§ The House having resolved itself into a committee of supply,
§ Sir George Clerkrose, to bring forward the Navy Estimates for the present year. He said, that after the great reductions which had already taken place in our naval department, he did not apprehend that any further ones were likely to be proposed. The vote called for this year was about 320,000l. more than had been taken last, because it was necessary to 168 make some small addition to our present force. He anticipated no objection to this from the gentlemen on the other side, because their complaint for some time had been rather that our naval establishment was too low. The unsettled state of some parts of the world to which the commerce of England was now, with every prospect of advantage, extending itself, would fully account for the trifling additional expense which was contemplated; and in addition to this consideration, there was the probability that the piratical depredations in the West Indies, which now were entirely stopped, would recommence if our strength in that quarter was withdrawn; and the necessity for maintaining our power in the Mediterranean, as long as the present disputes existed between Turkey and her Greek dependencies. With respect to the petition which had been presented by the hon. member for Aberdeen, the subject was already under the consideration of the board of admiralty, who were not blind to its importance. The fact was, in some measure, that from the great exigencies of the late war, it had been found necessary to build ships without those precautions which would have been used under circumstances of full leisure. Timber had been used, in many cases, which was not sufficiently seasoned. We were now, however, using every means to avoid the evil to which the hon. member had alluded. Ships were built under cover; the timber employed was perfectly dry; and the coal-tar—as to the harmlessness of which he had understood the hon. member to be satisfied—was made use of, and, as was believed, with good effect. Independent of these precautions, an experiment was now making, whether the dry rot might not be prevented by immersing the wood in salt water before it was worked up; and he begged to state, that the comptroller of the navy, whose information upon the matter was much better than his own, would be fully prepared to answer, if necessary, all the allegations in the hon. member for Aberdeen's petition. The hon. baronet concluded by stating, that the extra charge of 320,000l. incurred, was to meet the cost of 4,000 additional seamen (making our establishment, from 25,000 men, 29,000, including a force of 9,000 royal marines), together with certain expenses arising out of the increased price of provisions; and by moving "That a sum not exceeding 885,950l. be granted 169 for wages of the said 29,000 for 13 lunar months, at the rate of 2l. 7s. per man per month."
§ Mr. Warrewished to put a question with respect to the arrangements respecting the preventive service, which had established a sort of gendarmerie upon our shores. The high duties imposed in time of war were, now that France and England were at peace, operating as such a bounty upon contraband trade as no vigilance could withstand, and producing actually a regular guerilla warfare between the government force and the smugglers. We had now no fewer than 1,700 men employed in the preventive service, patrolling upon our coast. He wished also to know if, in case of any addition being made to the force appointed to the coast blockade, the additional forces would be put under the same commands as at present. There was one ship of war stationed in the Downs to watch over a line of coast so extensive, that the officer who there held control was either on horseback or in the boat, night and day continually, for weeks together. This he might do from his zeal and anxiety to complete a system of his own creation; but it was too much for the country to receive from the service of any one man. His only object, however, in rising, was, to know if any, and what portion of this additional force was to be put under the command of the gallant officer to whom he had alluded.
§ Sir G. Clerksaid, that it certainly was the intention of government to continue the system of the preventive service as at present established, which, notwithstanding the remarks of the hon. member, had operated with most complete success. There had been one violent and bloody affray upon the coast of Kent, which had been much dwelt on by the opponents of the system; but it was merely the last desperate effort of the smugglers in that part, to defend their unlawful occupation against the encroachments of the preventive service. It was very true that captain M'Culloch had his whole heart in the success of the system, of which he was the contriver, and that his duties were of a very weighty kind, his command reaching in extent from Chichester, westward, to the Isle of Sheppy, eastward. Of the additional force now asked for, 630 seamen were to be placed under the superintendence and direction of that officer. The narrowness of the channel in this 170 division made the running of spirits more easy than in other places. But he could safely say, that the greater part of the smuggling now carried on took place without the limits of the coast blockade. He admitted, that the high duties on spirits, rendered necessary by the large amount of taxes which must, of necessity be raised, offered a great inducement for smuggling, and therefore the preventive service naturally operated less effectively in those parts of the coast which offered the greatest facilities for the introduction of spirits.
