§ No. 1.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received September 24th.
§ (Extract.) Paris, Sept. 21, 1822.
§ I had a long discussion with M. de Villèle yesterday, on the relations of this government with Spain. It appears, that for a considerable time past, I believe since the alarm of infectious fever in Spain, the French government have been collecting the troops in the southern departments of France. They have not, however, on the immediate frontier, a larger body of men than are sufficient for the performance of the duties of the "Cordon Sanitaire," so long as that precaution is necessary, in consequence of the prevalence of the fever in the neighbouring provinces of Spain; or than can fairly be deemed necessary for the purposes of observation of a country which is the seat of a civil war, and for the protection of the French frontier from insult, by the different parties in operation immediately on the borders.
§ M. de Villèle said, that the assembly of the Congress at the present moment, was not matter of indifference, in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain, or to that in which the two countries stood towards each other. There was no doubt that expectations were formed respecting the result of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Spain, as well in Spain as elsewhere; and that if the 905 Congress were to separate, and come to no decision on those affairs it was probable that the existing evils would be greatly aggravated, and that the two countries might be forced into a war.
§ M. de Villèle wished that the Congress should take into consideration the actual position of the French government in relation to Spain; and the hypothesis under which they might, be forced into a war; and that the four other powers of the alliance should declare what line they would each take, in case of the occurrence of any of the events which they conceived would force them to war. I told M. de Villèle that it would be quite impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any hypothetical case.
§ I should wish to receive his majesty's instructions what line I shall take, and what arguments I shall use, in case the French government should make the proposition at the Congress, which M. de Villèle has made to me, respecting a declaration by the allies.
§ No. 2.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.
§ (Extract.) Foreign Office, Sept. 27,1822.
§ If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his majesty's government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference—so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be a party.
§ No. 3.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.
§ (Extract.) Verona, Oct. 22, 1822.
§ We had a conference on Sunday night, at which the French minister, M. de Montmorency read a paper of which I inclose a copy. I imagine that each of the ministers will answer this paper. In my answer, I shall review our line of conduct since April 1820; and shall decline to engage ourselves to adopt any measure beforehand, or till we shall have a full knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries. I propose, besides, to point out, that, considering the relative position of France and Spain, it is not probable that Spain will declare against them; if they explain, as they ought, the meaning and object of their corps of observation, and make some allowance for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain in a state of revolution and civil war.
§ (Translation of Enclosure in No. 3.)—Questions addressed by the French Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain.
§ Verona, October 20th, 1822.
§ 1. In case France should find herself under 906 the necessity of recalling her minister from Madrid, and of breaking off all diplomatic relations with Spain, will the high courts be disposed to adopt the like measures, and to recall their respective missions?
§ 2. Should war break out between France and Spain, under what form and by what acts would the high powers afford to France, that moral support which would give to her measures the weight and authority of the alliance, and inspire a salutary dread into the revolutionists of all countries?
§ 3. What, in short, is the intention of the high powers as to the extent and the form of the effective assistance, ("secours matériels,") which they would be disposed to give to France, in case active interference should, on her demand, become necessary.
§ No. 4.—The Duke of Wellington to; Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received November 14th.
§ (Extract.) Verona, Nov. 5th, 1822.
§ Prince Metternich called together a conference of the five cabinet ministers of Wednesday evening, at which were delivered in answers to the demands of the French minister on the 20th ultimo, from the Russian, Austrian and Prussian ministers; and that from myself, a copy of which I inclose.
§ (Inclosure in No. 4.) Memorandum.—Answer of the Duke of Wellington to the Questions of the French Plenipotentiary.
§ Verona, October 30, 1822.
§ Since the month of April 1820, the British government have availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to his majesty's allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain.
§ Without adverting to those principles which his majesty's government must always consider the rule of their conduct, in relation to the internal affairs of other countries, they considered that to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish revolution, the system then established, or the conduct of those who have since had the management of the internal affairs of Spain might be disapproved of, any amelioration which might be desired in the Spanish system, for the sake of Spain herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain, rather than abroad; and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the character and measures of the king.
§ They considered that an interference, with a view to assist the monarch on the throne, to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishment of any other form of government or constitution, particularly by force, would, only place that monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within his reach.
§ Such an interference always appeared to the British government an unnecessary assumption 907 of responsibility; which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the king of Spain to danger, and the power or powers which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters; to enormous expenses, and final disappointment in producing any result.
§ Upon these principles his majesty has advised his allies, and has acted himself, from the month of April 1820, to the present day.
§ The protocols and other acts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, which established the union at present existing between the five powers, so happily for the world, require the most unlimited confidence and communication on the part of each; and accordingly, his majesty has never failed to communicate to his allies, and Particularly to France, every instruction which he has sent to his minister at Madrid; and all the communications made by his majesty's commands to the minister of Spain residing in London:—all in the same spirit of good-will towards, the king of Spain and the Spanish Nation.
§ It is impossible to look at the existing relations between France and Spain, adverting to what has passed from the commencement of the year 1820, to the present moment, without being sensible of the unfortunately false position in which the king of Spain is placed; and that the spirit of party in both countries, having aggravated the national antipathy which antecedent circumstances had occasioned, is in a great measure the cause of the unfortunate irritation in Spain against France, to which his excellency the minister of France has adverted. The great object of his majesty's foreign policy is, to preserve peace among nations; he feels the most anxious interest for the happiness of his Catholic majesty, and the honour of his government; and it would be his sincere desire to allay that irritation.
