§ Lord Nugentsaid, that in laying before the House the grounds of the motion of which he had some days ago given notice, he must begin with stating, that he did not mean to animadvert on the vote to which the House had agreed on the first night of the session. This, however, he must say—that with respect to that part of the address of his majesty's ministers which regarded the neutrality of this country between France and Spain, he felt entirely with his hon. and learned friend (Mr. Brougham), who on that night had so forcibly and so eloquently expressed his sentiments—he felt with him that it was very difficult indeed to concur entirely in the terms of an address which could see nothing but a subject of congratulation in the result of the policy pursued by this country during the war which had just terminated. He thought, on the one hand, that the policy which government professed to adopt towards Spain, 191 was, from the outset, very little suited to the high and energetic tone which this country ought to assume to herself; and on the other, he could not help thinking that our conduct, in not adhering to that intended policy, had been most insincere and unworthy. He could not persuade himself, but that the course taken by ministers had been most hostile to the cause of Spain—that cause, with reference to which they had expressed themselves determined to remain neutral on several occasions. This country had been exposed, in consequence, to the reproaches of every friend of liberty, and to the scorn and contempt of those powers who had, unfortunately, triumphed against the freedom of Spain. The result had been as injurious to the interests of England, as to those of the conquered country; He could not but deeply lament, that Spain had been allowed to fall almost without a blow. She was not ruined by the actual hostility of this country; but by being, as he believed she had been, deceived by the hollow professions of neutrality which were held out by this country. He did not think he could fail in making out a case for the production of the papers which he meant to conclude by calling for.
He thought it right to state, that in the course of his observations he meant not to contradict, in any respect, that part of his majesty's speech in which it was said, "that, in the strict neutrality which he determined to observe in that contest, he best consulted the true interests of his people;" but he would argue, that in the course of those transactions, the government of this country had made themselves parties against Spain, at the most critical and important foment of her history. The last session had come to a close, without this House being able to look fairly at the character of the neutral policy as it was called, which had been adopted. Unanimous as they were at that time, in their disapprobation of the unjust and violent aggression which was then meditated against that state, it was impossible for them to foresee the conduct which ministers meant to pursue. They were prepared for ministers declining to take any part in a foreign quarrel, although in that quarrel were involved questions of principle most important to England—most important to all freestates—questionsofprin-ciple on which, indeed, the independence of all free states mainly rested: but they 192 were not prepared then for a gratuitous departure from a professed neutrality—they were not prepared for a course of conduct which was every way injurious to our J interests. The language of ministers had led them to suppose, that if they did not take that more generous part which appeared to some better befitting the ancient character and liberal policy of this country, they would not, at least, descend secretly and covertly to become the partizans and assistants of France in her unprincipled aggression. How far they had done so, was now to be inquired into. The useless regrets which had been expressed I by the other side of the House—the vain lamentations which had been poured forth over the fate of Spain—were but a poor atonement for the evils which, he believed this country had so mainly contributed to bring upon her. They could not disguise from their own feelings this fact—that owing to the course which had been taken, ministers must be considered as the principle spoliators of the peninsula. They had given to the French those advantages which they well knew how to make use of; and, by doing so, they had given up the strongest grounds of the prosperity and security of their country.
