HC Deb 26 June 1822 vol 7 cc1381-95
Mr. Creevey

said, he rose to submit to the House the consideration of the Ministerial Pension bill of 1817. He had formerly moved certain accounts as grounds of ulterior proceedings which he would now propose for repealing the bill. No task could be more difficult than to call upon that House to take away 42,000l. a year from the ministers of the Crown. He agreed with the noble lord opposite, that he should be unsuccessful, yet he relied upon the great allies of reform—public opinion, the publicity of their debates, and the forms of parliament. Though he should still fell confident that this bill should soon be withdrawn from the Stature-book. His object now was, to submit a certain set of resolutions, in which he hoped the hon. gentleman (Mr. Bankes) who had done so much in passing the bill, would agree with him. He might save time by standing his resolutions as his text, and making his observations afterwards. The first resolution stated the fact,

1. "That it appears to this House, by an act passed in the 57th year of his late majesty, c. 65, that a sum of 42,000l. per annum is charged in perpetuity upon the Consolidated fund, to be divided in pensions among certain persons who shall have held certain public offices under the Crown for certain periods of time; viz. six pensions of 3,000l. per ann. each, to such persons as shall have held the offices of First Commissioner of his majesty's Treasury, of one of the principal Secretaries of state, or Chancellor of the Exchequer, or First Lord of the Admiralty, for a period of not less then two years in the whole, either uninterruptedly or at different times: One other pension of 3,000l. per annum to any person who shall have held any of the last-mentioned offices without being subject to any limitation or restriction whatsoever as a duration of service: Three pensions of 2,000l. per ann. each, to such persons as shall have held the offices of Chief secretary for Ireland, or Secretary at War, for any period not less than five years in the whole, either uninterruptedly or at different times: Six pensions of 1,500l. per annum each, to such persons as shall have held the offices of one of the Joint Secretaries of the Treasury, of First Secretary of the Admiralty, for any period not less than five years: and six pensions of 1,000l. per ann. each, to such persons as shall have held the offices of the Under secretaries of State, Clerk of the Ordnance, or Second Secretary to the Admiralty, for any period not less than ten years."

Now, the chief justice, who generally was not a young man when he attained to that office, must be in office 15 years before he could be entitled to a pension. There was also a fancy pension of 3,000l. for which no time at all was necessary. The second Resolution was the pretence, that 42,000l. yearly were given as a compensation for the abolition and regulation of different offices. It sated,

2. "That it appears by the preamble of the last recited act, that such sum of 42,000l. per annum is provided for the different persons therein named, on ac- count of, and as a compensation for, the abolition and regulation of different public offices by other acts then and there passed, and which will deprive the Crown (as therein is stated) of part of the means by which his majesty had been theretofore enabled to recompense the meritorious services of persons holding, or who have held, high and efficient public offices."

He now came to the third Resolution. Whereas it had been heretofore the practice of the Crown to find out the merits of its servants, and when the funds at its disposal were insufficient to reward transcendant merit, to make a special application to parliament for the purpose, the Resolution stated,

3. "That although the said act of the 57th of his late majesty, c. 65, professes in its preamble to supply the Crown with new means of recompensing the services of persons holding, or who have held, high and efficient public offices, no application from the Crown for such new sources of patronage, by message or otherwise to this House, is to be found upon its Journals; that the said act appears to have originated solely from a Select Committee of this House, and which was partly composed of persons who, from their official situations, would themselves become entitled to the pensions created by the bill; that this Select Committee was appointed in the year 1817, during the pressure of great public financial distress; that the sole object of its appointment (as appears by the Journals) was, to examine into the public revenues and expenditure of the country, and more especially to ascertain what relief could be afforded to the people by the reduction of such expenditure; that this committee nevertheless, so appointed and so composed, did, in their first report, recommend the creation of this new and burthensome Pension Fund upon the people, fixing at their own discretion, upon such persons who were alone to possess it, and in what proportions, and leaving to his majesty the authority of his veto only in the last resort over pensions thus created by his servants in favour of themselves."

