, the officer in command having heard of some discontents, plainly asked the men what they wanted; and he satisfied them immediately, by telling them, that the matter should be investigated, and a remedy, if required, applied. But, supposing the conduct of the corps had been as flagrant as that of a regiment at Ava, which fired upon its officers—justice was more easily satisfied; and, although the regiment was disgraced, it was afterwards, to a certain degree, brought back into the service. Some years ago, in this very metropolis, harmony had been restored by similar means of remonstrance and conciliation; and, if a similar course had been adopted at Barrackpore, the result might have been far different, and less distressing.

He had stated fairly and candidly what impression had been produced on his own mind by these events; and if the fault lay not with the Governor-general in council, but with the commander-in-chief, sir E. Paget, who, with the host disposition and intentions, might have been misled, it was fit that he should sustain the responsibility. The evidence with which he had been furnished, had produced a strong impression upon Ins mind, that the official information he required was necessary for the purpose of placing the Bengal government and sir Edward Paget in that situation of commanding respect, which both ought to occupy, for the general advantage and security of our Indian empire. True it was that not one of the innocent men, if they were innocent, could be recovered: life had been destroyed and could not be restored; but to shew the natives of India that there was a disposition on the part of the government at home to inquire, and redress, as far as redress was possible, would have the effect not only of conciliating, but of securing even confidence and affection.—One word as to the objection which would probably be urged to his motion, and he had done. He begged to recall the recollection of the House to what had passed in it on the discussion of the freedom of the press in India. The advocates of its liberty were then told, that a free press in India might do harm to an extent that was beyond calculation; bat that, while the press was unshackled in England, the whole object would be I answered, and inquiries could not be I stopped into the conduct of any government in India which had afforded just ground of complaint. This reasoning-would strongly apply to the case now before the House. In this country discussion was unfettered, and he hoped that parliament would not refuse to interfere, whether the parties requiring its interposition were Christians, Mussulmen or Hindoos, and whether they were the subjects of the Crown on our own shores, or separated by half the globe. He would move "That there be laid before the House, a Copy of the Report from sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-chief, to the Governor General in Council at Calcutta, respecting the Mutiny at Barrackpore, and the measures adopted to suppress it."

