HC Deb 04 March 1822 vol 6 cc895-914

The House having resolved itself into a committee of supply, to which the Army Estimates were referred.

Lord Palmerston

said, that the estimates which he had now to bring forward would show, that in the army very considerable reductions had taken place, and very considerable savings had been made. The reductions amounted in men to 12,304, and the saving, that is to say, the total decrease of charge in 1822, amounted to 537,849l. 13s. 1d. On the land forces (exclusive of India) a reduction had been made of 499,817l. 12s. 6d. There were three modes of reduction which had suggested themselves. 1st. a reduction of regiments. 2dly. A reduction of men. 3dly. A reduction of troops or companies in each regiment. The latter expedient had been approved of, because it was found to effect a greater saving in point of charge, and also because it left the army more effective than any of the other modes could have done, and it did not interfere with the principle of rotation as applied to regiments abroad. There were two regiments of cavalry reduced intirely; two troops in each remaining regiment, and two companies in each regiment of foot. In the staff the reduction of charge, as compared with the charge of 1821, amounted to 13,571l. 12s. 6d. In the public departments, the reduction of charge amounted to 12,009l. 6s. 8d. The reduction of charges for medicines 9,284l. 5s. 8d. Volunteer corps 9,153l. 6s. 8d. In consequence of the unsatisfactory and very disturbed state of Ireland, it was found necessary to increase the force in that country, which made a difference in the estimates of 42,000l. In the Royal Military College, the saving amounted to 3,233l. 6s. 9d. In the army—pay of general officers, the increase was 8.356l. 8s. 1d. In the full-pay of retired officers, 15,234l. 19s. 4d. In the half-nay and military allowances 51,640l. 19s. 2d. In the foreign half-pay, the reductions amounted to 6,395l. In the in-pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham hospitals to 6,853l. 17s. 9d. But in the out-pensioners of these hospitals there was an increase in charge, of 34,591l. 10s. 7d. That increase was greatly to be accounted for by the reduction of the army, and the consequent increase of pensioners. In the Royal Military Asylum there was a reduction of charge, of 6,076l. 12s. 4d. In the widows' pension, the increase amounted to 3,283l. 14s. 9d. In the reduced adjutants of local militia, the reduction of charge amounted to 19,819l. 10s. In superannuation allowances, the increase amounted to 3,761l. 17s. 4d. In the royal veteran battalions the reduction of charge amounted to 67,144l. 7s. 6d. The total amount of reductions for the last year amounted to 537,849l. 13s. 1d. It was fair to observe, that that reduction had been made on a sum of 3,500,000l. Allusions had been made some nights since, to the finance committee which sat in 1817. That committee established the charge for the military service at 8,500,000l. The total charge for the present year amounted but to 7,494,000l., including a sum of 40,000l. for the yeomanry of Ireland. If that force had not been called out, of course there would have been additional reductions to the amount he had stated. There was an arrangement on foot with the East India company, by which it was proposed, that the company should pay 200,000l. towards the maintenance of the force there. If that arrangement should be completed, the sum necessary to be voted would amount to 960,000l. less than the amount of the estimates last year. The amount of charge for the present year, as compared with the year 1817, was less by a sum of 1,200,000l.; and the total expellee of the army, taking into consideration the extraordinary expenditure, amounted to nearly a million less than the estimate of the last year. The noble lord concluded by moving, "That a number of land forces, not exceeding 68,802 men, (exclusive of the men belonging to the regiments employed in the territorial possessions of the East India company) commissioned and non-commissioned officers included, be maintained for the service of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, from the 25th Dec. 1821, to the 24th Dec. 1822."

