COMMITMENTS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. (Hansard, 7 March 1826)

§ Mr. Hume

rose to move for a 1179 return of the number of persons confined in the Fleet and other prisons, for contempt, as it was called, of the Court of Chancery. He had moved, in 1820, for a similar return, including the number of persons who, being in confinement for such contempts, had died during the eight preceding years. It appeared by that return, that twenty persons had died during the period mentioned—some after a confinement of ten months, others after being in prison thirty-two years. Among the persons confined under the orders of the court of Chancery, many were in such a state of poverty, that they were unable to procure copies of the bills, for not answering which they had incurred this charge of contempt. The expense of procuring copies of these bills was enormous! they were to be paid for at the rate of l0d. per folio; and when the voluminous nature of Chancery proceedings was Considered, it would be clear that many of the persons called upon to put in answers were wholly unable to do so. Those bills were filed without any regard to truth. The plaintiffs were at liberty to tell any lies they pleased, and unless the individual against whom they were filed had money in the first place to obtain copies, and in the next to fee lawyers, he had no chance of avoiding the imprisonment to which this court doomed him. It appeared by the return which he held in his hand, that William Dawson was committed to the Fleet prison on the 12th of January 1818, and his wife Elizabeth, on the 1st of May, 1819. From, that time to the present they remained there for an alleged contempt of court, and, as they stated, were wholly unacquainted with the plaintiff, and with the reasons of the bill filed against them. There were many others who had been confined under the vague allegation of having incurred a Contempt of court, and whose only offence was their ignorance of the forms of the court, and their poverty, which disabled them from adopting the expensive measures necessary for putting in an answer. By the return made on the 11th of July 1820, it appeared that there were thirty-one persons then in confinement. He begged the attention of the secretary of state for the home department to this statement, because he thought that among the useful reforms which the right hon. gentleman had introduced into the system of administering the law of the land, none could be more properly or more 1180 beneficially introduced than some alteration of the proceedings in the court of Chancery. He (Mr. Hume) had taken the trouble to send a person to the Fleet prison, with the list in his hand, to inquire of the warden what had become of the persons whose names had been returned in it. The warden, for some reason which he could not understand, had refused to satisfy that inquiry; perhaps he was alarmed at the long array of names, and thought that some use was to be made of the information which he might afford. As he was, therefore, unable to state any more, than what the return contained, he should confine himself to that. It seemed that Hannah Barber had been committed on the 30th of January 1789, under a writ of rebellion. He did not know-exactly the nature of that proceeding, but he understood that if a man owed him 10l. it was necessary to state that he had attacked him with swords, staves, and knives, and in rebellion against his majesty. In a suit by the creditors of one Thomas Green against Hannah Barber and others, the defendant was committed for contempt in not obeying an order of the court, for payment of 406l. into the Bank of England. She remained in the Fleet until her death, which happened since the return, and after an imprisonment of between 30 and 40 years. He understood that by a clause in the Insolvent Debtors' act, a person might be discharged from custody for contempt, when the cause of imprisonment was only the non-payment of money, but that the court had no power to release from the costs. Was it not too much to say, that in a country like this, the criminal law was more mild in its effects than the civil? If a man were sentenced under the former to transportation or imprisonment, he knew the limit of his punishment; but having once fallen under the sentence of the court of Chancery, there was no knowing how long his imprisonment might continue. Such a system was better adapted to the arbitrary jurisprudence of Constantinople or Algiers than to this free and enlightened country. Another instance in the return was that of George Pigot, who had been sent to prison under a rule of court, ordering an attachment for want of answer to an amended bill. This man had been in prison for more than twenty years, during which time he had no means of obtaining a copy of the amended bill, nor of procuring a person 1181 to draw an answer to it. Anne Bretner was committed under a writ of habeas corpus from the Exchequer, for not appearing to a bill, and she was also dead. He now put it to the right hon. gentleman, whether this was right or not; whether some inquiry ought not to take place before persons were doomed to such imprisonments, as to the nature of their alleged contempts? and whether an end ought not to be put to so persecuting and oppressive a system? He understood that there were two instances in which the present lord chancellor, learning that the parties were unable, through poverty, to put in answers, had sent for them, and paid out of his own pocket the necessary expenses which their detention had occasioned. If his lordship saw the hardship of such cases, it was extraordinary that, being as he was at the head of the law, he had not brought forward some regulation to prevent such monstrous abuses for the future. He would only state one more case. It was that of Samuel Monson, who had been committed in 1813 for want of an answer, and who, although he had put in that answer ten years ago, was still detained for costs. Two other persons were in custody; one for speaking to a young lady, a ward of the court, after being ordered not to do so, and the other for cutting crops on an estate, in disobedience to an injunction of the court. He wished not only that the imprisonment which was the subject of his present complaint were done away, but that imprisonment for debt altogether was put a stop to; for he was convinced, that for one creditor who obtained payment of his debt, there were ten debtors who were made much worse members of society by it. The facility with which credit was given was injurious to society, and he could see no injustice in taking from those who were so ready to give it the power of imprisoning their debtors. Another, and the greatest hardship which attended this system of imprisonment by the court of Chancery was, that even if a man was ready to put in his answer, it would not be received until he was purged of his contempt; that was to say, until he had paid all the costs which had been incurred. The hon. member then moved for "A return of the several persons who have been committed to the Fleet prison and other gaols in England and Wales for contempts under process issuing out of his majesty's courts of Chancery and Ex 1182 chequer, since the 11th July 1820, with copies of their respective commitments with respect to such contempts; stating what persons have died, or have, been discharged, and at what time, and how many now remain in custody; also, a return of the number of persons that were confined for contempt on the 11th July 1820, and how many of them have died, been discharged, and at what time, or now remain in custody."