Colonel Daviesdoubted the last proposition of the gallant officer, that the amount of taxes could be augmented by such enormous duties on foreign spirits. And whether the surest mode of augmentation would not be considerably to reduce the duties; which would also enable them to get rid of that most expensive system of coast-blockade. By returns for which he had moved last session, it appeared that the expense was no less than 600,000l. in the collection of that branch of the revenue only. It was his intention, before long, to show how the revenue might be benefited, and the establishment reduced, by the adoption of a more reasonable policy. It was in vain to look for the extinction of smuggling to the preventive service. Those who violated the laws by the introduction of contraband goods considered that there was no moral offence; consequently there was no direct dread of ignominy in the punishments which they had to fear. There was nothing so prolific of crime (the laws concerning poachers always excepted) as the laws which went to the prevention of smuggling. As to the interests of the revenue, he pledged himself on a future day to prove that they were materially injured by the continuance of the present high duties.
§ Mr. Humesaid, he was not satisfied with the addition of the navy, nor did he like the mode in which the accounts were laid before the House. It was impossible to choose any method in which mischief would be more likely to arise, than the combining of the preventive service, with the regular means of defence for the country. The House was kept from knowing the limits of either branch of the service; and if it were not so, it was next to impossible to ascertain the expense of collecting the revenue, and consequently, they were without the power of deliberat- 171 ing upon the propriety of keeping up particular kinds of duties: they were proceeding altogether upon an erroneous principle. Formerly the naval estimates were kept entirely distinct from the charges for collecting the revenue. The naval officers on their different stations were at hand, and frequently assisted in the caption of smugglers. It was no advantage to the character of English seamen to be identified with the collectors of the revenue: it was calculated to lower, rather than improve them. They would be anxious, for the sake of the additional pay and the milder kind of discipline, to get into that line of the service. He was anxious the House should know what was required for the defence of the country, and the exact force that was employed in the prevention of smuggling? and he should also be glad to have specified the expense attending the coasts of Scotland and Ireland, and whether it was to continue the same or to be reduced. He should be glad to hear it stated why it was necessary in the present year, to maintain a navy of 29,000 men. He remembered very well that, in the year 1817 or 1818, when ministers were urged to reduce the then existing establishment, a noble lord, now no more, used to say, "Recollect the situation in which we are placed: we cannot come back to the peace establishment of 1814, the affairs of the country are not yet settled;" but he also remembered that the noble lord invariably held out the prospect that, when that tranquillity should be established which he expected would have been the result of his measures, then a considerable reduction would be made; and now he could see no reason why this augmentation should take place. Last year the House consented to an increase of 4,000 men, in consequence of the situation in which the country was supposed to be placed. At that time a confidence was reposed in ministers, because no one could say how soon hostilities might have been commenced; the House were then ignorant of the intentions of ministers, and it was impossible to say how soon the country might be called upon to arm. But now things were quite different. Peace had been restored in Spain. The South American provinces were likely to remain undisturbed and unmolested. The manifesto of the president of the United States has set that question at rest. Thanks to him for that—but not to us. If we had had 172 the manliness to speak out, much that had passed would have been prevented. But we were afraid to speak out: we were afraid of the Holy Alliance, who seemed determined to extend their arbitrary power over all the countries of Europe. But, if we were afraid to speak out our opinions and, if ministers had made up their minds that come what may, the interests of the country must be attended to; and, if they were still of opinion, that those interests were best consulted by preserving peace, then he would say, that unless the government were in possession of some information (and the House had seen how deficient they had sometimes been in that respect) which they had not disclosed, there could be no necessity whatever for maintaining such a fleet. If, indeed, they had any such information, let them speak out boldly, and not talk of the paltry necessity of a coast blockade. He was as anxious as any man to see our navy on a respectable footing; but before it was further augmented, he should like to hear some good reason assigned. It was irreconcileable in those who had proclaimed the prosperous state of the country, and the probability of that prosperity not being disturbed, to call for this augmentation of men. He considered it a wise policy to have preserved peace, and he wished, by husbanding our resources, to place the country in a condition best calculated to secure the continuance of peace, or to vindicate its interests and character, in the event of its being attacked by any foreign power. What motive, what apprehension, justified the proposed increase, he was at a loss to discover; as yet no reason had been given by those who proposed it. England at this moment had more ships and more men employed in her navy, than all the other powers of the world could, if united, furnish. Surely, then, the country had a right to know upon what grounds an increased expenditure, to such a considerable amount, was called for. The fact was, that from the system lately carried into effect in the management of the navy, parliament might pass resolutions, and the Board of Admiralty might issue orders, but it was impossible to get men. That difficulty had been felt very considerably