He meant not to advert to what had taken place last year—he would not touch on the many compliances which were then unfortunately made by ministers on questions of principle the most essential to our I welfare as a free state—he would not allude to the abandonment of all those real and effective means which this country possessed, of giving a support worthy of England to those rights—of giving a support worthy of England to that constitutional system of Spain, to which, be it remembered, we gave our solemn sanction, in 1812. He would not ask now, whether, if a bold and decisive tone had been used at the congress at Verona, it would have saved Spain, without the necessity of this country embarking in a war: neither would he ask whether, under any given circumstance, it became England to stand by patiently, with her eyes shut to the cool disregard with which his most christian majesty treated our protest. These questions had been decided last year, and he would not introduce them now. He would merely demand, was this system of neutrality the fit policy for this country to pursue? He believed it was so considered by the great bulk of the English people, All that he meant to say was, 193 that this ground, low and humble as it unquestionably was, ministers had since abandoned. What was considered at Verona as a possible ground for the interference of this country, if it occurred, had actually taken place. Yet we had not only not opposed France, but we had absolutely assisted her. We had allowed some of the most important privileges of our trading system, and even the honour of our flag, to be invaded with impunity. The possible cause of our taking part in this war was foreseen at Verona. That cause was, if circumstances imparted to it the character of a war of annexation. That was looked upon as a ground which would inevitably lead us to take a part in the contest. It was evident, from various acts of the French government, that the war did assume that aspect. No sooner did the duke d' Angoulême become aware of the difficulty of advancing into Spain—no sooner was he made acquainted with the vast expense which was occasioned by that servile body in Spain whom he had himself agreed to support—than, by a public edict, he had declared his object to be to take possession of Spain. He alluded to the edict published at Andujar in the beginning of August last. The duke d' Angoulême had then declared the power of the Spanish regency at an end, and he had called for the military, as well as the civil authority of the government to be placed in his hands. Did he blame the duke d' Angoulême for this act? No. He believed it was founded in humanity, and was demanded by the most urgent and immediate necessity; but he must say, that it was a declaration, as strong as terms could make it, that the real object of the war was the annexation of Spain as a province of France. This was not a mere vain empty proclamation on his part. The edict of Andujar was not in general circulation through Spain, when, in point of fact, the French flag was hoisted on almost every town in the Peninsula. They certainly could not praise the good faith of France on that occasion; because, on crossing the Pyrenees, a proclamation was issued by the invading army, promising the Spanish nation, that no flag but the Spanish flag should be hoisted in such towns as might be garrisoned by the French. But, no sooner was the proclamation of Andujar published, than the whole character, appearance, and object of the war with 194 Spain was altered; and the duke d' Angoulême became virtually viceroy of the Spanish provinces. But the British cabinet had declared, in those famous notes of instruction (of which they had heard so much last year) from the right hon. the secretary of state for foreign affairs, to the duke of Wellington, that "come what come may, this country would never assist France in the invasion of Spain." But how was this declaration adhered to? On the issue of that question he would rest his case. "Come what come may, this country would never assist France in the invasion of Spain," was a tolerably strong phrase; and he remembered the cheers with which that declaration was received, when it was propounded to the House by the right hon. secretary as part of his instructions to the duke of Wellington. But, in less than a month afterwards, what was their surprise, and that of the poor, sacrificed, betrayed people of Spain, to see the British minister, accredited to the Spanish government at Seville, throw himself into the hands of the duke d'Angoulême and the French government; and stating the ground of that step to be, an act which the Spanish cortes had done in the management of the internal affairs of Spain! I The moment sir W. A'Court withdrew: himself from Seville, it might be said that this government had published a proclamation against the liberties of Spain. A I distinct indication of a hostile feeling was thus manifested. Was that withdrawal, or was it not, an indication of a hostile nature? Did sir W. A'Court withdraw himself from the Spanish government, in accordance with instructions which he had received from home? If he did not I act in consequence of instructions from home? why was he continued? Having withdrawn himself under such circumstances, and at such a moment, when perhaps the fate of Spain hinged on the conduct of this country, why was he not recalled—why was he not impeached by ministers, if he had acted without orders If he took this step in consequence of instructions from home, then he contended it was contrary to all our professions, to all our arrangements, to all our previous declarations, to ail our pledges of good faith.
This country appeared to have, evinced a hostile feeling towards Spain, because the cortes, in the legal exercise of their unquestionable authority, had declared 195 the king, for a time, incapable of exercising the royal functions, and appointed a regency for the special and only purpose of removing the seat of government to Cadiz, where the king was again to be restored to his authority. In doing that act, the cortes exercised their undoubted right. Were they, the parliament of England, the persons who ought to question the legality of such a proceeding, in common with sir W. A'Court? Did they forget the act of the British parliament in 1810–11 In adverting to that subject, he felt the delicacy of the ground on which he trod; and God forbid that he should for a moment think of introducing in the same sentence the name of our late sovereign—a sovereign generally revered and beloved, who, at the close of a long reign, was struck with the heaviest calamity that could afflict our nature—God forbid that he should be capable of introducing his name along with that of a wretch, who, unfortunately placed on a throne, was the scourge and abhorrence of his people—who visited them with the basest ingratitude for all that they had done, and for all they had forborne to do—who afforded the most finished specimen that perhaps ever existed in human nature, of all that was base and grovelling, perfidious, bloody, and tyrannical. And therefore he was a fit object for the tender sympathies of those powers who venerated divine right and adored legitimacy I The circumstances which led to the conduct of parliament in 1810, and those on which the cortes had acted in 1823, were different: but, the exercise of power was the same. Now, had the cortes of Spain that power, or had they not? And was sir W. A'Court a fit judge of the circum-Stances under which that power ought to be used? If, in 1810, the minister of any foreign court had withdrawn himself from London, on account of the Regency act—if the Spanish ambassador had objected to that measure, and cited it as a reason for quitting the metropolis—if he had said, that he was accredited to the king, and not to the regent, should we not have considered such a minister as either insane, or as having been instructed by his government to manifest a hostile feeling? He would not advert to the case of the convention parliament, which was a self-constituted body. The cortes had not assumed such a power as that parliament had wielded. The cortes distinctly said, "the king is incapable for a 196 time to exercise the royal functions, but we will provide for his immediate restoration, when he is in a place of safety." Yet it was on this account that sir W. A'Court abandoned the Spanish government, to which he had been accredited.