§ But the British government cannot but feel, that to make any declaration on any of the three points referred to by his excellency, without a previous accurate knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries, would be not only premature and unjust, but would probably be unavailing; and would, in fact, deprive his majesty of the power of discussing and deciding upon the measures of his own government in this affair hereafter, when he should be better informed. His majesty must either place himself in this painful position, or he must do, what would be equally painful to his feelings, require from his august friend and ally the king of France, that he should submit his conduct to the advice and control of his majesty.
§ His majesty's government cannot think either alternative to be necessary; but are of opinion that a review of the obvious circumstances of the situation of France, as well as Spain, will show, that whatever may be the tone assumed towards France by the ruling powers in Spain, they are not in a state to carry into execution any plan of real hostility.
§ Considering that a civil was exists in the 908 whole extent of the frontier which separates the two kingdoms; that hostile armies are in movement and in operation in every part of it; and that there is not a town or village on the French frontier which is not liable to insult and injury—there is no person who must not approve of the precaution which his most Christian majesty has taken in forming a corps of observation for the protection of his frontier, and for the preservation of the tranquility of his people.
§ His Britannic majesty sincerely wishes that this measure may be effectual in attaining the objects for which it is calculated; and that the wisdom of the French government will have induced them to explain it at Madrid, in such terms as will satisfy the government of his Catholic majesty of its necessity.
§ Such an explanation will, it is hoped, tend to allay in some degree the irritation against France; and, on the other hand, it may be hoped that some allowance will he made in France for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in the very crisis of a revolution and civil war.
§ A moment's reflection upon the relative power of the two states will show, that the real evil to which his most Christian majesty is exposed, is that resulting from the operations of the civil war on the neighbouring frontier of Spain; against which the measure which his government have adopted is best calculated to preserve him.
§ Even revolutionary madness could not calculate upon the success of a serious attack by Spain upon France, under any circumstances, which it is possible to suppose to exist at present in the latter kingdom.—But the attention of the Spanish government is now occupied by a civil war, the operations of which certainly justify the formation of a corps of observation in France; and it is not very probable that they would, at this moment, desire to break with France.
§ Neither is it to be believed that, in their present situation, they would not desire still to enjoy the advantage of that countenance to their system, which the presence of the French ambassador at the seat of government must afford them.
§ His majesty therefore considers any rupture by Spain, or any measure on her part which may render necessary the immediate discontinuance of diplomatic relations by France, very improbable: and as his majesty is quite unacquainted with what has passed between France and Spain since the month of April, 1820; and his government cannot know upon what grounds his most Christian majesty's government may think proper to discontinue the diplomatic relations of France with Spain; or upon what grounds was may break out between the two countries; it is impossible for them now to pronounce what advice they should consider it their duty to give to his majesty, in case either or both of those events should occur.
909§ His majesty most anxiously wishes that such extremities may be avoided; and he feels convinced that the government of his most Christian majesty will find means of avoiding them.
§ No. 5.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Nov. 21.
§ (Extract.) Verona, November 12, 1822.
§ I have little to report as having occurred on the Spanish question, since I wrote to you on the 5th inst. But I inclose to you a memorandum on what is passing here, which I send to sir Charles Stuart by this occasion.
§ (Inclosure in No. 5.)—Memorandum.
§ (Extract.) Verona, November 12, 1822.
§ On the 20th of October, the French minister gave in a paper, requiring from the ministers of the allies to know, whether, if France should be under the necessity of withdrawing her minister from Spain, the other allied powers would do the same? In case France should be involved in war with Spain, what countenance the allies would give the former? And in case France should require it, what assistance?
§ To these questions the three continental allies answered on the 30th of October, that they would act as France should, in respect to their ministers in Spain, and would give to France every countenance and assistance she should require—the cause for such assistance, and the period and the mode of giving it, being reserved to be specified in a treaty.
§ The minister of Great Britain answered, that having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, and not being able to form a judgment upon an hypothetical case, he could give no answer to any of the questions.
§ The mode of communicating with Spain was considered on the 31st, with a view to prevent a rupture between France and Spain. It was agreed that the minister of each of the four continental courts at Madrid should present a separate note of the same tenor, and drawn upon the same principles; and on the 1st of November it was settled, that the four courts should draw up their notes and communicate them to the British minister; who should, upon seeing these notes, make known the line which his court would take.
§ Since that meeting, it is understood that the plan of proceeding proposed and agreed to, has been altered. Instead of official notes to be presented by the several ministers at Madrid to the Spanish government, it is now intended that dispatches shall be written to those ministers respectively, in which the several courts will express their wishes and intentions: this mode of proceeding is adopted, as affording greater latitude for discussion and explanation than that by official notes.
§ Accordingly M. de Montmorency has prepared the draft of his dispatch; and it is understood that the ministers of the continental powers are preparing theirs. These are the facts which have occurred at the existing Con- 910 gress. In the course of the discussions which have taken place upon this occasion, a marked difference of opinion as to the mode of action has appeared between the continental courts on the one hand, and England on the other. The minister of the latter power has recommended that France, and the powers which should interfere in this case, should confine themselves to what may properly be called the external quarrel between France and Spain; should not menace; and above all should not approach Spain in the form of enemies, bound in a treaty of defensive alliance against her.