Mr. Wynn

said, he felt bound to do justice to the moderation of the statement of the hon. member, although he held it inconsistent with the good of the service, and with the prosperity of our government in India, to grant the documents required. The hon. gentleman had introduced no inflammatory matter, and no needless exaggerations; and if he was inaccurate in some of the details he had presented to the House, no blame for mis-information could fairly be imputed to him. All that had been advanced might be separated into three questions. First, whether every thing reasonable had been done by the Indian government and by the commander-in-chief, to supply the men with necessary comforts? Secondly, whether proper steps had been taken for the supression of the mutiny, and whether there had not been a needless effusion of blood? And Thirdly, whether it had been fit to commute the sentences of many, and to employ them in irons upon the public roads? As to the origin of the mutiny among the native troops, he believed that it originated very much in a persuasion, that the Burmese possessed more than mortal power, and that they dealt in magic and enchantment, and that the industrious circulation of this notion promoted the calamity. The right hon. gentleman then adverted to the circumstances attending the order for embarkation, and stated that 4,000l. had been advanced to each regiment, for the purchase of animals to carry the baggage. It was a fact which he had mentioned to the hon. member for Aberdeen, but of which he had taken no notice, that a hundred bullocks, or ten bullocks to each company, were actually in the line of the refractory regiment for this purpose. If he were asked, at what time these animals were furnished, he should reply, that it was certainly before the order for embarkation. But the main ground on which the hon. gentleman seemed to rely was, that proper measures had not been taken to suppress the turbulent spirit of the native troops—that the officers ought to have gone among the men, in order to inquire into their grievances; and his position was, that if an investigation had been promised, no mutiny would have occurred. Was the hon. gentleman ignorant that that very course had been pursued? Did he not know, that the very day before the mutiny the men were called upon to send two soldiers from each company to state their grounds of complaint, and that a court of inquiry was ordered? It was asked, how could the rest of the men be assured that their two comrades would be sent back? The answer was, that colonel Cartwright himself had offered to remain a hostage for their safe return. All these means had been taken; but the men refused to state their reasons. The complaint was not, in truth, the want of cattle, but that the men knew that it was intended to embark them, whether they were or were not willing to go; that promotions in the regiment had not been regularly conducted, and that old officers had been superseded. The demands were, that they should either receive double pay or be allowed to depart to their homes, and that the Zemindar and Hamildar should be given up to them to be put to death. The hon. gentleman had said, that the mutiny was one of the mildest character; that the men refused to march, and that was all: but was he not aware that the men had carried off their colours by violence: that the twenty-sixth regiment presented their bayonets at the breast of major-general Dalzel; that they had forced their officers off the parade; and that they were afterwards joined by detachments from other regiments? Could such a state of things be allowed to continue with any thing like security? The hon. gentleman was ready to allow, that the commander-in-chief had acted with that promptitude, zeal, and activity, which had always distinguished him, and had collected a very superior force in an incredibly short time; but he contended, that this force had riot been displayed to the disaffected in due time. Now, he was prepared to show, that every means had been used to convince the men that they had no chance of success. Colonel Stuart, commanding one of the regiments, had gone among the men the night before, and represented to them how vain would be their efforts against a force so superior. Some of the delegates were also purposely carried through the lines, in order to convince them that they would not be able to accomplish any thing by resistance. It ought to be recollected, that there existed a general disinclination to the war; and if such a mutiny was allowed to continue, he would not say for days, but for hours, the consequences might have been dangerous to our empire in India. As to the conduct of sir Edward Paget on this anxious and perilous occasion, he would only refer the House to a case which came before lord Mansfield, where the question was, whether a captain in the navy, during a storm, was justified in abandoning his ship. Sir Charles Douglas, an officer of the most distinguished bravery, was asked by the judge, if he would have acted like the captain and the reply was, that if called upon to decide on a calm day in the sun-shine, he should say no; but if placed in the same circumstances, in the midst of the war of the elements, his determination might have been to have forsaken the vessel. So in the case of sir Edward Paget: it was easy at a distance to assert that he had been hasty and cruel, but the true mode of judging was, to suppose oneself on the spot in the midst of the tenors of a mutiny. The great responsibility which attached to the commander-in-chief at the moment of the mutiny, ought never to be lost sight of; for if this mutiny had not been suppressed with promptitude and decision, it might have extended to other regiments, and then he would have been responsible to the country for the consequences. With regard to the circumstances, it was, among other facts which he had mentioned, clearly established, that the adjutant-general had gone among the men, and endeavoured, by every means in his power, to persuade them to return to their duty; and having failed, he certainly did inform them, that they were to be allowed only ten minutes' time for deliberation. It was after that time had elapsed that the necessity of employing actual force to quell the mutiny became apparent. The artillery opened upon them; and