HC Deb 28 June 1825 vol 13 cc1410-33

The House having resolved itself into a committee of the whole House, upon the petition of M. M. Canfor against Mr. Kenrick,

Mr. Denman

said, the committee for which he moved some time ago in order to examine into the case of Mr. Canfor having now resumed, he presented himself to their notice, for the purpose of submitting certain resolutions, founded on the evidence which had been adduced in support of that case. He congratulated the committee on having come to no resolution or vote, either of censure or applause, in respect of Mr. Kenrick's conduct. It was to him matter of great satisfaction, that hitherto they had expressed no opinion on the question; and that the evidence which had been taken had now been put into the hands of members, long enough to allow them to form a much more deliberate judgment than they could have arrived at immediately after a meagre debate, or under the recent impression of an eloquent speech from a learned counsel. As some of the questions that had been addressed to the witness seemed to have been directed to the getting-up of this petition, he begged in the first place to say, that he had never heard of the petition until it was put into his hands. The charge which it contained was not brought forward alone, but in conjunction with another charge; and, in his view of the case, the two charges together formed matter of grave accusation against Mr. Kenrick. He now merely alluded to the case of Franks—postponed as he considered it to be, to the next session—in order that he might not be met by the assertion, that he had brought forward an isolated case against Mr. Kenrick. That case charged Mr. Kenrick with having, in the execution of his duty, conducted himself in a manner that had exposed himself to great animadversion. He (Mr. Denman) was quite aware, that he stood in a most peculiar situation with regard to his auditory on this occasion; for he could not help considering the House of Commons as a special jury of magistrates in a case of the kind. A large proportion of the House consisted of gentlemen who filled similar situations to Mr. Kenrick's in the magistracy. It was impossible, almost, that they therefore should not feel something like sympathy for Mr. Kenrick. They might, indeed, from the same cause, be the better enabled to judge of the motives which had influenced the conduct of that gentleman; and far was it from his desire to deprive any one in Mr. Kenrick's situation of the consolation of such a sympathy. With Mr. Canfor he had had no communication until he came to their bar. He thought that upon his testimony the case might very well be. left. He was aware, that many hon. gentlemen considered his evidence to have been flippant and unsatisfactory. That there was any thing improper in his manner he could not admit. Yet, however improper might be the motives and the manner of a witness, those considerations would have no effect upon the weight and credit of his testimony, unless there was room to suspect him either of fraud or falsehood in the delivery of his evidence. Now, when this witness came forward to be examined at their bar, he was evidently in a weak and nervous state. This individual came there, endeavouring to screw his courage to a higher pitch than he had ever before found to be necessary; and perceived himself to be in a situation that he had never previously experienced, surrounded as he was by so many gentlemen of the highest rank and distinction in the country. As to flippancy of manner, however, he would take leave to say, that he had never known a simple country witness, for example, after being subjected to a severe cross-examination, who did not leave the witness-box a much more impertinent person than he was when he first came into it, In answer to the statements of Canfor, Mr. Kenrick had himself presented a petition. Now, such facts as had been stated on the one side, and were admitted on the other, must be assumed to be true; and on such, hon. gentlemen might safely proceed to form a deliberate judgment. There were many such admitted facts in this case, which he would presently notice. What had been the situation of this Canfor in the month of May last year? He had a quantity of sheep, marked with a particular mark, feeding on a certain common. He lost about twenty of these sheep, including a particular ram of the South-down breed, of great value. On discovering his loss, he went in search of his sheep, at that particular season of the year when it was most inconvenient for a farmer to leave his premises. After some ten days or a fortnight's rambling about the country, he found one of his rams, under circumstances indicative, on his part, of no small ingenuity. He found on Westwood, common, a man who had seen such a ram, and having managed to get from him the whole history of the animal, he traced it to the possession of one Beale, residing at a considerable distance from Westwood-common. In a field of Beale's he found his ram, with its fleece shorn. Canfor saw Beale, and toll him, that if it was his sheep, it had a particular mark, Beale did not deny that it had such a mark, but said, that perhaps the man had put it up with his own. Now, this was an important period of the transaction. Canfor thought he had made a great discovery; Beale refused to produce the fleece when it was called for by Canfor; and Canfor went to a neighbouring magistrate. There he saw the magistrate's butler, who told him that it was not master's custom to transact any justice business after ten o'clock. At length Mr. Kenrick examined him, to ascertain whether or no the fleece was his. Canfor offered to make his deposition to that effect on oath; but Mr. Kenrick refused to take it. Now, this circumstance, especially when coupled with many of the other facts that ensued, was really very singular. It was of itself an extraordinary act. It was, unquestionably, in civil cases, the duty of the magistrate to proceed in that way which might seem best adapted to elicit the truth, and to do justice: but at the same time he should do so with the least possible offence to either of the parties. Canfor was dissatisfied; and Mr. Kenrick took fire at his declaring that he would go and find a solicitor to help him in his business. Mr. Kenrick declined granting the search-warrant, but he gave a note to Canfor, as was set out in the petition. It was said, that that note was given for the purpose of sparing the character of Beale, who was represented to be a very respectable man; but, looking to the contents of the note, it appeared to him to be a very strange way of protecting the character of the party to whom it was addressed. For his own part, he could not see how a search-warrant could affect a man's character more than a note. It was written quite in an official style. How any person could have a stronger weapon of attack against Beale, if he wished to use it, than this identical note, he could not conceive. This, however, was the instrument