HC Deb 10 March 1825 vol 12 cc973-86
Mr. Hume

rose, for the purpose of submitting to the House a resolution, "that no Member shall vote for or against any Question in which he has a direct pecuniary Interest." In doing this, he said he could assure the House, he deeply regretted that the execution of so important a task had not fallen into the hands of some person better able to discharge it than he felt himself to be. Its object was, to effect an alteration in the existing usages of parliament. Those usages consisted of a large collection of resolutions which the House had, from time to time, adopted, as present circumstances, or particular exigencies had required. It appeared that, at a very early period in the history of the parliament of England, it had been found inconvenient and unjust that members should be allowed to interpose the influence of their votes in the resolutions of the House on subjects in which they had a direct interest. It had therefore been provided by the House, that no member should be allowed to vote in favour of any measure, in the passing of which he was personally or pecuniarily concerned. But there had never yet been an order, that such members as were similarly interested in opposing a bill before the House, should also be disqualified from voting on it. It was to this latter point that his present motion more particularly referred, and which bethought was not less just, nor less important, than that which had already been provided for. He was prepared to believe that the House would not deal hastily with this proposition, nor, without consideration, agree to a resolution which should so materially alter the practice of parliament; but, if it could be proved that the existing law in this respect was unjust in itself, and injurious in its effect upon the interests of individuals (and he did not doubt that he should afford such proof in a very ample and satisfactory manner), he trusted that it would not be thought beneath the dignity of parliament to abrogate that law, and to establish such an alteration as might seem necessary. It was a subject in which he had personally no interest whatever, excepting that desire which he felt in common with every other; hon. gentleman, that the House should deserve and receive the respect of the whole community for all its acts. As the parliament was the highest tribunal in the country, so it ought to be in all respects the purest. In all the inferior courts, it was a rule as old as their establishment, that no person should be engaged in the administration of justice in a cause which involved, or might be supposed to involve, any pecuniary interest, or any personal feeling applying to himself. If, then, this precaution had been adopted in all the inferior branches of the constitution, how much the more necessary did it become to re-move every ground of suspicion, that the interests of members of parliament might, by any possibility, prevail so far as to bias the resolutions of the House.—He should proceed to detail what had hitherto been the practice, with respect to questions like the present; and having put the House in possession of evidence which precedents would supply, he should leave them to deal with the subject as they might think fit. The more he had considered it, the more of difficulty he was ready to confess presented itself, in the manner of applying a remedy to what he believed to be a great evil. It was almost impossible to compare at once, minutely and satisfactorily, the proceedings of that House with those of any of the inferior tribunals to which he had alluded. Still—as a part of the principle on which his resolution was grounded was admitted, by disqualifying the votes of persons interested for, and a part of it denied, by receiving the votes of persons interested against, such measures—the obvious inconsistency of the present practice was such as demanded a remedy. By care, however, some amelioration might be effected; though he was averse to throwing any obstacle in the way of improvements which many private measures were designed to carry into effect. The very bill out of which this motion had arisen, was, to put an end to an injurious monopoly.—He would now proceed to lay before the House what had been the practice and the law on the subject. The first case which he could find on the records of the House which bore upon the question, occurred in the year 1604, with regard to a member named Seymour: It was mentioned in the first volume of the Journals. A bill, he believed, establishing the lands of the deceased duke of Somerset, was offered to the question of commitment by Mr. Speaker. It was moved by sir Edward Stafford, that Mr. Seymour, a member of the House, and a party, might go forth during the debate, which was conceived to be agreeable with former order and precedent in like cases; and Mr. Seymour went presently forth at the door. It did not appear in this case, whether the member was in favour of, or opposed to, the measure; but his having an interest in it was considered a sufficient reason for excluding him from the privilege of voting. The next case occurred in 1664. Sir Robert Paston, a member of the House, being interested in favour of a bill, his vote was objected to, and refused on that ground. In this case, the vote of sir Robert Paston would have been of great importance; for the numbers on the division, with respect to the passing of the bill, were 81 and 80.