Now it was the acknowledged principle of our constitutional law, that parties interested should not be judges in their own case. How far this principle had been observed in the bill of which he spoke, the House would decide, when he stated, that the noble marquis opposite and the chancellor of the exchequer, were members of the committee. When an inquiry was proposed some time ago into the diplomatic expenditure, the noble lord declared, that he would not, as he called it, "disvigour" the monarchy, by; consenting to that inquiry. But bow much more did such a Bill as this "disvigour" the monarchy? The term was the noble lord's, or he should not have thought of using it. In the language of the noble lord he could not conceive any act more "disvigouring" to the country than a committee thus imposing on the people a great burthen of pensions, payable to ministers By "disvigoured," he understood "degraded;" and he thought the country was precisely in that situation, in consequence of such a proceeding. The effect of it was, to remove from ministers their responsibility and to attach in to the Crown. This pension fund of 42,000l. a year was charged in consequence of the proposal of a committee composed chiefly of the ministers of Crown, who were themselves to be the objects of such an arrangement.

The fourth Resolution stated,

4. "That antecedent to the act of the 57th of his late majesty, c. 65, it was unknown to the laws and constitution of this kingdom, that the abolition and regulation of useless or overpaid offices were to be purchased and paid for by pensions from the public, to persons holding high and efficient public offices; that the power of the Crown to dispose of its revenues in favour of the subject has been greatly abridged within the last two centuries, without any claims for compensation by pensions being made from the persons who then held high and efficient public offices; that various useless and overpaid offices have been abolished and regulated during the same period, particularly by the act of the 23rd of his late majesty, c. 82, whereby different offices of considerable emolument in his majesty's exchequer were abolished, and others, having profits to an enormous amount, were regulated, and reduced to a definite and comparatively moderate value, but that no compensation by pensions for such abolition and regulation was claimed by the persons who then held high and efficient situations."

The object of the resolution was, to show the country that this was the first time in which any set of public men had ever demanded to be paid by the public out of the profits or savings arising from the reduction of useless offices. In 1782, the reports upon which the regulations for the reduction of useless offices were framed and acted upon, were drawn up by persons who were not members of that House. The commissioners of accounts, appointed in 1780, were not only not, members of that House, but they were bound by an oath, to execute their office with fidelity. These commissioners were prohibited even from holding any office under government during the sitting of the commissioners. The contrary practice had long since been adopted; and really gentlemen seemed to think it was all matter of course and of constitutional law, that committees of that House should provide pensions for ministers his object in bringing this resolution before the House was, to record what a different practice they had once observed. The hon. gentleman here alluded to a message which came down from the Throne, in 1782, recommending the abolition of useless offices, &c., and repeated the answer of the Commons to that message; whereby they pledged themselves to an inquiry into the subject at an early period of the ensuing session. Now, this took place when our debt was 200 millions. His late majesty here talked of the sacrifices which had been generously made by the people during the American war. But had no sacrifices been made during the late war? Surely, after such sacrifices as bad recently been made, and with the national debt increased to 800 millions, the people were entitled to every possible relief. In that royal message "the people" were mentioned with consideration. But, in 1817, the member for Corfe-castle took the executive out of the Crown altogether; and by the bill which his exertions procured to be passed, ministers were carefully provided for; but not one word was said about "the people." But, supposing even that it had been the practice for committees of that House to propose rewards of this kind to public men; and to marshal them in classes, as they would do clerks in public offices—supposing that public men were ordinarily paid out of the savings arising from the abolition of public offices—still there never had been a bargain so atrocious and abominable as that which was entered into in 1817, between the committee and ministers, for the payment of the latter, at the expense of the public.—The 5th Resolution he had to submit was this:

5. "That, in addition to, and independent of, the preceding objections, to the origin and principle of the Pension bill, the contract which is thereby set up between the pensioners under the bill and the public, is without any adequate consideration or advantage on the part of the nation; that the office to be prospectively abolished or regulated by the acts of the 57 Geo. 3rd, c. 30, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, and 84, form a limited part only of offices of the same description, and which were all decided upon as fit to be abolished or regulated by the votes of this House, in the years 1812 and 1813; that of the offices to be prospectively abolished, those of the two chief justices in Eyre of the value of 2,000l. per annum each, are the only ones which have usually been granted by the Crown to persons who have held high and efficient civil offices; and that, of the principal regulation is, that the duties of such offices shall be performed by the holders thereof in person, instead of by deputy; the appointment to such offices, as well as of all salaries, being left at the sole discretion of the commissioners of his majesty's treasury; and yet, in return for, and by way of purchase of, these prospective, partial, and indefinite savings, the people are to pay from henceforth 42,000l. per annum, in perpetuity, to the different public servants of the Crown who are named in the Pension bill."