Then came the three celebrated notes of the allied powers—England, in the person of sir W. A'Court, following in the train of those three powers, whose principles she had previously disclaimed, and against whose conduct she had protested. Yes, she had followed in their train at an humble distance, but with the most fatal effect. He did not think that ministers could be insincere enough, and base enough, to warrant this proceeding; but certain it was, that sir W. A'Court had not been recalled, to answer those charges, which, if this country had not acted with the basest duplicity towards Spain, they were bound to investigate. No set of men were so particularly interested in examining the conduct of sir W. A'Court throughout these transactions as the ministers of this country. He hoped that much better opportunities would be given to that House, by the production of the correspondence with the Spanish government, to ascertain clearly what the real conduct of sir W. A'Court had been. Any thing which he could state on this subject must rest only on bare assertion; and, whatever credit the House might be prepared to give to his statement, it could not be considered as a ground for any proceeding when tangible documents were producible. Full, however, as sir W. A'Court was of his unabated desire to mediate, at any moment, in a spirit friendly to Spain, he always contrived to place himself in a position where mediation was impossible. He allowed the time to pass away, when the government left Seville, until the blockade of Cadiz was commenced, which effectually prevented him from proceeding, to that place, and he knew very well that Cadiz alone was the proper spot for negotiation. Where was sir W. A'Court from the period of the government leaving Seville, until the period of the investment and blockade of Cadiz? He was at Seville with the French army—the army of the faith, and the servile army He was at Seville, where he must have known the encouragement which he was giving by his presence to the servile army. He would state a circumstance which would show the effect sir W. A'Court's 197 presence had on the servile party. No less a proposition was made to him by an infuriated and sanguinary mob, headed by their priests, than that he should be made governor of Seville in the name of the absolute king! The offer was declined, by his stating, that if so preposterous a proposal was again made to him, he must leave Seville. But why, he demanded, had he remained one moment in Seville with the French army, the servile party, the priests, and their mob? He must have remained under the impression that this government was taking a decided part against the liberties of Spain. This was done in the teeth of the professions we had made of our anxious inclination and wish to come forward, at any moment, with a proffer of mediation, in a friendly disposition towards Spain. Now, what was the immediate effect of sir W. A'Court's conduct. The immediate effect of his withdrawing himself from the government of Spain, and the reason he assigned for so doing, was this—the hint which he thus offered, very intelligibly, was immediately taken by every traitor in Spain, from one end of the country to the other; the army commanded by Morillo immediately deserted; that general also deserted, stating, by a public proclamation, that the grounds for his treachery were the same that had influenced the proceedings of sir W. A'Court, and that the conduct of that individual, the conduct of the British minister, was the cause of his treason to his country. Here they saw a base wretch defending the treason he had committed against the freedom of his native land, by reference to the conduct of the minister of England. There was one part of the conduct of sir W. A'Court to which he could not but refer. He was bound to believe that sir W. A'Court meant well, meant charitably and generously, in the attempts he made, in more than one instance, to induce the Spanish generals to withdraw from the contest after the treason of Ballasteros. He had given this advice to general Alava—a man whose patriotic, honourable, and high-minded character, stood not in need of his praise. What he was about to relate on this point, he would begin, by stating, upon his honour, that he had not heard it directly or indirectly from that gallant officer. He had it from general notoriety, and as such he would state it, although he was never more certain of the truth of any given fact. General Alava, it was 198 true, had never expressed any decided concurrence in the abstract principles of the Spanish constitution; but he had felt nobly and honestly, that from the moment Spain was threatened with a foreign attempt to disturb her institutions the cause of those institutions became identified with herself. Faithful, therefore, to his duty—true and loyal to principles which could only at such a time be questioned by those who sought the overthrow of Spanish independence—general Alava had withstood the temptation held out to him, to save his own most valuable life from the wreck of his wretched country; and, who was the person who had tried to persuade this officer to save himself from the sinking cause of Spain—secretly to withdraw himself from her, and so extinguish her last hope? It was sir W. A'Court, whom he (lord N.) was bound to believe had done this upon principles of the purest generosity, and out of the deepest personal attachment to an individual, whose patriotism he admired, but who must nevertheless, at the same time have forgotten—what general Alava himself did not forget—that the withdrawing of such a person from Cadiz at such a time, could not fail to be imminent danger, if not destruction, to the cause of liberty—to hasten on the fate of Spain, while yet, by possibility, it might be protracted, and to subject his own character to the reproach, the abomination, and the indelible infamy, which had blasted the names of Abisbal, Morillo, and Ballasteros. He repeated his conviction, that sir W. A'Court could have been moved to this act by nothing but a zealous and most generous wish to save the life of one of the best men in Spain—of a man whose connexions with British influence and honour had made him peculiarly an object of sympathy, both here and in his country; but still, was it fair, or within the duty of sir W. A'Court, as the representative of England—was it within his duty—the man who, to say the least of it, had kept studiously aloof from cooperating with the constitutional government—who had kept himself aloof at Gibraltar—who had placed himself in a distant position from Cadiz—who at best had been but a cold, sullen, non-conducting medium between the last sighs of expiring Spain and the sympathies of this country? Was it worth sir W. A'Court's while, even to save such a man as general Alava, to strike a last blow at the Spanish constitution?
