HC Deb 18 April 1826 vol 15 cc298-318
Mr. Hume

rose to present a petition from an individual named William Richardson, labourer, confined in the Castle of York, under the order of the lord chancellor, for a Contempt of Court. The case was, in his opinion, one of great hardship. It appeared from the statements contained in the petition, that the petitioner was a labourer in the county of York. In the year 1824, he had the misfortune to have a property of 600l. left to him, on which a mortgage debt amounting to 300l. had been incurred. The creditor of the estate, in which Richardson had only a life interest, foreclosed the mortgage, and the petitioner was committed to prison in contempt, for not having put in an answer to a bill filed by the mortgagee. The petitioner appeared to have no prospect or hope of relief, unless it were afforded him by the House. He found it impracticable to raise more than 300l. (the amount of the mortgage debt) on the property, and was therefore likely to be consigned to a prison for life, on account of his inability to discharge the costs which had been incurred in the course of the proceeding. On the petitioner's decease the property reverted to a minor, now aged seven years, who was also in prison. Under these circumstances, the petitioner could neither sell nor dispose of it in such a way as to extricate him from his embarrassments. He (Mr. Hume) was desirous of calling the attention of the secretary for home affairs to this case in particular, and to the subject of the Court of Chancery generally. It was with pain he saw the long-expected reforms in that court protracted from day to day. The House had heard a great deal of the good likely to result from the labours of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the practice of the Court of Chancery. These commissioners had at length made their report; but he regretted that it was now extremely improbable that any measure founded upon it could receive the sanction of parliament that year. From all he could understand of the probable duration of the session, he thought it impossible that a bill, which was not to be introduced till the 4th of May, could be passed during the continuance of the present parliament. He declared, he thought the greatest curse that ever fell on any nation was to have such a chancellor, and such a court of Chancery, as this country was visited with [Murmurs of disapprobation, and cries of Order, order].—He was ready to repeat his expression, which he thought fully justified by the system at present pursued in that court. That such a system should be permitted to continue was a disgrace to the lord chancellor, who had presided there for more than twenty-five years. It was a still greater disgrace to his majesty's ministers to allow such injustice as was occasioned by means of that court to desolate the land. It was not saying too much to repeat, that a court and a judge, which went to perpetuate such a system, were curses to the country. The petition concluded by calling on the House to pass an act to relieve honest and unfortunate persons, committed for a contempt of court, from the consequences of such committal.

Mr. Lockhart

said, he was shocked, as he was convinced every other hon. gentleman must have been, by the language applied to the lord chancellor by the hon. member for Aberdeen. The delays of the court of Chancery were not attributable to the noble and learned lord who presided over that court, but to the system.

Mr. Secretary Peel

said, he did not see the candour or justice of the course adopted by the hon. member for Aberdeen. It would have been only fair in the hon. gentleman to have given notice that he was about to present the petition when coming down to the House with such an accusation in his pocket. The hon. member was in the habit of using such unmeasured language, that it might seem almost useless to protest against it; yet he could not but protest against his present proceeding. To say the least of it, it was unfair to bring forward such a statement without notice of his intention, when it was possible that some satisfactory explanation of the circumstances might have been given. He did not pretend to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case to which the petition referred, and therefore he had it not in his power to explain them. The petitioner appeared to complain of an unfavourable decision—a thing by no means surprising in an unfortunate and disappointed man; but, as he was not acquainted with the circumstances in question, he did not feel called on to reply to the statements of the hon. member. It was not his intention to deny the hon. gentleman's right to present such a petition in the way he did; but he repeated his opinion, that it would have been only fair to have apprised the House of his intention beforehand.

The Solicitor-General

said, that a judge, of any rank, was a person at least entitled to be treated with decency, if not with respect. He had not heard the expressions of the hon. gentleman, but it had been reported to him that the hon. gentleman, in the exercise of that privilege which, abstractedly, was certainly the right of every member, had said that the lord chancellor was a curse to the country. Now, he himself was a friend to the privileges of parliament; but, great as he wished its liberty to be—latitudinarian as he would wish its privilege to be—he must be allowed to say, that a greater curse than any lord chancellor could be to any country, would be that privilege, if, on an exparte statement, in the absence of any defence, in the impossibility of the party making his own defence, men of the highest station were to be denounced and hunted down in consequence of fulfilling a public trust. The case might be a strong one. Let the hon. gentleman in pursuing his motion, make that out: let him prove that this was a case which, on the face of it, carried marks of oppression and injustice, and then he might alter his opinion of the language which had been applied to the judge and the court of Chancery; though no circumstances could justify the use of such language even in that very strong case. To talk of a man as being a curse to his country, was to denounce him as being devoid of principle, of feeling, and of honour. But, indeed, to attack a man with such expressions behind his back, when none of his friends were present, or instructed either in the accusation or the defence which they might make when known, would, if drawn into practice, make that House the most grievous curse to the country.

