AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS REPORT.

HC Deb 07 May 1822 vol 7 cc371-421

On the order of the day for going into a committee of the whole House, to consider further of the Report of the Committee on Agricultural Distress,

Mr. Attwood

rose and said, that, entertaining the opinions he did respecting the utter inefficacy, as to any advantage to the petitioners, from the resolutions intended to be moved in the committee, and more particularly in consequence of what they had witnessed the preceding night, he thought it his duty to call their attention to a consideration of the general subject before them, and of the whole system of measures which they had pursued on that subject. The House, he said, had then before it, bodies of petitioners more numerous and important, and a statement of distress more urgent than had been at any former period brought under their consideration; and the complaints oldie petitioners were marked with a general and an increasing spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction, arising out of the manner in which their representations had been disposed of by the House. Undoubtedly, the whole of the measures they had adopted on this subject had been founded on a settled conviction previously entertained that the distress complained of was out of their power to relieve; but whilst the House acted on a conviction like that, it was essential, not only that they should ha themselves well satisfied of its justice, but that their measures should, if it were possible, satisfy the petitioners themselves, that the evils they suffered were out of the reach of parliamentary interference; and the House ought, in his opinion, to be cautious that it did not add to the other calamities of the present times, that of causing to be withdrawn the confidence of the people from parliament under the present circumstances in which they were placed. He would request them to review for a moment before they proceeded further, what their measures hitherto had been. They had delegated their duties to three successive committees, the proceedings of which committees had produced no other effect than this, that they had diverted the attention of three successive sessions of parliament from the adoption of any effectual measures of relief or even of effectual enquiry; and were they to be surprised if they found an opinion to prevail, that this, which had been the only result, had been the main object also for which these committees had been appointed? The House had limited on its appointment the powers of the first agricultural committee to an enquiry into a subject very trivial and unimportant in its nature, and which experience had shown to have been, in no way materially connected with the distress of agriculture; and in that way one session of parliament had been lost without any steps taken that afforded the remotest prospect, either of relieving or satisfying the petitioners. They next appointed a second committee with instructions to enquire into the truth of the allegations which the petitioners had made, of the truth of which no doubt whatever was any where entertained and when that enquiry was completed, and the committee had reported that the allegations submitted to the House had been confirmed to their fullest extent, there that proceeding dropped, nor had, up to the present day, any measure been proposed either by the committee itself, or by any other party founded on its report and enquiry. The House however proceeded to appoint a third agricultural committee, and the report of that committee was now before them; and a measure founded upon it had been introduced by his majesty's government, and by the party introducing it had been withdrawn, when it was perfectly certain that the House was disposed to adopt it. The further perseverance in measures such as these he earnestly deprecated. They fell very short of the duties which the House owed to the country; they were liable to be considered as little better than a mockery of the distress of the agricultural community; they were utterly unsuited to the exigence of the present time, and had lowered the character of parliament in the estimation and the confidence of the people, to an extent which had probably laid the foundation of great political changes. And with what prospect before them was it that they were now to resolve themselves into the committee which the noble marquis had proposed? Was it to see repeated the scene of the preceding night? Measures again proposed and again withdrawn? It was at least with the certainty before them of no measures being proposed there which could relieve the petitioners, and with an equal certainty of increasing their discontent.

In a condition of calamity and distress as extensive as that which now existed, no important measures of relief could be with advantage or even safety proposed, that were not founded on a comprehensive view and an accurate knowledge of the nature and origin, as well as the extent of the evils proposed to be removed. But the speech of the noble marquis who proposed the Speaker's leaving the chair, had afforded the House no light or exposition of that kind, and the three agricultural committees they had appointed, had failed altogether to arrive at any satisfactory explanation of the causes of agricultural distress. The evidence, indeed, which had been given before those committees was sufficiently distinct, intelligible, decisive and important, but it widely differed in all those qualities from the indistinct, vague, partial or trifling conclusions, which these committees had themselves formed upon that evidence. The evidence which the agricultural community had there given, formed a document as important, unless he greatly misunderstood its character, as had ever been submitted by a people to the consideration of a government, and the responsibility of the government was deeply involved, where a state of things existed such as was there described. The condition of calamity there exhibited to them, the wide extent of ruin there incontestibly established as existing, from whatever cause it had arisen, was altogether without example in any former period of the history of this country. The result of the agricultural evidence was, in short, this, that if no relief were given to agriculture, neither by raising the price of its produce, which he was convinced was altogether incompatible with the existence of the present standard of value they had adopted, nor by lessening the burthens under which it laboured, which they were told was equally inconsistent with the preservation of national faith and the support of the necessary expenses of the government; but whatever obstacles opposed themselves to that relief, the inevitable consequence before them was this, that if no relief were given, a great portion of the land at present under cultivation throughout the kingdom—that land from which the sub- sistence of the population was drawn—must of necessity and accompanied with a rapid deterioration in the cultivation of the remainder, and amidst the destructions of the farmers and labourers, be abandoned; and its cultivation be given up. It was from that soil, he again repeated, the cultivation of which rested on that precarious footing, that the subsistence of the people was drawn; and if there was any truth in the statements before them: if the whole body of evidence, taken before the agricultural committee of the last session, were not as full of deception and delusion, as the report accompanying it had been described to be, then the country had before it the prospect of dangers very different from those supposed to arise out of a redundance of agricultural produce; of dangers, the first approach of which they perhaps saw in Ireland, that country, overwhelmed, as they were lately told, with every species of destructive abundance, but where they now found, that the people were perishing with, want. Under such circumstances, indeed, the necessity of measures, such as were now intended to be proposed, might be considered, in one point of view, manifest and apparent—not, indeed, as measures to relieve agriculture, for they had no such tendency; but to pave the way for the introduction of foreign grain, for that was their real object and tendency, and they had no other. And those measures might be considered necessary with reference to the general interest of the country, threatened with a danger which the present corn-laws would aggravate: but that the abandoning those laws should be brought forward under the pretence of relieving agriculture; that a committee appointed to consider of means for relieving agricultural distress, should have been made the organ and instrument of proposing measures like those; that was to redouble the inconsistency, absurdity, and confusion in which their proceedings had been hitherto involved. That proceeding, so originating, was a mockery of the distress of agriculture. The only consistent defence which could be set up for those measures, must rest on a determination to afford no relief to agriculture, but to prepare themselves to meet, as well as they were able, as well as the clashing interests of society permitted, the first and most immediate consequences of its abandonment.

It was important for them to consider to what cause, or to what combination of causes, as new necessarily, and as extraordinary as the effects produced, the state of things before them was to be ascribed. Were they content to believe, with the hon. member for Portarlington, that it had been occasioned by a few harvests more or less abundant, or by land better or worse cultivated; or by the transport of a little grain from one part of the kingdom to the other; by the transport of a little grain from Ireland, that country which had exported every thing, which had imported nothing; and which, when they came to examine its situation, instead of finding Ireland relieved by that export of grain, the importation of which had been represented as so destructive to the agriculture of England, they found Ireland in a condition still more ruinous and deplorable than their own. If importations from Ireland had occasioned, in any considerable degree, the distress of this country, whence had the distress of Ireland itself arisen? It was for the hon. member to reconcile that inconsistency in his theory. But causes such as those were of common occurrence and operation. No condition of national prosperity was exempt from evils, if evils they were, such as those. They might occasion partial and trivial depression, but were capable of interrupting only for a moment the career of general prosperity; and had never yet occasioned a demand, or necessity for land to be permanently abandoned, or for cultivation to be permanently depressed. The hon. member for Portarlington had, indeed, referred to two other causes, somewhat, it would be admitted, more extraordinary in their nature, but according to that hon. gentleman's estimation, very trivial and unimportant in their operation, and they formed but a small part of his system. These two causes were, first, the alteration effected in the value of the currency; and secondly, the enormous burthen of taxation. With respect to the first of these, the alteration recently effected in our monied system, and the manner in which that alteration had affected monied prices, and had occasioned undoubtedly the distress of agriculture, as for as agricultural distress was occasioned, by the low price of its produce; into that question he would not now enter, because there was then before the House the notice of a motion, on which the nature of that operation, its extent and effects, would be more appropriately discussed. But with respect to the effect of taxation on agriculture, and the share which those burthens had in producing the difficulties under which the cultivators of the soil laboured, to that subject he would now call the attention of the House. The member for Portarlington was not singular in his opinion as to the trifling operation of our taxes on cultivation. That opinion was maintained by others; and in a tone of confidence which did not scruple to cast imputations on the motives, or opinions of those who thought, as he confessed he did, very differently on that subject. They were told that taxation was no cause of the distress of agriculture, because a taxation, still heavier in amount than the present, had existed at a period when no agricultural distress accompanied it. They had been told, also, that the distress of agriculture was not to be ascribed to taxation on another ground; that it was the low price of agricultural produce which had occasioned that distress, and that it was not in the nature of taxation to produce low prices. And, undoubtedly, there was some truth in both those assertions; but they were both founded on extremely partial and narrow views of that subject. Certainly, during a very considerable period of the late war, and again, at another period, that of the year 1818, as high a nominal amount, of taxation had existed as the present and had been accompanied with no agricultural difficulties, or embarrassments. But if they carried their observations one step further, they would arrive at period when low prices also existed, and when low prices also were accompanied with no agricultural distress. The prices of the present time were in no respect lower than the prices which preceded the late war, and, that was a period of great and general prosperity. There was as much reason, therefore, for maintaining that low prices were not the cause of distress, as for maintaining that this distress was not occasioned by high taxes. Both opinions were partly true. It was not low prices alone. It was not high taxes alone. It was low prices and high taxes joined, that agriculture was unable to support. That was a state of things, a combination of circumstances which had never before existed in the country, except during one short and calamitous period, during the years 1815 and part of 1816, and then their effects were precisely similar to those now experienced. It was the taxes of the late war com- bined with the prices that preceded it; the taxation of the paper standard; the prices of the metal standard; those taxes which could only have been imposed by the agency of their late paper money; those prices which could alone be sustained by the monied system they had now resorted to. It was the attempt to discharge debts and maintain taxes, in a species of money in which it was found utterly impossible to contract or impose them. That was the attempt of the legislature; the condition of the country was the evidence of its wisdom and success. Let the House consider what the full extent of that operation had been. Urged by the necessities of the late war; by the necessity of supplies which they found it impossible to obtain in money of the ancient value; they abandoned the old metal standard of value—they substituted in its place a paper money not convertible in gold—they depreciated that money, in other words—they raised all prices as estimated by it. In that money so depreciated, in those prices so raised, they imposed taxes and contracted debts, which it would have been impossible by any other means to have contracted or imposed, that having proceeded in that course for nearly the fourth part of a century, in which period not a year passed in which they had not added to their debts and taxes, an amount which never could have been raised in money of the old value, they proceeded at the end of the period, to withdraw from that enormous accumulation of taxation and debt, the means by which they had enabled the country to support it, the means by which they had induced the people to submit to it, and having completed that monstrous operation, they had left the country to struggle with its difficulties as it could, and appeared to be actuated by no other principle than an endeavour to avoid, if it were possible, the responsibility of their measures, and to evade from one session of parliament to another, the demands of the people for relief.