— He had hot met with any other precedent decidedly in point until 1797; and then he came to one which might, perhaps remove the doubts of some hon. members, as to the possibility of drawing a distinction between private interest and public duty. It would be recollected, that the subscribers to what was called the loyalty loan sustained a considerable loss by the fall in the price of the scrip; and, to afford the original subscribers relief, a bill was introduced by Mr. Pitt to give them a bonus of 5 per cent on their stock. In the progress of the bill, an objection was taken to the votes of several members who were known to have subscribed to the loan; on the ground that they were personally interested in the success of the measure. The objection was taken by the late Mr. Sheridan. A reference being made to the Chair on the subject, the Speaker said, "I have always understood the rule and practice of the House to be, that no member can regularly (subject to some qualification) vote on any question which involves in it an immediate interest of such member. But, when any measure is submitted to the House, the substance of which is to confer pecuniary advantage, or diminish a loss, which is the same thing, I am satisfied it is not consistent with that mode of proceeding which the House has adopted on occasions of delicacy and importance, that any member should vote on a measure by which he intends to derive any benefit, in case that measure should be carried into a law. It was impossible not to consider the bill before the House as a measure of the former description." Mr. Manning—who was then, as now, a member of the House —and other members of the House, thereupon stated, that as they were subscribers to the loan, and might be considered interested in the passing of the bill, they would not vote on the question, and they accordingly withdrew. Another hon. member—the late Mr. George Rose—who was a subscriber to the loan, remained, and his vote was directly challenged by Mr. Tierney. He rose and declared, that he did not mean to accept the bonus which was intended to be given by the bill, and contended that he, therefore, could not be considered as being interested in the measure. Having thus divested himself of any personal interest in the bill, the vote of the hon. member was allowed. These proceedings, however, met with considerable objection at the time. Mr. Ryder, a member, argued, that the rule which had been laid down by the Speaker, would, if pushed to its utmost extent, prevent members from voting upon all measures of taxation; for every man was interested in preventing the imposition of burthens upon himself. After considerable debate, reference was again made to the Chair. The Speaker then stated, that "the cases put by the hon. member were all cases where the interest of members was merely eventual along with those of the rest of the community—the rule laid down was, as to a direct and immediate interest." Now, he thought the distinction laid down by the Speaker in that case was clear, explicit, and rational, and might be followed on all future occasions. Another instance of challenging the vote of a member occurred in 1811, with respect to the Grand Junction canal bill; but he would pass that by, and come to another which occurred in July of the same year, when a bill, called the Bank-note bill, was brought into the House, the object of which was, to render Bank-notes current throughout the country. On that occasion the hon. member for Appleby, then member for That ford (Mr. Creevey), objected to the votes of 45 Bank proprietors—that was the number in the House then—on the ground, that as the operation of the bill would increase the property of the Bank of England, they, as proprietors, were interested in its passing, and should not be allowed to vote Mr. Manning, who was the governor of the Bank, said to the House on the part of the proprietors, "We may or may not be interested in the measure, but it is not one which we have asked for: the measure has been introduced by government, on the ground that it is necessary for the general welfare of the state, and not for our immediate and direct interest, consequently we ought not to be deprived of the right of voting on the question." Appeal being made to the Speaker, he said, "The rule was very plain. If they opened their Journals, they would find it established 200 years ago, and then spoken of as an ancient practice, that a personal interest in a question disqualified a member from voting. But this interest, it should be further understood, must be a pecuniary interest, and separately belonging to the persons whose votes were questioned, and not in common with the rest of his majesty's subjects, or on a matter of state policy. So it was, that on a canal bill, a person whose name was down as a subscriber could not vote. On the same principle, the question raised on the loyalty-loan bill was rightly decided; for that was neither more nor less than to give a pecuniary remuneration to persons who had sustained a loss. It was equally clear, that the House had done well on questions of taxation or colonial policy, which were held not to disqualify any votes. Such was the law on the subject. How far the fact applied to the present case he left it to the House to decide." The question was then put, and negatived without a division.—He would now direct the attention of the House to another case explanatory of the practice of the House, which he had omitted to quote in the proper place. In 1623, a bill was brought in, entitled, "An Act for reversing and making void a decree made in the Chancery, against the master and fellows of Magdalen College, Cambridge, and John Smyth, lessee, at the suit of the earl of Oxford, and others." Sir W, Earle moved, that Dr. Gooch, the master of the college, ought to withdraw, he being a party interested in the bill. After some discussion, a resolution passed, that Dr. Gooch should be heard, and then withdraw. He would mention another case of some importance. In April, 1621, a bill was introduced, entitled, "An Act for the Improvement of Trade." An objection was taken to the votes of members of corporations, on the ground that they, being connected with monopolies, had a personal interest in opposing the bill, and the House determined that the objection was good.—Having slated these precedents, he left it to the House to decide whether it would not be desirable that they should place themselves in such a situation as to convince the country, that every measure introduced into that House would receive a fair and impartial consideration. Without detaining the House longer, he would submit a resolution drawn up in the words of the former Speaker, in the case of the loyalty-loan bill, namely, "That no Member shall vote for or against any question in which he has a direct pecuniary Interest."