for some time past; and, in consequence, ships commissioned for foreign service, had been detained for weeks, not having been able to obtain their complement of seamen. What was the reason of this dis- 173 inclination to enter a service once the pride and boast of the British people? He was convinced that it proceeded from the regulations that had recently been acted upon with regard to that branch of the public service. By the tendency of those regulations seamen found themselves shut out from even the hope of promotion; no matter how distinguished and exemplary their services. All hope and energy was destroyed in that class of officers, from whom formerly our most experienced, and most valuable officers were taken. It was, however, but fair to say, that some deviation had, within the last three months, taken place on that head, and that some old officers had been appointed to ships. But the principle must be altogether changed, if the character of our navy was to be maintained. We must get rid altogether of that radical evil, which confined promotion to rank and influence. It was formerly the pride and the boast of every man who entered the navy, that he had open to him all the gradations of promotion—that talent and service were sure to conduct to reward and distinction. We were wont to contrast the character of our service with those of France and Spain, where no man was promoted unless he could boast high connexions at court, or could display a certain number of quarterings on his escutcheon. And yet, that very principle of exclusion which was then so much deprecated, was now acted upon, and constituted the radical defect in the management of our navy. Would it be believed that there were actually Orders in Council existing at this moment, which disqualified certain classes of officers from ever looking to promotion? He held a copy of one of them in his hand, and before he read it, he took upon himself to say, that if twelve naval officers were chosen by lot out of 500 in our service, eleven out of that twelve would declare, that such a principle of management must speedily bring utter ruin to that valuable branch of service. The order to which he alluded, was dated the 19th of January 1803. It was provided by that order, that no master or other warrant officer should look forward to promotion beyond that grade, with the exception of the schoolmaster. It was most strange that the schoolmaster, a man from his pursuits not devoted to the duties of a sailor, was the person in whose favour the exception was made, while masters, quarter-masters, and seamen, expert and conversant with 174 all the necessary qualifications, were excluded. For them, no matter what was the nature of their deserts or services, there was no hope; and yet that had not been the opinion or the practice of some of the most distinguished officers in that branch of service. What had been the conduct of lord Howe with regard to that description of officers? That meritorious and highly distinguished commander actually promoted his master, on the victory of June, 1794, acknowledging that the success of the action was more to be attributed to the master than to himself. In what a situation should we find ourselves, if, by acting on a principle of exclusion, except where rank and connexion interposed, we closed every prospect of bettering their condition, and of obtaining promotion in the profession to which they had devoted themselves, to the great body of British seamen! It had been the subject of deep regret with the country at large, that a principle so opposed to those proud feelings which, in former times, had given an impulse to our naval arms, was so generally brought into practice. These were the practices which demanded the consideration of parliament, and the reform of which would give greater efficiency to our naval force, than any resolutions which went to increase the numerical amount. Remove those radical defects, and with 20,000 seamen, well officered, and the corresponding number of ships, the country would have an efficient navy, fitted for any exigency. He believed, that that principle of exclusion, as affecting warrant officers, was confined to the naval service, and was not acted upon in the army. Was there any bar to a serjeant being made a commissioned officer? He understood there was none; and that it was the practice, when such a person signally distinguished himself, to promote him. Upon what principle, then, was the warrant officer in the navy to have all hopes of preferment shut out, while promotion was open to military non-commissioned officers? These were considerations which must be brought before that House, until a complete change in the system was effected. Were that change effected, and proper advantages held out to seamen, in place of difficulty in making up the complement of men, numbers would flock to the standard of that first arm of our defence, whenever the public exigencies required an increase. But administered as it new was, with their hopes 175 and expectations paralysed, the navy was unhappily looked upon as a kind of forlorn hope. Many causes contributed to produce that impression: first, the abominable system of being compelled to serve for life; next, that of impressment, the remembrance of the dreadful effects of which (though not acted upon in peace) it was impossible to efface. Then came the system of discipline, which placed at the discretiun of unfledged boys, the power of flogging any man they pleased, without the intervention of a court-martial. He felt quite aware of the difficulty that attended the discussion of such a question; but, whatever were the difficulties, it would become the duty of that House to grapple with them. He must repeat, that he saw no ground for the proposed increase; and though he knew that many members of that House (himself equally prepossessed) felt a strong disinclination to reduce such a favourite branch of service; yet, under all the circumstances, though he stood alone, he would, unless good reasons were assigned, divide the House. Better at once agree to a naval war establishment, than to go on from year to year, in passing resolutions for a progressive augmentation. He should therefore meet the proposition with an Amendment, that 25,000 men be substituted for the 29,000 proposed, in the grant before the committee.