Could an operation like that before them take place, and no extensive derangement, no difficulties of an extraordinary nature follow? Was not the present condition of the country as much without example as an operation, such as that before them, had been before unheard of? When had it before been heard of in this country at any time, or indeed, in any country, of a necessity for abandoning the cultivation of the soil, and when had an operation like that been ever before gravely proposed as a means of relief? But it was said that cultivation had been recently extended and improved. Was that a new state of things in this country? An extended, an improved cultivation had been the common condition of the country from its earliest period; and the duty and the interest of that House, it had been hitherto held, was to promote and encourage that improvement, and protect the interest of those who had embarked in undertakings of that nature. It was now for the first time that it had been heard in that House, that they had a different duty to perform; that their task now was to arrest the progress of cultivation and improvement, to force the stream of improvement backward, and to adopt measures, or to witness their operation, by which some of the most anciently cultivated districts in the kingdom were to be abandoned, and its richest beggared and reduced. He well knew that it had been said that it was land that had been recently inclosed, land recently and rashly cultivated, that it was now necessary to abandon. But all the evidence they had before them was in opposition to that assertion. The whole evidence before them went to this, that land which had been the most anciently cultivated, was amongst that which must be the first abandoned; that land which had existed in cultivation for centuries, and which, during the whole of that time had never failed to yield wages to the labourer, and profit to the farmer, and rent to the landlord, without all of which cultivation could not proceed, was now incapable of yielding that return, and for that state of things, without any former example, he denied that any other explanation could be given than this; that they had burthened this land with a cost of production equally unexampled also, and that it was that increased cost of production which the land was unable to support. But they had other alternatives before them than that of abandoning its cultivation. They had first to reduce the burthens by which it was oppressed. They had first to retread those steps by which they had lowered the price of its produce; and it was not till every other means had been attempted, till all other measures had been exhausted that they were called on to yield to that last and dangerous alternative, that of abandoning at once the soil, and the population it supports; and operation full of all the elements, not of suffering and calamity only, but full of all the elements of disorder, convulsion, and change, which they deceived themselves, if they believed that it was in the province of political economy to calculate.

He could not indeed, but consider it as somewhat surprising, that in the present day, when that new school, or new science as it was called, of political economy, was supposed so greatly to flourish, and was certainly, so widely extended; that in that House, experienced undoubtedly, in matters of taxation, beyond any assembly that had ever existed on the earth, doubts should be found to exist as to what the effect of taxation was: and whether it were capable even in its excess, for it never could be excessive in any country at any time, if it were not in excess in this country at the present time, of materially affecting or deranging the great interests of society. They saw the people labouring under unexampled difficulty: they saw them oppressed with unexampled burthens; but they refused to believe that one of these had arisen out of, or was materially connected with the other. The hon. member for Portarlington—(and if he referred so repeatedly to the opinion of that hon. gentleman, it was because he was the only individual of equal authority, who had given any consistent exposition at all of the causes of agricultural distress, and he thought that the agricultural interest was on that account indebted to the hon. gentleman, at least, for his intentions, although he (Mr. Attwood) did not agree with him, in scarcely any one of the Opinions he entertained; and was convinced that those opinions had produced extensive mischief and were calculated to occasion still more);—that hon. member had taken a survey of the condition of agriculture, and he found it suffering under great embarrassments; he had found that corn could not be produced in this country, at the present time, for the same monied cost at which been formerly produced here; and at which it could now be produced in the countries around them; and what was the explanation that he gave of the causes of this change? He told them that to feed an augmenting population, they had been driven to the cultivation of inferior soils; that those soils could be alone cultivated by the application of additional labour; that they yielded a smaller surplus produce; that none but a higher monied price could be a remunerative price for corn so grown; that this was the main source of the difficulties of agriculture, and that the relief from those difficulties was to be found in abandoning the cultivation of those poorer soils. But as this was the main ground on which the whole system of the hon. member rested, he would beg to state his opinions in his own words, as they were found in a pamphlet recently printed by him on that subject. [Mr. Attwood then read from a pamphlet of Mr. Ricardo]—"The Words remunerative price, are meant to denote the price at which corn can be raised, paying all charges.—It follows, from this definition, that in proportion as it country is driven to the cultivation of poorer lands for the support of an increasing population, the price of corn to be remunerative must rise. It appears, then, that in the progress of society, when no importation takes place we are obliged constantly to have recourse to worse soils to feed an augmenting population; and with every step of our progress the price of corn must rise." This was the hon. gentleman's theory, by which, as applied to this country, he explained the cause of the rise of corn since 1793, and why it was, that corn could, not now be grown in this country at a low price. Now he (Mr. Attwood) was convinced, that there was no foundation, in fact, for the assertions here maintained, and on which this system was founded. He believed, that the fact thus assumed was directly the reverse of that which did in reality exist; that, so far from the average quality of land becoming poorer as population and wealth advanced, it became richer; and he had no doubt, but the average quality of the land under cultivation in this country, at the period of its highest prices, and of the greatest prosperity of agriculture, at the period prior to, the close of the late war—that the average quality of land was then more fertile; that it produced more corn on an average by the acre, and with less positive labour; that it yielded a greater surplus produce, than at any former period. It was not true, that the cultivation of any country, proceeded in the manner, and according to the calculation here assumed. It was not the best land, which was first cultivated; not the worst land which was last cultivated. This was determined in a great measure by other circumstances; by the rights of proprietorship, by locality, by enterprise, by the peculiarities of feudal tenure, its remains still existing; by roads, canals, the erection of towns, of manufactories; all those and other obstacles of a similar nature interfered with the calculations of the hon. member; and bad land when it was once brought into cultivation, and subjected to the operations of agriculture; by draining, by watering, by the application of various substances, frequently became the best land, and was afterwards cultivated at the least expense. The committee on waste lands of 1795, calculated that there then remained unenclosed, in England, Scotland, and Wales, a million of acres of land capable of conversion into water meadows; the most profitable of all land; and the whole unenclosed land of England and Wales, was, by that committee, calculated at only nine million acres. In proof of our having been recently driven to cultivate bad soil, the hon. member had produced from the agricultural evidence, instances of land yielding no more than twelve bushels by the acre; but if he had directed his inquiries to the produce of land at those earlier stages of cultivation and population, when, if he was right, the people were cheaply fed from rich soils, he would have found the fact to have been, that a greater proportion of the land then cultivated, yielded no more than six bushels, than now of land that yielded twelve. But the statement of the hon. member permitted this question to be placed on a footing that admitted of no further dispute. He had referred to prices. He said, that the constantly increasing poverty of the land to which a people must have recourse in their progress in society and population, would be marked by a constantly advancing price of corn, accompanying every step of that progress. Of the quality of land at different periods, whether it was better or worse, it would be difficult to furnish decisive evidence: it was different with respect to the price of its produce. That was capable of being ascertained. The fact was, that the price of corn never had risen, in the way the hon. gentleman had supposed. It had been for about a century and a half, prior to the late war, that money of the present standard and value had existed in this country. Dr. Smith had estimated, that the increased supply of gold from the American mines had ceased about 1640, and from that time, therefore, to the late war, the present standard might be taken to have continued. In the whole of that long period, no advance had taken place in the price of corn. The average price of corn, had been as high at the commencement of that period, as t its close. If they took the price of corn for years ending with 1794, the average price for that fifty years was 39s. 3d. a quarter (he took that amount from the report, of the corn committee of 1813), and the average price of corn for 50 year ending 1696 was 39s. 4d., difference of 1d. in that whole century. That had been a period of improving cultivation, of increasing population; when, if the hon. member was right, we must have been driven to poorer soils, when a rise in the produce of land, must of necessity have followed, and when, of course, that rise of price would be found marked in the tables. But corn had not risen in price, in that period; or in any other period, as the hon. member imagined, or for the causes he ascribed. It was a most important fact, and he mentioned it to the House more particularly because it explained the causes of the extraordinary advance in agricultural prices during the war—that no rise in the monied price of corn—he, of course, meant no permanent and general rise,—had ever taken place in this country, from the period of its earliest cultivation down to the commencement of the late war; except on one occasion; and that was on the occasion of an event, of no less magnitude, than the discovery of the new world, and the consequent introduction into Europe and this country, of the long accumulated produce of the mines of that great continent. There was no fact in history, better attested than that. The tables of prices of those former times had been investigated by Smith, with the accuracy which distinguished that great writer, and the conclusion he drew from them had never been since contested. Those tables exhibited the face, that from the earliest periods of which the prices had been recorded—from the days of the Norman invasion, down to the days of the Spanish armada,—no rise whatever had taken place, in the monied price of corn in this country; on the contrary, it had regularly fallen, the price of corn had been 20s. at the commencement of that period, and had fallen to 10s. at its close. Ten shillings continued to be the price of a quarter of wheat, at the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth; and then it experienced a rise to four times its former price, it rose to 40s.; and that rise was permanent; and it was final; it was common to this country with all Europe, and the price of corn in Europe, had never since risen beyond the price it then attained. It had never risen beyond that price in this country, until we abandoned at the commencement of the late war, the precious metals as our standard of price, and having adopted a species of money, over the amount and extent of which we had full power; we poured that money into circulation with increased abundance, in the same manner in which the precious metals, had been poured into circulation in the reign of Elizabeth, and produced by that means similar effects. No advance in the progress of society, no increase of population, had ever yet occasioned an advance in the monied price of corn. Nothing but a fall in the value of money, no thing but its increased abundance, had ever produced that effect. Let the House compare these facts with the rise in corn during the late war, and they would want no other argument to show them what was the cause of that advance, and if any further evidence were wanting it would be found in this circumstance, that corn was now again fallen to its former monied price. But if their land then was not become inferior in quality, if it were not cultivated with greater labour, whence was it, that corn could not be now produced, as cheaply as at former times? Adam Smith, the greatest of authorities on the subject of political economy, would tell them, that the operation of excessive taxation on agriculture, was precisely similar to that which the member for Portarlington traced to an imaginary poverty of the land. The effect of taxation on agriculture, as explained by Dr. Smith, might be stated in these words; that it was an effect similar to that which would be produced,—by an increased barrenness of the soil; by an increased inclemency of the sky. They arrived then at the same result, through the burthens of their taxation, which they knew well to exist, as that which the hon. member would explain, by an imaginary barrenness of the soil, which had, in fact, no existence. And, in what, then, consisted the difference between their own agriculture and that of those hostile or rival nations to which they were referred for their supply? That the land of those countries was more fertile, better cultivated, or yielded a greater surplus produce? None of these circumstances were the case, the advantage those soils possessed over our agri- culture was this, that we had not been able to reach them, with the curse of our taxation. Those soils we had protected—indeed; our own agriculture was burthened for their protection, but no government had been able to tax them. Whence this absence of taxation in those countries? Had those governments experienced no necessity, or were they more moderate than our own? They had resorted to us in their necessity, and had been assisted by burthens imposed on our own agriculture; that agriculture which, having burthened for their protection, we would now abandon for their gain; and in pursuit of visionary theories and distant and doubtful advantage. The very absence of taxation in those countries, and its existence in our own, was of itself evidence of no greater surplus produce, and that the only disadvantage under which our agriculture laboured, as compared with that of foreigners, was, the amount of its burthens.