199 It was with great unwillingness that he trespassed so long upon the time of the House, and he would not continue to do so one moment longer than was absolutely necessary: but, there were one or two facts within his knowledge which might not be generally known to honourable members. He asserted—and it was a fact which he believed ministers would not deny—that overtures had been made at Madrid, by the cortes and acting government of Spain, to sir W. A'Court, offering to recognise the independence of Spanish South America, upon terms most advantageous in every way to Great Britain? Was the right hon. gentleman opposite prepared to deny that this was the fact? Then he should assert, until he was contradicted by the right hon. gentleman opposite, that such overtures had been made, and upon the terms which he had described; and yet the English government had rather preferred to risk all the danger and distress which might occur between England and the absolute government of Spain upon that subject—all the disputes which, perhaps, before twelve months were over our heads, might plunge us into a war which would extend through all Europe;—we had thought proper to risk all this, rather than accept the proposition of the constitutional party. He asserted—let it be contradicted!—that the cortes had repealed the ancient Spanish laws, restricting foreign commerce; that they had acknowledged, in the most liberal manner, the claims of the British merchants, and had gone on to make a provision for the liquidation of those claims: indeed, upon that point, we had had an assurance, and received a congratulation, last year in the king's speech. These things had been offered as an earnest of the desire of Spain to make the mediation of England in her cause, not merely an act of justice and humanity, but of interest; but we had neglected them all, in order to gratify the more important consideration of enabling France to restore Ferdinand to the throne, and of allowing him fully to gratify all the hellish, murderous passions, which had been in action ever since he had been permitted to leave Cadiz, to glut his vengeance with the expatriation or destruction of all those who had dared to give Spain those free institutions, which our own government had acknowledged for her in 1812.
The rest—besides the blood—which we had conceded to France, might be stated 200 shortly. We had allowed a blockade to be formed by France, of such a nature that we ourselves, in the very mid-day of our maritime power—masters as we were of the sea, and asserting rights upon it which, until now, we had never recognized in any foreign state—as we our selves had never instituted, or pretended to institute—a blockade, by which not only the whole English commerce had been excluded from the ports of Spain, but the seat of her government invested, and our own minister shut out from political communication. All this, which was a concession perfectly new and unprecedented, we had conceded, without remonstrance, to the successful ambition of the French. The right of search, too, had been given, and still without remonstrance, under circumstances which afforded no pretext even for such a pre caution. English merchant vessels had been boarded and detained, under every circumstance of violence and insult. Their captains had been detained prisoners upon the decks of French ships. In more than one instance, this had occurred at sea—not only in the neighbourhood of the port of Cadiz, but more than one degree of west longitude from it. English ships had been detained, which had entered Cadiz previous to the blockade. They had lain there, with cargoes on board, to the ruin of their owners, without the means of applying for aid to any political authority of our own; and, when application had been made upon the subject to the French admiral, it had been refused with every measure of incivility and insult. It might be asked, why representations had not been made to the regular authorities? For this plain reason—because there were no British authorities in Cadiz at the time—because the British minister, instead of remaining to protect, at least, British interests at Cadiz, had withdrawn himself, and was passing his autumn at Gibraltar—because the British consul at Cadiz, Mr. Brackenbury, instead of being at his post, had also withdrawn, and was passing his autumn in England—because there was no one at all, in short, at Cadiz, to whom representations could be made, except a merchant, a Mr. Egan, acting under the title of vice-consul, but without authority, without instructions, without influence, without support, or any means of interfering effectually for the protection of British property.