Colonel Davies

said, he was prepared to show, that the proposed reductions were not conducted with a view to economy, and that if instead of two troops or two companies from each regiment, a certain number of entire battalions were reduced, the saving to the country beyond what was now proposed, would be 111,000l.; as it was evident, that while the same number of men were reduced, there might be a much greater reduction of the officers, who formed so large a part of the expense of a regiment. He intended, therefore, to propose a reduction, in addition to what had been proposed, of four battalions of infantry, which would increase the numbers of the proposed reductions from 12,000 odd, to 15,000 men in addition to the staff corps and the waggon train, of which he should come to speak presently. He was sensible that in proposing so small a reduction, affecting too only the infantry, he was making a sacrifice of principle to expediency; for why, he would ask, was there to be main- tained now 3,000 more cavalry than in 1792? In 1792, there were only 5,000 cavalry; there were now 8,300, so that making the largest allowance, there might be now a reduction of 1,500 or 2,000 cavalry. Much had been said of the increase of our colonies, as calling for an increase of our military force; but as to the cavalry, there was no pretence for this increase, as this description of force was never employed in the colonies. In the year 1792, the estimates were proposed half-yearly; and so far from its being thought by Mr. Pitt, as had been lately asserted, that the establishments of 1792 were on too reduced a scale, the estimates for the latter half of that year reduced the military force by 6,000 men. The force in the colonies was then only 13,200 men, being 1,700 men less than those at present employed in the colonies which we had then possessed. In the new colonies an enormous force was maintained. In Malta there were 2,000 men; in the Ionian islands there were 4,000 men. And why was this force necessary? Because, instead of giving the people a good government, we had driven them to desperation by acts of oppression. In the Cape of Good Hope we had 2,000 men. Why, it might be asked, had we no colonial militia? But, even on the supposition hat we could have no militia, the garrison it the Cape of Good Hope was double what was necessary. In the island of Ceylon we had also 2,000 men; hot there we had 3,600 colonial troops. Why had we, with such a colonial force, so large a body of regular troops? It was true, that me of the regiments in Ceylon was at the charge of the East India company; but, is that regiment was as much as was necessary, it was unnecessary that we should be at any charge on account of hat island. He might, therefore, safely say, that the establishments were too large n Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, the Ionion islands, and in Malta; so that here was ample room for the further reduction which he had proposed. He lad said nothing of the West India islands, where the establishments were too large by some thousands of men. These establishments were defended on account of the change created by the independence of South America. That change, however, rather conduced to the safety of our colonial possessions, as the South Americans would form a counterpoise against the North, of whom they would be more likely to feel jealous than of this country.—He now came to the waggon train, which was set down in the estimates at a charge of 6,295l. In the whole army there was, in time of peace, nothing, more preposterous and unnecessary than this corps. When the troops were in active service, he granted, the corps was highly useful to facilitate the movement of the army: but now they were scattered about the kingdom, and attached solely to the forge-carts. This corps was only military in name. They were, in fact, only waggoners attached to the army, subject indeed to martial law but not to discipline; so that while there were waggoners in the country there would be no difficulty in raising them. He should propose to reduce this corps. The staff corps, too, which amounted to 558 men, stood at a charge of nearly 25,000l., whereas the ordinary charge for such a force would not be more than 11,000l. As to this force, it was stated by colonel Brown, that it was useful when extensive field works were carried on, and in cases of emergency. But there were now neither field works nor emergencies. This corps was as numerous now as in 1810, in the heat of the war. He should propose its entire reduction, which would be a saving of 24,581l. Another subject was one which he felt it invidious continually to recur to—connected as he was with the military profession; he meant the two majors who were now attached to each regiment. He should suggest, however, once more, that the second major of each regiment should be reduced, on this ground, that they had not been appointed till 1796, when they were so appointed on account of the contingencies, and the increase of numbers from 1,000 to 1,200. Yet now the numbers were reduced to one-half, and contingencies were so much less frequent, but the second majors remained. By their reduction 35,000l. more would be saved. The charge for recruiting was also one on which great saving might be effected. The total charge was 58,782l. The nett expense after deduction of the money paid for discharges, 45,000l. This was for an army of 68,000 men, while in 1819 the sum paid was about 40,000l. on an army of 80,000 men: including the sum paid for discharges, so that the increase of charge was 18,000l., though the numbers to be recruited for were reduced from 80 to 68,000. This was a sign of the greatest profusion in management. There was one corps in which the recruiting was managed without any expense, except that of bounties, as the parties reported immediately to the head quarters of the regiment. This arrangement might be adopted with respect to the whole army. As to the regiments on foreign service, the recruiting officers could report to the commander at the dépôts. The recruits too were twice charged, as borne on their respective regiments, and as recruits on their way to the regiments. By the change he proposed, the charge of 35 superintending officers would cease. The saving in this department might be 27,859l. He saw a charge in the present estimates for wounded officers. Now, though he should be the last to object to any remuneration to officers really wounded, he saw no probability of cases arising in the present year to call for the vote in question. This amounted to 1,200l. He now called attention to the riding establishment at Pimlico. He did not relieve there was a cavalry officer in the House, who would stand up and defend this establishment. It was, in fact, a mere job. Whatever the advantage of the new system of riding taught there might be, three years ago all regiments of cavalry had large detachments there who were thoroughly instructed, and were now quite competent to teach their comrades. If any thing more were necessary, one competent officer, with the title of riding-master general, to visit the regiments would be quite sufficient. This would be a saving of 1,450l. The total reduction he should propose would be 176,415l. under the following heads:—Four battalions in the colonies 80,000l. staff corps 24,581l.; waggon train 6,295l.; second majors of every regiment of cavalry and infantry 35,000l.; recruiting establishments 27,889l.; riding establishment at Pimlico 1,450l.; sum charged as remuneration for officers wounds, as we are now carrying on no hostile operations 1,200l.; total 176,415l. The hon. member called strongly on the House to support him in his proposed reductions, and not to listen to the tales of impracticability which they would hear from ministers: Last year, in like manner, the ministers had told them, that if only a part of what they had since done in the way of reduction were done, the consequences would be too dreadful to be contemplated. The members who had believed these asser- tions had been exposed to the just reproaches of their constituents. He agreed with hon. members who said, that the reduction of expenditure should precede the reduction of taxation, but he now called on them to support the work of retrenchment, in the same spirit as they had done in the case of the two lords of the Admiralty; as he trusted they had not effected that reduction as a clap-trap, to avoid the necessity of greater and more important savings. He concluded by moving an amendment to reduce the numbers proposed from 68,802 to 65,502 men.