Mr. Grenfell

said, he was not in the House when the words which caused this discussion were used. If his hon. friend had stated, that the lord chancellor was a curse to the country, he had done that which was not altogether becoming in him, or any other member, to do. If his hon. friend had said that the court of Chancery was a curse to the country, he had stated that which no man conversant with the subject could deny. It was only stating the current opinion of ninety-nine men out of every hundred. And he would tell the House the reason he had for holding that sentiment. It was because, by the practice of that court, a rich man was enabled to oppress, injure, and ruin, a poor man. It was a mere engine of oppression; and constituted as that court was, it was not too much to say that it was a curse to the country. While he was up, he would take the opportunity of expressing his disappointment at the result of the inquiry by the commissioners. In looking at the report, consisting of a huge volume of seven hundred pages, he had experienced great disappointment. He did not see any thing proposed as a corrective (he mentioned it by way of example) for that practice which was known by the name of a fishing-bill. By filing a fishing-bill, any man, however wicked, might oppugn any member of that House, or the Speaker, or any other man of the most unblemished character; he might accuse him of all kinds of abominations and offences, even the most atrocious; he might depict him as the most depraved of all mankind. Truth was not necessary to the allegations: their very foundation was generally laid in fiction. They were instruments by which the most virtuous men might be tortured, vexed, and harassed, without redress; not for weeks and months, but for years—for the greater part or the whole of their lives. After having incurred the enormous expense of such proceedings, what was the remedy of the individual? Suppose the whole attempt of the party to be false, what was the result of enduring all this vexation, injustice, and oppression? Why, that the assailing party was merely subject to the payment of taxed costs. There was really nothing else to affect the man who had been guilty of such oppressive and scandalous misconduct. Now, though he did not think it was quite becoming in his hon. friend to have said of the individual at the head of the court of Chancery, and who ought not to be personally visited with all the vices of the system, that he was a curse to the country; yet, most undoubtedly, such a system as had been described called for and would justify the censure of that House. In this view, he heartily concurred with his hon. friend in thinking that the system and practice of the court of Chancery, in such matters as had been referred to, deserved to be visited with the epithet of being a curse to the country.

Mr. Holme Sumner

said, that the hon. member who spoke last had spoken in modified terms of the present system of the court of Chancery. Not so, however, the hon. member who had preceded him, and who had, he would assert, made the most indecent, the most uncalled-for, and the most outrageous, attack upon the learned lord who presided in that court, which he had ever heard made in that House. This being his opinion, he thought the House would be deficient in its duty to its own dignity, if it did not call for some explanation from the hon. member, with the view of softening down the rigour of the phrase which he had ventured to use on the present occasion; and if, in failure of such an explanation, it did not by a specific resolution, express its opinion that such an expression was a violent and indecent abuse of the privileges of parliament. He begged further to state, that if the hon. member did not qualify his epithet, he, himself, would be the person who would move such a resolution, for the purpose of at least acquitting himself individually of the duty which was due to the learned person at the head of the court of Chancery, who ought to be protected from such a strain of abuse. The hon. and learned Solicitor-general had, indeed, said, with reference to the system of the court of Chancery, that the complexity of its practice was the fruit of the present complicated condition of the business of society. Now, he did not altogether concur in this opinion; for, however complicated were the concerns of society at large, he did concur with those who thought, that the delays which prevailed in some parts of the administration of justice were not only unjustifiable, but often ruinous to the aggrieved parties. The fault did not, however, rest with the lord chancellor: it rested as much with himself, and every other member of the House, who had neglected to introduce some remedial improvement in the system of the court, which had, for time out of mind, been defective. Indeed, so far from arraigning the lord chancellor in the way in which he had been arraigned for these imperfections, he thought it was a great blessing for the country, that it had a judge of his sound and enlightened understanding to administer a system which, in other hands, might have proved highly detrimental to the best interests of the community.