201 And this really was not all. He did not know how the House might feel as to a circumstance which he was about to relate; but he perfectly remembered what he himself had felt at hearing of it; and, avowing that those feelings had been: feelings of shame and of disgust, he still trusted they were only such as must be natural in the breast of any man, who felt keenly and delicately for the honour of the country of which he was a member, Let the House hear the fact, and judge. Mr. Appleton, the American charge d'affaires, at Cadiz, was preparing a protest to the duke d'Angoulême in the matter of certain American vessels, detained at Cadiz. Two English captains of merchant ships, who had entered Cadiz and taken in their cargoes prior to the blockade by the French being declared—who were lying in the harbour to the ruin of their owners, and saw no means of application, nor British authorities to apply to—these captains went to Mr. Appleton—to the American minister, and entreated, as a favour, that he would have the goodness to include their names in his protest. Here, then, was the British flag asking protection from the Americans against the French! for the Americans, they were our brothers in origin and in feeling. He trusted he should always think of them as he thought of them now—with the warmest interest and admiration. He hoped, at some period, to see England and America linked in the bonds of the closest interest and amity, forming a rallying point for the rights and liberties of the world; and he trusted that the time at which he should behold this was not very far distant: but he might be allowed to feel some jealousy—some slight humiliation—at seeing the interests of the British flag abandoned by the British minister, and seeking, though protection from America, yet still protection from a foreign power. For the effect of this inglorious policy, as regarded England, we need now look only at the Spanish ports, to see all the commerce of the country under the control and in the hands of France. French vessels, he was informed, were admitted duty free into every port of Spain, while heavy duties were still levied upon the ships of Great Britain. Bilboa, Malaga, Cadiz, Barcelona, Carthagena, all were garrisoned by the soldiers of France—Bilboa,and Malaga, I which had long been the seats of British factories; Cadiz, perhaps the most formid- 202 able point for a naval force in the World; Carthagena, proverbially the finest harbour in all Spain. He said "proverbially," because there was a Spanish proverb which said—in the metaphoric style of that country—that there were but three safe harbours in Spain.—"June, July, and Carthagena." Then there was Barcelona—the key, in a military view, of the whole country. Barcelona was in the possession of the French, as well as all those other places which we had thought it worth our while, but a very few years since, at the expense of so much blood and treasure, to wrest from them. The family compact, which was considered the ground of one of the longest and severest contests in which this country had ever been engaged—by this policy, the family compact was restored. Every object of our war with Buonaparte had been gratuitously abandoned. Whatever state of things in Spain was to be preserved—if it was fit to leave Ferdinand at liberty to sate himself with the blood of the best men that his country had ever produced.—It was surely at least the duty of England to prevent Spain from becoming a province of the French empire; and no less so to vindicate her dignity and her rights in a manner which, unhappily, she had totally neglected to do. It was because he felt that, in this transaction, the interests of England had been sacrificed, her honour tarnished, and her conquests abandoned, that he moved for papers to give the House full information upon the subject. There was a document which he believed to have been presented to the right hon. gentleman opposite; but, as he did not know the fact positively, he had not included it in his motion. The document to which he alluded was a state paper, sent during the last few days of the Spanish government at Cadiz—a paper sent to admiral Jabat, to be laid before the right hon. gentleman opposite, as a protest against the whole conduct of sir W. A'Court, since the Spanish government had left Seville. If in the course of what he had said, he had expressed himself too warmly, he could only beg pardon of the House, entreat them to attribute the error to a degree of feeling upon the subject, which he could not disguise from the House or himself to be one of the deepest and most serious description. The; noble lord concluded by moving,
"That an humble Address be present 203 ed to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, Copies of all Instructions to His Majesty's Minister plenipotentiary at the Court of Spain, with a view to his conduct in the War between that country and France, from the period of the entrance of the French troops into Spain to that of the surrender of Cadiz, inclusive; also, Copies of all Correspondence between His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary and the Spanish Government, with respect to the mediation of Great Britain during the same period.