He would recall to the attention of the House, what the detailed operation of taxation on agriculture necessarily was. The operation of taxation was this; that wherever any certain number of individuals, were employed in cultivating the soil, or in any other branch of productive industry—the effect of taxation was this, to place a certain other number of individuals to be supported by the labour of the former; and to draw their support from the produce of that labour, before the labourer was himself permitted, to taste of the fruit of his own industry. As they proceeded step by step, in that course, increasing the number of those who, by means of taxation, subsisted on the produce of the labour of others, they arrived at length at that point, when sufficient would not remain, for the support of the labourers themselves, and of those by whose capital they were employed. Then it was, that production and cultivation, becoming more difficult as taxation proceeded; became impossible in its excess; and that was the point at which the condition of the country evinced that they had now arrived. But if the ultimate effect of taxation was thus certain, its immediate operation, through the medium of money in which taxes were collected and paid, was still more visible and manifest. Every monied tax on the necessaries of life, must be paid out of the wages of labour, and increased the monied cost of cultivation and production. As they proceeded in this course, they were led at length to that point, where the monied cost of the cultivation of land, exceeded the monied price of its produce; for the monied price of the produce of land, was regulated by the value of that money in which it was estimated. Then cultivation became impossible—then production ceased—it was attended with loss: that was the condition of difficulty to which they were arrived; and it was in that condition that they were told of remedies, which were in fact no other than the evils of which they complained, when they were told of relief to be found in abandoning—not indeed the taxes; but the land which they oppressed,—of diminishing, not the magnitude of the burthen, but the strength by which it was to be borne. Taxation had no power, to whatever extent carried, to effect that rise in prices so necessary to its support. In that the hon. member for Portarlington, he was satisfied, would agree with him. He would ask this question, whether if their currency had still continued on the footing of the war currency, and they had doubled all existing taxes by direct imposition; if they had by posit1ve enactment made their 60 millions of taxes 120 millions; would that additional taxation have raised the price of corn? Not one farthing, if unaccompanied with the issue of additional paper money. The burthens and difficulties of agriculture would have been doubled; its prices have remained stationary. This then was the condition of difficulty to which they were arrived.

But if that was the nature of taxation, let them consider, then, to what extent taxation had been virtually increased, since that period, when agriculture had flourished in spite of the burthens which it endured. That increase must be admitted to be to that extent, whatever it was, into which the value of the currency had been raised. The extent of that alteration was now generally admitted to be 25 per cent. That estimate of 25 per cent was formed on a calculation, drawn from the price of gold; but the hon. member for Portarlington, who had chiefly insisted on that mode of calculation, had never hitherto been induced to explain, why gold, taken as a commodity, in the market, by the ounce, was to be considered as a better criterion than any other commodity; than hemp, or tallow, or cotton, or any other indifferent commodity, for the purpose of estimating the rate of a general rise, or a general fall of prices. But if that hon. member had failed to explain why gold was a better criterion, than any other commodity, he (Mr. Attwood) would show why it was undoubtedly a worse. In a rise of prices occasioned by the exclusive use of paper money, the great demand for bullion, that of circulation, at once ceased. The bullion market would then receive supplies from that quarter, from whence had previously arisen its principal demand. In the same manner when a metal standard was again resorted to, a new demand for gold would at once take place, precisely at that period, when there would exist, in consequence of a contraction in the general amount of money, a reduced demand for all other commodities. Gold bullion, consequently would be of all commodities, the last and the least to rise, in a general rise of prices, occasioned by the depreciation of paper money and the last and the least to fall, in a general fall of prices occasioned by the restoration of that depreciation; and it would therefore of necessity prove the most faulty of all measures, by which such general rise, and general fall, of prices could be estimated. But if gold could not be used as a proper criterion to estimate the increased value of the currency, to what commodity or measure were they to resort Undoubtedly, when the question was, to determine what was the increased pressure of taxation upon agriculture, occasioned by the change in the value of the currency; the most proper commodities to determine the extent of that change, were those in which agriculture was principally interested, corn and cattle. The price of corn during the last five years of the war, that period in which the last and the principal burthens of taxation had been imposed, was 107s. a quarter, for the average of that five years. The price of wheat was now 53s. a quarter, and the price of cattle had fallen in an equal degree. The pressure of taxation upon agriculture, therefore, had been doubled. Was not the farmer now compelled to pay the same amount of taxes out of every 50s. that be received, as he was formerly required to pay out of every 100s.? Do not the parties for whose benefit these taxes are paid, find that they now draw for every given amount of these taxes, a portion of agricultural produce, double that which they drew when these taxes were imposed? What became then of that preposterous argument which would represent that the taxes are no cause of the distress of agriculture, because agriculture had at one time flourished under taxes nominally as high as the present? What weight was due to the argument of the member for Portarlington, of 10 per cent additional taxation upon agriculture, arising out of the change in the currency; and his calculation of 4 millions and 2 millions, thus added to its burthens; and that sums like these were not sufficient to account for the ruin of the whole landed interest and agricultural community? These measures were not to be so estimated. Taxation had been doubled. During these last eight years in which they had been engaged in reforming, as they were pleased to term it, their currency; when they came to examine the result of their labours it would be found, that in that disastrous and dismal period, in which they had been so occupied, they had doubled the monstrous amount of 60 millions of annual taxes in their pressure on the agricultural community, and it was in the midst of that terrible operation, without example in the history of governments and of nations, and of the ruin and destruction which it had scattered throughout the different orders and interests of the state, that that, and the other House of Parliament, had been found discussing what the effect of taxation was; doubting whether taxation was in any way materially connected with the interests of those, by whom the taxes were paid; and turning to the price of gold, as it appeared in their tables, by the ounce, they at length reluctantly admitted that their measures had increased taxation on an agriculture which they had ruined, to an extent which was to be estimated by that absurd calculation; and by the price of a commodity with which agriculture had no concern.

Was this estimate of the increase of taxation too high? Not if the present prices of agricultural produce continued. It was upon that, that the question depended. Indisputably, at the present, moment, the increased pressure of taxation upon agriculture, was as great as he had assumed; and if the present prices were permanent, that increase of burthen was permanently established. If that new standard of value which they had adopted should prove incapable of sustaining (as he was convinced it was incapable), any higher rate of agricultural prices than the present, then the act of parliament by which it was established, was an act by which they had at once doubled, all the weight of 60 millions a annual taxes, and of 800 millions of permanent debt, in their pressure on the agricultural community. Of how much importance, therefore, had it been that the House should have inquired, as it never had inquired, before it established that new standard, or old standard, whichever it might be called, what its character and probable operation was, and what were the effects to be expected from it; what measure of value it was calculated to give; what rate of prices to support? It was not through the medium of the public burthen and debts only, that that measure affected the landed interest; its influence was equally destructive, in its operation on all the private engagements, with which the landed interest was concerned. Let them consider the case of that individual landowner, which had been recently mentioned in the House by a noble lord, the member for Tavistock. That individual, as he understood the noble lord, possessed an estate, which produced a rent in the high prices of the paper money of 20,000l. a year: and it was burthened with rent-charges, annuities, fortunes to relations, and other outgoings, founded in those high prices also, to the extent of 10,000l. a year; and the rent had now fallen it appeared, or must fall, one-half If this change had been effected by the alteration in their monied system; if these prices and rents were to be permanent; they had confiscated by act of parliament every shilling of the fortune of this individual; they had divested him of all property in his own estate, however long his ancestors had possessed it, however prudently he had himself enjoyed it: they had left him no longer any interest by law in any portion of the land of this country, except what he might derive as a pauper under the poor-laws. That was the violent manner in which their measures had affected the rights of property; whether to that degree or not, and to what degree was the only question that admitted even of a dispute. It was most important, therefore, to inquire, what that degree was, how far these violent measures were to be carried, who was to be affected by them, and who could consider himself and his property safe. And on that point, as to what the rate of prices was which their present money was capable of sustaining, and what measure of value their standard was capable of giving; on that subject he would not occupy the attention of the House, with any abstruse disquisitions. They had a better, and more certain guide before them, the obvious guide of experience, and he would refer to the information which that gave them. The money now again established, the standard of value adopted, was not new: it was that which had formerly existed, and he requested the House to consider what its former operation had been. The most extensive information before the House, on the subject of former prices, was given in the report of the corn committee of 1813, to which he had before referred. That report had given the prices of corn for a century, prior to the late war, and had divided those prices into average periods of five years; for corn, which fluctuated in price from one year to another more than any other commodity, was more uniform and permanent in its price, than any commodity, the produce of the labour of man, for any average period, of even a small number of years. The highest price, then, which appeared in that report for any average of five years was 49s. 9d. for a quarter of corn; and that price took place at the commencement of the last century. That was the highest average price, which in money of that weight and fineness in which corn was now again estimated, had ever been given in this country or that had ever been given in any other country, in such money, for a quarter of corn. It had been the price of corn also, as he had before mentioned, for half a century, before this table commenced. The price of corn began with the origin of their present standard, now nearly two centuries back at about 47s., as the highest average price for corn; and ended at about 47s. as its highest average price, at the commencement of the late war. And, what reason was there for believing that a standard of value, which for so long a period had continued so uniform in its operation: which amidst all the changes which the country had experienced, of war, of peace, of taxation, of debt, of over-production, or scanty production, which bad, amidst every kind of change, maintained so invariable a hold on the price of corn, would now assume a different character, and give a different estimate. It was for those who maintained that opinion, to show the grounds on which they supported it. That had not hitherto been attempted. Would it be contended that the precious metals had become more abundant, that they existed in greater quantities than before? That would appear in a rise of prices common to this country, and to the continent at large. The prices of corn on the continent, and in this country, as long as they were estimated alike, in money composed of the precious metals, hail always nearly corresponded. From 30s. to 40s. of our money a quarter had been the price of corn in France for nearly the last two centuries, there had been a regular correspondence between those prices and their own. Those were the prices of France at this time. There had been no material rise of prices in France during the whole of the late war, that period marked by such an extraordinary rise in this country. France had not altered the character of its money. Prices had not materially risen there, they had not, consequently, materially fallen. And was it possible that any considerable alteration in the relative value of corn and the precious metals, could take place in this country, when none took place in the countries around them? That gold could fall in value in one country and not in others.? That whilst the ancient price of two centuries, continued on the continent, the price of from 30s. to 40s.; a materially higher price of the principal article of subsistence, estimated in money of the same kind, could be permanently established here? No individual acquainted with the simplest maxims or political economy, would venture to maintain it. What result had the short experience they already possessed, of the effects of the reestablishment of the old standard given them? The price of corn he believed had already fallen to nearly its original rate. It was now about 50s. It had fallen to the same price, during the short period, in which they had attempted to re-establish that standard in 1815. The agricultural committee of the last session, in the laborious and perplexed inquiries, in which they had involved themselves respecting the prices of corn, had entirely mistaken the course which they ought to have pursued. They found existing a species of money, a standard of value, such as had existed in this country in all former times. They found existing, also, a price of corn, such as that money had always given; such as that standard had at all times measured—and they proceeded to enquire, whence a circumstance so extraordinary as that could have arisen? Whence it had occurred, that the same commodity on one hand, and the same money on the other, should strike out the same price—the same substance, measured by the same standard, give the same result now as at all former times? The proper subject for their inquiry, was—what had been the cause of those high prices which had distinguished the preceding twenty years. Whence it had arisen, that the price of corn, which had continued so uniform for nearly two centuries; which had never during that period, reached a higher price than 50s. for any short average of years; and which had now returned to 50s. again; had, in the interval, suddenly risen, and had reached the price of 80s. for a period of five years; and then 80s. for a period of ten years; and lastly 110s. for a like average period of five years. That extraordinary state of things, would have been well deserving of their labours, to elucidate and explain; and in that course of inquiry, it would have been scarcely possible for the committee to have proceeded, without arriving at one plain and direct conclusion—that this rise of prices had been merely nominal; that it was the quality of the money, and not the character of the commodity, either in its production or supply, that had undergone alteration. That the old metal money had been abandoned, when these prices were obtained; that a paper money had been substituted in its place; that that paper money had been issued in increased quantities; that so issued, and so existing in circulation, great nominal amounts had been given in exchange for all commodities; that it was in money of that species, in pounds and shillings of that description, that first 80s. and then 110s. had been obtained for a quarter of corn—that. with that species of money, those prices had ceased, and must of necessity have done so—that to hold out a contrary expectation to the people—to lead them to believe, that any higher prices than the present, could permanently exist, in conjunction with the money now again adopted—that the effect could remain, when the cause was removed—would be at best a gross and a senseless delusion, calculated to increase the 'calamities of the petitioners; to conceal from them their real condition: to prevent them from protecting their remaining fortunes by a just knowledge of it; and to aggravate all the sufferings which the committee were appointed to relieve.

