§ Mr. Canningrose. He said, that on a former evening, when he had brought forward his statement of the financial condition of the country, he had informed the committee that he should have to ask it for an additional vote of credit of 500,000l., for the purpose of meeting the contingent expenses of the further continuance of his majesty's forces in Portugal. The grounds on which those forces were sent to Portugal had been so fully explained to the House, and so nearly unanimously approved by it, that he held it unnecessary to refer to them; and he had little further to say at present, than that the same causes which induced his majesty to determine on sending that expedition, though diminished in their operation, still existed in sufficient force to render the continuance of our army in Portugal necessary. On the first occasion, when he mentioned this subject, he had taken the liberty of stating, that it was impossible for him to explain the full extent of the grounds on which his majesty's determination was founded, without entering into an hostile explanation of the conduct of Spain, which it was undesirable to give whilst there were any hopes of adjustment existing. If, in the hope of adjustment at a time when irritation prevailed, and menace was employed, it was prudent to abstain from irritating discussion, much more prudent was such a course now, when the most sanguine expectations were entertained, that all the causes which we had for distrust were coming to a speedy termination. The mere fact of sending our troops to Portugal had met, repelled, and anticipated the danger of ruin which threatened that country. That danger had been repelled—not by any active exertions—but by the mere presence of the British forces on the soil of Portugal. He would not pretend to deny that there had been differences and variations of counsels, on the part of the Spanish government, which had threatened the renewal of the same dangers; but he was now happy to state, that the tendency of the king of Spain's counsels was less dangerous, and 1176 that the country might look forward to a speedy adjustment of differences between the two nations, and to a removal of the causes of them. He abstained from saying more upon that expectation, as he was not able to say when it might be realized. It would be obvious to every gentleman, that a state of things which might not justify them in sending an army to Portugal, might justify them in not withdrawing it when it was there; and that it might be prudent to keep it there, not only till the danger was repressed, but till the probability of its recurrence was prevented. He had no hesitation in informing the House, that the prolongation of the stay of the British troops in Portugal rested upon the very same grounds as those on which they were sent there, and not upon any new causes, intentions, or dispositions whatever. He should conclude with moving, "That 500,000l. be granted to his Majesty, to enable him to provide for any additional expense which may arise on account of his Majesty's Forces in Portugal."
Mr. Bankessaid, that, as he had had the misfortune, when the question was formerly before the House, to differ from a large majority of the members, and as nothing had happened since to alter his opinion, he should trouble the committee with a very few words. No further communications had since been made by government to the House, and therefore, individuals like himself knew no more upon these affairs, than what was supplied by the common sources of public information. But from all that had been related, it did appear to him, that the casus fœderis, on which alone the conduct of ministers could be justified, had not been made out by the right hon. gentleman. The country was in the situation consequent upon having taken one wrong and precipitate step. There might be many persons convinced by the reasoning of his right hon. friend, in the speech he had uttered on this subject, upon first bringing it before parliament. It was a most brilliant speech, not soon to be forgotten in the old world, or in the new. Many might think the first effort right in sending troops to Portugal; but was it right to continue them there? Was there any thing unfair, was there any thing like aggression, on the part of Spain? Never had one single Spanish soldier marched across the Portuguese frontier. It had 1177 been stated, that Portugese rebels had been received into Spain; that they had been suffered to remain there; and that they had made a simultaneous effort. If this were true, it was clear that a Spanish soldier had never crossed the line. Had they done so since? No: never was this hostile aggression committed. But Eng[...]gland having taken the wrong and precipitate step, and having sent her army into Portugal upon unjust pretences, she now had not the means, or it might not be competent to the country to bring them back. Even if an address were to be proposed to the Crown to recall them, he did not know whether he could now agree to it. The country might eventually be involved in a war, by the steps that ministers had pursued; for she was placed in that awkward situation in which troops could not be kept in Portugal with justice, or re-called with safety. His right hon. friend had held out hopes, that affairs were coming to an adjustment. He hoped it might be so; but he looked with surprise, when large sums of money were called for, after the troops had been already provided for in the vote of supply. The right hon. gentleman asked for a contingent sum, which amounted to no less than 100l. per man, for every British soldier in Portugal. In what way could the expenses be made to amount so high? Was it possible that five thousand men, already provided for in the estimates, should cost an additional 100l. per man? It was stated, that there was a treaty with Portugal, by which she was bound to subsist these troops. Had that treaty been carried into execution? If it had, how could this large sum be required from the English people, unless it was intended to send more men to Portugal? This did not look like coming to a speedy conclusion. The extraordinary vote could not be called for by the necessity of the case, if what the right hon. gentleman said was correct. This country it seemed, was not obliged for its state of peace to the wisdom of her own councils, but to the moderation of those of France.
