HC Deb 13 March 1822 vol 6 cc1082-111
Lord Normanby

rose, to bring forward his motion for reducing the number of persons filling the Office of Joint Postmaster-General. Difficult as he at all times felt it to address that House, he should feel himself still more embarrassed if he thought it was for a moment supposed, that he was actuated by any invidious or personal motive on the present occasion. But he felt cheered by the reflection, that his only motive was a sense of duty to his country. He trusted that he should shew to the House, that this was as clear a question of reduction as any which could be brought under the consideration of parliament. It was matter of much satisfaction to him to know, that tile reduction which he was about to propose, did not involve any of those dis- tresses or hardships, which had been so feelingly described by his right hon. friend (Mr. F. Robinson) on a former evening, and which, were, in many cases, the necessary though lamentable result of the reductions which it had been found necessary to make in other public establishments. His right hon. friend had, with a feeling which did him honour, described to the House the sensations he felt at being obliged to reduce or dismiss those men who had large families, and who had spent their youth and strength in the public service. But, in the present instance, the case was different. When the House looked to the rank of the parties, they must at once see, that the proposed reduction could not be productive of any distress or embarrassment. On the contrary, he felt convinced, that the noble lords concerned, would cheerfully acquiesce in any opinion expressed by the House upon this subject. He was also satisfied, that in the event of the proposed reduction being made, the party reduced could have no claim to indemnity for his loss of office. It was also matter of great consolation to him, that in bringing forward his motion, it was not necessary he should impute blame to any body. The persons filling the chief situations at the Post-office were always of the first respectability; and those actively engaged in the business of the department under the superintendence of Mr. Freeling, could not be too highly praised for the efficiency of their services, nor could too much be said of the distinguished courtesy which was uniformly shown by the secretary to every individual who had business in his department. Neither did blame attach to his majesty's ministers, for continuing an office which had, both in good times and bad, been maintained by the government; for it could not be expected that they would surrender such a branch of patronage, until called upon by the recommendation of that House. The time had in his opinion at length arrived, when the circumstances of the country called for that recommendation. They stood pledged to principles of proper economy and retrenchment, and his task was very much lightened when he recollected that the particular reduction could not affect the comfort or respectability of any man. That the proposition now submitted to parliament was not unprecedented, he would make out; for in certain bills of the years 1812 and 1813, tending, in various ways, to economical arrangement, he found an enactment pointing directly at the Joint Postmaster-generalship, recommending that the duties should be performed by one officer, and that the salary and allowances of the second should be saved. Let the House decide whether the circumstances of the country now did not demand as strict economy as could have been necessary in 1812. As he, however, had brought the subject before the House, it might be expected that he should supply such information as had been collected, relative to the original division of the office of Postmaster-general. The period which had produced the existing strange constitution of that office—a twin birth he could not call the thing, for the divided portions of it had no separate existence—the period at which that plural unit, however, if he might so express himself, had appeared, must have been shortly subsequent to the statute of the 9th of Anne; a statute which corrected the former act of Charles II, and under which the Post-office warrants still stood at the present day. He found in the act which first established the Post-office, a direction that it should be placed under the control of one master; that master having the style and title of "his majesty's Postmaster-general." Now it. required mere subtlety than be possessed, to conceive how "one postmaster" could mean two joint postmasters; but the after words of the act, "he (the postmaster) and his deputies, shall do so and so," were still more decidedly at issue with the "they the joint postmaster," &c., used at the present day. The precise time, however, at which the division of office had taken place, could not be ascertained. Parliament, in the reign of queen Anne, had, at times, been very alert in the creation of new offices, and it might fairly be supposed, therefore, that they would be likely to make the most of the old ones; and, supposing any such inclination to exist, the Post-office was exactly a mark to be selected, because the patronage of the place was considerable enough to bear a division. The salary, he was aware, was not very heavy; but every one knew that the chief emoluments of the office were its patronage and the allowances attached to it: the patronage, even when halved, would be of considerable importance; and the allowances, as they could not conveniently be divided, would be doubled. An explanation, however, had been attempted to be given to the division of the office in question, upon which he would detain the House for a single moment. It had been said, that such a responsibility as the collection of the revenue demanded the presence of two officers. Now, why two could be necessary, unless one was to be a check upon the other, he could not conceive; and such a supposition as that of cluck, would upon every hand be rejected. The explanation, however, if it no way served the cause of the division, went to establish one fact which was worthy of attention—it would show, as far as it went, that at the first commencement of the division, the officers appointed, actually executed some portion of the business of the establishment. One only, even immediately subsequent to the division, could have been a sinecurist: the making sinecures of both the offices, or branches of office, could not have taken place until some years after. At present, it was well known that the removal of both, far less of one, of the postmasters general would no way impede the business of the office. He did not propose the removal of both, because he attached a certain quantity of value to the presence of a considerable name at the head of so considerable an establishment; but for the retaining of both, no plea, he thought, could be set up.—The noble lord then adverted to the ambiguous opinion, as he termed it, given by the finance committee upon the point. That committee had doubted, looking at the revenue of the Post-office, whether the collection of that revenue could be permanently confided, without disadvantage to the public, to one individual; but such a principle, if admitted, would not stop at the Post-office—it would lead to a doubling of every office in the state. His right hon. friend, the Treasurer of the Navy, would be compelled to have a double; and would become only half a public officer, instead of being, as he was at present, two public officers. He begged to be understood, as not intending the slightest disrespect to his right hon. friend, who held, he knew, one public office (and diligently performed the duties of it), without receiving any emolument; but, really, the plea of heavy responsibility was too feeble to deserve any weight with the House. The double appointment, too, he should be able to show, was mischievous as well as unnecessary and chargeable. Mr. Palmer, who, whatever difference of opinion there might have been, as to the extent of his claims to remuneration, was generally allowed to have been a great public benefactor—Mr. Palmer, speaking of the short continuance of postmasters-general in office, owing to their appointments being dependent upon political arrangements, stated, that no less than eight changes had taken place in the department in the course of one term of seven years. Changes in office arising out of changes of ministers, were not very applicable or to the point at the present moment; but, if such changes in office from year to year were mischievous, how much more mischievous must be the weekly change (by turns) of authority under the present system. As to the mischief, there could be very little doubt; it must be admitted on all hands, that the routine of such an establishment as the Post-office could only be preserved by the greatest uniformity of purpose. Against the entire uselessness of the second postmaster too, what arguments could be set up? Lord Chesterfield (himself a postmaster-general) being examined before the committee of finance in 1797, had stated a fact which was worth the attention of the House. A question being put to his lordship, as to what would be the effect of any difference of opinion between the two postmasters-general, the answer was, that such cases could seldom occur; but when they did, it was probable the junior lord would be inclined to give way to the senior. So, then, the country was paying 2,500l. a year to a noble marquis, to enable him to feel inclined to give way to a noble earl. [Hear, and a laugh.] As a further proof how unnecessary was the office in question, lord Clancarty, who held it from the year 1814 to 1816, was engaged during the greater part of that period, in diplomatic affairs abroad.—The noble lord then proceeded to the postmaster-generalship of Scotland, and took the office to be a sinecure, because the collection of the revenue was under the same direction with the English Post-office. The Irish Post-office was managed, too, at a much greater expense than that of this country; and surely, whatever might be the case here, there could be no occasion for two postmasters-general in Ireland. Many persons thought, indeed, that there was no necessity for any postmaster-general in Ireland; and there was a great deal of truth in the suggestion: at the same time, he gave great value, at the present moment, to any thing which was an inducement to an Irish nobleman to reside on his own side the water; and be, therefore, abstained from proposing an abolition of the office.—He trusted, that he had brought the question forward fairly; and he had purposely abstained from sustaining his proposition by any plea for diminishing the influence of the Crown. Although, whenever any measure for the lessening of that influence came in a proper and decided form before the House, he should be most ready to declare his opinion upon it, yet he had abstained from introducing that subject into the present discussion. At the same time, he must say, that if his proposition were resisted upon any collateral ground, that it would diminish the influence to which he adverted, he should think that the people of England were ill-treated. The very distress which galled the country at this moment, arose out of the baneful consequences of a war, which, by increasing taxation, and increasing the revenue, had silently and gradually increased the influence of the Crown; and it would be hard to resist a measure for abating the distress, from a fear of diminishing the influence which had grown up with it. The question, important as it was, lay in a narrow compass, and he had almost done. If he had weakened the cause or wearied the House, let the failure be attributed, not to the subject, but to the advocate. He could not forbear, however, to remind honourable members of the importance attaching to the decision of the point before them. The fate of the motion now pending, would show the value of the success obtained a few evenings since, by his hon. friend (sir M. W. Ridley.) It would show whether the votes of hon. gentlemen on that night were to be taken as a first dividend paid to their constituents, or whether they had been put forth as a payment in full of all demands. He did not mean to affirm, that every member who had voted for the reduction of the two lords of the admiralty, was bound absolutely to vote for every other species of reduction; but he felt that the present motion was even of more importance, than that which had been gained by his hon. friend; and he declared that he would rather have seen his hon. friend standing a single "ay" in support of his own measure, than suffer his triumph to be shared by any man who thought that, in doing what he then did, he did all that was necessary for the benefit of his country. But he did not believe that any such feeling had been entertained. The hon. member for Yorkshire (Mr. S. Wortley) had declared on the former evening, to which he alluded, that he would support every proposition for reduction of expenditure, which was consistent with the safety of the country. He should scarcely, therefore, on the present occasion, find himself opposed by that hon. member, because it would hardly be said, that the maintenance of two postmasters-general was necessary to the safety of the country. The hon. member for Suffolk (Mr. Gooch) had stated, that they ought to reduce the public expenditure before they reduced taxation. Here, then, was an opportunity afforded to the hon. member, of carrying his doctrine into effect. He called upon his honourable friends—he called upon the House—to pause before they negatived the present motion. He trusted they would not act in defiance of public opinion, in derision of the general suffering, and in total oblivion of all the promises of retrenchment which had been held out to the country. The noble lord concluded by moving, "That it is the opinion of this House, that without detriment to the public service, the duties of Joint Postmaster-general might be performed by one individual, and the salary of the other be thereby saved to the public."