§ No. 6.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received, Dec. 6.
§ (Extract.) Verona, November 22, 1822.
§ I inclose the minute of the answer which I returned to the ministers of the allies on the 20th inst. when they communicated to me the dispatches which they proposed to write to the ministers of their several courts at Madrid.
§ Minute.—(Inclosure in No. 6.)
§ Verona, November 20, 1822.
§ When the ministers of the five courts last assembled on the 1st instant, the object of their common solicitude was, to allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible rupture between the two powers.
§ Although his majesty's government did not consider themselves sufficiently informed, either of what had already taken place between France and Spain, or of what might occasion a rupture, to be able to answer in the affirmative, the questions submitted to the conference by his excellency the minister of France; yet, knowing the anxiety of the king, my master, for the honour of his most Christian majesty, and for the preservation of the peace of the world, I was willing to cuter into the consideration of the measures proposed, with, a view to attain our common object.
§ It was settled, that the notes to be prepared according to the proposition of his highness the Austrian minister, and to be presented to the Spanish government on this occasion, should be communicated to me, in order that I might see, whether, consistently With the view which the king had invariably taken of the affairs of Spain, and with the principles which had governed his majesty's conduct in relation to the internal concerns of other countries, his majesty's government could take any part which might forward the common purpose of preserving the general tranquillity.
§ The ministers of the allied courts have thought proper to make known to Spain the sentiments of their respective sovereigns, by dispatches addressed to the ministers of their several courts, residing at Madrid, instead of by official notes—as a mode of communication less formal, and affording, greater facility of discussion.
§ These dispatches, it appears, are to be communicated in extenso to the Spanish government.
911§ The origin, circumstances, and consequences of the Spanish revolution,—the existing state of affairs in Spain,—and the conduct of those who have been at the head of the Spanish government may have endangered the safety of other countries, and may have excited the uneasiness of the governments, whose ministers I am now addressing; and those governments may think it necessary to address the Spanish government upon the topics referred to in these dispatches.
§ There sentiments and opinions have certainly been entertained by the three cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for a considerable period of time; and the British government duly appreciates the forbearance and deference for the opinions of other cabinets, which have dictated the delay to make these communications, to the present moment. But having been delayed till now, I would request those ministers to consider, whether this is the moment at which such remonstrances ought to be made; whether they are calculated to allay the irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture; and whether they might not with advantage be delayed to a later period.
§ They are certainly calculated to irritate the government of Spain; to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation existing between that government and France, to call down upon Spain the power of the alliance; and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French government.
§ The result of these communications will probably be, that the diplomatic relations between the three allied courts and Spain will be discontinued—whatever may be the state of the questions between France and Spain: this occurrence cannot assist the cause of France; as those questions will stand upon their own ground, and the government of France must decide them upon their own merits.
§ But these communications are not only calculated to embarrass the French government, but likewise that of the king, my master. His majesty feels sincerely for the king and the people of Spain; he is anxious to see a termination of the evils and misfortunes by which that country is afflicted; and that it should be prosperous and happy. His majesty likewise earnestly desires, that the usual relations of amity and good neighbourhood may be reestablished between France and Spain; and his majesty's government would have been anxious to co-operate with those of his allies, in allaying the existing irritation, and in preventing a possible rupture.
§ But his majesty's government are of opinion, that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his majesty has invariably acted on all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his ma- 912 jesty in serious responsibility, if they should produce any effect; and must irritate, if they should not: and if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable discussions between that country and France.
§ The king's government must, therefore, decline to advise his majesty to hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion: and it is so necessary for his majesty, not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his government must equally refrain from advising his majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish government, on the subject of its relations with France.
§ His majesty, therefore, must limit his exertions and good offices, to the endeavours of his minister at Madrid to allay the ferment which these communications must occasion, and to do all the good in his power.
§ No. 7.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the duke of Wellington.
§ (Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 6, 1822.
§ The latest date of your grace's dispatches from Verona is the 19th ultimo. The French mail due yesterday, has, from some unaccountable accident failed to arrive; and we are left in an uncertainty, as to every thing that has passed at Verona for more than a fortnight. In this state of things, however difficult it may be to shape instructions to a case not ascertained, it has nevertheless been felt by his majesty's advisers, that we should be wanting to our duty, if we did not submit to his majesty the course which it would be expedient to pursue, in that which is understood to be the present situation of the question of peace or war between France and Spain.
§ M. de Villèle has taken several opportunities of expressing to sir Charles Stuart his own earnest desire for the preservation of peace; and his wish to receive, not only the support but the advice of the British government, in his endeavours to preserve it.
§ I have the king's commands to signify to your grace his majesty's pleasure, that your grace should seek a conversation with M. de Villèle; and, after referring to his excellency's communications through sir Charles Stuart, should offer to that minister the mediation of his majesty, between their most Christian and Catholic majesties.
§ It will not escape your grace's observation, that in order to afford a prospect of success in our mediation, if France should be willing to employ it, there should be some reasonable hope of a similar acceptance on the part of Spain.