Colonel Davieswas astonished at many of the statements and arguments of the hon. member. He was surprised that he could maintain the present not to be a casus fœderis. Could any man believe that the disturbances and rebellion in Portugal had not been fomented by Spain? Language of an irritating nature ought, in 1178 the present posture of affairs, to be avoided; but he could not hear it asserted that the government of Spain had acted with good faith and moderation, without entering his protest against it. If Spain had not sent troops across the frontier, the Portuguese refugees had been armed, clothed, and paid in Spain, and enabled to carry war and bloodshed into their country. If there ever was a time in which England was called upon, by a regard to treaties and her honour, to take a part in the affairs of Portugal, it was when the British forces were sent to that country. The Spanish army was upon the Portuguese frontier; and, if the British troops were withdrawn, they would march to Lisbon. Unless the House was prepared to say that Portugal, as well as Spain, should become a province of France, ministers could not have acted differently. If, in 1822 and 1823, they had stood in their proper attitude, they would not now have been under the necessity of incurring the present expense. They might have saved Spain from invasion, and saved the honour of England.
Colonel Lindsaysaid, that the declaration which Mr. Canning had made, that, if the Portuguese constitution were attacked, he could let loose all the passions of Europe in support of it, had caused it to be viewed with great jealousy by foreign powers. He condemned the sending of our troops to Portugal; which had placed the peace of the country in a very precarious situation. All the despotic governments of Europe looked upon us with fear and distrust, in consequence of that measure. He wished the right hon. gentleman would inform him whether our troops were kept in Portugal to repel foreign invasion or to support the present constitution. That constitution was unpopular among all classes of Portuguese, and ought not to be thrust down their throats by British bayonets.
§ Sir James Mackintoshsaid, he did not altogether feel himself called upon to address the House, after so long a silence, by what had fallen from the gentleman opposite. He was, however, desirous of taking an opportunity, which he regretted he had not had on a former occasion, of declaring his opinion to the House, or to such at least as thought his opinions worthy of attention. He considered the prompt and vigorous succour given to our old ally Portugal, at the moment of 1179 her extreme danger, as fit to be recorded in one of the brightest pages of the history of this country. This prompt and liberal succour was not the merely cold performance of an imperative obligation and inevitable duty. Were this all, he should deem it unworthy of any commendation. God forbid that he should ever be so regardless of the honour of his country, of the reputation of the former, and of the character of the present, ministers, as to suppose that the mere fulfilment of a treaty on our part required commendation! He confined his approbation to the prompt and vigorous measures which had been taken to render the performance of our duty effectual—measures which reflected the highest honour upon the government that had planned and executed them, and which, if they had not been sanctioned by all the individuals who composed the British parliament, had been sanctioned at least by all the parties into which it was divided. With regard to the speech just made by the hon. member for Dorsetshire, he must begin by observing, that the principal part of his argument was historical and retrospective. It was an inquiry into the result of the measures taken by the government in the December of last year, and had no reference to the vote of that night. Indeed, he did not see how the hon. member for Dorsetshire could oppose the present grant, unless he was prepared to show that government ought to retract all the declarations it had already made, and to acknowledge the injustice of every measure it had hitherto approved. The hon. member must have satisfied the committee, that what he had just said had no reference to the present vote; for he had boldly avowed, that if an address were proposed to his majesty, calling on him to withdraw his forces from Portugal, he could not agree to it. In a parliamentary sense, then, the hon. member had no opposition to this vote; in a parliamentary sense he must be considered as giving it the benefit of his assent. With respect to the considerations which the hon. member had offered to the House, on the amount of the vote, and on its distribution, man by man, among the soldiery in Portugal, he was not so good a calculator as to be able to decide off-hand upon its accuracy. It was most unfair and unreasonable, to say that this vote of credit was given to meet the expense of the army. It was not in the contemplation either of government or 1180 parliament, that all of it should be expended; it was merely asked, to meet any unforeseen exigency which might suddenly arise. A vote of credit, which armed government with large and extensive power, was calculated to lessen its expenses. By voting a large sum, the House was taking the best means to prevent a larger sum from being expended. Foreign powers might be influenced, by seeing that the British parliament continued their support of these measures with the same liberality which they displayed at the outset. The