It was not his intention however to enter into the question generally of the alteration in the currency: but to call the attention of the House to the causes which had distressed agriculture, and more particularly through the increase of its burthens; convinced as he was, that the House could not proceed with advantage, unless their measures were grounded on a full view of the whole extent of the evils before them, and their causes; he should regret if they adopted the partial and inefficient measures about to be proposed; and by which he was satisfied they would compromise still farther their own character, and increase the difficulties of the petitioners and the country.

Mr. Ricardo

said, he rose, impressed with great admiration for the speech which the House had just heard. He thought the hon. gentleman had shown a very considerable degree of talent, much research, and great knowledge of the subject upon which he had spoken. [Hear.] Notwithstanding these circumstances, he could not help thinking, that the hon. gentleman had committed a great many errors. The hon. gentleman had spoken of him (Mr. Ricardo) as if he had always been a favourer of a paper circulation [cries of "No, no"]—as if, in fact, he had not been one of the first to point out the evils of a currency, in the estimation of which the House could have no guide, and which was at all times liable to be increased or diminished, as it might suit the convenience or the pleasure of the Bank. The hon. gentleman appeared to have founded the whole of his speech upon a passage in a pamphlet that he (Mr. Ricardo) had written, respecting what were called "remunerating prices." To the test of the doctrine and reasoning of that pamphlet, he should be very willing to trust the whole of the argument in this case. It could make no difference to the farmer how he obtained those remunerating prices, provided he got them; although it was very true (as had been asserted by the hon. gentleman), that in order to obtain such prices, he must be content to be paid in money or value of very different descriptions. But the important fact was, that it was' impossible a man could long go on, producing any one particular commodity, unless he could obtain for it a remunerating price.—The hon. gentleman had spoken as if he (Mr. Ricardo) were alone responsible for the alteration which had lately taken place in the value of money. He would, however, beg the House to recollect the state in which the currency stood in the year 1819. At the time of the passing of the bill of 1819, the difference between the paper currency and gold was only 5 per cent. What he had then suggested was, that measures should be taken which, while they restored the value of the paper currency to an equality with gold, and thus put an end to the depreciation, would make any purchases of gold unnecessary. Under those measures, as there would have been no additional demand for gold, there could have been no increase in the value of that metal. But as that suggestion was not followed, but another which rendered the purchase of gold necessary, and which (as it had been carried into effect by the Bank) had made a considerable change in the value of gold, how was he (Mr. R.) responsible for the effects of it? If the change in the value of money had been 20 or even 50 per cent he should not have been responsible for it. Undoubtedly, as the hon. member contended, the burthen of money taxation was increased, in proportion to the increase in the value of money: the only difference was as to the amount of that increase. He (Mr. Ricardo) contended, that it was at the utmost about 10 per cent, and nothing like what had been contended by the hon. gentleman. The hon. member had said, that he (Mr. Ricardo) measured depreciation solely by the price of gold; and the same observation had been made in various parts of the House, and repeated elsewhere under an entire misconception of the meaning of the word depreciation. Depreciation meant a lowering of the value of the currency, as compared with the standard by which it was professedly regulated. When he used the word, he used it in this obvious and proper sense. The standard itself might be altered, as compared with other things; and it might so happen that a currency might be depreciated, when it had actually risen, as compared with commodities, because the standard might have risen in value in a still greater proportion. When he said, that the currency was relieved from depreciation to such and such an extent, did he say that the currency had not altered in value? The question of the value of the currency was quite a different thing from the question of depreciation; and if the hon. member could prove that gold had changed in value 40 or 50 per cent, he (Mr. R.) would allow that there was a proportionate increase of value in the currency. The hon. member asked why gold was a better standard than corn or any other commodity? He (Mr. R.) answered, that gold had always been the standard of the country; and if we had not passed the fatal law of 1797, we should have continued to this moment with a metallic standard. But, would it have been said on that account, that gold had not altered in value? If, while we had continued a metallic currency, any other country which had had a paper currency had been returning to a metallic standard, the hon. gentleman might have come down, as he did now, and said, that on account of the purchase of gold that had been made, the value of that metal had been enhanced and that the pressure of money taxes had been proportionately increased. But, did the hon. member mean seriously to contend, that corn was less variable in value than gold [Hear, hear!]? Let him propose, then, that the Bank directors should pay their Bank-notes at a certain rate in quarters of corn instead of sovereigns; for that was the bearing of his assertion [Hear!]. The hon. gentleman talked of the impossibility of the cultivators of the soil having recourse to land of inferior quality, but the hon. gentleman did not correctly state the argument. It was not that cultivators were always driven by the increase of population to lands of inferior quality, but that from the additional demand for grain, they might be driven to employ on land previously cultivated a second portion of capital, which did produce as much as the first. On a still farther demand a third portion might be employed, which did not produce so much as the seconds it was manifestly by the return on the last portion of capital applied, that the cost of production was determined. It was impossible, therefore, that the country should go on increasing its demand for grain without the cost of producing it being increased and causing an increased price. If the hon. member saw in the present state of things only the consequence of the change in the value of money, he gave no reason for the amount of the distress. Let them suppose his (Mr. Ricardo's) own case. He was possessed of a considerable quantity of land, the whole of which was unburthened by a single debt. Now, according to the hon. member, he and tenants on that land would have only been injured to the amount of the increase which the change in the value of money had made in the burthen of taxation. But they wore, in point of fact, injured much more. The hon. gentleman was mistaken as to the fact, when he said there was little variation in the price of grain in the last century. In the first 62 years of the last century the average price of the quarter of wheat had been 32s.; but, in the years front. 1784 to 1792 it had been 45s.—a very considerable increase on the value of corn. But, he would not rest on any scattered, facts what was so evident in principle, as that the extension of cultivation must extend the cost of production of corn. The hon. member had said, that the effect of taxation laid on the land was the same as if the farmer had to support an additional man from whose labours he reaped no benefit. That he (Mr. R.) acknowledged was the effect of all taxation [Hear!]. The hon. member had seemed to think that he would deny this. On the contrary, no one could assert the mischievousness of taxation more strongly than he would. He would never consent that one sixpence should be taken out of the pockets of the people that could be avoided. But he was not, therefore, so blind as to say that taxation was the cause of all the present distress [Hear, hear!]. It was truly said, that the effect of taxation on the landholder was the same as if he had to maintain an additional man: but was not this also the case of the merchant and the manufacturer [Hear!]? If taxation, then, were the sole cause of distress, the distress would press on all alike. The theory of the hon. member was, therefore, totally insufficient to account for what they now witnessed. The hon. gentleman had asked, whether the price of corn would not be doubled if the currency were paper, and taxation were doubled? If tithes were doubled, poor-rates doubled and all taxes affecting especially the growth of corn were doubled, the effect would certainly be to increase the price of corn to that amount; but the country might be taxed generally without producing that alteration. The hon. gentleman had said that he (Mr. Ricardo) advised the abandonment of the land. Now he did not advise the abandonment of it while it was profitable but he did undoubtedly advise farmers not to grow a commodity that Would not yield them a remunerating price. He would give similar advice to the clothier and to the ship-owner, if their circumstances were similar. He would not now enter into a discussion of the particular propositions about to be brought before the committee. He was content to have answered, however inadequately, the vary able speech of the hon. gentleman, and he sat down with declaring that he did not entertain the slightest doubt of the validity of the principles he had maintained.

Mr. Attwood,

in explanation, observed, that he had fallen into no mistake respecting the price of corn in the former part of the last century. He was perfectly aware of the fall which then took place, and he would remind the hon. member, that Adam Smith had ascribed it to an alteration in the value of money. He was aware also that, about the middle of the century, corn had recovered from that depression, from whatever cause, and had reached its former price, but had never exceeded it till the French war. If the hon. member would refer to the price for 20 years before the war, he would find no advance whatever in that time, and it was a period when much additional land was brought into cultivation, when importation above exportation was insignificant, and when population was rapidly increasing.