§ I inclose to your grace an extract of a despatch from the Spanish government its Chargé d'Affaires in London, which was read and delivered to me by Mr. de Colomb in a conference the day before yesterday.
913§ The remaining part of the despatch to M. de Colomb (with which I do not trouble your grace on this occasion) relates to the questions pending between the two governments, respecting commercial grievances, and the piracies in the West Indian seas.
§ (Inclosure in No. 7.)—Translation.—Extract of a despatch addressed by M. San Miguel, minister for foreign affairs at Madrid, to M. de Colomb, dated November 15, 1822.
§ The government of his majesty has received with gratitude, but without surprise, the verbal communication, purporting that the cabinet of Ins Britannic majesty, respecting the independence and the political institutions adopted by the [Spanish] nation, is determined not to interfere in our domestic affairs.
§ Nothing else could be expected from the government of a nation which like the British, knows its rights and the primordial principles of public law; and it is only to be wondered at, that it should not think it expedient to give to a declaration of such obvious justice the solemnity which it deserves.
§ The ties of intimate regard, the principles of mutual convenience and the analogy of the respective institutions which exist in Spain and in England—do they not positively entitle the former, overwhelmed with difficulties, to expect from the latter, whose political influence is of the greatest weight, something more than simple and abstract justice, something more than a passive respect for universal laws, than a cold and insensible neutrality? And if some tender interest, such as befits two nations in similar circumstances, exists in the court of London, how is it that it does not manifest itself in visible acts of friendly interposition to save its ally from evils, in which humanity, wisdom, and even cautious and provident state policy will sympathize? Or how is it that (if these benevolent acts exist) they are not communicated to the cabinet of his Catholic majesty?
§ The acts to which I allude, would in no wise compromise the most strictly conceived system of neutrality. Good offices, counsels, the reflections of one friend in favour of another, do not place a nation in concert of attack or defence with another, do not expose it to the enmity of the opposite party, even if they do not deserve its gratitude—they are not (in a word) effective aid, troops, arms, subsidies, which augment the force of one of the contending parties. It is of reason only that we are speaking, and it is with the pen of conciliation that a power, situated like Great Britain, might support Spain, without exposing herself to take part in a war, which she may perhaps prevent with general utility.
§ England might act, in this manner; being able, ought she so to act? and if she has she acted so? In the wise, just, and generous views of the government St. James, no other answer can exist than the affirmative. Why then does she not notify to Spain what 914 has been done, and what it is proposed to do in that mediatory sense (en aquel sentido mediator)? Are there weighty inconveniences which enjoin discretion, which show the necessity of secresy? They do not appear to an ordinary penetration.
§ Nevertheless, in such uncertainty of what she has to thank the British ministry for, the government of his Catholic majesty thinks itself bound to manifest, in the face of the world, in order that it may regard its profession of faith, that whilst it respects the rights of others, it will never admit the least intervention in its internal concerns, nor execute an act which may compromise in the least the free exercise of national sovereignty.
§ When once you shall have communicated these frank declarations to the right hon. George Canning, his excellency cannot do less than find them worthy of his flattering concurrence, as well in substance as in form, and must correspond cordially with the spirit which has dictated them; and it will be sufficient that you should terminate your discourse, by reminding his excellency that Spain has been almost always, in her political relations, the victim of her probity and good faith; that her friendship has been, and is useful to other nations, and sincere under every trial; that the government of his majesty is desirous to preserve the friendly ties which exist between Spain and England, but without the diminution, without the degradation of its dignity, and that, if it has to struggle with the embarrassments that result from its immense progressive losses, the Spanish people always possesses sublimity of sentiment to conduct itself with honour, strength of character to support its calamities, and constancy of resolution to maintain itself in spite of the last sacrifices, in the post which belongs to her in Europe.
§ No. 8.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received December 11.
§ (Extract.) Paris, December 9, 1822.
§ I arrived here this afternoon, and received your despatch of the 6th inst. I have since had an interview with M. de Villéle and I have the pleasure to inform you, that he has sent a messenger to Verona with orders to the French ministers at that place, to express the desire of the French government, that the transmission of the despatches to Madrid should be suspended.
§ No. 9. — Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.
§ (Extract.) Foreign Office, Dec. 13, 1822.
§ Your grace's despatches of Tuesday have been received and laid before the king. The step taken by M. de Villéle, in referring back to Verona the consideration of the despatches proposed to be sent by the three continental courts to their several ministers at Madrid, with a view of inducing the three courts to 915 suspend the transmission of those despatches, undoubtedly constituted a case (wholly unforeseen when the last instructions of your government were framed) which made it expedient to suspend, on your grace's part, the offer to the French government, of his majesty's mediation with Spain.—Upon a full review, however, of the situation in which we stand towards both those powers, and towards the other members of the alliance, and upon an anxious consideration of the several issues to which the question of peace or war may come—all those of his majesty's servants, whom I have been able to consult, are of opinion, that it is highly material, for the clear and perfect discharge of the duty of the British government, in a question so deeply affecting the interests, not only of the powers immediately concerned, but of the world, that your grace should not leave Paris, without having placed in the hands of the French government the eventual offer of his majesty's mediation.
§ No. 10.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received December 22.
§ (Extract.) Paris, December 17, 1822.
§ I waited upon M. de Montmorency this day, and presented to him the note of which I inclose a copy.