hon. member had not taken into his arithmetical calculations the expense of the transports which would be wanted to bring our forces back from Portugal. He believed it would amount to a large sum; and though it might not swallow up all the vote now asked for, it would swallow up a large proportion of it. Another hon. gentleman had said, that, in a moment of intoxication, the House had voted succours to our ally in performance of the obligations of treaties. He confessed that he deeply partook of the intoxication, if intoxication it were, which the hon. member so loudly condemned: and was afraid that he was now, after the lapse of several months, still in the same unfortunate state. He rejoiced greatly when he contemplated the skill with which that measure of assistance had been devised, and the promptitude and vigour with which it had been executed. He should have been ashamed of his country—he should have considered it overwhelmed with unprecedented disgrace, if it had hesitated for one moment in taking that part which the hon. member contended it had taken in a moment of intoxication. He would not stoop to argue the question, whether our troops had been sent to Portugal to support the constitution. That question had been long since anticipated and answered; and a reply to it at present was quite superfluous. It had been stated by his right hon. friend, in the most precise terms the English language could afford, that the troops now remained in Portugal to secure the very object they had been sent to accomplish. Now, the House had been informed, not once or twice, but repeatedly, that the British forces were sent to Portugal with express injunctions to repel foreign invasion from it, and not to interfere in its internal affairs. They were sent to Portugal for that purpose. His right hon. friend declared, that they stayed there for that purpose; and 1181 what further answer could the hon. member seek to obtain from the chancellor of the Exchequer? The hon. member for Dorsetshire must excuse him for expressing his surprise at the simplicity with which he had asked whether any Spanish soldier had been sent across the Portuguese frontier. He admitted it: but was not the assembling of a large Spanish army on the frontier, at a time when rebellion, excited by the intrigues and gold of a Spanish party, was desolating the interior of Portugal, a proceeding of a most alarming nature? Did not the hon. member know, that the assembling of an army by one power on the frontier of another was always considered just ground of demanding explanation in the first instance; and, if explanation were refused, of taking further measures to enforce it? He should like to hear any prudent statesman deny, that the assembling of a great military force on the frontier of a power whose deserters it supported, and even provided with munitions of war, was not a menace to that power, seriously affecting its internal security, and giving it the right, if it chose to exercise it, of appealing at once to arms. If no man could deny the principle of national jurisprudence which he had just laid down, it settled the question of our duty to our ally. The duty of England rested on the right of Portugal. If Portugal had a right to demand explanation from Spain, on account of the military force which the latter government had assembled on its frontier, and if the refusal of all satisfactory explanation by Spain were a sufficient justification of Portugal going to war—which no man would deny that it was—then was England bound in duty to afford the same assistance to Portugal as if she had been openly and directly attacked. The duty of the ally to give assistance rested, he maintained, on the right of the principal to go to war. It had been said, however, by the other side, that in case our troops continued in Portugal, they must, if we adhered to our doctrine of not interfering in the internal arrangements of independent states, confine their hostility to Spaniards alone. Now, from this doctrine, he must beg leave, under certain limitations, to dissent. Supposing Spain were to invade Portugal, partly with Spanish soldiers, and partly with Portuguese deserters, whom she had taken into her pay, would any man contend, that our cannons and our bayonets should make 1182 any distinction between the real Spanish soldier and the rebellious Portuguese, whom he had taken into his pay? No: the rebellious Portuguese must be considered as the allies of the foreign invaders; and as such our troops must treat them. He admitted of no interference between the two contending parties in Portugal. If no menace had been made by a foreign power against the existing government of Portugal, we should not merely have had no duty to meddle in the struggle—we should also have had no right. As soon, however, as a foreign partisan appeared on the stage, and dealt in menaces which endangered the security of the existing government, we were compelled by the obligation of treaties, to become the domestic partisan of that government against all foreign invaders, no matter how they were supported by its discontented subjects. If it had not been for the very extraordinary doctrines which had been held on this subject, he should have been very brief on this part of the question; but, as it was, he should beg leave to illustrate it a little more at length. If a foreign army were to land in England as auxiliaries to a party in rebellion against the government, the government would immediately obtain the right of calling upon all its foreign allies to bring their forces to its aid. He did not allude to Holland merely, which was bound to support the Protestant succession to the throne of these realms, whenever it was endangered, but to all our foreign allies, who would be bound, in such a case, to send over their contingents, not merely to attack the foreign invader, but also his domestic partisans. Thus it would be with our own forces in Portugal. The invader, with all his aiders and abettors, would be the legitimate object of the hostility which we were bound to wage there for the benefit of our ally.