§ Sir George Clerkobserved, in reference to the statement of the hon. member for Aberdeen, that in the year 1817, his majesty's ministers had held out the hope of still further reduction in the naval branch, he could positively say the hon. member was mistaken. Indeed, there was no sentiment more general in that House, and with the gentlemen on the other side, who generally voted with the hon. member, than the apprehension that at that period the naval force was reduced lower than the public service warranted. It was, in fact, reduced below the state in which it stood at the hon. gentleman's favourite epoch, the year 1792. The hon. gentleman had assumed, that no reason had or could be assigned for the augmentation at present proposed, except the demands of the coast blockade. Now, it was in the recollection of the committee, that in proposing the resolution, he had adverted to the necessity of such an augmentation, from the state of affairs which, without any prospect of hostilities on our part, naturally grew out of the condition 176 of the South American continent, our own colonies in the West Indies, and the actual war waging between Greece and Turkey. It was impossible for so formidable a power as Great Britain to allow the quarrels arising between inferior belligerents to interrupt her merchandise in the other hemisphere; and as large a force as the whole of the addition now asked, would be less than was required to restrain the petty piracies within the West-India seas. The difficulty of getting men for the ships, he was happy to inform the hon. member, was only imaginary—no ship had suffered any considerable delay on that account. As to the impressment which bound men to the service for life, the hon. member must be ignorant of the regulation which limited the period of service, in time of peace, to three years. When the exigencies of the state required it, men must be compelled to serve in the navy. In referring to the orders in council, the hon. member had neglected to quote a very important exception, which opened the line of promotion to masters who should distinguish themselves. The fact was, that no class of naval officers was so valuable as the masters, and therefore all that could be done in the fair regulations of the service, was done to retain them in their situations; but this was not without duly warning them, that in accepting the master's warrant, they excluded themselves from the direct line of promotion. The rules of the service gave as much facility to a foremast-man to advance himself as ever. As to unfledged boys enjoying too much power in the service, the present regulations did away all grounds for any such complaint. No midshipman could pass for lieutenant, unless he was nineteen years of age; and no officer could obtain a captain's commission unless he had served two years as lieutenant. This was all that he thought it necessary to say at present. If the hon. member chose to make the other matters of his speech the subject of a specific motion, of course he was at liberty so to do; but, after the triumphant answer which had been given to him in the course of last session by his gallant friend behind him (sir G. Cockburn), it was not very likely that he would return to the attack. [Cheers].
Mr. Bernalsaid, that if those cheers were intended to signalize the triumph of the gallant officer over his hon. friend, that opinion was allowable to those who 177 thought with the gallant officer; but if they went beyond that, and presumed that the House or the service would be satisfied, he could assure them, from the little experience he had had, that no speech could be more unsatisfactory to those who were chiefly interested; namely, the officers of the navy. He was aware that the present regulations prevented raw boys from the indiscreet exercise of power, as commanders, in a greater degree than before, and he believed that the condition of the service was a thousand times better than ever it had been; but still there was much to correct, especially in regard to the principle upon which appointments were at present obtained. He could not, however, altogether agree with his hon. friend, that there was no cause of dread, and no reason for any alteration in our naval equipments, arising from the unsettled situation of the World. On the contrary, it appeared to him, that the political horizon was full of signs and indications of approaching danger. He was therefore willing to leave the naval preparations of the country to the discretion of ministers, as he had all his life approached that subject with the greatest delicacy and caution.