given by Mr. Kenrick to Canfor, whose deposition he refused to take; and he also declined granting a search-warrant, which certainly ought to have been granted, that Canfor might have been properly prepared, in the event of the note not producing the contemplated effect. When the note was received by Beale, he laughed at it. He refused to give up the fleece, which he claimed. to be his own. Now, if it were really his, surely it was a matter of some importance for him to prove that he possessed a ram of the same description as that claimed by Canfor—that they were So nearly alike each other, that a mistake might easily have arisen, and that the mark on the animal said to be Beale's property was similar to the mark on Canfor's ram. No attempt of this kind was, however, made, and the note was treated with contempt. Both the objects for which Canfor waited on Mr. Kenrick were defeated, one of those objects being to recover his property, and the other to prosecute the person who, he supposed, had improperly possessed himself of it. The negation of the charge of felony actually placed Can for in a worse situation than that in which he originally stood. Having failed in procuring the fleece, he then proceeded to another magistrate, who refused to act in a case where a magistrate had already been applied to. He must here observe, that a sort of language had crept into use, in speaking of magistrates, generally, of which he could not approve. He would maintain that one of their most important duties was, to trace out and follow up property. That was the mode by which they could best protect those who were liable to depredations; and therefore the granting a search-warrant was not a matter of indulgence and favour, but it was their duty to grant it, wherever a fair ground of suspicion existed. But, though Mr. Kenrick might refuse the search-warrant, he certainly had no right to decline taking the evidence which was tendered to him on oath. He should have received it, and preserved it to be produced, if necessary, on trial. Canfor went, on the day after, to Mr. Kenrick's, and then he found that the question, as to whom the ram belonged, had been referred to two individuals. This was a strange course of proceeding. Why should a reference have been made, until Beale had shewn that he had lost something?—until he had proved that he possessed a ram similar to that claimed by Canfor? Mr. Kenrick thought that this course would put an end to the business, not recollecting, that another question might remain to be decided, even after the award of the referees—a question necessary to the furtherance of public duty—namely, how the sheep got into the possession of Beale? However, two persons, of the names of Nash and Ede, were appointed as referees. They met together, and the fleece was produced before them in a disguised state. The mark was so disguised, that if it had not been for the composition, they could not have judged whether it was or was not Canfor's. But, on examination, they said, "Oh, this belongs to Canfor," and he was suffered to walk off with it. He then proceeded to Mr. Kenrick, and stated, "You see my charge was true. Here are two notes, written by the parties to whom the matter was referred—here is the fleece, which has been given up to me—and therefore I do not stand before you a disgraced man." What did Mr. Kenrick himself say on this part of the subject in his petition? He stated, that Canfor brought two samples of wool with him, to show that it was the same as that of the sheep which he had lost, "but your petitioner is by no means convinced thereof." How, he would ask, was it possible for Mr. Kenrick to suppose that this was not the property of Canfor? He could not imagine how Mr. Kenrick could entertain any suspicion of the matter, when the notes, written by two individuals, perfectly competent to decide the question, declared that the fleece was Canfor's property. If Mr. Kenrick was anxious to preserve the character of Beale on this occasion, he certainly took a very bad way to effect that object. There was a primâ facie case of suspicion against Beale, which could not be cleared up, except by a full and fair investigation. He would ask any magistrate now present, if a charge were made against a respectable neighbour, and he refused a search-warrant to the applicant, whether he would not, on the moment, give notice to the party accused to stand forward, and clear up his character? Mr. Kenrick did not act thus. He washed his hands entirely of the business. He left the complainant to. get his property by means of a foolish note, which Beale disregarded. If there were a responsibility on the part of magistrates to use their best efforts for the restoration of property, then Mr. Kenrick had, in this case, neglected his duty. Canfor stated to him, when he found his representations were unavailing, that there was a solicitor at Reigate to whom he would apply for advice. This appeared to have vexed Mr. Kenrick; and he refused to grant the search-warrant, because the manner of Canfor did not please him. This was not conduct befitting a magistrate, who ought to guard against all capricious feeling. In his opinion, for. Kenrick's conduct was extremely reprehensible in letting the case out of his hands without due investigation. This, however, was not the worst part of the case. He was sure no gentleman in that House who was in the commission of the peace would say, that he would act with the same disregard of law and justice as it was admitted Mr. Kenrick had subsequently done. An individual applied to him for the restoration of his property, and instead of being assisted he was himself made a prisoner, and dealt with insolently and outrageously. He was ordered to be searched by Mr. Kenrick's butler, who was made a special constable on the moment for that purpose. A parish constable was then sent for, and was directed, to make an assault on this injured individual, who came before the magistrate for redress. If magistrates the thought proper to behave in this way, they ought to be taught that such conduct was as contrary to law as it was to justice. They should be informed, that they were not to act from the impulse of personal feeling, of offended pride, or wounded dignity. Such feelings ought to be discarded from their minds, the moment they ascended the judgment-seat. What was Mr. Kenrick's justification for this outrageous conduct? Why, he stated that Canfor, when he first came before him, behaved insolently—that he was very impertinent—that he said he, would apply to Mr. Burgess, a magistrate at Reigate; and that he accused Mr. Kenrick with not understanding his duty. Canfor, however, states in his petition, that he said he would apply advice to his solicitor at Reigate. This, he declared, was the only offence he had given; and he distinctly stated that there was no impropriety on his part. If there had been any greater cause given, let the House consider how well supplied Mr. Kenrick was with evidence to