—He had already answered the question which the hon. gentleman opposite had put, as to whether our troops were in Portugal to support the constitution, by reference to the declarations of his right hon. friend both in December last and upon the present evening. He would now carry his reply a little further. He would point out a circumstance which had occurred in 1823, and which proved decisively, that it was not in support of the constitution of Portugal, but of Portugal itself, that we now gave to the government of that country our assistance. He would beg honourable members to recollect what 1183 the condition of parliament was at that particular time. Many gentlemen would recollect, that among the papers which were laid on the table of the House in that year, relative to the negotiations to prevent the aggression on Spain, there was a letter of Mr. Canning to sir C. Stuart, in which he desired him to inform the French government explicitly, that any act of hostility committed by France upon Portugal would bring England with all her forces immediately into the field. Was it in behalf of the present constitution, that we threatened to interfere? No such thing. Portugal was at that time under a democratical form of government; which, it was well known, the British government by no means approved, and which constituted a subject of regret to all the real lovers of liberty in England, however hostile they were to its amendment by foreign interference; and yet, in favour of that Portugal, then so democratically revolutionized, England declared to France, that any attack upon its territory would bring her with all her forces into the field. Could there be a more conclusive demonstration, that we were not now in arms to support the constitution of Portugal, but only the right of Portugal to give itself a free constitution, uncontrolled by the interference of foreign powers? He would ask any gentleman, whether, because we were bound to support the government of Portugal, we were therefore bound to approve of its constitution. He himself should be afraid to pass any judgment upon it, for he knew very little about it. The gallant member, who had addressed the House for the first time that evening with so much promise, would discover, before he became so old a member of the House as he (sir J. M.) was, that it was a difficult matter to learn what was the real opinion of a foreign people—what was their real condition—and how far they were, or were not, fit for liberal institutions. These were often difficult questions, God knew, with respect to our own countrymen; but were so much more difficult with regard to the people of foreign countries, that a wise man would be reluctant to answer them.—There was, however, another point in the speech of the gallant member that surprised him exceedingly. The main objection which he urged against the conduct of the present administration with respect to Portugal was, that in maintaining the faith of treaties with our ancient 1184 ally, we were offending those great powers of Europe who exercised despotic sway over their respective countries. If this were true—if this great nation, so long renowned for its good faith, and strict observance of treaties, dared no longer perform the sacred obligations which its treaties imposed upon it, lest it should thereby displease the great despots of Europe—then he must say, that not only Portugal, but England too, was unfit for the enjoyment of liberty. If England had so far lost her ancient pride and spirit, as to be influenced by a bare fear, lest the performance of her duty should cause displeasure to any prince, power, or potentate, whatsoever—if she allowed such an unmanly and dastardly consideration to be present to her mind, when she was consulted on the destinies of nations—she might be sure that the day of her glory had departed; that the sceptre of power was passing from her grasp, and that she herself was "cito peritura." Whenever that sordid fear shall come over her, she will have lost all power to preserve her liberty at home, and to make her independence respected abroad.—He would imitate the example which had been set him by his right hon. friend, and would abstain from entering into any observations which might provoke a discussion on the conduct of the great states of Europe. He valued the existence of peace as much as any man. He would perform the duties of amity to every other power in Europe, as well as he would perform them to Portugal. The duties of courtesy, which were included in those of amity, he would perform to every government, no matter what opinion he entertained either of their form or of their conduct; but he would not be discouraged, by a fear of their resentment, from advising his country to perform that duty, which was required of her by the faith of ancient treaties. He would not, at this time of day, go over the contents of those treaties. Every body must know what they were—and he would venture to affirm, that if there was any