Mr. Robinson

said, he could not take so narrow a view of the present question as had been taken by his noble friend; and must confess that the speech of his noble friend had produced no other impression on his mind than to confirm his previous impressions. His noble friend had said, that he did not propose, in bringing forward his present motion, to interfere with other offices; but, an acquiescence on the part of the House in the present motion—a motion which Lad been brought forward in consequence of the success of a motion made by an hon. baronet the other night—would, he had no doubt, lead, in various other instances, to a similar proposition founded on similar grounds. And, that brought distinctly before them this principle—whether the influence of the Crown ought or ought not to be diminished? He knew it was easy to turn into ridicule any particular opposition to any particular and isolated motion like the present. It would be easy to say in various other cases, as was said in the present, "You must vote for this reduction, unless you think that the safety of the state depends upon the maintenance of two postmasters-general." But, that was a most unfair way of putting the case. He thought it ought to be viewed on principles more broad, more general, and more enlightened. He would oppose the abolition of the present office, because he felt that no sufficient ground had been stated to induce the House to diminish, to that extent, the influence of the Crown. He knew that this doctrine was unpopular; but the experience of all mankind, the instructions of history, tended to prove, that certain influence was necessary to be attached to government, in order to enable it, with any efficiency, to discharge its functions. True it was, that the offices under the Crown had numerically increased, as compared with former times; but, on the other hand, there had grown up a counteracting influence, which opposed—and he hoped always would oppose—an inseparable barrier to undue influence in the Crown. Could any one deny the existence of that counteracting power, which rendered comparatively inefficient in the country the influence, direct or indirect, of the Crown? When the extension of universal information throughout the country was considered—a degree of information which gave respectability to public opinion which it had never before possessed—an intelligence, which no man, half a century ago, could have expected—was not the balance to government interest apparent to every man? Half a century ago, the people of England had been alive to those matters in which their interests were immediately and obviously concerned; but, were the acts of public men, at that time of day, scrutinized with the just severity applied to them at present? Could any individual in eminent station, do a single act which was not canvassed by the public at large? And, did not every public officer at present feel that he acted under a responsibility unknown to ministers of former times? True, ministers were not made accountable as far as regarded their lives or their fortunes; but they could not walk through the public streets without meeting men who knew all that they had said, and all that they had done. He was glad of this. He rejoiced at it. He thought it a great blessing. He thought it a blessing, because it was a check; and a check far more effective upon the influence of the Crown, than any which had existed when that influence, as regarded parliament at least, had been much greater than at present. The noble lord, in grounding his present proposition denied any wish to reduce the influence of the Crown; but he took all the effect which could attach to such an intention, by imputing resistance, if he met with it, to an improper aversion to the diminution of that influence. The dilemma was ingeniously contrived by the noble lord; but it was not right that the House should fall into it. Unless gentlemen were prepared to go into the consideration of all the consequences to which the motion now submitted might hereafter lead, and to pronounce an opinion upon its future operation, they could not, as he conceived, vote for the motion. He knew it might be imputed to him and to those with whom he acted, that in opposing this motion they were proceeding upon corrupt motives, and acting only from a paltry and unworthy principle of attention to their own interests. It was the duty, however, of gentlemen who had the honour of sitting in that House, to allow no imputation of this sort to interfere with their proceedings, in any case where they were called upon to express their conscientious opinions; and if he thought that the individuals connected with his majesty's government could be deterred from looking at the present question in all its bearings, by any apprehension of this sort, he would be the first man to protest against their conduct. It was because, in the honest conviction of his own mind, he thought that the present motion had an unnecessary tendency to diminish the influence of the Crown, and that such diminution of its influence was not called for on any ground of public security, that he felt himself compelled to oppose it.