§ (Inclosure in No. 10.) The Duke of Wellington to M. de Montmorency.
§ Paris, December 17, 1822.
§ The undersigned, his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, has explained and recorded, in the conferences of Verona, the sentiments of his government upon the present critical state of affairs between France and Spain; and the earnest solicitude of the king his master, to avert a war of which no human foresight can calculate the consequences.
§ Upon his arrival at Paris, the undersigned found instructions from his government, to offer to his most Christian majesty the mediation of the king his master, before the decisive step should have been taken, of transmitting to Madrid the despatches written at Verona.
§ The undersigned rejoiced at the delay which had been interposed to the transmission of those despatches to Madrid, by the reference to Verona; and his government have learnt, with the liveliest satisfaction, the determination of the French government to reconsider a measure which the undersigned had so anxiously deprecated.
§ It is the sincere hope of his majesty, that this salutary reconsideration may prevent recourse to arms. But, as the issue of the reference to Verona may still be doubtful, the undersigned is instructed to declare, that, if the answer to that reference should not be such as to preclude all danger of hostilities, his majesty will be ready to accept the office of mediator between the French and Spanish governments; and to employ his most strenuous endeavours for the adjustment of their 916 differences, and for the preservation of the peace of the world. The undersigned, &c.
§ (Signed) WELLINGTON.
§ No. 11.—(Translation.) Note from the Duke of Montmorency to the Duke of Wellington, dated Paris the 26th Dec. 1822.
§ The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has received and laid before the king, the note which his excellency the duke of Wellington did him the honour to address to him on the 17th of this month.
§ His majesty has appreciated the sentiments which have induced the king of England to offer his mediation to his majesty, in order to prevent a rupture between him and the Spanish government. But his majesty could not but feel that the situation of France with regard to Spain, was not of a nature to call for a mediation between the two courts. In fact, there exists no difference between them, no specific point of discussion, by the arrangement of which their relations might be placed on the footing on which they ought to stand. Spain, by the nature of her revolution, and by the circumstances with which it has been attended has excited the apprehensions of several great powers. England participated in these apprehensions; for even in the year 1820, she foresaw cases, in which it would be impossible to preserve with Spain, relations of peace and good understanding.
§ France is more interested than any other power in the events which may result from the actual situation of that monarchy. But it is not her own interests alone which are compromised, and which she must keep in view in the present circumstances:—the repose of Europe, and the maintenance of those principles by which it is guaranteed, are involved.
§ The duke of Wellington knows that these are the sentiments which dictated the conduct of France at Verona; and that the courts which agreed in them regarded the consequences of the revolution, and of the actual state of Spain as being common to them all; that they never entertained the idea that it was between France and Spain alone that the existing difficulties needed to be arranged; that they considered the question to be "wholly European;" and that it is in consequence of this opinion, that the measures which had for their object the bringing about, if possible, an amelioration in the state of a country so highly interesting to Europe, were conceived and proposed—measures, the success of which would have been completely secured, if England had thought she could concur in them.
§ His most Christian majesty, who was bound to weigh these considerations maturely, has therefore thought that he could not accept the mediation that his Britannic majesty has been pleased to propose to him. He sees, however, with pleasure in this proposition, a new pledge of the conciliatory disposition of the English government; and he thinks that with such feel- 917 ings, that government may render essential service to Europe, by offering in the like manner to the government of Spain, advice, which by leading them to entertain more calm views, might produce a happy influence on the internal situation of that country.
§ His majesty would learn, with the liveliest satisfaction, the success of such efforts. He would see in it a firm ground to hope for the preservation of a peace, of the great value of which, the governments and the people of Europe cannot but be deeply sensible. The undersigned eagerly embraces the opportunity of renewing to his excellency the duke of Wellington the assurances of his high consideration. The undersigned, &c.
§ (Signed) MONTMORENCY.
§ No. 12.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the Vicomte de Marcellus.
§ Foreign Office, January 10, 1823.
§ The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has received from the duke of Wellington, late his majesty's plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona, and has laid before the king his master, the answer of the minister for foreign affairs of his most Christian majesty, to the official note in which the duke of Wellington, on his return from Verona, tendered to the French government the mediation of the king, for the adjustment of differences between France and Spain.
§ The undersigned is commanded to address to M. de Marcellus, chargé d'affaires of his most Christian majesty, the following observations on the note of his excellency the duke de Montmorency, to be transmitted by M. de Marcellus to his court.
§ The king has seen with pleasure, that his most Christian majesty does justice to the sentiments which dictated the offer of his majesty's mediation: and although the view which is taken in M. de Montmorency's note, of the nature of the differences between the French and Spanish governments, has induced his most Christian majesty to decline that mediation, the king will not the less anxiously employ, in every way that is yet open to him, those "conciliatory dispositions" for which his most Christian majesty gives him credit, to bring about a state of things less menacing to the peace of Europe, than that which is exhibited in the present position of those two governments towards each other.
§ The British cabinet had not to learn how fearfully the tranquillity of all Europe must be affected by the hostile collision of France and Spain. Accordingly, in the duke of Wellington's official note, the "adjustment" of the supposed "differences between the French and Spanish governments," was stated as auxiliary to "the preservation of the peace of the world." But the British cabinet certainly did not understand the questions brought forward at Verona, by the plenipotentiary of his most Christian majesty, with respect to the 918 actual situation and possible conduct of Spain, to be questions in which the concern of France was so little distinguishable from that of other powers, as the duke de Montmorency's note, represents it.