The fact was, that except the chief justiceships in Eyre, the great offices, such as the tellerships and the audit or ships of the Exchequer, had not been regulated, but only reserved. Their fate was not yet determined. The hon. member (Mr. Bankes) on a former occasion had said, that he (Mr. C.) had voted for the bills of 1812 and 1813. He had done so; and he was ashamed to acknowledge it, on finding the monstrous abuse of its principle which had since taken place. The principle which he voted for was, that all useless offices were to be abolished; all offices greatly overpaid to be regulated; all objectionable offices in the colonies and the courts of law to be done away with. This principle had been so very differently recognised by the hon. gentleman since he brought in his bill, that he hoped he had only to remind the hon. gentleman of that difference to be assured of his support on the present occasion. At the time that the hon. gentleman proposed the bill in question, he (Mr. C.) took him absolutely for a reformer, but surely never did reformer become more "disvigoured" than the hon. gentleman ever since he became a member of the committee of 1817. Never were two bills more different than those which the hon. gentleman had at those two different intervals introduced into the House. Indeed, it was astonishing to think of a grave and stayed gentleman, like the hon. member for Corfe-castle, being guilty of such extreme inconsistency. He began by a bill to abolish all useless offices, and to allow pensions after five years of service. But after he had got into company with the noble lord, he introduced a bill entirely different, and allowed pensions after two years service only.—He should like the House to guess at the precise sum which had been saved under the operation of the two bills during a period of five years. His next resolution would show:—

6. "That from the returns which have been made to the House of offices already abolished or regulated under the act last-mentioned, and of pensions received under the Pension-bill, the following appears to be the result of the contract between the pensioners under the Pension-bill and the public at large, up to the present period:—In England, offices abolished, those of clerk to the warden to the Mint, saving, 92l. 10s per annum; stamper of weights, saving 250l. per annum; total saving in England in five years, 312l. 10s. In Scotland, offices abolished, vice-admiral, saving 1,000l. per annum; inspector of military roads, saving 200l. per annum; offices vacant, and subject to regulation, lord registrar in Scotland, late value 1,200l., but no saving returned; king's remembrancer's office in Scotland, saving returned, 500l.; and the office of teller of the Exchequer in Ireland, late value—1,300l. per annum, but no saving returned.—Pensions which have received his majesty's sign manual; under the Pension-bill, to Henry lord viscount Sid-mouth, 3,000l. per annum; and to the right hon. Henry Goulburn, 1,000 per annum; the latter pension being suspended by the Pension-bill, as long as Mr. Goulburn holds the office of chief-secretary to the lord-lieutenant of Ireland."

Now, supposing that all the useless offices named were actually abolished, though the tellership of the Exchequer and other offices were still reserved, the total saving would be, 4,602l. 10s. in five years. All this, and particularly the matter of the last resolution, ought to be recorded on the Journals, in order to let the public know their great obligations to public men. The seventh Resolution was as follows:—

7. "That this House is of opinion, that had the offices of clerk to the warden of the mint, and stamper of weights in England, and the offices of vice-admiral and inspector of military roads in Scotland, remained at the disposal of the Crown, instead of being abolished, they would not have been conferred by his majesty upon Henry, lord viscount Sid-mouth as a recompense for his services in the different high and efficient situations which he has held; and that, even if they had been all so conferred upon lord Sidmouth, their united profits are very inferior in amount to the pension he now receives as a compensation for the loss of them; that it appears, moreover, by a document lately laid before this House, that in the year 1802, Henry, lord viscount Sidmouth, being then first commissioner of his majesty's treasury, did grant to his son, Henry Addington, the office of clerk of the pells in England, of the annual value of 3,000l.; and that lord Sidmouth or his family have received the profits of such office for 20 years, although lord Sidmouth during a great portion of such time has held different offices of great emolument under the Crown; that the office of clerk of the pells was, at the, time it was last granted, and is now, an office executed entirely by deputy, but by one of the acts of regulation before referred to, the duties of such office at some future period, are to be performed by the principal in person, so that lord Sidmouth or his family, receive at present 3,000l. per annum as the profit of this office, without being subject to any regulation whatsoever; and lord Sidmouth receives a farther sum of 3,000l. per annum as a compensation for some injury which it is presumed some other person may sustain by some future regulation of this office, when lord Sidmouth's interst or that of his family therein shall cease." [A laugh.]