Mr. Hume

said, it appeared that the language he had used with respect to the system of the court of Chancery, was considered as indecorous and improper. Now, on the contrary, he thought it perfectly applicable; and he begged that the hon. member, or the House, would, if they thought otherwise, order his words to be taken down; for he was ready to abide by them. Whatever might be the result of such a course, there were very few, he believed, out of that House, who would hesitate to say, that the court of Chancery deserved the appellation which he had directed against its system, and ought to be designated as a curse to the country; in point of fact, that it had been so for a very long time. How had he applied the epithet? The learned Solicitor-general was ignorant of the facts which the petition set forth, or he would not have made use of the observations which he had uttered, and supposed, contrary to what had occurred, that he had failed to make out a case of grievance. The facts which he had stated were these: The petitioner, a labourer, had unfortunately become possessed of a farm worth 600l., in which he had merely a life-interest, the property being to devolve upon his son. Here the hon. member re-stated the particulars of the petitioner's case, as he had described it in his opening speech, and then asked the House once more, whether the result had not proved most grievous for the petitioner, who was doomed, by the process of the court of Chancery, to linger out a miserable existence in a prison, like other unfortunate beings who were incarcerated for what were called contempts of court, some of them for their whole lives. Two had lately died who were in prison under these circumstances, one of them for twenty-nine years, the other for thirty-two years. And, when he thus spoke of the system of the court of Chancery, he begged not to be considered as referring to an insulated case, but to the system of that court. The learned Solicitor-general regretted that he had not paused to ascertain the truth of the petitioner's case. He had done so: he had referred to the re- spectable solicitor at Hull who drew up the case, and who had convinced him, that there was nothing supposititious about it, but that, on the contrary, it was a simplenarration of truth, in which the poor man was left entirely without a remedy. And, when such a course was to be denounced, was it to be in measured language? When he had to speak of abuses, he was not a man to use milk-and-water language, or to designate them in any other terms than those which they deserved. If the lord chancellor was, in a great measure, the cause of these evils, was he to use milder terms towards him than to the system which he had tolerated for the quarter of a century during which he had presided in that court? It was in that way that he had put his argument. And how could he have done otherwise? He, of course, could not suppose that the lord chancellor was a man who had so little humanity in his bosom, as to be the willing inflictor of so much wrong; but still it was the conduct of his court which had occasioned it: and why, with all the power which the learned lord could wield, had these abuses been so long suffered to exist? He did not mean that the whole of this blame should lie on the lord chancellor's head: he assuredly desired that a portion of it should attach to that House, and more particularly to his majesty's ministers, who had so long permitted these abuses to be practised unrestrained and unprevented. He would again repeat, that—such a system was a curse to the country which was burthened with it; and if it was suffered to exist through the supineness or remissness of the head of the court, who had the power of applying a remedy, then he was at a loss to see how the same epithet did not apply to the individual so acting, as well as to his system.

Mr. Sumner

said, he was certainly dissatisfied with the hon. gentleman's explanation; but he knew that, not having called for the hon. member's words to be taken down at the moment they were used, he had lost the opportunity of taking the matter up as a point of strict privilege. If, however, the hon. member still insisted, that not only was the system of the court of Chancery a curse to the country, but that the lord chancellor himself was equally so, then all he had to say was, that if the hon. member now repeated his expressions, he would certainly call to have his words taken down, and afterwards for the opinion of the House upon them.

Mr. Ellice

said, that if the hon. member was desirous of having it repeated, that the administration of justice in the court of Chancery as at present constituted, and the manner of its performance by the lord chancellor, who administered its affairs according to this system, had become a curse to the country, he, for one, would himself indulge him with the repetition of that animadversion. It did not become members of that House, when describing the abominable and most vexatious proceedings of such a system, to soften down and qualify the epithets which it loudly called for [hear].

Mr. Sumner

said, that lest the petition should contain expressions similar to those which had been used by the hon. member who had presented it, he would request to have it read by the clerk: for, should it be found to contain unwarrantable phrases of that kind, he hoped the House, for the sake of its own character, would not suffer such libellous aspersions to go forth from its table.