Lord Palmerston

stated, that the increase of the colonial force, even now, was only 1,678 men, of which number 588 came under the head of New South Wales; and no one who was aware of the great change which had taken place in that colony since 1792 could suppose that an increased force of 588 men was disproportioned to the new state of things. In the same way, it must at once be perceived that an increase of force was necessary in the American colonies. But, notwithstanding the change of circumstances, the number of men in the colonies was, on the whole, less than in 1792. In that year, the force abroad was 17,793 men; at present it was estimated at 14,965; being a reduction of nearly 3,000 men. The total amount was less considerable than in 1792, and where the number appeared greater, the circumstances sufficiently accounted for the increase. Now, the proposition of the hon. colonel was, to deduct from the force in the colonies 3,600 men. The hon. colonel had forgotten what had been already done, and what he and his friends had endeavoured to effect last year. Last session they proposed to reduce our military establishment 10,000 men. Government had in the interval not merely made reductions to the amount of 10,000, but of 12,300 men. The hon. gentlemen opposite had thus obtained a reduction of 2,300 men more than they demanded last year, and still they were dissatisfied. Then came the hon. colonel and proposed a reduction of 3,000 more. The appetite of the hon. gentleman, it must be confessed, was not easily gratified; for he not only was dissatisfied with the reductions, but the mode in which they were effected. If, however, his plan had been followed, of reducing by regiments rather than by companies, the saving would have been at least 50,000l. less. Now with respect to the staff corps, the hon. gentleman miscalculated the expense, and underrated the utility of this establishment. The staff establishment formed a corps of science, a corps of education—a corps not easily formed at first, and with difficulty restored if reduced. The body of officers consisted of men who had made the sciences connected with their profession their study, and who had acquired a knowledge and skill which could not always he found upon an emergency. The men of this corps were all artificers, who, though not like the officers, scientific, end highly educated, possessed manual skill and practical knowledge, which rendered them extremely useful in our foreign possessions. They were almost all abroad, and the advantage which their education gave them in directing works which could not be executed by the natives, might be easily calculated. Now, with respect to the waggon-train, he could not allow the justice of the hon. gentleman's observations. The corps was small, and was so necessary to the cavalry, that they could not move without it. The hon. gentleman had observed, that though useful in time of war, they could be of no service in time of peace. To that he would reply, that so long as we had cavalry, we must have some provision for their moving conveniently from one part of the island to another; and this they could not do without having a train like that in question. It was reduced now to a mere nucleus, on which to form an effective corps when necessary. The continuance of the establishment of second majors was disapproved of by the hon. gentleman; but he had miscalculated the saving which their reduction would occasion, and the source of hope and encouragement which their appointments held out to inferior officers. The saving accruing from their reduction, instead of being 35,000l., as he had stated, would not amount to more than 13,000l., if allowance were made for their half-pay. Considering the casualties which night occur on foreign stations two majors did not seem more than were necessary for the service of the regiment; and, at any rate, the establishment should be maintained as a reward to captains who were long without promotion. If the post of second major were reduced, a meritorious class of individuals would feel acutely the disappointment of their professional hopes. The hon. gentleman's observation with regard to the recruiting service admitted of an easy reply. In the first place, the sum which he mentioned as paid for recruiting service, included items which he did not consider; namely, expenses for marching, and charges for purchased horses: the whole amount of the expenses which properly fell under the head of recruiting did not exceed 9 or 10,000l.; and, in the second place, the plan of recruiting proposed by the hon. gentleman would be much more expensive and less effective. The present establishment was cheaper and more effective than any that had been proposed to be substituted. The hon. gentleman had expressed some surprise to see a charge for wounds in the estimates; but the fact was, officers were still arriving from abroad, and advancing claims for wounds received during the war. The riding establishment was more useful and less expensive than the hon. gentleman would allow it to be. So long as we had cavalry forces, they must be taught to ride; and great inconveniences would be prevented by having a uniform system for the whole of that part of the army. The plan proposed by the hon. gentleman, of instructing a certain number of officers, who might carry the knowledge of riding to the different regiments, like the subordinate instructors in a Lancasterian establishment, would not answer the purpose. The expense, so far from being 4,000l., would, on the reduced scale, not amount to 1,000l.