Gentlemen laughed; but surely never was a situation so romantic, and no doubt so distressing, as that of lord viscount Sidmouth! He would not go out of his way to utter a single disrespectful word of lord Sidmouth; but he would just mention two names, than whom that nobleman's warmest admirers would not deny, that lord Sidmouth was not likely to occupy a wider or more commanding position in the history of their country. Here was lord Sidmouth receiving for his very eminent services, two or more salaries. Now, the great, the good lord Godolphin, had but one pension, which he condescended to accept from the Crown. The celebrated Chatham also, had but one pension, and that, too, he condescended, certainly, to accept from the Crown; but in both cases the salaries were single. He did not see, therefore, why the noble lord Sidmouth should have two. The result of the different considerations which he had now the honour of submitting to the House was embodied in his last Resolution:—

8. "That this House is of opinion, that for the House of Commons to provide pensions for the principal civil servants of the Crown by committees of its own, and without any application from the Throne for such purposes, is an interference with the just prerogative of the Crown, an abuse of that power over the public money with which this House is intrusted by the constitution, and an intolerable grievance to the people; and that this grievance is still further aggravated by that new and degrading principle of the Pension bill, which compels the people to purchase from the servants of the Crown, every abolition or regulation of an useless or overpaid office:—That after all the sacrifices which have been made by the great and industrious population of these kingdoms, and under all that unparalleled distress with which a great portion of such population is at present afflicted, they are entitled to demand, as a matter of right and justice, and not of purchase, the abolition and regulation of every useless and overpaid office in the state whatsoever; and that, in conformity to such just and reasonable claims, it is the opinion of this House, that the Ministerial Pension bill, of the 57th year of his late majesty, c. 65, ought to be repealed forthwith."

Upon these Resolutions he knew very well that he should be left in a very limited minority: but he should be satisfied with the opportunity of recording them upon the Journals of the House. And sure he was, that when the public opinion, which had been admitted in that House to be so much enlightened, was expressed on the subject, sooner or later the act in question would be repealed. He should now conclude by moving his first Resolution.

Mr. Bankes

professed himself to have been a party to the principle upon which the acts of 1813 and 1817 were founded. On the first of these occasions, the hon. gentleman declared there was something so unjustifiable and abominable in the measure adopted, that he could not recur to it without shame. Now, what was that principle? The abolition of useful offices; the reduction in salary of overpaid ones; salary commensurate with duty; and at the same time carefully made adequate as compensation for the duties discharged. The hon. gentleman had said, that, in 1782, Mr. Burke did not act upon this principle. But what Mr. Burke said on, the subject of laying down all useless or overpaid offices, without exception, was this,—that it would be bad service to the state to take away from the Crown the means of tempting talents into its service. As for the hon. gentleman's complaining that these pensions, and compensations had been settled without any message from the Crown, the gentleman could not but be aware, that the Crown must be a party to every bill of this sort. The hon. member had contrasted the bills which he (Mr. B). had brought in, with that which formed the subject of debate. He did not hesitate to say, that believed the two bills which he had formerly introduced, would, if they had passed, have been found more effective than the present bill. The hon. member had assumed, that the existing bill was also his work. This he denied He did not mean to defend the bill altogether: he thought it defective, in several points, and particularly with respects the periods of service, which were too limited. The bill, however, contained much that was good; and, if it were repealed, it would be necessary to return to the state of things which existed before the measure was passed; and, therefore, the object of the motion must be considered to be not so much the repeal of the bill, as the restoration of sinecures. Was the House prepared for this? Would any man deny that the bill had effected an improvement upon the former system; or say, that was not better to have pensions, however large, than to revive sinecures? If the House were to agree to the motion, it would establish a most extraor- dinary precedent, by placing on the Journals the comments of the hon. member upon an act of parliament. The pensions which had been granted to lord Sidmouth, he considered no more than a fit remuneration for the arduous and meritorious services of that noble lord. It was the prerogative of the Crown to bestow pensions as rewards for eminent public services: and if ever that prerogative should be taken from the Crown, and vested in that House, it would be a departure from the principles of the constitution, and the change would be forty times more expensive and onerous than the original state of things. He concluded with moving, "That the other orders of the day be read."