Mr. Hudson Gurney

said, he was not disposed too much to retrench the influence of the Crown; but, concurring, as he did, in many of the observations which had fallen from hon. gentlemen on that subject, he must still admit the necessity of the present motion. As far as he could understand the speech of the right hon. gentleman, he did not even attempt to say that the office of the second post-master-general was at all necessary. The right hon. gentleman had talked of the influence of the Crown, and of the necessity of pre- serving that influence. But at a time like the present, when junior clerks and meritorious officers had been dismissed and thrown upon the world, after years of public service, it did appear to him that the House would disgrace itself beyond measure—would eternally disgrace itself in the eyes of all England—if, for the sake of sustaining what was called the influence of the Crown—an influence by which, in his opinion, its real interests were weakened instead of being strengthened—it should vote for keeping up an appointment, by which 2,500l. a year was granted to a great lord, to induce him to support the measures of the existing administration. As such, he should give his cordial support to the present motion. [Hear.]

Alderman C. Smith

trusted, that, on the present occasion, every loyal man would rally round the throne, to protect its just and constitutional privileges. If the House yielded to the present application, he should expect, that, one by one, each of the ministerial offices of the Crown would be abolished: and, under this impression, he should vote against the motion.

Sir John Sebright

said, that the noble marquis (Salisbury), who was the second post-master-general, had been for a number of years lord lieutenant of his county, and had discharged the duties of that office with honour to himself, and most beneficially for the county. Having as a magistrate acted under the noble marquis, he felt towards him the utmost respect; but he was placed there to discharge a great public duty. Private feelings, in that House, were not to give way to public principle. At a time like the present, when distress prevailed to an extent unexampled, he felt it to be his bounden duty to vote for every reduction of the public expenditure, that was consistent with the safety of the state. It had not been contended that two post-masters-general were necessary. He doubted whether even one was necessary. His own opinion was, that that able and intelligent officer, Mr. Freeling, who had discharged his public duty in a manner so beneficial to the country, would be able to do the business of the post-masters-general, without any other assistance.

Mr. Sumner

said, that at a late county meeting he had been met with a general cry of "retrenchment—unsparing retrenchment"! He was told that this was the popular cry throughout the country. But as to popular clamour, there was nothing which he mistrusted more; and the louder it was, the more his mistrust increased. He did think that popular opinion had been very much misled on the present and many similar occasions. He had expressed himself to this effect to his constituents; and had refused to receive their instructions to support their demands in parliament for unsparing, unqualified retrenchment; and had he not so refused their instructions, he should have lent his hand to the attainment of what he considered, in many cases, a great evil. As to the question before the House, he did not know whether two lords at the head of the Post-office were more or were less necessary, than two heads were to certain other boards. The House must be prepared to expect, that if the proposed reduction was effected, with a view to the diminution of the influence of the Crown, the same principle would be applied to every other office to which that influence was supposed to extend. He was not one of those who thought that, the influence of the Crown had become too great in parliament, or elsewhere. On the contrary, he considered that popular influence had increased in an infinitely greater proportion. He could not, therefore, support the present motion.

Sir Joseph Yorke

said, that having in his place voted that two junior lords of the Admiralty were unnecessary, he could not consistently oppose the present motion. He considered the second post-master-general entirely useless; and with respect to the influence of the Crown, he did not think that the influence or the dignity of the Crown, in a loyal and well-disposed country like this required to be bolstered up by half a dozen useless placemen. If these two officers of the public would be content to take the duty watch and watch, or take it by alternate three months, and receive only one post-master-general's salary, he could have no objection to accommodate them. If not, he must vote for his noble friend's motion.

Mr. Denison

said, he would never use, out of that House, any words which he was ashamed to utter in it. He begged leave to repeat, in his place, and before his hon. colleague that he ever would be an advocate for "retrenchment—unsparing retrenchment." A right hon. gentleman had said, that the influence of the Crown had not increased. In his (Mr. D's.) opinion, it had increased, and would continue to increase; seeing that the dis- tresses of the times, which so particularly pressed on the landed interest, would induce those gentlemen to look to the Crown rather than to any other source of emolument or advantage. It was impossible for any gentleman to look at the Red book, without being convinced of the increased influence of the Crown. If he had any objection to the motion, it was, that it did not go far enough. He was of opinion, that if the Post-office were put under the Treasury, Mr. Freeling would be able to do the business for which the two Post-masters-general were now paid. The places were, in point of fact, sinecures. The noble lords had little more to do than to receive their salaries.

Mr. Fremantle

said, he could not, consistently with his views of the safety and honour of the country, assent to the proposition. He could not consent to pull down the ancient institutions of the country—those institutions under which the country had so long prospered. No man could say, that, if the motion were acceded to, the abolition of the office would contribute one iota to the removal of the distress complained of. And yet; if conceded, it would have the effect of breaking down and destroying the system of government piecemeal. It would naturally be said, "cut down the salaries of all the offices of government, and let them no longer be filled by noblemen or gentlemen of influence or rank, but by clerks, who would be accountable to that House." The question had, he regretted to say, been taken up on narrow grounds, and the arguments therefore were the more fallacious. It was incumbent on the noble mover, to spew in what manner the present system of the postmastership was dangerous or injurious. There certainly existed a necessity for control in this department, and that control was as effectually vested in the postmasters, as in any other public boards. He concluded by observing, that the measure was improvident, and would prove highly dangerous as a precedent.

Mr. Stuart Wortley

said, he was anxious to state the reasons for his vote on the present question. The question had been treated by the noble mover with reference simply to the particular office which he had called on the House to abolish, on account of its inefficiency and needlessness. He (Mr. W.) could not confine himself to this view of the ques- tion. A week had scarcely elapsed since two offices conferring patronage, and contributing materially to the influence of the Crown, had been abolished: that night they were called upon to abolish another office; and, to-morrow, a whole office, the board of control was to come under consideration. Now, there was a point at which resistance must be made by those who wished to preserve the just influence of the Crown. He could not allow the establishments of the country to be thus beaten down; for, unless that measure which the gentleman opposite, be thought unwisely, advocated—a reform in parliament, were carried into effect, and the government brought much nearer to a republic than it actually was, it could not go on without a considerable influence in the hands of the Crown. Unless, therefore, they were prepared to say, that the government of this country was not near enough to a republic, it was necessary that the influence of the Crown should be preserved. As for the offices which had been abolished the other night, they had been pointed out for abolition, in the year 1797, by the committee of finance; and the feelings of the people had been so excited on the subject, that he had felt warranted in voting for their abolition. Looking also, at the proof of the inefficiency of the office under consideration, if he was sure the encroachment would stop here, he should, per. haps, consent to vote for the present motion; but, if he was to be led on step by step, last week having abolished the two lords of the Admiralty, to-day abolishing one joint-postmaster, and to-morrow the whole board of control, he would say, that he should resist at once the destruction of that influence, without which the government could not be carried on. He thought it absolutely necessary for the Crown to have its influence, and he could not consent thus, step by step, to diminish it. Having stated this fearlessly and honestly, be hoped he had only to say to his constituents this, that when they placed their confidence in him, he felt that he was to come down to that House and perform his duty to the best of his information and ability, but he could not join' any man in pulling down the influence of the Crown. If they should require him to aid in reducing the influence of the, Crown, he should tell them, that they must return another member, for that he should conceive that by so doing he was deserting his duty, as much as if he were to give his support to the Crown from corrupt motives.

