COMMERCIAL DISTRESS—PETITION OF MERCHANTS OF LONDON FOR RELIEF.

HC Deb 23 February 1826 vol 14 cc698-733

Mr. Thomas Wilson

said, he never rose with greater anxiety to address the House than on the present occasion with a petition on a subject of vital importance to the welfare of the country, seeing that the performance of this duty placed him in the situation in which he was obliged to differ much from those whom it had formerly been his pride to regard as his hon. friends; but, whatever might be the consequence—whatever might be the impression unfavourable to himself in the quarter to which he alluded—when he witnessed the distress that every where prevailed, and was called on by his constituents to discharge the duty they had imposed upon him, he felt himself bound to stand forward. He trusted, therefore, that he should experience the indulgence of the House, while he was compelled to trespass upon their attention. The House knew, that not only the city of London, but the whole mercantile world, had been suffering, for weeks and months, under the pressure of financial difficulties, which had brought many houses to the ground, and threatened destruction to many more. The merchants of London had solicited his majesty's government for relief, by an issue of Exchequer bills, as on former occasions of a similar character; and though he would make no comment on the manner in which that application had been received, yet he might venture to say, it was quite evident, from what had taken place, that his majesty's government had made up their minds to grant no relief whatever. Several objections had been stated on their part, to the course pursued by their predecessors. For himself, speaking as a practical man, he hoped he should be excused for saying, that on a great emergency like the present, that remedy would be found to be the most effectual, which had so proved at former periods of the same nature. During the discussion that had been going on, his majesty's government had found out that the charter of the Bank of England enabled that body to lend money on goods, and therefore they concluded, that any interference on their part would be highly improper, and Would have the effect of perpetuating a series of precedents, calculated, in their ulterior consequences, to work great injury to the country. As by this discovery it had been ascertained that the Bank was open to the relief of the mercantile classes, why, it was asked, did they not apply to that body? What necessity was there for an issue of Exchequer bills under these circumstances? The answer he bad to make on behalf of the mercantile classes was, that relief in one case was administered by means wholly unobjectionable; while, by the other mode, the affairs of the merchant must be subjected to an investigation which would completely expose his embarrassments to the Bank directors. The Exchequer bills would be issued under the management of commissioners sworn to secresy. A merchant who wanted an advance, not on imaginary security, but on real goods of intrinsic value, could, unknown to the world, apply to the commissioners, and thus overcome his difficulties, without the circumstance of his temporary embarrassment transpiring to any human being. The present idea, however, was, that if it was advisable to discount a bill, it was quite as easy and proper to obtain an advance of money on goods, indeed, that the latter course was less discre- ditable. No mistake could be greater. One transaction was sanctioned by time and custom. It was what occurred every day, and without it the business of the country could not go on. The other was a transaction that could not take place without bringing a slur on the credit of the individual having recourse to it. In the first stage of the discussion, the objection taken by government to afford relief, was directed more against the sufferers themselves, as sinners, than against the principle of relief itself. The merchants, manufacturers, and traders were treated as wild and profligate speculators; or at best, as men engaged in unreasonable adventures. They were described as being concerned in bubbles of every kind, railways, water-companies, and gas-associations; and it was said, that as by means of these speculations, and the consequent excess of trading, the country had been brought into its present state of distress, it was fit that things should be left to find their own level and that government ought, on no account, to interfere. As he wished to save the time of the conference, he had put the worst case that he thought it possible to conceive, and which yet he undertook to prove one deserving of relief. He had, therefore, stated the case of a speculator, who, though still owner of a good deal of property, had lost half he had possessed. Yet this individual, he contended, was worth saving; not for his own sake, but as forming part of the commercial community. So he would say of the sufferers generally. If not for their own deserts, they were yet worth saving for the sake of the country, to whose prosperity their welfare was essential. Passing over the connection that subsisted between the commercial and the agricultural interests, he would maintain the necessity of relief, on the ground that the distress—though he would not say it had been aggravated—had certainly been superinduced by the conduct of government, and therefore he would repeat, that the merchants, manufacturers, and traders had a fair claim of relief, considering all the circumstances under which the distress had been produced. As to the charge of excessive speculation, he had never gone into the subject before; but, when he was told that speculators did not deserve relief, and therefore that no relief ought to be administered to the existing distress, he would stand up for the merchants of the city of London and, in their name, deny that this was the case with them generally. They were not, as they had been represented, overgrown speculators. They did not deserve the imputations thus cast upon them. Before they were treated in this way, it became government to shew, that the difference in the price of consols had exercised no influence on the value of goods. Was the difference between consols at 95 and at 75, nothing? Had the fall in the price of government securities no effect in throwing down the value of goods? Was no allowance to be made to the merchant, on account of the change which now resulted from the proceedings of government, with the view of reducing the five per cents? There was no proof of speculation beyond what the circumstances of the times seemed to require. As to the excess of trading, with which the merchants were charged, it was easy now to throw the imputation in their teeth. They were accordingly told, that they had traded beyond their power and strength. But, how were they, beforehand, to arrive at this conclusion? How were they to know this result, till it had proved itself? When the trade opened with South America, who could say that five, or ten, or fifty cargoes, were too few or too many, of one kind of merchandize, before the market was actually glutted? At the same moment, too, goods were despatched, perhaps from London, from Liverpool, and from Glasgow, and this unforeseen union produced the overtrading. This objection had been pushed much too far against the mercantile classes. As to the mining concerns in South America, he differed widely from those who had attacked them. He was not in the House when some animadversions had been recently made upon them, or he would then have stated his opinion respecting them; but he had no hesitation in saying, that he considered them a legitimate employment of capital. If the government of Spain had been supported for so many years by the produce of the mines, it was surely not irrational to expect that these undertakings would, at the present time, yield a considerable profit; and, though the investment of capital in them might be a matter of inconvenience at this moment, there was no reason to apprehend that the result would not be greatly beneficial to the adventurers. The sums of money gained or lost by gambling in shares was altogether another consider- ation. He was not disposed to justify the practice of gambling in any shape, but it was obvious, that the sale of shares had nothing whatever to do with the present question. He perfectly agreed with the hon. member for Montrose, that the country had certainly not been impoverished by this gambling. One man was richer, and another poorer; but the whole stock of wealth was neither increased nor diminished. The question as to the South American mines was, whether the investment of capital in those undertakings was a legitimate speculation. He was perfectly satisfied that it was. One cause of the present suffering was said to be the excess of imports. The same remark was-applicable to this, as to the question of speculation generally. The imports of a country could only be known to be excessive, when, by experience, they were found to be so. At present, the imports were excessive, only because the demand for foreign goods had suddenly fallen off. The loss resulting from the difference of prices would not be entirely sustained by this country. While the great importations were taking place, and while the prices of foreign merchandize were advancing, the prices of our own manufactured goods were also advancing; so that if, on one hand, we were importing at high prices, we were sending out our own manufactures, on the other hand, at prices advanced proportionally to the rise on the raw material. He did not stand up to recommend that assistance should be given to the dealers in bubbles of any kind, rail-roads, or