Sir H. Vivian

was of opinion, that reductions in the army had been carried as far as they possibly could. With regard to the waggon train he thought it desirable to keep it up as a skeleton; for it was well known to be very inefficient at its first establishment, and it was some time before it was brought into a state of discipline. As to the riding establishment, he considered it of vital importance that a uniform system of riding should be adopted throughout the army. He could not conclude without expressing his gratitude to ministers for having adopted a suggestion which he had made in the last session, for placing majors-general of the army on full regimental allowance instead of half-pay.

Mr. Hume

began by pointing out the curious predicament in which the gallant officer and his friends stood, who last year had supported ministers in condemning reduction, and this year declared their satisfaction that such reduction had taken place. What was the reason on which they justified this change? It had been said, that the diminution of force in the colonies was the cause which admitted of this reduction. But what was the fact? Why, there had been almost no diminution of force in the colonies between this year and last, and yet our army was to be reduced from 81,000 to 68,000 men. Thus inconsistent were the reasons which were adduced to justify an adherence to ministerial projects. The difference between the number of troops in our colonies last year and this, which amounted only to a few hundred men, was stated as a ground for being satisfied with reduction to the amount of 12,300l. The whole of the saving on the vote before the House was 558,000l. The noble lord had accused his hon. friends of being too prone to discontent, because they only asked a reduction of 10,000 men last year, and ministers had reduced 12,300. Now, the noble lord should have done him (Mr. H.) the justice to remember, that he had made a motion for the reduction of 20,000 men, and that he had been induced to withdraw it only by the persuasion of his hon. friends, who thought that a motion for 10,000 was more likely to meet with success. He had formerly gone back to 1792, as a period of comparison; and he could not help again pressing on the attention of the committee the necessity of following the example then left us. At that time, our military force, rank and file, was 36,363 men, and including officers 45,000. Now, what was the reduced vote of this year?—68,000, including 8,000 officers. We had then 36,000 rank and file. We had now 60,000. The marine corps then amounted to 8,000. Now it amounted to 15,000. The noble marquis had lately stated that this corps was employed as a land force, and, consequently, might be added to the land force when comparing the numbers of the army at different periods. Here, therefore, there was an addition to our army of 7,000 men over the marine corps of 1792. This was surely too much. We had nine or ten regiments locked up in the Ionian islands, which, with a better government of those islands, might be withdrawn. We had 12,000 men in the new colonies, a great portion of which might be reduced. In reckoning our military force at home, the militia, the constitutional force of the country, had been strangely overlooked by the noble lord. That force amounted to 63,000 men, and, together with the volunteers, cost the public between 500, and 600,000l. per annum, a sum sufficient for the pay of the rank and file of our army in 1792, exclusive of Ireland. The militia, the volunteer corps, the marines, and the artillery, were all additions to our military establishment, and ought to enable us to reduce the regular force in proportion. These species of force were either useful or they were not. If they were of use, they ought to have been brought into the noble lord's account; if they were not of use, the sum which they now cost the country ought to be saved. For his own part, he would rather pay for these constitutional troops, and take means to render them effective, in preference to keeping up the present amount of our regular military force. So absurd and defective was the present system, as regarded the militia, that instead of keeping serjeants to instruct the troops, he believed one half of the money appropriated for maintaining them was spent in drums, fifes, arid music. He would ask the House, what necessity there could be for maintaining a greater number of regular troops now than in 1792? He was not aware of any circumstance which required an increased military force, except, perhaps, the present situation of Ireland [hear! from lord Palmerston]. The noble lord said "hear!" but he forgot that he had embodied 3,000 men for this service. The disturbances in Ireland, were, in fact, nothing more than riots. These were, indeed, attended with bloodshed, and with many melancholy and distressing circumstances; but they had not that character of union which belonged to an insurrection. Taking the whole of our military establishment, he could show that it would bear a reduction of 20,000 men; and, instead of the small and inefficient saving about to be effected by ministers, it would be quite consistent with every purpose of safety to make such a reduction as would save half a million of money. The reduction which he meant to propose would, in effect, produce a saving to that amount. The noble lord had said, that it would not be consistent with the safety of the colonies to reduce the colonial establishment; but, surely, there were not the same apprehensions with regard to that of the household—a part of our military force which was the most expensive, and which had been greatly augmented since 1792. At that period, the whole amount of the horse and life guards was 7,500 while last year it amounted to 17,000. The House might look at the difference of these amounts, and say whether there was not a large surplus which could be disposed of for the relief of the country' The life guards in 1792 amounted to 672; this year they amounted to 1032; the cavalry in 1792 were 4,376, now they were 5,916; the horse guards and other parts of the establishment were 2,909 in 1792, and vow they amounted to 5,104. Why, he would ask, should there be a larger number of these troops now than there was in 