prove it His butler, George Adams, William Beale, and Messrs. Nash and Ede, could easily prove whether there was any thing improper in Canfor's conduct. Batchelor, the constable of his own parish, who, astonished and bewildered, proceeded to execute the strange orders of Mr. Kenrick, could also speak to the conduct of Canfor. This last named individual, had not been called to make out a case for Mr. Kenrick; and therefore, he contended, they had that gentleman's evidence against himself. It was however said (and said too, by very learned persons in that House), that no felony had been committed. And why? Because the sheep was found straying on a common. He thought the right hon. Secretary would not adopt that line of argument. He surely would not assert, that because a sheep was taken from a common or highway, it was not a felonious offence. The place had nothing to do with the offence; which consisted in taking the property of another, and converting it to your own use. It was said, that when Mr. Kenrick ordered the fleece to be taken from Canfor, he did so because he wanted to place it in the hands of a constable as evidence to further the ends of justice: That, however, was not the fact; for he would have nothing to do with it. What could he want with the fleece, except in his character of magistrate? and as a magistrate he had dismissed the case. The conduct of Mr. Kenrick was the most outrageous he had ever heard of; and his abuse of power in appointing his butler special constable for the purpose of searching Canfor, was most unwarrantable. Suppose Canfor had resisted.—as indeed he did in the first instance when the butler attempted to search him)—suppose he had resisted when the constable came—suppose bloodshed had ensued—what excuse could be made for the conduct of Mr. Kenrick? Was that the conduct which a magistrate should adopt, on account of irritated or offended feelings? This case was one of the most serious importance; and when a case of improper conduct on the part of a magistrate, perpetrated under the colour of law, was brought forward, it ought to be minutely investigated. He knew it was argued, that Mr. Kenrick had paid the penalty of his offence. If the petitioner came to the bar, and demanded 5l. damages more than he had obtained in court, this answer would be complete—"You have accepted a certain sum, and you cannot come here for more." But it was a very different thing when he came to the house to complain or a denial of justice. The question was, whether it was proper that a magistrate should be intrusted with power, who had exhibited to the public So much irritability and violence? Was Mr. Kenrick, because he had been clearly proved guilty of these acts in a court of law, to be therefore continued in a situation where he might still further abuse his authority? Was he to be enabled to the end of his life to deny justice to those who applied for it? Suppose a gentleman's butler had robbed his master, and suffered a twelvemonths' imprisonment as the punishment of his offence, would not the gentleman feel greatly astonished if the offending party applied to be reinstated in his situation? If the individual asked him for the keys of his cellar and pantry, would he not say, "Do you not recollect that you robbed me?" The servant might answer, "It is very true; but I suffered the penalty of my crime. I was imprisoned for twelve months, and it is extremely unjust to punish me further by refusing to place me in my old situation." This was precisely akin to the argument used by hon gentlemen, when they said that as Mr. Kenrick had paid the penalty of his offence, he ought to be no further molested. He thought the magistrates of the country were too much above control. When he said this, he deemed it right to declare, that no man could feel more respect or veneration than he did for the magistrate who watched over his neighbourhood with paternal care; who settled petty quarrels and who exerted his authority to preserve the morals of the people, and to add to their comfort. But, he could not approve of that indiscriminate and blind obedience. which some individuals seemed to think ought to be paid to the magistracy in general. He would say, and he thought the government ought to say, when a case or gross misconduct on the part of a magistrate was brought forward, "Here is an offence of a crying nature, let us examine it, and see whether this magistrate shall longer be allowed to exercise the functions of a justice of the peace in the. county where he now acts." When magistrates misbehaved, they ought to be dismissed. That was the course which had been pursued in Ireland, and followed in parts of this country. A magistrate of Hampshire had, in the time of lord Loughborough, been thus treated. An action for false imprisonment was brought against him and 50l. damages were awarded. It was thought necessary to consider whether the individual was fit to remain in the situation of a magistrate. The lord lieutenant was unwilling to interfere; but lord Loughborough took up the case, and the offending party was removed Government, however, appeared to have lost that wholesome power; Not. a week passed in which complaints were not made against magistrates , but no notice was taken of them. As the power of the magistracy was increased, the super- intending control of government appeared to be diminished. With these views and sentiments he had brought this case before the House of Commons. He was influenced by no private or personal motives. He utterly disdained them. With respect to the individual whose conduct was inculpated, he never had the honour of his friendship. He harboured no feelings of animosity towards, and was never, to his knowledge, until the present occasion, under the same roof with him. He acted from a sense of public justice; and it would be deeply degrading to him if it could be supposed that he was influenced by feelings of any other description. It was his intention to submit the following propositions to the House—1st, "That this committee is of opinion, that the allegations contained in the petition of M. M. Canfor have been substantially proved. 2nd, That the said petitioner preferred his complaint to William Kenrick, esq. one of the magistrates for the county of Surrey, relative to the loss of a ram, and required a search-warrant, to recover the ram as well as its fleece, alleging both to be in the possession of William Beale, but that the said William Kenrick refused to grant a search-warrant, or to take the depositions of the petitioner, 3rd, That the said William Kenrick, in this respect, appears to have neglected his duty as a magistrate in not inquiring into facts of a suspicious character; and that his subsequent conduct in causing the said petitioner to be arrested, and detained in his house, and in causing to be taken from his person by force, a certain paper, was illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive, and a gross abuse of his authority as a magistrate."