gas companies, or foreign speculations, nor to the holders of bills of exchange of a long date, or difficult of negotiation. His proposition was simple. He wished that relief should be applied to that class of individuals who, with ample means, were suffering from the general want of credit and confidence, and who, he would add, were suffering to an extent which he would hardly venture to describe. No language could be used that would be too strong for the state of things to which it was to be applied. Every failure tended to aggravate the mischief and distress pervading the commercial world. Since the failure of the house of Goldschmidt, the consternation had spread in every direction. That house was deemed, like others, to have dealt too largely in foreign securities, and to have been concerned too deeply in over-trading. But, what was the fact? That name, lately so high in credit and affluence, had, no longer ago than last summer, through one of the partners, then abroad, laid out 50,000l. in the stocks of the United States, in order to obtain greater interest on the money than they could procure by any investment in this country. They had also founded an establishment at Leeds, in order to assist the manufacturers of this country, and at the time when the house stopped payment, they had made advances to the extent of 45,000l. on the manufactured goods under their care. The course they pursued was this: If the goods were sold, the advance was repaid;—if not sold within a certain period, the goods were sent out to such part of Brazil or South America, as the manufacturer chose to point out. Of the 45,000l. advanced, 12,000l., had been in this manner repaid. But, what was the state of the country at this moment? Parliament might learn it from the affairs of this house. A communication received the other day from the head of the concern at Leeds stated, that he could not raise 12,000l. to support the credit of the establishment. Four days previous to the stoppage of the house, doubts having been expressed as to its stability, communications to that effect were despatched to Paris and Amsterdam, The alarm produced there, by this intelligence, was excessive. Advices had been sent over from both those cities, stating, that the mischief that must follow this event on the two exchanges, would be incalculable, and would ultimately recoil upon the merchants of London. In this way the distress, great as it was, would be aggravated by every fresh failure. Never was the truth of the old proverb more apparent—that delays were dangerous. Those hon. gentlemen who were acquainted with the city, knew what frightful reports were in circulation only yesterday, respecting establishments of the highest respectability and of known property. Yet, these mere rumours had driven down the price of the English funds two or three per cent, and the foreign funds four or five per cent. Among the inconveniences pointed out as likely to result from the granting of relief, was the evil of an excessive issue of Exchequer-bills. It might, he admitted, be attended with inconvenience, under present circumstances, to government, or the Bank, if Exchequer-bills were, to any great extent, brought into the market; but not treble the amount asked for would, under more favourable circumstances, produce any mischievous effect. If his-majesty's government sympathised, with the mercantile classes, all would be well; but not while they said, "Some of you have done what you ought not, and-as we cannot discriminate between you, all shall suffer alike." This was hard treatment from a government which depended mainly on trade for the means of supporting its army, its navy, and its other, great establishments. The conduct of his majesty's government was, in this respect, utterly unjustifiable. Perhaps it would be said, that he had overcharged the picture he had drawn, and he expected that severe animadversions would be made upon him for inflaming the public mind. He declared, however, solemnly, that he was discharging a most unpleasant duty conscientiously, to the best of his belief. Among the many painful feelings he suffered on this occasion, one of the most painful was that arising from the necessity of removing from the bench on which he had sat with so much satisfaction for so many years, to that sort of neutral ground on which he was standing. He had judged it more advisable to take up that position, than to go at once over to the opposition benches, where, possibly, he might have been looked upon as a spy in the enemies camp. The president of the Board of Trade had lately recommended to the House, that the balance of trade should be kept in view by the merchant, in order to regulate his proceedings. But he (Mr. Wilson) was one of the old school, of which it was a doctrine that the balance could, be defined only by the result. The state of our foreign trade was now greatly, altered. When our imports were chiefly from, and our exports to the continent, the balance of trade was easily adjusted. But now the supplies received by this country from the continent were much greater; and they would necessarily increase in consequence of the relaxation that had taken place in our navigation laws. The exports to the continent last year had been cramped by restrictions, but the, great dependance of the country as to exports was on the trade with India, Brazil, and South America generally; and the returns in that trade could not be calculated until after 12, 18, or 24 months. As to the doctrine of limiting trade in order to force up the exchanges, he regarded it as one of the absurdities of the day. It must be left, he contended, to the Bank of Eng- land to decide for itself, when it should extend or decrease its discounts. To say that the Bank directors should be compelled to watch the exchanges, and drive them up by contracting their discounts, was to inculcate a doctrine wholly at variance with the sound principles of trade. If it were to be acted on, he would say, "Good bye to the consequence, importance, and respectability of the mercantile establishments of this country." A favourite notion afloat at the present time was the necessity of putting the currency and trade of the country into a wholesome state. He readily admitted, that no object could be more desirable; but, if parliament was to begin this intended course of improvement by ruining some of the existing banking establishments, and inducing the rest, in self-defence, to shut up their shops, they would inflict calamities which they could not foresee on the country, already suffering excessively from the operation, perhaps unavoidable, of other causes. In his opinion, they should have let well alone. Government had committed themselves by a legislative enactment, in the circulation of country bank notes during an extended, period. The right hon. the chancellor of the Exchequer might now pay all the compliments he could invent to the country bankers; but he could not remove the stigma which was, at the opening of the session, fixed upon them all. On the part of the public there would be runs, and on the part of the bankers distrust.—He regretted that he bad occupied the attention of the House at such length; but there were yet two subjects on which he begged leave to say a few words, mainly connected, as they were, with the causes of the present commercial distress—he alluded to the Corn laws and the Silk trade. He could not help considering these subjects, at the present time, as being closely connected with the actual state of country banking. If, at this period, government persisted in their intention of unhinging so many important interests, they would, in his opinion, adopt a dangerous system of legislation, which he trusted parliament would not tolerate. If the principles of free trade were to be introduced, government should at least pause, until they knew what were the feelings of the landed interests as to the proposed alteration of the Com laws. The landed interest, after all, would probably turn round upon them, and defeat the grand design. What a state of confusion would there then be between wholesome and unwholesome principles jumbled together into a system, if it might be so called, which no man could pretend to understand. In conclusion, he had one or two words to say as to himself. If he had, in strong terms, advocated the measure of relief, he begged it might be understood that he had not advocated his own cause, but that of the merchants of London. He had no personal interest whatever in obtaining an advance of Exchequer bills; but he had heard and witnessed so much distress, that he could not avoid speaking in the strong language in which he had delivered himself. For the consolation of his majesty's ministers, and the country at large, he felt it his duty to say, that he did believe that the country was never possessed of more elements of prosperity, or a greater mass of substantial riches, notwithstanding the extraordinary, unnatural, and fearful situation in which it was placed, by measures pursued and by measures not adopted. There was property enough to answer every demand. All that was wanted was the restoration of confidence. The city of London, however, had sent memorials and deputations in vain. But his majesty's government, it appeared, had made up their minds to give no relief, and therefore the merchants were compelled to lay the statement of their condition before the House of Commons, and pray for redress from parliament. Before he sat down, he gave notice of his intention, on Tuesday next, to move for a select committee to inquire into the present distress of the commercial world.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