Mr. Secretary Canningsaid, he merely rose to answer one or two questions which had been put to him by the noble lord opposite, before the debate went any farther. Looking from the period at which the Spanish government left Seville, to the surrender of Cadiz, the noble lord had asked, whether sir W. A'Court, during that time, had acted upon instructions, or upon his own personal discretion. The answer was, that sir W. A'Court had acted, in some degree, upon both. Government had endeavoured to foresee every case which was likely to arise, and had furnished sir W. A'Court with instructions, in every such case, how to act; but that gentleman had also been made fully aware, that if circumstances should arise which the caution of ministers had not enabled them to foresee, the greatest confidence was placed upon his personal discretion, and he had been apprised that, supposing any case of a new and unprecedented nature to occur, the ' safest course for him would be to repair to Gibraltar, and either remain there until he should receive instructions, or proceed to any other spot at which his services I might seem to be required. It so happened, that none of the cases foreseen by government did occur, and that a case did occur—upon which he should not dwell now, because he did not mean, in the present stage, at all to argue the question. A case did occur, which no wisdom of man could have foreseen; namely, the deposition, for a limited period, of the king. Sir W. A'Court, certainly, had not been prepared for this event; and it would be rather a high demand upon the sagacity of ministers, to say, that they should have anticipated it: under such circumstances, sir William, of course, acted for the time upon his own discretion. It was true that sir W. 204 A'Court's continuance for a short period at Seville had been misconstrued by a factious party at that place, and that they had attempted to make him an instrument in their hands: but, when the noble lord stated this, he ought to have added, that he had refused to become the instrument that was desired. On quitting Seville, sir W. A'Court had made it known to government that he should remain as near Cadiz as he could. He had gone to San Lucar, and from thence to Gibraltar; and had at once intimated at home, on his leaving the seat of the Spanish government, that there were two cases in which, if he had no instructions, he should act forthwith upon his own view—that, if he received any notice that his presence in Cadiz would conduce to the personal safety of the king, he should proceed there; and that he should take the same course, unless he was instructed to the contrary, if he heard that the king was restored to the functions of government. Instructions, however, had reached sir W. A'Court; and when the proper time came, he and his colleagues should be ready to justify that instruction which forbad sir W. A'Court to put himself into a blockaded place. The blame of that course, if it was blameable, belonged to himself and his friends. The course, such as it was, they were ready to sustain and to justify. But he thought that, before the debate went any further, it was right that sir W. A'Court should, upon that point, be entirely exonerated.
§ Mr. Sturges Bournesaid, that if the British Government had been guilty of the breach of neutrality which the noble lord would ascribe to them, he thought they should not only have heard of it at home, but it would have been loudly proclaimed abroad; yet, strange to say, this was the first intimation he had heard of such a charge. He had expected the noble lord would not have confined himself to a general charge, but would have pointed out the particular instances upon which he founded his accusation, and then he should have been able to follow him. The country would, at least, give the government credit for having prevented a war, which would have gone from one end of Europe, probably, to the other, and brought England into the contest. That fact was absolutely certain, with the greater proportion of the Spanish population. But it was worth while to examine a little further the circumstances under 205 which this country would have been compelled to go into action, if she had interfered with an armed force. Had we gone to war for Spain, we must have acted either as principals or as auxiliaries. As principals, no one had ever contemplated our engaging in the contest; and as auxiliaries, who was it that we should have been acting with? With Abisbal, Morillo, and Ballasteros. Would England have been contented to see her troops led on by such generals as these? What her fate would have been if she had, it was not very difficult to determine; and as regarded the resignation by the Spaniards of the chief command, it would be recollected, that even under the duke of Wellington, so late in the Peninsular contest as after the battle of Salamanca, when that great general had delivered Portugal, was still in the midst of victory, and the Spanish government was ready to invest him with the direction of its armies, Ballasteros, on that very account alone, abandoned the cause of his country; and his defection at that time was not a matter of indifference for the English commander was crippled immediately, and general Soult had wintered in the south of Spain instead of the duke of Wellington. It was an obvious case, that nothing could have been more dangerous than a war under such circumstances and with such commanders. There was, in fact, but one opinion on the subject throughout the country, and it was in vain for him to dwell upon it.