The Petition was then read, setting forth,

"That the Petitioner is a labourer, and hath heretofore been accustomed to earn his bread by the work of his hands, as a servant in husbandry; that in or about the year 1824, by the death of the petitioner's wife, he became seised for his life of an estate, consisting of about seven acres of land, with a house thereon, worth about 600l., but subject to mortgage for 300l. and interest, lent by one Teavil Leeson, of Cave, in the county of York, on security thereon; and, after the petitioner's decease, the said estate descends in fee to Joseph Gardiner, the heir-at-law of the petitioner's said wife, who is now an infant, of the age of seven years, and also a prisoner with the petitioner in York Castle; that the said Teavil Leeson some time since gave the petitioner notice to pay in the said mortgage money, but the petitioner being unaccustomed to the forms of business, from the nature of his employment, and hearing no more about the matter, neglected to inquire about other money to replace it; that, in the course of a short time afterwards, some one gave the petitioner a nonsensical paper, about Richard Roe attacking John Doe, with swords, and staves, and knives, and turning him out of an estate, containing about seventy acres of land, with a great number of houses, barns, &c.; that, shortly afterwards, an officer of the sheriff of Yorkshire came and took possession of the said estate of the petitioner, and delivered the same to the said Teavil Leeson, when the petitioner learned, that the above nonsensical paper was a proceeding in an action of ejectment, in which the said Teavil Leeson had obtained a judgment, to take possession of the petitioner's said estate, and that the petitioner was also liable to pay the said Teavil Leeson a large amount for the costs of the said action; that nearly about the same time as the above-mentioned proceeding in ejectment was delivered to the petitioner, the said Teavil Leeson also filed a bill in Chancery against the petitioner and the said Joseph Gardiner for a foreclosure of his said mortgage on the said estate; that the petitioner was very anxious to raise the money to pay the said Teavil Leeson's said mortgage off, but found that the said Teavil Leeson would not accept the amount of his mortgage-money unless he was also paid the costs of the said ejectment, the costs of the said Chancery suit, and a small arrear of interest, amounting altogether to a large sum of money; that the petitioner was also willing to pay such costs and interest, but being a poor labourer, dependent on the work of his hands for his subsistence, and being deprived of the rents of the said estate by the said Teavil Leeson taking possession thereof; and the relations of the petitioner being also poor persons like himself, the petitioner had no means of raising the said principal money, costs, and interest, unless the same could be raised upon security of the said estate, for which purpose the petitioner made application to divers attornies, who informed him, that they had the money, and the estate was of ample value as a security, but that the petitioner could not legally raise more than the sum of 300l. previously charged on the said estate, because he had but a life interest in the said estate, subject to a mortgage for 300l.; and that the remainderman, Joseph Gardiner, could not charge the estate with a further mortgage for raising the additional sum, because, he being a minor, of the age of seven years, could not execute a deed of mortgage; that the petitioner, finding the principal, interest, and costs could not be raised by a security of the said estate, determined to put in such answers to the bill in Chancery, for himself and the said minor, as would enable Teavil Leeson to sell the estate, and pay himself the principal, interest, and costs, leaving the residue of the purchase-money for the benefit of the petitioner and the said minor; and the petitioner applied to several attornies for that purpose, who declined undertaking the said business, because, as they said, the expense of putting in such answers would amount, at the least, to between 20l. and 30l., which they saw no prospect of the petitioner being able to pay, and which the petitioner was and is totally unable to raise by any means whatever, and that as to waiting for payment of their costs till the estate was sold, the attornies told the petitioner, that, although all the parties were willing it should be sold, and might try their utmost to obtain an order from the court of Chancery for the purpose, yet that it might be still some years before such an order could be obtained, and that there would be a great deal of additional costs and charges besides the answer, for all which the attorney would have to remit money to London, with but a distant prospect of re-payment, wherefore they all declined to be concerned in putting in the said answers, on account of the great risk of their being losers ultimately; that the petitioner next informed the said Teavil Leeson, through his attorney, of the situation he was placed in, and offered, if the said Teavil Leeson would supply the money for the purpose, that the petitioner and the said Joseph Gardiner would put in such answers as would enable him to sell the estate, and out of the purchase money to pay himself his principal, interest, and costs, and repay himself what he might so advance for the petitioner and the said Joseph Gardiner, putting in such answers as aforesaid, and to invest the residue of such purchase-money in such way as the lord chancellor might direct, for the benefit of the petitioner and the said Joseph Gardiner, but the said Teavil Leeson refused to do so; that the petitioner, and also the said Joseph Gardiner have been imprisoned since last November in York Castle, at the suit of the said Teavil Leeson, upon an attachment for a contempt of the court of Chancery, for not putting in answers to the said bill in Chancery, which they are most willing but unable to do, for want of money only; that the petitioner has been attacked with a violent fever since his imprisonment, during which he received every kindness from the persons intrusted with the care of the said Castle, compatible with his situation; but the medical man who attends the petitioner informed him, that he must get liberated, or his life would be of very short duration; that Mr. Thompson, solicitor, of Hull, has represented the above circumstances to the said Teavil Leeson, through his attorney, and again urged his consenting to the liberation of the petitioner and the said minor, or acceding to the plan above-mentioned, but the said Teavil Leeson has refused so to do; that the petitioner, therefore, sees no prospect but that of terminating his life in prison, and that the said unfortunate minor should spend the most valuable part of his life in gaol, from the present time until he be of an age when he may possibly raise the principal, interest, and costs, by a sale of the said estate, and release himself from prison, ruined in fortune, education, and moral character, unless parliament should, in the mean time, interfere; the petitioner, therefore, humbly prays, That the House will be pleased to pass an Act whereby honest but unfortunate persons committed to prison for Contempt of Court, who are willing but unable to clear themselves from that contempt, may be liberated from prison."