§ The plenipotentiary of the king of France Solicited from his most Christian majesty's allies a declaration:
§ 1st. Whether, if France should find herself obliged to recall her minister from Madrid, and to break off all diplomatic relations with Spain, they would be disposed to take the like measure, and to recall their several legations?
§ 2nd. If war should break out between France and Spain, in what form, and by what acts, would they afford to France that moral support, which would give to her proceedings the whole force of the alliance, and would inspire a salutary fear into the revolutionists of all countries?
§ 3rd. What were the intentions of the several powers, both as to the substance and the form of the direct assistance which they would be disposed to give to France, in a casein which, upon her demand, their active intervention should become necessary?
§ France, therefore, originated the discussions upon Spanish affairs at Verona; and the answers of the three continental members of the alliance were addressed to the cases supposed, and to the support demanded, by France.
§ In common with the three continental powers, the plenipotentiary of his majesty considered the question of peace or war with Spain, as a question peculiarly French, In his answer (given in simultaneously with those of the three continental powers) to the queries of the French plenipotentiary, and in all the discussions which followed thereupon, the duke of Wellington uniformly alleged, as one of his reasons for not assenting to the propositions of M. de Montmorency, the ignorance of the British government as to the antecedent Transactions and communications (during the last-two years) between the governments of France and Spain.
§ No objection was stated by the duke of Wellington, on the part of the king his master, to the precautionary measures of France, within her own frontier; measures which the right of self-defence plainly authorized, not only against the danger of contagious disease (in which they professedly originated, and to which, till the month of September, they were exclusively ascribed), but against those inconveniences which might possibly arise to France from civil contest in a country separated from France only by a conventional line of demarcation; against the moral infection of political intrigue, and against the violation of French territory by occasional military incursions. But it appeared to his majesty's plenipotentiary at Verona to be necessary and just, that, before he was called upon to promise eventually the support of his government to measures on the part of France which were likely 919 to lead to war with Spain, opportunity should have been allowed to his government to examine the grounds of those measures—that the Cause of offence given by Spain to France should have been specifically defined.
§ It was therefore impossible for his majesty's plenipotentiary to "concur" in the decisions of Verona.
§ It remains for the undersigned to advert to that part of the French official note, which appears to insinuate a reproach against this country, as if she had abandoned at Verona, opinions which she had formerly declared with respect to the affairs of Spain.
§ "England," it is said, "partook in 1820, of the inquietude which the revolution in Spain occasioned to many great powers; she foresaw cases in which it might be impossible to preserve with Spain the relations of good intelligence and peace."
§ The undersigned must be permitted to say, that though questions were indeed propounded to England in the year 1820, as to possible future contingencies in the affairs of Spain, so far from "foreseeing cases," and deciding upon the conduct which would be applicable to them, in the manner here described, the British government positively declined to bind itself, by a contingent opinion, to any conditional Course of action.
§ But there was no indisposition or hesitation to avow the principles upon which the opinion of England would be formed, and her course of action regulated. It was not only declared that the British government disclaimed any general right of interference in the internal concerns of independent nations; but it was specifically stated, that there was perhaps no country of equal magnitude with Spain whose internal disturbances would be so little likely to menace other states with that direct and imminent danger, which could alone, in exception to the general rule, justify foreign interference.
§ The application of these principles to the cases brought forward by France at Verona, was as direct as it was consistent with the former professions of the British cabinet.—That application was further enforced by other considerations, which, though they had not perhaps been distinctly anticipated in a prospective and hypothetical argument bore nevertheless with undeniable force upon the question to be decided at Verona.
§ Dangers not necessarily arising from the existence of the internal agitations of Spain, might nevertheless be created by an uncalled for and injudicious interposition in them. The spirit of revolution, which, shut up within the Pyrennees, might exhaust itself in struggles, trying indeed to Spain, but harmless to her neighbours, it called forth from within those precincts by the provocation of foreign attack, might find perhaps in other countries fresh aliment for its fury; and might renew throughout Europe, the miseries of the five and twenty years which preceded the peace of 1815.
920§ For these and abundant other reasons, the voice of his majesty's plenipotentiary at Verona was for peace. The preservation of general peace is the earnest wish and object of his majesty; and the undersigned is commanded to repeat, that no means will be left unexhausted by his majesty's government, which the impartial employment of good offices can afford, to soothe the irritation at present unhappily subsisting between the governments of France and Spain, and to prevent, if possible, the commencement of hostilities, the consequences of which no human foresight can calculate. The undersigned, &c.
§ (Signed) GEORGE CANNING.
§ No. 13.—(Translation).—The Viscount de Chateaubriand to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received, Jan. 27th.
§ Paris, Jan. 23, 1823.
§ The undersigned minister for foreign affairs, of his most Christian majesty, has laid before the king, the note, dated the 10th of this month which his excellency, the principal secretary of state for foreign affairs of his Britannic majesty, has addressed to viscount Marcellus. He has been commanded to make the following communication to his excellency:
§ The cabinet of his Britannic majesty would fall into a serious error, if it imagined that France had represented to the congress of Verona, the question of Spain, as having for her an interest entirely separate from that of the allied powers; that, consequently she is inconsistent when, in her answer to the proposition of mediation made by England, she maintains that that question is "wholly European."