§ Sir George Cockburnsaid, he would not appeal to either of the hon. members, to know whether the speech which he had had the honour of making to the House in the course of last session was satisfactory or not to the officers in the service. There were several able and experienced officers in the House: if they were prepared to say, that there was any thing in the remarks which he had then made which was disagreeable to the service generally, let them get up and assert it manfully. He himself was intimate with some officers of the service, and probably had had as much experience to guide him, as to the general opinion of what he then said, as either of the hon. members. What he had then advanced, he now repeated; namely, that while the road of promotion was kept open to merit and enterprise, however obscure the station and origin of the parties, the navy would feel no jealousy whatever at seeing persons of rank and condition promoted among them. Let not the committee believe that the employment of officers of high rank and connexions was the source of any mean or undue jealousy in that service. On the contrary, the navy felt proud in having such men in the profession—they felt 178 that it re-acted on all the members of the service. It was gratifying, it was useful, to have naval officers in that House [a laugh, and hear, hear!]. Never was the British navy in a higher state of efficiency than it was at that moment. Never were our ships, with reference to a peace establishment, better manned. Never were our officers more capable of sustaining and extending its character and its glory; never were more pains taken that men in command should possess the qualifications that fitted them for an able discharge of their duties. There was a mischievous practice of those good old times to which the hon. member alluded, which now existed no longer, of boys in their mothers drawing-rooms being put on a ship's books, and thus serving their time without ever being at sea. It was in the memory of many persons, that in the American war, we had post-captains of seventeen years of age; but now no man could be made post till he was of proper age. Then it was in the power of an admiral to make his son, or his nephew, a lieutenant at sixteen or seventeen years of age; but now there was a difficult examination to go through, and if the candidate was not sufficiently skilled in navigation to sail the ship without the assistance of the master, he could not be a made lieutenant. With regard to the masters, of the impediments to whose promotion the hon. member complained, it was to be observed, that no other officer could become so at once; a lieutenant could not be made, nor could pursers or surgeons attain their respective ranks, without going through the previous steps in the royal navy; but a master, if he had sailed in a merchant ship and was competent, might be made a master at once; and on that account it was thought but just that to that rank he should be restricted, unless he distinguished himself. With respect to discipline, the hon. member should not mislead the House by asserting that boys might flog the men; that power was in the hands of the captain only; and as it was a power necessary, the House would see that it could not be lodged in more proper hands. When the committee bore in mind the number and the manner in which men were congregated on board ships, and the positive necessity of enforcing obedience and regularity, they would at once feel that such a power must be lodged somewhere, and they would find, that every vigilance was exerted to prevent any abuse.
§ Sir F. Ommanneysupported the resolution.
Captain Maberlystated, that whether he looked to the assurances of the Speech from the throne, which held out hopes of the continuance of peace with foreign powers, or to the states of South America, now assuming an organised form of government, and therefore likely to be relieved from those disputes with neutrals, in which infant communities struggling for freedom were likely to be involved, he saw no ground for the proposed augmentation. Spain, without the assistance of a foreign power, could not renew war in South America. Our commercial intercourse, which had perhaps in the disturbance of revolution suffered, was now to be superintended by consuls, sent out for that special service. The natural expectation was, therefore, that the interference of naval officers would not be necessary as heretofore. What reason, therefore, existed for such an increase? The finance committee, whose reports were on the table, never contemplated a naval peace establishment above 19,000 men.
§ Mr. Humeasked, why ministers had allowed six British ships of war to remain in the Tagus, doing nothing, while there was only one at Lima?—Let the Board of Admiralty answer that. What cause was there at present for an extension of our naval force in South America? While the South American colonies were in confusion, and privateers were fitted out from those colonies, to attack the trade of all countries—then, where were our ships? Then, indeed, there might have been some cause for apprehension; but then, no efforts were made. Now, that those states were independent;—now that their independence was acknowledged to a certain degree, what fear could there be of their ships meddling with our trade at sea? As to the question, respecting the promotion of masters in the navy, he readily admitted, that if they were not qualified, they ought not to be promoted, and allowed to take the situation of lieutenants. But the order in council to which he had alluded, declared that they were not eligible even to be examined. If there was an order in council which stated that if masters were meritorious they should be promoted, let the gallant officer produce it, and he would not say another word on the subject. In all that he had said, his only object had been to uphold the navy, by advising that pre-eminent 180 merit should always meet with its reward; which, if matters continued to be conducted as they had lately been conducted, it would not do. He had not met with a single naval officer who was not of opinion with himself respecting it. He begged the hon. baronet to put the question to any naval officers except those who were looking out for personal advantages; and he would soon ascertain the impression that had been made upon the navy, by what had fallen from the hon. baronet last session, respecting the expediency of promoting young men of rank and family. The general belief certainly was, that the hon. baronet had said, that when a young man of rank and family left the comforts of his home, and engaged in all the fag of the naval service, government were bound to promote him. If the gallant officer had said, that a certain proportion of such persons ought to be promoted, he (Mr. H.) would not object to it; but he could show that a much greater than the proper proportion had been so promoted. He thought that he proved himself the best friend to the administration, when he pointed out what appeared to him to be abuses, in order that they might either be explained or corrected. To return, however, to the main question. Nothing that had fallen from any hon. member had altered his opinion with respect to it. His majesty had told parliament, in the speech from the throne, that there never was a greater prospect of continued tranquillity; that all the foreign relations with this country appeared to be of the most amicable character. Why, then, was there an increase of 4,000 men in the proposed grant? He would take the sense of the House on the resolution; convinced as he was, that while it was our duty to maintain an adequate navy, it was also our duty to abstain from extravagant expenditure, and to husband our resources until the arrival of a time when we might be required to avail ourselves of them to their fullest extent.