The Solicitor-General

said, he did not rise to oppose the reception of this petition, but merely to point out, that nothing had been done in this case, according to the petitioner's own statement, but what was done every day by an hon. member of that House, who had to foreclose a mortgage and proceed with an ejectment cause; and yet this process which every gentleman's attorney had daily to resort to in cases of this kind, was to be made the frame-work of a bitter attack upon the lord chancellor, as if he alone had inflicted an unusual injury upon an individual, in administering a particular process of law. The fact was, it was not the court which had upset this man, but the lessor, who had directed his attorney to proceed to a decree against him. Why, then, did not the hon. member, instead of impugning the lord chancellor, attack the attorney or his client? The reason was, no doubt, not so much his sense of justice, as of gallantry, for he did not like to attack a female, and therefore he had refrained from casting any reflection upon Phoebe Leeson. [Repeated laughter, the learned gentleman having mistaken the name mentioned in the petition for that of a female.] Still, after all, he doubted much that the true reason was, that the petitioner failed through poverty in giving an answer to the process of law. What was to be done in the administration of justice, if a court of competent judicature had not the power to enforce obedience to its own decrees? How could justice be administered without such compulsory process? The man's case might not, indeed, have been heard, owing to his poverty; and no attorney could well be blamed for disregarding a client who had no money to pay his costs; still he doubted the story, for in the whole course of his experience, he never knew a man left without redress who showed a desire to do what was just and right in these matters of form, and he therefore suspected that there was a little obstinacy mixed up with this individual's poverty, and that he had to thank himself more than any body else for his present condition. On the whole, he must repeat his expression of condemnation, that such terms of abuse should have been levelled against a process of court, for an act which every gentleman of that House readily called upon his attorney to do for him, in the recovery of mortgaged property. He deprecated the use of such harsh language, as that such a process, and the judge administering it, were a curse to the country, This was a strong expression; and though little disposed to weigh by the scruple or ounce words which fell in the heat of debate, still he could not help complaining of this unjust vilification of the lord chancellor, for acting upon the old and recognized practice of his court, which, if wrong, it was not for him, but the legislature to alter. The court itself was not to blame for acting upon the system intrusted to it, until a better was provided for this administration; and he must say, with reference to the present petition, that of all the petitions which had ever been presented to that House for the purpose of endeavouring to vilify the lord chancellor, this exceeded them for farfetched invective, gross calumny, and wanton falsehood.

Mr. Baring

said, he was obliged to his hon. friend for having brought forward this petitioner's case, and drawn the attention of the House to the enormous abuses which prevailed in the system of the court of Chancery. At the same time, he regretted the introduction of any harsh epithets as applied to the head of that court, from their natural tendency to indispose the majority of that House from seriously considering the nature of the case itself; which undoubtedly seemed to call for dispassionate consideration. As to the noble lord at the head of the court of Chancery, if any grave cause of blame attached to him for the existence of those abuses, it must be that he had sat so long in his distinguished station, without calling for the application of a remedy, to prevent the occurrence of abuses which so attentive a person ought to have seen in frequent operation. He could of his own knowledge state instances of grievance which this system had inflicted. He had been applied to on one occasion, by two or three industrious people who lived in his neighbourhood in the country, and who held cottages and gardens, with a few acres of land. These they had agreed to sell to a person in a higher situation in life than themselves; but that person having possessed himself of their original papers, refused to fulfil his part of the contract. These poor people applied to him for advice how to act: not being well versed in the law, he went to a respectable attorney, and begged he would do what was right for these people; but the attorney, after inquiring into the particulars of their case, fully admitted the justice of their complaint, and that redress could be obtained by filing a bill in chancery; adding, however, that before he could take three steps in their cause, away would go the little cottage and garden with the expenses of the suit. Such was the grievous condition of chancery proceedings; and surely it was of importance for the House to consider their nature and tendency; but he agreed that this should be done dispassionately and without any intermixture of personal reflections. While upon this subject he must confess, that, in looking through the report of the chancery commissioners, he was sorry not to have found even the suggestion of a remedy, nor any endeavour to have some summary process afforded for the settlement of small matters of property which fell into litigation. It was quite notorious that no man could afford to seek equity for any sum under 1,000l. or 2,000l. He really wished to hear no harsh names applied to these transactions; but the existence of such facts was a reproach and disgrace to the administration of justice in the country. People of small property could not venture upon this mode of redress, and any man of common sense must feel that the nuisance of such a state of things could not be palliated. To file an answer to a bill in Chancery would, he was informed, cost the party about 20l.; and, if the man who was perhaps wantonly dragged by a litigious person into such a predicament, was unable to afford this expenditure, he must be in what was called contempt. After ail, when it was notorious that equity could not be safely sought for property which did not amount to mere than 500l. or 600l. he hoped that the attention of the House would be seriously called to such notorious evils.