The first resolution having been read,

Mr. Secretary Peel

said, he entirely acquitted the learned gentleman of being actuated by any undue motives in bringing this case forward. The high and manly character which he had always maintained, would form a sufficient vindication against any such charge. At the same time, he must observe, that the course which he (Mr. Peel) meant to take on this occasion did not arise from any undue bias towards Mr. Kenrick, with whom he had no acquaintance. He was only anxious that they should decide in the manner most consistent with the forms of parliament, and, above all, agreeably to the principles of equity and justice. In the outset he called on gentle- men to divest themselves of all prejudices connected with the other case. Although there were many gentlemen present who held the situation of a magistrate, he was persuaded that they would indulge in no fellow-feeling on that account. On the contrary, if the House interfered, those individuals would, he thought, be more likely to vindicate, by their votes, the situation of magistrate from any imputation that might be cast on it, in consequence of any improper conduct committed by one of their body, The learned gentleman had divided the case into two parts: 1st, the refusal of the search-warrant on the application of Canfor; and 2nd, the conduct of Mr. Kenrick in ordering Canfor to be detained, in appointing his butler as a constable, and in taking from him the note and the fleece. He would pursue the same course, in considering the question, that the learned gentleman had done. It was wholly unnecessary for him to show that Mr. Kenrick had acted with perfect propriety in this transaction, or that no charge of impropriety could be maintained against him. All he would contend for was, that there was no ground for the interference of the House. On the first part of the charge he would say, that whether Mr. Kenrick did or did not act like a perfect magistrate, he must exonerate him from having pursued the course he took from any corrupt or improper motive. He appeared to have been influenced by a desire to act with strict and impartial justice. Whether his note did not contain phrases which ought not to have been found there, he would not enter into an inquiry. The principal accusation was, that Mr. Kenrick had suppressed a case of felony, and that he had done so on account of a corrupt feeling. He denied that any such imputation could attach to him. Here, it appeared, was an individual, living in his neighbourhood, against whom a search-warrant was applied for. Was not the character of W . Beale impeached by this proceeding? Unquestionably it was. Then came the consideration, who was Mr. Beale? It appeared that he was a man of good character, and of some property; for in the fold where the ram was found he had between seventy and eighty sheep. Canfor had lost twenty sheep, and amongst those belonging to Beale a ram was found, which Canfor supposed was his property. Was any concealment attempted? None whatever. The sheep were kept in an open field, accessible to all. The learned gentlemen said "the ram was shorn," which he considered as proving a desire of concealment. If it had been at the season of the year when it was unusual for sheep to be shorn, or if the other sheep in the fold were not shorn, then there would be some foundation for assuming that concealment was contemplated. But, as it happened in the shearing season, and as all the other sheep were shorn, how was it possible to maintain the accusation of attempting to conceal the sheep, against W. Beale? When he was asked for the fleece, what would have been easier than for him to have said, "It is not in my possession. I have disposed of it," He, however, at once said, that he had it, but would not give it up. Now, under these circumstances, was it desirable that Mr. Kenrick should issue a search-warrant against a respectable individual, on such light grounds? Besides, Beale claimed the fleece as his property; which formed a very peculiar feature in this case. Canfor was asked, "Did you tell Mr. Kenrick that Beale claimed the ram as his property?" and the petitioner, after a good deal of prevarication, answered, that "he did." This was most important; because, Mr. Kenrick, knowing Beale's character, would naturally say, on receiving this information, "Oh, it is a question of property, and I will not ruin this man's character for ever, by issuing, on such grounds as these, a search-warrant." It was here very material to attend to Canfor's evidence on this point. He was asked, "Did you not tell Mr. Kenrick, Beale insisted it was his ram?—I said he refused to produce the fleece. Did you not tell Mr" Kenrick he said it was his ram?—Certainly; he claimed it. And that he described the marks on the fleece just as you have described them?—I asked him whether the ram he took had not this particular mark, and he said it had, and he thought it was his ram, and that somebody else had taken it, and marked it. afresh. That you told Mr. Kenrick?—I cannot whether I did or not. How much of that did you tell Mr.Kenrick?—I cannot say. Did you tell Mr. Kenrick he claimed it as his ram?—That he would not give it up to me. Did you not tell Mr. Kenrick that he claimed it as his ram? —No." From this specimen the House might see what diffi- culty there had been in sifting the witness, as long as the questions had come, which those had done, from his side of the House; as a member on the other side had asked him, "When was the first time you saw Beale? —On Sunday, about one o'clock. How late was it when you saw Mr. Kenrick?—On the Monday, about the same time. On that Sunday Beale maintained the sheep to be his, and the fleece to be his?—Yes. And you told Mr. Kenrick that?—Yes." Under these circumstances, and knowing that Beale had seventy or eighty sheep of his own, he thought Mr. Kenrick in refusing the search-warrant, had acted rightly. In a case of this kind, a number of slight circumstances were often of very great importance in leading to a correct conclusion; and he wished the House to observe, that Mr. Kenrick, who was said to have acted partially on account of a sort of acquaintance with Beale, did not know the Christian name of the person to whom he was so anxious to act favourably. That piece of information he received from the butler. It also appeared that the butler, who was acquainted with Mr. Kenrick's mode of administering justice, handed a search-warrant to him for the purpose of having it filled; but Mr. Kenrick merely stated that he did not think it necessary in this case. On this part of the case the general impression must be, that no undue, corrupt, or improper feeling had been made out which could warrant the House to interfere in the matter.