§ Sir G. Cockburnwished still more particularly to deny the bold misrepresentation which had been made of the opinions which he had delivered in the last session. What he had most distinctly stated was, not that every young nobleman, or other man of family, ought to be promoted such an assertion would have been most absurd. The whole of his argument had been, that if it were proved that sufficient attention 181 was paid to merit and service, the navy would not be jealous at seeing men of rank and family not only in their profession, but get on in it. As to the advice given him by the hon. gentleman, not to listen to those naval officers about him, who, expressed themselves satisfied with the proceedings of the naval administration, he might return that advice, and recommend the hon. gentleman, not to listen to those naval officers by whom he was addressed, and who, he might depend upon it, were, on the other hand, dissatisfied. He repeated, that, what he had said last session had been most boldly misrepresented, and he confidently appealed on the subject to the hon. members who had heard him.
Mr. Secretary Canningconfirmed the accuracy of what had just fallen from his hon. and gallant friend. His hon. and gallant friend had never said—no man in his senses ever could think of saying—that the claim of individuals of rank and family to promotion in the naval service was a matter of course. His hon. and gallant friend had said nothing like it. The substance of what his hon. and gallant friend had last session said was, that it was for the good of the naval service, that it was for the good of the whole profession, and even that it was for the I good of that part of the profession which bad nothing but its services to depend; upon, that its general respectability should be maintained by a due mixture in it of men distinguished by birth as well as by service; and that, provided a due proportion of promotion was given to merit and service, those who by their merit and service had earned that promotion, would look without grudging on the promotion of the others. And why? Because the character of every individual in the service materially depended on the general character of the service. In the naval service, as, happily in all classes in England, eminence must be combined of self-created merit, with original claims. The observation of his hon. and gallant friend had been, not that an invidious preference ought to be held out to induce young men of rank and family to enter the navy; but that, without some promise of reward, it could not be expected that they would leave the ease and indulgence of their homes, and that they could be allured to do so only by such a partial expectation of promotion, as would at the same time not be inconsistent with the 182 just expectations of those, whose only hope of distinction arose from their merit and services. Some just excitement ought to be resorted to, to obtain the co-operation of those who, instead of injuring the navy by causing a proscription of talent and services, were the cause of a great good, by the sentiment which they diffused throughout it, and by rendering it a profession not only of men of gallantry and of skill, but of gentlemen. With regard to what had fallen from the hon. member for Aberdeen, respecting the inexpediency of any increase of our naval force, at a time when his majesty, in his speech from the throne, had expressed himself so strongly as to the probability of the continuance of peace, he begged to say a few words. Undoubtedly, there never was a time in which his majesty's government were more thoroughly justified, by the assurances of our foreign relations, in looking for a continuance of peace than the present moment. But it was equally true, that there never was a time in which, so many points of importance were agitated; and in which it became the British government more vigilantly to take care that the continuance of peace should depend, not only on the dispositions we experienced, and on the assurances we received, on the part of foreign countries, but on the conviction impressed on all parts of the world, that we were able and ready to maintain our rights by war. It was impossible to look at the three great naval stations; he meant the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and now South America, and to contemplate the possible occurrence of events which might render a vigorous interference on our part necessary, and not be convinced, not only that it was the duty of the Admiralty to, take care, that, in that event, the naval force of England on those stations should be equal to that of any other nation, friendly or otherwise; but that it might be necessary to provide means, by which the naval force of this country, on any of those stations, should outweigh that of any other nation; and, for that purpose, that there should be other stations from, which additional strength might be at pleasure derived. If any person would calculate the strength which would be necessary to meet the demands to which he had alluded, in the event of their occurrence, that person would find, that the proposed vote was not only not beyond that necessity, but that its limited nature 183 afforded abundant proof, that the state of the world gave his majesty's government additional confidence in the continuance of peace; without which confidence such a proposition would be insufficient.
§ Mr. Humeobserved, that after what had fallen from the right hon. gentleman, he would not press his amendment to a division.
§ The original resolution was then put, and agreed to.