Mr. Secretary Canning

said, that he had to confess the same ignorance as the hon. gentleman who had last spoken, of mere points of law; but really he must say that, for the purpose of this petition, the discussion Which had taken place was quite irregular and uncalled-for. The preamble of grievances in the petition set forth, that the evil lay in the court of Chancery, but one half of the subsequent matter applied equally to process issuing from any of the courts of common law. The man had refused obedience to a process which had been duly taken out against him, but of the effect of which he pretended ignorance, by remarking, that the piece of parchment referred to the affairs of one John Doe and Richard Roe, and mentioned staves and knives, and such nonsense. This notification he admitted he had treated with great contempt; and for so doing he had entailed upon himself the further proceeding of which he had complained. Now, all this would have happened in any other court as well as the court of Chancery. What, then, became of the general argument? Why, nothing but this, that legal proceedings inflicted pecuniary penalties, and that the rich man must always, in such litigations, have an advantage over the poor man; and this must, from the nature of things, continue, not only in this but in every other country which had laws to administer: and a grievance it was so far for the poor man; one, too, carrying with it the painful conviction, that it was impossible for the wisdom of man to devise any remedy against its operation. The only inference that could be drawn from the speech of the hon. gentleman was, that the court of Chancery, and the judge who presided there, were both corrupt. This was a gross injustice: it was as unfounded as it was unfair; and if any man thought he could remedy abuses by pursuing such a line of conduct, he was grossly mistaken. Such a system of attack was not the proper course to pursue, if gentlemen wished to remedy the evils of the court of Chancery. It was not by slanderous and unjust imputations that such a consummation could be effected—imputations which were not only discreditable in their import, but were unworthy of a man of honour to utter. And what, now, were the statements contained in that petition? The petition stated that the child was imprisoned with his father. One would have thought that this had been an error in the drawing up of the petition, for the thing was so utterly absurd that it would be a libel on the judgment of every individual to suppose that such a thing could have happened. But when the hon. gentleman seized upon this imaginary circumstance for the purpose of pursuing and strengthening his attack, it was right that this ground of objection should be removed, although he was sure that the good sense of the House did not require any explanation on an objection so evidently founded in error. The simple and only construction which the passage in the petition admitted of was this—that when the man was a prisoner, his child was with him. This was the sole meaning of the sentence; and he defied the ingenuity of the hon. gentleman to give it any other construction. It was one thing, therefore, to say that the child was a voluntary partaker of his father's imprisonment, and another to state that he was also a prisoner for contempt of court. So much as to the first half of the petition; and, as to that portion of it which related equally to the courts of Common Law as to the court of Chancery—to the latter portion of it, that which exclusively referred to the court of Chancery, and personally to the lord chancellor, he would now more particularly address himself. As to the tirade which had been pronounced against that noble and learned lord, every syllable of it could, with equal truth and fairness, be made to apply to the chief justice of the King's-bench; and every part of the declamation which had been poured forth against him could quite as well be launched against any of the other judges. The whole gravamen of the offence con- sisted in this—that the lord chancellor was the party to whom it was imagined the acts in question could be attributed. Suppose, however, the petition had come from the opposite party—suppose the complaint was the very reverse of what it actually was. Suppose the other litigant had stated, that he had tried far a remedy at law, and could not obtain one; that he had then gone into equity, that he had filed a bill, that the defendant had refused to put in an answer, and that the whole of these delays and difficulties were attributable to the lord chancellor. He entertained not the slightest doubt that, with such a petition, the very reverse of that then under the consideration of the House, the hon. gentleman opposite would have found means to effuse precisely such another stream of vituperative declamation as it had then been his pleasure to pour forth against the presiding judge in the court of Chancery, because, forsooth, he had not been able to find a remedy for the alleged grievance. Much as he (Mr. Canning) might wish to see those grievances remedied, he thought the House would concur with him, that the most effectual mode of accomplishing that object was not by vituperation against the lord chancellor personally, but rather by the efforts of competent persons, directed to the removal of acknowledged evils, and the correction of defects, respecting which no difference of opinion existed, but for the origin and continuance of which the present lord chancellor was as little responsible as any other judge in the land. It was fully as just to bring forward the present accusations against him, as to say that, because the system in the court of King's-bench was in many respects imperfect, therefore, the lord chief justice was culpable and corrupt. There would be quite as much fairness in saying that he, called on to administer a system which he had not created, was "a curse to the country," as to apply that language to the lord chancellor. The same was true of all the other courts. The remedy for the evils complained of was not to be found in increasing vituperation of that noble person. To think so was a great mistake. If gentlemen imagined, that such measures would have the effect of removing him from office, they would find, to their disappointment, that its only result would be that of rivet-ting more strongly than ever the hold which he possessed on the confidence of the Crown and the country.