—He now came to Mr. Kenrick's subsequent conduct towards Canfor, and on that he would speak his undisguised sentiments. He thought that Mr. Kenrick, in calling on his servant to act as a constable, and seizing the note he had given to Canfor, had acted in an indefensible manner. A civil action had, however, been brought against him, and a verdict obtained; which proved he had acted improperly. But, his conduct with the severity urged by the learned gentleman, was a question, admitting of very considerable doubt. For his own part, he thought it would lessen the dignified powers of parliament, if they were to proceed in a vindictive manner, because Mr. Kenrick had detained Canfor in his house for one hour, that individual having obtained damages for the false imprisonment. Mr. Kenrick had acted improperly, and he was sorry that he had suffered his temper to be ruffled: but, in estimating a moral wrong, they ought not to lose sight of the provacation which he had received. The complainant came before him writhing under feelings of regret for the loss of his ram. He had travelled, it seemed, 500 miles in the middle of summer, until the blood was running out at the knees of his breeches. In this state of heat he might have offered some provocation to Mr. Kenrick, to bear which would require more stoicism than that gentleman possessed. They had been told, that they were to draw no improper conclusion from Canfor's conduct at the bar, because he was so nervous, and so overwhelmed by the novelty of his situation, that he was unable to give evidence so correct as he otherwise might have done. Of course, he was extremely terrified when placed before the Commons of England; but, the House could not forget his demeanour; and, from the specimen they had seen, it was possible that in the heat of summer, and under the feelings which the learned gentleman had described, his conduct to Mr. Kenrick might not have been of the mildest and most conciliatory nature. When it was considered, besides, that Canfor had threatened to hand Mr. Kenrick over to his solicitor, who would tackle with him, he was induced to believe that the whole of his conduct had been offensive and provoking. He did not say, that if the provocation had been greater, it would be a sufficient excuse for Mr. Kenrick's forgetting the moderation and temper which belonged to his situation as a magistrate, but it must be allowed to have some weight when the House came to determine the degree of moral delinquency in the case. A great stress had been laid upon Mr. Kenrick's having thought proper to detain the fleece. He thought the reason which that gentleman gave for having done. so was a very satisfactory one. He said, that believing it would thereafter be made the subject of a civil action, he had taken it into his own possession that it might be forthcoming at the proper time. He knew that Mr. Kenrick was wrong in doing so—he knew that he could not justify his conduct in a court of justice—but still, the motive which had influenced him ought not to be lost sight of by the House when they were called upon to pronounce a censure upon this magistrate. The learned gentleman had said, that because one part of a man's conduct had been the subject of an action in a court .of justice, it was no reason why other parts of it should not afterwards be investigated. He agreed with him in the general principle; and he agreed that the criminal conviction of a magistrate was a sufficient ground for the lord chancellor's removing him from the commission; but the question in this case, as in every other, must be, whether such a punishment would not be beyond the offence charged? And here it must be remembered, that there was not only no conviction, but not even a criminal charge. He knew the same thing had been done in Ireland, even without a conviction; but that proceeding was not approved of in that House, and it had been said, that the lord chancellor for Ireland would have done better to follow the English practice. The learned gentleman had alluded to the case of a servant who should rob his master; but, he put it to his candour whether there was the slightest resemblance between that case and the present. Mr. Kenrick's conduct had never been brought before a court of justice. Canfor, the person bringing this charge, had accepted 5l. as a composition for his action; and it was said, that he had now presented his petition to the House solely from a love of public justice, and to prevent an improper person from holding any longer an authority which he had abused. He could not say, that he thought any of the allegations in the petition had been proved. He denied that the charge of felony had been suppressed, or attempted to be suppressed, by Mr. Kenrick. He denied, at least he doubted, that Canfor had been influenced by the motives foisted into his petition. He believed that, hearing of Franks's case, Canfor had thought it was a good opportunity for bringing forward his own complaint; but, while he denied this, he admitted that the House had nothing whatever to do with his motives. He would not, however, have it supposed that Mr. Kenrick was therefore, to have a verdict of applause. Mr. Kenrick's conduct was such as could, in no point of view, be justified; but still he thought it was not such as called for the interference of the House. It should be with the utmost caution that the House permitted itself to express an opinion which might have an ill effect upon the magistracy of the country. If any sufficient case of abuse had been made out, it was the province of the executive power to dismiss the person offending; and it would be in all cases better that the House Should not interfere with the exercise Of that power, unless they were satisfied that the case justified it. To him it appeared, in the present case, that such a course was wholly unjustifiable and inconsistent; because the evidence which had been adduced left the charges wholly unsupported. He should therefore conclude by moving a resolution, which although it might be unsatisfactory to some hon. gentlemen, was, in his opinion, consistent with the justice of the case, and with the usual practice of the House of Commons. He then moved, "That the committee, having heard evidence in support of the allegations contained in the petition of Martin Money Canfor, and having heard counsel in behalf of Mr. Kenrick, does not think it necessary to recommend to the House the institution of any further proceeding with reference to the petition of Canfor.

