HC Deb 23 May 1821 vol 5 cc890-3
Mr. Dugdale

having presented a petition from Birmingham, complaining of the severity of the Criminal Laws,

Mr. Brougham

said, he was anxious to take the opportunity afforded to him by a petition being presented for an alteration in the criminal law, to complain of another alteration in the criminal laws, not made upon the sound and constitutional principles of his hon. and learned friend (sir J. Mackintosh), but upon principles and with feelings which justly created serious alarm in the public mind. He alluded to the inroad made upon that which, if not the exclusive right, had at least been the general practice of his majesty's attorney and solicitor-general—the proceeding officially against all persons guilty of offences against the church or state. He did not mean to contend that, by law, this right was vested solely in the solicitor and attorney-general, for he held that by law any man could proceed against another for a public offence. After the many associations which had existed for the prosecution of felonies, it would be hard to raise a question with respect to their strict legality. But the proceedings of these associations had always been confined to the prosecution of felonies, or of those odious crimes which came more immediately under the cognizance of the Society for the Suppression of Vice, which at the time of its establishment was strongly objected to, on the ground of its impropriety, but with respect to which, he wished to be understood to give no decided opinion. The Society for the Suppression of Vice, however, by confining itself to the object of its institution, and connecting itself with no party, had done less mischief than had been apprehended at the time of its establishment, and had even effected some good. But there was a society now in existence, of a perfectly different nature, which meant to proceed to the prosecution of political offences, to be selected at the discretion of political feeling. The prosecutions were to be conducted by means of a common fund, and no person of respectability could be fixed upon as immediately responsible for the acts of the society. He did not mean to say there were no respectable individuals connected with the association. He knew, indeed, that there were many most respectable persons connected with it, to whom, on the present occasion, he wished to address himself only in the language of expostulation. He believed that many persons had entered into this association, without seeing how likely it was to be perverted to improper objects; without being aware that they were lending the credit of their names to proceedings, of which, if they did not hereafter repent, he, knowing their sound constitutional principles, should be surprised. He thought that no one calling himself a friend of the constitution, that no person connected by principle with the existing administration, that not even a constitutional Tory in church and state, could support this society, when he considered the danger that might result from it to the principles and interests to which he was conscientiously attached. There might be occasions on which it would be not merely allowable, but the duty of government not to prosecute. He could conceive a case of the most gross description, in which, if an indictment were preferred, conviction must ensue, and punishment must follow on conviction: he could conceive a case of this nature, where it would not only be the interest Of government not to prosecute, but where the greatest public mischief would arise from bringing it into a court of justice. This society, however, might prosecute a ease of this nature, in opposition to the wishes and interests of the government. When he spoke of this society, he did not mean the respectable persons whom he had before alluded to, but two or three attorneys, who would be paid out of the funds of the society, and would care little for the ultimate effect of the prosecutions which they might institute. Hitherto the office of prosecuting for offences, to which this society professed to oppose itself, had been vested in the attorney-general, who was open to the influence of public opinion, which restrained him in the exercise of a very high, and if not coupled with responsibility, a very dangerous political power. Indeed, by many persons, it had been deemed too high a power to be entrusted to any individual, however responsible for the exercise of his trust; but here was a set of individuals, under the name of a constitutional association, proposing to exercise the functions of the law-officers of the Crown without any responsibility whatever. He had said that he knew there were many godly and respectable men connected with the association. He believed that these persons had been induced to lend the influence of their names to it in the belief that it was particularly devoted to put down offences against religion. Abhorring offences of this description as much as the contempt which he felt for them would permit him—he meant contempt for the effect which they were likely to produce—he had much rather that they should only he liable to prosecution by the recognised officers of the crown, than be also liable to it by an association, where that would interfere which must always be dangerous in such cases—he meant the spirit of particular sects. He found in the list of the members of this association, the names of forty peers. Surely these individuals could not have reflected, when they made themselves parties to the undertaking, that they were judges in the last resort. In cases of libel, the whole question was put on the record, and it might therefore become necessary for some of the peers to decide upon a case which they had previously given funds to prosecute. He did not think it would be any remedy for the evil he complained of to establish contrary associations. This would only lead to a contest between two political parties, each prosecuting what they considered libels—a system which would finally deprive the country of the benefit of any political discussion whatever.