said, that if the hon. member for the city of London anticipated from him any severe animadversions, either on the manner in which he had stated the case, on the mode in which he had described the distress, which they all knew was, unfortunately, prevailing in different parts of the country, or on his own personal conduct in bringing the question under the consideration of the House, expressing, as he had done, his altered sentiments on many important questions relative to the policy of the country, he would be greatly disappointed; because, sensible, as he was, that it was impossible the hon. member could address the House on the subject without feelings of the greatest pain, he trusted that the hon. gentleman would also do him the justice to believe, that he could not address the House himself without similar feelings, naturally arising from that sympathy which every honest man felt in the distresses of his country. It would be a great injustice, therefore, to his own feelings, if he gave utterance to any remark on the hon. member's speech, which could, with propriety, be described as a severe animadversion upon it. When the hon. gentleman, the other evening, had asked whether it was the intention of his majesty's government to submit any proposition to parliament, following the example of two former occasions, he had felt it his duty at once, distinctly and unequivocally, to state, that, in the opinion of his majesty's government, it would be highly dangerous, if not fatal to the permanent interests of the country, to imitate, on the present occasion, those examples. He knew the course recommended by the hon. gentleman was sanctioned by the authority of great names. He knew he might be taunted with affecting to follow, though with humble steps, the policy of those great names, while, in fact, it would be said, he was departing from it. To that reproach, however, he would submit, rather than incur the danger which he foresaw must result from the measure to which he was now urged. If parliament were to adopt it, he should deeply regret such a determinatiqn—not as to the immediate effect of the measure, but with regard to the consequences that would not remotely flow from it. In these matters it was the first step which it was essential to avoid. If, because this measure had been adopted twice before, it was, therefore, to be adopted again, he could not see where the practice was to stop. On every occasion of distress, it would be called for, as, every time distress occurred, it would be represented as the most grievous calamity the country had ever endured. He objected to it decidedly on principle, and he would found his objection on the very arguments used by the hon. gentleman in its favour. He contended, that the proposed relief would unavowedly be, to offer a bonus to extravagant speculation. For what were the cases to which the hon. gentleman had referred I He had told the House of enormous speculations in cotton, wool, and other commodities, which, followed by excessive importations, had produced a dreadful depression of prices. If that were to be the ground of relief on the present occasion, what hope was the House to have that prudence would ever operate on the affairs of men? What was the description given by the hon. gentleman of the situation of the great house of Goldschmidt? He had never heard the particulars stated before; but, according to the showing of the hon. gentleman himself, surely, if ever there was a case of excessive speculation, that was the very case. They had locked up their disposable capital in the stocks of a foreign government thousands of miles off. The establishment at Leeds was not to execute orders in the ordinary way of business, but to speculate in getting commissions where they were, by sales, to have been obtained. Their whole establishment was conducted on a principle which was the very essence of speculation. But, ministers were said to be guilty of injustice; they were charged with attacking characters, and endangering the credit of stable and respectable houses, because they had expressed themselves freely as to the evils of the present state of things. But, it was the very nature of speculation, that the mischiefs it produced were not confined to the individuals who embarked in it. Was it to be laid down as a principle, that whenever general distress was produced by excessive speculation, his majesty's government were to step forward and administer relief? On all occasions was this to be the rule? If, indeed, he could believe that this was the last time relief would be called for, his view might be somewhat changed; but he foresaw clearly that if it was now granted, another demand of a similar nature could not be far distant. This would continue to be the case as long as parliament, on every fresh occasion, supplied fresh fuel for the fire of speculation. The hon. gentleman had referred to the power of the Bank of England to afford a relief, by lending money on goods; but he had, at the same time, expressed his opinion, that that was an improper measure to resort to. Now, what was the state of the law? By the charter of the Bank, by the act of parliament, creating and regulating that corporation, and by the bye-laws by which it governed itself, that identical mode of proceeding was clearly settled and pointed out. It might not be desirable, perhaps, to have recourse to it. Many reasons might induce the Bank to abstain from that course; but why was a new law to be passed, creating the government and people into a sort of new bank for that purpose, when there was already an existing law, and an existing Bank, competent to do the identical thing for which a new law and a new bank were called for? Why were the members of his majesty's government to be loaded with every species of obloquy, because they would not create a new law and a new body, when there was actually existing a body by law, capable of giving all the relief expected or desired. He recollected well, that on the discussion of the law of merchant and factor, the argument used by the lion, gentleman in favour of the amendment of the law—and a pinching argument it was, which nobody could evade or resist—was, that, as the law formerly stood, it was impossible for any banker to advance money on goods. Parliament was convinced by this argument, and felt compelled to alter the law specially, for the purpose of enabling advances to be safely made on goods. If this amendment of the law was desirable, in order that bankers might have the power of making these advances, on what principle would parliament be now told, that it was utterly unjustifiable to refer the merchants to the Bank of England for the relief which, by its charter, it was competent to give, and which the amended law rendered it perfectly safe to administer? He could not comprehend why government was to place itself in the situation of a public banker, for a purpose that any existing banking establishment might effect.—He would not, on that occasion, follow the hon. gentleman into the subject of the Corn laws or the Silk trade; but he would revert to one point in his speech which confirmed him, if possible, more strongly than ever in the opinions he held as to the propriety of the course which government had adopted. He had heard with the greatest dismay, an argument used by the hon. gentleman on the subject of the currency and the exchanges; namely, that the Bank of England ought not to look to the state of the exchanges to regulate its issues, but only to what was termed the effective demand of the mercantile interests. If that principle was sanctioned by parliament, all that had been done to restore a wholesome state of the currency would be rendered completely abortive. Nothing in that case could prevent the recurrence of the desperate evils which had overwhelmed the country with all the calamities, from which no man knew how to escape, and which, he feared, it was destined for some time yet to feel. He besought the pardon of the House-He had, perhaps, expressed himself with more warmth than he ought to have done—certainly with less self-possession than the question required—but he hoped the House would do him the justice to believe, that any expressions he might have uttered, to which any gentleman might object, or any omissions of which he had been guilty, had not arisen from any want of sympathy for the unfortunate distresses which at present existed, or from neglecting to exercise the best energies of his own mind, or to avail himself of the wisdom of the more powerful minds of those by whom he was surrounded. He had endeavoured to express, to the utmost of his ability, the considerations which, in his mind, rendered it impolitic to adopt the course which the hon. gentleman had proposed.