this was the instrument which of all others was the most proper for the occasion, and that which would produce the least portion of slaughter and bloodshed. With regard to the statement, that the mutineers had made no efforts to resist, the hon. member had been very much misinformed. The hon. member had said, that they had not fired a shot; but the truth was, that they had fired several shots at the royals, who were in the rear. The mutineers had, indeed, evinced, from the beginning, an unequivocal determination to resist, when they drove their principal officers from their quarters, and committed other acts of insubordination. The hon. member had also been misinformed as to the time employed in following the fugitives. To be sure, it was not possible to stop all at once the career of a regiment actually engaged in hostility, in the same manner as if it were at a review; but, from the most authentic accounts that could be collected, it appeared that, after the lapse of half an hour from the commencement of the attack, not a shot had been fired. The hon. member had also been misinformed as to the numbers which had been killed during the attack. Some exaggerated accounts had stated it at three hundred; but upon the most correct inquiries, it could not be found to amount to more than one hundred and sixty to a hundred and eighty. With regard to the report of the committee of inquiry, he could not, for various reasons, not altogether connected with the mutiny, agree that it should at present be laid on the table of the House. That inquiry related to a great number of general matters connected with the state of the Indian native army, the constitution of that army, and a variety of other matters which it would at present be inexpedient to make public. Besides, it was material to state, that various measures had been already adopted, founded on that report—such as regulations with respect to carriages, and other articles to be supplied to the regiments. Several other measures, founded on that report, were still under consideration; and it was obviously inexpedient, in the meantime, to publish the report, lest it should excite expectations that might not be realized. Then, with respect to those who had been tried after the mutiny had been quelled, the number did not exceed a hundred and forty: and by whom had they been tried? By a court-martial of native officers: a hundred and forty were tried in this manner, and a hundred and forty had been convicted; and of these only twelve had been executed. When the magnitude of this mutiny was considered—when it was considered, that it took place at head-quarters, and in the immediate vicinity of the governor-general's residence; that three regiments were concerned in it; that the principal mutineers had driven away their officers, and showed every determination to resist, which resistance had only been prevented by the judicious choice of the artillery as the chief engine for quelling the mutiny—it could not surely be thought a very severe proceeding, when only twelve were afterwards executed. The rest had been sent to work in irons on the roads. This was not at all an unusual punishment in India; and even under the mild administration of the marquis of Hastings, it had been inflicted, in the ordinary course of justice, upon persons of high caste. But, on account of the good conduct of the sepoys at Arracan, it was resolved by the Indian government, that a general amnesty should be granted. Orders to that effect had, indeed, been sent out from the authorities at home; but the Indian government had anticipated them, and had granted the indemnity before the orders arrived in India. With respect to the native officers of the 47th Native Infantry, it was quite impossible that they could be ignorant of the proceedings of the men; more especially as they must have held meetings, not only among themselves, but in conjunction with the men of two other regiments; and there must have been, therefore, on their part, a great degree of criminal connivance. The officers must have known of these meetings; and if they did, it was their duty to have prevented them: if they did not know of them, that fact was a proof of a considerable degree of culpable negligence; and, therefore, whether they did know or did not know of these meetings, it was quite certain that they were not fit for their situations. Then the hon. member had adverted to the order sent to the newspapers, prohibiting the publication of the transactions at Barrackpore, and blamed that order. Now, he confidently asserted, that the order in question was highly proper; for every one knew what a tendency to misrepresentation and exaggeration existed in these cases, more especially in India, and what calamitous results might have been the consequence. It was, therefore, a most proper precaution to prevent such accounts from extending to other regiments, until it should be known, at the same time, that the mutineers had been punished. He trusted he had now explained these transactions to the satisfaction of the House; and as to whatever stain might have attached to the native troops on account of this unfortunate occurrence, it had been completely removed by the excellent conduct of the sepoys, both in the west and the east; and the native troops themselves were completely satisfied on the subject. This was evident, from the cheerfulness with which they had entered into new terms of engagement with the government, and had volunteered to serve beyond seas as in Bengal. Every complaint that could be reasonably made by the native troops had been attended to; and, upon the ' whole, as the present case was intimately connected with the discipline of the army, it was but reasonable to expect that a considerable degree of confidence should be reposed in the Indian government. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry could not at present, with advantage, be produced and made public. The examination of the officers had taken place with closed doors; and it would be unfair to them at once to publish their evidence. As to the other papers to be called for by the hon. member, such as the general orders, the numbers tried and convicted, and such matters, it was quite unnecessary to produce them, as they had been all published in the newspapers, and were already known.