The House having resolved itself into a committee,

The Marquis of Londonderry

said, that no individual listened with more satisfaction than he did to displays of talent, coming from any part of the House, on any question connected with the great interests of the country, but he must say, that if they did not confine themselves to some one practical view of the question before them, they would sacrifice the interests of the country. The hon. member (Mr. Attwood), whom he should have listened to with great pleasure on a more suitable occasion, had entered into the wide field of the bullion question, and he had naturally brought forward the hon. member for Portarlington, as the gladiator on the other side of the question. He humbly suggested to the hon. member; that if be was disposed to consider the effect of taxation on the country, he might have taken the occasion when the proposition was, to take off some of the taxes; and that if he chose to consider the state of the currency in its largest sense, he might have taken the opportu- nity which would be shortly offered, by the motion of the hon. member for Essex. He should not have said so much, but for the animadversion of the hon. member, on the narrow view which he conceived the ministers had taken of agricultural distress. That narrow view was, however, very important. It was the consideration of a measure, not of immediate relief, but of future safety to the dearest interests of the country. The question was, how far agriculture was menaced by the importation of foreign corn, in the event of the ports being thrown open, under the present law; and to this he would now direct the attention of the House. The practical question depended, first, upon the price under which it might be prudent to open the ports for the importation of foreign corn; secondly, upon the rate of duty at which such importation should take place; and, thirdly, whether, after the ports were opened, any rate of duty should continue? He would state shortly, in the outset, why the House was called upon to adopt some measure on the subject. The presumption certainly was against the ports being opened; but if they were opened, in the present state of the markets of the continent, the importation of foreign grain would be so much beyond the wants of the country, as for a long time most ruinously to depress the prices in the British market. All agreed that something should be done, and by means of duty. Five plans had been broached; and, taking the preliminary point for granted, he would come to the practical points which had noticed. First, as to the price at which the ports should be opened for importation: at present it was 80s., and when they were opened, it was without restraint as to duty, and limitation as to quantity. All parties consented to proceed on the principle of the report of last year—that if a duty of restraint were imposed, there ought to be some relaxation of the price at which corn might be imported. The legislature was called upon by the petitioners to give additional protection to agriculture. Now, he had heard no case to show that the distress arose from a want of protection. The protection was now quite ample; but it could not give price. The price of 70s., he thought, in all ordinary years, would operate as a prohibition, and secure the monopoly to our own growers. The resolutions both of his right hon. friend, and of the hon. member for Portarlington, contemplated an immediate change in the import price. The latter opened the port at 70s., with prior right of entry at 65s. to corn ware housed. The former allowed the introduction of warehoused corn at 70s., gave it the monopoly for 3 months, or until the price rose to 80s., and then foreign importations were permitted. He freely owned, that, as far as his own individual opinion was concerned, he should feel no alarm if either proposition were adopted; but he had felt it right to propose, that the ports should open at 65s. with a duty of 15s. and a fluctuating duty of 5s. per quarter. The great mass of the committee had thought that it would be highly inexpedient to open the ports under 80s.; and if alarm prevailed on this point, parliament ought to endeavour to legislate in the tone of the sentiments of the country; it ought not to aggravate the real sufferings of the agriculturists by torturing their minds. He had thought that the great tide of foreign corn would be regulated by a duty with more effect if it began at an earlier point than 80s. if the British market were not opened until it reached that price, the torrent of foreign corn would accumulate and swell, and when set at liberty, it would roll over rather in an overwhelming cascade, than in a regular stream. The hon. members for Somerset and Wilts concurred with the committee in the price of 80s., excepting that the committee admitted, warehoused corn at 70s.—He now came to the question of duty, and here also different suggestions had been made. The hon. member for Somerset proposed 35s.; but he might just as well declare that foreign corn should not be imported at all. To the 35s. duty, must be added 10s. for expences, and 80s. or 90s. for the price of the corn; for it could not then be admitted until the average was 80s., consequently some of the prices would be considerably higher. In a year of scarcity, a bill to repeal such a law would be passed, as a measure of public safety, through ally; its stages in a single night. The recommendation of the hon. member for Wilts, though more moderate, partook strongly of the same quality: to his duty of 24s. was to be added 10s. for the expenses and the price of the quarter of corn. 80s. or 90s. These propositions led him to the question of a fixed rate of duty, reference to the price of the commodity, in the market. The hon. member for Portarlington wished to have a fixed rate of duty always in operation; and it might be realized when the markets of the world were in a natural state. His right hon. friend (Mr. Huskisson) was not prepared to make it a fixed rate of duty. He (lord L.) did not believe it possible to levy a duty to a considerable amount after a certain price, because the moral feeling of the country would be against it: in point of fact, a high duty could not exist with a high price. He should infinitely prefer a simple measure of a fixed rate of duty, getting rid of all complexity, without any fixed price; but that theory could not be realized. He would state why it would not be safe to try the experiment now. If he could bring his own mind to think that there was no practical danger in it, he could not persuade the country to think so. In arguing the question of duty, he must begin at a more moderate rate than those of either the hon. member for Somerset or Wilts. The proposition of the committee was the lowest of all; but if no alteration was to be made in the scale of duty until the price reached 80s., it would be necessary to look at the situation of the market when open to foreign grain. Taking the duty to be 15s. and the price 90s., (to make the average of 80s.), deducting the duty, the foreign importer would be able to procure 65s. The value of corn on the continent was now so low, that he would be able to realize a considerable profit. On this point he had been somewhat mistaken out of doors. It had been supposed that he had said on a former night, that foreign corn could not at this moment be obtained in this country at 30s. or 35s. He had never so stated. The corn now warehoused might be obtained for 25s., or even 20s., because the holders were uncertain of a market. If, also, only a small quantity were at present required from the continent, it might be had at 30s., or 35s.; but he maintained that it could not be imported at that rate in all years and in all quantities. The continental grower would not be remunerated at that price. It was clear, however, that even from Dantzic, where wheat was the dearest, it might be brought to this country with great advantage when the importer could secure 65s. If, then, some mode were not adopted for preventing it, foreign grain would continue to pour in until it found its level here with the rest of the world, and the result might be most prejudicial to agriculture. The experiment might be risked when the world had returned to its natural state; but, at present, duty only would not be an adequate protection. At present any reasonable duty would leave such an interval between the price here and on the continent, that the influx might be ruinous. What, then, was the remedy? He knew of no other but that after the price had run down below what agriculture could bear, the import price should be taken in aid of the duty. The report of last year, had drawn a marked distinction between measures that might be necessary at the present time, and those which it might be desirable to adopt at a future period; but those ultimate measures it had recommended with great caution and great discretion. Now, he must say, that nothing had occurred in the course of the last year to satisfy him that we had approximated more nearly to a state of things in which we could legislate on general maxims. Therefore, he was rather for a modification, than for adopting the more sound and established general principles. He should feel great distrust in giving his own opinions in opposition to those of his right hon. friend and the hon. member for Portarlington, if he did not see distinctly the ground on which they differed. They thought that we were arrived at that period when the establishment of sound principles of a corn law was right and practicable. He was of opinion that we had not yet arrived at that period. He could not see that the market of the world was less superabundant; he did not think that prices had risen on the continent; he knew, unfortunately, that they had not risen in this country. If the country were in a more natural state of things, and we had opened our ports earlier, 10s. added to the foreign price he should think a right protection. If wheat were then 25s., 30s., or 35s., the quarter on the continent, and if it rose from 35s. to 40s. which was its natural price, than 10s. of expense of importation, and 15s. of duty, would raise the price to 65s. This would be nearly equal to the home price of 70s. He admitted that it was desirable to dispose of the question of the corn laws at once. We referred to it with pain. His right hon. friend was therefore anxious to set the subject at rest, and with this feeling had shown a disposition to modify his general principles. The hon. member for Portarlington, too, had acted with as much accommodation as could be expected from a person who held so high the principles to which he gave his authority. That hon. member attempted to reconcile the measure which the present exigency required, with the measure which ought to be permanently established, by imposing now a duty, which, in the course of the next ten years, would fall to its permanent amount of 10s. He should like this proposition better, if it allowed a larger operation to the commerce in corn; and for that reason he had proposed 65s. in the committee. But if that should not be the price at which the ports were to be open, then he would support what was the general view of the committee. His right hon. friend proposed a duty of 15s. The committee recommended 12s., with an alteration of 5s. He would rather take the duty at 20s. or 15s. than leave the country exposed to the evils which were now felt in consequence of the irregular importation of foreign corn. It was upon those general principles that he ventured submit the proposition to the House. Two or three shillings could not have such a charm with any member, as to render it worth while to spend much time in discussing it. The great object was, the substituting a more extended commerce in grain instead of a monopoly, and then prospectively the removal of restrictions. One thing he strongly deprecated. With every disposition to show their sympathies with the agriculturist, let them not contemplate an aggravated scale of protection. Such a measure as he proposed might pass very smoothly through the House; yet if they awakened the feelings of the people, their future legislation would be impeded by petitions, as at a former period, when such fatal consequences attended them. He had endeavoured to legislate with an even hand between the grower and the consumer. Unusual supply, and a violent transition from high to low prices, little accorded with the interests of either. He hoped they would be allowed to go forward with their legislation with the confidence of the country. But if an aggravated protection were sought for the sake of additional efficacy, they might expect to have the whole proceedings broken in upon. If the hon. member for Somersetshire proposed nothing but simplicity, and if he could persuade the committee to adopt the protecting duty of 35s., he (lord L.) would withdraw all the scale of duties which he now proposed.—The noble marquis then moved, "That it is the opinion of this Committee, that whenever foreign wheat shall have been made for home consumption under the provisions of an act made in the 55th year of his late majesty, the scale of prices at which the home consumption of foreign corn, meal or flour, is permitted by the said act, shall cease and determine."