Mr. John Williams

commenced by disclaiming the slightest feelings of personal disrespect towards the noble and learned lord who presided in the court of Chancery, in whom was blended a great and singular mixture of the courtesy of the nobleman with the dignity of the judge. He was most willing to admit that the noble and learned lord could not be surpassed in those amiable qualities by which he was distinguished; and, to use the words of the noble and learned lord himself, in alluding, on another occasion, to a no less gifted individual, "he wished him well wherever he might be." [hear, and a laugh.] But while speaking on the subject which had chiefly given rise to the present discussion—he meant the unlucky monosyllable which had spread so much alarm on the opposite side of the House, and had even caused the hair of his hon. and learned friend, the solicitor-general, actually to stand on end,—he begged leave for himself to adopt that monosyllable, and to repeat it if requisite. That the court of Chancery was a curse to the country, could not be denied. He did not wish to anticipate the general question respecting the court of Chancery which his hon. friend (sir F. Burdett) meant to introduce, by following up the present discussion; but he could not but observe the inconsistency of conduct adopted by some gentlemen on the present occasion. What said the hon. member for Surrey? Why, that the lord chancellor was not to blame for the delays and abuses which were so notorious in his court. Where, he would ask, was the vote of that hon. gentleman when the abuses of chancery were discussed in parliament in the session of 1823? Where was that hon. member's vote when the question was discussed at a still later period? Was it not notorious that this House had declared, by repeated majorities, that the abuses in chancery should be investigated? And the only difference of opinion which existed on the subject was, with respect to the time which would be requisite to investigate the proceedings of that court, with a view to correct the abuses which might be found to exist. As deliberation might be said to infuse its effects into all the proceedings of chancery, it was natural to expect that a sufficient time would be demanded; and accordingly a convenient pause was granted, in order to give the; commission the fullest opportunity of in- vestigating the entire system. "We will have," said the right hon. Secretary for the Home Department, "no interruption to our proceedings—we will not languish in our duty—we will despatch the business—and will only ask two years for the purposes in which we are engaged." "Give me," said the right hon. Secretary, "a commission—a commission of our own choosing, at the head of which the noble and learned lord shall sit in judgment on himself" [hear]. Such was the committee, which, after infinite labour, was at last appointed; and the right hon. Secretary now came forward with his pocket commission, and a report, which, from the number of pages it occupied, and the quantity of matter it contained, no one would have patience to read. He could not but consider it a little extra-ordinary, that although nearly three years had been allowed for remedying the abuses of the court of Chancery, it was still suffered to remain a nuisance to the country; or, to adopt the short and expressive monosyllable which the patients of that court had themselves adopted, that it should continue "a curse." He was aware that the term was not the most courteous, and that it might perhaps offend the noble and learned lord to whom the term might seem to apply. But even if that term had been uncalled-for—even if the attack were unjust— whether it was contained in a lengthened speech, or confined to a single monosyllable, the friends of the noble and learned lord, and the country in general, need not be alarmed. There was no cause to dread the effects which would be produced by the attack, for the noble and learned lord against whom it was aimed, was determined to brave his enemies to the last, and had long since made up his mind to quit office and life at the same time [hear, hear]. Panegyric or abuse would neither defer nor hasten the consummation of that event—that final stopping of the breath—that complete and cureless overthrow of his capacious and marvellous mind. Let it not, therefore, be feared that praise or censure would at all operate to produce an effect so fatal and alarming; for the noble and learned lord was not so easily vanquished. He did not wish at present to enter into the question more fully; as another opportunity would be afforded him of stating his opinion at length. He had no wish to go through the report, or to consider the propriety of the hundred and ninety thousand suggestions for improvements which it contained. He should only observe, in concluding, that he was prepared, not by declamation, but by proofs: not by monosyllables, but by facts: not in generalities, but in detail—to show the practice of the court of Chancery, and to show, at the same time, that that court was placed in the predicament of depriving persons of moderate fortune from obtaining justice, and thereby of violating the first principle of our laws, which said, that right and justice should not be delayed, nor denied, to any one.