Mr. H. G. Bennet

said, he considered the bill a fraudulent measure. Under it, very few offices had been abolished, and not many regulated. He objected to the whole of the present system. He had satisfied himself by inquiry, that since the Revolution, all the great offices of state had been given as bribes to families, for the support of ministers when they had lost the confidence of the country. Those offices were not bestowed as rewards for public services, but as pay for political prostitution. He chiefly objected to the present bill, because it held out inducements to political adventurers to enter that House, who, by prostituting the talents with which Providence had gifted them, arrived at situations of rank, and, after two years' service, retired upon a pension for life. He must deny that the country would be a loser by the repeal of the bill. He did not believe that the House, even constituted as it was, would agree to a pension of 3,000l. to lord Sidmouth. It was painful to allude to particular individuals; but he felt it his duty to declare, that from the hapless day when lord Sidmouth quitted the chair of that House to become prime minister of this country—for which situation, in point of ability and talent, he was no more qualified than any of the door-keepers of the house—down to the present time, he had done nothing to deserve such a reward as that which had been bestowed upon him. [Cheers.] It would be very consistent in those who were the supporters of the Manchester massacre, and the eulogists of spies and informers, to praise the noble viscount; but he could not consider it any thing but an unfortunate selection which had placed such a man in an office of such great importance. He judged, from the general conduct of the hon. member for Corfe-castle, that he was a friend to reform in little things, but an enemy to economy and reform in matters of importance; and he was of opinion, that nobody had done more to prevent any real reform from taking place.

Mr. Bankes

said, that the attack made on him by the hon. member was most unfounded. He would appeal to the whole course of his parliamentary conduct against such an insinuation, which, in justice to himself, he must term false.

Mr. H. G. Bennet

said, that with every possible contumely, he returned the term "false," in every sense in which it was used by the hon. member.

The Marquis of Londonderry

said, he could not, without the utmost indignation, listen to the attacks which had been so profusely and so unwarrantably made on the characters of individuals by the two hon. members. Those hon. members could not be ignorant of the inconsistency of their arguments on the question of rewards to public servants. They ought to be aware, that the reform of Mr. Burke allowed of rewards to public servants who had filled high and important situations. The speeches, however, of the hon. members, however they might affect to approve the principle of that measure, presented the most disgusting system of inconsistency he had ever met with; for though they had been sticklers for the bill on a former occasion, which admitted the justice of such rewards, they now came forward to oppose them, with the evident view of attacking the character of a nobleman, in whose case the principle had been applied. The character of his noble friend (lord Sidmouth) was, however, too exalted to be affected by such insinuations; for he would assert, that a more able and efficient minister of the Crown had not existed than he had proved himself. By his talents and exertions he had contributed mainly to the salvation of the country in an hour of danger and peril. Having those opinions with respect to the character and talents of his noble friend, it was not without feelings of disgust that he had heard the gross attack upon him, in which he had been compared to one of the door-keepers of that House. Such language never ought to have been used in the observations of one gentleman upon the political conduct of another. It was, however, reserved for the hon. member for Shrewsbury, and he did not envy him the proud distinction, to make the exception. The conduct of his noble friend, would, on every occasion of his life, bear the strictest scrutiny. At the time he left the chair of that House, which he had filled with so much credit and ability, he left it, not from any wish of his own, but in obedience to the commands of his sovereign; and though his political career might not be so brilliant as that of Mr. Pitt or Mr. Fox, on a comparison, his eminent services were not the less entitled to the gratitude of his country. But the attacks of the hon. members did not end here. An attempt was made to wound the personal feelings of his noble friend, by a charge of his having acted from interested motives. Such a charge was most unwarranted. When his noble friend left the chair of that House, he refused to accept of any provision; and the same disinterested feelings actuated him when he retired from the cabinet. In consideration of his eminent services, his late majesty had given his commands to Mr. Yorke to draw up a message to the Commons to make provision for him. His noble friend most peremptorily refused to accept of any. It was objected by the hon. mover, that his noble friend had conferred offices upon members of his own family. If he had done so, he had done no more than had been done by other ministers. But what had that provision to do with the present question? This, however, did not prevent the gentlemen opposite from alluding to circumstances, which were calculated to harrow up family feelings, and that, too, in a case where no other object could, by possibility, be attained. It must have been known to the hon. members, that of the profits of the situation which had been conferred on a part of the family of his noble friend, he could not, under the particular circumstances, touch a penny; and for that reason, as it could not support any one of their arguments, common feelings of humanity should have induced them to abstain from introducing it. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, it was not without feelings of great disgust that he had heard the remarks of the hon. gentlemen, and he could not sit there without expressing his reprobation of language the most disgusting and disgraceful he had ever heard within the walls of a British parliament, [Immense cheering from the ministerial side].