Mr. Tierney

said, he was glad to hear from the right hon. gentleman, that it was impossible to approve of the conduct of Mr. Kenrick. He went, however, a little further, and thought that the House would lower itself in the estimation of the public, if it did not, in the most unequivocal manner, mark its sense of the outrageous conduct of that gentleman. The first part of the case made out against him, was his refusal to grant a search-warrant on Canfor's application; the second was his imprisonment, of that person in consequence of his refusing to give up the fleece. The right hon. gentleman said, that all attempts to prove any corrupt motives on the part of Mr. Kenrick had failed. Now, it was not necessary to prove any such motive; but, whether any such corrupt motives really existed, or not, still it was obvious, that Mr. Kenrick was unfit any longer to remain a magistrate and a judge. The right hon. gentleman said, that Canfor's manner was calculated to provoke the magistrate. He said, he had rode 500 miles after his ram, until the blood ran out of his breeches-knees. It was no wonder, then, that he should be chafed a little, when he applied to the magistrate: but, when he was imprisoned, he showed no symptoms of violence, he was then extremely temperate, and the violence was all on the side of the magistrate. Let the House consider whether the man had not some excuse for being a little out of temper. He told the magistrate that he had lost his ram, and after going a long time in search of it, he had at length found it in the fold of another Man. That man told him he would neither give him his ram nor show him the fleece which had been shorn from its back: and he therefore asked the magistrate to give him a search-warrant, which he thought was the best means of getting possession of his property. And so every man in his situation would have thought. Well, Mr. Kenrick said, "I wont grant you a search-warrant: but I'll give you a note to the man who, you say, has got your ram, and this will operate as a summons and bring him to me." He found no fault with this proceeding, except that Canfor's evidence was not taken on oath. There might be many objections to such a course; it might have thrown an imputation on a man's character, and lowered him in the esteem of his neighbours. To grant a summons, therefore, might have been the best course. Mr. Beale, who had the ram, was said to be an excellent character. A noble lord had given a very high testimony to his respectability. It might be so; but he must be permitted to say, that Beale's conduct with respect to the ram was very extraordinary. Beale lost a ram that had a mark upon its rump. He happened to find another, which had a mark on its side, and he said to himself; that although this was not his, it would do as well as another; so he took it home, and to prevent any mistake about the mark he sheared the fleece off. The owner of the ram saw it; and notwithstanding the change it had undergone, he recognized it to be his, and told Beale so, who refused to give it up. Canfor then said, "Show me the fleece, and Ill convince you that it is mine. "Beale refused this request, and said, "No, that is the very reason why I won't show you the fleece." This made Canfor very angry, and no wonder that it did. He then went to Mr. Kenrick, and applied for a search-warrant. Mr. Kenrick gave him a note instead, and with this he went to Beale again. Beale says still, "I won't show you the fleece, and I don't care for Mr. Kenrick nor his note either." This made Canfor still more angry; and as he found Mr. Kenrick's note of so little use, he went to another magistrate, Mr. Burgess, who, from a regard to etiquette, refused to interfere. Canfor had therefore nothing to do but to go back again to Mr. Kenrick; and then came a very material part of the story. Canfor found Mr. Kenrick's servant, George Adams; who was a principal actor in the drama. This person, who was no doubt a very excellent clerk and a worthy butler, said, "My master will have nothing further to do in this business." This singular saying had never been contradicted. Mr. Kenrick, in his petition did not rebut this statement. Was it, therefore, too much to infer that which Mr. Kenrick did not think fit to deny? Did the right hon. gentleman mean to say that he acted correctly here? His objection to grant a warrant might be reasonable enough; but, was there any reason why he should have refused to investigate the affair? All that the poor man got, instead of the redress he went for, was a message through the butler, to the effect that Mr. Kenrick would have nothing more to do with it. Canfor then grumbled; and it was not surprising that he did so; upon which the butler said, that Beale had been there, and that there was a proposition to refer it to Mr. Nash. Canfor said, he did not care to whom it was referred, if the fleece should be produced, because without that it would be impossible to satisfy the referee. Now, although before this Mr. Kenrick knew nothing of Mr. Beale, he had in the interim become acquainted with him through his butler. The matter was then referred, and the result was, that Canfor got both his ram and his fleece. He might then have gone home if he had chosen; but he said, "No. I'll go to Mr. Kenrick again, and show him that I have had an award in my favour." Now this seemed to be praiseworthy conduct on his part. He went to Mr. Kenrick, and there the scene was entirely changed. "Oh, you dog!" said Mr. Kenrick, "you have got back your ram and your fleece, have you! then I'll make a special constable of my butler, and have you taken into custody. And this was what the poor fellow got for calling upon the magistrate to pay him a passing civility. Mr. Kenrick gave as a reason for this, that he wished to keep the fleece, because it might be necessary afterwards to produce it, as it might be the subject of an action. Now, he must take the freedom to say he did not believe this. He said, he desired Canfor to leave the fleece for the purpose for which it had been given to him, and which was that he had stated. Mr. Kenrick, it must be remembered, was a judge. He had no such excuse as other persons might have pleaded. He was well acquainted with the law, and he must have known whether such a pretence was well founded or not. He might have produced Ede and Nash, the referees, and Adams and Beale; but he had not done so; and therefore he (Mr. T.) did not believe one word of a statement which was opposed to common sense. Well, Canfor said, he would not give up the fleece, nor the note: upon which, Mr. Kenrick told his butler, whom he had made a special constable, to fetch Batchelor, another constable, to search him; and when the other constable came, Canfor gave up the note. Canfor brought an action for this imprisonment, and Mr. Kenrick, when it came to trial, thought fit to compromise it. The action was put an end to by the payment of 5l. and the costs. A good deal had been said about Canfor's motives. The House had nothing to do with them; but since, by a sort of "God-send," the case had come before them, were they to shut their eyes to it? The right hon. gentleman said, the case was not worthy of the interference of the House. Why, if this was not, he wished to know what case was worthy to be interfered in? If this instance of intemperate use of authority was not a reason why the conduct of a magistrate should be investigated, what case could require an investigation? It was said, that the case of Franks must not now be taken into the account. He did not want to do so; but, the facts of that case had been made so public that no one could forget them. A piece of timber of the value of one shilling had been stolen from Mr. Kenrick, for which he committed Franks to gaol, and afterwards offered to let him out, if the man would plead guilty but he would not. He was ready to believe that, notwithstanding his opposition to the present resolutions, it would not be the right hon. gentleman's fault, if Mr. Kenrick was not persuaded to quit the premises, and not interfere further with the administration of justice. In his opinion, it was the duty of ministers to advise his majesty, to remove Mr. Kenrick. For his own part he declared most conscientiously, that he had never heard of a case more suspicious or more disgusting to his mind than this; and he could not imagine any person less fitted to discharge the duties of a magistrate than one who had conducted himself like Mr. Kenrick. Whether the resolutions of his hon. and learned friend were such as met the case, or not, he did not understand; but this was his firm opinion. He said so without any feeling of ill-will towards Mr. Kenrick, of whom he knew nothing. He implored his majesty's ministers to consider the consequences of denying justice to the people, and the necessity of preserving in the minds of all men a good opinion of those who were intrusted with the administration of it [hear].