—He should now come to the charges brought by the noble lord against his majesty's government and sir W. A'Court; and never in his life had he been more surprised than at the instances which the noble lord had selected in support of his arguments. The first charge was, that sir W. A'Court had not proceeded at once to Cadiz, and this was considered a proof of a violation of neutrality. But let the House consider that sir W. A'Court was accredited to the king of Spain, at Seville. There he ceased to be king, and there, consequently, sir William's credentials fell to the ground. This rather appeared to him the very reverse of the suspicion which was charged upon him. The king was deposed for a lime and during that period sir W. A'Court had no authority; for whilst the one ceased to be king, the other ceased to be accredited. It appeared to him that nothing could have been more wise than for sir W. A'Court to have gone to Gibraltar.—The 206 next charge was the advice given by sir W. A'Court to a distinguished Spanish officer, general Alava; but he could not see with what justice that could be made an accusation; for, even according to the noble lord's own shewing, that advice was given in a private capacity, and not as a minister of Great Britain. The third charge, however, was of a still more extraordinary nature. It was actually that this country had permitted the blockade of Cadiz. And where was it laid down that a neutral power had authority to prevent one nation from blockading the ports of another? And was it we, of all people, who were to strike so readily at the right of blockade—we who had been so notorious for the rigid enforcement of it These, as it seemed to him, were the three grounds, or at least the three principal ones, upon which the noble lord had moved for the production of most important documents; namely, that the secret instructions of the King to his ministers plenipotentiary, should be laid before the House of Commons, and, through the House of Commons, before the eyes of all Europe. For himself, he thought there was not the slightest case made out for production of such documents.—The right hon. gentleman then went on to vindicate the proceedings of the right hon. foreign secretary from any imputation of unfairness to the cortes, or of partiality for the interests of their opponents. It was difficult to conceive how any such charge could be made against them, when, throughout all the transactions of that momentous period, the advice which had been communicated from the British Government to that of Spain, by sir W. A'Court, had been given without any contemporaneous communication with the French party. That the advice was sound—that it was wisely given—subsequent events had fully proved. Most unfortunate had it turned out for Spain, and many of those concerned, that their advice had not been taken If it had been taken, no man who heard him could doubt that Spain would have been enabled to retain a freer constitution than at present she could hope for. The proposals of his Majesty's ministers had failed of success, and the results were but too well known. Yet though their mediation was rejected, that did not preclude the interposition of sir W. A'Court, upon the occurrence of any opportunity in which his services were 207 likely to be useful. Accordingly, up to the last moment, he had used his best efforts to induce the Spanish Government to avoid war. But they ought to consider what was the situation of the British Government in the mean time. In preserving that neutrality which reflected so much honour on the wisdom of their councils, had they no obstacle to overcome? Was it nothing to have to resist the solicitations of one belligerent who had beset them for the and of their interference, and that, too, at a time when the general feeling at home might be assumed, from particular demonstrations, to be strongly opposed to that neutrality? Difficult as were the duties of that station which his right hon. friend now filled, at any time, and peculiarly difficult as they were at that particular time, they were not a little aggravated by the obstacles to which he had referred. What strength must have been required to hold the scales even between the two parties, when there was thrown into one of them, this almost overpowering weight of opinion! At the very time that the noble lord was expressing, his dissatisfaction at the treatment of Spain by the English government, the French had manifested against them the same kind of uneasiness and discontent. What better proof could there be that the conduct of his right hon. friend was just such as, for the best interests of his own country, could be wished—that he had turned neither to the right nor to the left—that he had gone forward in that honest and manly course which would be his fullest justification with the House, and the subject of his praise in time to come? In the absence of all reasonable ground for the motion of the noble lord, he would beg leave to move as an amendment, to leave out of the motion all the words after the word "that," and to substitute these words—"This House is duly sensible of the advantages derived to this country from that neutrality in the war between France and Spain, which his majesty at the beginning of that war declared to have been his determination to observe, and which appears to this House, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, scrupulously and inviolably maintained."