Sir Charles Forbes

maintained, that the Report of the Committee of Inquiry ought to be produced, if it were only for the purpose of supporting the case which the right hon. gentleman seemed to suppose he had so triumphantly made out. Its publication was due also to sir Edward Paget, and to the European officers. It was due besides to the native officers who had been dismissed the service without a Court-martial, or any inquiry—a proceeding which would not have been adopted with respect to European officers. It was most unjust to have one law for the natives, and another for the Europeans. The same rule ought to be adopted for all. It was necessary to have the Report on the table, that every one might be able to satisfy himself where the blame rested; especially after a transaction of such a horrible nature, that nothing like it had before occurred in the British dominions, either at home or abroad. There was nothing in this case but what usually occurred among the native troops; who never scrupled to complain when they thought themselves ill-used, and even to mutiny until their grievances were redressed. Certain regiments had before so far mutinied, even in the face of an army; and sometimes whole armies had mutinied on the same grounds. The mutiny of the army of Scindea was an example. He did not mean to justify such things; they would be done among the native troops; but they did not require this mode of punishment; and, in point of fact, neither this nor any other example of the kind would prevent such things occurring among those troops. There was only one way to prevent mutiny among the native troops—and that way was, to do them justice, and to use them well. Treat them in this manner, and they would submit to the greatest privations and hardships, and might form an example to other troops. They had been sometimes in arrears of pay for eight, twelve, even eighteen months; having nothing but a bare subsistence. But they did not complain, and rested satisfied with the assurance of their officers, that their arrears would be paid up as soon as possible. These troops—he spoke chiefly of the Bombay and Madras troops—might form an example to other troops. He observed some members, who he supposed were young military officers, smiling at this. But he repeated, that these gentlemen might acquire some instruction by going to India, and observing the conduct of the native troops; and he would recommend to them to consult the present illustrious commander-in-chief, and learn from him what he thought of the Indian native troops. Among the many unfortunate persons who fell victims, one was massacred under peculiarly affecting circumstances. Two Europeans were seen by an officer taking aim at an unfortunate creature who had taken shelter in a tree. The man called out to the Europeans not to fire; one of them, nevertheless, did fire, and the poor wretch fell from the tree, calling out for mercy in the Hindostanee language, and stating that he was not a sepoy, but the governor-general's gardener. He put it to the House, whether, if a Coroner's inquest had inquired into such a transaction, they could have returned any other verdict than one of wilful murder? In fact, men, women, and children, were indiscriminately sacrificed. Under such circumstances, it was not surprising that the feeling between the Europeans and the natives was now very different from what it had formerly been. The kind feeling entertained by the natives towards Europeans was strikingly exemplified, during the siege of Arcot; when there was a scarcity of provisions, and the native troops willingly conceded their portion of rice to the Europeans, who were accustomed, as they declared, to more solid diet than themselves. There were many instances of mutiny in India which had been quelled without bloodshed. In the former siege of Bhurtpore, two of the king's regiments refused to march to a breach. They declared that the breach was not practicable; "make a hole for us," was the language held by these regiments, "and we will march." On that occasion two Bengal regiments, and one Bombay native regiment, volunteered to undertake the service refused by the European regiments. "Come, my lads," said the colonel of the Bombay regiment, "if the Europeans will not go, let us try." These gallant sepoys marched three times to the breach, and were three times re- pulsed from it. The offending European troops were subsequently ordered by colonel Dickinson to be surrounded by native troops, and to ground their arms. The mutinous troops were embarked for Europe, without a single man being tried, or a single drop of European blood being spilt. European blood was too valuable in India to be wantonly spilt: they could not afford to massacre Europeans as they massacred the native Indians. If we wished to preserve our empire in India, we must establish it in the affections of the people; for it would be impossible to maintain it through their fears. In the mutiny of the officers at Madras, one of the most alarming mutinies that had ever occurred in India, no blood was shed, and not a single officer was dismissed without a Court-martial. He trusted the House would see the propriety, the necessity, and the humanity of having the documents laid before them, which could alone elucidate the facts connected with the unfortunate affair at Barrackpore. If there were but one other member in that House ready to vote with him, he should not be ashamed to vote in such a minority. Notwithstanding all that had been said of the danger likely to result from agitating this question, he should never cease, as long as he had a seat in that House, to bring under its notice, session after session, the massacre at Barrackpore. In his opinion, his majesty's ministers were bound to agree to the motion, both in justice to the natives of India, and in justice to the noble lord at the head of the government in India.

Mr. Wynn

in explanation, said, that the letter alluded to by the hon. member was a private letter to lord Amherst from captain Amherst, an amiable young man, acting at the time under the influence of warm and excited feelings; but in no part of the correspondence of lord Amherst with this country, was there any expression of censure upon the conduct of the commander-in-chief.

Mr. Hart Davis

said, he must, upon the authority of a letter received from a relative in India, deny the assertion made by an hon. member, that the artillery was brought unawares upon the mutineers. The fact was, that the tents of the mutineers were close to the cannon; that they were aware of the intention of the officer in command to make use of the artillery; and that, notwithstanding their being aware of such intention, they actually drove back at the point of the bayonet the officers, who had made an attempt to remonstrate with them upon their conduct. He wished to know, now that the transaction was almost forgotten in India, what good could be produced by having all the circumstances ripped up by a parliamentary inquiry? He must also say, that the number killed upon that occasion was very much exaggerated. Those persons whose duty it was to make returns of the numbers killed, and whose interest it was to make out as large a return as possible, because they were paid for burying the mutineers at so much per head, had never stated the number killed at more than one hundred and eighty. With respect to the alleged misunderstanding between the governor-general and the commander-in-chief of the army in India, he would say, that it was utterly unfounded. He was warranted in making this statement, by the letter to which he had alluded—a letter which was one strictly of a private nature, and never intended by the writer to be made public, but which he had felt it his duty to transmit to lord Liverpool, who had by his permission, shewn it to his grace, the commander-in-chief. [The hon. member here read extracts from the letter, giving a detail of the operations of the army employed in the Burmese war, and stating that lord Amherst and the commander-in-chief were on the best terms, and that the harmony which subsisted between them had never been interrupted, even for a single hour]. He trusted that the hon. member for Montrose would state whether he had seen the letter to which he had alluded, and whether it bore the signature of captain Amherst.