Mr. Baring

said, that no man could have listened to the right hon. gentleman who had just spoken, without being fully impressed with his perfect sincerity on the present occasion; nor did he require any assurances beyond those which the right hon. gentleman himself expressed, and which a knowledge of his character fully supported, that the distress under which so large a portion of the community was suffering, produced a large share of sympathy in his mind. But in stating thus much, he must also say that the whole speech of the right hon. gentleman convinced him that the right hon. gentleman was not fully sensible of the extent and depth of the existing distresses. And on this important subject, which was one more of understanding than of feeling, he trusted the House would not be carried away by the earnestness of the manner, or the perfect good faith of the character of the right hon. gentleman. He would readily admit that it was not the business of government to interfere in any ordinary case of distress, but a case might arise (and such was the present) where the distress might be of such an extraordinary nature, and so extensive in its operation, as to render it the indispensable duty of government to step forward and attempt its alleviation. It was most unjust to attribute disasters to the improvident speculations of the whole of these merchants. He, on the part of the merchants of the country, denied the fact. He believed, upon examination, it would be found, that nearly three-fourths of the absurd schemes which were set afloat last year, had their origin, not in the counting-houses of the merchants, but in the inns of court—that they were concocted by some cunning attorney, or some scheming land-surveyor, whose only aim was to make money for the time being, by going before a committee of that House, careless to what the project might ultimately come. Some of those speculations might be traced to the more courtly circles of the west end of the town; and really, if the gentlemen of St. James's-street thought proper to bring their speculations to the merchants of the Royal Exchange, they had no right to say that the merchants of London alone were blameable. e did not mean to deny that many of those speculations had originated with that class of the community, but it was unfair to attribute the whole fault exclusively and entirely to them. As to the consequences which had ensued, he had never, at any time, hesitated to express his opinion that such must be the case; but, because he had ventured to predict that such consequences would ensue, he should not feel himself justified in turning round like the noble earl at the head of his majesty's government, who, because he had predicted, and no one would take warning, was for leaving the victims to their fate. Had it been the case of an individual, or of a particular branch of trade, perhaps he might say that it would be useful to allow experience to teach its lesson. But it was not that limited question; it was a question that embraced the country; that affected its leading interests, its revenue, its industry, its commerce, its manufactures, and its agriculture. The right hon. gentleman had stated no good reason why that remedy, which two examples had already proved the utility of, a remedy of known benefit, a remedy practised by the greatest man that ever administered the civil and internal affairs of this country—Mr. Pitt there was no reason why that remedy which had been found to work so well on former occasions should not now again be resorted to: for he firmly believed, that if all the cases of distress that had ever, in any former time, occurred in this country were to be summed up together, they would fall far short of equalling the mass of distress and suffering which at present oppressed the nation. That distress had at first sprung up from natural causes, but it had been grievously aggravated by the measures of government. What reason, then, was there for withholding similar assistance now, when it was well known, that the difficulties did not arise from any want of real substantial property, but from the cessation of the means of commercial intercourse, from the abstraction of the medium of circulation, and the destruction of that mutual confidence upon which our commerce depended? A general panic seemed to pervade every man's mind, that he would be unable to meet his engagements in consequence of the distresses of others. Every debtor had, as it were, his creditor at his throat. This, then, was surely a state of things peculiarly fitted for the interference of government; and the high estimation in which government paper and securities were at present held, considering the great depreciation which had taken place in other property, afforded an additional reason for granting the required assistance. But, it seemed that government had determined to adhere to a rigid, invariable, unbending rule, to listen to no practical men, but to be actuated only by abstract theories. They seemed to have altogether forgotten, that, in matters of even greater moment than the one now under consideration, we had been obliged practically to acknowledge the truth of the maxim, that necessity had not, nor could have, any fixed law; for, what was in estimation or in reality more valuable to a Briton than his personal liberty? Still, a state of things had more than once arisen in this country, when it had become absolutely necessary for a time to subject that most estimable right of Englishmen to the absolute disposal of the government. To a frequent interference by ministers in these matters, he had as great an objection as the right hon. gentleman could possibly have; but he looked upon this as one of those peculiar cases which required them to step forward and lend a helping hand to those who were now sinking under the pressure of distress. He was induced to think that the issue of Exchequer-bills would do more than any other mode which could be devised, for the relief of the present distress. The very ground and origin of that distress was a general want of confidence; and, because the measure he had alluded to was calculated to relieve the distress, and at the same time to restore confidence, he preferred it above any other. Persons who were in want of assistance would feel the greatest reluctance in applying for it to the Bank. In order to procure it, they must make a statement of their affairs, and expose circumstances which their interest required them to conceal. Such an application, too, must be always disagreeable, and even in some instances disgraceful—he meant disgraceful to the mercantile reputation of such persons as were driven to make it. The applications, on the contrary, which might be made to the proposed commission, would be conducted with that privacy which was necessary to die welfare of the merchants, and being made upon oath, would afford the greatest possible security to the government. With respect to money being advanced by the Bank of England on the deposit of merchandise, he looked upon that expedient to be as objectionable in principle and as inconvenient in practice as could possibly be imagined. It might be true (hat the charter of the Bank empowered the directors to do so if they thought fit; but it was certain that they had not thought proper to exercise that power. Until it had been discovered just now, by the research of some industrious antiquary, nobody had been aware, not even the directors themselves, that any such power existed. And even if it should be asserted that they had, it was quite clear that they bad never thought it wise or wholesome to exercise it. Any person acquainted with the nature of these affairs must know, that if the Bank should once adopt this measure, they would be called upon constantly to continue it. It would have the very effect which the legislature intended to prevent, by making them dealers in merchandize; for, although they were restrained from buying goods, they were empowered to sell in the event of the nonpayment of their advances, and thus they must be, to all intents and purposes, dealers. He thought, too, that the complaint coming as it did directly before the House, it became them to provide some remedy for the distress which had become so urgent, and not to send the persons who were suffering under it from themselves to the Bank. With the greatest respect for the right hon. gentleman, be thought such a proceeding would be unsatisfactory and even unfair. The distress, it should be remembered, was felt not only in London, but had extended, and was rapidly extending itself, to all the other important towns and cities in the kingdom. He could tee no ground of objection to compliance on the part of the government. An advance of Exchequer-bills would be most opportune. It would ease the pressure of distress, calm agitations, and restore mutual confidence, between the commercial classes. He was satisfied, though 5,000,000l. might be the sum required, that, as on former occasions, the issue of 1, or 2,000,000l., at most, would be found sufficient to put the elements of prosperity into action. The principle had been acted upon with decided advantage; and there was no instance, be believed, of the application of it being attended with a loss of sixpence to the public. His hon. friend who presented this petition had done no more than represent the wishes and opinions of his constituents. He was glad to see his hon. friend take up what in military phraseology would be called an imposing position on the left flank of ministers. For his own part, he cordially concurred in the opinions be had expressed with so much good sense and spirit.