Sir T. Lethbridge

began by returning his thanks to the hon. member for Callington (Mr. Attwood) for one of the most able speeches he had ever heard in that House—a speech which would carry conviction to the heart of every man in the country. He agreed with that hon. member, that it was the duty of the House to legislate with a view to the benefit of the whole community, and he admitted, that he must be mistaken in the grounds on which he supported his present opinions, if they were opposed to that principle. The distinguishing feature in his proposition was, that it imposed a protecting duty on all agricultural produce. He was aware of the delicacy of legislating upon the food of man. In this commercial and manufacturing country this was always a delicate subject of legislation. But, if ever there was a period when it was incumbent on the House to look firmly at the question, this was that time. It was said, that a duty of 35s. was too great, and that it would be impossible to collect it. He was not satisfied that it would be so. What was the state of the market at the present moment? He had been informed by a merchant of high respectability, that he could deliver any quantity of wheat at 26s. a quarter. The agriculturists had been asked what they wanted in the shape of protection beyond monopoly? But he contended, that, they had had nothing like a monopoly. In Feb. 1819, no less than 2,500,000 quarters of corn had been imported—a quantity which had had a sensible influence on the market ever since. There were at present 800,000 quarters of corn warehoused in the country; and the object of one of the new measures was, to let out this quantity of foreign corn before the price reached 80s. But corn was not the only article to which the House ought to direct its attention. Last week, in London, 1,400 firkins of foreign butter had been sold at from 56s. to 60s., to which the price had fallen in consequence of the glut; but Buckinghamshire butter could not be sold at 6d. per lb., because the Dutchman had sold his quantity the day before, and, after deducting all charges, got 3d. per lb. by it. In like manner, he had known the Somersetshire farmers refuse to sell their cheese for less than 33s., when a cargo came from Rotterdam and filled up the vacancy left by the farmers refusing to sell. Hemp, tallow, and hides were in the same state. Unless protection was carried to a much greater extent than it now was, it was in vain to expect that the agriculturists could maintain their station in society. This might appear no evil in the opinion of some hon. members, but in his opinion, it was a crying evil, and required all the energies of parliament to prevent the consequences which were likely to result from it. The public creditor might be paid for a short time longer, but it was impossible that he could go on receiving his dividends, when so large a class of the community were in a state of ruin, and it would be unjust to expect it. Mr. Peel's bill was the main cause of the existing distress, and there could be no doubt that parliament would be obliged to retrace their steps. The tail of that bill must be cut off. It was impossible to go through with it; and the proposition with regard to country banks, proved that the government were convinced of the impossibility of pushing this measure to extremities. He knew not what the fate of the resolution which he was about to propose would be, but he was quite satisfied, that when the time should arrive for a free importation of corn, with regard to price, a lower rate of duty than that which he proposed, would not furnish an adequate protection to the agriculture of the country. He remembered an observation in that House which had made an indelible impression on his mind—that even with a duty of 40s. the country might at any time be inundated with foreign corn. The agricultural interest had always remained firm to their duty; and he doubted not that they would still continue so, if they were not goaded to desperation [Hear!]. He was one of those who would be heard; and he must say, that the measures which had been lately pursued, were calculated to drive the land-owners to desperation. He would not be put down, nor prevented from declaring his sentiments, and be trusted the House would not be led away by false speculations, and the abominable theories of political economists. [A laugh.] He hoped the House would put down those theories with all their might and force, and in so doing they would prove themselves to be the representatives of the whole people, and not of an interested class of the community. The agriculturists would be most grievously disappointed if the measures of the noble marquis were carried into effect. The resolution which he was about to propose, would afford a full and adequate protection to the various articles of native produce, and by that resolution he was prepared to stand or fall. The hon. baronet concluded by proposing the following resolution:— That it is expedient, for the protection of the agriculture of the united kingdom against foreign competition, that the following rate of duties shall be payable, and paid, on the import of any productions of foreign countries similar to those of our own, soil; and that, subject to such rates and duties, the import of all such productions shall, whenever the ports shall open under the present law, thereafter remain free for the import of all such productions, viz.:—

Wheat	40s. per qr.	Hemp	15s. cwt.
Meal	10s. cwt.	Hides	2d. lb.
Flour	14s. cwt.	Tallow	20s. cwt.
Rye	26s. 6d. qr.	Seeds	28s. cwt.
Oats	13s. 6d. qr.	Butter	56s. cwt.
Pease	26s. 6d. qr.	Cheese	37s. 4d. cwt.
Beans	26s. 6d. qr.	Poultry, 33l. per cent ad valorem according to price current.
Barley, Bear or Bigg	20s. qr.	Apples	5s. per bush.
Wool	1s. lb.	Pears	7s. bush.
Flax	20s. cwt.

All things not enumerated 33l. per cent ad valorem."