Mr. Hume

answered in the affirmative.

Mr. Hart Davis

.—Even taking the sentiments in that letter to be as stated by the hon. member, was it fair towards the commander-in-chief, or towards the writer of the letter, who, under the excitement of heated feelings, had, in a letter strictly private, expressed his opinions, to bring them forward in a public discussion? Would it be fair towards any man, to bring-forward upon a motion attaching censure to him, the opinions expressed by other persons, in a confidential communication? He should be glad to know, what would be the feelings of the hon. member for Montrose, if such a course were pursued upon a motion made with respect to the Greek war [cheers]. Would that hon. member think it fair, that, upon such a motion, the opinions of other persons as to his financial care of the interests of the people whom he had taken under his protection, should be pressed into the discussion? He mentioned this to shew that persons who lived in glass houses should not be the first to throw stones [cheers]. He was induced to make those observations, from his anxiety to rescue the character of a gallant officer from the imputations which had been most unjustly cast upon him.

Colonel Davies

said, the hon. member who spoke last, had alluded to the proverb, "that those who lived in glass houses ought not to throw stones." He would leave the House to appreciate the good feeling and good taste of such an allusion. He would not himself give any opinion on the subject, much less would he, in imitation of the hon. member, bring before the House the misfortunes—for he could call them nothing but misfortunes—which befel the hon. member himself some years ago. If he followed that hon. member's example, he could mention transactions, connected with the hon. member's name, which would bring a blush of shame on that hon. member's cheeks [cheers and murmurs].

Mr. Hart Davis

rose instantly. "I call; upon the gallant colonel," said he, "to explain what he means. He may say what he pleases. I defy him."

The Speaker

said, that he never interfered with the proceedings of the House without great pain, and often not without some doubt as to whether, in what he was doing, he might be doing good. Certain he was that his interference could never do good, except in cases where it was absolutely necessary—a consideration which often kept him silent. But perhaps the best proof which could be had of the utility of observing even rigorously the forms of the House, was to be found in the inconvenience which commonly arose from any deviation from them. In the beginning, the mischief seemed trifling; but it almost constantly very soon increased to an extent which the House itself could not bear. The hon. member for Bristol could hardly fail to be aware, that he had begun, in the present case, by deviating from the immediate subject before the House, and alluding to topics connected entirely with other matter. How far the observations made upon that matter might be intended to be personal to the feelings of another hon. member, was not exactly the question; because the hon. member could not be surprised if they were, at all events, taken to be so; and, being- so taken, they could hardly fail to produce retorts. He hoped that what he had felt it his duty to say, would convince hon. members of the inconvenience attending any deviation, however slight, from the rules of the House; and that the hon. gentleman who was about to resume the debate, would confine himself exclusively to the question.

Colonel Davies

resumed. Certainly, he said, when he rose to speak, he was labouring under feelings which were painful to utter; but he believed the great body of the House would concur with him, that his feelings were such as ought to animate every man who had a heart. The gallant member then referred to the details of the melancholy transaction which they were discussing. He was the last person who would impute cruelty to the gallant general who commanded. He believed him to be a brave, honourable, and humane man: but he contended, nevertheless, that the production of the papers was necessary to the vindication of sir E. Paget's character; and to shew where the guilt really lay.