Mr. John Smith

said, that in all that had been urged upon this subject, that which he took to be the most important point had been lightly touched on by his hon. friends: he meant the unprecedented nature of the distress which prevailed, and the mode which had been hitherto adopted for its relief. It was not his intention to inquire into the causes which had produced that distress—whether the panic which was its immediate cause bad solely occasioned it, or whether the clumsy contrivances which had been suggested had increased it to its present extent. This, however, was quite clear, that the House was called upon to deal with an entirely new state of things. At this juncture the chancellor of the Exchequer bad taken up the subject of the currency, and had proposed to do away with the circulation of one and two pound notes. He believed that the announcement of that intention on the part of government had had no small effect in producing the evils of which we had to complain. Was this to be renewed at some distant period? Was the House again to be occupied with debates on this subject? He hoped not. With respect, however, to the existing distress, he did not remember, nor, he believed, could any man living remember, a time of such universal pressure; Did any man recollect a period at which six London and an immense number of country bankers had broken?—when distress like that which now prevailed was felt at the same time in London and at Manchester, Leicester, Derby, Nottingham, and many other towns of the highest importance? It was very true that, some time ago, an absurd desire for speculation had existed throughout all conditions of the people. The noble earl at the head of his majesty's ministry had not been the only man to foresee the fatal consequences which must result from that rash spirit of speculation. He himself had expressed to his friends his firm conviction that some dreadful calamity would ensue; but he had in one respect been deceived, because he thought the distress would take place, not in the winter, but in the spring. It unfortunately happened, that the consequences of that calamity had extended themselves far beyond the persons who had been instrumental in spreading the mania for speculating. Many honourable tradesmen and most deserving individuals had been involved in the ruinous effects. Among those to whom he alluded the persons engaged in the silk trade were in die most unmerited and alarming state of suffering. Many of them had large stocks of silk, for which they had been obliged to pay, but which they found it impossible to turn to any account. In the present state of the trade, they durst not; manufacture it; and even if they could have disposed of it, they could not have procured for it any price. Such a class of men deserved the warmest sympathy, because they had done nothing to deserve what they were now suffering. Day after day their bills were dishonoured, and they could see no limits to this time of pressure and dismay. A man of this description, who was possessed of 40,000l. worth of silk goods, had come to him that day, and said, "I have in my possession this property, but, I cannot go on, unless you will lend me some money." He, and those with whom he was connected, did so, and would continue to do so, as far as they could; but it must be obvious that no prudent man in these times, could do this to any great extent. He approved of the manner in which his right hon. friend opposite (Mr. Huskisson) had resisted all the attempts which had been made against the law which, he had introduced on the subject of the silk-trade; but he wished it to be put into immediate operation, rather than wait till July next. He believed, that, so far from that measure having any injurious effect, it would, on the contrary, be a means of relieving the public. There could be no question that the Bank had a right to lend money on the deposit of merchandize, and in fact they had done so. This, he understood, was now objected to, and he was sorry to hear it. But although that was a measure which, under some circumstances, he thought highly expedient, he did not think it could be adopted so as to be universally useful on the present occasion. He preferred, on every account, the issue of Exchequer-bills, because the relief which they would afford would be prompt; and it was in the promptness of relief at the critical moment that its efficacy must consist. He could imagine no reasonable grounds on which ministers ought to refuse the request now made to them. What was there in it that they should hesitate to grant? It was true there were other modes in which relief might be afforded; to adopt them would require time, and while the grass was growing the steed would starve. He besought ministers to recollect, that the dangers which were now menacing the country were of no small importance. Without touching further upon this point, he would have the House to remember, that hungry men were not easily made to listen to advice, or to obey the laws by which they were, in times of less excitement peacefully governed. If such a stale of things as that to which he could only venture to allude distantly should arrive, he knew that no one would regret it more than the right hon. the chancellor of the Exchequer. To avoid this the means seemed to be obvious. There could be no doubt that it was the duty of government to do whatever they could for the purpose of granting that relief which was imperatively called for. Before he sat down, he must say, that he could never understand upon what principle it was that ministers thought themselves bound to act. Some two or three years ago, unless his memory deceived him, a noble lord at the head of the ministry, from a speech which he had made, appeared disposed to believe that, even in case of absolute famine, it was not the duty of government to interfere to do away the evil, lest they should destroy that caution and care which the people ought always to have for their own protection and preservation. He could by no means concur in so general a proposition. He thought, on the contrary, that the conduct of government, on this and on all other occasions, should be regulated by public utility. They were bound to ascertain, in cases where a request like the present was made, whether greater evils were likely to ensue from their refusing than from their granting it. If, on this occasion, they could show, that greater evils would ensue from their granting than from their withholding it, they should have his full concurrence. So wholly different, however, was his present impression upon the subject, that he was seriously apprehensive of the greatest evils, unless the relief prayed for should be granted without delay. He trusted, therefore, that the government, either by themselves or through their influence with the Bank, would afford this relief; and he hoped that the House would do him the justice to believe, that he would not have used the language, nor have uttered the sentiments which had been drawn from him on this occasion, but from a perfect conviction that they were such as the present exigency demanded.

Mr. Pearse

observed, that if the directors of the Bank of England had withheld the relief which was so urgently required, it was not because they did not know and feel the difficulties under which the country laboured. Being, as they all were, either merchants or engaged in pursuits intimately connected with the commerce of the country, they were interested (speaking merely of their pecuniary interests) in removing, if it was in their power, the present distress. The reason which had induced them not to interfere to any greater extent than they had already done, was, because they knew, by experience, that much better means than any which they could put in practice had been devised, and which, in their opinion, were altogether free from objection. He would shortly state the reasons which induced him to concur in this view of the case. In the first place, she distress had extended itself throughout the country. There was no place of importance which did not feel its full share of calamity, and in the appointment of the commission which had been so urgently, and he thought so wisely, recommended to the adoption of the House, the same method of forming it should be pursued as in that of 1793, when persons were inserted to represent every part of the kingdom. One gentleman from Scotland, who was well acquainted with the inter- ests of that country, which then had its share of suffering, was placed upon the; commission, in order that its interests and wants might be ascertained and provided for. The same rule was observed With respect to other parts of the kingdom. The great advantage of this plan, when the distress was, as in the present instance, diffused generally, was too obvious to need any comment. The practice and knowledge of the directors of the Bank of England were necessarily confined to London, while the commission would have the best possible information respecting the whole country. Another advantage to be gained by the commission would be its great notoriety. It would convince the people that the legislature were interested in their distresses, and that they had busied themselves in the attempt to remove them. In this point of view more than in any other, he thought the commission would be highly advisable, and that it would produce the most satisfactory results. No issue of money from the Bank, to whatever amount, would have the effect that this measure would immediately occasion; because it would restore that public confidence which, although it had originated with the actual distress, had made that distress infinitely more dangerous and universal. The Bank had already done a great deal in all such ways as it could. It did certainly possess, as had been stated, the power to lend money upon the deposit of goods; but that was a permissive power, and the few occasions upon which it had been exercised, showed that it was not intended nor calculated to be frequently resorted to. The act expressly said, that the Bank should not purchase goods; but the very next clause empowered them, having lent money, to sell the pledged goods in case of their not being redeemed in due time. It was evident, therefore, that this power was not to be exercised excepting when some necessity required it. He could not imagine any objection, in practice, to the advance of Exchequer-bills by the government; and particularly at this moment, he was convinced that no other measure would be so advisable. This was the opinion of all the persons with whom he had the honour to act, and who had exercised the best of their skill and judgment in investigating the Subject. The result of their deliberations had long ago satisfied them of this. The experience of the last four or five days had served to convince them more and more, that this was the most desirable way of meeting the present crisis. The mere knowledge that the House had taken up the subject of the general distress, would have the immediate effect of restoring confidence. Without the issue of a single pound, a conviction that the commission was to be appointed would mitigate the sufferings of the country, and be the most effectual and wholesome cure for all the evils which were now universally felt.