§ Lord Nugentrose to reply. He said that the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down had mistaken much that had fallen from him; and it appeared to him, that if the right hon. gentleman disapproved of the motion, the most obvious course would 208 have been to have met it with a direct negative: but he had no right, he admitted, to complain of the mode in which any gentleman might please to express his opposition to any opinion of his own. From the remarks of the right hon. gentleman upon the motion, he seemed to suppose that the offer of the English court was simply an offer resting upon the disposition of the Spanish government for its success, the condition being merely that of altering the constitution. Certainly, he could not speak with the certainty of official information, because the papers were not now before the House; but, unless he had been egregiously misinformed, the offer made by the right hon. the foreign secretary to the Spanish government was of a three-fold nature. The first part of that offer was immediately assented to by the cortes; the second was of a kind which, consistently with national honour could not be subscribed by the cortes; the third, consistently with the constitution which they were sworn to maintain, could not be accepted. The recognition of the independence of the South American States was the first of these propositions; and, as he understood, it was instantly conceded by the cortes. The second was to exact a pledge from them that no injury should be done to the person of the king, or of any one of the royal family. As no violence had at that time been done to the king of Spain or to any one of his family, it would have ill behoved the government of Spain to have given a pledge-which, as it presumed danger to the king's person, was inconsistent with their honour. The third proposition required a promise from the cortes, which this government must have known it was impossible for the cortes to give. It required, that the next cortes which should be called should consent to modify the constitution, according to the suggestions of the British government. Now, he would put it to this House, or to any other parliament which had ever sat in it—he would put it to any constituent body that had ever represented the rights of a free state—if the cortes then acting could have pledged themselves to any act to be done by a constituent body not even in existence? When that offer was made, the Spanish court was at Seville;. and upon the retiring to Cadiz, sir W. A'Court removed first to San Lucar and then to Gibraltar. In absence of the papers they were left to conclude that he withdrew from Seville as soon as the offer 209 was made; but, for three weeks after the departure of the Spanish court, sir W. A' Court remained in Seville, while it was in the occupation of the French army and the Servile party, until the news arrived of the blockading of Cadiz. It was then, for the first time, that sir W. A'Court vouchsafed an answer to the representations of the cortes, as if he was undetermined what to do—as if he had waited for an accident to move him; and this accident, which no sagacity of his could have foreseen turned up. "See now," he then said, with an eagerness very unlike his former delay, "how hopeless is your case—the French troops are in possession of your territory—French ships have blockaded Cadiz, and are watching the mouths of your harbours—nothing remains to you but timely submission.'' This did not seem like the conduct, which, in these circumstances of political adversity, should have been observed with respect to the cortes and the Spanish people. As nothing that had offered in the course of the debate had shaken the grounds upon which he rested his motion he was bound in duty to divide the House upon it. Should it be rejected—and he was free to own that he had reason to expect that it would be rejected by a formidable majority—he would then move another resolution, upon which it was not his intention to offer a single remark, still less to divide the House. He merely wished to have his opinions upon this momentous subject recorded upon the Journals.
§ The question being put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question," the House divided: Ayes 30: Noes 171. Majority against lord Nugent's Motion 141.
| List of the Minority. | |
| Baring, A. | Ingilby, sir W. |
| Burdertt, sir F. | Maberly, J |
| Benyon, B. | Maberly, W. L. |
| Brougham, H. | Mackintosh, sir J. |
| Campbell, hon. J. | Marjoribanks, S. |
| Cavendish, H. | Palmer, C. F. |
| Denison, W. J. | Robarts, col. |
| Denman, T. | Russell, lord J. |
| Ellice, E. | White, L. |
| Grattan J. | Wall, B. |
| Graham, S. | Wood, M. |
| Hume, J. | Wilkins, W. |
| Hutchinson, hon. C. H. | Wilson sir R. |
| Hamilton, lord A. | TELLERS. |
| Honywood, F. | Hobhouse, J. C. |
| Hurst, R. | Nugent, lord |
Mr. Sturges Bourne'smotion being then put; namely, "That this House is duly sen- 210 sible of the advantages derived to this country from that neutrality in the war between France and Spain, which his majesty, at the commencement of that war declared his determination to observe, and which appears to this House to have been, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, scrupulously and inviolably maintained," Lord Nugent proposed, by way of amendment, to leave out all the words after This House," in order to add the words "is of opinion that the system of strict neutrality which his majesty determined to observe in the late unjust war undertaken by France against Spain, and which a consideration of the financial state of this country alone induced the House to approve, has not been maintained in a spirit consistent with his majesty's avowed intentions, with the just expectations of this House, or with the honour of the country:—That, while the House laments the event of that war, as dangerous to the rights of all independent states, it is of opinion that his majesty's continued desire to mediate in behalf of Spain has not been carried into effect:—That, deeply impressed as the House is with the importance of manifesting the sincerity of those professions, it has reason to apprehend that an effect hostile and injurious to the constitutional government of Spain, and encouraging to its enemies, was produced by the conduct of his majesty's minister plenipotentiary, in abandoning at Seville the government to which he was accredited; and that by his continued absence from the seat of that government, after its removal to Cadiz, opportunities were neglected of proffering with effect those good offices which his majesty had professed himself ready at any time to renew, and which might have averted calamities so deplorable to Great Britain as the successful invasion of the rights of a free country, the occupation by the French of the capital, fortresses and great commercial ports of Spain, and the establishment of a French influence destructive of the balance of power, and highly prejudicial to the best interests of this country," instead thereof.—Mr. Sturges Bourne's motion was agreed to, without a division.