Mr. Secretary Canning

said, he fully concurred in the last sentiment of his right hon. friend: but, before the House came to the conclusion which he would press upon them, they would do well to consider whether the case was of so grave a nature as to justify the course proposed by the learned gentleman. Nothing could be more untrue than that, because ministers were not prepared to go all lengths in censuring the conduct of Mr. Kenrick, they therefore admired and approved of it. The question was, whether the case called upon the House to exercise that highest and most transcendent power which parliament possessed; and, if it did not (as he thought it did not), whether they ought to pursue an intermediate course, which would brand Mr. Kenrick with an imputation which would render him powerless in the high office he held, and thereby produce a great public mischief. Without going into the details of the case, he was decidedly of opinion that neither of these courses should be adopted. He had no acquaintance with Mr. Kenrick; he believed he had never been in the same room with him: he was sure he had never exchanged a word with him: he had no partiality in his favour; and yet he must say, that the case appeared to him the most trumpery that was ever heard of. The whole extent to which it reached proved only that Mr. Kenrick had been guilty of a discreditable and culpable want of temper, in his interview with Canfor. With respect to the search-warrant, that part of the charge was abandoned. All that remained was Mr. Kenrick's conduct on the second interview. That he had suffered his temper and his discretion to be overcome, could not be denied, nor could it be justified; but, the complaint and the punishment must be taken together. Was the loss of temper in an interview with that most unprovoking of mankind, who had lately appeared at the bar of that House, so great a crime that it could only be sufficiently punished by removing the person who had committed it from his high office of judge? He could not, in his conscience, say that it deserved any such punishment; and, as that was the only one which could be inflicted consistently with the interests of the country, he would not consent to adopt that other measure, as unjust as it was inconsistent with those interests, of blasting the character of the person accused, and yet leaving him in the possession of his office. This was the short view which he had taken of the subject, and, without going any further into it, determined him not to vote for the resolutions of the learned gentleman, which would be nugatory unless they were followed up by an address to his majesty, which the learned gentleman did not contemplate. It could not be denied that flying into a passion—the only charge proved against Mr. Kenrick—was a moral fault; but, the House of Commons must be cautious in inquiring into the private life of persons, because it might happen, that the most venerable characters, whose public conduct was without reproach, might be open to similar imputations in their private habits. The right hon. gentleman concluded, by repeating his opinion that nothing had been proved which could justify the House in passing upon Mr. Kenrick the censure contained in the resolution of the learned gentleman.

Mr. H. Sumner

said, that, however disgusting the demeanour of Canfor might have been, the allegations in his petition had been substantially proved, and those allegations were perfectly consistent with the statement which had been made to him ten days after the occurrence took place. He was astonished to hear the right hon. Secretary characterize this as the most trumpery case he had ever heard of. Mr. Kenrick had directed an act to be done, which, in the first instance, led to an assault, and which might have led to much more serious consequences. For his part, he could not conceive a case which called more imperatively, for the interference of that House. Mr. Kenrick had called no witnesses to character, but his hon. colleague and a noble lord had represented him as a good husband, father, and friend. So he had always understood him to be; but private character had nothing to do with the matter; although, if he were asked whether Mr. Kenrick were a good neighbour, he should say, no such thing, but a very bad one. [Here the hon. member was about to relate an anecdote of Mr. Kenrick, to illustrate the opinion he had expressed of him, when he was called to order by Mr. W. Lamb.] He should abstain from going into that case; but could not at all concur in the propriety of postponing Franks's case until the next session. The two charges ought to be heard together; for although each, taken separately, might not be strong enough to warrant the removal of Mr. Kenrick; yet when the entire conduct of the individual was taken into consideration, there might appear abundant reason! And only see the situation in which Mr. Kenrick himself was placed. Upon the last circuit, he was cut by all the gentry. The postponement, therefore, would not enable him to administer justice satisfactorily.