Mr. Brougham

said, he rose to protest against the tone and language which the noble lord had dared to use.

The Marquis of Londonderry

rose to order, and said—When any hon. member uses the word "dare," as applied to any remark made by any other member, I apprehend it is quite inconsistent with the order of parliamentary proceedings. If the term is applied to any observation used by me, it is irregular; for at the time of my making a remark which could call for such en expression, it was the learned member's duty to have interrupted me. The learned member has neglected to do so, and I now appeal to the chair whether he is regular in the expression he has used.

The Speaker

said, that, undoubtedly, if the use of the word "dare" were to be interpreted in the sense in which the noble lord took it, it would be quite disorderly; but the House would allow him to say, that the term was one which was frequently used in debate without any offensive intention on the part of the member using it.

Mr. Brougham

maintained, that he had a right to impugn any minister of the Crown for presuming (if he must be driven from his former word) to accuse a representative of the people, engaged in the honest discharge of his duty, in language such as no member of that House had, ever ventured to employ. Disgraceful! disgusting! There might be some members who deemed his hon. friend's speech disgraceful, but he (Mr. B.) was not one of them: there might be some who considered them disgusting, but he belonged not to that class. It was one thing, however, to think, and another to utter such language; and never in his life had he heard such expressions uttered in that House as those which had been launched by a minister of the Crown at the head of a representative of the people. He should feel for any member who was treated in this most novel and unparliamentary, fashion; but, in the present instance, he felt for a dear, long tried, and much valued friend, for whom he entertained all those sentiments to which the excellence of his heart, the manliness of his character, and the inflexible integrity of his public conduct justly entitled him. With respect to the general question, he would only say, that without entering into the personal character of lord Sidmouth, a more absurd or ridiculous attempt than that of raising him to the office of prime minister of the country, and particularly at the time be was so raised, had never before been heard of. He then defended his hon. friend against the charge of the noble lord, that his remarks were intended to wound that noble lord's feelings. Nothing could be farther from his hon. friend's intentions; but the noble lord knew well where the shoe pinched; he know also, that it was not the individual filling the situation of a sinecure to whom the objection was made, but to the principle of keeping tip places which were wholly unnecessary.

The Marquis of Londonderry

said, he had used the words "disgraceful and disgusting" in no other than a parliamentary sense, and did not apply them to the general scope of the argument of the hon. member. When he heard the hon. member compare his noble friend to a doorkeeper, and undertake to prove that all the great families, from the period of the Revolution, had been corrupted by grants, similar to those conferred on lord Sidmouth, he considered those two declarations both disgraceful and disgusting; and though he wished it to be understood that he used these expressions in a parliamentary sense, he did not upon reflection consider that he had at all misapplied the terms.

Mr. Creevey

said, that as the hon. member for Corfe-Castle had moved as an amendment, that the House should proceed to the other orders of the day, and as his (Mr. C.'s) object was to put his resolutions upon the Journals, he should merely band up to the Speaker his first resolution. If it was negatived, he should then move his other resolutions, as the other orders of the day were proposed to be read. He did not, however, intend to divide the House upon any of his resolutions, except the first.

The question being put, "That the other orders of the day be now read, the House divided: Ayes, 143. Noes, 42. Majority against Mr. Creevey's first resolution, 101.

List of the Minority.
Bennet, hon. H. G. Denman, T.
Bernal, R. Dundas, hon. T.
Brougham, H. Dennison, W. J.
Calvert, C. Fergusson, sir R. C.
Carter, J. Folkestone, visct.
Davies, T. H. Grattan, J.
Guise, sir W. Robinson, sir G.
Haldimand, W. Rice, T. S.
Hobhouse, J. C. Ricardo, D.
Honeywood, W. P. Rowley, sir W.
Hughes, W. L. Robarts, A.
Hume, J. Robarts, G.
Holdsworth, T. Smith, J.
James, W. Smith, W.
Jervoise, G. P. Taylor, M. A.
Lennard, T. B. Western, C. C.
Lushington, S. Whitbread, S. C.
Maberly, J. Wilson, sir R.
Maberly, W. Wood, alderman
Milbank, M. TELLERS.
Monck, J. B. Creevey, T.
Newport, sir J. Duncannon, visct.
Palmer, C. F.