Mr. Bankes

said, he had that night heard principles advanced which, during all the time that he had had a seat in that House, he had never heard propounded with an equal degree of daring. The doctrine he had formerly collected from what he had conceived to be, at the time, he best and most weighty authorities in the House was, that the Crown was intitled to a large and legitimate influence in all those offices that were more immediately connected with, what he might call, the monarchical part of our constitution. This influence was exercised by the Crown's appointment to a large body of such offices as were necessary to the discharge of the various duties that devolved upon that department of the state which he spoke of; and he always considered, that these should be placed, even more than they had been, within the immediate disposal and pleasure of the Crown. He thought that the House ought not to interfere with them, except in cases which involved some constitutional question. They were the legitimate appointments of the Crown, and they ought to be retained as long as they were necessary; but beyond this, the principle ought not to be carried. His hon. friend who had just spoken had said, that the noble mover, must show, not only that the office proposed to be reduced was useless, but that it was an office of influence. But it was sufficient for him to show that it was useless; and, indeed, the onus of proof lay on those who supported the office. All offices he conceived to be, in a certain degree, grievances. At the same time, he did not wish to diminish the influence of the Crown to a point beyond what the interests of the Crown appeared to require. His hon. friend, who opposed, but did not seem disinclined to vote for, the motion, called on gentlemen to state where the reductions of office would stop. Now this appeared to him to be one of the plainest cases that ever was brought before the House. It was not an attempt to carry the principle of economy to an extreme. In thinking that it ought to be carried, he did not go farther than he and others had done in 1812; and nothing had occurred since that time to change the state of the question. It was not intended at that time, nor did he suppose it was now meant, to abolish useful offices; but to reduce the number of useless offices, or sinecures. During the course of the debate, not a single argument had been adduced against the motion, that at all applied to the usefulness of this office. Those who had opposed the motion of the noble lord had proceeded entirely upon general grounds. When Mr. Freeling was examined before the committee, his evidence did not go to show the necessity of the office, though it appeared from what he stated, that it was not altogether such a sinecure as many gentlemen supposed it to be. He was perfectly ready to do justice to the great merits of Mr. Freeling; but be was not prepared to say, that it was not necessary to have a person of rank and consequence at the head of a department of so much responsibility. He felt the duty which he was now performing to be especially imposed on him, in consequence of the line of conduct he pursued in 1812–1813; as he was then the mover of the address to the throne on the subject of retrenchment which had been graciously answered. It therefore appeared that the Crown was not offended with the interference of parliament. And how, indeed, could general views of economy and retrenchment be carried into effect, if what had been termed prerogative and patronage were left wholly untouched? The pledge which the house had given in the year 1812–1813, had not been redeemed; and his expectations, be confessed, had been exceedingly disappointed. He regretted extremely, that ministers had not shown a wish to adopt that temperate economy and reform, by which so much benefit might he effected for the country. He looked forward, however, with confident expectation to the division of that night; for, in his opinion, it could not be otherwise than in favour of the abolition of this office. Not a word had been said in its defence; except that it was necessary to keep up prerogative and patronage, and that it was of very ancient origin. The latter was as weak as the former; since an office that had existed for centuries (which, however, was not the case with this) might be completely useless. In point of economy, the saving would not be very great; but, the principle was of immense importance. He would always support the existence of those offices which, while they added to the prerogative of the Crown, were necessarily connected with the interests of the country; but he could not give his vote in favour of the continuance of useless offices, on the ground that they were necessary to keep up a certain extent of influence.