Mr. Denison

said, that, as Mr. Kenrick's near neighbour, all he knew of that gentleman was in his favour. On the first night of the present charge being brought forward, Mr. Kenrick had requested him to state to the House, that he was most anxious for the fullest investigation. In the refusal of the search-warrant, he thought Mr. Kenrick had been justified. The taking Canfor into custody was reprehensible. But, as far as warmth of temper was concerned, seeing what the House had seen of Canfor at the bar, if no man was fit to be a magistrate but such as could have patience with that person, very few, he believed, would be in a state of qualification. On the whole he did not quite agree in either of the courses which had been recommended. That suggested by the learned member, he thought, went too far; while the other did not convey that degree of censure which the case deserved.

Sir F. Burdett

said, he took the short question to be—a question which the House was bound to pursue in any shape, and by all available inquiries—whether Mr. Kenrick had or had not exhibited such qualities of character as deserved to preclude him from filling two such high offices as those of justice of the peace, and judge upon a circuit. In his opinion this had decidedly been the case. He by no means looked at the transaction in the light in which it was attempted to be presented by the gentlemen opposite. But, seeing that it was too late in the session to obtain all the evidence which Mr. Kenrick might think necessary to his justification, he should advise his hon. and learned friend to rest satisfied with the opinion which the House had already expressed; leaving upon ministers the responsibility of deciding how far, upon their own investigation, the resolution moved ought to be carried into operation, and reserving to himself the duty, in the next session, of inquiring what discretion had been exercised. In proposing this course, he desired to be understood as being fully ready to go all the length proposed by his hon. and learned friend: and as being decidedly of opinion, that, upon due consideration, there was only one course which the right hon. gentlemen on the other side could adopt.

Mr. W. Courtenay

said, that the proposition of the hon. baronet appeared to be very extraordinary, as coming from so staunch a champion of constitutional rights. Was it not very singular that the hon. baronet, of all other members, should call on ministers to remove an individual from his offices, whose case had been submitted to the consideration of the House, without their passing any opinion upon it? [Sir F. Burdett said, across the House, that he only called for the dismissal of Mr. K. from the magistracy.] Then, the proposition of the hon. baronet, was still more objectionable; because it supposed the propriety of allowing an individual, who was dismissed for misconduct from the magistracy, to continue unmolested in the exercise of the far more important functions of a judge. The learned member contended, that this was a case in which the House was not called on to interfere.

Mr. Denman

said, that as nothing like a defence had been set up for Mr. Kenrick, the case of that gentleman might be considered one, respecting which there existed no difference of opinion. "Reprehensible" was the mildest phrase applied to the conduct of Mr. Kenrick. That Mr. Kenrick's conduct was open to great censure no man denied. Indeed, the right hon. gentleman fully admitted it, for although be called this a trumpery case, he had followed up that statement by saying that Mr. Kenrick had displayed "a most discreditable want of temper," and that his conduct was "a fit object of censure." Why was it "discreditable," if he was not unfit for his office, why was he "a fit object of censure," if he did not deserve to be removed. Was there any gentleman in that House who, if lie were asked on his honour or oath whether the charge contained in the resolution had been fully substantiated, would hesitate to admit it; or would deny for a moment that the charge was perfectly true? Under these circumstances, if it was the wish of the House, he should content himself with merely having the resolutions put, without troubling them with a decision.

Mr. Croker

said, that however blamable Mr. Kenrick might have been for his warmth of temper respecting the fleece and the note, still his motive was praiseworthy; namely, to produce them in evidence in a cause which was then considered to be pending; and the best proof that such were his motives was, that they remained in the possession of the constable until the day of the trial.

Mr. Lockhart

said, there was a great inconvenience in including gentlemen's names in the commission of the peace, who held judicial appointments; and he trusted that in future it would be avoided.

Mr. Wynn

admitted, that there had been some haste and intemperance in Mr. Kenrick's conduct in the present case, but declared that his conduct as a judge in Wales had given the highest satisfaction. With respect to the strictures upon Mr. Kenrick's private character, he thought they might as well have been omitted. As to the charge of intemperance, that was one to which, unfortunately, many persons were liable. What would the hon. member for Surrey think of any member of that House who should be so intemperate as, in a private committee, to resort to personal violence against another hon. member? He believed there had been many excellent judges, whose conduct would not have borne the inquiry which had been inflicted on Mr. Kenrick. If it had been proved that Mr. Kenrick had acted from corrupt motives, that would have been a sufficient ground for addressing the Crown to remove him; but no such fact had been established, and the case, as it at present stood, was too slight to be met by the censure of that House.

The amendment, moved by Mr. Secretary Peel, was then agreed to.