Mr. Bright

referred to the report of the commissioners appointed in 1793, and said, that the beneficial effects which had resulted from the measures adopted under that commission, were the best arguments that could be used for its renewal upon the present occasion. He did not know for what reason the government should refuse now to do that which had then been found so satisfactory a remedy for evils of precisely the same nature as the present. The commissioners of 1793 said in their report "that its advantages were evinced by a speedy restoration of confidence in mercantile transactions, which produced a facility in raising money that leas presently felt, not only in the metropolis, but through the whole extent of Great Britain." He saw no reason why any doubt should be entertained that the same consequences would result, if the same measure were now put in practice. The commissioners further stated, that "the difficulties in which many considerable commercial houses were involved have been thus removed, and the fatal effects of those difficulties on other houses who were dependent on them have been prevented." Nor was the operation of the act less beneficial with respect to a variety of eminent manufacturers in different parts of the kingdom, who having, in a great degree, suspended their works, were enabled to resume them, and to afford employment to a number of workmen who must Otherwise have been thrown on the public for support, and perhaps, in some cases, with the loss of the manufacture. We now beard complaints, that not only those who had rashly entered into the speculations which were so universally condemned were ruined, but that they had drawn into the same distress many honest and laborious tradesmen who bad taken no part in their schemes. To obviate evils such as these, ministers were called upon to adopt an expedient, the efficacy of which had beep already satisfactorily proved. Many manufacturers who bad bees obliged to suspend their works and to discharge their workmen would, by these means, be enabled to re-employ them, and that most important branch of the national interests with which they were connected would again be restored. Such distress as that which now prevailed—distress at once so extreme and so general—no man, he believed, had ever witnessed. It was vain to say that precedent did not justify this measure, or that it was contrary to the principles by which the government felt itself bound to act. The occasion was one of such urgent necessity, that it required no precedent; and principles, however valuable on other occasions, must give way to an exigency like this. But, said the right hon. the chancellor of the Exchequer, we must not encourage rash and unjustifiable speculation. He would not stop to inquire who it was that encouraged that speculation—whose speeches favoured that speculation, the knowledge of which they avowed, and on the success of which they congratulated the country—while they described the prosperity which was to be the consequence of them; but he bad a right to complain, that ministers now quitted the course they had found so pleasant a one; that they turned round upon all they had done before; and, when a plan was recommended to them which would relieve the distress that had been increased, if not produced, by their own measures, they rejected it, and refused to listen to the counsel of men the best informed and instructed. The right hon. gentlemen now sheltered themselves under the authority of principle; and said, that whatever relief was to be afforded, ought to be granted by the Bank, over which (notwithstanding the censures which were heard respecting the connection between the government and the Bank) the right hon. gentleman said he had no such influence as was supposed. Why was not the power which the Bank was to have of purchasing Exchequer bills, not in the way nor for the purpose of their trade, a violation of principle? When Exchequer bills were selling at a discount, and men who wanted money were obliged to part with them at the market-price, the Bank stepped in, and raised the price to the certain loss of those who bad been compelled to sell them at a large discount. Was the government to empower them to do this, and afterwards to refuse a mea- sore which was for the benefit of the whole country, on the ground of its being contrary to principle? To quit this subject, and return to the expediency of the measure proposed—he would ask, why they should hesitate to do that which had been done before? It could not be denied that it was necessary that public confidence should be restored. The House was called upon to interfere to effect this; and even if what they now did should be followed by some slight inconvenience, still he was satisfied that the urgency of the present distress was such as would justify the measure. He disclaimed any interest in that measure, excepting such as every other member of the community must feel; and concluded by expressing his conviction, that unless the government should consent to the issue of Exchequer bills in the manner recommended, the distress must become more extensive, and the consequences such as every man must contemplate with dismay.

Mr. Holme Sumner

concurred in the view taken on this subject by the hon. member who had spoken last. He was as great an advocate as any man could be for adherence to principles, as long as that was practicable. But, circumstances might happen to render it necessary to lay aside for a time those principles; and such circumstances he thought prevailed at this moment. The distress had assumed such a shape, that there was no class in the community exempt from its operation. No man, whether of high or low station, could say he was secure from the general pressure. It was true that owe of the causes of this distress might be ascribed to the rash and unjustifiable speculations which had been indulged in. But the melancholy fact was, that the speculators no longer existed; they had been swept away in the general ruin; and those who remained and implored relief were not those who had thus sinned, but men of respectability, honour, and integrity, who had unfortunately become the sufferers from the operations of others. It was not, therefore; with a view of serving the speculators but others who had no connection with them that he joined in imploring relief; for there were not any classes of society—not even those who fancied themselves wholly beyond the reach of disaster of any kind—who might not be eventually dragged into the vortex of destructions, if something was not done to save those who were at present in dan- ger. It was, therefore, for the House and his majesty's ministers to consider, whether something should not be done to stop the conflagration which raged at present in their neighbour's house, and might eventually reach their own.

Mr. Monteith

said, that the distress which prevailed was by no means confined to England. It had reached Scotland, and was making rapid and alarming progress there. The city of Glasgow was at that moment suffering under distress as severe and universal as any other part of the kingdom. He valued the principles upon which the government acted so highly, that nothing short of absolute necessity should induce him to sanction any departure from them. But circumstances like the present left no option, and either the issue of Exchequer-bills must be consented to by ministers, or consequences of the most disastrous nature would ensue. On the other hand, it appeared to him, that by consenting to this measure, no possible injury, or even inconvenience, could be the result. He trusted that the representations which had been made would have their weight with the right hon. gentleman, and that an acquiescence in them would dissipate that frightful train of evils which presented themselves in prospect.

Mr. Manning

expressed himself in favour of an issue of Exchequer-bills under commissioners by the government. A similar measure was adopted by government in 1793 with the happiest results—the distress at that time immediately subsiding. Government then proposed to issue Exchequer-bills to the amount of 5,000,000l., but it appeared from the report of the commissioners, that they never found occasion to lend more than 2,200,000l. Originally, they wereapplied to for advances to the extent of 3,855,624l., but the parties who applied found relief in other quarters; for, the moment it was known that government had authorized an issue of Exchequer-bills, assistance was easily procured in various quarters. Ministers in that House, and in another place, had thought fit to attribute nearly the whole of the present distress to the speculations in joint-stock companies, and other matters; but, on that point, he begged leave to differ from them. He did not mean to impute it as a matter of blame to ministers; but he must say, that much of the present distress had originated in measures adopted by themselves. He had never, either In public or private, concealed his opinion, that the measures which ministers adopted for reducing the rate of interest on Exchequer-bills and other public securities were very impolitic. What bad been the effect of those measures? Ministers complained of the foreign loans which had been raised in this country. What had led to them? It was the reduction of the 5 per cents to 4 per cents, and the reduction of the rate of interest on Exchequer-bills. In consequence of those measures, persons who had before derived moderate incomes from the funds were driven to invest their money in foreign securities, in which they had a prospect of obtaining 7 or 8 per cent. Ministers were aware that the Bank disapproved of the reduction of the rate of interest: they remonstrated on the subject, and stated, that great public inconvenience would arise from the measure. The Bank had been reproached with being instrumental in causing the present distress, by extending their issues of notes. It must be obvious, that there were occasions when it was necessary for the Bank to extend their issues; but he mustsay, after thirty years connection with that body, that he had never known an instance in which such an extension of issues had taken place but upon the best motives. When he stated, that the reduction of the rate of interest had led to the investment of money in foreign securities, he did not intend to blame ministers, but merely to show that they were not justified in attributing all the existing distress to speculation. A state of distress, such as no member of that House had ever witnessed before, had now existed for two months. During the continuance of that distress, the Bank had done every thing in their power to alleviate it. They had performed their duty, their bounden duty to the public. If they had acted otherwise, they would have deserved censure. The Bank, however, could do no more than they had already done. It had been said, that the Bank should look only to their own security, and leave the consideration of the interests of the country to parliament and the government. If the Bank had acted upon that selfish principle in December last when the two Houses of parliament were not sitting, and ministers, he believed, were all out of town, how greatly would the embarrassments of the commercial world have been augmented! Fromall parts of the kingdom—from all the great towns of England, Wales, and even Scotland—persons had come to the Bank to ask assistance, and that assistance had been most liberally granted. As a merchant, he was happy to second his hon. friend who sat near him, in calling upon government, as a matter of favour and grace, to take into consideration, in the interval between the present moment and the day on which the hon. member for the city had given notice of a discussion, the propriety of adopting the measure which, had been successfully resorted to on former occasions, for the purpose of alleviating commercial distress. He did not wish them, to give an answer one way or the other at that moment; but he trusted that they would turn the subject in their minds, and consider whether they ought to persevere in the course which they had commenced. Distress had now extended to merchants of every description. The warehouses were every where full. This was a state of things which called loudly for the assistance of government. Under these circumstances, he trusted that they would act upon the precedent of 1793 and 1811. It was obvious, that it must be extremely inconvenient for the Bank to go out of their regular course of business, and become the holders of goods in warehouse. They would not have the same remedy as government in cases of failure. He could assure the House, that it was from no want of desire on the part of the Bank to alleviate the prevailing distress, that they had resolved not to advance money on goods.