Mr. Secretary Peel

said, that his noble friend who had commenced the present discussion, had treated the question with reference solely to the duties of the particular office. He had been followed by his right hon. friend, who had met the question on the general ground of principle, and had declared that the proposition was ab initio to be resisted, as an attempt to diminish the legitimate influence of the Crown. He did not, however, understand that his right hon. friend in any way conceded, that the office was unnecessary, because he had met it on more enlarged grounds, which he thought sufficient to decide the question. He hoped, however, he should not treat the subject unfairly, if he combined both the elements of the discussion which had been heretofore taken separately, and considered; in the first place, whether the particular office was so entirely inefficient as it had been represented to be; and, in the second place, what effect its abolition would have on the general interests of the state. On the first part of the question, he should submit some considerations, which, if not conclusive in themselves, it was at least fit that the House should advert to. In considering the nature of a particular office it was fit first to inquire when it was founded, in order to ascertain the circumstances which might have called for it. Antiquity was was not in itself a proof of the importance of an office; but, on the other hand, if it was created under temporary circumstances, which had passed away, a very strong argument in favour of the abolition of an office was afforded. They were now constantly referred to the year 1792. The establishment of that time was the standard to which every thing was to be brought. If the office had been created since that time, in consequence of the war that, had intervened, there was a fair presumption that it should be abolished. He also referred to 1792; but it was to 1692, and in that year he found the office in existence, and held by two joint postmasters-general. That, therefore, was a slight presumption in favour of the office: but there might have been, it was true, such a diminution in the duties of the office, and the nature of it might have so changed, that that presumption might be destroyed. Was there any such diminution? He asked the House to look at the duties and the efficiency of the office, as measured by the revenue which it controlled, and they would see that the office established at the Revolution had had a constant and gradual increase of duties assigned to it. He only said that this was a presumption in favour of the office; but it certainly was a strong presumption, if they found that of an office established at such a time the duties had since been quintupled. He should only take a few periods in the last reign to show the increase of the Post-office revenues. In 1764, the revenue of the Post-office was 430,000l.; in 1783 it was 434,00021.; in 1793 it was 627,0002l.; in 1795 it was 705,000l.; and in 1815, and since, it was upwards of two millions.—So much as to the increase of the duties of the office, from which the House would judge whether it could be presumed to be entirely inefficient. As to the particular testimony to the efficiency of the office, they had an authority beyond all exception, in the committee of 1797; for never was there a committee to which such general and just compliments had been paid, without reference to party. What was the report of that committee? Why, that on account of the importance of the establishment to commerce and to the revenue, it was worthy of consideration whether there should not be a board of commissioners, as in the other great departments of the revenue. The committee stated truly, that much depended on the skill in making the various and numerous contracts. Now, the measure suggested by the committee would have greatly increased the influence of the Crown; for supposing five commissioners were appointed at 1,000l. a year, though there was not more expense than with two joint post-masters at 2,500l. a year, there could be no question that the patronage would be augmented by the distribution. The committee observed also, that the patronage in the hands of the Post-office was most extensive and important, and required much knowledge and considerable attention to the characters of individuals. Now, what was the proposition of one hon. member? That it should all be transferred to the Treasury, and that Mr. Freeling should be the executive officer. The proposition of the committee of 1797 was supported by the committee, on the ground that greater regularity and dispatch would be obtained from a commission. But the business of the Post-office could not be managed with greater regularity and dispatch than since 1797; and it was not fair to attribute all the merit of this universally acknowledged result to a subordinate officer of the board. Certainly, if the question was between him and the committee of 1797, whether the board of commissioners should be appointed, he had no doubt the gentlemen opposite to him would hold his argument to be valid. Then came the committee of 1817, which bad, indeed, after the experience the country had had, decided against the proposal for putting the management of the Post-office under a board of commissioners of more than two, but still was not prepared to say that the business should be managed by only one. The duties of the office were of a peculiar nature, not only as regarded the amount of the revenue, but the amount of the expenditure.—The revenue amounted to two millions; the expenditure was as much as half a million. Now, all the payments were under warrant of the joint post-master, and Mr. Freeling, whose testimony on this point would, perhaps, not be taken, had stated his opinion, that there should be two lords. As for the evidence of lord Chesterfield, no inference unfavourable to the office could be drawn from it. Being asked, what was the result when there was a difference of opinion on any subject referred? He answered, that the business was so amicably managed, that a difference seldom occurred, but that if any did occur, the junior would naturally yield to the senior. Now this was necessarily the case in all co-ordinate jurisdictions—the least experienced officer generally gave way. The salary of the joint post-master had been fixed in 1785, at 5,000l., the present amount. Had they heard nothing of economy then? Had there been no reform of the civil list; no regulation of political, household, and useless offices? Did Mr. Burke, however, at that time, when in the full career of his reforms, touch the office of joint post-master, the revenue under whose management was one-third of its present amount? The only two state offices which Mr. Burke proposed to touch, were the president of the board of trade, and the third secretary of state. The office of the postmaster-general must have been under consideration; but he left it untouched. When they saw, there- fore, that Mr. Burke, in laying down his large and luminous principles for the management of every department of the state, had thought it unfit to be abolished —when the duties had since been trebled —when it was proved that there were daily matters of reference on the most important matters—when the revenue managed was two millions, and the actual payments 500,000l., he could not consent to treat it as an entirely useless and inefficient office.—He now approached the more enlarged view of this subject which had been taken by others; and he approached it with great diffidence, because he could not argue it without letting in questions of great difficulty, delicacy, and magnitude, as they respected the constitution of the country. It was, he thought, impossible to say what the just and exact influence of the Crown should be. At various periods the extent of that influence must vary with the varying circumstances of the time. At present, a very considerable alteration had been effected in the mariners and habits of the country. The constant publication of the discussions in that House, the deference to, public opinion which now marked their proceedings infinitely more than at any former period, greatly outweighed any ill that might be apprehended from the supposed increase of the influence of the Crown. Still, however, he knew no subject more difficult to argue on than the just influence of the Crown. But, if he saw an office remaining untouched for a long period—remaining untouched, when other offices were new-modelled— he could not help thinking, that it might fairly be considered as forming a part of that influence which he thought was just. He had heard doctrines stated in the course of the present session, with respect to the mode of governing a great country, which excited as much surprise in his mind, as the sentiments expressed that night appeared to have excited in the mind of his hon. friend (Mr. Bankes). The hon. member for Sandwich (Mr. Marryat) had argued, that because the depressed state of trade had compelled him to dismiss four clerks from his office, there must, therefore, be a necessity for a considerable reduction in the establishments of the country. He, however, could not allow that there was any analogy between the business of a merchant's house, however respectable, and the mode in which the concerns of a great state were to be carried on [Hear.] Again, the hon. member for Appleby (Mr. Creevey) would lead the House to suppose, that no provision should be made for those who had passed their lives in the service of the public. He had described public men as a corporation, established for their own benefit; and he had attacked a sum of no great magnitude as being entirely too great for the reward of their services. He (Mr. Peel) had observed upon that occasion, a studious forgetfulness of all that had been done for the abolition of sinecures—an utter neglect of those measures which had been taken for contracting the undue influence of the Crown. The hon. member must have meant, or he meant nothing, that the service of the country should be left to those who would undertake great duties and trusts for nothing; or that they should be placed in the hands of a wealthy oligarchy, who could afford to labour for a very trifling remuneration. Whether this was the hon. member's meaning or not, he could not say; but, such a proceeding was inconsistent with the principles of our monarchy—inconsistent with the great principles of the constitution—and utterly inconsistent with the principles on which Mr. Burke proposed to introduce his great and comprehensive scheme of reform, when he told the House, with perfect wisdom, that he would not have the duties of the state performed for nothing—he would not give great offices to those who were able to outbid their competitors on a sinking scale. He told them, that if this country depended too much on the offers of severe and restrictive virtue—that if it trusted for the performance of public duties to the generosity of individuals, it would rue its acquiescence in such a principle. He added, that the country would find itself most inefficiently served, if it gave offices of importance to those who were willing to take them for the least possible emolument. This high principle had beer acted on no later than in the last session. A sum was voted, which parliament thought sufficient to support lofty rant and elevated station. That sum was refused. But the answer of the House of Commons—and that answer re-echoed by the public—was, "we will not hear of refusal—we have voted the money, am we cannot take it back, however interest ed the individual may be in the refusal." [Hear.]—The considerations to which he had adverted must be taken in the account in arguing this question. But there were others, which, though of a subordinate nature, the House would not overlook. Let the House consider what was the extent of business in the different public departments. If they looked to that point, they would find, that though the same number of offices existed, yet the fact was, that the extent of influence had decreased. The influence even of a high and efficient office at present, was very different from what it was formerly. The occupation of time in an office, the multiplication of duties, the necessary attendance in parliament, rendered individuals of extensive influence less anxious than formerly for office; and, though these duties did not degrade the office, yet they tended to contract that extent of influence which was heretofore known to exist. The Treasury department existed as it did in 1792, but its duties had increased in an eight-fold proportion; and, from the increase of business in the Treasury, the increase in other departments might be inferred. The number of official papers examined by the Treasury was—in 1793, 2,833; in 1797, 4,400; in 1815, 19,000; and in 1819 and 1820, 25,000. Thus progressively rising from about 3,000 in 1793, to 25,000 in 1819. Now, as the duties of office were thus increased, the desire of individuals, possessing extensive fortune and influence, had, it was fair to infer, proportionably decreased. He did not think there could be a principle of greater importance than that on which they were now called on to decide. The House might abolish the office; but if they did so on the principle that they thereby reduced the just influence of the Crown, he would ask them, whether they were not doing that which was, not indeed inconsistent with the safety of the country, but which was inconsistent with the substantial interests of the country? The safety of the country would not be compromised by this act. But was nothing more than its safety to be considered? Were they not to look with an anxious eye to the substantial interests of the country? There was no reason for believing that the influence of the Crown was more than commensurate with the increased power of other interests. When the influence of other bodies was hourly extended, it was fitting that a proper check should exist. Under all these considerations, he would, on the most con- scientious grounds, give his decided negative to the motion.