Mr. Littleton

said, he had no doubt that the hon. member was correct when he said, that he had found great difficulty in coming to a determination as to the mode of treating this question. He had no doubt, that when he first gave notice of his motion, the hon. gentleman did not anticipate the difficulties which he afterwards experienced. He hoped the hon. member would give him credit for sincerity, when he said, that he was as strongly impressed as any hon. member could be, with a conviction of the necessity of maintaining the individual character of members of that House, when he reminded him that, two years ago, he had given notice of a motion somewhat similar to that which the hon. member had submitted to the House. But that motion he had been obliged to abandon, because he found that the objections to it were insuperable. His motion was, however, confined to the finding a remedy for that which he still considered a serious evil; namely, the manner in which private business was conducted in committees up stairs. In the House private interests were merged in the great man of unbiassed opinion, and could produce but little effect; but, in committees on private bills, nobody but the parties interested ever thought of appearing; and it was there that the mischief was done. He thought that the House would gain nothing by departing from its ancient usage; which it would do by the adoption of the motion. Under the present system, this advantage was apparent—that it was well known what individuals were interested in any measure before the House. Votes on private bills were so seldom challenged, that members did not think it necessary to conceal their interest in particular measures. But, when once the present motion should be carried, members would be driven to resort to evasive measures. They would buy shares in the names of friends, and so have an opportunity of advocating their private interests in that House, under the pretence of performing a public duty. In many instances the interests of county members were identified with those of their constituents; and yet the effect of the motion would be, to deprive those constituents of the services of the individuals who could best advance their object. There was another circumstance which might arise from agreeing to the motion. Members might purchase an interest in one of two rival undertakings, in order to avoid being called upon to perform a duty in that House which might give offence to parties out of doors. For these reasons, he thought it better to leave the ancient usage of parliament untouched, and to allow every member to act as he felt due to his own character and honour. That, in his opinion, was the only moral restraint that could be imposed upon practices which certainly brought discredit on the House. He would therefore move the previous question.

Mr. Grenfell

complained, that he had been disqualified from voting on a question of great public importance on a former evening, because he was known to have a private interest in the measure. It so happened, too, that on the very day when he had been disqualified, one of the hon. members for Grampound had signed a petition against the measure from the London-dock company, in which it was stated, that the measure affected their pecuniary interests. Now, the principle of exclusion ought to be applied to both sides, or not at all—to those who had an interest in opposing, as well as to those whose interest it would be to support any measure. In his opinion, it would be extremely unwise to accede to the present motion; for if it were agreed to, half the time of the House would be wasted in finding out what members were interested in the measures before the House. In the interim, however, until the disqualification of his vote on the St. Catherine's-dock bill was rescinded, he should avail himself of every opportunity to apply the same principle of disqualification to all members who might have a direct interest in opposing any measure brought before the House.