one proposition in the law of nations more demonstrative than another, it was the obligation of Great Britain to give her support to her ancient ally Portugal, when she was required to do so in December last. The law of the case was clear; the facts of the case were clear; and the application of the law to the facts was, he might almost say, self-evident, He was therefore as 1185 tonished—nay, he was more than astonished—he was pained—at hearing the doctrines which were propounded on this subject, when the House appeared to be representing the general feeling of the country, by his hon. friend the member for Aberdeen, for whose extremely useful and most honest labours in behalf of the public, he should ever entertain a grateful esteem. His hon. friend had called on the House to deliberate carefully and cautiously, before it ventured to the arduous and complicated question, whether it should violate the ancient good faith of the country or not. He had never heard that his hon. friend had attempted to show that the obligation of treaties did not blind us to assist Portugal; on the contrary, he believed that his hon. friend jumped at once to this conclusion—that if we did assist Portugal, we should be guilty of a wanton interference in the internal affairs of another country. He did not know whether he ought to admire the boldness with which his hon. friend overleaped, or the discretion with which he overlooked, all the obstacles which, stood between him and his conclusion. He rather thought that he ought to applaud his discretion; because it would require greater talents than even his hon. friend possessed, to produce any effect upon the House, whilst he attempted to show either that we were not bound by the faith of treaties to assist Portugal, or that if we were bound, we ought to seek the means of evading them.—In justifying the measures which the present administration had taken upon this subject, so much to their honour, he did not mean to justify them, on the ground that the force we sent out was sent out to maintain either liberal or any other kind of institutions. He would ask no more, under these treaties, than if they had been entered into with the emperor of Morocco: he would demand no more under them, than if they had been entered into with a power which was endeavouring to destroy a free government, instead of one that was aiming at the establishment of a liberal system. If he were asked, why he rejoiced in the interposition of the country, he would frankly avow that he did so, because that interposition must have the effect of checking a system by which it was attempted to prevent the establishment of free institutions in Europe. The only plausible topic urged against this 1186 proceeding was one that would hardly be used on any other occasion; and which, he conceived, was advanced with a peculiar ill grace on this. What was that topic? Why, that England was interfering to give liberty to a country, that was not prepared to receive it, and that did not require it. But the fact was, that this attempt to introduce a liberal system was the work of the king and people of Portugal, and our interference was called for by the government of Portugal, under the faith of treaties. The effect of such an argument as that which he had quoted was, that they were scrupulously to observe the stipulations of all treaties that required the most odious and revolting interference—an interference that might lead, in its operation, to the most unfortunate consequences; and the only treaties, with respect to which some few gentlemen were willing to relax this strict principle, appeared to be those under which the interference of England might be called for, to prevent an ally from being over-ruled by a hostile power, when that ally was making an attempt to give to his country a just and free government. Was such a doctrine as this agreeable to the ears of the committee? Was it in unison with the generous feelings of this country? He approved in the highest degree of the step which the government had taken in sending troops to Portugal to prevent the aggression of Spain. If those troops were suffered to remain there one moment after the object of their mission was accomplished, ministers would be guilty of a flagrant wrong; and if they were recalled one moment sooner than that object was effected, they would be guilty of gross perfidy. Such an act might leave Portugal in a far worse situation than that in which they found it. The presence of the British troops might have incited thousands of individuals to exert themselves to save their country from a despotism; and, if the protecting force were prematurely withdrawn, those persons would be left at the mercy of their most implacable enemies. He trusted, therefore, that the feelings of a generous, manly, and honourable fidelity, which had produced these measures, would never suffer ministers to listen to the plea of retrenchment, or of the propriety of non-interference with the affairs of another nation, or to any other doctrine, however plausibly it might he advanced, for the purpose of inducing 1187 them to change their course of policy. A gallant officer had said, that the governments of Europe, or the nations of Europe, he knew not which—perhaps both—were dissatisfied with the part which England had taken on this occasion. Now, he had heard, only eight and forty hours ago, from the authority of an English gentleman who had recently travelled through Europe, a statement directly the reverse. He had not the permission of that gentleman