Sir J. Mackintosh

said, that if the House had been occupied with the only question which the noble mover had introduced to their notice—and on that question alone had they to decide—he certainly should have consulted his own convenience and the state of his health by giving a hearty and conscientious, but a silent vote, in favour of the noble lord's proposition. Other questions, however, and of far greater magnitude, had been introduced by the right hon. gentleman who spoke second in the debate —questions, he would say, of as great magnitude and importance, as were ever brought before the House of Commons. Novelties, as he conceived them, in constitutional doctrine, had been boldly advanced—never, before, indeed, had they been avowed so distinctly and unequivocally in a public assembly — novelties which struck nearly at the root of the British constitution—novelties, which, if the House acted on them, would be more injurious to their estimation in the minds of the people of this kingdom, than any measure they had been ever induced to adopt. He agreed with the hon. member for Corfe Castle, that on all former occasions, when reformation was attempted in that House, particucularly that of 1782, by Mr. Burke, the principle of keeping up useless offices in order to support the influence of the Crown never once reared its head. At that time the whole question was decided on a very narrow ground—"Are these offices useless, or are they beneficial to the public?" There was one exception—the great sinecures of the state. And why? Because they constituted the only provision for the retired servants of the Crown. The right hon. gentleman placed the whole defence of sinecures on that ground. But, could be argue, with any degree of consistency, that sinecures should be continued, when pensions were granted in their stead? He did, however, so argue the question. He would not only have pensions but sinecures for retired officers. The right hon. gentleman who had last spoken had showed a great deal of skill and dexterity in the arrangement of his topics. He had given great space and latitude to the unimportant part of his argument, and had passed rapidly over that which most demanded attention; because he was well aware of its difficult, critical, and invidious nature; because he did not wish to meet or reiterate what the right hon. gentleman who spoke second had unhesitatingly advanced and defended; namely, that useless offices were to be kept up in order to maintain influence—that not a single useless situation could be abolished, without placing the good government of this country in danger. But the right hon. gentleman had treated, at great length, of questions quite immaterial of themselves, and altogether irrevelant to the present motion. He had, like a skilful commander, disposed of his troops so as to give them the appearance of an extended line, and thus to prevent an attack on the weak part of his array. But, notwithstanding his respect for so great a captain, he would not imitate his tactics; nor would he direct his attention to the whole line thus skilfully constructed, but he would consider the point at issue, solely on the principle, whether the office were necessary or not. The first argument of the right hon. gentleman on this point was, that the office was an ancient one, and therefore ought not to be abolished. This was an attack upon the House of Commons for their conduct during the last ten years. In that period they had abolished offices which were as old as the monarchy—offices which were coeval with the Plantagenets. They had abolished the tellers of Exchequer; they had abolished the justices in Eyre, and they had abolished them precisely because they were ancient and useless. The House had considered them not adapted to sound and modern purpose; they had regarded them as obsolete and superannuated. They had not bought of the paradoxical view of the right hon. gentleman which would represent an office as efficient because it was old; but they had, on the contrary, acted on the belief, that an office, because it was old might, by those accidents of time, which could not have been prevented, lave become inefficient.—The second proposition of the right hon. gentleman was in appeal to the year 1792. This was the model set up. In 1792 this office had existed, therefore it ought not, according o the right hon. gentleman, to be now abolished; but, in 1792, were there not tellers of the exchequer, and justices in Lyre? Those offices had been preserved, principally, because they afforded means of pensions for retired officers when no other provision of that kind existed. But, said the right hon. gentleman, the revenue of the Post-office increased to five fold since 1792, and could they in that case call for the reduction of one of the postmasters? But, had the duties of the postmasters increased with the revenue? The right hon. gentleman would not tell the House that two postmasters were necessary, because the revenue had increased; and therefore he refuted his own case by the very nature of his appeal. In 1792, no question had been raised for the abolition of such offices. Great useless offices had then been reserved, because no other means were provided to the state for pensioning meritorious and retired servants. The right hon. gentleman said, that by the abolition of this office, the appointment to a great many offices would be transferred to the Treasury; and then what a dreadful circumstance this would be, to have so much patronage tranferred to the Treasury! He was unwilling to meet this argument by a direct contradiction; because it was very easy for the right hon. gentleman to be accurate in form, but inaccurate in substance. But the transfer which was now deprecated had been already made, and the appointment to offices, which would be more inconvenient if made by the Treasury, was already in the patronage of the Treasury. Another argument had been raised on the ground of check and public security. This touched not the proposal of his noble friend. His noble friend had not made any allusion to another being required to watch and guard the conduct of another peer. He could not have expressed such an imputation against a body with which he was so nearly connected. Then came an extraordinary topic, which the right hon. gentleman had used in defence of useless offices. And here he entreated those gentlemen who had pledged themselves to retrenchment and economy, to consider on what footing they stood with the right hon. gentleman, who had contended, that useless offices were necessary to the good government of the kingdom; and that one useless office could not be reduced without danger to that government. Let them set up this principle, and it barred all retrenchment, and all reduction of offices. —The way in which the hon. member for Corfe Castle had treated the subject, had been so strictly constitutional, and so unanswerable, as to leave him little to say upon this point of view It was, indeed, the way in which all who had entertained just views, and acquired authority upon the subject, had treated it. The hon. member had stated the just influence of the Crown as that which grew out of the legal authority of the Crown. Such influence would be continued as long as the monarchy, which he trusted would be perpetual. That influence arose from the collection and administration of the greatest revenue ever known, and the appointment to all civil and military offices. A revenue of 60,000,000l. an army of 70,000 men, a large navy, the constant support of nine-tenths of the patronage of India—these were the sources of just and legitimate influence, and to that influence he did not object. If it had been proposed to abandon one of our 35 colonies, which formed so fertile a source of patronage, then, indeed, it might be argued that it was an attack upon the just influence of the Crown. The right hon. gentleman had distinctly contended, that the abolition of this office would be a diminution of the just influence of the Crown. So, according to him, no office, however useless or expensive, must now be touched; for they were all necessary for maintaining the just influence of the Crown. What one, two, or three parliaments might have clone, was nothing. There was no sort of limit to be allowed to the influence of the Crown. But, according to the hon. member (Mr. Bankes), with whom he perfectly concurred, the just influence of the Crown was that which belonged to it without the abolition of necessary offices, or a change in the manner and forms of government. He remembered to have heard this well stated by an hon. member not now in the House. It was on a question relating to the vice-treasurership of Ireland. In reply to an hon. friend of hiss who had spoken in defence of the vice-treasurership, an hon. member then for Peterborough now for Hertfordshire (Mr. W. Lamb), had stated with great force the principle on which, what seemed so difficult now, namely, the natural limit in the influence of the Crown, could be determined. It was this—that wherever the power was constitutional and legal, its influence was legal. If, then, parliament were to be so unsparing in their reduction as to extend it to the lowest offices, were they to maintain useless offices for the sake of influence? The clerks were fit objects for the equity, he did not say for the compassion of the House: he would never, notwithstanding any clamour, deny to poor clerks what was equitably due to them, nor had he taken any part in the reductions which affected them. But a cruel necessity now compelled ministers, on the naked ground of influence, to continue an office not only demonstrated, but acknowledged, to be inefficient. He did not see with what time the majority in that House could apply themselves to retrenchment again, if they now voted for continuing an office on such ground. How would their conduct appear to the people of England? How would the very institution be deluged with calumnies, if the House of Commons should declare, by their vote, that the power of the Crown was so founded on rottenness, that while the people were growing in intelligence, and while legitimate influence, arising from-the revenue, the army, and all the establishments of the country, was formidable, as it had never been before, yet, that it was of such a tottering kind, that it could not be supported without what, in that House, was called influence, but what would elsewhere be called corruption? He was happy to hear a right hon. gentleman appeal to the intelligence and information of the people? But, what inference ought parliament to draw from this state of growing intelligence? It was this—that no influence was necessary for supporting what was agreeable to a great and intelligent people. According to the right hon. gentleman, however, the more intelligent the people grew, the more jealous ought the government to be, and the more formidable ought they to become by the influence of unnecessary offices, in order to prevent the explosion of that displeasure which they provoked, and which might prove fatal if not thus prevented. He knew nothing which could more widen the breach, and make the separation incurable, of classes who ought to become more closely united, than such a principle. He was aware that the people were every day becoming more intelligent, and that, whether parliament did or did not take part in the honour of diffusing knowledge, the people would advance in education and provide instruction for themselves. To attend to the public voice, and not to reverse the conduct, was the only means of keeping up the right relations of the state, and preserving ministers and parliament from feeling inconve- nience from what was so undeniable. Of all the arguments used on the other side, this was the most extraordinary; and that the right hon. gentleman, whose accuracy, ingenuity, and perspicuity were so great, who came always so prepared for discussion, and who understood so well the import of words, and the bearing of arguments, that he should have thus entered into the enemy's fortress, and carried away a regiment for his assistance, was the best proof of his having felt the case to be desperate. By voting for the proposition now submitted to them, the House did nothing more than admit the motion of his noble friend. They would only avoid pledging themselves to support useless places for the sake of influence, and to reduce any office not useless was not intended. Was it, then, too much to request the hon. member for Yorkshire to reconsider the question? He had said, that he would vote for reducing all expenses not necessary. Here the one-hundreth part of that principle was not required. The office in question, the hon. member was too candid and too fair not to admit to be useless. If, then, he voted not against an office which was admitted to be useless, be plainly abandoned the strong hold of principle. There could not be a stranger case than this. For the lords of the Admiralty much more might be said, and had been said. The two offices abolished had not been absolutely useless, but they had not been very necessary. That was not the situation of this office. He voted for its abolition because it was totally and absolutely useless.