Mr. Secretary Canning

said, he so far agreed with the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, as to consider, that, as this question was to be brought before the House on a future day, when the course of their proceedings would leave them to the further expression of their opinions by a vote—it was not desirable to proceed with this discussion on the present occasion; and more especially, as there stood upon the paper, for that night, the consideration of a subject of very great interest, and connecting itself, in some degree, with many of the topics which had now been brought forward, rather irrelevantly, to be sure, in the course of this discussion; but which it would be, for the purposes of a sound discretion, quite desirable to separate from those which the House was so about to enter upon. He could not, however, suffer a part of the speech of the hon. gentleman who had just concluded, nor the speech of the hon. Bank director who had preceded the member for Lymington, and the tone of authority and admonition that they had both of them adopted, in respect of his majesty's government, to pass without some observation, and some explanation, on the part of government, of the principles by which they were actuated in respect of the proposed advances. He thought it fair to throw out of the question altogether the crimination and recrimination in which hon. gentlemen had thought proper to indulge, as to any alleged insensibility on the part of his majesty's ministers to the distresses of the country. It was a matter which had not been fairly raised that night; unless, indeed, it was meant to be said, that whoever were really sensible to the distresses of the country, were bound to adopt, without examination, and against conviction, whatever remedy any individual might propose to administer for those distresses. It was most unfair to infer from any hesitation on the part of government to adopt any particular remedy, under such circumstances, that there existed, therefore, on their part, an insensibility to the extent or nature of the existing evil. "For myself," continued the right hon. gentleman "and for my colleagues, I totally disdain to answer such insinuations. I impute to no man, who now hears me, that he is insensible; but, Sir, for others to impute to those upon whom, every day and every night, care and anxiety are brought by the consideration of those distresses, in addition to the common sympathy in which they share as men, is to impute to them, not only a want of feeling, but a want of sense, which would unfit them, not merely for the situations which they fill in the government of the country, but to appear here, in the midst of those whom I have the honour of now addressing. Why, Sir, the present situation of the country, as to these distresses, is afflicting and alarming; but the whole question in which the hon. member for the city of London, and other hon. gentlemen have brought before us, is, not whether the state of the country be alarming and afflicting, but whether the particular remedy which they suggest ought to be adopted by government, without previous examination, and against the judgment of those on whom it is proposed to throw the task of propounding it to parliament, of explaining its details, and of vindicating its propriety. If any man will think but for a moment bow much easier it would be for us to give in to this proposal, at once—if, considering this (as the hon. Bank director said) merely a fair measure for parliamentary consideration, under circumstances of great public distress and difficulty, we were disposed to popularize, by sanctioning a measure of this kind, can it be doubted by any who hears me, that it would only be necessary for my right hon. friend to stand up in his place and say, 'My judgment remains unshaken and unaltered; but I yield to the current. I see that there is a combination of opinion against me; and notwithstanding my own remains unchanged, I will yield to the torrent which sets against me.' That would be the language which my right hon. friend would be justified in holding, under the circumstances I am supposing: but I say, Sir, that if it were possible that my right hon. friend could hold it, he would decidedly desert his duty. He would desert the duty which, as a member of parliament, he owed to his constituents, and to the country in general; and he would violate the weighty trust reposed in him, as a member of the government, by acceding to that, as a popular expedient, which his deliberate judgment had taught him to reject, as being in itself prejudicial to the interests of the whole community. As an individual member of parliament, called upon only to discharge the ordinary responsibilities of his situation, he might, perhaps, with the same conviction, have yielded to the urgent necessity of the case, and abandoned what he conceived to be the strict line of his duty, when assailed by the strongest sense of misery, supported with all the eloquence of distress; and he might so have yielded, without any reflection upon the justice or propriety of that course which the circumstances of their situation had forced him to adopt. But, as a responsible minister of the Crown, called upon to bring forward a proposition of relief—to carry it through this House—to adopt it as one of the measures of his policy—to fight for it now and hereafter, against all the objections which may be brought against it—for even now although the wish seems so unanimous, objection will be brought against it from some quarter—and hereafter to contend against all the accusations which might be the consequence of either its failure or its success—why then, I say, Sir, that if his judgment is not convinced of the thorough propriety of the course which has been recommended, it becomes his duty to waive every other consideration, to persevere in his determination, and leave to the parliament of the country to adopt such measures as to them may seem expedient, and to place measures which he does not think it right to sanction, in hands more capable of carrying them into execution. Now, Sir, in our opinion, there is but one proper remedy for the distress; I say plainly and openly but one, and that is, the exercise of the power vested by charter in the Bank to make advances upon the security of property or merchandize, to those who may require them. The Bank directors, however, say, as indeed the hon. member who spoke last reminded us, that the power is in an imperfect degree—that it is not sufficient for security—that, in short, it is not an imperative, but only a permissive power. And yet, Sir, the Bank of England—I hope the hon. director will admit that—lends money on mortgages, buys gold and silver, and makes advances upon bills of exchange, and other like securities. Will it, then, be said, that the power of lending on all these, is not a power which extends to other commodities capable of sale? Why, Sir, the act of William and Mary expressly mentions merchandize as one of those things upon which the Bank was permitted to make advances, when it obtained its charter; and there remains not a shadow of doubt upon my mind, that the power to make advances upon that kind of security, is no more a power exclusively permissive than the power to lend money upon the security of bullion. The words of the act are: 'Provided always, that nothing herein contained be construed to hinder the corporation of the Bank of England from dealing in bills of exchange, or in coined gold and silver, or in bullion, or merchandize, which may have been bona fide deposited with them as a security for advances.' Can it, then, be denied for a moment, that the power here mentioned is not as much an imperative as a permissive power? I say it is. I gay, as far as the sense of the legislature can be gathered from the words of this act, that the power is precisely the same as that upon which the Bank makes its issues upon any other description of property, and that the making advances upon merchandise is as much in the discretion and power of the directors, as upon mortgages or bullion. Undoubtedly it is in the power of the directors of that company to say they will not; and they have said they will not. They have refused to make advances upon those deposits which may be offered to them, and have called to-night upon his majesty's ministers to supply that assistance to the country which they refuse, upon grounds, of which it may be said, stet pro ratione voluntas, but which, I contend, they have full power to grant, when required. We have considered it our duty to deny the assistance claimed from us; and it will remain now to be determined, what means are left to meet the exigences of our situation. It has been said, not only by the hon. bank director, but by almost every one who has taken a part in the debate, that the application upon this occasion is supported by a series of precedents, commencing with the year 1793. I say, Sir, that, independent of the question, and whether we are right or wrong in our refusal, the granting of this assistance of Exchequer-bills would be altogether a new measure, and that, as far as regards the precedent of 1793, it is only applicable at all in the existence of the distress. But, Sir, I would draw a distinction not only between our present situation, and the time of 1793, but between it and all the others; and it is this, that we were called upon to make advances to the distressed in a time of war and during the reign of the Bank Restriction act; and until we are placed again in the same situation, we must not be told that, we are to follow a precise precedent. The distinction, Sir, is always to be taken. Not that on no possible occasion the government should again lend money to relieve the distresses of the commercial interests; but when they are called upon to do so, there should be the same union of political contingencies which on that occasion formed both the reason and the justification for so extraordinary a departure from general policy. But, Sir, no man seems to consider the strange condition in which the country was unexpectedly placed, in passing from a state of peace to that of war, at the time of the precedent alluded to. In the year 1792, when Mr. Pitt brought forward his budget, no language could be more pacific than that which he then addressed to parliament and the country; and yet, in a short time after, without the slightest warning, without any apprehension on the part of those engaged in our commercial transactions, we were on a sudden engaged in an extended war. I do not mean to cast the slightest reflection upon the reputation of that great statesman. No man respected his character when living, or venerates his memory when dead, more than I do; but I wish to show how little the country was prepared for such a transition; that those engaged in its commerce could have had no foresight of the events which were to plunge them in distress, and that the great and unexpected changes and reverses which then took place, were the result of circumstances totally different, and gave rise to claims essentially more imperative upon the compassion of the government, than those, however lamentable or extensive they may be, which have been created in a time of peace, the most profound which the world has witnessed for half a century. It does not, therefore, follow, because his majesty's ministers do not adopt the measure which has been suggested to them, that they have not considered. On the contrary, they have considered it deeply and anxiously. That consideration, however, does not lead them to an abandonment of the course which they have laid down, and which they are determined to pursue. In adverting to past transactions, and to what have been regarded as precedents parallel to this period of distress, I do so only with a view of negativing the effect of those precedents, as applicable to the present time. If the course now recommended by some, was adopted in every future case of emergency, and every pressure, even of less general distress than the present, this course would be pleaded as a precedent; and, if such a case should occur in five or six years hence, there would be no reasonable ground for resisting the importunities of those who might require it. It might, to be sure, be more agreeable to yield to the arguments, or rather the desires of those who recommended a departure from the line of conduct marked out by ministers. It might be, perhaps, the road to popularity. But convinced as ministers were of the wisdom of not departing from it, they would persevere, regardless of the censures with which they may be visited by some, and of the admonitions so liberally proffered to them by others. Let it not, Sir, be supposed that relief will be precluded by government not acceding to the measure now recom- mended to its adoption. The Bank has the power of administering relief in the way that I have pointed out, and that power stands upon the same footing as the discharge of any other of its functions. They may act as they think proper, and there is no person to call them to account. It has been said, by the hon. member for Medhurst, that although this power is vested in the Bank to advance money on goods, there is a great disinclination on the part of the Bank to act upon it. It is said, that merchants are not disposed to go to the Bank for assistance. Why not? For the life of me I cannot see why such a disinclination should exist. What is the ordinary course of proceeding between merchants and the Bank? It is usual for the Bank, in ordinary cases, to discount the bills of merchants. These bills are the connecting link between the Bank and the holders of those bills. They are 'the visible and outward signs' of property on which the advances are made. But now a chasm has occurred in this species of security. It is true, that as the Bank have the power of making advances, they have also a discretion to exercise in the manner in which they make them. But I am utterly at a loss to know why there should be any shyness on the part of merchants in taking their bills of parcels or their invoices to the Bank, which would be a substantial foundation of property; and on their depositing these, advances might with propriety and safety be made upon them. There is one facility in effecting the measure at the present time, which did not formerly exist. Before, the goods on which the advances were made were scattered all over the face of the metropolis and of the country, so that it would be almost necessary for the Bank to have an establishment, in order to keep an eye upon them. Whereas, at present, the goods on which advances would be required are warehoused under the king's lock and key, and it only required to transfer the key in the door, to effect a transfer of them. Under these circumstances, I own I can see no reason why advances should not be made by the Bank, and required by the merchants. There is one point to which, as it is a personal one, I wish to advert, before I conclude. It was stated by an hon. bank director, that during the pressure of severe distress his majesty's ministers were out of town. It was stated, that in the month of December last we were absent. Now, I can only say, on the part of my right hon, friends on my right and on my left (Mr. Peel and Mr. Huskisson), and my right hon. friend, the chancellor of the Exchequer, and myself, that we were then in town, and that we were at our posts day and night, constantly and anxiously engaged in deliberation upon the distresses of the country, and the best mode of relieving them. We were then in town, when the hon. director was in the country; at least, if he was in town, we did not see him on any of those occasions when we had the pleasure of seeing his brother directors; and I can appeal confidently to one of those gentlemen (Mr. Pearse), who, I am sure, will be ready to bear testimony to the anxious solicitude then evinced by his majesty's ministers; I can appeal to him to testify that there was no want of disposition—no want of zeal—on our parts, to render whatever assistance was in our power: nor were we backward in rendering those acknowledgments which we thought were due to the conduct of the Bank at that momentous crisis."