to disclose his name, and therefore he should withhold it; because he had ever made it a rule not to name an individual without his permission, nor to produce a written document without the writer's leave; but if he had had permission to mention his name, he was quite sure, that there was no quarter in that House, in which the opinion of the individual to whom he had alluded would not have weight. The impression on the mind of that gentleman was very different from that which they had heard that night. He stated, that, in the capital where he resided, every Englishman, twenty-four hours after the news of succour having been afforded to Portugal had arrived, found himself in a different situation, in point of dignity and importance, in every society he entered. And those who had business to transact with the public authorities also perceived that this event created for them additional respect. In short, the just, honourable, and brilliant conduct adopted by this country had raised the national character all over the continent to as high a pitch of honour as it had attained at that glorious period, the Seven years' war, when the great lord Chatham was at the head of the administration. Some individuals might consider those little particulars as of no weight—of no importance; but he contended, that they were of high importance, because they were indicative of the general feeling and the general judgment of the civilized world on this particular measure, however lightly they might be viewed, or however cheaply they might be held, by a few gentlemen in that House. Such marks of respect and esteem tended to exalt the character of the nation, and to strengthen and secure the best interests of the state. They gave a moral estimation, in the highest degree conducive to good government, in the highest degree conducive to the preservation of that tranquillity and peace, which, after honour, should be the chief object 1188 with every member in that House, and with every English minister. There never was a measure more likely to secure peace than this.—A retrospective view had been dragged into the discussion, in the course of that evening's debate: but what was he to understand from all that had been said against this measure? Why, that by it England had saved her ally, and, instead of being exposed thereby to war, had given herself a tenfold security against it. He would assert, on the honourable and impartial authority to which he had before alluded, that the proceedings of the minister for Foreign Affairs, and of his maty's government supported by that House, were calculated to send an Englishman to the continent more proud of his country, more closely and naturally attached to that country, and more anxious for her fame and honour, than he would have been if those measures had never been adopted.—He had begun by observing, that all the parties in begun House were agreed in the propriety of this act; and he could not entertain a doubt but that the policy of the country would support it, unless some extraordinary and unexpected alteration in the state of affairs justified the government in abandoning it. The House, it was true, had been originally divided on the question; but those who had so divided it immediately saw the utter futility of so feeble an opposition. Much had been recently said on the subject of coalitions. Now, he saw no objection to coalitions in the abstract. If they were mischievous in their nature, then he must say that this was a most unfortunate country; for one third of the administrations that had elapsed since the Revolution had been administrations formed by coalition. He was the less shaken by the frequent use of the watch-word, because he recollected that coalitions had not given to this country the worst administrations. It was not a coalition-ministry that signed the peace of Utrecht, and endeavoured to exclude the House of Hanover, from the throne of these realms—it was not a coalition-ministry that dismembered the British empire, and lost North America by acts of injustice and oppression; but it was a coalition-ministry, composed of the Tories or Jacobites, lord Godolphin and the duke of Malborough, and of the Whigs or Revolutionists, lord Somers and the duke of Devonshire, that achieved all the Rictories of the reign of queen Anne, and planned all 1189 the measures which secured and established the House of Hanover on the throne of Great Britain. There was another coalition of a more recent date, that of the immortal earl of Chatham. He formed a coalition with those against whom he had long contended in a fierce acrimonious, and personal opposition; and that coalition claimed, and justly claimed, all the glories of the Seven years' war. But he meant not to confine himself to warlike operations or warlike successes; "Peace has her victories as well as war;" and many of those victories might be boasted of within the last few years. The question of coalition to which he had just referred, was deeply interesting to men of generous and independent natures. Were such men, because their opinions did not assimilate on all points of policy, to be continually estranged? Were they to keep up a perpetual political enmity? He knew that, with respect to Whig and Tory, a very great difference was supposed to exist. Extremely aristocratic opinions were assigned to one party, and highly liberal opinions to the other. The question was, whether they might not be blended in one system? Now, he entirely agreed in the opinion given by Dr. Johnson, as stated in a work which