Mr. Secretary Peel

observed, that, from what had fallen from the hon. and learned gentleman, it was quite plain that no report, however pleasing, would have given him satisfaction. Indeed, so prejudiced was the hon. and learned gentleman, that he could not see the difference between 190,000 and the 190 suggestions of improvement which the report contained. For himself, he thought it most extraordinary that because improvements had been suggested, the court of Chancery should be run down. The hon. and learned gentleman complained that the report was unwieldy and voluminous. Did he forget that this was his own suggestion? When the commission was appointed, did not the hon. and learned gentleman say, "I hope you will give a full and ample report?" Nothing at that time would satisfy him but a full report. His suggestion was adopted; but when the report was brought forward, what did he say? "It is too voluminous, we can never get through it." Such was the spirit of justice displayed by the hon. and learned gentleman. The hon. and learned gentleman seemed to complain of the delay which the measure occasioned. Long before this time the evidence was placed in the hands of the printer of the House of Commons, in order that those members who might have been interested in the measure, should have an opportunity of inspecting the progress which had been made. Yet this was the return of the hon. and learned gentleman, by whose desire the evidence had been printed. Why was the report voluminous? Because every person who had a complaint to prefer, every country solicitor who might offer an objection against the practice of chancery, was invited to state his grievance and propose his remedy. With respect to the present petition, he thought the House should wait to hear from the attorney employed on the other side, who might give a new version to the story. It was unjust to attend to an ex-parte statement; and he for one was free to confess that he did not believe the case which the petition detailed. The hon. gentleman admitted that a solicitor drew up this petition. Yet could it be credited that a professional man would have set down such silly stuff as that relating to "John Doe and Richard Roe," and "staves and bludgeons?" It would certainly require no ordinary stretch of faith to believe that a man, who at all understood his business, would have so committed himself; and they only who were possessed of "that charity which believeth much," could give credit to the tale. The petitioner said, that he offered 300l. to obtain his liberation, but the party to whom he was opposed had refused the offer; and then the man was committed for contempt of court. Had he tendered, however, with the 300l. the expenses of the suit, he might have had his liberty without further trouble. If the petition should be ordered to be printed, he hoped that an opportunity would be afforded to the party on the other side to state their case; and he believed that, from that statement, the whole case would be materially altered.

Mr. Brougham

considered the report to be, in one sense, too long, inasmuch as it occupied eight or nine hundred folio pages, although in another sense he considered it too short. He did not, however, now mean to enter into any discussion upon the subject, further than to say, that its omissions were numerous and palpable, and that, though the volume was bulky, it was any thing but full of information. Many answers were given, which the parties giving them must have known to be imperfect, and explanations were withheld which rendered the evidence any thing but what it ought to have been. In proof of this he would just state one instance. A question was put to one gentleman, and he was asked if three persons could do the business of the court of Chancery? and his answer to that was "no, certainly, nor three angels." Now, surely, every one must see that such an answer should have been followed up, and then, perhaps, the House would be able to ascertain what it was that neither three men nor three angels could perform. Another gentleman was asked, if it were competent for any man devoting six hours a day of every day to the business of the court, and the court lending all its attention to that business, whether, in such a case, one man could discharge the business, and the answer was—that one man would be utterly incapable of getting through it. Here again, would not every man see that this answer must suggest another very obvious question; namely, "did any body devote six hours of each day, and lend all his mind to the business of the court?" There were other instances of the same description, which shewed that a difference of taste upon the bulk and value of the report might be entertained, without any charge of unfairness on the one hand or the other. For his own part, he would only say that the report was very bulky, but at the same time, very defective and meagre.

Mr. R. Smith

defended the conduct of the commissioners, who felt it their duty to present as ample a report to the House, as they could possibly prepare.

Mr. Hume

said, that after patiently listening to all that had been urged on the other side of the House, he saw no reason to think that he had over-stated the evils of the court of Chancery.

Ordered to lie on the table.