Sir F. Burdett

said, he felt no inclination to agree to any of the propositions which had been submitted to the House. With regard to the proposition of the hon. baronet for imposing an import duty on the various articles of our produce, for the sake of keeping up the prices, it was, in his opinion, a matter of minor importance, if not of total indifference. The hon. baronet appeared to complain, very unnecessarily, of an attempt to put him down; seeing that his opinions, whether they were right or wrong, had been listened to with attention by the House. There was one point in which he agreed with the hon. baronet, namely, the utter futility of all the projects and resolutions which had been proposed to the House. The view which the hon. baronet had taken of this subject, such as it was, was at least clear and intelligible. Its object was, that such a duty should be imposed as would pre- vent the possibility of importation, until corn should rise to a price with which the farmer could pay what was required from him in taxation, and through another cause, which the noble lord had left entirely out of view—he meant the change in the currency. The hon. baronet required that wheat should be raised to 120s. per quarter [Cries of "No, no."]. He had misunderstood him, then. At any rate, he had said, that if prices were not kept up, the agriculturists could not be relieved. With regard to the noble lord, he knew not well what to think he could not determine whether that noble lord was in jest or in earnest [Cheers!]. The noble lord had proposed a plan; but he (Sir F. B.) did not know in what light to consider it. He did not know whether the noble lord was more in earnest or less in joke than he was last night, when he brought forward a measure that he had treated with so much ill-placed levity. So much did the noble lord on this subject seem to forget the gravity that became a minister, and the seriousness that was due to the interests he was discussing, that if he (Sir F. B.) had a musical voice and wished to answer him in his own vein, he should be inclined to borrow the words of the old song, "Cease your funning." [A laugh.] This temper, on such an occasion he thought worse than levity. The manner in which the noble lord had introduced and surrendered the measure, showed inconsistency and incapacity. The noble lord's disposition seemed now humbled. Instead of threatening, as formerly, to yield nothing, he yielded every thing, as soon as he saw in the country gentlemen a desire to assert their claims. Nay, he yielded up his own conviction, and introduced a measure contrary to that conviction, because he thought it agreeable to their views; and, when he found that they received it with apathy, or treated it with aversion, he withdrew it with the same inconsiderate levity. The noble lord must have entertained a poor opinion of the House, or a high idea of his own powers of persuasion, when he undertook to convince it of the wisdom and policy of a measure of which he was not convinced himself. He had a right, therefore, to ask, was the proposition now before the committee the noble lord's own progeny, or if he found it as ill treated as the resolution of yesterday, would he come forward, deny the parental relation, and call upon the real father to relieve him from his ill-omened charge? Professing to be nurse or foster-father of this measure for agricultural relief, he scarcely allowed it to see the light when he extinguished it. The noble lord had recommended it to the House. He then came forward, and not only deprived it of existence, but seemed so ashamed of it, that he called upon the real parent to own his progeny, and free him from the imputation of being its parent. The noble lord's present project was, to impose a duty on the importation of foreign corn for the protection of the English grower; and various opinions had been stated as to the proper amount of that duty. Now, in his (sir F. B's.) opinion, there ought to be no duties at all. This was his sincere opinion; and it did not matter with him whether it was agreeable or not to the landed interest, or any other interest in the House. The noble lord himself appeared to have no opinion on the subject. Feeling perplexed in his place, and resolved to do something, without being able to decide on what ought to be done, he called upon the land-owner and the farmer to come to the relief of the minister. Though, from his official situation, he ought to be placed on an eminence whence he could survey all the interests of the country, and be able to apply all the measures which the exigency required, he professed himself to be guided by the views of the farmers and country gentlemen, and became the blind instrument of their will. To the plan which, at their suggestion, he brought forward, the noble lord contented himself with giving this recommendation, that "if it did no good, it could do no harm;" whereas he (sir F. B.) would maintain, that legislation which did no good on a subject like this, must do harm. But the noble lord could not advance farther; and when he found that the insufficiency of his proposed measure was detected and exposed, he declared that he put his trust in the healing effects of time. [Hear.] This had been long his infallible remedy. Time was to cure us of all our evils for the last seven years; yet, instead of being cured, they had only been aggravated. The physician had only exasperated the malignity of the disease, and increased the danger of the patient. Though the noble lord had not entered at all into the causes of the distress under which the country laboured, and seemed desirous of carrying the measure before the House, without proving its necessity or its adaptation to the end of effecting relief, he (sir F. B.) would go somewhat into the subject, to show that corn duties were not called for, and would be injurious. The great causes of our present sufferings were, the change in the currency and the pressure of taxation. He had not been present in the House when, as he had been told, a speech (Mr. Attwood's) of great ability was delivered on the effects of the change in the currency. There could be no doubt that that change, and not circumstances of partial operation or equivocal influence, was the cause of the general distress. It was a doctrine advanced by a noble earl in another place, that superabundance of produce was the cause of our agricultural embarrassments, and that no possible reduction of taxes would effect any relief; and the noble lord opposite, adopting the principles, but embellishing it with his usual exaggerations, had argued, that the remission of all the 70 millions of taxes would not sensibly alleviate the sufferings of the landed interest. What, then, would relieve us? He could not agree with the hon. member who spoke last in his denunciation of the principles of political economy; nor could he comprehend what that hon. member meant by political economy when he so abused it, unless he thought that it meant low prices. [A laugh.] The principles of political economy, when properly understood, meant only those principles which should guide the management of the public resources, and enabled us to explain those questions which related to them. According to any thing he could understand of political economy, it did not appear that the superabundance of produce, against which such complaints were made, could be proved to exist. It was stated before the committee, that the last two crops in this country had not been very abundant; and it was acknowledged on all hands that there had been no importation from abroad. It was a fact, likewise undeniable that during the war, when importation took place to a considerable extent, prices were high, and that when importation had ceased, prices had fallen. It did not seem, therefore, consistent with just reasoning to infer, that importation of foreign corn, or excessive supplies at home, had occasioned the fall of prices.—But, there was another fact which was connected with that fall, and which appeared more likely to be its cause. Simultaneous with the fall of prices, was a diminution, in the quantity of the currency. The former might be the effect of the latter. A decrease in the quantity of an article might raise its price beyond the proportion of that decrease. But the currency had been diminished to a great extent. During the war, the Bank' circulation rose to about 30,000,000l., and the circulation of country paper amounted, on calculation, to 40,000,000l. more, making together 70,000,000l. Taking the circulation of the country to be about a tenth part of its income, then a diminution of one per cent in the value of the circulating medium would depress prices 10 per cent. Such change affected all classes to a great extent; and as the income of the consumers diminished, consumption was consequently lessened. The importation of corn could not in this or any other state of things have affected us. The importing country was always rich; and it was on imports that the value of our commerce depended. They invigorated manufactures, they stimulated labour, and they increased the market for all commodities of home growth. By stopping the importation of corn by means of the corn laws, he was persuaded that the evils resulting from the change in the currency had been aggravated.—It had been objected by some persons to the landlords, that they endeavoured to obtain high rents. For his own part, he professed that he liked high rents, for he thought that high rents were a proof of the prosperity of a country. When high rents were enjoyed by the landlord, the farmer enjoyed high profits, and the labourer adequate wages. This might have been the state of things without fluctuation, but for the measure of 1797; which, by occasioning a change in the currency, cut both ways, and caused transfers of property without doing any good, which it was surprising the nation could pass through without ruin. The acts by which the circulation was at first depreciated and then restored, combined an operation which no other government ever attempted, and which no other nation could ever have endured. It had been said, that the act of 1819 had not occasioned distress, because the distress had begun before it passed; but, the preparation for carrying it into effect had begun long before the bill had received the sanction of parliament. That bill merely prevented prices from taking a backward course. The evils which the measure had caused in its contemplation and subsequent execution, were incalculable. It was the most fraudulent transaction that ever disgraced any country; and he knew of no greater crime than that involved in the unjust transfers of property which it created. Ministers ought to have been impeached, if they had been aware of the consequences of the measure without taking precautions against them [Hear, hear!]. They had thus forcibly altered all existing contracts—they had deprived one man of his property to enrich another. And how many might now be lingering in prison, who had been found by this iniquitous act in the midst of plenty, and had been left by it dry on the strand, to pant and expire without relief, like the fish of a pond after the water was withdrawn! By this interference with the currency sometimes the creditor suffered, sometimes the debtor: by it, the charges of the government and all the burthens of the state had been aggravated almost beyond endurance. In the mean time, the salaries of ministers, and the emoluments of office had not been affected, and the means of corrupt influence remained undiminished. It had been said, by those who wished to console us under our sufferings, that similar changes to this which he had described had occurred in other periods of our history; and the reigns of Edward 6th and William 3rd, had been appealed to as proofs of the assertion. True it was, that parts of the coin had formerly been clipped and debased; but a change had never before now been suddenly effected in the whole circulation of the country. When formerly the base coin was called in, or "cried down," according to the phrase used, notice was given that it would, after a certain time, be stopped, and a new coin issued. No inconvenience or loss was occasioned to the holders of it. Government at the time appointed, received it in the discharge of taxes. The country was thus relieved from a debased coin; which at any rate was of some value, and the holders of it were indemnified. But, what was the case now? Not a small portion of the coin only, but the whole circulating medium of the country had been altered 30 per cent. In the meantime, nothing had been settled. Ministers did nothing to compensate for the changes which they had occasioned; and the noble lord contented himself by standing up and referring the country to the general working of events, by which all things would be set to rights! Unless some compensation was made for this forcible change in the currency, there could be no claim for the amount of the present taxes [Hear!]. All our taxes ought to be lowered in proportion to the rise in the value of money: all our establishments ought to be reduced in that proportion—our civil list, and all the salaries of public officers. There was no use, for instance, for a civil list of 2,000,000l. It might be true, that they could not at once remove so much of the taxes as would occasion a complete relief; but they should bear in mind that the last hair breaks the camel's back, and that the one pound which they took off now would be a greater relief than that which they might take off next. The more distressed the country was, the more sensibly would the most trifling relief be felt and acknowledged. He with this view of the subject, did not think the result of the vote for the reduction of one of the postmasters-general unimportant; and he hoped the noble lord (Normanby) who had managed the business in so spirited a manner, and conducted it to so fortunate an issue, would not stop in his career, but take up some other similar job; and he was sure he would find no difficulty in making his choice [Hear!]. No retrenchment could be obtained from the present ministers without compelling them to it; but a few votes like that of the other evening would procure for the country some relief. Ministers had declared, at the beginning of the session, that they could not remit a single farthing of taxes; and since then we had heard of a remission of several millions. Indeed, they were so inconsistent in their conduct, and the reasons which they gave for it, that they almost in the same breath declared that an abolition of taxes would afford no relief, and then proposed to remit taxes as a source of relief.—Taxation, then, joined with the change in the currency, was the manifest cause of the distresses under which the country laboured; and the country gentlemen of England, with whom as a class be was connected, and whom he always looked upon with respect—whose fate was bound up in that of their country—who could not leave it, but must stand or fall along with it—were imperiously called upon at the present moment to come forward, and force upon ministers the means of their own salvation. He was convinced, that, whether generally connected with ministers or not, they would do their duty: he was convinced that they would see the destruction that impended over them: he was convinced that they would not look upon it as a trifling matter, who should get possession of their estates, though the soil might be cultivated as before: he was convinced that they would stand up and preserve their fields and mansions, which they had received from their fathers, and which they were pledged to transmit to their posterity. This they could not do, if they supported the present weak ministers in their vacillating policy and foolish projects [Hear, hear!]. They had unwarily given their confidence to men who trifled with their dearest interests, and insulted their deepest distresses—who came forward with a proposition for their relief which they professed would do neither good nor harm, and afterwards withdrew that proposition with levity and jesting—who treated them with a debate as children with a plaything, and when the amusement had lasted a sufficient time, closed it without coming to any result. The noble lord had formerly asked the country not to turn its back upon itself; but he made no scruple of turning his back upon his friends. He had last night, in withdrawing his countenance from one of them, wished "the saddle to be placed on the right horse;" but he had not only put on the saddle, but had ridden the horse hard to boot [Hear, and a laugh.] He had abandoned the measure which he brought forward for them; but this was not to be wondered at, for he had abandoned some of his own. He had heard the noble lord's plans and projects at the beginning of the session (which he confessed he did not understand); and he now found that they were given up. There was a scheme to lend money to parishes on the security of the poor-rates, and others, equally notable, of which he now heard nothing. He never remembered to have read or heard of a ministry that presented itself before the country like the present. An hon. gentleman had said, that they possessed the confidence of the House; but he was sure if this was the case, that both they and the House had lost, and justly lost, the confidence of the country [Hear, hear!]. The noble lord had last night been extremely jocular, and treated the proposition which he introduced as a jest. It would now be necessary to ask him, if to-night he was in earnest. Let him say whether he meant to support his own scheme, or was merely introducing it for the sake of a speech. The House would then know what they were about. If the noble lord was serious, he (sir F. B.) would propose, for the relief of agriculture, other measures than that before the committee. He would propose that all the expenses of the state should be reduced to the scale of 1792, as all prices had fallen to that standard; and as the currency had altered all the charges of government, that they should be all adjusted anew. The noble lord had laid great stress on keeping faith with the public creditor; but was not faith likewise to be kept with the public—the people of England? It was not by high prices that agriculture should be expected to flourish, but by a diminution of the public burthens and an adjustment of the change in the currency. The public creditor, if he was to receive his due, ought not to receive more than he contracted for. The state of the farmer must be looked to as well as that of the public creditor. It must come to that at last. The country could not go on without it [Hear, hear!]. The proposition, that the distress of the country proceeded from superabundance was contrary to every principle of political economy. Whenever there was an abundant crop, the farmer was compensated in the increase of quantity for the diminution of price. He was himself a consumer, and enjoyed to, the amount of his own consumption the benefit of low prices. He paid his rent to his landlord from his increased produce; and the landlord becoming his customer consumed more on account of the diminished price. The manufacturer, the labourer, and every class of the community enjoyed and consumed more of the farmer's produce, and were enabled to supply him at a lower price. It was quite impossible, in this view of the subject, that superabundance could produce mischief. But even if it could, what was the fact with regard to the reality of that overabundance? It did not exist, the last two crops were only average crops, and we had had no importation for three years. Providence had not therefore inflicted this imaginary evil upon us; our distress arose from the change in the currency and the pressure of taxation, and was not to be relieved by corn bills. The causes of our embarrass- ments were, our immense military and colonial establishments, our civil list, and our great load of taxation. The corn trade, as well as all other trade, should be free; and its freedom would occasion no inconvenience, if we were relieved from a portion of our burthens. The great evil was a ministry who had not wisdom to propose, or character to execute, any great or beneficial measure—who could take no large or liberal view of the state, of the country—who thought only of preserving their places, and of obtaining a vote for the evening. Such an administration, with the noble lord at its head, was a national calamity. His vacillation, perplexity, and ignorance of what he should do, was owned by the noble lord himself—habes confitentem reum; and yet he was a bold man, too, for he hoped for shelter even in the storm that threatened and surrounded us. But, when the waves dashed, when the tempest raged, when they heard the wind whistling through the shrouds, would the gentlemen of England so stultify themselves as to continue their confidence in such a pilot at the helm? [Loud cheers.] Could they expect that, under the counsels of such an imbecile government, any country could stand? When we saw boldness and rashness joined to such imbecility, was it not time that they should be checked in their career? We had now been passing through our seven years' transition from war to peace, and nothing had been done. If the noble lord could not find out some beneficial measure, he ought to surrender a power which he could not direct to any good purpose. The noble lord bad, since the peace, been at conferences, at congresses—he had feasted with princes and sovereigns—he had attended balls and routs with high personages, and he might address to him what had been said on a different occasion— Lusisti satis, edisti satis, atque bibisti; Tempus abire tibi est.—— Any ministry at the head of affairs in this country, at this time, ought to be able to look its difficulties in the face, and meet them with corresponding vigour. This could not be done by men whose only object was to get a vote, and to stop discussion—who pretended, when the principle of a measure was before them, that they should postpone the debate to the details, and who then said, that after the details they could not return to the principle— who had, for three years, promised the agriculturists to do something, and who now confessed that they could do nothing—and who, when the latter complained, and justly complained, of high taxes, refused to reduce the establishments by which a part of those taxes might be remitted. Nothing wise or beneficial could be expected from the government unless we had a different set of ministers. It was impossible that the country could long go on under their counsels [Loud cheers].