Mr. Sumner

said, that if the amendment had not been moved, he had intended to have proposed a resolution, declaratory of the opinion of the House, that it was derogatory from the honour of a member to vote in any question wherein he had a peculiar interest. As it was, he would vote for the amendment.

Sir M. W. Ridley

thought it would be advisable for the House to pass some declaratory resolution of the nature alluded to by the hon. member for Surrey, as a guide for their conduct on all future occasions. He would vote for the amendment, in the hope that some such resolution might subsequently be proposed.

Mr. Secretary Peel

expressed his regret, not that the motion had been made, but that there should have been any necessity for making it. He thought it would be extremely difficult to come to any resolution on the subject. He intended to vote for the amendment, by doing which, he should not be precluded from hereafter adopting any measure which he should, think applicable to the subject. There were three courses which it was open to the House to pursue. The first was, to adopt the motion of the hon. member for Aberdeen; the second was, to pass a declaratory resolution, to the effect stated by the member for Surrey; and the third was, to agree to the amendment proposed by the hon. member for Staffordshire. There were, in his opinion, great difficulties in the way of the adoption of the original motion. In the first place, without entering into any nice disquisition, the right of disqualifying members from voting was one which the House ought to exercise with great caution. Honourable members were sent to that House to perform duties to others. He was not certain that if he were called upon to come to a decision on the question a priori—that was to say, if there were no precedents on the subject—he would ever consent to any law by which a member could be disqualified from voting on any question. He should have felt a priori great doubts of the competency of parliament to disqualify a member from exercising his discretion, even on questions in which he had a direct personal interest. Might it not happen that a member's private interest would be concurrent with the interests of his constituents? He objected to the extension of the principle of disqualification, which was proposed by the motion. ["No," from Mr. Hume.] If the motion were not intended to extend the law of disqualification, he asked the hon. member, in God's name, to leave it as it stood He thought that the hon. member's proposition was to come to them recommended by the consideration of novelty—that it was to determine what was doubtful, and supply what was wanting. Imperfect legislation on the subject—and it was legislation as far as they were concerned—he deemed most unwise. The effect of the motion would only be to divert the influence which was now openly avowed into secret and hidden channels. He thought that the hon. member had not applied himself to the correction of the great evil of which there was cause to complain—he meant the outrageous system of canvassing for votes on private committees. That which was a matter of notoriety was not so much to be dreaded as that which was transacted in privacy. If he knew any member to be interested in a measure, he could challenge him before the House, and put it to his honour whether he could give his vote on the question; and such an appeal would not be made in vain. He certainly would prefer to the motion such a resolution as that proposed by the hon. member for Surrey; although he was not prepared to say that he would adopt even that. If such a resolution should be agreed to, it would lessen the power which the House already had over its members. It was better that the House should have the power of deciding upon each individual case that should be brought before it, than to lay down any general rule on the subject. He did not see that any embarrassment would arise from passing to the other orders of the day. He took the law of parliament at present on the subject to be this—that members who had a direct pecuniary interest in a question should not vote for or against it. It appeared to him, that there was some injustice in that rule; and he was sure that the extension of it might, in some cases, put a stop to all improvement. Since the period of the loyalty-loan bill, the question of disqualifying members from voting had scarcely been agitated. It had only arisen on the present occasion, from the peculiar press of public business. On the best consideration he could give to the subject, he thought the course for the House to pursue was to agree to the amendment; by doing which they would not tie themselves up from adopting any resolution which might hereafter appear desirable.