§ France, since the transactions of Aix-la-Chapelle, is closely united with the courts, who, by their efforts, have re-established peace upon the continent. Deeply impressed with the sacred obligation of treaties, she will fulfil the duties which they impose upon her:—one of the duties thus required of France was, to make known to her allies, the motives which had compelled her to establish an army of observation on one of her frontiers, and to explain her uneasiness on approaching events, of which it was easy to calculate the chances. In the position in which the agitations in Spain had placed her, common prudence required that she should make herself acquainted with the part which the allied powers would take, in the event of war becoming inevitable.
§ This line of conduct, which good sense and reason pointed cut, the duke de Montmorency was bound to follow at Verona. The sovereigns were of opinion (in which the French government concluded,) that there was imminent danger to society, in that military anarchy in Spain, in which those principles were put forth anew, which, during thirty years, had occasioned the misfortunes of Europe. From these general conferences, particular questions naturally arose; and cases which were originally involved in the general interests, became the subject of specific discussion.
921§ The result of these frank communications was, that France found herself placed in a position to act separately in a cause which was, as it were, appropriated to her, without, however, separating her policy from that of her allies; so that, according to the impression which the case conveyed, it might be said, without fear of contradiction, that the question respecting Spain was at once "wholly French, and wholly European."
§ The undersigned, flattering himself that he has given a satisfactory answer to the first objection of his Britannic majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, proceeds to the consideration of another point.
§ The cabinet of the Tuilleries have not forgotten, that the principal motive alleged by his grace the duke of Wellington at Verona, for not explaining himself upon the casus fœderis, was, the ignorance of his government of the transactions which had taken place between France and Spain, from 1820 to 1822. That objection was removed at the congress, as it will be here, by the single observation, that the grievances of which France might have to complain, on the subject of the Spanish revolution, were unfortunately of public notoriety; and this is what the undersigned will have occasion to develope in the course of this note.
§ The minister for foreign affairs of his Britannic majesty, in reply to an observation contained in the note of M. le Due de Montmorency, dated the 24th December, states that the cabinet of St. James's has never admitted that there was a case to justify intervention in the affairs of Spain; and that therefore it might refuse to bind itself for the future by expressing an opinion upon contingent and uncertain events. The undersigned thinks, however, that he has reasons for not doubting that in a Mémoire drawn up by the cabinet of London, in answer to a despatch of the court of Russia, and communicated on the 17th Nay, 1820, by sir Charles Stuart to the French minister for foreign affairs, an opinion is pronounced that an interference in the affairs of Spain would be justifiable; 1st, if the violence of the persons in power led them to an attack against any other states: 2nd, if Spain attempted to possess herself of Portugal, or to effect a re-union of the two states.—This opinion of the British cabinet appeared at the time as conformable with the general interests of Europe, as with particular interests, to the care of which every government has an acknowledged right to attend.
§ The undersigned regrets that he cannot coincide in opinion with his Britannic majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, as to the little danger to which the Spanish revolution exposes the other powers of Europe. The state of modern civilization brings one nation into communication with all others, however completely it may be insulated by geographical position. France, especially, the only country whose frontier touches that of Spain, suffers considerably from the troubles 922 which agitate the kingdom of Ferdinand—A revolution which seems to have taken for its model, that of which the traces are not yet, effaced, awakens and agitates in the bosom of France a host of passions and recollections.—Innumerable proofs exist that the revolutionists of Spain and France are in close connexion; and in all the military conspiracies tried by the French tribunals, the name and the hope of the Cortes have invariably appeared. Offenders escaped from justice have found an asylum in the Peninsula, where they menace and' insult with impunity, the monarchy and the throne of the Bourbons.—Libels written in French and printed in Spain, are scattered abroad amongst the Army of Observation, for the purpose of corrupting it. And even in the English papers the British government has seen that our soldiers were excited to revolt in the name of Spain. These facts were admitted by implication by his grace the duke of Wellington, when, in his diplomatic notes he extended his approbation to the establishment of the Army of Observation. The very note to which the undersigned has now the honour to reply, confirms all that he here advances, in citing the following expressions of the noble duke.—"The duke of Wellington made no objection in the name of the king, his master, to the, precautionary measures taken by France on her own frontiers, whilst these measures were evidently authorized by the right of defending herself, not only against the dangers of infectious disease, but also against the moral contagion of political intrigue; and finally, against the violation of the French territory by casual military incursions."—This admission is remarkable, and besides, did not Piedmont and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies rise in the name of the Cortes; and is any other proof required, that the Spanish revolution may pass the limits of the Pyrennees? France then has the right to defend herself against moral contagion. It is equally necessary for her to secure herself against dangers of another sort, since the French territory has been thrice violated by the constitutional troops of Spain.
§ That France, disquieted in her interior, and armed on her frontiers for her defence, should be under an imperious necessity to escape from a position so painful to her, is what it is impossible not to acknowledge. Like the British government, she sincerely desires peace. She would not have hesitated in concert with her allies, to accept the mediation of England, if the discussion of specific interest were in question; but it is impossible to establish a basis of negotiation upon political theories, and of arbitration upon principles.