Mr. Robinson

began by stating, that the party invective in which the hon. baronet had indulged, seemed to him ill placed on a debate of this nature. If a specific motion were brought forward involving the conduct of ministers, be should feel no difficulty to meet and answer it. Even if he were to admit the propositions of the hon. baronet, that the present distresses were occasioned by taxation and the late change in the currency, and that the only remedy for them was the reduction of taxation on one hand, and on the other the abrogation of the law which compelled cash payments, yet, as it was not contended that any immediate benefit could result from either of those measures, whatever their remedial effect might ultimately be, he could see no: reason why, on the present occasion, the. House should not take into consideration, the mode in which acknowledged defects in the existing laws relative to the trade in corn could most conveniently be removed. He had always taken this view of the question—that an alteration in the corn laws, either in the shape proposed by his right hon. friend, or the hon. members for Somersetshire and for Wiltshire,, could not operate any immediate relief. The immediate pressure upon the agricultural interest arose, it must be admitted, from extreme depression of price, which, was partly occasioned by superabundant production. The hon. baronet had ridiculed this argument which had been urged, by his noble friend; but he, thought he must have done so from misunderstanding its nature. Nobody had ever said that abundance generally was an evil; but, on the other hand, nobody who thought upon the subject at all could deny, that if the quantity of any article produced, exceeded the demand for it, so that the price in the market fell below the cost of its production, the producer must suffer from that circumstance. He had never contended that abundance under any circumstance was an evil. Such an argument would be a libel on the constitution of nature. He had on former occasions always endeavoured to show that none of the proposed alterations in the corn laws could produce immediate relief. He was not insensible to the defects of the existing laws. When it had fallen to his lot to introduce those laws to parliament, it would be recollected that he did not describe them as a benefit, but only as a choice of two evils. He would admit that restrictions upon the trade in corn were not in themselves desirable, and that a new system, of which such restrictions would form no part, might not afford relief to the agriculturists; but still he was decidedly of opinion that good would result from curing the evils of the existing laws. He would go further and say, that if he thought the House could obtain the support of the country in adopting a system of corn laws, founded on the principles so ably laid down by his right hon. friend, such a measure would receive his sanction. But ministers did not deserve to be reproached as they had been by the hon. baronet, as being persons whose continuance in office was the sole cause of all the distresses of the country, and whose removal from their places would be the sole remedy. They ought not to be thus reproached, because they were not prepared to force a measure by the mere force of law against the prejudices of the people. The question for the consideration of the House might be reduced to very narrow limits. It was simply this, whether the proposition of his noble friend was calculated to remedy the particular evil arising out of the present law, which evil the agricultural committee of last session had described as being of considerable magnitude. In his opinion it was. It should be recollected, that when his noble friend proposed the re-appointment of the agricultural committee this session, he stated, that his object was to have the defects of the present corn laws particularly considered; and upon that occasion there were not wanting gentlemen opposite (particularly the member for Waterford), who suggested that the committee should be limited by the instructions of the House to the consideration of that point exclusively. It appeared to him that no such limitation should be imposed upon the committee, and his opinion coincided with that of the House generally; but it was clearly understood, that the subject alluded to would receive particular consideration. The particular evil of the present laws, in his opinion, arose from the change which they permitted from unqualified prohibition to unlimited admission. If it was not thought necessary to abrogate the law altogether, surely it was advisable to render it as fit as possible for its purpose, by the remedy of existing defects! He did not see how the particular evil which he had just stated could be remedied, except by the imposition of duties. The scale of duties proposed by his noble friend, whilst on the one hand they did not tend to raise the price of corn in this country, more than was the case under the existing law, on the other secured to the agriculturist that protection which he at present received, and to which he was, under existing circumstances, entitled. He would ask those who attributed the pressures which prevailed in this country upon the agricultural interest to account for precisely the same pressure which was experienced in almost every corn-producing part of the world. There was at present scarcely a country in Europe, not excepting those which hardly produced corn sufficient for their own consumption, such as Spain and Portugal, which had not established, or was not about to establish, restrictive systems of corn laws. The same distress which was felt in this country prevailed in every part of Europe, and even in the United States of America; where he was confident the hon. baronet would not say it was the effect of severe taxation. He must take the liberty to say this, that if the hon. baronet could convince the House—and if his opinions were right, he hoped he would convince them—that all the evils of which the country complained were to be ascribed to ministers, feeling an anxious regard for the country to which he belonged, he trusted the hon. baronet would induce the House to remove them from their situations. But until the hon. baronet could persuade the House to adopt his opinions, he could assure him, that not all his taunts would induce ministers to depart from the line of conduct which they thought it necessary to pursue. They would do what they considered best adapted to the interests of the country; and he did not doubt that if they did their duty the country would support them.

Sir J. Newport

was of opinion, that it was impolitic to agitate the question of the corn laws, unless a certain remedy could be proposed for the evils complained of. It would be most expedient to let the existing laws take their course, until the affairs of the agricultural classes both here and abroad should assume a more settled appearance.

Mr. Ricardo,

being of opinion that the sufferings of the agriculturists were in a great degree owing to the corn laws, considered the present a fit opportunity for saying a few words upon that subject. Even if he were fully to agree with gentlemen who ascribed the present distresses to the change in the value of the currency and the weight of taxation, still he thought those gentlemen must admit that the corn laws, considered abstractedly without any reference to those two questions, were calculated to produce great evils. One of the principal of these evils was, the unnaturally high price of corn in this country over all other countries. The hon. baronet had admitted, that superabundance would occasion a great fall in the value of corn as well as all other articles. And here he must observe, that there appeared to be a little inconsistency in the arguments of the hon. baronet. In one part of his speech the hon. baronet admitted that a superabundant production of corn would occasion mischief to the extent in which it was at present experienced. [Sir. F. Burdett dissented.] The hon. baronet now said he did not admit this; but he certainly understood him to do so, and to apply the argument to the change in the value of the currency; for he said that those who contended, that the increase of an article beyond a certain limit, would occasion a fall in price greater in proportion than the increase which had taken place, must admit that an alteration in the value of the currency will produce a change in the value of commodities, greater in proportion than the alteration in the value of money. Although he (Mr. R.) was of opinion, that a superabundant supply of an article produced a sinking in the value of the article greater than in proportion to the additional quantity, yet he did not apply this argument to money. He would put a case to the House, to show how a superabundant supply of an article would produce a sinking of its aggregate value much greater than in proportion to the surplus supply. He would suppose, that in a particular country a very rare commodity was introduced for the first time—superfine cloth for instance. If 10,000 yards of this cloth were imported under such circumstances, many persons would be desirous of purchasing it, and the price consequently would be enormously high. Supposing this quantity of cloth to be doubled, he was of opinion that the aggregate value of the 20,000 yards would be much more considerable than the aggregate value of the 10,000 yards, for the article would still be scarce, and therefore in great demand. If the quantity of cloth were to be again doubled, the effect would still be the same; for although each particular yard of the 40,000 would fall in price, the value of the whole would be greater than that of the 20,000. But, if he went on in this way increasing the quantity of the cloth, until it came within the reach of the purchase of every class in the country, from that time any addition to its quantity would diminish the aggregate value. This argument he applied to corn. Corn was an article which was necessarily limited in its consumption: and if you went on increasing it in quantity, its aggregate value would be diminished beyond that of a smaller quantity. He made an exception of this argument in favour of money. If there were only 100,000l. in this country, it would answer all the purposes of a more extended circulation; but if the quantity were increased, the value of commodities would alter only in proportion to the increase, because there was no necessary limitation of the quantity of money. The argument of the hon. baronet, to which he had before alluded, was therefore inapplicable. With respect to the subject more particularly before the House; namely, the evils of the present corn laws, he was of opinion that the farmer would suffer an injury from having too abundant crops. But to look at the other side of the question. Suppose the farmer should have, scarce seasons, and that his corn should rise; just at the moment when he would be about to reap the benefit of this circumstance, the ports would be opened, and corn would pour in in unlimited quantities. These evils had been pointed out in the most able manner in the agricultural report, and in the resolutions of his right hon. friend (Mr. Huskisson), to some of which he should be sorry if the House did not agree. In his opinion, not the resolutions of the noble marquis, nor even those of his right hon. friend, and still less those of hon. members on his own side of the House, were at all adequate to remove the evils complained of. How was the evil of an habitually higher price in this country than in foreign countries to be remedied? By making the growing price in this country on a level with that of other nations. If his propositions should be agreed to, for imposing a duty of 10s. upon imported corn, and granting a bounty of 7s. upon exported corn, he thought it impossible that the price of wheat in this country could ever be materially higher than that of foreign nations. If abundant harvests should occur here, the farmer would have his remedy in exportation. In fixing the duty of 10s. upon imported corn, he had been guided by what he thought the circumstances of the case required. He did not intend that the House should adopt the duty of 10s. all at once. In the present distressed state of the agriculturists in this country, and taking into consideration the abundant supply of grain on the other side of the water, he was willing to give the farmer protection up to 70s., and then open the ports for importation, commencing with a duty of 20s. In his own opinion, this duty of 20s. would amount to a total exclusion of foreign corn, but he selected it, because, under the existing laws, all importation was prohibited, and therefore he was not making the situation of the consumer worse than at present, at the same time that he was securing a gradual approach to what he considered right principles. He would state the grounds upon which he calculated the duty of 10s. He found it stated in the evidence given before both Houses, that the whole of the charges which the farmer had to pay, which were principally tithes and poor-rates, amounted to about 10s. per quarter. The hon. member for Wiltshire said last night, that he, desired no more than to have a duty placed upon the importation of corn, calculated on the taxes which fell on the landed interest. He did not understand the calculations of that hon. member, but he called upon him to refute his if he could. If the hon. member admitted their correctness, he should expect the support of his vote. He recommended the imposition of the duty upon imported corn, for the reasons he had before stated, namely, the protection of the farmer in the event of a bad harvest He contended that he was vindicating the cause of the farmers more effectually than many gen- tlemen who called themselves their friends.—It was necessary for him to make a few observations upon that part of his plan which provided for the introduction of foreign corn, now in bond, into the home market, subject to a duty of 15s. whenever the price of wheat should reach 65s. The hon. member for Oxford had said, that this measure would be destructive of the agricultural interest, and that it would reduce the price of corn to 47s. But the farmer had the remedy in his own hands. When the price of wheat should arrive at 64s., if he apprehended the influx of foreign grain, he would be in possession of the market, and might dispose of his corn to advantage. He had selected 65s. in order to secure the farmer from being placed in competition with the holders of foreign corn in bond and in foreign countries at the same time; he would first have to cope with the former, and if the price should afterwards rise to 70s. he would then compete with the latter. It might be right to observe, that a duty of 10s. would be fully adequate to protect the farmer even when the ports were opened. According to the evidence before the committee, there appeared to be little dander of the country being overwhelmed by importations. The noble marquis had stated, that the expense of bringing corn from abroad to this country amounted do 10s. per quarter. But Mr. Solly, in his evidence, calculated that the expense of growing of corn in the interior of Germany, together with all the charges consequent upon its carriage to this country, would amount to 2l. 16s. the duty of 10s. upon importation would increase this sum to 3l. 6s. Now, the member for Cumberland was of opinion, that 65s. was a fair protecting price; and if so, why did he and other members object to the duty of 10s., which would secure them against importation until the price of wheat should be at least 65s.? He could not understand upon what principle the agriculturist could object to his propositions. He was willing to give them not only a remunerating price of 70s., but a duty of 20s., and yet they thought that was not adequate protection. He would take this opportunity of informing the House, that Mr. Solly, to whose evidence he had referred, understanding that the noble marquis had asserted, that the last harvest in Silicia had been so very abundant that it was not considered worth while to reap it, had instructed him (Mr. R.) to state, that so far from having had an abundant harvest, the inhabitants were reduced to the necessity of buying seed-wheat. The noble marquis's propositions did not appear calculated to remove the existing evils, but rather to confirm them. They would tend to encourage jibe agriculturist in speculating upon high prices, and would thus produce the same round of evils. He also objected, though in a less degree, to the propositions of his right hon. friend. His right hon. friend proposed a duty of 15s. on imported corn without any drawback upon exportation, the consequence of which would be, to make the price of corn in this country habitually 15s. higher than in foreign countries. Nobody had more clearly shown the evil of such a circumstance than his right hon. friend, and therefore he was exposed to the charge of inconsistency for having proposed a measure calculated to produce it. The drawback which be (Mr. R.) proposed, would operate in favour of the farmer when he would stand most in need of assistance. He declined entering upon the question of the currency, but he could not avoid making one observation on that subject Some gentlemen seemed to think that the contraction of two or three millions of the currency had never before the present time taken place. In the report of the committee of 1797, it was stated, that in 1782—at which time the Bank paper in circulation did not amount to more than 8,000,000l. or 9,000,000l. in addition to coin—an actual reduction of 3,000,000l. of the amount of the money in circulation took place.

The chairman then reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again to-morrow.