1792? They were not efficient to the defence of the colonies, and they were the most expensive troops in the pay of government. One life-guardsman was as expensive as two soldiers, and a common cavalry-man was equal in expence to two-thirds of a life-guardsman. Any one of these cost the country full as much as did one of those junior clerks who had been paid off, although the state of the accounts showed that more of these clerks had been discharged than was perhaps consistent with the regular discharge of public business. Rather than have discharged so many of these, would it not have been better to reduce the number of life and horse guards, who really were of no use but to attend upon the sovereign? Of such troops we now had 9,500, when 6,000 would be fully sufficient; for it was not necessary that we should have guards in such numbers stationed at the West India docks, the gallery in Pall-mall, the Opera-house, and the British museum; as if it were necessary to have military to protect the arts and sciences, when it had been always understood, that of these a military force was the enemy. He thought that a reduction of 360 men might be effected in the guards alone. But though he was prepared to show, that there was a disposable surplus of 20,000 men, he did not mean to propose the reduction of that surplus. He would leave a disposable surplus of 10,000 to meet contingencies, and reduce the other 10,000l. He would now advert to the staff, which was in fact the most expensive establishment of them all, and which, if diminished in the same ratio with the reduction which he had suggested in the numerical amount of the army, would operate a very extensive saving. If the men alone were estimated at the rate of 33,000l. per every thousand, then the reduction of 10,000 would produce 330,000l., and the reduction of the staff, in the same proportion, would give a half more, which would make a total saving to the public of about half a million; and this too, having a surplus of 10,000 of the line above the number in 1792, independently of militia, yeomanry, and other corps, which could he rendered efficient, if necessary, for the safety of the country. He could, indeed, see no harm in reducing the establishment of the line to the establishment of 1792. In the colonies there was a great increase; and yet, making allowance for the Ionian islands, the number of troops left a much greater proportion to the extent of the colonies than in 1792.—He would trouble the House with one observation relative to the mode in which ministers proposed to effect their reductions of the army. There were three ways by which this might be done—the reduction of corps, the reduction of companies, and the reduction of men in each; and he might refer to the statement of the finance committee to show that the reduction proposed by ministers was not the one which, even in its opinion, would be the most beneficial. Previous to 1792, there was no uniform system of discipline: every regiment then following its own; so that though they were efficient enough as separate corps, they could not act together, and therefore were unserviceable as an army. Now, however, since the introduction of an uniformity of discipline, they could act in larger masses, and thus far, the new organization was better than the old. Even then, however, the number of corps had been reduced; and surely there could be no good objection to a reduction of the number of corps now. Ministers, then, would do little service to the country by a simple reduction of the number of men, if they did not put the reduced army in a state more consistent with the necessities of the country. If they were to reduce the staffs, and other establishments, there would be a saving of 71,000l. in every 8,000 men. Hence, although the same numerical establishment of men was kept up, as much would be gained by this reduction of the number of corps as would compensate for the additional pay which had been granted since 1792. He was at a loss how to reconcile the reduction of the corps to 550 men, with the pretended reduction of the expence; for if they had made the numerical, seduction which he proposed, and kept the corps at 8,000, they would have effected a saving of upwards of 500,000l. Now, why should they have reduced the corps to 550, when, by the other mode, there would have been a clear saving in the staff to the amount of 200,000l.? The mode of reduction was, therefore, extravagant. They talked of keeping up skeleton regiments; but of what use were skeleton regiments for the performance of regimental duty? Ministers might say it was difficult to make any reduction in the number of regiments; but, in his opinion, nothing would conduce more to the efficiency of the army. The plan proposed by ministers was, therefore, the most extensive, and at the same time the most expensive. This reduction was objectionable both in its extent and in its mode: in neither the one respect nor the other was it the best for the country. If they were to do any good at all—if they were not to mock the country in the midst of its distress—then they ought to reduce, not the number of men merely, but the number of corps. The duke of York had reduced the number of regiments from 110 to 94. He had done this in 1796, when the country was involved in war. It had been found advantageous even then; and could it fail to be productive of advantage now? The present establishment was too large; and the proposal of ministers was not what the circumstances of the country demanded. They could easily dispense with 10,000 of the present army, and so re-model the remainder as to produce a saving upon the whole of half a million a year. He would mention one particular instance:—there was no necessity for our keeping up 5,000 men in Canada, when the Americans were diminishing their establishment. Considering the ease with which the reduction that he proposed could be effected, and still more the circumstances of the country, he could not see how the House could refuse him its support. They would hear in mind, that every 1,000 men reduced was a saving of 33,000l. besides the half of that sum more for contingencies. The hon. member concluded by moving, that the reduction instead of being only 5,000 men should be 10,000.