Mr. Hudson Gurney

said, he agreed in every thing which had fallen from the right hon. Secretary; but thought that one of the prevailing practices, in order to procure the support of members of parliament in that House, ought to be noticed, in the severest terms of reprehension. He meant, the custom of the proprietors of all the wild schemes now afloat, offering shares to members—advertizing them by preference as directors, to entrap the unwary; and, as directors, giving them shares to sell at a profit in the Bubble-market. He held in his hand a letter, which had been received by an hon. member, with whom he was connected; and who, having inherited shares in a company of which the receipts were likely to be diminished by the establishment of a rival concern, thought he could not do better than apply for shares in the new project, to secure himself against any injury it might do to the old one:—so getting his dividend, either from the one or the other. By the next post, he received a note, stating, that a certain number of shares were at his service; but ending in these words, "The committee rely on your best exertions, on all occasions, to promote the success of the project."[Hear, hear!] Accompanied by these conditions, he instantly refused to have any thing to do with them; but employed an agent to purchase shares in the open market; where he paid for them just ten times the amount which the directors had, in their note, required of him as deposit. The hon. member said, he did not wish to give any names of parties, as he was perfectly convinced it was no more than a common occurrence. But, the whole system, in all its ramifications, was, in his view, infamous; and called for the most pointed animadversion of the House.

Mr. Wynn

said, he considered it the duty of the House to throw out any measure, no matter what its object, which had been pressed on the attention of members by means such as those to which the hon. member had just alluded [hear, hear]; and he thought the hon. member would be doing an important service to the country, by giving the name of the particular project, in support of which the application he described had been made [hear, hear, and cries of name, name]. With respect to the object of the hon. member who submitted the present motion, he thought it would, in a great measure, be answered by enforcing what was the law and usage of the House. In his opinion, that law was, that the vote of any member on a bill in which he had a direct pecuniary interest should not be allowed. There were a great many analogous cases where the principle was recognized. Thus, in a discussion with respect to a member's seat—in questions which affected a member's conduct, and which might afterwards be followed by the censure of the House, or on which an impeachment might be founded, the practice of parliament was, to hear the member in his place; after which he always withdrew, without joining in the vote. He thought it therefore better to adhere to the principle, "quieta non movere," to go on without making any new rule, but let the old and recognized law of parliament take its course. The House, he thought, could not prevent any member from voting; but they might, in cases where he had a direct pecuniary interest, disallow his vote when that fact became known. It would be highly dangerous, he thought, to add to the precedent of extending the principle of disqualification, as if the House had the power of doing so. It had been said, that the principle of disallowing the vote of a member, in cases where he had a direct pecuniary interest, would, in some cases, prevent the House from hearing the man who, perhaps, might be best qualified to give them information on that particular subject; but it should be recollected, that the disqualification, or disallowance, extended only to the member's vote, and that he would, in all cases, retain the right of delivering his sentiments on every subject. On the whole, he thought it would be better to adhere to the old law of parliament on these matters; to deal with each particular case as it might arise; and to disallow the vote of any member, on a matter in which he was proved to have a direct pecuniary interest—that interest to be ascertained by his own declaration.