Mr. Pearse

disclaimed the use of any tone by the Bank which would amount to an admonition to the government. They had merely represented, that as the mode pursued in 1793 had operated so beneficially, it would be advisable to adopt the same course now.

Mr. Robertson

said, that the conduct of ministers, and the measures introduced by them, were loudly condemned by the country. They had proved themselves unfit for their situations. The opinion and feeling of those within and without doors were, that they had reduced the country to a most helpless condition [Cries of "Question!"]. Such was his opinion of their conduct, and he would not be deterred from stating it. It was usual, when ministers found that their measures were not approved of to resign their places to those whose counsels were acceptable to the nation. Their continuance in office was an embarrassment to the king; who with other ministers, might adopt measures more applicable to the situation of the country.

Mr. Alderman Bridges

concurred in all that had been said with respect to the strong claims which the unexampled pressure of the present crisis gave to the commercial world for relief. He could not understand why a measure which proved so successful in 1793, should not be resorted to at the present moment. The causes and consequences of the two periods were exactly similar. Such was his grave opinion, and such was the conclusion to which a hundred merchants of London, after the most mature deliberation, had come to. In 1811, government afforded relief by an issue of Exchequer-bills, though the distress was not then so great as at present.

Mr. Curteis

contended, that the precedent of 1793 was a very fair guide as to what the government ought to do in the present case. The Bank directors were all men of practical experience, who understood the nature of the distress better than any body else; and, as they advised the government to come forward with assistance, he was inclined to think that they were right. It was true that the recent measures of ministers had been cheered by their opponents; but those cheers ought to be looked at with some jealousy. He was one of their friends, as he generally voted with them, except when they got into their novelties. Whatever mischiefs might arise from their new doctrines of free-trade, he could not be looked upon as a particeps criminis as he had invariably opposed them.

The petition was then brought up and read, setting forth, "That the House has, in former instances of extraordinary pressure amongst the mercantile classes, sanctioned an issue of Exchequer-bills for the relief of the commercial and manufacturing interests of the British empire; that the petitioners beg leave to approach the House with a respectful expression of their opinion that the unexampled distress which at this time prevails amongst a very large portion of the merchants and traders of the city of London, and of various other parts of the United Kingdom presents an irresistible case for the immediate interposition of the legislature; and the petitioners are therefore of opinion, that an issue of Exchequer-bills, in such amount, and under like regulations, as have been adopted upon former similar occasions, will not only afford essential relief to those who are now suffering under temporary commercial embarrassment, but will operate in a most important degree to restore that confidence in mercantile transactions which has been recently suspended, and to which the distress which now exists is chiefly attributable; that the petitioners, being deeply impressed with these sentiments, humbly pray that the House will be pleased to take the premises into its most favourable consideration, and afford such relief, by the issue of Exchequer-bills or otherwise, as in its wisdom may seem meet."

Ordered to be printed.