Colonel Wood

understood the hon. gentleman to have said, that a considerable portion of the sums voted for the staff was laid out on bands of music, instead of being expended in drilling the recruits. All he could say to this was, that strict orders had been given that the musicians attached to a corps should be restricted to one drummer to two companies. The band was the most difficult part of a regiment to keep in order, and there was no disposition to have an unnecessary number of musicians. The hon. gentleman had spoken of the disorders in Ireland as if they amounted merely to a little riot. He could only say, that he should be very sorry to witness such riots in the country in which he lived. In this instance the hon. gentleman had taken a view of the subject very different from that taken of it by his friends near him, who had thought it desirable that martial law should be proclaimed in Ireland, which would not have been recommended, to put down a little riot. The hon. gentleman had stated the duke of York to have reduced 110 regiments to 94, in 1796. but that very circumstance arose out of the inconveniences previously experienced from the reductions having been made on that principle which the hon. gentleman seemed disposed to prefer. New corps had been raised early in the war; and these, when brought into the field had been found inefficient.

Sir J. Newport

said, he would not have risen upon this question, but for remarks which had been made respecting the state of Ireland, in which he could not concur. His earliest wish had been to get an examination instituted into the state of Ireland, and a remedy applied to the evils which distracted that country. But there was a limit to investigation as to other things, and Ireland was in that state when investigation could not be instituted, and when, not riot, but insurrection, required the strong arm of the law. It was impossible for him to regard as a not what was open insurrection, and a defiance of all law and authority. The government of Ireland had been most scandalously deceived by men who ought to have had correct information. He alluded to the information given respecting Belfast and Mountrath. Most dreadful outrages and horrid assassinations had been committed. A Roman catholic clergyman had been attacked, because he had from the altar recommended peace and good order. Could he doubt that this was a state requiring additional military force? He trusted that these dreadful disorders would pass away, but it would be by the vigorous execution of the law in putting down violence. It would be imperious afterwards to look into the causes of the disturbances. He never would concur in thinking that they ought not to be looked into and probed to the bottom. But while insurrection prevailed, he hoped no hon. member would seem for a moment to express any terms of mitigation. Having always been the advocate of peace and examination, he was now obliged to say that tranquillity must be first restored; and then he would urge a thorough, complete, and radical investigation of the evils of which Ireland complained, with a view to the application of a full, safe, and adequate remedy for them.

General Gascoyne

said, he would certainly vote against the proposed reduction. Honourable members talked of the state in which our army had stood previous to the late war; but, let it be remembered, that very heavy objections had been taken upon the breaking out of that war, to the condition now so lauded. The very small force which England brought into the field had been a source of astonishment and of displeasure to her allies. He (gen. G.) being on service in one of the brigades sent out upon that occasion, the brigade was so weak, that an Austrian general actually took it for a battalion, and asked whether all the British battalions were of equal force. The gallant member contended for the necessity of maintaining such a force as should have an eye to the northern as well as to the southern parts of that country; and concluded by declaring, that the seeds of war existed in every part of Europe, and that appearances were such as to justify measures of precaution. The hon. member for Aberdeen went on, taken up wholly by his figures and marking out reduction here and there in the army, without being possessed of the smallest military know, ledge himself, but denying that an officer could know any thing at all of the matter. He would tell that hon. gentleman, whatever his profession might be, whether it was in the way of slaughtering or of healing, that in this instance his calculations were far from being correct.