Sir H. Vivian

expressed not only his regret at the occurrence of so many mutinies in India, within the last twenty years, but his conviction of the necessity of putting an end to them by such a measure as that adopted by sir Edward Paget. He had known and served with his gallant friend many years: he had been in the same regiment and the same company with him; and he had had many opportunities of witnessing the humanity of his disposition. It was well said, in a general order issued by an illustrious individual, whose loss they had lately to deplore, that "the brightest gem in the character of the British soldier was humanity." Now, in no bosom did that gem shine more brightly than in that of his gallant friend. He could assure the House, that there was no officer in the British army more adverse to unnecessary severity of discipline, than that gallant officer. Menacing and mutiny on the part of soldiers, with arms in their hands, ought to be instantly suppressed on all occasions; but particularly in a country so circumstanced as India. Were not all proper means used to prevent the unhappy occurrence. An offer was made to the mutineers before the officers left the regiment, to lay their complaints before a tribunal, which was about to be convened, and even the commander-in-chief's plate was offered to them as a hostage, to assure them of the sincerity of the intended offer; and the officers who went to propose a submission the following day were turned back at the point, of the bayonet. How, then, could his gallant friend yield to them under such circumstances? A concession to their insolent claims would have subverted all discipline in India, and shaken the very foundation of the British power. Nor was this the only mutiny in India in which lives had been lost. In the mutiny at Vellore, in which the sepoys fired on the European troops in a barrack yard, and which was ultimately suppressed by the gallantry of general Gillespie, who broke open the gates, and rescued the King's troops from destruction, there were no less than six hundred lives lost. The sacrifice of lives in the late affair at Barrackpore was imperatively called for; and it was but just that they with whom the insurrection had originated should be made to pay the penalties. The mutineers were, he would admit, soon broken and dispersed; but even after that some of them meditated resistance, and actually fired on the Royals. Was it not impossible to restrain the fury of soldiers, against even a national enemy, when broken? As to the Report of the Committee of Inquiry, nothing could give the family of his gallant friend more pleasure than the production of it. He was convinced that his gallant friend had done no more than was necessary to uphold the discipline of the army, and the authority of the British government in India.

Mr. Money

admitted that more lives were lost than was necessary, but it was natural that soldiers, irritated and let loose on their opponents, should commit excesses that humanity must deplore. As to the effects of the example made on that occasion they were most beneficial; as appeared from the present superior discipline of the Bengal army. The hon. member said, he should oppose the production of the report.

General Duff

spoke with great warmth against the motion. The hon. gentleman who had brought it forward, had, he said, undertaken to treat of a subject which he did not understand. He might be very good authority on a question of physic; and he wished that the hon. gentleman would for the future confine himself to such subjects as he really did know [a laugh]. His speech on this occasion was, to use a parliamentary expression, frivolous and vexatious; for his part, if he had been in sir Edward Paget's place, he would have done the same; and he would do so a hundred times, if it was necessary.

Mr. Maberly

was not of opinion that the conduct of sir E. Paget was blamcable; but it was equally clear that there was something connected with this mutiny which the public were not to see. The Sepoys complained of grievances, which had since been admitted and redressed. It was evidently necessary that some substantial remedy should be applied, to prevent the recurrence of an event which might lead to the loss of our vast empire in the east.

Sir Joseph Yorke

said, he had heard several, but not all of the speeches which had been delivered, on this occasion, and among others, that of the hon. baronet (sir C. Forbes) whose speech seemed to comprise all the observations that had fallen from all the East India proprietors during the last twenty years. He had also heard the very temperate and conciliatory remarks of the Chair, in its endeavour to produce a better understanding between two hon. members; but he certainly had not heard any attack attempted on the character of sir E. Paget, although he had heard it vindicated, as if some hostile animadversions had been made upon it. The fact was, that sir E. Paget, in the extraordinary situation in which he found himself, had but done that, which every brave and humane man, in the capacity of commander-in-chief, would have done under similar circumstances. He had, undoubtedly, acquitted himself in an honourable, a just and a gallant manner. But the question before the House was, whether these papers should or should not be granted? All agreed that sir Edward had not proceeded to extremities, until that course could be no longer avoided. But, in answer to this demand for the papers necessary to put parliament in possession of the history of this unfortunate transaction, he had heard one of his majesty's ministers affirm, that their production would be exceedingly inconvenient; and if it rested on that right hon. gentleman's own responsibility, he would give this assertion so much credit, as to take the matter for granted. But when it was added, that the granting of these papers would implicate too many persons in India, he could not help asking, what sort of hold must our's upon India be, if gentlemen were to be met, on calling for inquiry into the causes of any great disaster, with exclamations of alarm, and his majesty's government were the first persons to cry, "Hush, for God's sake, not a word on that subject!" It had been admitted, that one cause of the disaffection exhibited by the sepoys was, their destination at the time; for it was conceded on all hands, that the Burmese war was exceedingly disrelished in that part of the country and by the native troops. If the fact was so, it exceedingly behoved those gentlemen, who were most connected with the government of India, to keep those boundaries, for the future, which good policy and equity alike prescribed to them, as the proper limits of their eastern possessions. If they should exceed those limits, he for one hoped to see the day when the government of such noble territories would be taken out of the hands of those who, at present, wielded it in Leadenhall-street; and placed in hands to which it should long since have been made over—the hands of his majesty's government.