Mr. Wynn

said, he had supported the bills of 1812 and 1813 for diminishing the influence of the Crown, because a power to reward public services was substituted. Much obloquy had been previously thrown upon sinecures, and it was considered advisable to provide for public services in another mode. He admitted the merits of the secretary of the Post-office; but he could not agree to entrust so extensive a public department to his sole management; especially as a political connexion was necessary between ministers and the higher public officers. He believed it was by no means the wish of the people to strip the Crown of its legitimate influence, which was the best safeguard of the constitution.

The Marquis of Londonderry

said, he agreed with his right hon. friend who spoke second in the debate, that this ques- tion did not rest merely upon a consideration of the influence of the Crown, nor upon the functions of the office, separately considered, but upon a combined view of those two considerations. In the first place, he begged leave most distinctly to disclaim the principle, that any useless offices ought to be preserved, merely for the purpose of maintaining, the influence of the Crown. It was undoubtedly no part of our constitution that any influence should be given to the Crown for the purpose of corrupting individuals, or inducing them to swerve from the due discharge of their public duty. His hon. friend, the member for Cone Castle, had made a slip, when he seemed to suppose that ministers were desirous of closing the chapter of retrenchment. He was sure that no man was less disposed than his hon. friend to undervalue the extent of retrenchment which was opened to the House on a former night. There could be no stronger proof of the desire of ministers to continue the work of retrenchment, than the fact, that committees were sitting at that moment on every branch of the public service, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any branch in which further retrenchment might be made. It was incumbent upon the House, in looking at this question, to consider how far the machine of government might be effected by any change in the official establishments of the country. When he looked at the machine of government, involving as it did the departments of the army and the navy, the collection of the revenue, and the various branches of administrative polity, be went along with his right hon. friend in thinking that the question could not be fairly canvassed upon a mere view of economical expediency, but that it must be considered on more enlarged grounds. It was not a fair view of the question to argue, that the great offices of the state, which maintain the personal dignity of the sovereign, and contribute to the political power of the Crown, as recognized by the constitution, might be conducted on a more economical scale of expenditure. How far the influence derived from those offices was or was not constitutional, was a much more important consideration; and, upon this view of the question, he was prepared to meet hon. gentlemen opposite. If they succeeded in making out an unconstitutional excess of influence, then he would admit that his argument must fall to the ground. The mere question of economy did not involve a sum of more than from 10 to 20,000l. as applied to the whole of these establishments. The great change which had taken place in the extent of business and the mode of conducting it, had placed the government on a footing which rendered it impossible to be conducted without a division of the labour proportional to its increased amount. The machine of government involved 50 or 60 offices of various descriptions; and if the mass of efficient labour were diminished, they would run the risk of destroying that machine. The necessity of a reform of parliament was a favourite doctrine with some of the gentlemen opposite; and one very effectual way of accomplishing their object would be, to make the government incapable of carrying on the warfare against them. He begged it might not be supposed that he admitted the present office to be unnecessary or inefficient, or that he voted for it as a sinecure office. His hon. friend (Mr. Bankes) had indeed included this office in the schedule to a bill which he brought in, in 1813; but, when parliament came to exercise a deliberate judgment on the subject, it rejected the proposition of his hon. friend. Was it the opinion of the committee of 1797, that the office was a useless sinecure which ought to be suppressed? So far were they from being of this opinion, that instead of two officers for the control of this department, they recommended a numerous board. He therefore hoped that the gentlemen of England would see the impropriety of acceding to the present motion; and trusted that they would come to the determination of rejecting it, regardless of the unpopularity to which such a determination might for a time be subjected. A noble example had been set them that evening, which he trusted that all of them would follow. Whether they would or not, he could not tell; but of this he was sure, that if they truckled to the spirit and the clamour which was now abroad, they would betray their own situation, and what was worse, they would betray the people themselves.

Sir John Newport

said, the noble lord had avowed that it was not his intention to maintain that useless offices should be kept up for the support of the influence of the Crown, and yet his whole speech had been a contradiction to that avowal. This office was admitted to be quite useless by the finance committee of 1797; for they said that, as it was administered by post-masters of great rank but positive inefficiency, it ought to be regulated in some other manner; and then they suggested a board of five commissioners. The House ought to abolish this office, lest an opinion should get abroad, that it had been retained because it was held by an individual of great rank, whilst others had been abolished because they were held by individuals of scarcely any rank at all. He implored the House not to make war upon public opinion, nor to treat the demand of the public for retrenchment as idle, unfounded clamour.

Sir I. Coffin

observed, that the postmasters-general did not do any duty, and, therefore, he thought they should be both abolished.

Lord Normanby

shortly replied. After his majesty's ministers had brought down the King's gracious message, announcing his majesty's intention of making a great sacrifice out of his personal income, it was rather extraordinary that they should take so early an opportunity of making the Crown the means of defending a piece of mere ministerial patronage.

The House divided: Ayes 159. Noes, 184. Majority against the motion 25.