was, after all, the greatest monument of his fame,—he meant his "Life," by Boswell, where he said, that "a reasonable Whig and a moderate Tory differ only in degree. The doctrines of an extreme Tory are unintelligible, and those of an extreme Whig render government impracticable." They were both within the pale of the constitution, and both might be useful in preserving it, as was clearly proved by the proceedings of the great coalition in the time of queen Anne. For his own part, he gave his very humble support to the present administration, because he conceived their course of policy to have for its object the honour and the interests of the country. He approved of the foreign and of the domestic policy pursued by ministers. The trade, manufactures, and commerce, of the country, were placed under the superintending vigilance of one of the most deserving public servants, that this kingdom ever possessed (Mr. Huskisson), and, he must also say, one of the most grossly calumniated and ill-requited men that ever filled an important situation in the state [cheers.] He concurred in all that right hon. gentleman's measures; 1190 and he admired as much the soundnes of his general principles, as his wariness and expertness in applying their details to the complicated system of the trade and commerce of the country. He supported ministers, because they were anxious to do every thing that was favourable for religious liberty; and, whatever circumstances would admit, for the pacification of Ireland. He entirely agreed in the wisdom of their foreign policy. Looking to the recognition of the independence of the South American States—looking to the succours that had been sent to Portugal—considering the good which, he hoped, was silently but surely working for Greece, he came to this conclusion, when he cast his eye over the page of history, that no three preceding years could be compared with the three which had elapsed since the invasion of Spain by France, in point of brilliant, beneficial, and successful, policy. In his opinion there were no three years, not even in the reign of Elizabeth herself, leaving war entirely out of the case, that were so highly distinguished for a liberal and brilliant policy as those three years. The interests of the country, the interests of independence, and the interests of the human race, had, during that time, been supported and improved. He was, therefore, happy to afford to ministers the humble and feeble support of his voice. He had, perhaps, hurried away by the warmth which the contemplation of such principles naturally excited, been induced to intrude too long on the time of the House. But, after so long an absence from parliament, he was very desirous to take an opportunity of plainly and dispassionately stating his opinion on the subject of Portugal, and also with respect to the measures adopted by that government to which he meant to afford his cordial support.
§ Mr. Humeexpressed a doubt, whether the treaties which had been referred to were binding on this country; and he was sorry that the learned gentleman who had just spoken had left the House. He trusted, however, that the learned gentleman would hereafter state his opinion on that subject. It appeared that a tripartite treaty had been entered into between Holland, Portugal, and England. It was there stipulated on the part of Holland and England that in case the Portuguese territory was invaded, by France or Spain, then, and then only 1191 should Great Britain and Holland afford assistance to the Portuguese. Now Holland had withdrawn from that treaty, and the question was whether, under these circumstances, England was bound to carry the treaty into execution? In his opinion, the treaty ought to have lapsed when one of the parties withdrew. Besides they had no information that there had been any violation of the Portuguese territory by the Spaniards, and therefore this country was not justified in keeping troops in Portugal any longer. The right hon. gentleman had asserted, that the people of Portugal were in favour of this new constitution. But could he give any proof of that fact? Was there any such thing as a legal and established government in Portugal? In fact, this country was supporting a constitution which the people did not require. It had been forced on them by the king of the Brazils, and our troops were called in to prevent it from falling. No man was more friendly to free governments than he was; but the maintaining a British army in Portugal could have no other effect but to overawe the people, and thus prevent them from forming such a government as they wished. When France invaded Spain, what language had been used with respect to that act? The most severe terms were applied to it. Now, he could not help thinking that the conduct of Great Britain was precisely similar to that of France.
§ Mr. H. Twisssaid, that the hon. member having put a question to a learned friend of his not now in his place, he was anxious to answer for him. The question put by the hon. member was, whether, in the event of a treaty between two powers to protect a third, their ally, from an invading party, and one of those contracting parties withdrawing from that engagement, the other was not absolved from any obligation to fulfil it? If such were the case, any one party had only to withdraw, in order to absolve the other, and then leave the invaded country open to its opponents. He was anxious to prevent such an opinion from going forth to the prejudice of our national faith.
The Resolution was agreed to.