The Attorney-General

said, that as he understood the return now moved for was a continuation of that formerly made, he could, of course, have no objection to it. Every body was aware of the importance of this subject; but put, as it was, in this general way, he should not feel himself justified if he took up the time of the House by any statement at present. His right hon. friend would soon present to the House the report of the commission appointed to inquire into the practice of the court of Chancery, and it would probably then become his duty to propose certain bills to carry into effect the alterations in the present practice which, that report might suggest. He could assure the House that every attention would be paid to the subject. With respect to the contempt incurred for non-payment of costs, if it were as stated by the hon. gentleman, he was ready to admit that the provision of the Insolvent Debtors' act, which already went to release persons confined for non-payment of money ordered by the court, ought to be extended, so as to relieve them from imprisonment for costs. The other cases were of a very different nature. Some remedy ought to be applied, if any thing like oppression or unfairness could be shown to exist under the present system; but it was impossible to meet all the views of the hon. gentleman on this subject, without going the length of abolishing the court of Chancery altogether. In a bill, for example, filed for the purpose of obtaining discoveries of the utmost importance to the justice of a case; if the defendant obstinately refused to make the discovery sought of him, what was to be done? There was no mode consistent with the law of England by which he could be compelled to do what justice required, except by imprisonment. But, the moment he put in his answer, he was released from confinement. Where was the hardship in this? If there were a hardship, and if it was thought that such a power ought no 1183 longer to exist, the court of Chancery must be abolished; because there was no other mode of enforcing its decrees. The hon. member had stated that the ignorance of parties exposed them to offend unintentionally against the law. He had been totally misinformed upon this point. No party was called upon to put in an answer until he had been warned by subpoena, and notices of the time at which he was to do so. It was only because he disregarded these notices, and refused to obey the order of the court, that he was imprisoned. If a party chose to remain in prison rather than do that which the interests of justice demanded of him, was the House to assume that his imprisonment was oppressive, and that there had been no inquiry into the merits of his case? The basis of any investigation which the House would direct into this practice, ought to be, that the order had been properly made, and that it should have been obeyed. He by no means meant to say, that if a person was unable to pay a sum which the court had ordered him to pay, he ought to be kept in prison for life. He agreed that to such a law, if it existed, a remedy ought to be applied; but after the statements which he had heard the hon. gentleman advance in that House he was not disposed to rely implicitly on any fact which he might assert. He would read the clause of the Insolvent Debtors' act alluded to by the hon. gentleman, and the House would see with what safety they could trust to the accuracy of the hon. gentleman. [The Attorney-general then read the clause, which, after providing for the release of prisoners confined for contempt in not paying money ordered by the court of Chancery, goes on to provide the same relief for persons detained in prison for non-payment of costs]. This might be taken as a fair specimen of the hon. gentleman's accuracy. The act of which he had spoken was passed in 1812, and contained the very remedy which the hon. gentleman had so strenuously proposed. It was obvious that the only means the court of Chancery had of enforcing obedience to its decrees, was by the imprisonment of the refractory parties; but if they obtained their liberation on complying with the order of the court, no evil could be said to exist. He stated this as a general proposition, and he would add to it this qualification—that if the cause of detention was merely the nonpayment of money, and the prisoner was 1184 unable to pay, then he was entitled to the, benefit of the laws which bad been made for the relief of other debtors who had no-means of discharging their debts. Upon this broad distinction the House ought to act. When the subject came before the House in a different shape, he should feel it his duty to attempt to obviate all that might seem to be difficult, or that might occasion any hardship or unfairness. The system of that court, in general, was one which deserved universal veneration; for its constant tendency was, to protect and secure the property of the people. He was convinced that if the court of Chancery was not supported, it would be impossible to keep up the courts of common law; because, unless they were modified by the court of Chancery, they would become such a means of producing evil and inconvenience, that they could not be allowed to exist. The principles upon which the court of Chancery was established were so sound and so admirable, that he would defy the ingenuity of man, or the collective wisdom of any body of men, to devise a system more beneficial to the community.