List of the Majority, and also of the Minority.
Alexander, J. Chandos, marq.
A'Court, E. H. Courtenay, T. P.
Arbuthnot, rt. hon. C. Courtenay, W.
Apsley, lord Cholmondeley, lord H.
Ancram, lord Calvert, John
Antrobus, G. C. Cust, hon. col.
Browne, Peter Cheere, E. M.
Balfour, John Croker, J. W.
Bourne, rt. hon. W. S. Cumming, G.
Bruce, Rt. Canning, rt. hon. G.
Buchanan, J. Cockerell, sir C.
Binning, lord Cripps, J.
Bathurst, hon. S. Cranbourne, visct.
Bathurst, rt. hon. B. Clive, Rt.
Broadhead, T. H. Clive, lord
Brudenell, lord Cockburne, sir G.
Barne, M. Collett, E. J.
Barry, col. Copley, sir J. S.
Blake, Rt. Dalrymple, A.
Bradshaw, T. H. Divett, Thos.
Burgh, sir U. Dawson, G.
Beresford, lord G. Dodson, John
Blair, J. Dunlop, J.
Blackburne, John Drummond, H. Home
Brogden, J Downie, Rt.
Cole, sir L. Drake, T. T.
Cecil, lord T. Dawkins, J.
Campbell, Arch. Dawkins, H.
Douglas, W. R. K. Pole, sir Peter
Dundas, rt. hon. W. Pollington, visct.
Estcourt, T. G. Pitt, Jos.
Egerton, W. Palmerston, visc.
Evelyn, L. Prendergast, M. G.
Ellis, C. R. Pennant, G. H. D.
Ellis, T. Plumber, John
Fleming, John Paxton, W. G.
Forbes, lord Paget, hon. B.
Fremantle, Wm. Peel, right hon. R.
Fleming, John Phillimore, Dr.
Forrester, F. Plunkett, rt. hon.
Gossett, col. Peel, W. G.
Gower, lord F. L. Phipps, hon. Ed.
Grant, A. C. Pringle, sir W.
Gordon, hon. W. Rae, sir W.
Graves, lord Rice, hon. G.
Gladstone, John Robinson, rt. hon. F.
Gilbert, D. Rowley, sir J.
Goulburn, rt. hon. H. Russell, J. W.
Grant, G. W. Ryder, rt. hon. Rd.
Gifford, sir R. Sandon, visc.
Holford, G. Scott, hon. John
Holmes, W. Shiffner, sir G.
Hill, sir G. Smith, Ch.
Hardingc, sir H. Sumner, G. H.
Huskisson, rt. hon. W. Somerset, lord G.
Hodson, S. A. Somerset, lord E.
Hope, sir W, Strutt, T. W.
Irving, John Shaw, sir rt.
Jolliffe, G. H. Stewart, A.
Jenkinson, hon. C. C. Seymour, Horace
Knox, hon. Thos. Strathaven, lord
Kerr, David Sheldon, Ralph
Lindsay, lord Taylor, sir H.
Lindsay, hon. H. Taylor, G. W.
Lloyd, S. J. Trench, col.
Luttrell, H. F. Twiss, Horace
Luttrell, J. F. Townshend, H.
Lowther, visc. Uxbridge, earl of
Lowther, John Ure, M.
Lascelles, hon. W. Villiers, rt. hon. J.
Londonderry, marq. of Vansittart, rt. hon. N.
Lewis, T. F. Wilbraham, E. B.
Lockhart, W. E. Williams, Rt.
Long, right hon. C. Wilson, sir H.
Lenox, lord G. Wilson, W. W. C.
Macqueen, T. P. Wilson, Tho.
Macnaghten, E. A. Wetherell, C.
Mundy, G. Wellesley, R.
Magennis, R. Warren, C.
Martin, sir T. B. Wortley, J. S.
Manning, Wm. Warrender, rt. hon. sir G
Musgrave, sir P. Wood, col.
Manners, lord C. Wallace, rt. hon. T.
Manners, lord R. Wynn, sir W. W.
Mills, C. Wynn, C. W.
Neale, sir H. B. Wilmot, Rt.
Nightingale, sir M. Willoughby, H.
Nugent, sir G. Windham, W.
Needham, hon. F. J. Yarmouth, earl of
Onslow, Arthur TELLERS.
Osborne, sir John Clerk, sir G.
Ommanney, sir F. Lushington, S. R.
Abercromby, hon. J. Althorp, visct.
Astley, sir J. D. Hamilton, lord A.
Beaumont, T. W. Hobhouse, J. C.
Barham, J. F. Howard, hon. W.
Baring, sir T. Hume, J.
Barrett, S. M. Hurst, R.
Bennet, hon. H. G. Hutchinson, hon. C. H.
Benyon, B. Hulse, sir C.
Bernal, R. Harvey, sir E.
Birch, Jos. Kennedy, T. F.
Bright, H. Legh Keck, G. A.
Burdett, sir F. Lamb, hon. G.
Bury, visc. Lambton, J. G.
Byng, G. Lemon, sir W.
Benett, John Lennard, T. B.
Bankes, H. Lushington, St.
Baillie, John Langston, J. H.
Belgrave, visct. Leake, W.
Bentinck, lord W. Littleton, Ed.
Blake, sir F. Leycester, R.
Buxton, T. F. Lethbridge, sir T.
Boughey, sir J. F. Maberly, J.
Brandling, C. Maberly, W. L.
Butterworth, J. Macdonald, J.
Calvert, C. Mackintosh, sir J.
Calcraft, John Martin, J.
Campbell, hon. G. Manic, hon. W.
Cavendish, lord G. Moore, Peter
Cavendish, H. Marjoribanks, S.
Cavendish, C. Marryat, J.
Coffin, sir I. Miles, P.
Coke, T. W. Neville, hon. R.
Colburne, N. R. Newman, R. W.
Concannon, Lucius Newport, rt. hon. sir J.
Crespigny, sir W. De O'Callaghan, J.
Crompton, S. Ord, W.
Creevey, T. Ossulston, lord
Chetwynd, G. Palmer, C. F.
Coote, sir C. Pares, T.
Calthorpe, hon. F. Phillips, G.
Corbett, P. Philips, G. R.
Cole, sir C. Peirse, Henry
Cherry, G. H. Price, R.
Davies, T. H. Pollen, sir John
Denison, W. J. Pym, F.
Dugdale, D. Portman, Ed.
Doveton, G. Rick ford, W.
Davenport, D. Ricardo, D.
Dickinson, W. Ridley, sir M. W.
Ebrington, viscount Robarts, A.
Ellice, E. Robinson, sir G.
Eastnor, lord Russell, lord J.
Fergusson, sir R. C. Russel, R. G.
Fitzgerald, lord W. Rice, T. S.
Fitzroy, lord C. Robertson, A.
Fitzroy, lord J. Rumbold, Ch.
Foley, J. H. Scudamore, R.
Farrand, Robert Scott, J.
Fane, John Sykes, D.
Ford, M. Sebright, sir J.
Fellowes, W. H. Shelley, sir J.
Graham, S. Smith, hon. R.
Grenfell, P. Smith, W.
Griffith, J. W. Smith, John
Guise, sir W. Smith, G.
Gooch, T. S. Smith, Sam.
Gipps, G. Smith, Abel
Haldimand, W. Smith, Robert
Taylor, M. A. Williams, T. P.
Tierney, rt. hon. G. Wilson, sir R.
Tynte, C. R. Winnington, sir T.
Tulk, C. A. Wood, Matthew
Tennison, C. Wells, John
Townshend, lord C. Wodehouse, Ed.
Walpole, lord Westenra, hon. H.
Warre, J. A. Yorke, sir J.
Webb, Ed. TELLERS.
Wharton, John Duncannon, visct,
Whitbread, S. Normanby, visct.
Williams, O.