Mr. Forbes

considered that the papers called for were absolutely requisite, to shew whether a case of sufficient necessity really did arise, for the dreadful massacre in which, not only one hundred and sixty of the native soldiers had lost their lives, but many women and children, residing in their huts, were sacrificed also.

Sir J. Beresford

, when he heard some hon. gentlemen really doubting whether the transactions which had been so much referred to that evening, did or did not amount to a mutiny, begged to observe, that he had received a letter from a brother officer of rank, who was present at the scene, and who not only described it as a mutiny, but declared that sir E. Paget had—by his forbearance in the beginning, and his determination at the conclusion, of those transactions—as much entitled himself to the praise of having saved his country, so far as her eastern dominion was concerned, as lord St. Vincent had done, by his admirable conduct in the mutiny off Cadiz, in preserving to Great Britain the allegiance of her navy. This officer had written, home, that sir Edward merited the thanks, not only of India, but of the whole British empire; and he particularly extolled the good feeling manifested by this distinguished commander, in going before the troops, in front of their line, under arms, and asking them with the utmost earnestness and anxiety, to return to their obedience. When, he at length found that his remonstrances were vain, he performed the sad duty which remained to him, like a man, whose determination was equal to his humanity.

Mr. Hume

, in reply, contended, that the right hon. gentleman himself, with a degree of candour for which he was bound to thank him, had, in fact, admitted the whole of the case, with one or two exceptions that were of little moment; for he admitted, that the evils complained of by the native troops, as to the deficiency of beasts, and other means of transport and accommodation, had existed, and that they had since been remedied. He was very glad to hear this assurance; but the admission with which it was coupled sanctioned the principle of the motion now before the House. In stating the loss of human life, however, on this melancholy occasion, at only one hundred and sixty, the right hon. gentleman greatly underrated the extent of the calamity, for he did not include the one hundred and fifty natives who perished in their attempt to escape over the river, and were shot at like so many wild fowl. As to those who had been described as the great fomenters of the discontents, and the necessity of whose removal had been, in some sort, made the excuse for the attack upon the sepoys, it was notorious that they lived in line with the rest of the native troops; and might, at any moment, have been all of them seized and executed, if their destruction was thought essential to the preservation of our influence and power in India. But our own troops and officers had, by their acts, increased the discontent and resentment of the sepoys; who did, however, manifest, in return for what they felt as insults and injuries, the most extraordinary forbearance. Among other instances of this forbearance on their part, was the case of colonel Dalzel. That officer, who did not understand a word of Hindostanee, in the irritation of the moment, reviled and abused them, and addressed to them epithets, which among our own soldiers and sailors would be re- ceived as the most degrading terms of reproach. For instance, he "God damned their eyes," and every thing else. He pulled off his coat, tore open his waistcoat, and, baring his bosom, bad them shoot him, and otherwise deported himself in such a manner, as to make the sepoys think him of unsound mind. The hon. gentleman concluded by disclaiming the notion of intending any personal disrespect to sir Edward Paget by this motion; and animadverted on the utter irrelevancy of all the eulogies which had been passed on that eminent officer, to the objects of the present motion.

The House divided: For the motion 44; Against it 176: Majority against the motion 132.

List of the Minority.
Althorp, lord Lamb, hon. G.
Baring, W. B. Lombe, E.
Bernard, Ralph Lumley, J. S.
Brougham, Jas. Lushington, Dr.
Buxton, T. Fowell Maberly, J.
Cradock, col. Maberly, W. L.
Dawson, Alex. Monck, J. B.
Dundas, hon. T. Nugent, lord
Dundas, hon. sir R. Ponsonby, hon. G.
Dundas, hon. G. L. Rowley, sir W.
Easthope, J. Smith, John
Forbes, sir C. Stewart, John
Forbes, J. Sykes, D.
Gordon, R. Taylor, M. A.
Grattan, H. Tennyson, C.
Grattan, J. Warburton, H.
Harvey, D. W. Webbe, col.
Heathcote, R. E. Wells, John
Hobhouse, J. C. Western, C. C.
Honywood, W. P. Wood, ald.
Hutchinson, H. (Cork) TELLERS.
Jephson, C. D. Davies, col.
King, hon. R. Hume, Joseph