§ For the same reason France could not accede to the proposal which M. de San Miguel made on the 12th of this month, to the minister of Great Britain at the court of Madrid, in order to engage that power to interfere in the affairs of the French and Spanish governments—an intervention useless, at the least, since it appears 923 that it would have no other object than measures relative to the Army of Observation.
§ If the cabinet of Madrid is sincere in its communications, does it need an intermediate channel to transmit them to the cabinet of the Tuilleries? The latter does not fear to explain itself. Even recently it has made known the reasonable conditions, by means of which a speedy reconciliation might be effected.
§ The Comte de la Garde has received orders to communicate confidentially to sir William A'Court the king's benevolent intentions. His most Christian majesty demands, that his Catholic majesty, should, of himself, and by his own authority, apply the necessary modifications to the institutions which have been imposed on the crown of Spain by the revolt of a few soldiers.
§ To this free concession by king Ferdinand, of the corrected institutions, the king of France thinks that it would be proper to add, a full and complete amnesty, for all political acts committed from 1822, up to the day of promulgating the royal concession.—Thus would disappear from the Spanish constitution, the defects, in substance, and in form, which endanger all legitimate monarchies. The undersigned feels persuaded, that propositions so just and so moderate will obtain the concurrence of all the cabinets of Europe.
§ The French government having made every sort of sacrifice to the desire of avoiding war; having struggled, perhaps too long, against public opinion, roused by the provocations of Spain—has at length reached that last limit of concession which no power, that respects itself, can with impunity over-step. Injured in her essential interests France, without ceasing to offer the most ardent prayers for peace, can no longer shut her eyes to the dangers which threaten her. She has already taken, and she will continue to take, the measures best calculated for putting an end to a state of uncertainty, which compromises alike her safety, her honour, and her dignity. Whatever may be the event, France will always have pleasure in relying on the good offices of which the English government has again been pleased to renew to her the proposal. She will herself use her utmost endeavour to draw closer the ties which so happily unite the two monarchies and the two people.
§ (Signed) CHATEAUBRIAND.
§ No. 14.—Mr. Secretary Canning to Sir Charles Stuart.
§ Foreign Office, January 28, 1823.
§ Sir;—Shortly after I had despatched the messenger yesterday, M. de Marcellus delivered to me the official answer of M. de Chateaubriand to the note addressed by me to M. de Marcellus on the 10th instant.
§ As it appears from your excellency's despatch of the 24th, which also reached me yesterday that M. de Chateaubriand, though he stated to your excellency the substance of this note, had not furnished you with a copy of 924 it, I think it right to inclose a copy for your information.
§ Upon a first consideration I am by no means sure that it will be necessary to reply officially to this note of M. de Chateaubriand; since it in effect admits all the material propositions of the note to which it is an answer.
§ The questions brought forward by France at Verona are acknowledged to have been French questions, in the sense in which they are in my note described to have been such; that is to say, the interest of France is stated in those questions not as distinct from the interest of Europe, but as more immediate:—and it is not denied, that the refusal of his majesty's plenipotentiary to concur in the decisions of Verona, was founded on the omission by France to substantiate any specific ground of complaint against the Spanish government.
§ In the subsequent part of M. de Chateaubriand's note, while the assertion of my note of the 10th instant, that Great Britain had in 1820 declined anticipating hypothetical cases in which it might be impossible to remain at peace with Spain, is disputed; the only two cases which are cited in exception to that assertion, are cases wholly independent of the principle of interference in the internal concerns of other nations.
§ It is averred, that we admitted the necessity of war against Spain; first, if Spain herself should be guilty of aggression against other states, and secondly and specifically, if she should attempt to possess herself of Portugal.
§ Unquestionably, with respect to either of those cases, Great Britain would admit, not only prospectively and hypothetically, and as to Spain, but positively and directly as to any power whatever, that aggression against any of its neighbours would justify war; and that aggression against Portugal would impose upon Great Britain the duty of protecting her ally.
§ But these admissions leave the question as to the right of interference in the affairs of Spain, where it was.
§ With respect to that part of M. de Chateaubriand's note which describes the nature of the demands intended to be made by France upon Spain, and takes credit for the moderation of them; your excellency will not fail to observe, that our difference with France and the allies throughout, is not as to the arrangements which it might be desirable to obtain from Spain, but as to the principle upon which France and the allies propose to require them.
§ We disclaim for ourselves, and deny for other powers, the right of requiring any changes in the internal institutions of independent states, with the menace of hostile attack in case of refusal. The moderation of such demands in no degree justifies in our eyes such a mode of enforcing them; and this distinction it is the more important to keep steadily in view, and to impress upon the French government, at a moment when, for their sake, and at their desire, we are suggesting to Spain, in 925 a tone of friendly counsel, alterations similar to those which France is proposing as the alternative of hostilities.
§ Your excellency will speak in this sense to M. de Chateaubriand, when you acknowledge on my part the receipt of his official note; from the general tone of which, and from the friendliness of its expressions towards this country, you will inform M. de Chateaubriand, that his majesty's government derives the liveliest satisfaction; at the same time that it views with deep regret the tendency of that part of the note which appears to indicate an expectation of hostilities with Spain. I am, &c.
§ (Signed) GEORGE CANNING.