Mr. Wilmot

said, he felt himself bound, in the outset of his speech, to protest against the expediency of any farther military reduction. Before, however, he stated the reasons of his dissent from such a measure, he would make a few observations upon what had fallen from the hon. member for Aberdeen. With regard to the reduction already effected in the colo- nies, the hon. member had stated it as not exceding 400 men. If the hon. member meant to persist in that assertion, he (Mr. W.) could satisfy the House that a more monstrous assertion had never been put forth; for the reduction actually effected in the colonies amounted to 4,535 men. Upon the estimates of the present year, article "Stations abroad, India excepted," the numerical force, officers and non-commissioned officers included, stood at 27,943. The very same article, in the estimates of last year, gave, as the number of men, 32,467. Now, this reduction, the hon. member called, a reduction not exceeding 400 men. The very items, however, of the alteration should be stated to the House. In the old Leeward islands there had been a reduction of 370; in Jamaica and Honduras, 513; in North America, including Canada and the Bermudas, 863; at Gibraltar, 381; in the new Leeward islands, 208; at the Cape, 228; at the Mauritius, 192; at St. Helena, 1,492; and at Ceylon, 1,034; in New South Wales there was an increase of 153; in Africa 30; and in Malta and the Ionian islands 625: but the saving, he repeated, upon the whole alterations amounted to 4,500 men. So much, then, for the question of reduction effected; and now to the question of farther reduction. proposed. If the hon. and gallant member who had alluded to the state of the Cape would look to the character of the population of that settlement, and to the nature of the predatory hordes by which it was surrounded, he would scarcely think the number of troops at present maintained too great. With respect to Ceylon, considering the immense area of that country, its recent subjugation, and the reduction already effected, both of regular and local force, it was impossible to think of farther alteration without endangering the security of our possession. The increase of force in Malta and the Ionian islands had been ascribed to the operation of a certain course of policy. As the time would come, and at no very distant period, when that subject would be fully investigated, it would not be proper for him to introduce it upon the present occasion; thus much, however, he would say, that there was no subject on which the public had been more extensively and systematically deluded. Confining himself, however, to the colonies, simply, he had shown the House that the calculations of the hon. member for Aberdeen were upon a wrong principle; and he defied that hon. member to contradict his statement. When it was seen that the old colonies were even at a lower establishment than in the beginning of 1792, he did trust that the House would reject, and with disdain, the proposition of the hon. member for Aberdeen. He did confess that he felt annoyed when the government was accused of having insulted the country by its offers of reduction. Mr. Burke had said, that the age of chivalry was past, and that of calculators had succeeded it. He really thought that the hon. member in his love fur calculation, forgot sometimes the true interests of the country. He could not think it possible that that hon. member could wish that England should forfeit her rank among the nations of Europe, and that by reducing her power of resistance she should invite acts of aggression. He could not believe that the hon. member had lost sight of the maxim—Si vis prcem Para bellum; but whatever might be the opinion of the hon. member on that point, he (Mr. W.) entreated of that House to consult petty savings less than the real and prospective advantage of the nation.

Mr. Bennet

thought, that before the House resolved to keep up so large a military establishment as that which was proposed, they should consider whether the country was able to pay its creditors. If the public interests were more imperious than the payment of the debt, then that ought to give way; but he did not see how, under existing circumstances, an army of so large an amount was a matter of imperious necessity. He fully concurred in all that had been said, as to the present state of Ireland; but he could not forget that the wretched condition of that country was the effect of the mal-administration of the gentlemen who sat opposite to him. Ireland had enjoyed the full benefit of coercion; she had had insurrection acts, martial law, and fresh troops in abundance; but nothing to improve, to relieve, or to tranquillize her. The state of Ireland brought to his mind every thing connected with abuse and bad government. The hon. member insisted that a reduction of 10,000 men was safe and easy. The cavalry and the guards could afford to lose 2,000. Of 17,000 men in India, 3,000 might be reduced: 5,000 might be taken at once from the force of England. He admit- ted the present exigency of Ireland, and therefore it was, that he confined his vote to the reduction of 10,000 men. But for that circumstance, he should have insisted upon taking off 20,000.