Mr. Abercromby

admitted, that the subject was attended with difficulties almost inexplicable. It might be hard to say, that a man should be allowed to vote in a case where he himself had a direct pecuniary interest; but, the objection to his vote, under such circumstance, must be founded in attributing to him motives by which his mind was supposed to be more or less unfairly biassed. If the House adopted this principle, they should carry it further, and apply it to all cases where motives might be supposed to operate on the member's mind. He was satisfied that, if the principle were carried to this length, it would render the House extremely obnoxious to their constituents; and after they were upset, it would be found that those who should come after them would be in the same situation from which they had started. As long as they continued to be human beings, they must be affected more or less in their actions by motives. In some instances those motives were bad; but, in such cases, he knew of no control over them but that of public opinion. That must be the best control in each particular case, and in all cases as they occurred. Why, what would be the operation of the principle now proposed to be enforced? A man who possessed a 100l. share in a company, was not to be allowed to vote; but, the constituents of that member might be extremely interested in it, and might instruct him to vote. His refusal would be at the risk of his seat. Thus they would have him balancing the shares on one side, and the seat on the other. Would it not be much better to leave this matter to take its course—to deal with each case as it arose—and not fetter themselves with a general rule which it would be impossible to apply to every case which might arise? If they could not trust themselves to deal with all such cases as they occurred, it would be better for them at once to depart the House, for they had no business there. He admitted that this question was brought on under particular circumstances, and in peculiar times, when speculation had gone to a great height all over the country, and when members of that House were possessed of interests in them to a considerable extent; but, to assert that this would give to their votes a corrupt bias, would be going entirely too far. The safest control, in all these cases, would be that which might be exercised by public opinion in any particular instance which arose. He fully concurred with the right hon. Secretary in thinking, that it would be inconvenient and improper to extend the principle of disqualification. This had ever been his opinion, and he had, on more than one occasion, taken the liberty of expressing it to the House; but, he took the principle further—he did not admit, that the House possessed the right of disqualifying any member, or that it had any authority to expel any one from that House. That was an infringement upon the rights of their constituents, unjust in its principle, and against which he had ever opposed himself. As to the proposition of the hon. baronet, he did not see how it would remedy any of the evils complained of. The House should deal with each case that might come before it; but he thought it would be somewhat absurd to request members not to do that which was at the same time declared to be highly improper. If he were to point out any measure to the House on this question, it would be to appoint a select committee, to inquire what precedents there were on their Journals for the principle of disqualification, with the view of their being expunged. When he said this, he begged he might not be understood as denying the abuse which existed in committees up stairs. He did not mean to say that these arose from corrupt motives. They rather, in most cases, arose from an obliging disposition, which one individual was inclined to exercise towards another; but, the mischief of it was, that this was exercised, in many instances, without the consideration, that in obliging a friend, they adopted measures highly injurious to the interests of many individuals. It was not at all an uncommon thing—but in this he spoke more from the reports of others than his own personal observation— to hear members, when in committees up stairs, ask each other, "Which party do you support? For whom do you come here to vote?" Now, this was a practice to which he should wish to see the whole weight of public opinion directed; but he thought public opinion alone could put it down.

Mr. Stuart Wortley

fully concurred in the remarks which had just fallen from his hon. and learned friend, and agreed, that instead of adopting the motion, they ought to appoint a committee, to inquire what precedents of disqualification existed on their Journals, for the purpose of expunging them. He admitted that great abuses existed in the present system of soliciting for votes in committees. This was the main evil; and it ought to be corrected: but he agreed, that public opinion would be found its best corrective. To disqualify a man from voting who had a personal interest in a measure, would disqualify many persons who were the most active and efficient on committees: for, he presumed, if they were disqualified in the House, they would be also disqualified up stairs.

Mr. Lockhart

objected to the motion, on the ground that it would be injurious in its effects in many instances, and inapplicable in others. He hoped, therefore, the hon. gentleman would consent to withdraw it.

Sir E. Knatchbull

denied that the business in committees up stairs was carried on in a corrupt or partial manner. If any instances of abuse occurred, what was there to hinder the parties aggrieved from appealing to the House for protection? And he begged to ask, whether any case was known in which such appeal was made without effect?

Mr. Robertson

supported the motion. When it was well known, that in most of the speculations now afloat in the city, some thousand shares were reserved for the use of members of parliament, he thought it was high time that the subject should be taken into consideration. The fact was, that some of the wildest speculations were encouraged by the expected support of some members of that House.

Mr. Hume,

in reply, said, that if he was before impressed with the necessity of the measure which he proposed to the House, he was still more convinced of it, after what he had heard in the course of this discussion. It was stated by one right hon. gentleman, that the law of parliament on the question of members being disqualified from voting where they had a direct pecuniary interest, was clear and positive; and this was doubted by another right hon. gentleman. Now, he wished to have the matter set at rest, by the declaration which he proposed. It was not he who violated any constitutional principle in this motion, but those who opposed it. It was admitted, as a constitutional principle, in all our courts, that no mart could be received as an evidence, in cases where he had a direct personal interest; and he thought it a violation of that principle that the House of Commons should be made an exception to it. However the motion might be disposed of, his object was, in a great degree gained; for no member had attempted to impugn the general principle for which he contended.

The previous question being put, Mr. Hume's motion was negatived, without a division.