Captain O'Grady

disapproved of the mode in which economy had been carried into execution, with regard to the army in Ireland, and instanced the case of two regiments which were disbanded in Limerick, at the very time when rebellion was exhibited in the most unequivocal form. He regretted to observe also, that a military system was now acted on by the insurgents. The insurrection in Ireland could not be put down without force: and, therefore, though there many grievances in that country which ought to be redressed as soon as possible, the military force ought not to be too hastily reduced. He agreed that considerable reductions might be made in the civil departments, and the retired allowances.

Mr. Warre

thought, that under all the circumstances, the reduction of 10,000 men which took place last year was sufficient; but in differing in opinion with his hon. friend the member for Aberdeen, he felt nothing like "disdain," and thought that expression might have been spared on the other side of the House.

Lord Althorp

agreed with the hon. member for Shrewsbury that 10,000 men might be reduced, with perfect safety to the country.

Mr. Caleraft

said, that the reduction of the army being brought to the point for which he had contended during the last six years, he could see nothing in the situation of the country, either at home or abroad, to require any farther reduction. If he did not think so, there was no man more willing than he should be, from constitutional and economical reasons, to support the cause of reduction. So far from conceiving the strength of the army too great at present, he did not know from what part of this country a disposable force could be sent to Ireland if occasion required it. His hon. friend had talked of the inability of the country to pay its troops. But surely no man, whatever his love of retrenchment might be, could look fairly at the situation of England, and say that she could not pay the troops that were necessary to her security. Such an opinion was a desponding opinion; an opinion which exaggerated the distress of the country, and in which he could not concur. The country not pay its troops! Why, we had a sinking fund of 5,000,000l. It was said, "Apply that fund to the reduction of the taxes;" but, surely, the safety of the state was more important than the reduction of taxes. He by no means bound himself as to what he might do hereafter, when Ireland should be brought into a more tranquil state; but, under existing circumstances, he could not vote for the reduction contended for. He agreed, that all reductions should be made by companies, and not by regiments, that we might be enabled to raise an army more readily in any case of emergency. It was the worst economy in the world to place our armies in a state which would render it difficult to build them up again.

Sir H. Hardinge

contended for the necessity of keeping up in time of peace, a force necessary to recruit our army in time of war, and insisted particularly on the expediency of making such a provision with respect to the waggon-train—the greatest military authority in the country having given a decided opinion to the same effect.

Sir R. Fergusson

expressed his conviction, that the atrocities committed in Ireland ought to be put down by a military force, and he would prefer the employment of the regular troops to that of the resident yeomanry and volunteers, as being less under the influence of local prejudices. He would, however, support the amendment on the ground of the necessity of limiting our expenses. With respect to our foreign possessions, all he should say was this, that we ought to look at home first, and if we found that we could not keep our colonies but at an expense which the country could not bear, we ought to give them up altogether.

The committee divided, first, on Mr. Hume's amendment: Ayes, 51. Noes, 196. A second division took place on colonel Davies' amendment: Ayes, 58. Noes, 184. The original resolution was then agreed to.

List of the Minority.
Althorp, lord Davies, Colonel
Bernal, R. Denison, W. J.
Barrett, S. B. M. Denman, T.
Benyon, B. Fergusson, sir R.
Birch, J. Fitzgerald, lord
Bright, H. Foley, J. H.
Blake, sir F. Graham, S.
Bury, lord Guise, sir W.
Byng, G. Hobhouse, J. C.
Coffin, sir I. Honywood, W. P.
Coneannon, L. Hughes, Colonel
Hume, J. Russell, lord J.
Hutchinson, hon. H. Rice, T. S.
James, W. Scott, J.
Johnston, colonel Smith, A.
Kennedy, T. F. Stanley, lord
Lambton, J. G. Smith, W.
Lushington, Dr. Sefton, earl
Maberly, J. jun. Stuart, lord J.
Martin, J. Wharton, J.
Maxwell, J. Webb, colonel
Maule, hon. W. Whitbread, S.
Monck, J. B. Whitbread, W. H.
Moore, P. Wilson, sir R.
Newman, R. W. Wyvil, M.
Nugent, lord Wilkins, W.
Philips, G. R. Williams, W.
Price, R. Wood, Alderman
Ricardo, D. TELLER.
Rubinson, sir G. Bennet, H. G.